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Foreign
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of the
United
States



1945

Volume V

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Department of State
Washington

Philip E. Morse

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Diplomatic Papers
1945

Volume V
Europe



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PREFACE

This volume was prepared under the direct supervision of E. Ralph Perkins, formerly Chief of the Foreign Relations Division. He was assisted by S. Everett Gleason, the present head of the Division. The compilers of the volume were Rogers P. Churchill, William Slany, John G. Reid, and former staff members N. O. Sappington and Douglas W. Houston. Acknowledgment is also made to the historians of the Department of Defense for their assistance in the compilation and editing of this volume.

The Publishing and Reproduction Services Division (Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief) was responsible for the technical editing of the volume. This function was performed in the Historical Editing Section under the direct supervision of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN
*Director, Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs*

NOVEMBER 6, 1967

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Office shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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NETHERLANDS

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN PROVIDING RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE NETHERLANDS

840.50/1-645 : Airgram

*The Ambassador to the Netherlands Government in Exile
(Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 6, 1945.

[Received January 13—1 p. m.]

Netherlands Series A-4. Reference Department's telegram No. 9872, November 23, 6 p. m. to London Embassy.¹ In a note of January 1, 1945, the Netherlands Government welcomes the proposed exchange of views regarding the transfer of responsibility for civilian supplies but would "before replying to the specific suggestion made, like to draw attention to the following facts".

"1. It is with growing concern that the Netherlands Government have observed that during the period in which full responsibility for the supply of the primary needs of the civilian population of the liberated part of the Netherlands rested with SHAEF,² it apparently was not possible for SHAEF to meet the requirements of the situation.

2. The Netherlands Government are well aware of the fact that the unhappy conditions, notably with regard to food, clothing, shelter, fuel and medical supplies, which lasted for many weeks after the withdrawal of the Germans in the liberated area—conditions far worse than those obtaining during the German occupation—were at least partly due to other urgent demands made upon SHAEF in connection with the immediate prosecution of the war, and in so far, attributable to military necessity. Nevertheless, they cannot help but feel that, especially if the Netherlands Government had been placed in a position to provide the population of the liberated provinces with certain additional supplies for their own account, more could have been done to relieve the distress of these people.

3. For, fully realising the pressing demands of actual warfare, the Netherlands Government made repeated attempts to supplement those supplies which SHAEF had been able to provide, but which did not in themselves suffice to guarantee satisfactory minimum rations for the civil population in the liberated area. In doing so they were guided by the conviction that no nation that is in the fortunate possession of a considerable merchant marine can, save for a short period

¹ Not printed.

² Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

and in exceptional circumstances, be expected to remain inactive whilst seeing that the supplies provided for her citizens are so insufficient as to barely cover their most essential needs and prevent disease and dire distress. The Netherlands Government compare their position in this respect with that of the Governments of countries which have not been occupied by the enemy and which being, like the Netherlands, in possession of their own shipping, have experienced no similar difficulties in respect of the supply of essential commodities to their civilian population.

4. So far, the Netherlands Government unfortunately have not been successful in obtaining the desired quantities of essential primary supplies, the procuring of which has not infrequently been made dependent on authorisation to obtain means of transport. Availability of transport, on the other hand, has constantly been made dependent by the Combined Boards,^{2a} the national Procurement Agencies and others, on the authorisation to procure supplies. Thus, it has not proved possible, so far, to break this vicious circle.

5. The Netherlands Government believe that any preparatory discussions in which they are to take part in view of their taking over from SHAEF the responsibility for the provision of supplies for the civilian population, should be based on the following principles:

(a) Sufficient provisions to be guaranteed to cover the requirements of the civilian population of the Netherlands on the level existing for countries which—without having been occupied by the enemy—are largely provisioned from overseas for a period to be agreed upon;

(b) Adequate and suitable shipping space to be guaranteed for regular transport of provisions to the ports of destination in Europe;

(c) Sufficient and suitable means of transport to be made available for a regular and adequate distribution of these provisions to the centres of consumption in the liberated Netherlands.

In the opinion of the Netherlands Government it would not be sufficient to re-affirm that the Inter-Allied and National Agencies concerned will give full co-operation in the procurement and transport of such provisions. It is their opinion that arrangements should be made which would place such supplies and means of transport fully and freely at their disposal. With regard, therefore, to these supply arrangements the adoption of the following practical measures should be ensured:

(d) The Combined Boards to allocate requirements submitted by the Netherlands Government for a period of 6 months after the complete liberation of their territory and to continue the allocation thereafter to such an extent as will enable them to acquit themselves in a just and reasonable manner of their responsibility to the people of the Netherlands.

^{2a} For brief description and membership of the Combined Boards on which the United States was represented, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 16, 1943, pp. 67-69.

(e) The Netherlands Government to be ensured the possibility of realising their purchasing programme, and the necessary instructions in this connection to be given to the National Procurement Agencies concerned, i.e., commodity controls in the countries represented on the Combined Boards.

6. The Netherlands Government consider the acceptance of the foregoing principles essential for the successful discussion of the point raised in your letter since they would be unable to acquit themselves of their responsibility if the conditions indicated above were not fulfilled. They would therefore be glad to learn whether the Government of the United States of America can see their way to considering these principles as a common basis for the proposed preparatory discussion and planning. If so, the Netherlands Government will be glad to transmit in due course the names of their representatives both for the matter of provision of supplies and of shipping space and other means of transport.

7. In connection with the subject matter of this letter, the Netherlands Government desire to draw attention to two further points:

Firstly, the Netherlands Government are fully aware that their need for shipping space, during the period in which the responsibility for the provision of supplies for the civilian population still remains with SHAEF is likely to grow more urgent. Adequate shipping space will consequently form the most important means of preventing interruption of the steady flow of supplies when the responsibility is transferred from SHAEF to the Netherlands Government. It is therefore confidently hoped that, in view of their present proposals, the Government of the United States of America will continue to support the Netherlands Government by having sufficient shipping placed at their disposal.

Secondly, The Netherlands Government have learned that the preparations for sending supplies for the civilian population of the Western part of the Netherlands after its liberation have been entrusted to the 21st Army Group, and that the necessary discussions in this respect will be held in Brussels. Although these arrangements deal with a different period from that under consideration, Her Majesty's Government are, nevertheless, of the opinion, that these matters should not be discussed separately. The quantity of supplies required by the Netherlands Government to fulfill their own obligations in due time, will, of course, greatly depend upon the steps to be taken by the 21st Army Group for the still occupied part of Western Holland. It is therefore suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee also be adequately represented at the conversations to be held in Washington.

In view of the fact that the most pressing material needs of the people of the Netherlands are involved, the Netherlands Government have felt it their duty to submit this somewhat elaborate reply to the suggestion contained in your letter."

HORNBECK

856.00/1-2545

*The Ambassador to the Netherlands Government in Exile
(Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State*

No. 34

LONDON, January 25, 1945.

[Received February 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that:

I. I called on the morning of January 20 on Mr. Hoyer-Millar, the recently appointed head of the Western Department of the British Foreign Office, within the purview of which office British relations with the Netherlands fall. Mr. Hoyer-Millar opened the conversation with an observation to the effect that he did not possess great knowledge of the Netherlands but that he does know that the situation in Holland, especially as regards the livelihood of the people, is at present "pretty miserable". There followed a conversation of about twenty minutes, in the course of which Mr. Hoyer-Millar stated that he thought that this situation and the problems of relief which it presents are being given appropriate and adequate attention by SHAEF; he talked of a "Plan B"; he said that Dr. Gerbrandy³ had come away from his conversation with General Eisenhower feeling "pretty well satisfied"; he said that one of the greatest difficulties is that no one can tell what the physical conditions will be at the time when the liberation of Holland is completed, as regards, for instance, accessibility of harbors (the approaches to which may be full of mines and the facilities of which may be nonexistent) and as regards transportation in general; he said that he thought there would be ample stock piles of food but one could not know what the shipping situation would be; he said that Mr. Law⁴ had, since his return from Washington, had a conversation with the Netherlands Ambassador to Great Britain (Michiels van Verduynen), and that the Ambassador had given indication that he was gratified with the present state of arrangements; he said that the allocation of shipping which had been effected in Washington for France and Belgium related to space in connection with the supplying of materials and equipment for reinforcement and revival of industry, and that it had nothing to do with the question, either immediate or future, of food and other supplies for relief; he said that Dr. Gerbrandy had written letters to Mr. Churchill⁵ and President Roosevelt.

II. On January 22, I encountered Mr. Hoyer-Millar at a luncheon party, and in the course of a very brief conversation Mr. Hoyer-Millar informed me in confidence that in the letters which Prime Min-

³ P. S. Gerbrandy, Netherlands Prime Minister.

⁴ Richard K. Law, British Minister of State.

⁵ Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister.

ister Gerbrandy had sent to President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, Dr. Gerbrandy had urged that one or the other of two alternatives be adopted: that the Allies either make revision of plans of military strategy toward speeding up the liberation of Holland or make arrangements for promptly sending foodstuffs and other relief supplies into Holland. Further, he said that Dr. Gerbrandy had had a conversation with Mr. Churchill on January 20, and that in this conversation Dr. Gerbrandy had urged adoption of the first of those alternatives and had said nothing about the second. Mr. Churchill had replied, he said, that the question of military strategy was in the hands of the generals; but Dr. Gerbrandy had urged that it was not exclusively so.

III. During the course of a luncheon party given by him on January 22, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eden, remarked to me that difficult problems lie ahead in relation to the country to which I am accredited and that the British view the conditions of hardship which now prevail in that country (Holland) with sympathetic concern. I commented that I feel that some of those difficult problems are already upon us; that the situation with which the Dutch people and government are confronted and which must concern many of us calls for sympathetic attention and solicitous effort; and that for my part I feel that he and his people have it in their power to be very helpful and I am hoping that they will give all the assistance of which they are capable. Mr. Eden replied that we might count on them for that.

Respectfully yours,

STANLEY K. HORNBECK

856.48/2-2245

*The Ambassador to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Hornbeck)
to President Roosevelt*⁶

LONDON, February 21, 1945.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I.

In my contacts thus far with officials of the Netherlands Government I have encountered several who seem weary, perplexed, apprehensive, burdened with a psychosis of frustration and—in greater or less degree—suspicioning resentment. Regarding some of them, there come to me reports that in their dealings with opposite numbers in

⁶ A copy of this letter was sent by Mr. Hornbeck to the Secretary of State with the notation that the message related to matters which fell within the purview of the Secretary as well as that of the President.

the allied governments they are importunate to a degree which creates irritation and impatience. There are among them, however, more than a few who seem calm, cheerful, optimistic, and who are in their contacts effectively urbane.

The long and the short of the matter is that these officials are representing and are working on behalf of a country which is small, is being weakened, and is—with warrant—terribly concerned about its future; and they are dealing constantly with officials of three countries (in particular) which are large, are powerful, and are pre-occupied with the problem of defeating common enemies and laying foundations for relationships of peace and security in the postwar world.

Some of the problems with which these Netherlands officials are confronted are of vital importance to them and are of a nature which can be given more sympathetic consideration by the Government and the people of the United States than by those of any other country. The greatest and most immediately pressing of those problems is that of survival—first of their people, second of their country. There is a very real question today whether many of their people—especially those who live in western Holland and those who have been taken by the Germans for slave labor—may not in the course of the next six months die of starvation, neglect or abuse; a question whether still more of them will not have become so worn down that they can never fully (i.e., both physically and psychologically) recover; a question how far the stamina of the nation is being permanently impaired; a question what will be the political structure of the metropolitan area and of the empire when conditions of peace have taken the place of conditions of war; and, finally, a question what will be the standing, the contribution and the influence of the Netherlands in international relations in the postwar world.

These officials and their people are looking to the Government and the people of the United States for a kind and a degree of consideration and helpfulness greater than they hope or expect to receive from the governments and peoples of any other countries. They are not asking for charity. They do plead for opportunity. They want to be able to buy—at the earliest possible moment. They cling to a concept of independence which makes them resentful of the fact that in reality they are dependent upon and have to accept the dictates of their greater and more powerful allies.

Nowhere is there greater call, it seems to me, in the field of our relations with other countries, for patience, tolerance, forbearance, giving of material assistance and the whole content of the course of good neighborliness, on the part of the United States, than in our

relations with these hard-pressed Netherlanders; nowhere a greater call—not even in our relations with the Chinese.

II.

One of the things that these officials most crave is that in matters of special concern to their country they be consulted, that in matters of common concern they be taken into the confidence of their allies, that as a government they be given full opportunity to express their views, advance their claims, and make their country's commitments on an "in council" basis. The more it may be found possible for the people and the governments of the greater powers to accord them and their views and their representations sympathetic consideration, the easier it will be to reconcile them to decisions which run counter to their desires and to elicit from them the fullest cooperation of which they are capable.

III.

Most important, however, today, of all the problems that confront them and that relate to them, is the problem of getting *food* to their people. At this moment starvation stares the population of western Holland, including The Hague, squarely in the face. Unless food can be sent into that area not only soon but more than soon, there can be no telling how many innocent and worth while people may be lost to Holland and to the world—a development which, were it to occur, would lay the major powers open to a variety of charges by hostile critics in days to come.

It is not for me to attempt to assess what may be the conditions of need in France and in Belgium; but on the basis of such information as I have, it does not appear that the people of either of those countries are critically short of food, and it does appear that neither of them has suffered as have the Dutch or has in prospect such further sufferings as have the Dutch. What may be the situations in Italy and in Norway are matters for consideration in some other context. Whatever may be the needs elsewhere, in western Holland the Dutch are now confronted with conditions of *desperate* need.

IV.

There are, I well know and understand, considerations of policy, considerations of military strategy, problems of relative advantages in allocation of short supplies and in use of shipping space, etc., etc. Against the background of these considerations, it is easily possible to believe and to affirm that delivery of food to the population of unliberated Holland at the present time or in the near future is "impossible". That conclusion, however, can only derive from premises ex-

pressive of man-made decisions. There is food, there are ships, there are airplanes, there are armed forces. There is one possible procedure at least—and there are perhaps others—by which food *could be* gotten into Holland. Over and over during the recent years of war there has been achieved not only the possible but also the “impossible”. In regard to each and to both of these there have had to be made at highest levels choices as between competing claims and objectives. The situation is changing constantly and decisions made at given moments come in for review from time to time as changes occur. It would be inappropriate for me to attempt to suggest at what point or in what manner a review should be made of decisions of strategy, whether military or political or both. It is my function to bring to your attention facts and to inform you regarding what seem to me to be possibilities. These two things I have attempted to do in this letter.

V.

Recapitulating:

There would seem to be special need at this time for the maximum of considerateness on the part of the personnel of the allied governments in their contacts with and their handling of the Dutch; Holland is in danger of being submerged (in more ways than one); the Dutch nation, small in numbers at best, is in danger of being decimated; that situation poses a problem and presents a challenge to the good will, the capacity and the ingenuity of the whole community of the United Nations.

Yours respectfully,

STANLEY K. HORNBECK

840.50/2-2245 : Airgram

*The Ambassador to the Netherlands Government in Exile
(Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 22, 1945.

[Received February 27—5 p. m.]

Netherlands Series A-7. In a note of February 20, 1945, the Netherlands Foreign Office refers to paragraph No. 5 of its note of January 1, 1945—see airgram Netherlands Series A-4 of January 6, 1945—and makes the following comment:

“Thus far, the Netherlands Government are without a reply from the Government of the United States of America informing them that this Government are in agreement with these principles as a common basis for the proposed discussion and planning, although the events on the battlefields of Europe clearly seem to indicate that the moment to begin the planning in this respect is approaching more rapidly than might have been thought previously.

“For this reason, the Netherlands Government have the duty to point out that the gravest consequences may result from unreadiness in this important matter, and therefore hope that they may receive at an early date the views of Your Government on the contents of their letter of January 1st, 1945.”

HORNBECK

856.48/3-545

The Netherlands Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Netherlands Government is negotiating with the British Government regarding deliveries of foodstuffs destined for the larger cities in the Western part of the occupied Netherlands, where, as is well known, conditions are deteriorating from day to day and indeed the point of starvation has been reached.

These deliveries will consist of 5000 tons weekly, namely, 750 tons of margarine, 4000 tons of flour, 250 tons of foodstuffs for children and ill persons, to wit: infant food, condensed milk, whole milk, oats, powdered sugar, dehydrated eggs and chocolate. Further, a small quantity of medicines which cannot be specified at present but the tonnage of which will be small in comparison with the entire cargo.

Transportation will take place by way of Sweden, because otherwise the German Government would refuse the necessary permit, and the ships will be directed from Sweden to the port of Delfzijl, where the first cargo would arrive in the beginning of April.

The British Government, although favorably inclined to the plan set forth above, doubts whether it will be able to provide the above enumerated quantities in their entirety from their own supplies. However, being aware that the needs of the Netherlands are most pressing and urgent and that the first shipments of foodstuffs should suffer no delay, it is seriously considering to furnish the beforementioned quantities in full for these initial shipments, provided the shortages which thus might arise should be replenished from elsewhere.

The Netherlands Ambassador would be grateful if through the kind intermediacy of the Department of State the above described matter should be submitted to the Combined Boards for such measures of relief as they may deem suitable to take.

In addition, it may be mentioned that the goods to be furnished by the British Government will be purchased by the Government of the Netherlands.

A request similar to the one put forward above will be addressed to the Government of the Dominion of Canada.

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1945.

856.48/3-545 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1945—10 p. m.

1904. Department received following *aide-mémoire* from Netherlands Embassy dated March 5:

[Here follows text of *aide-mémoire* printed *supra*.]

This proposal raises questions relative both to blockade and British supply situation and stockpiles. Before considering proposal further or taking it up with military here Department would appreciate your ascertaining how far British have gone with Netherlands in approving proposal on blockade grounds and in agreeing on supply grounds. The latter point involves problem of British stockpiles and their replenishment, which will be handled separately and you should not enter into discussions with British on that matter. Has EWD⁷ any information as to attitude of SHAEF on blockade aspect of introduction of proposed supplies into Netherlands or whether Netherlands authorities have raised this question with SHAEF.

STETTINIUS

856.50/3-1445 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Hornbeck), at London

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1945.

Netherlands Series A-10. With reference to notes received from the Netherlands Government on January 1, 1945, and February 20, 1945, referred to in your airgrams A-4 dated January 6 and A-7 dated February 22 respectively, you are requested to inform the Netherlands Government of the following.

(1) The Government of the United States has been kept fully informed of conditions in the Netherlands, more especially in the liberated part of the country, and is keenly aware of the acute need of the civilian population due to current shortages of food, clothing, shelter, fuel and medical supplies. This Government has not sought to compare such unhappy conditions with those obtaining during the period of occupation by the enemy nor with those obtaining in countries not occupied by the Axis powers. Any such comparison would seem without useful purpose, if viewed in the light of the major objectives of the United Nations, namely, defeat of the enemy and liberation from Axis domination.

⁷ Economic Warfare Division of the Embassy in London.

(2) At the same time, this Government has been determined from the outset, within the limitations of military necessity, to alleviate suffering, hunger and distress of the Allied peoples to the greatest possible degree. Early in the war, the principle was firmly established that resources of the supplying countries would be mobilized on a combined basis, not only in the prosecution of the war but in the equitable provision for civilian needs so far as such resources, including shipping, after provision for military operations, would permit. No one has been able to foretell with any accuracy the course of military events and it has therefore been necessary to reserve a general first priority for military needs.

It has been impossible, due to limitations of supply and shipping, to adopt the principle of making firm commitments in advance for other than basic military requirements or to guarantee in advance, supplies, shipping or inland transport facilities for national import programs, as the Netherlands Government suggests. Allocations must of necessity await actual availabilities as and when they occur.

(3) The United States Government has been pleased to note in recent weeks a slight improvement in supply and shipping availabilities and, preparatory to the eventual relinquishment by the military of supply operations for the civilian populations of liberated territories, has urged the establishment of national government import programs, based on port clearance and inland transport capacity, on behalf of which claims for supplies and shipping could be separately presented to the allocating authorities.

As the Netherlands Government has been informed allocations of shipping, outside military requirements, have already been made for the first and second quarters of 1945 and all possible assistance by the civilian agencies is being directed to the procurement of supplies for such ships. This Government urges that the representatives of the Netherlands Government, concerned with procurement, be instructed to expedite purchases wherever possible and to take the maximum advantage of wartime supply availabilities including the utilization of substitutes where more full specifications cannot be met.

(4) Progress is therefore being made toward the objectives outlined in the notes of the Netherlands Government under reference. The Government of the United States recognizes the desirability of these objectives and will, as military considerations permit, cooperate fully in their realization.

(5) Pending the fuller implementation of the Netherlands Government's plans to supply civilian needs in the liberated portion of the Netherlands, the Government of the United States has been in continuous touch with the military authorities to the end that liberated

civilian populations be afforded the maximum relief supplies which can, during the period of armed conflict, appropriately be supplied through military facilities. It has, indeed, been unfortunate that military requirements have prevented up to the present time, the carrying out of the planned provision for civilian needs. This Government has recently noted with gratification, an improvement in the availability of military civilian supplies for the portion of the Netherlands now liberated and the accumulation of special reserves for that portion of the Netherlands still under domination of the enemy.

STETTINIUS

856.48/3-1945

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Hornbeck)^a

[LONDON,] March 19, 1945.

I. Shortly before Judge Rosenman's departure from London for the Continent^{sa} there was handed to Judge Rosenman by Mr. Hornbeck a memorandum as follows:

"March 12, 1945.

"The situation and problem with regard to Holland boil down to this:

"That Holland (the Netherlands in Europe) now consists of two areas: the liberated area (between one-fifth and one-third of the country) and the unliberated area (between two-thirds and four-fifths of the country);

"That in the liberated portion (the population about two million) there exists a situation of distress (if not of desperate need) which is gradually being relieved: conditions there are growing better;

"That in the unliberated portion (population about six million) there exists a situation of desperate need (people are already dying of starvation: conditions there are rapidly growing worse);

"That pending the liberation of the still unliberated area, it is for practical purposes impossible for the Allies to deliver to the population food (or any other forms of relief) in any substantial amount;

"That between now and the time when liberation occurs conditions of starvation will be seriously affecting from three to four million persons;

"That when the liberation of that area takes place responsibility with regard to that population (i.e., with regard to conditions of civilian livelihood in that area) will immediately devolve upon the Allies (i.e., upon the military agencies, and behind them the governments, thereof);

"That the one thing that can and imperatively should be done currently by the Allies in this connection is to perfect plans, accumu-

^a Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador as an enclosure to his letter dated March 19, 1945; received March 25.

^{sa} Regarding the Rosenman Mission to Europe, see vol. II, pp. 1064, 1074, 1075-1076, 1080-1082, and 1097.

late supplies, make ample provision regarding assignment of personnel and earmarking equipment, etc., (especially transport) for discharging with the maximum of possible promptness, as soon as it devolves upon them, that responsibility;

"That toward ensuring that such preparations be made—and be comprehensively and adequately made—there is need for a top level decision and a Combined Staff issuance of orders that this situation and problem are to be given the highest practicable priority of effective attention."

II. It is believed that there might to advantage be added to what was stated in that memorandum additional paragraphs as follows:

"That there are four reasons in particular why action in the sense of the last paragraph of the memorandum of March 12 (above) should be taken: first, it appears to be the only procedure which will adequately accelerate the administrative processes which are involved in the handling of this problem; second, such acceleration is imperative toward preparedness to meet the needs of a situation which may confront the Allies soon and with unexpected suddenness; third, substantial humanitarian considerations are at stake; and, fourth, should the Allies be 'caught short' in this matter, there would be unfortunate and disagreeable political repercussions.

"That the desirability of prompt action in regard to this matter cannot be over estimated."

III. With regard to the statement which appears in the fourth paragraph of the memorandum of March 12: namely, "That pending the liberation of the still unliberated area, it is for practical purposes impossible for the Allies to deliver to the population food (or any other forms of relief) in any substantial amount", it is believed that, for purposes of clarification, supplementary observation should be offered. While it is for practicable purposes not possible for *the Allies to deliver* to the population in the unliberated part of the Netherlands food or other forms of relief in any substantial amount, it nevertheless is beginning to appear possible for the Allies to effect and to contribute to the success of an arrangement whereby deliveries of food, etc., may be made to the population under reference by and through Swedish agencies: in other words, it may become possible for the Allies to effect such deliveries indirectly. It is understood that conversations and negotiations are in process toward the effecting thus of deliveries of perhaps as much as 20,000 tons per month at the port of Delftzijl of supplies the ultimate sources of which would be Great Britain, the United States, Canada. It is believed that every practicable effort should be made to effect the conclusion of such an arrangement and the putting of it into operation at the earliest possible moment.

856.48/3-2245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 22, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received March 23—9:15 a. m.]

2970. *a.* Embassy near the Netherlands Government inquired of Secretary General of the Netherlands Foreign Office whether question of food shipments to occupied parts of the Netherlands had recently been raised with SHAEF by Netherlands Government. Embassy near the Netherlands Government was informed that Netherlands Government in London has no indication of any recent discussion with SHAEF on this matter (reEmbs 2686 of March 15 paragraph 11⁹). It is possible that the Netherlands Prime Minister in his conversations with General Eisenhower about three weeks ago discussed the question but no report of such a discussion has been received by Netherlands Government here.

b. EWD has been informed by MEW¹⁰ that the Netherlands Ambassador has suggested that in order to avoid an interruption in shipment of relief supplies to the Netherlands which might occur at time Sweden becomes unable to supply further foodstuffs and before plan for shipments from United Kingdom or other sources could be instituted, an interim plan be adopted under which Swedes would continue to ship goods in return for an assurance of replacement from Allied sources.

MEW in giving its views, interdepartmentally, to Foreign Office has said that it would raise no objection from blockade standpoint to principle of Swedes receiving compensating imports but that it spoke only for the British and not for American blockade authorities. In addition MEW has pointed out that it doubts whether supply authorities would be prepared to give an undertaking to replace foodstuffs until they know precisely how much they are being asked to replace. Embassy would appreciate indication of Department's preliminary views on (1) question of exports to Sweden to compensate for further shipments to the Netherlands and (2) shipments to the Netherlands through the blockade.

WINANT

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ Ministry of Economic Warfare.

856.48/3-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1945—6 p. m.

1139. For Reber.^{10a} In *aide-mémoire* from Dutch Embassy, March 5, Netherlands Government requested approval of delivery of 5,000 tons relief supplies weekly in Swedish ships for larger cities in occupied Netherlands. AmEmbassy, London, advises that Foreign Office and British Chiefs of Staff are in accord and War Cabinet expected give approval shortly. In November SHAEF approved introduction foodstuffs into occupied Holland even though there might be possibility that portion would fall into enemy hands. We have not as yet approached War Department here as our understanding is that Combined Chiefs of Staff have already agreed in principle to food shipments into occupied territory to relieve extreme conditions subject to SHAEF's approval. AmEmbassy London advises British are satisfied and do not intend put question to SHAEF again. Can you ascertain whether Dutch have discussed present problem with SHAEF and if not whether SHAEF approves present Dutch proposal? Foregoing refers to blockade aspect of proposal. Concerning supply aspect British expected make supplies available from U.K. but raise question of overseas replacements to fill shortages which might thus arise. For your information, this Government believes that replenishment question must be considered as part of over-all supply problem which includes consideration of U.K. stockpiles. Arrangements being made for comprehensive discussions between U.K. and U.S. on this matter.

GREW

856.48/3-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, March 26, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received March 27—4:36 a. m.]

1449. From Reber. Reference Department's 1139, March 23. Various proposals for food supply to occupied Holland have been discussed with the Dutch Government. This specific proposal was not mentioned in the last talks. SHAEF has, however, agreed in principle to food shipments to Dutch territory occupied by the Germans and would raise no objection to the present proposal.

^{10a} Samuel Reber, Counselor of Mission on the staff of the United States Political Adviser, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, with personal rank of Minister.

In this connection it is noted that the question of replenishment will be considered as part of the overall supply problem which meets with SHAEF's approval. [Reber.]

CAFFERY

856.48/3-3045

The Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State

No. 133/45

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: His Holiness has instructed me to present the following facts for the valued consideration of the Government of the United States:

Pressing appeals are constantly being made with a view to securing the intervention of the Holy See on behalf of the population of Holland, particularly in the western provinces, where the food situation is arousing the gravest preoccupations. This is also true of the northern part of the country. Large numbers of persons are actually dying in the streets, and the general situation is such as to produce genuine conditions of famine and starvation. In some cases, individuals have had to be so long without nourishing food that they were unable to take food when it finally became available even in reduced quantities.

The pitiful appeals which are thus sent to the Holy See find a compassionate echo in the heart of His Holiness, and with all confidence he asks the United States Government to take means to provide relief for this serious problem, just as soon as circumstances and means will make assistance possible. The Holy Father observes that the understanding charity of the United States in this critical situation will win for the American nation an everlasting claim on the gratitude of the people who will benefit from this relief, and will likewise be a source of universal admiration for a humanitarian work so generously carried out.

Sincerely yours,

A. G. COGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

856.48/4-345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 3, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received April 3—5:08 p. m.]

3397. Germans have agreed to Swedish ship *Gotland* leaving Baltic for United Kingdom port there to load supplies for relief distribu-

tion in occupied Netherlands. Although Admiralty has not yet fixed route and port either for voyage to United Kingdom or thence to the Netherlands, British, with Embassy's concurrence, are indicating to Swedes that we wish ship to leave Baltic as soon as departure can be arranged. Amount of food for occupied Holland which Ministry of Food can make available is limited, but it could probably provide food and medicines for at least one and perhaps two or three trips of *Gotland*. *Gotland* is understood to carry 3,500 tons. Thus far Embassy has agreed only to *Gotland's* proceeding to United Kingdom but unless Department and FEA¹¹ see objection Embassy will also agree to despatch of foodstuffs and medicines from United Kingdom to occupied Holland, provided amounts are reasonable and reports on distribution continue satisfactory.

Sent Department as 3397 repeated Stockholm as 290.

WINANT

856.48/3-545

The Secretary of State to the Netherlands Ambassador (Loudon)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Netherlands and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* dated March 5, 1945 in regard to a proposal which has been under consideration by the British and Netherlands Governments that food shipments amounting to 5,000 tons weekly be made to the enemy-occupied portion of the Netherlands.

Mr. Stettinius is glad to inform Dr. Loudon that from the blockade point of view this proposal meets with the approval of the Department of State. The American Embassy at London and the American Legation at Stockholm have been so informed.

As regards the question of supply this Government likewise has been informed that the British Government is willing to advance certain supplies from food stocks in the United Kingdom but has requested replenishment from overseas in respect of shortages which might thus arise. This Government is not informed as to the nature of the supplies for which replenishment may be required nor the source from which replenishment is expected. As Dr. Loudon may know, the overall question of supply and stockpiles is being reviewed in conversations now in progress between the British and American Governments.¹² This Government, therefore, is not in a position to discuss the question of possible replenishment from United States sources pending the conclusion of the conversations referred to above.

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1945.

¹¹ Foreign Economic Administration.

¹² For documentation on these conversations, see vol. II, pp. 1059 ff.

856.48/3-3045

The Secretary of State to the Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani)

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1945.

MY DEAR ARCHBISHOP: I have received your letter No. 133/45 of March 30, 1945 regarding appeals that are being received on behalf of the suffering population of the Netherlands.

The alarming conditions in the occupied portion of the Netherlands have been a cause for deep concern on the part of this Government. You will be interested to know that several shipments of relief supplies have recently been made to that country from Sweden. The question of further and increased shipments from other sources is being urgently explored and you may be assured that all possible steps, consistent with military requirements, will be taken for the relief of suffering in the Netherlands.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

856.48/4-445

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1945.

Reference is made to Mr. Hassett's memorandum dated April 4, 1945¹³ requesting a report for you on the status of measures to bring relief to the civilian population of the occupied portion of the Netherlands.

The food situation in that area had reached a state of serious deterioration by November 1944. Inquiry was made of General Eisenhower whether he would object from the military point of view to shipments of relief supplies to occupied Holland. He replied that he had no objection and, moreover, indicated the desirability of such shipments. Since December approximately 20,000 tons of relief foodstuffs and medicines have been forwarded. The greater part of supplies thus far sent have been of Swedish origin.

The Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration recently approved, after further clearance with SHAEF, a British proposal to make further and continued shipments to occupied Holland of relief supplies up to 5,000 tons weekly. Initial shipments will be made from food stockpiles in the United Kingdom.

At the time the report by the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee¹⁴ was made, it is believed that distribution of the initial shipments from Sweden had not begun. These shipments plus

¹³ Not printed; Mr. William D. Hassett was Secretary to President Roosevelt.

¹⁴ Not printed.

the further shipments recently authorized should serve materially to alleviate conditions in that area.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*¹⁵

LONDON, 9 April 1945.

938. 1. The plight of the civil population of occupied Holland is desperate. Between two and three million people are facing starvation. We believe that large numbers are dying daily, and the situation must deteriorate rapidly now that communications between Germany and Holland are virtually cut. I fear we may soon be in the presence of a tragedy.

2. Eisenhower has plans prepared for bringing relief to the civil population when Western Holland is liberated and we have accumulated the stocks for this purpose in suitable proximity. But if we wait until Holland has been liberated, this help may come too late. There is need for action to bring immediate help, on a far larger scale than is afforded by the Swedish relief scheme.

3. I therefore ask you to join me in giving notice to the German Government, through the Swiss Government as the protecting power, to the following effect.

It is the responsibility of the German Government to sustain the civil population in those parts of Holland which remain in German occupation. As they have failed to discharge that responsibility, we are prepared to send food and medical supplies for distribution to the civil population through the agency of the International Red Cross.

We are ready in [*to*] increase the limited supplies that are already being sent from Sweden and also to send in further supplies, by sea or direct from areas under military control of the Allies, subject to the necessary safe conducts being arranged. We invite the German Government to accord the facilities to enable this to be done.

4. In present circumstances I think that the German Government might well accede to this request. If, however, they should refuse, I propose that we should, at this stage, warn the German Commander in Holland and all the troops under his command that by resisting our attempt to bring relief to the civil population in this area they brand themselves as murderers before the world, and we shall hold them responsible with their lives for the fate which overtakes the people of Holland.

¹⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

Full publicity would be given to this warning so as to bring it home to all German troops stationed in Holland.

5. We must avert this tragedy if we can. But, if we cannot, we must at least make it clear to the world on whose shoulders the responsibility lies.

6. The terms of the communication to be made to the German Government through the protecting power are being drafted and will be sent to you tomorrow.

In the meantime, I hope that you will feel able to agree in principle.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*¹⁶

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] 10 April 1945.

740. Your No. 938. I agree in principle with your proposal to give notice to the German Government that it is responsible for the sustenance of the civil population in those parts of Holland that remain in German occupation.

In view of Stalin's¹⁷ recent allegations in regard to CROSSWORD,¹⁸ I believe that before making any arrangement through the Red Cross with any German authority we should inform Stalin.

ROOSEVELT

856.48/4-1345

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In his telegram No. 743^{19a} to the Prime Minister, President Roosevelt agreed to His Majesty's Government's scheme for sending relief supplies to enemy occupied Holland through the lines.

2. In his telegram No. 740, President Roosevelt suggested that His Majesty's Government should inform Marshal Stalin. But in his telegram No. 743, in approving the message proposed by His Majesty's Government to the German Government through the Swiss Government, the President appeared to make his approval subject to approval by Marshal Stalin, as distinct from asking that Marshal Stalin be informed.

¹⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

¹⁷ Josif Vissarionovich Stalin. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

¹⁸ Reference is to "Sunrise-Crossword", the code name for discussion then taking place in Switzerland between German and Allied military representatives regarding a possible surrender of German forces in Northern Italy. For documentation on this subject, see vol. III, pp. 717 ff.

^{19a} Not printed.

3. His Majesty's Government see no reason for doing more than notifying Marshal Stalin since

(1) they have had most reassuring accounts of the way which supplies allowed through the blockade from Sweden have been distributed so far under the supervision of the Swedish Red Cross observers;

(2) even if any food were diverted by the German Army it could not possibly reach any Germans fighting the Russians;

(3) there will be no direct contact with any German authorities.

4. The matter is most urgent. Even on the present reduced scale, rations in the area will only last another fortnight. If Soviet consent is sought the whole plan may be held up indefinitely.

5. In the circumstances His Majesty's Government urgently invite the United States Government to concur in the despatch of the attached message from the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.¹⁹

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1945.

856.48/4-1845: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1945—7 p. m.

1556. For Reber. The Department on April 4 approved a British-Netherlands plan for immediate shipment of relief foodstuffs up to 5,000 tons weekly to occupied Netherlands by neutral means and under adequate safeguards. The Department is now informed that a proposal approved by the British military and Foreign Office for dropping daily by air a large amount of supplies into German occupied Netherlands may be referred to SHAEF. In such case you may advise SHAEF that the Department would approve the additional introduction of foodstuffs into occupied Holland but only if there appears to be reasonable assurance that such foodstuffs would in fact reach Netherlands hands.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 EW/4-2445: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1945—7 p. m.

942. Following an urgent proposal by the Netherlands Government that a truce be arranged with the German authorities in the Nether-

¹⁹ Not printed; it stated that the United Kingdom and the United States were prepared to send food and medical supplies through the International Red Cross to those parts of the Netherlands still under German occupation (856.48/4-1345).

lands²⁰ to make possible the supply of desperately needed food and medicine to the starving population of the occupied provinces, the Combined Chiefs of Staff on April 23 authorized the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in his discretion to undertake any operations and effect any truce arrangements for the purpose of providing relief to the Netherlands which are indicated by the situation and do not prejudice his main operations, provided that in so doing he does not depart from the unconditional surrender policy agreed upon by the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. and provided further that the Soviet military authorities shall not only be kept fully informed but shall, if they so desire, have military representatives present at any discussions with the German Commander or his representatives.

General Eisenhower has been instructed that in the event he decides to negotiate a truce he shall endeavor to obtain the following conditions:

1. That the truce shall be without prejudice to the ultimate unconditional surrender of all German forces in the Netherlands.

2. That all German forces in the occupied Netherlands shall cease all active operations including all forms of naval and air activity conducted from that area.

3. That the Germans shall freely admit and facilitate the distribution of all forms of relief supplies for the Netherlands population under arrangements to be agreed upon.

4. That the Germans shall refrain from any form of inundation or destruction of capital goods.

5. That all political prisoners shall be transferred from prison to accommodations in accordance with the standards of the Geneva Convention.²¹

6. That no further executions of political prisoners shall take place.

7. That raids and similar measures shall be discontinued by the security police.

If these conditions are accepted by the German Commander, General Eisenhower is authorized to agree in return:

²⁰ The Netherlands Government presented the proposal to the British on April 12, 1945, who in turn reported it to Secretary of State Stettinius. Secretary Stettinius concurred in the idea of a truce and suggested that the matter be put into General Eisenhower's hands with the necessary discretion for action left to him, but that such action, however, be subject to instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he not depart from the policy of unconditional surrender agreed to by the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union be consulted upon any action contemplated. (740.0011 EW/4-1745). For further account of proposals for aiding the Netherlands, see Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 457-459.

²¹ International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva July 27, 1929. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336.

1. That the Allied forces will not advance beyond the "Grebbe Line" (mouth of the river Eems through Amersfoort to Veenendaal to Wageningen on the Rhine) or such other line as may be agreed upon.

2. That the Allied forces will cease active operations against the German forces within the occupied Netherlands. This agreement to cease operations shall not apply to Allied operations in Netherlands territorial waters against enemy forces operating from bases outside German occupied Netherlands.

Concert with your British colleague and inform the appropriate Soviet authorities of the foregoing. It should be made clear in this connection that General Eisenhower has been authorized to carry out his instructions without delay.

GREW

740.00119 E.W./4-2845: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, April 28, 1945—midnight.

[Received April 29—9:50 a. m.]

2199. For Matthews²² from Murphy.²³ Reference my letter of April 16. The Department will be interested in SHAEF cable to Combined Chiefs of Staff Scaf 314 April 27 regarding truce in Holland. Latest developments are that two Generals from British 21st Army Group will enter into contact today with representatives of Seyss-Inquart. Discussions will be initially limited to question of food supplies for Holland. It has apparently not yet been decided when and if SHAEF will later take part in discussions. In meantime pending negotiations dropping of food by air will be begun today.

Russians have replied through military mission Moscow they have studied conditions of discussion with the Germans and would like to add one more namely that the German command be obligated not to transfer its troops to other parts of the front including the Russian front during the entire period of proposed armistice. [Murphy.]

CAFFERY

856.48/5-245: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 2, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 4:11 p. m.]

2279. From Murphy. Generals Smith and Strong of SHAEF returned today after their meeting yesterday with Seyss-Inquart and a

²² H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

²³ Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser for Germany.

delegation of 26 Germans. Despite threats Seyss-Inquart yielded nothing on the matter of negotiations for a surrender or truce stating that as Civil Administrator he was competent only to discuss the supplying of Holland with food. He said western Holland was a fortress area for whose defense the German military commander was responsible. When a telegram from Swiss was read to the Germans stating that the Swiss had been informed by German officials that a central administration had ceased in practice to exist the Germans said they were in full touch with the German Government and High Command. In contrast to their attitude on military affairs the Germans were willing to facilitate arrangements for the supply of food. They opposed dropping by air which they said was wasteful as so many of the drops were misdirected and fell in canals. Agreement was reached on the transport of food by rail at one point through the lines and also through the port of Amsterdam to which first ship will proceed on Friday. Drops by air may, however, be continued to assure distribution to outlying regions. [Murphy.]

CAFFERY

856.48/6-2645

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Netherlands Ambassador
(London)*

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Netherlands and has the honor to inform him that on June 19, 1945 the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to terminate military responsibility for provision and distribution of relief supplies for various countries including the Netherlands upon the completion of August loadings, and the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has been so informed. Responsibility for the provision of petroleum, oil and lubricants and coal will be the subject of separate consideration.

The Acting Secretary is advised that while the Combined Military Authorities will do everything possible to ship all approved requirements up to and including August loadings, they cannot remain responsible after the termination of military responsibility for shipment of any approved requirements which for supply reasons were not available by that time.

It is understood that the shipping authorities are considering the transition of supply responsibility to the Netherlands Government and will endeavor to make available as nearly as possible an equivalent amount of tonnage. At the same time, the military authorities in conjunction with the Combined Boards expect to make such ad-

justments in existing allocations and procurement arrangements as may be necessary to insure a proper sharing of the total supplies allocated for liberated areas.

The Acting Secretary has every reason to believe that the transition of supply responsibility to the Netherlands Government will be carried out effectively, and that shipping and allocations of supplies will be adjusted as far as possible within the over-all limitations. To this end the agencies of the United States Government will lend every possible assistance and the Acting Secretary urges that the Netherlands Government appropriately instruct its supply and procurement officials concerning the responsibility to be assumed.

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1945.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS REGARDING MUTUAL AID

[For texts of agreements between the United States and the Netherlands respecting mutual aid, including agreement relating to supplies and services signed at Washington, April 30, 1945, with accompanying memorandum and exchange of notes, signed at Washington, April 30, 1945; agreement relating to principles applying to the provisions of aid to the armed forces of the United States, effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington, April 30, 1945; and exchange of notes, signed at Washington, April 30, 1945, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 480, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1627-1641.]

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES FOLLOWING THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

(See under Netherlands East Indies, Volume VI)

NORWAY

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN INTRA-BLOCKADE RELIEF SHIPMENTS FROM SWEDEN TO NORWAY¹

SWNCC² File

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Stimson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)*³

WASHINGTON, 9 February 1945.

Subject: Swedish proposal to alleviate Norwegian distress caused by the Germans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy advise the Secretary of State in the sense of the letter attached. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that in the present instance military considerations are of greatest importance and the attached reply has been written from this standpoint.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

R. S. EDWARDS

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,

*Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations*

[Annex]

Draft Reply to the Secretary of State From the Secretaries of War and the Navy

In the light of the complete review contained in your letter of 22 December 1944,⁵ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have at our request not only reexamined the proposals in connection with your memorandum of 22 November 1944⁶ for the introduction of relief supplies behind German lines in Norway, but have also reexamined the entire ques-

¹ For documentation regarding the negotiations of the United States and the United Kingdom with Sweden for the cessation of Swedish exports to German-occupied Europe, see pp. 731 ff.

² State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

³ This memorandum, together with its attachment, circulated in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as document SWNCC 24, dated 10 February 1945.

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 296.

⁶ Not found in Department files.

tion of movement of relief supplies behind and through the blockade in the light of the changes in the strategic and logistic situation which have come about since the first proposals of nearly a year ago. It is understood from your letter, dated 22 December 1944, that neither this Government nor the British Government is committed to the relief program recommended by the Joint Anglo-American Relief Committee, but that the conversations that have taken place have been exploratory rather than definitive.

As you are aware, the feeding of civil populations behind our own lines is an increasingly heavy burden on our logistical and administrative facilities. The shortages of shipping, transport of all kinds, and port facilities during the past year have served to increase this burden. In certain critical categories of the basic items such as food and clothing, not only are we unable to discharge completely our obligations to civilians behind our lines but we are experiencing great difficulty in supplying the needs of our own combat forces. There is possibility that the enemy may withdraw from certain areas that they now occupy (e.g. northern Italy) in which case we are committed to shoulder an even greater burden. In defending War Department requests for appropriations for the purpose of civil relief before the Congress, the following statement was made:

“One of these objectives is to secure the civilian populations to the maximum extent possible, which is an obligation under international law; and second, to see that the civilian populations do not interfere with military operations in any important particular; and that they are so treated that they will be able to assist the forward movement of our troops to the greatest extent possible. That is the beginning and the end of our involvement in this business.”

It has been recognized that these civilian relief operations in many cases must extend beyond immediate combat areas and direct lines of communication.

On the German side, we have no reason to believe that this burden is less onerous or that the objectives of civil relief are for them militarily any less desirable. Present indications are that food is becoming a critical item in Germany. If we discharge this obligation of our enemies the net effect will be to relieve their economy and thus aid their war production. If the premise is accepted that relief feeding on our side is a matter of operational necessity then relief feeding by us on the German side is counter-operational, and to that extent may prolong an already bitter campaign of unknown duration. With regard to this phase of the question, little distinction can be made between relief shipments behind the blockade and shipments through the blockade.

The Germans have in the last year suffered the loss of several food

producing areas and there is other evidence of food shortages. This critical period in German food supply makes suspect the worth of German promises coming from a nation wherein every resource is dedicated to the purposes of war.

Even if only ships now in the Baltic were used with "fuel from Western Hemisphere sources" to be furnished at "designated points of origin," and even if our own already strained supply and manpower situation would permit, Allied port and transport facilities would be interfered with in any plan of relief offered.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised us that, for the above reasons, they consider that there is a military interest in relief shipments behind or through the blockade and that they are constrained, in the light of the present strategic and logistic situation, to reaffirm the statements in their letter of 2 December 1944⁷ both as to the proposal to forward relief supplies to northern Norway and any similar proposals which may follow. With reference to the understanding set forth in the last paragraph of your letter, dated 22 December 1944, they are of the opinion that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the details of any relief plans of this nature, should be considered before committing the Government.

We are in agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any stop-gap or interim measures for temporary relief which may prolong the war and increase loss of life and property in battle cannot be supported on military considerations. In our opinion the greatest aid that can be given to distressed countries is to liberate them at the earliest possible moment.

SWNCC File

*Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee*⁸

[WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1945.

The Department has never been inclined to minimize the military aspects of relief operations in enemy-occupied territory but in view of the strong political as well as humanitarian reasons for alleviating to some extent the distress of Allied civilian populations, it has taken the position that in so far as military and economic warfare considerations permit, limited assistance should be brought to these peoples.

This policy has been followed since before our entry into the war. The largest relief operation of this nature was the Greek relief

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 293.

⁸ Circulated in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as document SWNCC 24/1, dated 15 February 1945.

scheme.⁹ This involved large shipments through the blockade and, of course, had the consent of the Allied military authorities. So far as the Department is aware, no allegation has even been made that this relief program adversely affected military operations. It did, however, serve to prevent mass starvation in the urban centers of Greece during the German occupation. No responsibility was lifted from the shoulders of the Germans since, as evidenced by the death figures during the horrible winter of 1940-41, the Germans had no intention of furnishing food to Greece. In the other then occupied areas, such large-scale relief measures were neither necessary nor desirable. We did, however, find it practicable and politically desirable to send through the blockade certain medical supplies and to facilitate the movement from neutral sources of supply of special foodstuffs for the benefit of children and women who received scant consideration from the occupying authorities.

There are now only two areas remaining under enemy occupation where the question of relief prior to liberation arises, i.e. the occupied portion of the Netherlands¹⁰ and Norway.

In the case of the Netherlands the situation by late fall of 1944 had deteriorated to such an alarming degree that from the humanitarian and political point of view it was essential to bring some measure of aid if military considerations permitted. As noted in the attached memorandum of November 8, 1944,¹¹ the matter was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff who left the decision in the case to General Eisenhower.¹² General Eisenhower not only concurred as to the desirability of sending assistance to this area but urged that it be done. Approximately 5,000 tons of Swedish produce have gone forward to this area. Further shipments aggregating somewhat more than 5,000 tons are ready to go forward. The Department of State has recently been informed by the American Embassy at London that the military authorities, instead of merely tolerating these shipments are anxious for operational as well as political reasons that there be no delay in sending further consignments. The military authorities, rather than expressing apprehension that such shipments might adversely affect projected military operations, have taken the position that failure to send further consignments would so affect those operations. Such a

⁹ For documentation regarding the food relief program for Axis-occupied Greece, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 167 ff., and *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 179 ff.

¹⁰ For documentation regarding the negotiations for the establishment of a food relief program for German-occupied Europe in 1944, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. ii, pp. 252 ff. For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in 1945 in providing relief supplies for the people of the Netherlands, see *ante*, pp. 1 ff.

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

situation may well arise in Norway, if in fact it has not already arisen. It is essential, therefore, that we be in a position to take immediately such further relief action there, in consultation with the theatre commander, as may be required.

The draft reply enclosed with SWNCC 24¹³ suggests that from the military point of view civilian relief is important only in a period following liberation of enemy-occupied territory by our forces. London's telegram 1498¹⁴ indicates quite clearly that the military authorities in the field are of the opinion that in certain circumstances at least it is of equally urgent importance for military reasons to alleviate famine conditions even prior to liberation by our forces. Norway may soon fall into this category.

With reference to the objection to these relief operations based on the added burden on Allied shipping and port facilities, the Department can only reiterate the statement made in its letter of December 22^{14a} that only *neutral shipping* not otherwise available for the Allied war effort would be employed. Few, if any, port facilities available to the Allies would be used. It cannot be seen how supplies sent under such programs can have any effect on military requirements since such supplies come from civilian allocations or neutral sources.

Considerable importance seems to be attached to the possibility of such operations resulting in benefit to the Germans by relieving them of the burden of provisioning civilian populations under their control. The fact is well known that this burden, while imposed on the occupying power by international law and practice, is not discharged by the Germans when it is inconvenient for them to do so. We have never proposed sending supplies to areas where the need is not so great as to prove conclusively that the Germans either cannot or will not provide adequately for the civilian population there. To provide a small measure of assistance in such circumstances relieves the Germans of a burden in theory only but not in practice.

The Department of State has received word from London that the British Prime Minister apparently now tends toward a relaxation in blockade policy to permit relief shipments from overseas. While specific reference is made to Holland, the same attitude can be expected to be taken as regards Norway if conditions there continue to deteriorate. Growing pressure is developing in favor of increased relief measures in Norway and it is understood that the Norwegian Crown Prince¹⁵ will shortly approach the President on this point. If the British Government agrees to increased relief for Norway, this change in its attitude can be attributed in no small measure to the position

¹³ *Supra.*

¹⁴ Not printed.

^{14a} *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. II, p. 296.

¹⁵ Prince Olav, Commander in Chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces.

heretofore taken by this Government on the basis of correspondence exchanged between the Department and the J.C.S. on this subject in 1944. That correspondence is referred to in some detail in the Department's letter of December 22, 1944.

For high political reasons the Government of the United States cannot about-face now in its attitude toward this general question. Aside from the important political reasons involved, the foregoing demonstrates that in certain circumstances relief programs in occupied territory are not detrimental to the prosecution of Allied military operations but, on the contrary, may be contributory to their success.

740.00112 E.W./2-1545

The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State

The Ambassador of Norway presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor to ask for the Secretary's kind assistance in the following matter:

The Norwegian Government desires to have transported from Sweden to Norway 10,000 tons of grain seed for distribution to Norwegian farmers. This quantity would be taken out of stock piles in the possession of the Norwegian Ministry of Supply at present stored in Sweden. The grain would be sent to Norwegian [Norway?] in sealed sacks and would nominally remain the property of "Svenska Norgeshjälpen" (Swedish Aid for Norway) until the sacks reach the individual farmers. Distribution in Norway would be effected through the agencies of the Norwegian Grain Monopoly which have always proved trustworthy and would be strictly controlled by representatives of the Swedish donator committee. Thus, all possible precautions would be taken to prevent the grain from being used by Germans for other purposes, and the transaction would not interfere with the obligations of the occupation authorities to furnish Norway with grain.

It is of the utmost importance that the consent of the proper Allied authorities be given as soon as possible so that the grain may reach the farmers in time for the Spring sowing. It is, of course, of great importance that the crops in Norway reach as great proportions as possible, as successful crops will imply relief of the shipping situation in Europe.

The matter has already been taken up with the Allied blockade authorities in London and Stockholm. The Norwegian Ambassador would be grateful if the Secretary of State would give the matter his best recommendation.

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1945.

857.48/3-545

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*¹⁶

WASHINGTON, 5 March 1945.

Reference is made to the letter, dated 22 December 1944, from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, regarding the Swedish proposals for relief shipments from Sweden to Norway to alleviate Norwegian distress caused by the Germans and requesting that these proposals be again submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval.

In a communication, dated 9 February 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted, for the signatures of the Secretaries of War and the Navy, a draft reply to the Secretary of State's letter in effect disapproving the proposals.

This draft reply has been considered by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. At the Committee's meeting on 23 February 1945 the State Department pointed out that pursuant to an agreement reached in June 1944,¹⁷ to which the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration were parties, Sweden was authorized to export an average of 500 tons per month of relief supplies to Norway and that this monthly shipment has recently been increased to an average of 1,000 tons, with the agreement of this Government. In view of this position, which the State Department considers of high political and humanitarian importance, the Committee at that meeting agreed that this program shall be continued provided the average monthly shipments are limited to 1,000 tons and are restricted to the types of commodities listed in paragraph B of the enclosed memorandum dated 21 February from the Department of State to the Committee.

The Committee further agreed that requests for any additional relief shipments from Sweden to Norway should be referred to the War and Navy Departments for decision.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

¹⁶ At its 12th Meeting, March 3, 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee agreed to forward this memorandum to the Secretary of State. The memorandum was designated document SWNCC 24/3, 5 March 1945, Enclosure 1.

¹⁷ For the terms of the agreement reached in June 1944 between the British Ministry of Economic Warfare on the one hand, and the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration on the other, see the memorandum by Mr. Eldred D. Kuppinger of the Special War Problems Division, dated June 12, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 266.

[Annex]

*Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee*¹⁸

[WASHINGTON,] February 21, 1945.

A. *Continuing relief program.* Pursuant to an agreement reached in June 1944 between the British Ministry of Economic Warfare on the one hand, and the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration on the other, Sweden was authorized to export an average of 500 tons per month of relief supplies to Norway for distribution under Swedish auspices and responsibility. The foodstuffs have been utilized in connection with a daily school lunch program for over 134,000 Norwegian school children and in sustaining 38,500 aged persons and 15,000 young Norwegians living "underground". The majority of the latter are believed to be members of "Milorg",¹⁹ the Norwegian equivalent of the FFI²⁰ groups operating in France prior to its liberation. Recently, the Swedish authorities requested and obtained from the British and American Governments permission to increase the average monthly shipment of relief supplies to Norway from 500 tons to 1,000 tons. This will consist of 63 tons of milk powder, 42 tons of sugar, 35 tons of oat groats, 169 tons of peas, 78 tons of barley groats, 11 tons of dried vegetables, 50 tons of potato flakes, 183 tons of meat preserves, 35 tons of semolina and a balance within the 1,000 ton limit which will vary from month to month. For the month of February 1945, the balance will be composed of approximately 100 tons of whey cheese or whey butter, 100 tons of margarine, 50 tons of biscuits, and 50 tons of barley flakes. Except for the sugar, which was produced in Denmark, and the meat preserves and margarine, which were originally imported into Sweden from Argentina for Swedish consumption, all of the aforementioned products are of Swedish origin.

The relief supplies described above are distributed in Norway by the Donors' Committee, a coordinating organization combining the Norwegian relief efforts of the Swedish Red Cross, the Norwegian Relief Organization, Save the Children, and Norwegian Relief Inc. (an American agency). Both the Swedish Foreign Office and the free Norwegian Legation at Stockholm are fully satisfied that every pre-

¹⁸ Submitted in accordance with the recommendation contained in the Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee held on February 16, 1945, not printed.

¹⁹ Norwegian resistance organization.

²⁰ Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (French Forces of the Interior), French resistance organization.

caution is taken to prevent any of these shipments either from falling into the hands of the Germans or from being diverted to purposes other than those for which they are exported. These precautions are described as follows:

1. All relief supplies are shipped from Sweden to Norway only after approval by the Anglo-American-Swedish Joint Standing Committee,²¹ and are handled by the Donors' Committee, which operates from Oslo and which consists of reliable Swedes and Norwegians. The goods when shipped into Norway are shipped as Swedish property.

2. The goods are generally distributed immediately under the supervision of the Donors' Committee by Norwegians who have been approved by the Committee, the underground, and the Free Norwegian Legation at Stockholm.

3. Goods which are not distributed immediately are held in storage in various warehouses, which for security reasons are not located in or near centers of population. It has been arranged by the Donors' Committee that in the event the Germans discover and molest goods held in storage in any one place, goods in other storage facilities will either be removed or destroyed.

4. The American and British Legations check on the distribution of the goods through periodical reports received from the Donors' Committee in Oslo, transmitted to Sweden through underground facilities; through meetings with representatives of the Oslo Donors' Committee, at such time as any member comes to Sweden and through reports received by members of the American and British Legations from the Norwegian underground. The underground mail communications controlled by the OSS^{21a} are employed to obtain information on any particular shipment.

5. In no instance has any report been received indicating that relief supplies shipped to Norway have been diverted from approved Norwegians. On the contrary, the information received on relief shipments to Norway reveals that the goods already distributed have, in each case, been received by desirable Norwegians and that there has been no German interference with their storage or distribution.

B. *Special shipments of relief supplies.* From time to time, the American and British Governments have agreed to special requests by the Norwegian Government for the shipment of relief supplies from Sweden to Norway. Some recent examples are:

1. Agreement to the shipment of 6,500 tons of Swedish foodstuffs for distribution among Norwegian households to be held in reserve to help tide Norwegian families over a period of dislocation incident to increased military activities in Northern Norway. This total consists of 1,000 tons of sugar, 20,000 tons of wheat flour, 1,000 tons of

²¹ The Joint Standing Committee consisting of United States, United Kingdom, and Swedish representatives was established in Stockholm to assure the Allied Governments that Swedish trade policy was in accordance with various wartime trade agreements.

^{21a} Office of Strategic Services.

fats, 200 tons of blood pudding, 200 tons of dried vegetables, 500 tons of port [*pork?*] and a balance made up of dried milk and fats.

2. Approximately 350 tons of clothing and 75,000 pairs of shoes of Swedish origin for distribution among Norwegian civilians.

3. Small quantities of Swedish medical supplies for civil hospitals.

4. 2,000 tons of fats for distribution in Urban areas where there is extremely serious shortage.

5. 10,000 tons of seed grain for planting this spring and harvesting in the fall of 1945. This quantity represents approximately one-fifth of the total amount required by Norway for planting purposes.

All of the above special shipments are distributed in Norway by the Donor's Committee.

Although in the past certain of the commodities included in the special relief shipments, in particular fats, represented purchases made by the Norwegian Government outside the blockade area and shipped to Sweden on Swedish safe-conduct vessels, it is highly doubtful whether it would be possible to follow this procedure in the future in view of Germany's recent action in suspending the Swedish safe-conduct traffic in retaliation for the termination of all Swedish exports to Germany.

C. Recommendations of the State Department. As stated in SWNCC 24/1, dated February 15, 1944,²² the State Department considers that for high political reasons the Government of the United States cannot about-face now in its attitude toward the general question of relief shipments from Sweden to Norway. Aside from the political reasons involved, the State Department is convinced that in certain circumstances such as those pertaining to Norway, relief programs in occupied territory are not detriments to the prosecution of Allied military operations but, on the contrary, may be contributory to their success. It feels that the shipment of arms to resistance groups in occupied territory is of little avail unless the civilian population in general and members of the resistance groups in particular are likewise furnished with a modicum of foodstuffs. The State Department considers that this Government is formally committed to the continuance of the monthly Norwegian relief program of 1,000 tons. With respect to special relief shipments from Sweden to Norway, the State Department strongly recommends that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff agree, in principal, to their continuance. In connection with this latter type of relief work, the State Department is prepared to refer every special relief request to the War and Navy Departments and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for decision.

No Allied shipping has been or will be involved in the maintenance either of the continuing Swedish relief program for Norway or for special relief shipments. Furthermore, no compensatory shipments

²² See footnote 8, p. 28.

to Sweden to make up for relief shipments to Norway are contemplated until after the war.

SWNCC File

Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee ²³

THE PROBLEM

1. Pending request by Norwegian Government for authorization to ship from Sweden to Norway 6,700 tons of grain seed ²⁴ for spring planting.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The proposed shipment of grain seed of Swedish origin to Norway from Sweden constitutes considerably less than 20 percent of such seed ordinarily sown yearly in the former country. It would consist of fall and spring wheat, fall rye, barley, oats, peas, and vetches.

The Norwegians put up this proposal on the basis of the expected liberation of their country by the time the crop is ready for harvest in the fall. The Foreign Economic Administration strongly favors the proposal on this basis in the belief that if by fall the occupying forces are not entirely out of Norway, they will at least be so thinly spread out as to preclude the probability that they would be able to put into execution an effective requisitioning program under which any large amount of the harvest would be delivered to them.

American and British representatives on the Joint Standing Committee at Stockholm, the Foreign Economic Administration and the State Department consider that the means to be employed to safeguard the delivery of the grain seed to loyal Norwegian families are entirely satisfactory from the standpoint of economic warfare. In general, the same safeguards would be employed as are used in the case of the regular monthly shipments of foodstuffs from Sweden to Norway which are distributed under the responsibility of the Swedish Donors' Committee.

The seed would be shipped in sealed bags in lots of up to 1,000 tons as Swedish property. The entire amount would go forward in relatively small shipments with each subsequent shipment held back until the immediately prior shipment had actually been distributed to loyal Norwegian farmers. The actual distribution to the farmers

²³ Circulated for consideration by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as SWNCC 24/4, dated March 8, 1945.

²⁴ Subsequent to the Norwegian Ambassador's note of February 15 (*ante*, p. 31), the original figure of 10,000 tons of grain seed was reduced to 6,700 tons in accordance with information furnished the Department by the Counselor of the Norwegian Embassy, Mr. Francis Irgens.

would take place through the channels of the Norwegian Corn Monopoly, an organization which the Norwegian Government-in-Exile considers to be completely reliable and loyal. Distribution of the seed in the original bags would be made by the Corn Monopoly through its district offices only to farmers approved by the Swedish Donors' Committee. The seed would not be stored in any one place in large quantities. The Donors' Committee has arranged to receive current reports from the Corn Monopoly as to distribution and in the remote possibility that any shipment might be confiscated or not satisfactorily accounted for, further shipments would not be made. In rough percentage, distribution would be made as follows: 25 percent to the south and Stavanger area, 50 percent to the eastern area, 20 percent to the Trondheim district, 5 percent to the northern area. Loyal and reliable Norwegians have informed our Legation at Stockholm that there has been no interference by the Germans with foodstuffs sent to Norway from Sweden under the program conducted by the Swedish Donors' Committee and that loyal Norwegian officials strongly support this plan and are certain that it can be carried out with success.

3. One of the strongest arguments in support of this proposal is that assuming the liberation of Norway by harvest time, the burden on Allied shipping resources would be reduced by the amount of the harvest resulting from this seed (estimated by the Department of Agriculture at approximately 60,000 tons). Should it transpire that Norway is not completely liberated by harvest time, it is believed, as noted above, that the Norwegians themselves will get substantially all the benefit from the harvest which in turn would reduce to some considerable degree the pressure which by that time will have been built up for modification in the blockade policy to permit direct shipments of foodstuffs to Norway.

CONCLUSION

4. The Norwegian Government has been pressing strongly for a decision in this case which, of course, it hopes will be in the affirmative. The British Economic Warfare authorities have already approved the proposal in principle. In view of the fact that the planting season is rapidly approaching, it is imperative that a decision on this matter should be reached as quickly as possible.

RECOMMENDATION

5. The Department of State strongly recommends that an affirmative position be taken on the Norwegian request.

857.48/3-2245

Mr. Harold H. Neff, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of War (Patterson), to the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)

WASHINGTON, 22 March 1945.

DEAR MR. CUMMING: I am sending you attached the statement which you requested from me in regard to SWNCC 24/4.²⁵

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD H. NEFF

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the War Department Regarding the Swedish Proposal to Alleviate Norwegian Distress Caused by the Germans

WASHINGTON, 22 March 1945.

The acute food difficulties of Norway result from the German taking of food there. For example, from roughly April 1940 to September 1944 the Germans have taken out of Norway some 1,000,000 tons of fish. Germany has shipped in certain quantities of food, but in no sense correlative to that taken out. No data has been presented showing the food the Germans are at present taking from Norway, or have taken in the last six months. It is not possible, therefore, to judge the extent the Germans are aided by the shipments to Norway. It must be assumed at least, however, that the German occupation forces are being fed from local supplies, and, in consequence, that shipments in are in replacement of supplies taken by the Germans.

The fact that the grain shipped to Norway is seed grain would not prevent aid to the Germans. The seed grain would free the grain already present in Norway for either animal or human consumption.

The Germans have recently taken for their own consumption Red Cross prisoner of war supplies. If they have taken such supplies, no reason is seen why they would not take supplies not so safeguarded.

The recommendation that the seed grain go in is partially based on the assumption of an early termination of the war. One of the

²⁵ See footnote 23, p. 36.

ways of bringing about such early termination is to assure that the German morale is not aided by a supplement to the German critical food supply.

More generally, the present request should be refused on the ground that it is but one instance of a number which all tend to the general breakdown of the German food blockade, at the very time when it may be most effective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed themselves as being against any relaxation, on the ground that, once exceptions are made, no line can be drawn for not making others.

Requests are presently pending to ship to Norway: 5,000 tons of super phosphate, 10,000 tons of flour or grain, and 1,000 tons of dried peas; to occupied Holland, 5,000 tons per week of foodstuffs plus medical supplies.

There are, in addition, substantial quantities of supplies which have recently gone and are going at present into German-held Europe under previous authorization. No overall statement has been made available as to the total quantities of these supplies.

The non-German population still under German control amounts to many millions. No reason is seen why, if we undertake to feed portions of this non-German population, the Germans will not deprive the other portions of essential supplies, so as to throw that burden upon the Allies.

We are already incapable of meeting the essential needs of the liberated areas on our lines of communication. It is fair to assume that these needs will increase before they will diminish. Any supplies sent behind the German lines, in last analysis, detract from our ability to meet the needs of the areas which are our prime military responsibility.

It is submitted that a general overall survey should be made of all supplies from all sources which are already authorized to go into German-held Europe from areas outside.

In the terms previously employed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the shipping in of the grain in question is counter-operational and, therefore, from a military standpoint, should be opposed.

857.48/3-2445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 24, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

3078. ReEmbs 2895, March 20²⁶ and 3045, March 23.²⁷

a. Foot²⁸ has suggested meeting with MWD [*MEW?*]²⁹ representatives on March 27 and with EWD³⁰ representatives and Norwegians on March 28 to discuss Norwegian relief memorandum. Urgent decisions on outstanding applications, particularly 6,700 tons of seed grain (reDepts 2270, March 23³¹) and 10,000 tons of grain (or flour) (reEmbs 2560, March 12³²) would therefore be appreciated. In view of past representations made by Embassy to British on subject of relief shipments further delay in obtaining Washington's approval may be difficult to explain to MEW. EWD would also appreciate urgent instructions on extent to which, in meeting with Norwegians, we can agree to principle of (a) shipments from Sweden without compensation, (b) shipments from Sweden requiring compensation, and (c) shipments from areas outside the blockade. Specific recommendations arising from meetings will, of course, be referred to Washington for final clearance.

b. Following is paraphrase of minute dictated by Lord Selborne after his meeting with Dr. Lie:

The attached memorandum was handed to me today by Dr. Lie when he called. The food situation in Norway, he said, was now very serious and it was estimated that there was only wheat enough to carry through until the latter part of April. Although Norway had hitherto been receiving food supplies from Germany, the last consignment was in January and he felt it unlikely that they would receive any more. Something had, therefore, to be done to prevent famine prior to the liberation of Norway. I told Dr. Lie that if he could arrange the import of food from Sweden he would encounter

²⁶ Not printed; it reported that Trygve Lie, the Foreign Minister of the Norwegian Government in Exile, had discussed with Lord Selborne, the British Minister of Economic Warfare, a proposal for sending additional relief supplies to Norway; it also reported that the British War Cabinet had withdrawn its objection in principle to all relief supplies through the blockade of German-occupied territories (740.00112 EW/3-2145).

²⁷ Not printed; it reported on further efforts by the Norwegian Government in Exile to obtain permission for relief shipments from Sweden to Norway (857.48/3-2345).

²⁸ Dingle Foot, Member of Parliament and Parliamentary Secretary, British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

²⁹ British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

³⁰ Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in London.

³¹ Not printed; it stated that approval of seed grain shipment to Norway had not yet been given by competent American authorities (740.00112 E.W./3-2745).

³² Not printed.

no difficulty from me. It was my opinion that the objections to shipment from Sweden to Norway of large quantities of food were no longer valid and I should be glad, so far as I was concerned, to facilitate shipments by agreeing to Sweden's receiving compensating imports in so far as Sweden could arrange them. Norwegian Foreign Minister thanked me and said that he would be glad to supply any further information which I might require after studying the memorandum.

WINANT

740.00112 EW/3-2145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1945—noon.

2348. Your 3078, March 28 [24], 7 [8] p. m. No discretion may be given you to approve in principle any type of Swedish relief shipments to Norway. Because of military and economic warfare factors involved, each case must be referred to Washington for consideration by the interested agencies of this Government.

For your confidential information, a special Ad Hoc Committee consisting of representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments and a FEA³³ adviser, has been established to handle proposed relief shipments from Sweden to Norway. Unanimous decision is required before any shipment can be approved. In the event of disagreement, the case in question is referred to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. The seed grain application is at present being considered by the latter body.

GREW

740.00112 EW/3-2845

The Acting Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 28 March 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I received today the enclosed message from the President. I hope that every step will be taken to expedite the shipment of the seed grain from Sweden to Norway.

Any previous objection by the War Department is, of course, withdrawn.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

³³ Foreign Economic Administration.

[Enclosure]

President Roosevelt to the Acting Secretary of War (Patterson)

[WASHINGTON,] 28 March 1945.

It is most important that the seed requested by the Norwegians to be shipped from Sweden be sent them at once. Please let me know if this is being done.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OSEVELT]

857.48/3-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1945—6 p. m.

2403. From Department and FEA for EWD. ReEmbs 3045, March 23,³⁵ paragraph C-7. American authorities are agreeable to immediate shipment of 6700 tons seed grain from Sweden to Norway under supervision JSC,³⁶ Stockholm. It is understood that MEW agrees. Inform Stockholm of joint decision. Department endeavoring expedite consideration other pending Norwegian relief proposals.

GREW

857.48/3-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 28, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received March 28—6 p. m.]

3199. For the Acting Secretary. Acting on instructions contained in Department's instructions 4234, June 26, 1944³⁷ and 4257, July 1, 1944,³⁸ telegram 8882, October 25, 1944³⁷ and 10128 December 2, 1944,³⁹ which have never been modified by further instructions from the Department and FEA, the Embassy has continually pressed the British to adopt a more liberal policy towards relief shipments to occupied Europe. As instructed by the Secretary of State⁴⁰ (see paragraph 4, instruction No. 4257) I personally met with Lord Selborne and other representatives of the British Government on September 20 and em-

³⁵ See footnote 27, p. 40.³⁶ Joint Standing Committee.³⁷ Not printed.³⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 272.³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 291.⁴⁰ Cordell Hull, who resigned on November 21, 1944.

phasized the importance our Government attached to shipments, not only from neutral countries to the then occupied countries but also to shipments through the blockade to those areas. We have assumed on the basis of the foregoing, particularly telegrams 8882, October 25 and 10128, December 2 that the Embassy had authority, at the least, to agree in principle to (a) shipments from Sweden to Norway and (b) shipments from Sweden to Norway for which Sweden would require compensation. In this connection, please see particularly paragraph 5 of Department's 10128, December 2 which stated, in paraphrase, "we hope that MEW will not insist upon applying strictly the principle of indigenous produce with respect to food from either Sweden or Switzerland for this purpose. We are ready to allow Switzerland and Sweden compensating imports and to give the Legations, Bern and the JSC, Stockholm, wide discretion along the lines recommended by the joint Anglo-American Relief Committee with respect to Norway as given in A-1211, October 4 from Embassy."⁴¹

Yesterday Embassy representatives met with representatives of British Foreign Office and MEW to concert our views prior to meeting with Norwegians today, March 28. At meeting with British it was agreed, on basis of our outstanding instructions, that we could at this time inform Norwegians in following sense:

1. Blockade approval would, in principle, be given to shipment to Norway of any foodstuffs which Norwegians could obtain in Sweden which did not require compensating imports although all proposed shipments would continue to be brought before JSC in the usual way and our right reserved to refuse applications in the event that evidence was produced of misappropriation of food by Germans.

2. The overriding blockade objection to all shipments through the blockade to Norway, or shipments to Sweden in compensation for shipments made to Norway, would no longer be controlling and we would be prepared to examine each case on its merits although supply and shipping difficulties might be anticipated. We should, however, interpose no objection to Norwegians examining with the supply authorities possibility of obtaining those supplies set out in the memorandum which could not be obtained from Sweden.

On receipt of Department's telegram 2348⁴² one hour before meeting was to be held, the Embassy requested British to postpone meeting until we could receive clarification of your instructions. Meeting is now scheduled for Wednesday, April 4.

I feel that I am placed in an untenable position by the Department's telegram and urgently request authority to concur with the British along lines proposed above.

⁴¹ Not printed, but see telegram 8373, October 5, 1944, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 282.

⁴² Dated March 27, p. 41.

I find it difficult to understand why if our Government was in a position to endorse and strongly to support the principle of expanded relief shipments last summer, it is unable to do so now when the danger of the Germans benefitting therefrom has been materially lessened and when the needs of the Norwegians have increased.

WINANT

740.00112 E.W./3-2945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 29, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 9:55 p. m.]

Noweg⁴³ 36. Norwegian Government will find it extremely difficult to understand any change of policy tending to create additional obstacles to trans-blockade relief at a time when Norway's food position has deteriorated seriously and when military events would certainly seem to Norwegians to justify relaxations in this type of relief rather than greater strictness (reference Department's telegram No. 2348 of March 27, noon, to Winant).

The amounts of supplies being sent from and via Sweden are relatively negligible and should under all circumstances be continued if not increased. If we now reverse our policy and become more hard boiled than British we must not be surprised if British prestige reaps the benefit; nor must we be surprised if postwar position of Norwegian Government and with it political stability in Norway are adversely affected.

[OSBORNE]

740.00112 EW/3-2845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1945—5 p. m.

2501. I fully appreciate the situation with which you are confronted described in your 3199, March 28. I deeply regret that such a situation has arisen and I am hopeful that in the near future this Government's position in such matters will again be clarified.

You are quite correct in pointing out that pursuant to previous instructions the Embassy had reason to believe that this Government had a clear line of settled policy as regards certain types of relief

⁴³ Series designation for telegrams to and from the American Mission to the Norwegian Government in Exile, at London.

shipments to occupied territory. The Department in forwarding those instructions to the Embassy relied on exchanges of correspondence during the early part of 1944 with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In December 1944 the Joint Chiefs altered their views and recommended that on military grounds no relief shipments from any source whatsoever be permitted to go forward to occupied areas. Since that time the Department has been endeavoring to obtain modification of that position, and some progress has been made. I am hopeful that the result of White House intervention in the matter of shipment of grain seed from Sweden to Norway (reDepts 2403, March 28) and the position adopted by SHAEF⁴⁴ as regards relief shipments to occupied Netherlands and certain German-held channel areas, it will be possible to obtain a coordination of the views of the interested agencies of this Government on the question of relief shipments.

We had not previously explained this situation to the Embassy since it was hoped that the matter would be resolved without undue delay. I cannot definitely assure you that this matter will be resolved by April 4, although we are making every effort to obtain quick action. I suggest, therefore, that you may wish to have this meeting put forward another week within which time the Department will make every effort to obtain a coordination of views on the matter.

STETTINIUS

857.48/2-1545

The Secretary of State to the Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstjerne)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Norwegian Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note dated February 15, 1945 in regard to the desire of the Norwegian Government to ship from Sweden to Norway grain seed for distribution to Norwegian farmers.

While the amount given in the Embassy's note under reference was 10,000 tons, it will be recalled that this figure subsequently was reduced to 6700 tons in accordance with information furnished the Department by Mr. Irgens.⁴⁵

Mr. Stettinius is pleased to be in a position to inform Mr. Morgenstjerne that the competent American authorities have indicated their approval of the proposed shipment of seed. The American Embassy at London was informed accordingly on March 28 and since

⁴⁴ For a description of the efforts of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to effect an amelioration of the food shortage in German-occupied Netherlands, see Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 334-336, 457-459.

⁴⁵ Francis Irgens, Counselor of the Norwegian Embassy.

it is understood that the British authorities likewise have indicated their approval of the shipment, it is expected that the initial consignments of seed will go forward from Sweden immediately.

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1945.

857.48/4-245

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to the Department's letter of December 22, 1944 ⁴⁶ concerning the question of intra-blockade and trans-blockade shipments of relief supplies to enemy-occupied areas.

The draft reply to this letter forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on February 9, 1945 was considered by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in the light of counter-arguments presented by the State Department representative on that Committee (see SWNCC 24 and 24/1 ⁴⁷). On March 5, 1945 SWNCC advised the State Department of an agreement reached by it for continuation of the relief program from Sweden to Norway provided the average monthly shipments are limited to 1,000 tons and are restricted to relief supplies and provided that any additional relief shipments are referred to the War and Navy Departments for decision.

It is my desire in this letter to raise for further and urgent consideration the question of relief shipments from neutral countries inside the blockaded area to enemy-occupied territory. As a practical matter the only neutral country involved is Sweden and the enemy-occupied areas consist principally of Norway and occupied Holland.

As the result of the discussion of this matter in SWNCC, it was decided to delegate to a subcommittee composed of representatives of the War, Navy, and State Departments, and an observer from the Foreign Economic Administration the function of receiving and considering such proposals. The War Department representative, however, in the light of the position expressed in the JCS letter of December 2 ⁴⁸ considers that he is without authority to take a favorable position on behalf of the War Department on any proposal of this character. Consequently, although various proposals have been submitted for consideration, only one such proposal thus far has been agreed to by the military authorities and in that case agreement was given only as the result of intervention in the matter by the

⁴⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 296.

⁴⁷ *Ante*, pp. 26 and 28, respectively.

⁴⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 293.

President. In effect, therefore, the position now adhered to by the military authorities, if not altered, amounts to the implementation of the policy suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their letter of December 2, proposing that this Government adopt as a policy the position that no relief shipments, regardless of origin, should be permitted to enemy-occupied territory.

In its administration of the European blockade, prior to the entrance of the United States into the present war, the British Government took a favorable attitude in regard to the movement of relief supplies from neutral countries within the blockaded area to enemy-occupied territory in cases where adequate safeguards could be set up in regard to distribution and the amounts involved were not unduly large. Upon its entrance into the war, this Government accepted this position and relief shipments of this nature continued to be made from time to time, with the approval of the blockade authorities. The Allied military authorities were fully aware of this policy and until objection thereto was expressed in the JCS letter of December 2, no military objection to this policy had ever been put forward. The Allied Governments likewise were fully familiar with this policy and relied upon it as a settled and continuing policy.

The policy was adopted as a means of relieving pressure on the Governments responsible for the maintenance of the blockade in favor of granting exceptions to the blockade in order to permit the direct shipment of relief supplies from overseas to the civilian populations of the occupied countries. The policy served its purpose well since, as you know, during the period when such shipments might have had an adverse effect on Allied military success, authorization for trans-blockade shipments to occupied countries was withheld except in the special case of Greece. The policy regarding intra-blockade relief shipments had an important political value also in that it afforded a means of giving encouragement to resistance groups, served to strengthen the internal political position of the Governments in exile thereby tending to reduce the danger of political unrest following liberation, and made it possible for the blockading Governments to demonstrate in a practical way their concern for the plight of the civilian populations of the occupied countries, without permitting the introduction of supplies into the blockaded area which were not already available for purchase by the enemy.

The effect of the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to reverse this Government's position on the question of intra-blockade relief shipments at a time when the Department of State is at a complete loss to advance to the interested governments any reasons for a change in that policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave no reasons for

this change in position in their letter of December 2 and no reasons have subsequently been put forward except that to introduce from any source supplies into an enemy-occupied country is tantamount to making such supplies available to the enemy and thereby prolonging the war. The fact is that enemy requisitions in occupied territory are made without reference to the needs of the native population. Such requisitions are neither increased nor decreased by the possibility of relief shipments into the area concerned. Such shipments, therefore, serve only to fill a void arising in part from enemy requisitions which otherwise would remain unfilled. Experience has shown that, under adequate safeguards in regard to distribution, relief supplies do reach the persons for whom intended.

In the light of SHAEF's recent authorization for the introduction from any source whatsoever of relief supplies for the civilian populations of the Channel Islands, La Rochelle, the islands of Oleron and Ré, and the occupied portion of the Netherlands, the Department of State feels even more strongly than it did at the time its letter of December 22 was prepared that the movement of modest amounts of relief supplies from neutral countries to enemy-occupied territory under proper safeguards as to distribution is of little, if any military significance and is a question which must and should be decided on economic warfare and political bases.

I, therefore, most strongly urge that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested to reconsider the position taken in their letter of December 2, 1944 and maintained since that time, and that they inform the Department of State that from the military point of view no objection will be offered to the movement of reasonable quantities of relief supplies from neutral countries within the blockade area to enemy-occupied areas under such safeguards and conditions as the blockade authorities deem advisable. This has been the practice followed by the British military authorities. Consequently, under present circumstances that Government in meritorious cases is able to take immediate action on such proposals. This Government is not in such a position and, therefore, the onus for holding up shipments to which the British are agreeable falls on this Government. This matter has taken on an added degree of urgency as the result of a recent telegram from the American Ambassador at London,⁵⁰ a copy of which, in paraphrase, is enclosed. It will be noted that a meeting in London was originally scheduled for March 28 to discuss Norwegian relief matters. That meeting has been postponed until April 4 and the Department is suggesting that it be put forward another week by which time the Department hopes to be in a position to dispel the

⁵⁰ Telegram 3199, March 28, 6 p. m., p. 42.

confusion which now exists and to give the Embassy further guidance as to the position it should take. I should, therefore, be grateful if this matter were treated as one of the greatest urgency.

I am sending a similar letter to the Secretary of War.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS

857.48/4-245

*Memorandum by the Secretaries of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee*⁵¹

SWNCC 24/6

[WASHINGTON,] 7 April 1945.

RELIEF SHIPMENTS TO ENEMY-OCCUPIED TERRITORY

The enclosure, a draft of a letter to the Secretary of State from the Secretaries of War and the Navy, as proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

[Enclosure]

Draft Letter to the Secretary of State From the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy

Reference is made to your letter of 2 April 1945 in regard to the shipment of supplies to German-held areas in Europe, particularly to Norway and Holland.

From a military standpoint, the situation has changed since the time of the previous letters to you expressing the effect of the shipment of supplies to German-held areas in Europe. At that time the question was rather one of the general supply of German-held Europe, since there was no indication that the German troops themselves did not have the necessary food for their maintenance. At the present time, however, there is a fair prospect that the Germans may set up islands of resistance, particularly in Holland and Norway. It is clear that, if this is done, the German forces will have to rely upon the food resources in those countries and that any food shipped into such areas would contribute to those resources.

⁵¹ According to document SWNCC 24/7, dated 12 April 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee by informal action on April 10 approved SWNCC 24/6 and the letter contained in the enclosure was forwarded to the Secretary of State on April 11.

In other words, as the situation now presents itself, the shipment of food and other supplies to the areas in question may prolong German resistance in those areas. The forces there may be of such number that their quick reduction could be made only with large loss of Allied life.

From a military standpoint, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that it is inadvisable to ship supplies into German-held portions of Holland and to increase the relief now going to enemy-occupied Norway until organized resistance in those areas has ended.

If the decision is made to ship in the supplies, it must be based on political and humanitarian rather than military considerations.

740.00112 EW/4-1145: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1945—3 p. m.

2806. ReDepts 2501, March 31. Reply has now been received from Joint Chiefs of Staff which substantially restates position previously expressed regarding relief shipments into enemy-occupied territory. Department is putting this matter up to White House for final decision. I realize fully the embarrassment involved in requesting further postponement of meeting with British but in circumstances I suggest that such a postponement be obtained pending receipt of reply from White House.

STETTINIUS

740.00112 EW/4-1745

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*⁵²

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1945.

The Norwegians have requested us on an urgent basis to approve intra-blockade relief shipments by rail from Sweden to Norway involving such commodities as 5,000 tons of super phosphate fertilizers, 10,000 tons of flour, 1,000 tons of dried peas, 3,000 tons of seed potatoes and 100 tons of clothing.⁵³ Further requests of a similar nature may be anticipated. Distribution would be effected by loyal Norwegian groups and a Swedish relief organization, the commodities to remain

⁵² A marginal handwritten notation reads: "Approved 4/17/45 Harry Truman." President Roosevelt died on April 12.

⁵³ The requests were presented in two *aide-mémoires* from the Norwegian Embassy to the Department of State, both dated April 6, 1945, neither printed.

Swedish property until delivered to the ultimate Norwegian consumer. These controls have always proved satisfactory in the past. Owing to the poor 1944 harvest and faulty transportation, the food situation in Norway is serious, but, except in isolated places, is not believed to approach the famine conditions existing in Holland. The British have already indicated their approval of these shipments, while SHAEF has urged that all possible measures be taken to insure maximum planting of Norwegian crops. The U.S. Joint Chiefs, however, consider that from a military standpoint it is inadvisable to increase relief shipments to Norway beyond the present 1,000 tons monthly program in view of the possibility that they might be seized by the Germans and used to sustain pockets of resistance in Norway after the collapse in Germany. They therefore feel that a decision to ship the supplies must be based on political and humanitarian rather than military considerations.

From a political, as well as humanitarian viewpoint, I consider it highly desirable that modest relief shipments, such as those above, be permitted to go forward. All possible precautions would be taken to prevent them falling into German hands, as is being done in the case of the 6,700 tons of seed grain recently approved at your direction. Prior approval by the Department and FEA would be required in each case. FEA concurs in this view. This system was in effect until recently questioned by the Joint Chiefs. At this late stage, I feel it to be highly undesirable politically to reverse our position. May I have your authorization to provide for the continuance of these shipments?

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

740.00112 E.W./4-1345 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 13, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 11 : 30 p. m.]

Noweg 58. Reference my Noweg 36, March 29 and Department's Noweg 8, April 3.⁵⁴

Norwegian Foreign Minister presented to me yesterday a memorandum indicating the grave concern of his Government regarding the extreme delay in obtaining authorization from Washington for relief shipments to occupied Norway. The memorandum refers to the delay in obtaining permission for shipment of 10,000 tons seed grain applied

⁵⁴ Latter not printed ; it referred to telegram 2501, March 31, 5 p. m., to London, p. 44.

for on February 9 and not approved until March 28, by which time it was impossible to send and distribute more than 3000 tons. The following three pending applications are stated urgently to require an immediate decision (ref London Embassy's 3427 of April 4⁵⁵):

- (a) 10,000 tons of grain or flour of which 2000 tons are urgently required for Narvik district and 2000 tons for Trondheim;
- (b) 5000 tons of superphosphate; and
- (c) 3000 tons of seed potatoes.

The memorandum refers in connection with the superphosphate and seed potatoes, to the SHAEF request to the Norwegian Government to take steps to ensure a large harvest this year (ref London Embassy's 3292 of March 30⁵⁶).

The memorandum states that unless the existing machinery is improved the consequences in Norway may be catastrophic and strongly recommends that the Allied authorities in London should be given power to make final decisions without prior reference to Washington regarding relief shipments to Norway at least from Sweden. Full text of memorandum being sent by air pouch.

My attention has been called to the Department's 2806 of April 11 to London Embassy stating that this general matter has been submitted to the White House for final decision. I strongly urge that every effort be made not only to secure immediate approval of outstanding applications but also to delegate to London Embassy power to approve future applications.

[OSBORNE]

740.00112 EW/4-1745

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 17 April 1945.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: There was one matter which I did not have an opportunity of raising with you yesterday, and though I should have preferred to have spoken to you about it, I think it well to send you this letter, as I shall be out of Washington for the next couple of days.

I understand from my colleague, Mr. Dingle Foot, that some difficulty has arisen in regard to the work of the Joint Standing Com-

⁵⁵ Not printed; it reported that the Norwegian Government was pressing for an answer to its requests for relief supplies (857.5018/4-445).

⁵⁶ Not printed.

mission in Stockholm relating to the shipment of relief supplies to Norway through the blockade.

I think you know that the Norwegian Government has recently pressed strongly that we should agree to allow them to obtain from Sweden anything which the Swedes can provide without limitation, and to permit certain imports from overseas of Swedish ships earmarked for Norway. In either case the Joint Standing Commission would retain complete authority to veto further consignments if it appeared that the Germans were misappropriating any of the food-stuffs or if there were any other reason to be dissatisfied with the distribution.

I now understand that the United States Government are not willing to give any general discretion in this matter to the Joint Standing Commission in Stockholm and were disposed to refuse further requests for shipments from overseas.

I believe that conditions in occupied Norway, though less serious than in the Netherlands, have greatly deteriorated and my feeling is that it would be appropriate at this period of the war to enable relief to reach the Norwegian population as freely as possible and that for this purpose it would be right to give our representatives in Stockholm a reasonable measure of discretion.

I should be very grateful therefore if you would look into the matter, and let me know what you think.

Yours sincerely

ANTHONY EDEN

740.00112 EW/4-2045 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1945—6 p. m.

3108. ReDepts 2501, March 31, and 2806, April 11. Authorization has been received from President for Department and FEA to take action on proposed relief shipments from Sweden to Norway. Department prefers not to vest discretion in Embassy to act on these cases without reference since (a) we wish to be currently informed of all such proposals and (b) each proposal must be examined to determine whether it comes within the scope of our authorization to act. Now that the policy question has been determined, however, Embassy may be assured of prompt action in Washington on all such proposals.

Embassy is authorized to indicate American approval to following pending cases:

4500 tons seed potatoes (Embassy's 3845, April 14⁵⁹).

1000 tons dried peas (Stockholm's 1087, March 20, repeated London as 591⁵⁹).

4 tons baby outfits, JSC cases S/393 and S/397 (Stockholm's 1394, April 16, repeated London as 809⁵⁹).

Onward shipment to Norway from Sweden of second 2000 tons of lard from Argentina (Embassy's 3745, April 12⁵⁹).

100 tons of Swedish clothing (Stockholm's 1144, March 26, repeated London as 625,⁵⁹ and Department's 573, March 28 to Stockholm repeated London as 2407⁵⁹).

5000 tons super-phosphate (Stockholm's 991, March 14, repeated London as 530⁵⁹). Increase in reserve under home supply arrangement requires further consideration and authorization to agree to an increase is being withheld.

10,000 tons of Swedish flour (reDepts 540, March 23 to Stockholm repeated London as 2274⁵⁹).

We must emphasize the increasing necessity for the strictest kind of supervision over distribution of relief shipments sent to Norway with a view to preventing the utilization of any such supplies by German forces. It would be most unfortunate if pocketed German units cut off from other sources of supply were able to subsist themselves from seized relief shipments and thus be enabled to hold out. In this connection Department draws attention to fact that very few reports covering distribution of previous shipments have been received in Washington. It is hoped that the preparation of such reports will be expedited and it is requested that copies of all such reports be forwarded to Department.

With reference Embassy's 3078, March 24, MEW and Norwegians may be informed that in principle this Government favors modest relief shipments from Sweden which can be made without compensation. However, each case should be referred to Washington. Agreement in principle cannot be given to proposals involving compensating shipments although this need not preclude the submission of such proposals for consideration. Proposed direct trans-blockade shipments to Norway are outside authority of Department and FEA to decide. Therefore, any such proposal would have to be considered in consultation with other interested American authorities.

Inform Osborne.

Sent London as Department's 3108, of April 20, repeated Stockholm.

STETTINIUS

⁵⁹ Not printed.

740.00112 EW/4-1745

*The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (Eden)*

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1945.

DEAR ANTHONY: With reference to your letter of April 17, I am very pleased to inform you that telegrams have been sent to the American Embassy at London and the American Legation at Stockholm informing them of the approval of this Government of all outstanding applications covering proposed intra-blockade relief shipments from Sweden to Norway. Furthermore, this Government will be prepared to give favorable consideration to further applications covering modest relief shipments provided a situation does not develop in Norway which might result in a large portion of these supplies falling into German hands. We prefer, however, that each application be referred to Washington for consideration by the appropriate agencies of this Government rather than to give the American members on the Joint Standing Commission at Stockholm a certain degree of discretion.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

857.48/4-2045

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Grew)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1945.

In the course of the call of the Norwegian Ambassador on me today when he expressed appreciation of the decision to permit the shipment from Sweden to Norway of various foodstuffs and other relief supplies, I took occasion to express to Mr. Morgenstierne the hope that necessary instructions would be issued to the Norwegian home front to intensify their efforts to prevent any of the relief supplies from falling into German hands. The Ambassador said that such instructions had already been issued.

JOSEPH C. GREW

CONSIDERATION BY THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM,
NORWAY, AND SWEDEN OF MEASURES TO ASSURE THE LIBERATION
OF NORWAY FROM THE GERMAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION

740.0011 EW/1-1245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 12, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 11 : 33 p. m.]

Noweg 5. Arrangements have been completed for Crown Prince Olav and one aide to fly to the United States next week. Foreign Minister Lie said yesterday that the Crown Prince would carry with him proposed overall plans for the transport of troops, ships, et cetera, for northern Norway together with the necessary supplies to maintain them for the next few months. SHAEF's⁶² insistence that no further supplies (beyond the 6,000 tons already allocated) can be sent to northern Norway until the Russians have formally agreed to recognize the responsibility of the Norwegian Government for that theatre is in Mr. Lie's opinion the wrong approach and in fact he expressed considerable impatience at this attitude of SHAEF's and did not conceal the fact that the Crown Prince's mission is in effect an effort to go over SHAEF's head to the Joint Chiefs. He said that if the United Kingdom and United States will agree to sending Norwegian troops and ships plus the necessary supplies in sufficient numbers and quantities to insure an effective occupation of the liberated territory he will "stake his head" that the Russians will raise no objection to assumption of full responsibility by the Norwegian Government. Mr. Lie said he would let me see the overall plans to be carried by the Crown Prince as soon as they are ready. He also said he had taken this whole matter up with Mr. Eden⁶³ who had requested that it be covered in a note for consideration by the War Cabinet.

[OSBORNE]

⁶² Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

⁶³ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 E.W./1-1845

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1945.

Participants: Secretary of State,
 H.R.H. Crown Prince Olav of Norway (Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces),
 Ambassador of Norway,⁶⁴
 Assistant Secretary of State Dunn,
 Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs.

The Norwegian Ambassador called on the Secretary of State by appointment in order to present His Royal Highness Crown Prince Olav of Norway who is also Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The Ambassador handed the attached note ^{64a} to Mr. Stettinius and the Crown Prince initiated a further elaboration of its contents.

At this point the Secretary of State sent for Mr. Dunn and Mr. Cumming and they joined in the conversation.

After some discussion during which the Crown Prince emphasized that the Soviet Government was apparently willing and, in fact, desirous of withdrawing its forces from Northern Norway and the substitution therefor of an all Norwegian Force but desired that a specific plan of operations be drawn up, Secretary Stettinius suggested, and Mr. Dunn agreed, that the Crown Prince should discuss the matter with the War Department which seemed to be primarily concerned although there are of course political aspects. Accordingly, the Secretary and Mr. Dunn arranged a meeting between the Crown Prince and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy to take place on the afternoon of Saturday, January 20.

HUGH S. CUMMING, JR.

740.0011 E.W./1-1845

The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstjerne) to the Secretary of State

No. 29

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: In a letter dated November 28, 1944, addressed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of his Government, called the British Government's attention to the critical situation in Northern Nor-

⁶⁴ Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstjerne.

^{64a} Not printed.

way, and proposed an Allied military expedition with a view to cutting off the German retreat.

By a letter of December 13, 1944, Mr. Eden replied that this proposal had received detailed study and consideration by the British Chiefs of Staff, but that unfortunately the expedition was not, in the circumstances, deemed possible, owing to the fact that the necessary forces could not be trained and equipped for operations under arctic conditions within the time limit proposed.

On January 15, 1945, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs replied, stating:

In the meantime, the German forces have continued their withdrawal to a temporary main line of defence in the Lyngenfjord area, leaving only small detachments behind. In withdrawing, they have burnt the houses, destroyed all means of communication, deported the population, and, in general, laid the country completely waste. Those who have managed to escape deportation find themselves in an extremely difficult and even desperate position owing to the devastation of the country, and they are constantly exposed to German raids by sea and by air and even by land.

The Soviet forces, who liberated the Kirkenes and the Varangerfjord areas and advanced as far as the Tanafjord in pursuit of the retreating Germans, have now halted in their advance and even withdrawn from their forward positions, and the Soviet Government have informed the Norwegian Government that, as far as they are concerned, they consider that the operations in Northern Norway should be carried on by Norwegian forces.

In these circumstances, the Norwegian Government, having carefully examined the situation both in its political and its military aspects, feel that it is their duty to request that the necessary facilities should be given for sending a combined Norwegian military expedition to Northern Norway with a view to protecting the population against further enemy raids, providing them with the necessary supplies, and continuing the liberation of the country as circumstances permit.

To this end, it will be necessary to release Norwegian naval, air and military forces who are now under British operational control in accordance with the Military Agreement of the 28th May, 1941, between Norway and the United Kingdom, and to make provisions for the supply and maintenance of such forces. It will further be necessary to make arrangements as regards other military supplies that

cannot be otherwise obtained and also as regards supplies for the civilian population.

With his letter to Mr. Eden the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs enclosed a Memorandum giving an outline of the present military situation in Northern Norway and containing a brief summary of the plan proposed by the Norwegian High Command, together with the annexes mentioned therein. The Minister also, on behalf of the Norwegian Government, requested that these proposals be submitted to the British Government for their earnest and sympathetic consideration.

I have been instructed to inform Your Excellency of the letters exchanged between Mr. Lie and Mr. Eden and to ask that the matter be submitted to the American Government for their urgent and sympathetic consideration.

Accept [etc.]

W. MUNTHE MORGENSTIERNE

740.0011 E.W./1-1845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1945—11 p. m.

462. Crown Prince Olav has had conversations with me and with high War Department officials regarding plans for dispatch of an all Norwegian expeditionary force to northern Norway. Please consult with Ambassador Osborne with respect to his Noweg 10, January 18⁶⁵ and related telegrams and endeavor to ascertain from the British Foreign Office its views. I assume that if the Norwegian project is approved by the British from the political standpoint the British will present the project to the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the British Joint Chiefs.

For your own information, our feeling here is that while the project has political aspects and would not be disapproved by us from the political standpoint it is primarily a military matter principally of British military interest.

STETTINIUS

⁶⁵ Not printed; it reported that the Norwegian Crown Prince had taken to Washington a revised plan for military intervention in northern Norway different from the one already rejected by the British (740.0011 EW/1-1845).

740.0011 E.W./1-2445

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Trimble) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1945.

In accordance with your instructions I informed Mr. Francis Irgens, Counselor of the Norwegian Embassy, that the proposal made by Crown Prince Olav to send a Norwegian Expeditionary Force to Northern Norway would be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the British Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since our military authorities are already fully conversant with the proposal as a result of the meeting in Mr. McCloy's office at the War Department on January 20, no further meeting would be necessary and the next step is up to the British. I requested Mr. Irgens to convey this message to the Norwegian Ambassador and through him to Crown Prince Olav.

W[ILLIAM] C. T[RIMBLE]

740.0011 E.W./2-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 1, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received February 1—2:10 p. m.]

1107. ReEmbs 844, January 24, 7 p. m.⁶⁶ Warner⁶⁷ told us today that British joint chiefs [*British Chiefs of Staff?*] had decided that Norwegian project in its present form was not feasible at this time and that this opinion had been passed on to Combined Chiefs of Staff. Warner added that British joint chiefs appreciate, however, that it would be very embarrassing for Foreign Office to tell Norwegian Government that transfer of Norwegian forces to Norway is entirely out of the question. Joint chiefs have therefore recommended that consideration be given by Combined Chiefs to ask Norwegians to recast their request in more modest terms.

WINANT

⁶⁶ Not printed; it stated that the British Foreign Office viewed the Norwegian project sympathetically from a political angle, but referred the project to the British Chiefs of Staff for consideration from the purely military point of view (740.0011 European War/1-2445).

⁶⁷ Christopher F. A. Warner, head of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office.

740.0011 E.W./2-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 1, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received February 1—4:29 p. m.]

Noweg 14. Norwegians have today given an *aide-mémoire*⁶⁸ to Swedish Minister here⁶⁹ referring to temporary cessation of destruction in Norway by Germans pointing out that military situation may soon develop so that Germans will leave further districts and resume policy of destruction. Reference is made to comprehensive list of hostages whom Germans and Quislings⁷⁰ plan to take. Document then states that if Germans resume policy of destruction on larger scale Norway must approach Sweden to make representations to Germany. Swedes could themselves best decide contents and form such representations; Norwegians however point out such *démarche* could scarcely lead to results unless Sweden is prepared to support it with determined measures should Germans decline to act. Doubtful if severing diplomatic relations effective or economic sanctions as trade practically broken off already. Swedes would presumably therefore have to suggest armed intervention. As Germany's situation becomes more critical Norwegians assume Germans would be reluctant to risk military intervention by Sweden but might take such a risk. Norwegian Government is drawing attention that such intervention may be requested of Sweden. Gratification expressed for representations already made to German Government by Swedes. Closes by stating Norwegians venture hope Sweden would be willing actively intervene should German policy of terror and destruction in Norway become serious threat in future.

Lie tells me Norwegians have done this on their own initiative but that its effectiveness in Sweden would be greater if backed up by British, American and Soviet Governments.

Swedish Minister was told that these Governments were being informed.

⁶⁸ Text of the *aide-mémoire* was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile as an enclosure to his despatch No. 16, February 2, not printed. The text of the *aide-mémoire* has been printed in the documentary collection of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (Utenriksdepartement), *Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940-45: Aktstykker utgitt av Det Kgl. Utenriksdepartement*, (Oslo, Gyldenal Norsk Forlag, 1950), vol. III, pp. 304-306. For a discussion from the Swedish point of view of this *aide-mémoire* and subsequent diplomatic exchanges regarding possible Swedish intervention in Norway, see the pamphlet by the Swedish Foreign Ministry (Utrikesdepartementet), *Förhandlingarna 1945 om Svensk Intervention i Norge och Danmark* (Stockholm, 1957).

⁶⁹ Baron Johan Hugo Beck-Friis, Swedish Minister to the Norwegian Government in Exile.

⁷⁰ Those Norwegians collaborating with the German forces of occupation.

Foreign Minister said that present *aide-mémoire* was simply to put Swedes on notice so that if request is later actually made there will be less ground to delay decision.

Sent Department as Noweg 14, repeated Stockholm as 149.

[OSBORNE]

740.0011 E.W./1-1845

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Norwegian Ambassador
(Morgenstjerne)*

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency's note number 29, dated January 18, 1945 in regard to the desire of the Norwegian Government that necessary facilities be provided to send a combined Norwegian military expedition to Northern Norway with a view to protecting the population against further enemy raids, providing them with the necessary supplies, and continuing the liberation of the country as circumstances permit. The proposal was referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who, after careful consideration of all aspects of the matter, have informed me, through the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the following sense:

"The Combined Chiefs of Staff fully appreciate the desirability and the urgency of taking all possible steps to alleviate conditions in northern Norway, and to assist the Norwegian Government in assuming control of the liberated areas. However, the scale of the proposed plan has definite military objections when considered in conjunction with the requirements of current operations. These military objections are, in particular:

a. Certain of the naval units and the especially trained and equipped No. 333 R.A.F.⁷¹ Squadron (Norwegian) are fully employed in countering the present U-boat offensive.

b. The shipping requirement for the dispatch and maintenance of this force in addition to that necessary for the relief of the liberated area would be a further demand on the already acute over-all shipping position.

c. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, is unable to accept the maintenance commitment for these proposals and it is considered that there is a grave risk of administrative breakdown in view of the lack of trained Norwegian administrative units.

d. A German withdrawal or possible counter offensive would, in all probability, lead to calls for increased support that cannot be met at this stage of the war.

"In view of the above, the Combined Chiefs of Staff regret that they are unable to accept the Norwegian Government's plan as at

⁷¹ Royal Air Force.

present proposed. They suggest that the Norwegian Government be asked to reconsider their plans confining their proposals to those measures required to ensure minimum proper supervision of relief in the liberated area. Should the revised plans require additional forces, the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be willing to release Norwegian naval units (with some exceptions) and land forces and to consider the substitution of a Norwegian Spitfire Squadron now employed with Second Tactical Air Force in France in lieu of No. 333 Squadron RAF which is presently employed in anti-submarine patrol. Since the provision and shipment of supplies for these forces cannot be promised at this juncture, the Norwegians should be asked to keep the commitment to a minimum and to make clear their requirements and the extent to which these can be met from Swedish sources when they submit their revised plans."

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

740.0011 E.W./4-645: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 6, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received April 6—4: 30 p. m.]

Noweg 43. Recent developments indicate that the possibility and desirability of bringing Sweden into the war, and the steps necessary to that end, should be carefully reviewed from the political and military angles. It seems to me to have become increasingly evident in the last few weeks that Sweden is more receptive than hitherto to the idea of military intervention, and that the Norwegian Government is far more ready to accept it because of deterioration of the food and transport situations and the increased probability of bitter-end German resistance in Norway even after general collapse in Germany.

This last consideration also, in my opinion, makes Swedish intervention much more desirable from our viewpoint.

Foreign Minister Trygve Lie confirmed yesterday what he had said previously: (1) That Sweden will intervene military [*militarily*] if directly requested by Norway and (2) that while Norway would much prefer liberation by British and American forces, the question of Swedish armed intervention is a military one and Norway would abide by the decision of the Allied military authorities. In other words, if SHAEF in agreement with the Russian High Command, asks the Norwegian Government to request Swedish intervention, the Norwegians will comply; and on the basis of the assurances Lie received in Stockholm, he is confident that Sweden will not refuse Norway's plea.

With reference to (1) above and the last sentence of foregoing paragraph, I believe Department some months ago received a telegram from our Legation in Stockholm which would tend to confirm this all-important point.

While Germans continue to evacuate some troops, there are still reported to be between 150,000 and 200,000 in their armed forces in Norway. Moreover, naval personnel, ammunition and explosives are being shipped to Norway, naval installations and fortifications are being built or strengthened, all indicating an intention of continued resistance, particularly naval warfare.

From the Allied point of view a bitter-end German resistance in Norway will undoubtedly involve at least several additional weeks of U-boat activity against shipping, the effect of which on the war in the Far East and on the progress of the rehabilitation of Europe may be considered.

Sent Department as Noweg 43; repeated to Stockholm as 297.

[OSBORNE]

740.0011 E.W./4-1045: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 10, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 11:09 p. m.]

1342. The possibility of Swedish military intervention in aid of Norway seems to be viewed in London's 297, April 6, 8 p. m. (Ambassador Osborne's 43, April 6, 8 p. m. to Department) in a somewhat broader light than appears to me to be warranted by available facts. There is no doubt that the Swedish Government has made far-reaching plans for military assistance to Norway under certain contingencies. These plans and whatever Swedish commitments to the Royal Norwegian Government may exist are a closely guarded secret and some of the highest officials of the Foreign Office are not informed of the details nor of the nature of the commitments. I am of the opinion, however, that the information given me by Norwegian Foreign Minister Lie and reported to the Department in my Top Secret 4729, November 18, 8 p. m.⁷² is substantially correct. If the Norwegian Government deems Swedish assistance vitally necessary for the liberation of Norway and the King of Norway⁷³ makes a direct request for

⁷² Not printed; it reported that the United States Minister in Sweden (Johnson) had been told by the Norwegian Foreign Minister (Lie), then on a visit to Stockholm, that the Swedish Prime Minister (Hansson) had assured Norway of military assistance against the Germans should events make such assistance necessary (740.0011 EW/11-1844).

⁷³ Haakon VII.

that assistance which is fully endorsed by the Allied High Command I believe the Swedish Government will give a favorable response and that the assistance will go far beyond a "volunteer corps" which it is generally agreed would be inadequate; it may, however, be camouflaged as "volunteer". Much will depend on the course of events in Norway. If there is an orderly withdrawal of German forces from the north to the south and no attempt on the part of the Germans to make Norway a shambles the Swedish Government on receipt of a Norwegian request under those circumstances would probably inquire very closely into the reasons for the necessity of Swedish intervention. I do not believe that the Swedish Government will take any action against Germany as such nor could be brought to sever relations with Germany and to declare war on that country simply to facilitate a German collapse against the Allied onslaught in Germany proper, even though that might incidentally hasten the liberation of Norway. There is much conjecture but no certain knowledge as yet regarding the line the Germans will take in Norway during the last days of collapse. High foreign officials state that they have reliable information from Germany which indicates that Himmler⁷⁴ is strongly opposed to making a stand in Norway or to any wanton destruction in that country; he is said to advocate an orderly withdrawal. Hitler is believed to have opposite views.

My 759, April 10, 8 p. m., top secret, repeats this to London for Ambassador Winant and Osborne.

Although the Swedish Foreign Office has issued a public denial of recent press reports that the Norwegian Government has made a request for aid, I have nevertheless been informed that a "feeler" was put out by Lie about a month or 6 weeks ago to Swedish Minister to the Norwegian Government Beck-Friis. This *démarche* of Lie's seems to have been in the nature of a warning to the Swedes that a direct request for assistance might soon be made. I understand that the reply made by Boheman,⁷⁵ who was then in London, was sympathetic but no definite new commitment was made. Boheman has only come to the Foreign Office today after a stay in the country of 2 weeks following his return from London. I shall endeavor to see him tomorrow and to solicit his views on a frank basis and such information as he will give me. I intend also to talk to Mr. Günther.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Heinrich Himmler, German Minister of Interior and Commander in Chief of the Home Army.

⁷⁵ Erik C. Boheman, Under Secretary of State in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. For Foreign Minister Lie's record of his conversation in London on February 23 with Boheman, see *Norges Forhold til Sverige under Krigen 1940-45*, vol. III, pp. 308-310.

⁷⁶ Christian E. Günther, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

There are indications that political conditions in Norway are more factious than ever and that the Royal Government in London is being put in an increasingly defensive political position. That this should be so occasions no surprise; judging from reports by our secret service in Sweden and confirmed by the British, the Royal Norwegian Government and its representatives and agents in Sweden do not desire any active American or British collaboration in Norway; they want all the material assistance we can give them but they want no control and are not frank in their dealings. It is not entirely clear what are the causes of this attitude. The Allied refusal a short time past to accede to a Norwegian request for intervention in Norway may be partly responsible. The desire for Swedish intervention at the present time may have partly political motives. The Swedes themselves while prepared to give far-reaching assistance to Norway will not be hurried or pushed into action to serve any political ends of the Royal Government and they will require full support and endorsement of any Norwegian request for intervention from the Allied High Command with all that will imply of obligation on our part.

I will endeavor to clarify this situation as soon as possible and will report immediately.

JOHNSON

740.0011 E.W./4-1245: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 12, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received April 12—6:40 p. m.]

Noweg 50. My Noweg 14 February 1, 7 p. m., repeated to Stockholm as my 149, February 1, 7 p. m. Minister of Foreign Affairs Trygve Lie has today handed to Swedish Minister to Norway an *aide-mémoire* dated April 12⁷⁸ referring to the Norwegian *aide-mémoire* of February 1, 1945 which touched upon possible armed intervention in Norway by Sweden.

In the *aide-mémoire* of April 12 reference is made to Allied High Command's belief that it will not be possible to conclude a formal armistice with the Nazis, and the Norwegian Government therefore finds that it must reckon with the possibility of a long continued fight by the German divisions now in Norway.

The *aide-mémoire* expresses confidence that Sweden will be ready to undertake intervention if it should appear necessary in order to

⁷⁸ For text of this *aide-mémoire*, see *Norges Forhold til Sverige under Krigen 1940-45*, vol. III, pp. 310-312.

spare Norwegian people from suffering. It expresses the Norwegian Government's belief that the time for intervention will occur immediately after the Allied High Command has declared that Germany is to be regarded as conquered. But the Norwegian Government believes it of decisive importance that there should now be undertaken by Sweden such measures as will leave no doubt among German forces in Norway that their position will be untenable after Germany's collapse, and that if necessary they will be attacked from Sweden if they do not then give up. The Norwegian Government is convinced that its objective can be reached only if the Swedish Army is placed in a state of full military preparedness as soon as possible. In requesting this step the Norwegian Government fully understands that it will involve sacrifices for the Swedish people.

Full text of *aide-mémoire* will be telegraphed when a smooth translation has been completed.⁷⁹

In this connection please see my Noweg 43 April 6, 8 p. m., which was repeated to Stockholm as No. 297.

Repeated to Stockholm as 307, April 12, 9 p. m.

[OSBORNE]

740.0011 E.W./4-1345 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 13, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received April 14—2:55 a. m.]

Noweg 53. See Stockholm's 1342 to the Department April 10, 8 p. m. I believe that the "broader light" in which the possibility of Swedish intervention may seem to be viewed here arises from the fact that on neither occasion when Lie mentioned to me the assurances he had received from the Swedes did he say that a Norwegian request for assistance from Sweden must be coupled with or backed by an Allied request to Sweden. In fact in emphasizing the statement reported in the third paragraph of my Noweg 43 April 6, 8 p. m., which was repeated to Stockholm as 297, he specifically said that the Allies alone could not cause Sweden to intervene in Norway, but that Sweden would comply with a Norwegian request. Nor did Lie seem to think that Sweden would comply with a Norwegian request only after a German collapse, but would refuse it prior to such a collapse.

However, far from being inclined to ask for Swedish intervention now, I believe the Norwegian Government would be most reluctant

⁷⁹ Text of the *aide-mémoire* contained in Noweg 52, April 13, 1945, 2 p. m., not printed (740.0011 European War/4-1345).

to request it, and that it will not make such a request (unless pressed by the Allies) until it has become reasonably certain that the Germans will fight in Norway after the end of organized resistance in Germany. The Norwegians here believe that an attack by Sweden now would be resisted by the Germans and would result in widespread destruction which they still hope can be avoided. Also I doubt whether the Norwegian Government will ever ask for Swedish intervention in order to strengthen its own standing in Norway, because it is inclined to believe that Swedish intervention might very probably have precisely the opposite effect.

This is all aside from the question, primarily a military one, whether our own interests make desirable Swedish intervention now in order to bring about a speedier end of U-boat warfare even though such pursuit of our interests might be at the expense of Norway.

To sum up the Norwegians' point of view, I believe it is as follows:

(1) They do not want Swedish intervention at present, although they are more ready to accept it than they were 2 months ago;

(2) They still hope for a German surrender in Norway following Allied occupation of most or all of Germany; but they are far less hopeful on this point than they were;

(3) Until they are certain that there will be no such surrender in Norway, they will not ask for Swedish intervention on their own initiative, but they would ask for it if pressed by the Allies as a necessary military measure;

(4) When and if it becomes clear that there will be no surrender in Norway, the Norwegians would still prefer liberation by Allied forces exclusively, but if that should be impossible they would almost certainly be prepared to ask for Swedish aid;

(5) They would also ask for armed Swedish help, without reference to the views of the Allies, if a further German retreat in the north is accompanied by forced evacuation of populations and pursuance of the scorched earth policy (see my Noweg 43 April 6, 8 p. m.).

In this connection I would be interested in learning whether the feeler which Johnson⁸⁰ refers to as having been put out to the Swedes a month or 6 weeks ago was supplementary to the *démarche* described in my telegram Noweg 14 February 1, 7 p. m. repeated to Stockholm as 149 February 1. This *démarche* was in the form of an *aide-mémoire* dated February 1 which was handed to the Swedish Minister in London, Baron Beck-Friis.

Repeated to Stockholm as 309, sent Department as Noweg 53.

[OSBORNE]

⁸⁰ Herschel V. Johnson, American Minister in Sweden.

740.0011 EW/4-1445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne), at London

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1945—7 p. m.

Noweg 14. Information contained in your Noweg 50, April 12, 9 p. m., and in previous messages regarding Swedish-Norwegian relations is most helpful and Department trusts that you will continue to report fully on this subject. You will appreciate, however, that as this is primarily a military matter on which no decision has been reached by our military authorities, you should carefully refrain from giving Lie any indication that the actions being taken by the Norwegians meet with our approval.

STETTINIUS

740.0011 EW/4-1345 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 13, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received April 14—12:35 p. m.]

1383. For Winant and Osborne. This afternoon Foreign Minister Günther requested Sir Victor Mallet⁸¹ and me to see him urgently. We went to the Foreign Office at 5 p. m. and Günther together with Boheman who accompanied him informed us of the Norwegian *aide-mémoire* dated April 12 referred to in Ambassador Osborne's 50, April 12, 9 p. m., to Department, (repeated to Stockholm as London's 307, April 12, 9 p. m.; 14 in Noweg series). Günther said he felt it important to advise United States and British Government of Swedish Government's views on *mémoire* as developed in special Cabinet meeting convened today to consider Norwegian request. Reply will not be made by Swedish Government till Foreign Relations Committee of Riksdag has had an opportunity to examine request and give its views.

Our 795 repeats this to London. See my 1342, April 10, 8 p. m. (759 to London) and London's Noweg 14, February 1, 7 p. m. (149 to Stockholm).

Swedish Government's judgment on Norwegian request is based on information which Günther characterized as extremely reliable both from home front sources in Norway and from Swedish secret sources in Germany. This information coincides to effect that Swedish action suggested by Norwegian Government would be unwise at this time. Swedish Government thinks it of paramount importance both from Swedish and Norwegian points of view that Norway should be

⁸¹ British Minister in Sweden.

liberated without becoming theater of war and with as little destruction of country as possible. Swedish Government thinks there is every hope that if German resistance in Germany collapses, German forces in Norway will not resist and it is further of opinion that if total Swedish mobilization suggested by Norwegian Government should take place, the German forces now in Norway would in all probability take hostages and resort to various destructive measures. In Swedish view mobilization now would provoke the very conditions which it would be desired to prevent. Situation is not ripe for such action. Günther stated he has information on which his Government places reliance that Terboven,⁸² Gestapo⁸³ and SS⁸⁴ forces in Norway desire to continue the fight even after collapse of Germany and to stay in Norway as long as possible. Terboven in past week has carried on intensive propaganda in speeches and otherwise to this end. If Germans in Norway are attacked by Norwegians or seriously menaced, he will give orders for systematic destruction of a number of industrial plants about the importance of which he is fully informed. German Army and Navy chiefs on other hand do not desire to continue struggle after collapse of Germany but are too weak to refuse to obey order from High Command in Germany. Vast majority of rank and file of Wehrmacht⁸⁵ do not desire to continue fight if they are not provoked. Swedish mobilization now in anticipation of immediate collapse in Germany would provoke Norwegian uprisings and would thereby play lukewarm Wehrmacht into hands of Terboven and Gestapo crowd who could overbear military chiefs. Nothing according to Günther would suit Gestapo and SS purposes better. Günther describes view of Norwegian Government to be that Swedish mobilization would so frighten Germans in Norway that they would give up on military collapse in Germany; that Foreign Minister Lie no more designs [*desires?*] fighting on Norwegian soil with further destruction of lives and property than does Norwegian Home Front.^{86a} Suggestion for immediate Swedish mobilization is therefore in Swedish view a gamble.

Günther said he had earlier today expressed above views with complete frankness to Norwegian Minister Esmarch⁸⁶ and that Esmarch had informed him his own information from home front sources in Norway ran parallel to Swedish information which is contrary to views held by Norwegian Government in London.

⁸² Josef Terboven, German Reichskommissar for Norway.

⁸³ Geheime Staats Polizei (German Secret State Police).

⁸⁴ Schutzstaffel, elite corps of the Nazi Party, used for military and police purposes.

⁸⁵ German armed forces.

^{86a} Norwegian resistance movement.

⁸⁶ August Esmarch. For Boheman's record of Günther's conversation with Esmarch, see *Förhandlingarna 1945 om Svensk Intervention i Norge och Danmark*, pp. 15-16.

Both Mallet and I expressed desire to have from Günther a statement of what Swedish reaction would be if, contrary to Swedish expectations, German military in Norway should put up stiff resistance after collapse of Germany, taking hostages, killing people and destroying property. Günther said that would, of course, create entirely new situation which he admitted would not exclude drastic Swedish action at later stage but he said Government would not commit itself on hypothetical basis.

Inasmuch as Norwegian note ⁸⁷ has been communicated for information to United States, British and Russian Governments, we gathered from Günther's remarks that he contemplates giving statement of Swedish views also to USSR representative in Stockholm.

Günther in conclusion said he felt that careful reading of Norwegian note might convey suggestion to Allied Governments that some sort of secret understanding existed between Sweden and Norway regarding possible Swedish armed intervention, and that Mr. Lie's note might be interpreted as having been based on such an understanding. He felt it necessary, therefore, to make it clear to British Minister and me that Sweden has no commitments with Norwegian Government for armed intervention. Boheman reiterated this remark saying that Mr. Lie may have erroneously given the contrary impression to Allied Governments. Günther's statement in effect was flat denial of truth of statements made to me by Mr. Lie and reported in my top secret 4729, November 18, 8 p. m.⁸⁸ Mallet seemed to have impression, as I had, that some sort of definite commitment existed between the two governments. I gather that Lie must have made remarks to him last November in same sense as information he gave me. Günther said he had told Norwegian Minister this a. m. of what he proposed to say to Mallet and me and stated in reply to suggestion from us that he had no objection to our discussing matter with Esmarch.

Mallet and Boheman both referred to conversation in London in February between latter and Sir Orme Sargent ⁸⁹ in which Boheman informed Sargent of Swedish reply to Norwegian *démarche* of February 1. Mallet agreed with Boheman's statement that British at that time had expressed themselves as opposed to Swedish military intervention on practical grounds.

JOHNSON

⁸⁷ Apparent reference to the Norwegian *aide-mémoire* of April 12 to the Swedish Government; see telegram Noweg 50, April 12, 9 p. m., from the Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile, p. 66, and footnote 78.

⁸⁸ See footnote 72, p. 64.

⁸⁹ British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 EW/4-1545 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 15, 1945—11 p. m.
[Received April 15—10:52 p. m.]

Noweg 59. My telegram Noweg 52 April 13, 2 p. m.,⁹⁰ repeated to Stockholm as 308, April 13. I saw Foreign Minister Trygve Lie late this afternoon immediately prior to his departure for the United States. He told me that the Swedish reply to the Norwegian *aide-mémoire* had been received and that Mr. Terje Wold⁹¹ (who will act for him in his absence) would make a copy available to me tomorrow. However, he indicated that the reply follows closely the Swedish point of view as set forth to Johnson by Foreign Minister Günther (telegram No. 1383 April 13 from Stockholm to the Department). He did not ask me whether I had any information from Stockholm and I volunteered nothing.

Mr. Lie expressed considerable irritation at the assumption that the Swedish Government knew better than the Norwegian Government what was good for Norway and that it had better information as to the attitude of the Home Front. He was certain that Swedish mobilization of itself—and Norway was not requesting anything further—would not precipitate a German policy of destruction in Norway. It was, of course, possible that the Germans in Norway would surrender when resistance in Germany ceased even without Swedish mobilization; but as to the effect within Norway of Swedish mobilization, the Norwegian Government was the best judge. As for the Home Front, this particular matter, like all other important questions, had been cleared with and approved by it. This statement was agreed to by Mr. Oisten Thommessen⁹² who was present at the conclusion of the discussion and who is going to San Francisco⁹³ as the Home Front's representative.

Mr. Lie said he would not ask that the United States and Britain should support the Norwegian request but he did urge that they should not support the Swedish position in this matter concerning which further representations will be made to Sweden. Mr. Lie said that his belief that the Swedes would comply with the Norwegian request had been based on assurances given him in Stockholm by the Swedish Prime Minister⁹⁴ and Foreign Secretary and by the Swedish Minister

⁹⁰ Not printed.

⁹¹ Norwegian Minister of Justice.

⁹² Member of the Norwegian resistance movement recently escaped from Norway.

⁹³ For documentation regarding the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, April 25–June 26, 1945, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

⁹⁴ Per Albin Hansson.

here. It is Mr. Lie's view that the present Swedish attitude is primarily motivated by a desire not to run any risk of being involved in hostilities "so long as Germany has a bomber left"; also by doubts as to the effectiveness of the Swedish Army.

I may add that I have never given Mr. Lie the slightest ground for believing that the step which the Norwegians have taken would have the approval of the United States, as I am in complete ignorance of the views on the matter of the Department and the military authorities.

Sent Department as Noweg 59, April 15, 11 p. m.; repeated to Stockholm as 316, April 15, 11 p. m.

[OSBORNE]

740.0011 E.W./4-1645

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1945.

Participants: The President
 The Secretary of State
 The Right Honorable Anthony Eden
 The Earl of Halifax

In a conversation at the White House starting at 10 o'clock this morning, Mr. Eden said that there was a Swedish matter that he wanted to mention to the President. This related to the ten German divisions in Norway. He said that present indications point to the fact that the Germans are going to keep these ten divisions in Norway indefinitely and to obviate the necessity of sending an Allied Expeditionary Force into Norway, he raised the question of our two governments endeavoring to get Sweden to declare war and "clean up Norway." The President had a favorable reaction. Mr. Eden said that with the President's permission, he would pursue this matter further with me. I stated that I wanted to discuss the whole matter with Mr. Eden and then talk to Admiral Leahy⁹⁵ about it and we could bring a specific recommendation to the President.

Upon my return to the Department I sent for Mr. Hickerson, Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs and asked him to get in touch with Mr. Eden and his party about this matter. He did this at once and it has been agreed that the British representatives on the Combined Chiefs of Staff will take up this matter at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

⁹⁵ Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy.

740.0011 E.W./4-1645

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1945.

I was called to the Secretary's office at 11:30 this morning. The Secretary said that in a conversation between President Truman, Mr. Eden and himself, Mr. Eden had stated that the British Government believes there is a good chance that the ten German divisions in Norway will continue resistance after the collapse of Germany. In those circumstances Mr. Eden stated it might be necessary for the allied governments to organize an expeditionary force to Norway unless some other means can be found for dealing with these German divisions. The British Government therefore feels that the United States and the United Kingdom Governments should give consideration to making an approach to the Swedish Government to try to get the Swedish Government to use its military forces to bring about the surrender of the German forces in Norway.

The Secretary said that the President and he had told Mr. Eden that this matter was one in which there were military and political considerations and that we would be glad to go into this matter at once with the British authorities. He instructed me to get in touch with the British Embassy and Mr. Eden's principal private secretary⁹⁷ and to tell them that I had been instructed to tell them that we were ready to talk to them any time they desired.

I called Mr. Roger Makins⁹⁸ on the telephone at 2:30 p. m. and inquired whether he was familiar with the topics of conversation between Mr. Eden on the one hand and President Truman and Secretary of State on the other. He replied that he was. I then said that the Secretary had asked me to get in touch with the Embassy and Mr. Eden's principal private secretary and to say that I had been requested to talk to them as soon as possible about the matter involving "a northern country." Mr. Makins said that he understood the reference. I said that Mr. Hugh Cumming, Mr. William Trimble⁹⁹ and I were ready to talk at any time. Mr. Makins said that the Embassy had received a brief telegram from London on the subject which stated that another telegram was being sent in the course of the day. He therefore said that they were not in a position to talk today but would be tomorrow morning. I told him that we were ready to talk at any time. We made an appointment for Mr. Makins and whom-ever he wishes to bring with him to come to my office at 10:30 tomorrow morning, April 17th.

⁹⁷ Pierson John Dixon.

⁹⁸ Counselor of the British Embassy.

⁹⁹ Assistant Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs.

Mr. Makins said that the British military officers in Washington were already at work on the subject. I told him that that was fine since it seems to us to be principally a military matter.

JOHN HICKERSON

740.0011 E.W./4-1745

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)

[WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Roger Makins, Counselor of British Embassy
Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs
William C. Trimble, Assistant Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs

Mr. Makins called at the Department at Mr. Hickerson's request to discuss the possibility of Swedish military intervention in Norway. I informed Mr. Makins that Mr. Hickerson would be unable to be present but that I had discussed the subject with him in a preliminary fashion yesterday and that I thought the views which I would express to him coincide with those of Mr. Hickerson.

I told Mr. Makins that, in our opinion, the question of Swedish intervention in Norway was ninety-five percent military and therefore must be decided on military rather than political grounds. It would, I thought, be very difficult to secure a formal declaration-of-war by Sweden, and an approach to the Swedes along these lines might get their backs up. It was, however, in Sweden's interest as well as our own that law and order be maintained in Norway and, hence, I felt that the Swedes have undoubtedly made extensive plans looking toward some form of intervention in Norway should disturbances develop. The Swedes will probably seek to maintain law and order until such a time as the Norwegians could take over.

Should we desire Sweden to intervene, I suggested that a frank approach be made to the Swedes asking them for information concerning plans they may have made and the extent to which they would be willing to undertake to police Norway to save that country from destruction. I added that it would probably be necessary to clarify the position of the Soviets.

Mr. Makins fully concurred in my views. I suggested, following Mr. Hickerson's views, that since the matter had been brought to the attention of the President by Mr. Eden, it would be advisable for the British Joint Chiefs to introduce a paper on the subject to the Combined Chiefs. The matter would then come before the U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff who would undoubtedly consult the State Department with respect to political angles. Mr. Makins said that this was already being done and that he believed the views of the British military would be submitted to the Combined Chiefs by this evening.

HUGH S. CUMMING, JR.

740.0011 EW/4-1945 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 19, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

1459. My 1457, April 19, 6 p. m.¹ In giving me the copy of the Swedish reply of April 17 to the Norwegian request for mobilization Mr. Boheman told me that when the matter was up for consideration by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Riksdag there was unanimity amongst members of all parties that the Norwegian request was ill-timed. He said that it was almost equally unanimous ("only a few peasant members who understand nothing gave dissenting opinions") that the entire committee desires to assist Norway in any practicable manner and that they are prepared for military action when that may be necessary. This desire and intention he said is very real and represents the Government's views also. The Government however will be little influenced by outside foreign opinion and will not make its decision based upon emotional premises or estimates of necessity from non-Swedish quarters. Boheman was speaking very earnestly and said that it was his profound personal conviction that if Sweden in response to the Norwegian request should order now a total mobilization the results would be disastrous for Norway and would provoke German measures from which Norway would suffer cruelly.

It is my opinion, based on talks with Boheman and other responsible officials together with opinions which Colonel Rayens² has gathered from military quarters, that the responsible authorities of this country believe that intervention in Norway would be justified if such action could in fact save Norwegian lives and property. As long as the chance remains that when the end is announced in Germany the Germans will evacuate Norway without widespread de-

¹ Not printed; it transmitted the text of the Swedish *aide-mémoire* of April 17 replying to the Norwegian *aide-mémoire* of April 12 (740.0011 EW/4-1945). Regarding the Norwegian *aide-mémoire*, see telegram Norweg 50, April 12, from London, p. 66. For text of the Swedish *aide-mémoire* of April 17, see *Norges Forhold til Sverige under Krigen 1940-45*, vol. III, p. 316.

² Col. Charles E. Rayens, Assistant Military Attaché and Military Attaché for Air in Sweden.

struction the Swedes will not intervene. They probably believe it wiser to leave an escape corridor open to internment in Sweden than to close the door before the Germans make their decision. According to information which responsible quarters allege is in the hands of the Swedish Government, there appears to be an equal chance that the Wehrmacht (estimated strength approximately 150,000) will evacuate Norway via Sweden and Swedes consequently think it would be rash and unjustified to risk Norwegian lives and the destruction of essential facilities by wielding the big stick before the time is ripe. The Swedish view is that in order to accomplish the desired end of saving life and property, the Germans must be surprised and overpowered in a minimum time to prevent the demolition plans of the SS and Gestapo being executed. To count upon surprise is extremely hazardous since the approaches to Norway are through limited corridors where the Germans, already alerted by articles in the free Swedish press urging intervention, stand in prepared positions facing Sweden. As I am able to judge it here, the Swedish Government will not "rock the boat" as long as there is substantial hope for German withdrawal to Sweden. If the Germans do not withdraw and do commit excesses in Norway, indications are that the Swedes would intervene wholeheartedly if requested to do so; they are not however likely to make any prior commitment.

The Government is very interested in Russia's attitude toward intervention and I have been informed that Madame Kollontay,³ sometime before she left Stockholm, told Mr. Günther frankly that the Russian Government did not desire Swedish military intervention in Norway.

Incidentally Boheman told me that according to Swedish information there are not more than 3500 SS and Gestapo personnel in Norway; the rest are Wehrmacht.

Repeated to London for Ambassadors Winant and Osborne as my 831, April 19, 6 p. m.

JOHNSON

740.0011 EW/4-2045

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Grew)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1945.

The Norwegian Ambassador called on me this afternoon at his request and said that when the Nazis are finally defeated in Germany

³ Mme. Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay, Soviet Minister in Sweden until her departure in mid-March 1945.

the Norwegian Government, including the "home front" in Norway, are convinced that the Germans in Norway will undertake a systematic destruction of everything in Norway, including buildings, bridges, supplies, crops, etc. The Norwegians feel very strongly that if Sweden will promptly mobilize its army and move it to the Norwegian frontier the Germans will be deterred from carrying out such destruction, as the Swedes would warn them that in such an event they would be driven into the sea. The Norwegian Government has asked the Swedish Government to take this step but the Swedish Government has refused and the Ambassador understands that the position of the Swedish Government was supported by the American, British and Soviet representatives. The Ambassador expressed the hope that we would alter our position in this respect and would recommend to the Swedish Government that its army be promptly mobilized and moved to the Norwegian frontier.

I asked the Ambassador if he knew the grounds on which the Swedish Government had declined to act favorably on the Norwegian request. As the Ambassador did not reply, I suggested that it might be because the Swedes believed that mobilization of the Swedish Army would in itself cause the Germans in Norway promptly to undertake a scorched-earth policy and that thus their mobilization might have an effect precisely contrary to that desired. The Ambassador admitted that this was the case. I said that this was, of course, a military matter and could probably only be settled by military authorities, either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Ambassador replied that he thought the political implications more important than military considerations. I said that I took due note of his representations and would look into the matter.

JOSEPH C. GREW

740.0011 EW/4-1945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1945—7 p. m.

752. In recent conversation with me ⁴ the Norwegian Ambassador indicated that his government had received information to the effect that in conversations with Swedish authorities you and your British and Soviet colleagues had supported the position taken by the Swedish Government on the Norwegian request for mobilization. He expressed the hope that we would alter our position and recommend to

⁴ See memorandum *supra*.

the Swedes that the army be promptly mobilized and moved to the frontier. It has been ascertained that this assumption was based on Minister Esmarch's reports to the Norwegian Government. The Norwegians here have been assured that no such support was given by you and that while you reported fully your conversations with Günther and Esmarch, you gave them no indication whatsoever that the American Government approved or disapproved of the Norwegian *démarche*.

For your strictly secret information, the advisability of approaching the Swedes with a view to securing their intervention in Norway is under consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the present time.

GREW

740.0011 E.W./4-2545

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1945.

Mr. Eden's suggestion to you that an Anglo-American approach be made to the Swedes with a view to securing their intervention in Norway was embodied in a paper submitted by the British Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on April 19 where the matter is presently being considered. In my opinion, the proposal is primarily military in nature and must be decided on military rather than political grounds.

Without prior clearance by SHAEF, the Norwegians recently asked the Swedes to mobilize in order to indicate to the Germans in Norway that prolonged resistance would be useless. The Swedes considered such action as a gamble which might very well have the contrary effect. They therefore rejected the Norwegian request but left the door open for further approach should it subsequently appear that the Germans in Norway will continue to resist after the collapse in Germany proper.

Despite this turn-down, I feel there is a good possibility that the Swedes would be willing to intervene if a request is made by the American, British and Norwegian Governments and no objection is raised by the Soviets. It is extremely doubtful, however, whether the Swedes would declare war on Germany. Intervention would probably be effected by regular units of the Swedish army acting either as "volunteers" or in the guise of "police" operating against "guerrilla" forces. As the result would be the same, it is felt that we should not press the Swedes for a formal declaration of war.

JOSEPH C. GREW

740.0011 E.W./4-2645

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 27, 1945.

While I was at the White House this morning I showed the President telegram 1565, April 26, 8 p. m., from Minister Johnson in Stockholm⁵ concerning negotiations between a representative of the Swedish Government and Himmler's representative to discuss the possibility of all Germans in Denmark and Norway surrendering to the Swedes in Sweden.⁶ The Swedes would undertake not to turn German troops over to Soviet Russia but would intern them for the Inter-Allied Commission and they would also endeavor to arrange that 20,000 Russian prisoners of war now held by the Germans in Norway would be returned to Russia via Sweden. The President was keenly interested and said he thought that this made sense.

JOSEPH C. GREW

740.0011 EW/4-3045 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 30, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 8:43 p. m.]

Noweg 71. Acting Foreign Minister Terje Wold sent for me this afternoon.

1. He said he had received a note from Christopher Warner, head of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office, stating that on April 21 the Secretary temporarily in charge of the British Legation at Stockholm had informed the Swedish Foreign Minister of the British Government's regret that the Swedish Government had refused to comply with the request contained in the Norwegian *aide-mémoire* of April 12; and that on April 26 the British Minister to Sweden urged the Swedish Foreign Minister not to commit the Swedish Government, at the secret meeting of the Swedish Riksdag to be held on April 27, to a negative course in connection with the Norwegian request.

⁵ Not printed.⁶ The negotiations involving Count Folke Bernadotte, head of the Swedish Red Cross, and Major General (Brigadefuehrer) Walter Schellenberg regarding the surrender of German armed forces in Norway and Denmark to Swedish custody during April 1945 are discussed in Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 476-477.

Mr. Wold again expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would give similar support in Stockholm to the Norwegian Government's *démarche*.

2. Mr. Wold said that the Norwegian Minister in Stockholm had recently been approached by a prominent Swedish businessman in close touch with the Swedish Foreign Office, who submitted a detailed plan for the surrender, under certain conditions, of the Wehrmacht in Norway, which the Minister had reported to the Government here. He had been instructed in reply to tell the intermediary that nothing but unconditional surrender would be acceptable and that in any case arrangements relating to German surrender were a matter for the Allied military authorities to deal with.

Mr. Wold expressed considerably more optimism than hitherto concerning the possibility of German surrender in Norway.

[OSBORNE]

740.0011 EW/4-3045 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 30, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received April 30—1:03 p. m.]

1606. British Minister having received instructions in all essential points identic to those in your 782, April 28, 8 p. m.,⁷ we called together at 12:30 this morning on Foreign Minister Günther and saw him and Mr. Boheman together. Mr. Günther's reaction to the request for staff talks as outlined in your telegram was immediately favorable. It was necessary to consult the Government Mr. Günther said but he believed the reply would be favorable.

I received a telephone call from Mr. Boheman at 2:15 saying that the answer to our *démarche* is in the affirmative and that the Swedish Government would appreciate our taking action to follow it up as quickly as possible. He suggested that the arrival of the officers who may be sent by General Eisenhower be as unobtrusive as possible and that the Swedish Government would prefer them to be in civilian clothes.

JOHNSON

⁷ See telegram Noweg 22, April 30, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile, *infra*.

740.0011 EW/4-1945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne), at London

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1945—9 p. m.

Noweg 22. The following telegram was sent to Stockholm as Department's 782, April 28, 8 p. m.

"With reference to the question of the desirability of the entry of Sweden into the war, the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force,^s are of the opinion that Norway can only be entered in strength through Sweden and that if operations prove necessary to clear up the Norwegian situation they should be completed before winter conditions set in. From the military point of view the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that the advantages of opening up a line of communication to Sweden and drawing that country into the war would be as follows:

(a) With Sweden in the war, her bases at our disposal, and her troops ready to cooperate with us, a direct and opposed entry into Norway could be avoided and considerable economy in Allied troops and resources would be made possible. The liberation of Norway would thus be accelerated and the remaining operational bases for the U-boats would be removed.

(b) Some two million tons of Swedish and Norwegian shipping, now lying idle in Swedish waters, would be free.

The moment for the entry of Sweden into the war however will require most careful judgment. At this stage an injudicious approach might result in frightening the Swedes into a flat refusal based on the belief that the Allied military demands from her will be far greater than the Combined Chiefs of Staff anticipate will in fact be the case. In the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Sweden is not strong enough to achieve any useful results on her own, consequently they would not wish for an immediate declaration of war by Sweden nor the opening of hostilities.

On instruction of the Combined Chiefs, General Eisenhower is preparing a plan to deal with the Germans in Norway and has now reached a point where it is vital to him to discuss the matter with the Swedish General Staff since he has so little knowledge of the Swedish forces that he cannot decide on the strength of the United States and British forces which may be required or which it might be desirable to introduce through Sweden. You are therefore requested to approach the appropriate Swedish authorities in this matter at your earliest opportunity. In your approach you should (a) reassure the Swedish Government that the British and American Governments do not ask nor expect the Swedish Government to undertake any warlike operations by themselves, now or at any time; (b) press the Swedish Government to agree at once to staff conversations taking place between the Swedish General Staff and Supreme Head-

^s General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

quarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, with the object of drawing up a plan for possible operations to deal with the Germans in Norway.

In the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, active Russian co-operation in the campaign to clear Norway will not be essential from the military point of view. You should concert with your British colleague."

The foregoing is for your own background information.

Please associate yourself with your British colleague⁹ and inform the Acting Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs that at the instance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the American and British Ministers at Stockholm have approached the Swedish Foreign Minister with a view to arranging staff conversations between representatives of the Swedish general staff and SHAEF with the object of formulating a plan for possible operations by Allied and Swedish forces against the Germans in Norway. You may add that a message has just been received from Mr. Johnson stating that the Swedish Government has agreed to the early opening of such conversations. You should make it clear to Mr. Wold that your remarks to him are for the strictly confidential information of his own Government.

GREW

740.0011 EW/5-445: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, May 5, 1945—2 a. m.

[Received 2:07 a. m.]

1687. Foreign Minister Günther asked the British Minister and me to see him at midnight. He informed us that Swedish Minister Dardel at Copenhagen had advised his Government that General Schellenberg¹⁰ is arriving at Stockholm at 10 a. m. today (May 5) with full powers from Doenitz¹¹ to arrange for surrender to the Swedes of German troops in Norway.¹² Mr. Günther thinks it most likely that this means internment in Sweden until these forces can be taken over by the Allies.

Swedish Government would be grateful for a most immediate expression of the views of the American and British Governments with respect to this course of action.

⁹ Ambassador Laurence Collier.

¹⁰ Maj. Gen. Walter Schellenberg, Major General in Waffen (Armed) S.S. and Chief of Military and Foreign Political Intelligence of the Reich Security Main Office.

¹¹ Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz, Chief of the German State (Staats-Führer) following the death of Adolf Hitler, and Commander in Chief of the German Navy.

¹² For further documentation on General Schellenberg's role in discussions relating to surrender of German forces, see vol. III, pp. 717 ff.

Mr. Günther has not yet informed the Soviet representative in view of the fact that in the proposed staff conversations (your 782, April 28, 8 p. m.¹⁴ and my 1606, April 30, 3 p. m.) it had not been the intention of the American and British Governments to bring the Russians into these conversations. If, however, it is your intention to inform the Soviet Government at this stage of the forthcoming visit of Schellenberg the Swedish Government would particularly desire to have the first opportunity to do so and are anxious to have the views of the American and British Governments.

Mr. Günther asks for absolute secrecy but wishes you to know that the Norwegian Minister is being informed immediately.

It is my opinion and that of the British Minister that qualified representatives from SHAEF should arrive at Stockholm at the earliest possible moment to advise us in these matters. The Swedish Government has no objection and Mr. Günther informed us that the officers may come in uniform and with armed escort planes if timely notice of arrival is given so that adequate warning and instructions can be given to Swedish anti-aircraft forces.

JOHNSON

740.00119 EW/5-545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1945—11 a. m.

815. Reurtel 1687 May 5, 2 a. m. General Eisenhower has been directed to send SHAEF representatives to Stockholm immediately.

It is the feeling of the Department and of the War Department that the Soviet Government should be informed immediately and we are agreeable to having the Swedish Government take the necessary action to that end.¹⁵

¹⁴ Quoted in telegram 22, April 30, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile, *supra*.

¹⁵ Telegram 1716, May 5, midnight, from Stockholm, reported that the Department's views had been communicated to Under Secretary of State Boheman and that subsequently Boheman had informed the Soviet Chargé that General Schellenberg had arrived in Stockholm on the morning of May 5 and had informed the Swedish Foreign Office that Admiral Doenitz had empowered him to arrange immediately for a capitulation of the German troops in Norway, possibly with Swedish collaboration; that General Eisenhower had been informed of this at General Schellenberg's request; and that General Eisenhower was sending a mission to Stockholm (740.00119 EW/5-545).

The Department of Defense has supplied the information that General Eisenhower was authorized rather than directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to send SHAEF representatives to Stockholm. Because of other developments, no mission actually was sent.

In order to avoid delay we suggest that you communicate any further developments directly to General Eisenhower as well as to the Department.

GREW

740.0011 E.W./5-745: Telegram

The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 7, 1945—midnight.

[Received May 8—6:24 a. m.]

2460. SHAEF has informed Johnson that in view of developments reported in my 2429, May 7, 1 p. m.,¹⁶ it will not be necessary to send SHAEF mission to Stockholm.

[MURPHY]

DISCUSSIONS REGARDING NEGOTIATION OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORWAY CONCERNING LIBERATED SHIPS; THE CASE OF THE M.S. "DARSS"

740.00112 EW/9-445

The Norwegian Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Norwegian shipowners A/S A. F. Klaveness in February 1939 entered into a contract with the Framnæs Mekaniske Verksted, (Framnes Shipbuilding Co.) Sandefjord, for the construction of a ship. The total amount agreed to was Norwegian Kroner 3,625,000. The construction was not terminated when the German invasion took place.

In 1941 the German authorities, against the protest of the owners, confiscated the ship after having offered to buy the contract. The owners up to then had paid Kroner 2,175,000. The Germans paid an additional amount of Kroner 1,450,000. The builders contend that an additional amount of Kr. 120,000 is still due. Upon completion the ship was taken over by the German authorities and given the name of *Darss*.

The *Darss* is at present in Bremerhaven where it has been seized as a prize by the American Navy. The shipowners have protested through the Norwegian Shipping Office in Hamburg and the matter

¹⁶ Not printed; it reported that the unconditional surrender of all German land, sea, and air forces in Europe to the Allied Expeditionary Force and to the Soviet High Command had been signed by a representative of the German High Command at 01:41 hours Central European Time, May 7, 1945 (740.00119 EW/5-745).

has been discussed by Norwegian and United States authorities in London. The latter have contended that it must be proved that the owners are Norwegian and that the builders have no further claims.

According to the draft agreement regarding liberated ships negotiated between the Norwegian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom Norwegian ships seized by the Germans under conditions as described are still deemed to be Norwegian. The proper American authorities were kept informed regarding the said negotiations, and it is understood that they had no objections to the principles embodied in the draft. The British Ministry of War Transports in a letter of August 22, 1945 to the Norwegian Ministry of Shipping placed the *Darss* at the disposal of the Norwegian Government freed from all responsibilities.

The Norwegian Government trusts that the United States authorities will consent to the delivery of the *Darss* to the Norwegian owners. The A/S A. F. Klaveness is a well-known Norwegian shipping firm with a capital 100% Norwegian. The Framnæs Mekaniske Verksted, which maintains a claim against the ship is also a Norwegian corporation.

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1945.

740.00112 EW/10-1045

The Norwegian Chargé (Jorstad) to the Secretary of State

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Norway presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of September 4, 1945, regarding the Norwegian S/S *Darss* which is temporarily in the hands of the American Navy.

The Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to inform the Government of the United States that the Norwegian Government will indemnify the other United Nations' Governments concerned against any claims made against them or any one or more of them arising out of the handing over of the S/S *Darss*. This is in accordance with the Draft Agreement now being negotiated between the Norwegian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom referred to in the Embassy's above mentioned *Aide-Mémoire* of September 4, 1945.

The Chargé d'Affaires would be grateful if the Secretary of State would kindly communicate the contents of the present note to other pertinent United States authorities.

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1945.

No. 803

740.00112 EW/10-1645

The Norwegian Chargé (Jorstad) to the Secretary of State

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Norway presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor, acting under instructions from his Government, to ask the United States Government to consider the negotiation of an agreement concerning liberated ships.

Negotiations for a liberated ships agreement between the Norwegian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom have taken place in London and an agreement was signed on October 11, 1945. The agreement is based on a "Memorandum concerning the use and disposal of United Nations vessel captured or found by their forces in the course of operations for the liberation of Europe", submitted by the British negotiators, a letter from the Norwegian Ambassador to London to the British Foreign Office of June 5th, 1944 and the reply from the Foreign Office of August 7th, 1944. Copies of the three documents are enclosed.¹⁷

The Chargé d'Affaires has the honor to suggest that an agreement similar to the one negotiated between the Governments of Norway and the United Kingdom be concluded between the Government of the United States and the Norwegian Government. An Agreement as the one contemplated would solve the questions relating to the Norwegian S/S *Darss*, which was referred to in the Chargé d'Affaires note No. 803 of October 10, 1945.

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1945.

No. 808

857.85/11-945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Adviser on Shipping (Mann)

[WASHINGTON,] November 9, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Francis Irgens, Counselor, Norwegian Embassy
 Mr. Summers, Le ^{17a}
 Mr. Mann, SD ^{17b}

Meeting was held in Mr. Saugstad's ¹⁸ office at Mr. Summers' suggestion and went over much the same ground that Mr. Irgens and

¹⁷ None printed.

^{17a} Office of the Legal Adviser.

^{17b} Shipping Division.

¹⁸ Jesse E. Saugstad, Chief of the Shipping Division of the Department of State.

Mr. Mann had gone over at a previous meeting on November 8. The following points were developed:

(1) The *Darss* had not, to the best information of the Norwegians, been brought to a prize court by the Germans.

(2) Mr. Summers stated that the statutory authority for the Anglo U.S. Liberated Vessels Agreement¹⁹ was the Lend Lease Act,²⁰ and therefore, to enter into such an agreement with Norway now that the war is over would present serious difficulties from the legal standpoint.

(3) Mr. Summers raised the point that if the *Darss* is the only vessel involved, the question might well be disposed of under the pending bill HR 4231,²¹ which would permit the setting up of a prize court at the port where the ship is lying.

Mr. Irgens again pointed out that the German taking was illegal and not supported by international law, and should be considered null and void; that the United States Navy was placed in a position to seize the vessel, not necessarily by force of arms, but it went into Bremerhaven as a matter of Allied convenience, and that Norway is an ally too and just happened to be fighting somewhere else, that Norway's Lend Lease agreement with the United States²² recognizes that the United States will do what it can to assist in the rehabilitation of Norway's Merchant Marine and that its action in the *Darss* case might be considered inconsistent with this policy; that public reaction towards the United States would be very bad when the facts are known in Norway.

It was decided at the meeting that Mr. Mann and Mr. Summers would first sound out the Navy Department with the view to developing the Navy's position; and after such exploration would, if it appeared feasible, invite the Department of Justice and War Shipping Administration to attend a joint conference with State and the Navy with a view to ironing out the *Darss* matter and making suitable recommendations to all of these agencies.

Pursuant to the foregoing arrangements, Mr. Mann telephoned Captain Myron Avery of the Navy Department with regard to making an appointment for himself and Mr. Summers to discuss the matter. Captain Avery is tied up all next week and, therefore, put on the phone his assistant, Lt. Wood, who is also working on the *Darss* case and

¹⁹ For documentation relating to the agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the use and disposition of recaptured vessels, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 140 ff; for text of the agreement effected by exchange of notes signed May 7 and June 15, 1945, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1556*, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1909.

²⁰ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

²¹ Public Law 222, 79th Congress, an Act to facilitate further the disposition of prizes captured by the United States, and for other purposes, approved November 14, 1945; 59 Stat. 581.

²² For text of the agreement of July 11, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 262.

a three-cornered conversation was held. Captain Avery stated that the U.S. Navy might not be interested in remaining on the *Darss* or in bringing it to prize court, however, it could not turn the vessel over to the Norwegians without possibly incurring liabilities to German individuals who might make claims; that in view of the bad condition of the *Darss*, Naval Operations might be sympathetic to a recommendation that the Navy prize crew abandon the *Darss* whereupon the Norwegians could move on board and settle the matter with the Germans or any other nation which might make a claim; but before the Navy could consider any such recommendation it would have to be furnished with an indemnity agreement from the Norwegian Government which would protect the U.S. Navy against any claims or liabilities or activities growing out of the U.S. Navy's taking possession of or abandoning of the *Darss*; that such indemnity must not be conditioned on the Navy's turning over the vessel to the Norwegians because the Navy had no such intention. The Navy might consider just getting off the *Darss* if properly indemnified against any claims whatsoever by reason of getting on the vessel or of abandoning it, and if not so indemnified would have to have the rights of all parties properly adjudicated.

Mr. Mann suggested to Captain Avery that he would try to get together with Mr. Irgens of the Norwegian Embassy and Mr. Summers of the Legal Division to see if the three of them could draft an indemnity which the Norwegians might be willing to make to the Navy, and which Mr. Summers and Mr. Mann feel would meet the Navy's points. Captain Avery stated that if Mr. Mann would mail him such a draft that he and Lt. Wood would give it immediate consideration and mail it back with any changes the Navy would want to insist upon. Captain Avery will be glad to see Mr. Summers and Mr. Mann at any time after next week but suggested that we first try to work out the matter along the lines of the draft indemnity which was discussed.

857.85/12-1245

The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State

No. 912

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's note No. 827 of October 24, 1945²³ regarding the M/S *Darss* and to subsequent conversations between representatives of the Department of State and a representative of the Embassy.

²³ Not printed.

Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to state that the Norwegian Government, in the event that the Norwegian Government or any Norwegian corporation or Norwegian nationals or parties having a Norwegian interest, shall, after 1 December 1945, assume, either permanently or temporarily, the custody or possession of the Norwegian motorship *Darss*, now in the Port of Bremerhaven and in the possession of a United States prize crew, hereby agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America, the Navy Department and its personnel, whether enlisted or commissioned, and any agents, representatives or persons acting for the United States or the Navy Department in any capacity whatsoever, from any and all claims, demands or causes of action of any character whatsoever, which may be made, asserted or litigated against the United States and its agents or representatives as above described, in connection with or growing out of or by reason of any act whatsoever which may have been taken in connection with the motorship *Darss*.

Without limiting the generality or in any way restricting the foregoing, this obligation is particularly directed toward any claims, demands or causes of action growing out of the construction, seizure, the taking of possession by a United States Prize crew of the *Darss* in Bremerhaven and any action taken thereafter in connection with the said *Darss*.

The Norwegian Government hereby agrees, in the event of any litigation or controversy growing out of the activity of the United States and its agents or representatives and hereinbefore described, that said Norwegian Government will assume, defend and hold harmless the United States in any such proceedings. The Norwegian Government, in the event that the United States shall proceed to a final determination of any rights of prize arising out of the capture of the *Darss*, does not, by this obligation, abandon any right which it may have to assert a Norwegian interest in the said vessel.

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:
LARS J. JORSTAD

740.00112 EW/10-1645

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Norwegian Ambassador
(Morgenstierne)*

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1946.

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Norway and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note No. 808 dated October 16, 1945 asking the United States Government to consider the negotiation of an agreement between the Norwegian Government and the Government of the United

States concerning liberated ships and referring to questions relating to the M.S. *Darss* which would be solved if such an agreement were in effect.

Since the Embassy's note of October 16, 1945 was received by the Department, a number of conferences have been held between officers of the Embassy and of the Department and correspondence has been exchanged with respect to the negotiations suggested by the Embassy and to the situation relating to the *Darss*. The Department now understands that the *Darss* problem has been satisfactorily solved,²⁴ and no similar situation exists or probably will arise whereunder a liberated vessels agreement between Norway and the United States would be useful. In view of these premises, the Department no longer perceives the necessity for such an agreement between Norway and the United States and would welcome the views of the Embassy in this respect.

**ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING REPORTED DEMANDS
BY THE SOVIET UNION ON NORWAY WITH RESPECT TO SPITS-
BERGEN AND BEAR ISLAND**

857.014/7-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

OSLO, July 5, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 11:35 p. m.]

204. In strict confidence Foreign Minister Lie informed me that during his November Moscow visit Molotov,²⁵ in very strong terms, had put forward an outright claim to Bear Island and a demand Spitzbergen be placed under Russo-Norwegian condominium in order to defend vital Russian communication lines. He said US and UK were taking similar steps in Pacific, Mediterranean and elsewhere.

Molotov wished Norway to denounce 1920 treaty²⁶ regarding the territories, and pressed for immediate answer. Lie resisted and later made one unacceptable counter-proposal and subsequently another for regional agreement for Russo-Norwegian defense of the islands

²⁴ On December 28, 1945, the Department of State was informed by the Navy Department that on December 22, the United States Navy prize crew was withdrawn from the M.S. *Darss* in Bremerhaven, and that a Norwegian crew came aboard and took possession. The Norwegian Embassy was informed and expressed its gratitude for the cooperation of the Department of State in solving this problem. (857.85/12-2845)

²⁵ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

²⁶ For text of the treaty between the United States and other powers relating to Spitsbergen, signed at Paris February 9, 1920, see *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. 1, p. 78.

under United Nations Security Council. Lie said Norway felt compelled to give in that much. No reply yet received. Molotov at San Francisco²⁷ told Lie matter could wait until Govt returned to Oslo. Lie says Eden²⁸ was informed last winter and Crown Prince²⁹ on last trip discussed matter with President Roosevelt who informed Secretary Stettinius. Lie has now informed Storting³⁰ in secret session and Brit Ambassador³¹ [but?] nothing will be given out here now and he is most anxious matter be kept secret.

OSBORNE

SWNCC³² File

*Memorandum by the Acting Chairman, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Hickerson)*³³

SWNCC 159

13 July 1945.

SOVIET DEMANDS WITH RESPECT TO BEAR ISLAND AND THE SPITSBERGEN
ARCHIPELAGO

THE PROBLEM

1. Soviet demand for outright cession of Bear Island, the establishment of Soviet-Norwegian condominium over Spitsbergen and denunciation by Norway of 1920 multilateral treaty recognizing its sovereignty over the Spitsbergen Archipelago.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. There are attached a paraphrase of top secret telegram no. 204, dated July 5, from the American Ambassador to Norway (Appendix "A"),^{33a} and a paper prepared by the State Department describing the status of Spitsbergen (Appendix "B").³⁴

DISCUSSION

3. The interest of the Soviet Union in acquiring military bases in the Spitsbergen Archipelago is natural in view of the experiences gained in the war respecting the safeguarding of convoys to Mur-

²⁷ Foreign Commissar Molotov attended the opening sessions of the United Nations Conference at San Francisco in April 1945. For documentation regarding this Conference, held April 25 to June 26, 1945, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

²⁸ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²⁹ Crown Prince Olav of Norway visited Washington during January 1945.

³⁰ The Norwegian Parliament.

³¹ Sir Laurence Collier.

³² State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

³³ This memorandum was circulated for the consideration of the Committee, and a copy was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view. According to document SWNCC 159/4, dated 27 July 1945 (not printed), on July 26 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee panel at Potsdam approved SWNCC 159.

^{33a} *Supra*.

³⁴ Not printed.

mansk. So far as Norway is concerned, it would be loath to modify in any way its sovereignty over Spitsbergen. However, should it develop that the Soviet Government is adamant in demanding either bases in Spitsbergen or on the Norwegian mainland, the Norwegian Government would obviously prefer the former alternative, particularly if it could be accomplished, as suggested by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Norwegian defense under the United Nations Security Council.

4. Anything affecting the *status quo* in the North Atlantic and the approaches thereto is of direct interest to the United States. Accordingly, before determining what policy should be adopted by this Government should the Soviets reiterate their demands respecting the Spitsbergen Archipelago, the views of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military aspects of the matter should be obtained. The question is therefore being submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for transmission to the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Joint Chiefs.

5. From a political standpoint, it is considered that, as a general principle, the United States should not acquiesce in any action taken in contravention of the terms of a multilateral convention to which the United States is a party. In the case in question, Norwegian sovereignty over the Spitsbergen Archipelago was recognized in the 1920 Treaty "subject to the stipulations of the present treaty" which included its demilitarization. Other powers waived in favor of Norway any claims which they may have had to this hitherto *terra nullius* on the express stipulation that these conditions were met by the Norwegian Government. Should it fail to do so, the Signatory Powers would theoretically have the right to withdraw their recognition of Norwegian sovereignty. Accordingly, it would seem apparent that Norway, even should it desire to do so, could not change the status of the Spitsbergen Archipelago by unilateral action.

CONCLUSIONS

6. The Department of State assumes that anything affecting the *status quo* in the North Atlantic and approaches thereto is of direct interest to the United States from a military as well as political standpoint. It therefore desires to receive the views of the Secretaries of War and Navy and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic aspects of the proposal of the Soviet Government to acquire bases on the Spitsbergen Archipelago for use in determining what the policy of the United States should be toward the Soviet demand on Norway.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. The Department of State recommends that the views of the Secretaries of War and Navy and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be transmitted to it on an urgent basis in view of the possibility that the status of the Spitsbergen Archipelago may be discussed at the forthcoming meeting³⁵ of the President, Mr. Churchill³⁶ and Marshal Stalin.³⁷ In considering this matter it will be necessary to bear in mind the relationship of the possible Soviet acquisition of bases in the Spitsbergen Archipelago, Bornholm and Jan Mayen Island, where a radio sonde station is now being operated by the United States³⁸ with the consent of the Norwegian Government, to the possible acquisition of United States bases in Iceland³⁹ and Greenland.⁴⁰

JOHN HICKERSON

857.014/7-545 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Norway
(Osborne)*

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1945—2 p. m.

114. The info contained in your 204, July 5, has been read with much interest by the Dept. Should a suitable opportunity arise, you should informally advise Lie that you would like to be kept informed of any new developments in the matter.

For your secret info only and not to be discussed with anyone, Dept considers that anything affecting the North Atlantic and the approaches thereto is of direct interest to the US. It is therefore obtaining the views of the Secretaries of War and Navy and Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Soviet demands on Norway in order to assist it in determining what our policy shall be. You will be kept informed.

GREW

³⁵ For documentation regarding the Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference), July 16 to August 2, 1945, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, 2 volumes. The status of Spitsbergen was not discussed at this Conference.

³⁶ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister until July 27, 1945, when he was succeeded by Clement R. Attlee.

³⁷ Marshal of the Soviet Union Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

³⁸ For documentation concerning arrangements for the withdrawal of United States Navy personnel from Jan Mayen Island, see pp. 100 ff.

³⁹ For bracketed note concerning efforts by the United States to obtain post-war leases for military bases in Iceland, see vol. iv, p. 953.

⁴⁰ For documentation concerning the United States agreement with Denmark regarding the defense of Greenland, see *ibid.*, pp. 574 ff.

857.014/7-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

OsLO, July 23, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received July 24—12:11 p. m.]

277. British Ambassador was recently asked from Potsdam whether secrecy should still be maintained on matter dealt with my 265, July 19⁴¹ and was later informed member US delegation had raised question. Foreign Minister Lie told Collier he had no objection to Anglo-American discussion but hoped matter would not be discussed with Russians unless he himself could be present.

Today Collier and I given copies of English translations of (a) Norwegian note to Molotov dated March 31 last and (b) draft joint declaration dated April 9 for joint defense of territories in question submitted by Norwegians.

Latter is proposal mentioned by Lie (my 204, July 5) as still unreplied to.

Besides information given starting [*Storting*] in secret session matter has been communicated secretly for background purposes to press. Nothing has appeared in print.

Copies both documents being airmailed.⁴² Suggest I can send copies to Secretary Byrnes⁴³ by Army plane if desired.

Substance both documents follows in Part 2 this telegram.

Following is substance of document (a) mentioned Part 1 this telegram: Molotov had informed Andvord⁴⁴ January 25 that Soviet Government had most attentively studied Norwegian Ambassador's statement January 25 that Norway proposes with reference to Bear Island and Spitsbergen, to negotiate on joint military defence and Norway proposes in re proposals worked out by the two Governments, to consult Allied Governments. Soviets were in agreement with Norway's proposal and on above-stated basis wished to propose negotiations simultaneously re: exploitation by Russia and Norway of coal and other resources on Spitsbergen; also the necessity of abrogation of February 9, 1920 treaty.

⁴¹ Not printed; it reported that Foreign Minister Lie had heard nothing more from the Soviet Government regarding Spitsbergen and believed that the Russians would not again approach the Norwegian Government on the matter until after the Potsdam Conference, where the matter might be taken up (857.014/7-1945).

⁴² Neither printed; they were transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Norway as enclosures to despatch 158, July 28, 1945 (not printed). At the instruction of the Department, a copy of this despatch and its enclosures were transmitted to the Secretary of State at Potsdam on July 26, 1945 (857.014/7-2645).

⁴³ James F. Byrnes, who became Secretary of State on July 3, 1945, accompanied President Truman to the Potsdam Conference.

⁴⁴ Rolf Otto Andvord, Norwegian Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Norway (Norwegian note to Molotov continues) accepts Soviet's proposals on starting negotiations based on this communication but points out final agreements must receive Storting approval pursuant to constitution. Norway also wishes make following points:

1. Military defense of territories joint concern Norway and USSR. Defensive measures shall accord with International Security Organization's arrangements. All permanent installations on land to be provided by Norway.

Two countries will observe equality in all points on military affairs and will make agreements on permanent installations, composition of forces, questions of command, etc., and in costs.

Fact that defense is undertaken in special interest of either will not in itself imply other country is belligerent.

2. Since no representations ever received that regulations re coal and other resources unsatisfactory Norway would like information in advance on questions Soviet might wish to raise.

3. Norway presumes abrogation 1920 treaty will be carried out according to international law, but countries fighting against Norway or USSR or their Allies need not be consulted.

Substance of document (b) is as follows: Norway and Soviets believe neutralization established in February 9, 1920 treaty impracticable and continued adherence contrary to two countries' interests; desire an arrangement for use of territories for military purposes which will protect two countries' military security and be regional link of organization for international security; have agreed on following principles pending consultation with certain Allied governments and Sweden and subject Storting approval: Then follows verbatim with one minor change points listed under point numbered 1 in document (a) concluding paragraph which closely follows point numbered 3 in document (a). Point numbered 2 in that document is not mentioned.

OSBORNE

SWNCC File

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee*⁴⁶

WASHINGTON, 23 July 1945.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff present the following comments, from a military point of view, on the memorandum by the Acting Chairman

⁴⁶ This memorandum was designated SWNCC 159/3, 26 July 1945 and was circulated for the consideration of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at Potsdam in connection with their consideration of SWNCC 159. On July 26 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee panel at Potsdam approved SWNCC 159/3.

of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee which was circulated as SWNCC 159:

1. Every effort should be made to have this question considered for settlement in conjunction with all other territorial changes arising from war and thereby avoid piecemeal settlement of Russian demands in order to preserve the bargaining position on world-wide United States security requirements.

2. If, notwithstanding, it is necessary to discuss and possibly decide these questions, then we should oppose the Russian proposals, not only as untimely, but as unnecessary for Soviet security and contrary to long-range and over-all security considerations from our point of view. This war has been fought to prevent an aggressive nation from dominating Europe, and ultimately threatening the Western Hemisphere. From the long-range security point of view, and until the post-war situation and Soviet policy can be seen more clearly, we should, in so far as practicable, resist demands and policies which tend to improve Soviet position in Western Europe.

3. If it is not practicable to successfully oppose the Soviet proposals, then we should insist that the Soviets in return agree to the following:

a. No objection to the United States obtaining exclusive base rights in Iceland and Greenland.

b. Remove all Soviet troops from and renounce military control of Northern Norway.

c. Make no bids for Jan Mayen Island.

d. Agree that Norwegian coal and economic rights in Spitsbergen be preserved.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. MCFARLAND,

Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Secretary

857.014/8-2745

Memorandum by the Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 27 August 1945.

1. On 24 August 1945 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 159/6,⁴⁷ a memorandum by its State Department member suggesting that, since Greenland has long been considered as lying within the Western Hemisphere and therefore covered by the Monroe Doctrine, this Government should not seek to obtain Soviet

⁴⁷ Not printed.

concurrence to the establishment by the United States of exclusive base rights in Greenland.

2. This action cancels the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as contained in subparagraph *a* of paragraph 3, SWNCC 159/3,⁴⁸ and communicated to the Secretary of State at Potsdam, the pertinent part of which paragraph reads as follows:

“3. If it is not practicable to successfully oppose the Soviet proposals, then we should insist that the Soviets in return agree to the following:

a. No objection to the United States obtaining exclusive base rights in Iceland and Greenland . . .”

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:
JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

857.014/10-245

The Ambassador in Norway (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

No. 301

OSLO, October 2, 1945.
[Received October 23.]

SIR: I have the honor to report, with reference to my telegram No. 204, July 5 and No. 277, July 23, that there is still no public knowledge of the Soviet demands on Norway with reference to Bear Island and Spitzbergen. I believe this is a notable fact and one not altogether easy to explain. As reported in my telegram No. 204, July 5 the Foreign Minister discussed the matter in a secret session of the Storting with its 150 members; he also dealt with it in a secret conference with the press; the Norwegian military and naval authorities certainly know about it. Yet no American or other foreign newspaper correspondent has apparently got even a smell of it; and I and the one or two members of the Embassy staff who know of it have not had any indication that anyone outside official circles is aware of it.

This might not be so surprising if the matter were one of slight intrinsic interest to the average member of the Norwegian public. That is certainly not the case. Most of the well-to-do Norwegians are extremely sensitive with regard to Russia and tend to be alert in respect of anything which contains the least suspicion of Soviet aggressiveness. There can be no question that knowledge of the Soviet demands would affect these people greatly—and most painfully. There would moreover be the liveliest general public interest in any proposal to derogate complete Norwegian sovereignty over the territories in question. Yet the Soviet demands remain a well kept secret. There has been absolutely no public mention of them—no hint even;

⁴⁸ See footnote 46, p. 96.

if there has been private discussion, outside a restricted official circle, the Embassy is unaware of it. The only explanation I can offer is that the Norwegians are naturally a reticent people and that, in this case, fear has made the considerable number who are in the know preternaturally reticent—which with Norwegians means absolutely mum.

In the meantime Foreign Minister Lie continues to inform me that the Soviets have not raised the question again or made any reply to the Norwegian counter-proposal mentioned in my telegram No. 204, July 5.

Respectfully yours,

LITHGOW OSBORNE

857.014/10-1745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 17, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received October 17—3:19 p. m.]

3575. Norwegian Ambassador told me yesterday that Molotov at Chinese reception October 10, had mentioned to him desirability of having further talks regarding question of bases on Spitsbergen and Bear Island. Norwegian Ambassador says last time this matter was discussed was in April just before Molotov's departure for San Francisco. At that time he had presented to Molotov a general draft of an agreement which would give Soviet Government equal rights with Norwegian in a joint defense plan. Ambassador emphasized secrecy of these negotiations. He added that he understood Foreign Minister Lie had informed British and American Governments of the Soviet proposals to him while he was in Moscow and had subsequently advised the Soviet Government that he had informed us.

HARRIMAN

857.014/10-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

OSLO, October 24, 1945—noon.
[Received October 25—7:30 a. m.]

576. ReDept 396, October 19⁴⁹ and 397, October 19.⁵⁰ Foreign Minister Lie yesterday gave me somewhat different version of incident re-

⁴⁹ Not printed; it reported that at his press conference of October 18, the Secretary of State had been asked a question concerning the presentation of Soviet claims to bases in Spitsbergen during the First Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London from September 11 to October 2, 1945. The Secretary had replied that no such demand had been presented, that the agenda of the London conference did not contain any such proposal, and that no proposal of this nature was ever made (857.014/8-2745).

⁵⁰ Not printed (857.014/10-1745); it repeated the contents of telegram 3575, October 17, from Moscow, *supra*.

ported in Moscow's 3575, October 17. He said Molotov suggested to Andvord that it was time to discuss questions pending between countries without specifically mentioning Spitzbergen and Bear Island. (Note: British Ambassador received similar version.) As there are a number of minor questions at issue, including power station at Boris-Gleb (reEmb 329, August 13⁵¹), fishing rights in Pasvik River and setting up boundary markers along new frontier, Lie still hopes that Russians may not press Svalbard⁵² claims but plainly fears our request for bases in Iceland (reDept circular October 16⁵³) may precipitate renewed Russian pressure. He said Bevin⁵⁴ expressed opinion in August that Russia had dropped Svalbard demands.

Report of Secretary of State's reference to matter as given in Embassy's 554, October 18⁵⁵ was played down in Norwegian press at Lie's request and has not been commented on editorially. He seems to hope that silence on question both here and in United States may help to avoid or at least postpone Norway's having to face the issue. I learn from reliable source that Lie, after he had informed Storting, took press into his confidence (re despatch 301, October 2) only as a result of strong pressure from Hambro⁵⁶ in Foreign Affairs Committee.

Repeated to Moscow as 9.

OSBORNE

ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES NAVY PERSONNEL FROM JAN MAYEN ISLAND

857.9243/1-3145

*The Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy Near the Norwegian Government in Exile, at London*⁵⁷

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the

⁵¹ Not printed; it reported that the Soviet Government had informed the Norwegian Government that the Soviet Union planned to construct immediately a dam and hydro-electric station at Boris-Gleb on the Pasvik River on Soviet territory adjacent to the Norwegian frontier (857.6463/8-1345).

⁵² Spitsbergen.

⁵³ Not printed.

⁵⁴ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from July 27, 1945.

⁵⁵ Not printed; it summarized the reports in the Oslo newspapers of the Secretary of State's statement at his October 18 press conference regarding alleged Soviet demands for bases in Spitsbergen made at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers (811.34541/10-1845).

⁵⁶ Carl J. Hambro, member of the Storting.

⁵⁷ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile as an enclosure to his despatch No. 14, January 31, 1945, not printed.

honour to refer to its Note of the 1st November 1943, and to the Embassy's Note of the 7th January, 1944, concerning the installation by the United States Navy on Jan Mayen Island of a high frequency direction finder.⁵⁸

2. The Norwegian Government's consent to the installation and operation of the station in question was given subject to *i.a.* the condition that "the installation and the personnel will be withdrawn from the island after the cessation of the present hostilities."

3. The appropriate Norwegian authorities have now suggested that they may be given the opportunity of taking over, after the cessation of the hostilities, the buildings and installations which can be used in connection with the ordinary radio-service on the island. This solution seems indeed to be the most economic and adequate both from the point of view of the United States and of Norway.

4. It would consequently be appreciated if the U.S. Navy would refrain from taking down any buildings, installations etc. on Jan Mayen Island before consultations have taken place with representatives of the Norwegian Government with the view of deciding what buildings, installations etc. the Norwegian authorities might desire to take over from the American authorities.

5. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be grateful

⁵⁸ On October 26, 1943, the American Embassy had asked the permission of the Norwegian Government for installation by the United States Navy of a high frequency direction finder on Jan Mayen Island. In a *note verbale* dated November 1, 1943, not printed, the Norwegian Government in Exile gave their consent to such an installation manned by a small staff of American naval personnel on the following conditions:

"1. The installations and the personnel will be withdrawn from the Island after the cessation of the present hostilities.

"2. The Commanding Officer of the American unit will be subordinated to the Commanding Officer of the Norwegian garrison in questions concerning the defence of the Island.

"3. Only such extraterritorial rights which are prescribed by international law, will be enjoyed by the American personnel.

"4. Full compensation will be paid by the American Authorities for any damage due to the installation or the American personnel on Jan Mayen Island.

"5. The American personnel will not undertake any hunting or trapping on the Island without having obtained a permit from the Norwegian Ministry of Commerce, according to the rules established by Royal Decree of June 6th, 1930." (Oslo Embassy File, Box 76, Folder 882, Aids to Navigation.)

On January 7, 1944, the American Chargé, Mr. Rudolf Schoenfeld, informed the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Trygve Lie, that the United States Navy Department had indicated its concurrence in the conditions. On April 6, 1944, the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed the American Embassy that the Norwegian Government in Exile had given its consent also to the establishment by the United States Navy of radiosonde facilities at the high frequency radio direction finder station on Jan Mayen Island (857.9243/-11-2745).

for the Embassy's assistance in having the present proposal submitted to the United States Navy Department.

p[ro] t[empore] LONDON, 27 January, 1945.

857.9243/1-3145 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne), at London.

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1945.

Noweg A-11. Your despatch no. 14, dated January 31, 1945.⁵⁹ The Secretary of the Navy has informed the Department that upon the cessation of hostilities in the Atlantic, the United States Navy will turn over to the Norwegian Government such buildings as may be desired on Jan Mayen Island, and will consult with representatives of the Norwegian Government regarding certain of the installations thereon prior to their removal.

Please inform the Norwegian Government in the above sense.

STETTINIUS

SWNCC File

*Memorandum by the Acting Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Hickerson)*⁶⁰

SWNCC 159/2

23 July 1945.

Reference is made to my memorandum concerning Soviet demands with regard to Bear Island and the Spitsbergen Archipelago⁶¹ (SWNCC 159, dated 13 July 1945⁶²). On page 11, Appendix B to this memorandum,⁶³ it is stated that in July 1941 the Soviet authorities made it clear that they looked to Jan Mayen as well as Spitsbergen and

⁵⁹ For enclosure to this despatch, see *supra*.

⁶⁰ This memorandum was circulated for the consideration of the Committee in connection with their consideration of SWNCC 159 of July 13, 1945 (*ante*, p. 92), and a copy was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view. In a memorandum to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, dated August 10, 1945, not printed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested "that the Department of State be informed that pending settlement of the question of proposed bases the United States naval personnel presently attached to the radio-sonde station on Jan Mayen Island will not be withdrawn." (SWNCC File) According to SWNCC 159/7, 22 August 1945 (Note by the Secretaries of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, not printed), by informal action on 21 August 1945, the Committee approved 159/2.

⁶¹ For documentation regarding the attitude of the United States concerning reported demands by the Soviet Union on Norway with respect to Spitsbergen and Bear Island, see pp. 91 ff.

⁶² *Ante*, p. 92.

⁶³ The undated study prepared by the Department of State and entitled "Soviet Interest in Bases: Spitsbergen and Bear Island", not printed.

Bear Island as potentially important communication links with the rest of the world and pointed out the importance of defending these islands. Considering this circumstance and the fact that the Soviet Foreign Minister reiterated in November, 1944, the Soviet demands with regard to Bear Island and Spitsbergen, and again referred to this matter in a conversation with the Norwegian Foreign Minister in May, 1945, the Department of State recommends that, pending settlement of the question of proposed Soviet bases in the North Atlantic, no steps be taken to withdraw United States Navy personnel presently attached to the radio-sonde station on Jan Mayen Island.

JOHN HICKERSON

857.9243/11-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

OSLO, November 20, 1945—noon.

[Received 3:37 p. m.]

678. Foreign Minister Lie has requested information as to truth of reports in Danish press that US is sending new crews to service wireless station on Jan Mayen Island pending its eventual transfer to UNO⁶⁴ control. Lie says agreement about Jan Mayen stipulated US withdrawal and transfer of wireless station to Norwegians at war's end and is evidently anxious that this be carried out. Russian Ambassador⁶⁵ has asked Lie about truth of Danish reports. I am requesting Copenhagen for information on latter as they have not been reprinted here. Embassy's files do not contain copy of original agreement relating to Jan Mayen or even much pertinent information relating to it.

Sent to Dept as 678; repeated to Copenhagen as 33; to Moscow as 11.

OSBORNE

857.9243/11-2345 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Norway (Osborne)

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1945—6 p. m.

490. Your 678, Nov. 20. Recent replacement of Naval personnel on Jan Mayen Island was merely routine operation customarily followed by Navy Dept with respect to all isolated and inhospitable stations. This action should not be interpreted as indicating that we desire to maintain forces there indefinitely. The question of eventual transfer of the station to UNO control has never even been contemplated by us.

⁶⁴ United Nations Organization.

⁶⁵ Niko!ay Dmitriyevich Kuznetsov.

For your confidential info, Lie's desire that our forces be withdrawn from Jan Mayen Island and the installations transferred to Norway is being submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee with the recommendation that steps be taken to comply with his wish.

As original agreement concerning Jan Mayen Island was made by the Embassy near the Norwegian Government at London in the fall of 1943, Dept suggests that further search be made of Embassy's files referring in this connection to your despatch no. 14 dated Jan 31, 1945⁶⁶ and the correspondence mentioned therein.

BYRNES

857.9243/11-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

OSLO, November 24, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received November 24—5 :18 p. m.]

700. Retel 678, November 20. Foreign Minister has now handed me an *aide-mémoire* dated November 22 on Jan Mayen Island question. It states inquiry as to installation submitted October 26, 1943 (reDeptel 6, [October] 21, 8 p. m., 1943⁶⁷) to which Norwegian Government have [*gave?*] consent under certain conditions (retel 15, November 1, 8 p. m., 1943⁶⁷). These conditions were accepted by us (reDeptel 2, January 6, 10 p. m., 1944⁶⁷); in April 1944 same conditions greeted [*granted*] Radio Sonde (reDeptel 10, April 3, 5 p. m., 1944; retel 7, April 6, 2 p. m., 1944⁶⁸). *Aide-mémoire* refers to arrangements for taking over buildings and installations at end of hostilities. (Redes 14, January 31, 1945⁶⁹; reDepgam A-11, March [14], 1945; redes 63, March 29, 1945⁷⁰). Then says in accordance with exchange of notes this service should have been discontinued rather a long time ago. Special situation and needs which made this service necessary no longer exist and Norwegian authorities are prepared to maintain as in earlier years full ordinary radio service on island. Norwegian Government, therefore, suggests negotiations concerning taking

⁶⁶ Not printed; it listed the correspondence between the Department and the American Embassy near the Norwegian Government in Exile in connection with the exchange of notes of November 1, 1943, and January 7, 1944 (not printed), concerning the installation and operation of a high frequency direction finder station of the U.S. Navy on Jan Mayen Island (857.9243/1-3145).

⁶⁷ Not printed.

⁶⁸ Neither printed.

⁶⁹ Not printed; see footnote 57, p. 100.

⁷⁰ Not printed; it transmitted to the Department a copy of a communication from the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated March 27, 1945, expressing its deep appreciation for the obliging attitude taken by the United States authorities in connection with U.S. intention to turn over to the Norwegian Government, upon the cessation of hostilities, such buildings as might be desired on Jan Mayen Island (857.9243/3-2945).

over buildings and installations be taken up immediately and American personnel on island be withdrawn at early date. Full text by airgram.⁷¹

Foreign Office aware of exchange of messages concerning transfer (reurtel 33, May 19, 8 p. m.; ⁷² mytel 89, May 22, 2 p. m.; ⁷³ urtel 79, July 2, 2 p. m.; ⁷⁴ mytel 208, July 5, 6 p. m.⁷⁴ all 1945).

In handing me this *aide-mémoire* Foreign Minister again stressed that Soviets through Ambassador here had reacted very quickly to press reports of new personnel being sent to Jan Mayen Island. Undoubtedly *aide-mémoire* is primarily a gesture to placate Moscow but the Norwegians are genuinely concerned lest US requests for facilities on Greenland, Iceland and Jan Mayen will be followed by increased Russian pressure for corresponding or greater facilities on Svalbard ⁷⁵ and Bornholm.⁷⁶

Copy of *aide-mémoire* has been handed British and Russian Ambassadors here.

Sent to Department as 700; repeated to London as 102 and to Moscow as 12.

OSBORNE.

857.9243/11-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

OSLO, November 26, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received November 27—3:13 p. m.]

704. We have now been able to get together a complete file on Jan Mayen.

Transmission to Dept of *aide-mémoire* of November 22 (reEmb's 700, November 24) was held up 2 days at request of Foreign Office after Embassy called attention to its inquiries of the Norwegian Naval authorities in May and July 1945 (reDeptels Noweg 33, May 19,⁷⁷ and 79, July 2⁷⁴) which had clearly been overlooked in drafting of *aide-mémoire*. Foreign Office eventually requested that it be for-

⁷¹ Airgram A-141, November 27, 1945, from Oslo, not printed.

⁷² Not printed; it stated that the Navy Department requested that it be informed of the appropriate Norwegian officials with whom the transfer of buildings and equipment on Jan Mayen could be discussed (857.9243/5-1845).

⁷³ Not printed; it supplied the information requested in telegram 33, May 19, to Oslo (857.9243/5-2245).

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ Spitsbergen.

⁷⁶ For a brief description of the circumstances of the Soviet occupation of the Danish island of Bornholm, see Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 509.

⁷⁷ See footnote 72, above.

warded as it stood, probably because copies had already been furnished Soviet and British Ambassadors.

I suggested to Lie this afternoon that, since our communications of last summer clearly indicated correctness of our attitude in regard to Jan Mayen, he would probably want to complete the record by informing British and Soviet Ambassadors concerning them. This he said he would do in a letter supplementing the *aide-mémoire*.

I also informed Lie of the substance of first paragraph of Dept's 490, November 23.

Sent to Dept as 704; repeated to Moscow as 14.

OSBORNE

857.9243/11-2445: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Norway (Osborne)

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1945—8 p. m.

498. Dept has difficulty in finding explanation for Lie's action in presenting formal note regarding withdrawal from Jan Mayen Island without awaiting our reply to his verbal request on this subject made only 4 days earlier (your 700, November 24). It is also surprised that he should have transmitted to third parties without consultation with us copies of a note on a purely Norwegian-American question. Please inform Lie orally in the above sense.

BYRNES

857.9243/11-3045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

OSLO, November 30, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received November 30—4: 53 p. m.]

724. I communicated orally to Lie substance of Deptel 498, November 27. He said his verbal query (reported in my 678, November 20) had followed inquiry by Soviet Ambassador on his own initiative concerning Danish press reports relative to Jan Mayen. The *aide-mémoire* followed a second call from Kuznetsov upon instructions from Moscow (Note: He had not previously told me this).

Lie admitted frankly he was fearful Russians would at once press demands regarding Svalbard unless he did something quickly.⁷⁹ He said it also was not to our interest to have these demands pressed. As concerns his action in making copies of *aide-mémoire* available

⁷⁹In his telegram 796, December 19, 1945, 4 p. m., the Ambassador in Norway reported having been informed by the British Ambassador that a Soviet Embassy official had asked the opinion of a British Embassy official about the Jan Mayen matter, particularly whether he thought the Americans would in fact withdraw (857.9243/12-1945).

to British and Soviet Ambassador he said he regretted he had felt that this was necessary but stressed he had given me and Collier copies of communications with Russians re Svalbard (reEmbs 277, July 23) ^{79a} despite Soviet insistence that their original demands relating to Bear Island Spitzbergen were purely a Russo-Norwegian affair.

OSBORNE

857.9243/11-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Osborne) to the Secretary of State

OSLO, November 30, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received December 1—8:26 p. m.]

725. ReEmbs 700, November 24, and No. 1 [12] to Moscow; reEmbs 704, November 26, and No. 14 to Moscow. Subsequent to receipt of Department's No. 498, November 27, but before I saw Lie today I received from him the promised letter supplementary to *aide-mémoire* of November 22. Letter recapitulates communications between this Embassy and Norwegian naval authorities of May and July and "confesses" that in "confusion" attendant upon return of Government to Oslo these did not become known to Foreign Affairs. Letter then states Lie is happy to learn these facts and also information given by me on 26th (see first paragraph Department's No. 490, November 23) that recent change of American personnel on Jan Mayen Island was an ordinary routine matter; but he hopes negotiations (for transfer of installations, etc.) foreseen in original exchange of notes can now be started in Oslo.

Full text being airmailed.⁸⁰ Copies given to Soviet and British Ambassadors by Lie (see also my No. 724, November 30).

Sent to Department as 725; repeated to Moscow as 16.

OSBORNE

857.9243/12-1745

Memorandum by the Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 17 December 1945.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 November 1945,⁸¹ circulated as SWNCC 159/9, in which it is proposed that United States naval personnel be withdrawn from Jan Mayen Island.

This matter was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comments from a military point of view.

^{79a} *Ante*, p. 95.⁸⁰ Airgram A-145, December 3, 1945, from Oslo, not printed.⁸¹ Not printed.

It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there is no military reason for the continuance of a United States military force on that island and they therefore perceive no objection to its withdrawal. They wish to point out, however, that while withdrawal can probably take place promptly if undertaken prior to March, weather and ice conditions may cause considerable delay after that time.

The Secretary of War⁸² and Secretary of the Navy⁸³ have advised the Secretariat, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, that they are in accord with the views of the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:
 JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

857.9243/11-2345: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Norway
 (Osborne)*

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1945—3 p. m.

557. With reference to Dept's 490, Nov 23, you are requested to address a note to FonMin informing him that in accordance with the exchange of notes of Oct-Nov 1943 and Apr 1944, this Govt plans to withdraw in the very near future the American Naval personnel on Jan Mayen Island.

You may add orally for Lie's confidential information that weather and ice conditions permitting, the withdrawal will take place on or about Jan 15, 1946.⁸⁴ You should also ascertain the name of the Norwegian official authorized by the Norwegian Govt to negotiate the transfer of buildings and installations on the Island.

ACHESON

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORWAY RESPECTING CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF MARINE TRANSPORTATION AND LITIGATION, EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED MAY 29, 1945

[For text of agreement, signed at Washington, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 471, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1541. This agreement was terminated October 29, 1945, as a result of written

⁸² Robert P. Patterson.

⁸³ James V. Forrestal.

⁸⁴ The American radio direction station on Jan Mayen Island was closed and the station with equipment was taken over by the Norwegian garrison on February 15, 1946. American personnel left the island by ship several days later.

notice given by the Norwegian Government on September 29, 1945, in accordance with article 5 (2) of the agreement (411.57 Ships/9-2945).]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORWAY RESPECTING AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES, EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED OCTOBER 6, 1945

[For text of agreement, signed at Washington, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 482, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1658.]

POLAND

PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POLISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE BOUNDARIES OF POLAND

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ¹

[WASHINGTON,] 4 January 1945.

691. There is quoted herewith following for your information Stalin's² reply to my message in regard to the Polish situation, my No. 684.³ I am not replying to Stalin, but we may discuss the matter at the meeting:⁴

"1 January 1945. I have received your message of December 31. I am extremely sorry that I did not succeed in convincing you of the correctness of the position of the Soviet Government on the Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope that events will convince you that the Polish National Committee⁵ has all the time rendered and is continuing to render the Allies, in particular the Red Army, important assistance in the fight against Hitlerite Germany whereas the *émigré* Government in London is bringing disorganization into this struggle and thus is aiding the Germans.

Of course, your suggestion to postpone for a month the recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the Soviet Union is perfectly understandable to me. But there is one circumstance which makes me powerless to fulfill your wish. The fact is that on December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to an appropriate request of the Poles has already informed them that it intends to recognize the Provisional Government of Poland as soon

¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

² Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

³ Telegram 684 transmitted to Prime Minister Churchill the text of President Roosevelt's telegram 153 to Marshal Stalin, dated December 30, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 1444.

⁴ President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, with their advisers, met in conference at Yalta in the Crimea, February 4-11, 1945. For documentation regarding the conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945.

⁵ By a decree dated July 21, 1944, of the Communist-dominated legislative body in Soviet-liberated Poland, the Polish National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, also sometimes rendered as the National Council of the Homeland), a Polish Committee of National Liberation was formed. Shortly afterwards, this Committee was established in Lublin and became known as the "Lublin Committee". For an account of the establishment of this Committee, see telegram 2736, July 24, 1944, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 1425.

as it is formed.⁶ This circumstance makes me powerless to fulfill your wish.

Permit me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish you health and success.”

I have not told Stalin that my message to him was shown to you.

ROOSEVELT

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁷

LONDON, 6 January 1945.

876. Yours number 691. Thank you for the information and it is interesting to see that the “Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR” has now been brought up into the line.

Stalin has communicated to me⁸ your message to him, of which you sent me a copy in your number 691. We have not ourselves communicated with him on this subject since you sent us a copy of your original message to him (number 675)⁹ but had already made it clear in earlier telegrams, and I in fact mentioned it in parliament, that we continue to recognize the London Poles¹⁰ as the Government of Poland. I have now replied to Stalin as follows:

“Naturally I and my war cabinet colleagues are distressed at the course events are taking. I am quite clear that much the best thing is for us three to meet together and talk all these matters over, not only as isolated problems but in relation to the whole world situation both of the war and the transition to peace. Meanwhile our attitude as you know it remains unchanged. I look forward very much to this momentous meeting and I am glad that the President of the United States has been willing to make this long journey. We have agreed, subject to your concurrence, that the code-name shall be called “ARGONAUT” and I hope you will use that in any messages that may be interchanged by the staffs who will be consulting about the arrangements.”

You may rest assured of our entire support.

⁶ On December 31, 1944, the Polish National Council decreed the transformation of the “Lublin Committee” into the Provisional Polish Government. On January 5, 1945, the Soviet Union announced its recognition of the Polish Provisional Government, thereby becoming the first government to extend such recognition.

⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁸ For text of Marshal Stalin’s message of January 4, 1945, to Prime Minister Churchill, see Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), p. 336.

⁹ President Roosevelt’s telegram 136 to Marshal Stalin, dated December 16, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 1345.

¹⁰ The Polish Government in Exile in London.

860C.01/1-1045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1945.

Lord Halifax¹¹ called upon me at his request this morning. He stated that his Government had taken the definite position that they would not have any dealings with the Lublin Committee but they had dropped in by parachute a few British Army Officers to work with the underground.

I told him we had no plan whatsoever in connection with our relations with Poland other than that made known the other day¹² pending a full discussion among the President, the Prime Minister and Stalin.

860C.01/1-845 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London*¹³

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1945—midnight.

281. In response to your Zecho 1, January 8, 1945, 2 p. m.¹⁴ the Department feels that you should not take any initiative in relation to the recognition of the Lublin Committee by the Czechoslovak Government. If, however, the question is raised again you may find it advisable to point out that this Government continues to recognize the Polish Government in Exile as stated publicly by the Secretary on January 1, 1945 and January 5 [4?] 1945.¹⁵ The recognition of the

¹¹ British Ambassador.

¹² On January 1, 1945, during the course of a news conference and in response to a correspondent's question as to whether the United States Government was considering recognizing the Lublin Committee's claim to be the provisional government of Poland, the Secretary of State made the following statement: "This Government continues to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in Exile in London." (Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary in Charge of Press Releases, Verbatim Reports, Press Conferences, 1945, vol. xvi, no. 1). At his press conference of January 4, 1945, when asked by correspondents whether the United States Government had been in communication with the Soviet Government on the question of recognizing the Lublin Committee, the Secretary of State referred correspondents to his previous statement on Polish relations and added that no useful purpose would be served by his discussing the Polish situation any further (*ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4).

¹³ Rudolf Schoenfeld was also Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile, at London.

¹⁴ Czechoslovak Series telegram No. 1, not printed; in it the Chargé reported having been informed by a Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry official that the Soviet Government had requested the Czechoslovak Government to extend recognition to the Lublin Committee as the Provisional Government of Poland while the British had requested the Czechoslovak Government not to do so (860C.01/1-845).

¹⁵ See footnote 12, above.

Lublin Committee is a matter solely for the decision of the Czechoslovak Government.¹⁶

GREW

740.0011 E.W./1-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

ROME, January 23, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 4:10 p. m.]

198. Some days ago Ministry of Foreign Affairs telegraphed Quaroni¹⁷ referring to permission granted French Delegate¹⁸ to go to Lublin to discuss with local Polish authorities the repatriation of Frenchmen who had crossed German lines and instructing him to approach Soviet authorities unofficially to inquire if an Italian officer might be authorized to proceed to Lublin for analogous task as it was known that several thousand Italians had also crossed lines and were not [*now?*] in Polish territory.

British Embassy informs me today that it has received a telegram from the Foreign Office in London stating that it had been learned "by most secret means" that Quaroni is replying that nothing could be accomplished unless diplomatic status were granted the Italian delegate and suggesting that he be informed if this were possible. Foreign Office telegram added that this proposal was not viewed with favor in London and that British Embassy in Washington was being instructed to discuss the matter with the Department.

It appears that Quaroni's reply has not yet reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but British representative has been instructed that upon receipt of the message by the Ministry, he should inform the Italian Government that the matter is being discussed by the British and the American Governments and should request that no action be taken thereon for the moment.

KIRK

¹⁶ In his Czechoslovak Series telegram No. 6, January 30, 1945, 8 p. m., not printed, the Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile, reported having been informed by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, that the Czechoslovak Government had decided to recognize the Lublin Committee as the Provisional Government of Poland as a result of severe pressure by the Soviet Government (860C.01/1-3045).

¹⁷ Pietro Quaroni, Italian Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

¹⁸ Christian Fouchet, Chief of the Delegation of the French Provisional Government to Lublin.

860C.01/1-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1945—7 p. m.

134. Your 198, January 23, 3 p. m. United States Government would not look with favor upon proposals to send any kind of Italian observer to Lublin at this time, particularly one with diplomatic status. Please see de Gasperi¹⁹ urgently and discuss this question with him. Ask if he has considered the political implications of such a move. Point out that any action by the Italian Government which might be interpreted as recognition of the group at Lublin would be distinctly regretted by the United States Government which does not recognize the Lublin group, has no representative in Lublin, and sees no necessity for the Italian Government's having such a representative. This Government is confident that the Italian Government will agree with this point of view.²⁰

The British Embassy has been informed of the above and your British colleague will, it is understood, receive similar instructions.

For your secret information the French "unofficial observer" now in Poland was sent there primarily because Stalin tried to force de Gaulle²¹ (during the latter's visit to Moscow²²) to recognize the Lublin Committee. De Gaulle refused but finally consented, in a last minute compromise, to send an unofficial observer to Lublin to look after such French citizens as might be there. The presence of the Frenchman in Lublin has, of course, been exploited by the Committee there.

Sent to Rome; repeated to London and Moscow.

GREW

¹⁹ Alcide de Gasperi, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

²⁰ In telegram 224, January 25, 1945, 5 p. m., the Ambassador in Italy reported having communicated to Foreign Minister de Gasperi the views of the Department and stated:

"De Gasperi seemed to appreciate the unadvisability of taking any step of a formal nature involving the Lublin group and assured me that no decision in any phase of this matter would be taken without consulting me further." (860C.01/1-2545).

²¹ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government of France.

²² For General de Gaulle's description of his visit to Moscow during December 1944, his conversations with Marshal Stalin, and the discussions between French and Soviet officials regarding the recognition of the communist-dominated Polish Provisional Government, see *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation, 1944-1946* (New York, 1960), pp. 67-89.

860C.01/1-2745 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 27, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received January 27—2: 08 p. m.]

Poles²³ 8. The following telegram has been sent to Paris 36, January 26, 7 p. m. For Bohlen²⁴ for appropriate disposition.

I give below memorandum drawn up by Mr. Mikolajczyk²⁵ giving his personal views on the possible solution of the Polish problem. He has provided the British with a similar memorandum.

Memorandum begins: The meeting of the heads of the Governments of the Three Great Powers will take place in exceptional circumstances when many a problem can be solved in a more permanent way than at any time before.

As to the question of Poland almost its entire territory has already been freed from German occupation and those territories which ought to be included in Poland may soon also be liberated.

Poland, one of the first victims of Nazi aggression, Poland, a nation which never surrendered to the Germans, never produced a Quisling, and takes, both in the homeland and abroad, from the very beginning of the war an active part in the common struggle side by side with the Allies; this Poland should in principle not emerge from the war with its territory diminished. It should rise as a true sovereign independent and democratic state.

Meanwhile the Polish nation and its soldiers fighting on various fronts have grounds for apprehension as to the frontiers of the future Poland as well as its genuine independence.

The threat to Poland's territories results from the claims of the Soviet Union to the eastern province of Poland.

The threat to Poland's independence results from the establishment on Polish soil of a "provisional government" representing solely and exclusively the authority of one trifling group, namely, of the Communists.

²³ Series designation for telegrams to and from the American Mission to the Polish Government in Exile, at London.

²⁴ Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, who was then in Paris. Mr. Bohlen, who was a member of the American delegation to the Yalta Conference, was accompanying Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, in pre-conference visits to London, Paris, and Rome.

²⁵ Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, at London (resigned November 1944) ; exiled leader of the Peasant Party.

The Teheran Conference foreclosed in large measure the question of Poland's eastern frontiers.²⁶ On the results of the coming meeting will depend the solution of both problems: its frontiers and its independence. The attitude of the Polish people in the homeland, as expressed in their messages to London, can be summed up as follows:

(1) There exists among the Poles a unanimous desire to regulate Polish-Soviet relations and to arrive at a friendly and good neighborly cooperation.

(2) At the same time there exists the fear that Poland will be forced into Communism and there is a lack of faith in the keeping of international agreements.

(3) Poles pin their hopes for the upholding of their independence and freedom on Great Britain and the US and in this connection they put forward the necessity of a guarantee by all the Three Great Powers of a complete settlement of all Polish problems particularly of Poland's frontiers and independence.

(4) Taking into account the realities of the present situation, the following views on the territorial issue are advanced:

(a) Frontier changes should embrace simultaneously all frontiers.

(b) The delineation of the eastern frontiers should be effected by a compromise not by a unilateral dictation. In the settlement between Poland and Lithuania, Belo-Russia and the Ukraine, statistical data based on the census of the population and Poland's economic interests should be taken into account. According to the Council of National Unity in Poland,²⁷ the new frontier line in the east which should be delineated with the consent of the Allies should be more favorable to Poland than the so-called Curzon Line.^{27a}

(c) The territorial compromise in the east should be arrived at only in conjunction with the guaranteeing to Poland of the restitution of Danzig, East Prussia and of those lands in the west which were torn away from Poland and Germanized in the course of Poland's history.

Conclusions.

In seeking a solution of the Polish question two main problems come to the fore: The future frontiers of the Polish Republic and the independence, sovereignty and freedom of the Polish nation.

²⁶ For documentation regarding the conference of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin, with their advisers, at Tehran, November 28-December 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*; concerning Poland's eastern frontiers, see *ibid.*, Index, p. 920, entries under "Poland: Boundary revision, proposed", and map facing p. 601.

²⁷ Rade Jednosci Narodowej, the underground parliament in German-occupied Poland.

^{27a} For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794. See also *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. III, p. 1220, footnote 15.

Both these questions are closely intertwined and correlated because:

(1) The question of the independence of a nation must include the territory in which that nation has to live.

(2) The Polish nation would be unable to accept a compromise which would leave out the question of what territories will be allocated to the Poles in the west and in the north.

(3) World public opinion would remain uneasy if it were only decided to take away from Poland 48% of Polish prewar territory for the benefit of Russia.

(4) If Poland is to lose territory it must not lose the Polish population living in it. That population must know beforehand what its fate is going to be, and the right of repatriation and assistance in the resettlement of these people must be guaranteed to them.

(5) A plan for the eviction of the Germans as well as for the transfer of Poles in Russia possessing Polish citizenship, of Poles inhabiting eastern Poland and of Poles in Germany must be prepared in advance. This plan must be coupled with a plan of credits and economic investments for the reconstruction of Poland with a plan involving both foreign and internal credits. These plans cannot be prepared and completed without the delineation of the future frontiers of the Republic of Poland.

The problem of Poland's frontiers.

In view of the Soviet claims to Poland's eastern lands and the determination of the Soviet Government to keep these lands a frontier compromise which the Poland nation might be able to accept under the strain of necessity and one which the majority of Polish political leaders probably could accept no responsibility for submitting to the Polish Parliament for ratification, ought to be based on the so-called Curzon Line prolonged in Eastern Galicia along the so-called Line (B)²⁸ with certain modifications in the north such as would leave within Poland Bielowieza forest and Grodno. In the southern sector, Line (B) should be straightened out from Jaryszow to the Carpathians allocating Kalusz to Poland in view of its great importance to an agricultural country.

In the west and north Poland's new frontier should include East Prussia, Danzig, the region of Opole (Oppeln), the region of Gruenberg on the left bank of the Oder and, northward, the whole right

²⁸In Report No. 3, dated June 17, 1919, of the Commission on Polish Affairs at the Paris Peace Conference, two lines were proposed for the Polish frontier in Eastern Galicia. "Of these alternatives 'line A' was the frontier subsequently incorporated in article I.A of the draft treaty relative to Eastern Galicia; this line constituted the southern part of what subsequently became known as the Curzon Line. 'Line B' ran approximately from just west of Sokal southwards by way of Dobrotwór to Bóbrka whence it ran generally southwestwards to the Czechoslovak frontier slightly northwest of Klimiec, thereby including in Polish territory Lemberg (Lvov) and Drohobycz." (*Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, First Series, vol. I, footnote on p. 789.) For descriptions of lines A and B, including map, see *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 839-841.

bank of the Oder including its estuary with the town and harbor of Stettin and the two islands Usedom and Wollen.

With the inclusion of Königsberg and the River Niemen in the Soviet Union, Poland's economic and communications system requires in order to utilize fully the access to the sea—the control of the Rivers Vistula and Oder. If these conditions were not fulfilled the broad belt of seacoast would not be of greater value to Poland in view of the lack of a more important port and of a navigable river flowing into the Baltic, considering particularly the fact that the whole system of land communications of this territory runs rather from west to east than from south to the north.

The above mentioned solution would benefit both Poland and Czechoslovakia. The two countries would thereby be more closely linked economically and would obtain facilities for trading with overseas countries eliminating the transit through German territory.

This solution offers also great advantages from the point of view of security against any threat of a new German aggression, as on the territories thus cut off from Germany are certain industries which are working for the military machine of the Reich, including plants of synthetic oil.

Problems of Poland's independence and the right of self-determination of the Polish nation.

The present memorandum leaves out problems relating to the security and independence of Poland which result from international agreements and alliances. It is assumed that the exchange of views in writing between the Polish Government headed by Premier Mikolajczyk and the points agreed on during his negotiations with the British and US Governments remain in force and that a Polish-Soviet agreement, including an alliance between the two countries—if concluded—will solve the problems of exchange of populations, security, et cetera.

Herein only questions of the government and of the administration of Poland are presented with the view of seeking such solutions as would secure for Poland—in the transition period—a government truly representing all democratic forces of the country, a government enjoying the confidence of the Polish people and capable of assuming the onerous task of normalization of conditions inside Poland, of initiating her reconstruction, of carrying out evictions and resettlements on a very large scale, in short a government which would remain in office until the convocation of the first postwar parliament and which would enable the people to cast their votes freely in an honest general election.

There are the following alternatives:

(1) The simplest solution would be the return of the Polish President to Poland where he would appoint a new government.

(2) The second alternative would be an agreement on a person in Poland in whose favor the President should resign his office. This new legal president would then appoint a new government.

(3) The third solution—outside the scope of legal procedure—would be for the representatives of the Council of National Unity and of the National Council of the Homeland (Lublin Committee) to assemble in the presence of the representatives of the Three Great Powers with the object of choosing a new government to be created in Poland.

(4) Still another way out—also outside of legal procedure—would be to create in Poland a “presidential council” which should be composed of the most widely known leaders and representatives of political life, the churches and science.

This council would summon a conference of the representatives of the following bodies:

- (a) Ministers of the Polish Government who lived and acted in Poland throughout the war.
- (b) The Council of National Unity in Poland.
- (c) The Lublin “provisional government”.
- (d) The National Council of the Homeland (Lublin).
- (e) The political parties of Poland.

This conference should take place in the presence of the representatives of the Three Great Powers. Afterwards, the “presidential council” would determine the number and names of the parties to be represented in the new government, the proportion in which they should be represented, and the Prime Minister Designate who would form the new cabinet to be nominated by the “presidential council”.

(5) It could also be that the “presidential council” would summon a conference of the representatives of the political parties only (again in the presence of the representatives of the Three Great Allied Powers) and, that at this conference the person of the Prime Minister Designate, the proportion of party representatives in the government and other details should be determined.

In assessing impartially the respective influence of the various political movements they should be listed in the following order:

- (1) The most numerous party is the Peasant Party.
- (2) National Party.
- (3) Socialist Party.
- (4) Christian Labor Party.

The Polish Communist Party which is now called the Polish Workers Party, before the war never represented more than one or one-half percent of the people. The National Radical Party (1) represented only a very small percentage of the intelligentsia, particu-

larly in Warsaw but on account of its anti-Democratic program it is not to be taken into consideration and—like the Pilsudskist Party²⁹—it was never represented on the authorities of the underground state. The so-called Democratic Party has no great influence although its representative sits on the Council of National Unity in Poland.

The Government of Mr. Mikolajczyk proposed in their memorandum that each of the five main parties should have an even 20% of seats in the cabinet to be formed in Warsaw.

It should be stressed that it is the principal condition that the parties in question and their legitimate authorities must themselves choose their representatives, for until now the Lublin Committee has been speaking for all the parties, putting up entirely unknown people who had no right to represent these parties. All the parties have their legitimate authorities either in the underground or in exile and their representatives must be determined in agreement with those party authorities. Also the complete freedom of organizing themselves and the right of unmolested assembly must be secured for these parties.

The Polish nation would most certainly lose its independence if the Lublin “provisional government” were left in office, for this would mean the rule of a trifling Communist group over huge majority of the nation even if it were sanctioned by sham elections which under such circumstances—as we know from experience in totalitarian countries—give a 100% vote for the ruling group.

Therefore it is decisive for the independence of Poland and for the freedom and future of the nation—to establish without further delay—a government based on all democratic political movements and to secure for this government the freedom of action, the assistance of the Allies and their confidence.

The creating in Poland of Government of National Unity capable of action and based on the will of the great majority of the nation and on its democratic political movements (which deserve so much credit for their five years of struggle against the Germans) will also create a favorable impression on the world public opinion. When the Lublin “government” will be dissolved and when such a new government will be created and enabled to act then also the parties who will be assured of freedom of action in a free country and will recall their leaders and members from abroad where they are representing the nation and Poland’s independence. *End of memorandum.*

²⁹ The “Sanitation Party”, the popular name for the “Non-Party Bloc of Co-operation with the Government” which supported the pre-war regime of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski.

Persons that Mr. Mikolajczyk considers as possible candidates for the "presidential council" are as follows: Prince Sapieha, Archbishop of Cracow; Mgr. Lukemski, Bishop of Lomza; Professor Stanislaw Kutrzeba,³⁰ Cracow University; Professor Franciszek Bujak,³¹ Lwow University; Professor Veon [apparent garble] Marchlewski, Cracow University; Professor Stefan Pienkowski, Rector of Warsaw Polytechnic; Professor Wladyslaw Szafer, ex-Rector Cracow University; Wincenty Witos,³² noted Peasant leader, former Prime Minister; Zygmunt Zulawski,³³ Cracow; Stanislaw Wojciechowski, Warsaw (the 1926 President of Poland); Aleksander Mogilnicki; President of the Supreme Court; Professor Stanislaw Grabski, President of National Council London.³⁴

[SCHOENFELD]

[President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, met in conference at Malta, January 30–February 2, 1945, and President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, with their advisers, met in conference at Yalta, February 4–11, 1945. For the consideration of Polish matters at these conferences, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, index entries under Poland, pages 1011–1012. For the Declaration on Poland included as item VI of the Report of the Crimea Conference (the communiqué issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin on February 11, 1945, at the end of the conference and released to the press on February 12), see *ibid.*, pages 973–974. For additional pre-Conference documentation regarding Poland, see *ibid.*, pages 227–236.]

740.0011 E.W./2–1545

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Acting Secretary of State

49/Sow/SZ–t/23

[WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1945.

SIR: Acting on instructions of my Government, I have the honor to communicate the following statement of the Polish Government:

³⁰ Professor of History and Rector of the University of Cracow before World War II; member of the Polish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919.

³¹ Polish economist and educator and authority on Polish agrarian problems.

³² Leader of the pre-1939 Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe); Prime Minister of Poland, 1920–1921 and 1923–1926; in retirement in Poland during World War II.

³³ Chairman of the National Council of the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partja Socjalistyczna); in Poland during World War II in the London-directed underground resistance.

³⁴ Resigned in November 1944.

"On Feb. 12, at 7:30 P. M., the British Foreign Office handed to the Polish Ambassador in London³⁵ the text of the resolution concerning Poland³⁶ adopted by President Roosevelt, Premier Churchill and Marshal Stalin at the Yalta conference between Feb. 4 and 11.

"Before the conference began, the Polish Government handed to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States a memorandum³⁷ in which was expressed that these Governments would not be party to any decision regarding an allied Polish state without previous consultation and without the consent of the Polish Government.

"At the same time, the Polish Government declared themselves willing to seek a solution of the dispute initiated by Soviet Russia through normal international procedure and with due respect for the rights of the two parties concerned.

"In spite of this, decisions of the three-Power conference were prepared and taken not only without participation and authorization of the Polish Government but also without their knowledge.

"The method adopted in the case of Poland is a contradiction of the elementary principles binding the Allies and constitutes a violation of the letter and the spirit of the Atlantic Charter³⁸ and the right of every nation to defend its own interests.

"The Polish Government declares that the decision of the Three-Power conference concerning Poland cannot be recognized by the Polish Government and cannot bind the Polish nation.

"The Polish Government will consider the severance of the eastern half of the territory of Poland through the imposition of a Polish-Soviet frontier following along the so-called Curzon Line as the fifth partition of Poland now accomplished by her Allies.

"The intention of the three Powers to create a 'Provisional Polish Government of National Unity' by enlarging the foreign-appointed Lublin Committee with persons vaguely described as 'Democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad' can only legalize Soviet interference in Polish internal affairs.

"As long as the territory of Poland will remain under the sole occupation of Soviet troops, government of that kind will not safeguard to the Polish nation, even in the presence of British and American diplomats, the unfettered right of free expression.

"The Polish Government, which is the sole legal and generally recognized Government of Poland and which for five and one-half years has directed the struggle of the Polish state and nation against Axis countries both through the underground movement in the homeland and through the Polish armed forces in all theatres of war, has expressed their readiness in a memorial presented to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States to cooperate in the creation of a Government in Poland truly representative of the will of the Polish nation. The Polish Government maintains its offer."

Accept [etc.]

J. CIECHANOWSKI

³⁵ Count Edward Raczyński.

³⁶ i.e., the Declaration on Poland, *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 973.

³⁷ Memorandum from the Polish Ambassador to the Secretary of State, dated January 22, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 228.

³⁸ Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. I, p. 367.

*The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to
President Roosevelt*³⁹

LONDON, February 17, 1945—3:09 p. m.

[Received February 18—12:50 a. m.]

Under cover of a letter of today's date, Prime Minister Arciszewski⁴⁰ requests me to transmit the following message to the President:

"Secret message from the Prime Minister of Poland to His Excellency Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States of America. Your message⁴¹ received yesterday February 16, 1945. I welcome your assurances that Poland's problems received most careful and sympathetic consideration at the Crimea Conference and that it is your hope that a correct solution of these problems may be found in due time. I consider it my duty to take this opportunity to state that the decisions of the Crimea Conference as made public were received by all Poles as a new partition of Poland leaving her under Soviet protectorate. Nevertheless the Polish nation is deeply convinced that this cannot be the final settlement of the Polish question and retains its implicit faith both in your profoundly sympathetic attitude towards Poland and in your unswerving championship of the high ideals of freedom and justice in the defense of which American and Polish soldiers are so generously giving their lives. London, February 17, 1945."

860C.01/2-2445 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

MOSCOW, February 24, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

540. For the Acting Secretary. We had our first meeting of the Polish Commission⁴² yesterday. Molotov, who assumed the chairmanship, was most affable throughout the discussions. Referring to the Crimea statement on Poland, he suggested that the Provisional Government should be called to Moscow and consulted in the first instance.

³⁹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁴⁰ Tomaz Arciszewski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London.

⁴¹ President Roosevelt's telegram to Prime Minister Arciszewski, dated February 15, *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 950, footnote 1.

⁴² The Declaration on Poland (*ibid.*, p. 973) provided for Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and W. Averell Harriman, American Ambassador in the Soviet Union, to constitute themselves as a Commission:

" . . . to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines."

To this Clark Kerr and I agreed but suggested that we might, at this time, agree among ourselves as to which Poles we should invite from Poland and abroad for consultation. Clark Kerr and I suggested the names of Bishop Sapieha, Wincenty Witos and Zulawski from Poland. I emphasized we were advancing these names for consultation and not necessarily for inclusion within the new government. Molotov agreed to the three names but referred to the President's letter to Marshal Stalin at Yalta⁴⁵ in which five names had been suggested and as a result we agreed to invite in addition Professors Bujak and Kutrzeba.

Clark Kerr, with my support, proposed the names of Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Romer⁴⁶ from London. Molotov repeated the doubt expressed at Yalta as to the reaction of the provisional government to Mikolajczyk. Clark Kerr stated the British public and parliamentary opinion considered Mikolajczyk a *sine qua non* in view of the public confidence he enjoys.

I recalled to Molotov what the President had said at Yalta about his own attitude and that of the American public towards Mikolajczyk and stated unequivocally that American opinion would not accept consultations which did not include Mikolajczyk. In reply to my inquiry as to whether Molotov had any additional suggestions of Poles from London, he proposed General Zelikowski.⁴⁷ Clark Kerr immediately agreed but I pointed out that according to my information he was 80 years old and not in full possession of his faculties. If this was correct the invitation of a man in such physical condition would put us in a rather ludicrous position in public opinion. Molotov readily dropped the name with the understanding that it might be given consideration later.

After some discussion it was agreed to invite the members from the Provisional Government to come to Moscow and to advise them of the names we were proposing to invite for consultation from Poland and abroad, giving them the opportunity to comment. Molotov agreed that the commission would in no sense be bound by the views of the Provisional Government.

It was agreed to send a telegram from the three of us to Warsaw:⁴⁸

(1) Indicating our desire for a meeting with the representatives of the Polish Government and asking whom they would send;

⁴⁵ For text of President Roosevelt's letter of February 6, 1945, to Marshal Stalin, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 727.

⁴⁶ Tadeusz Romer, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Polish Government in Exile, at London (resigned November 1944).

⁴⁷ General Lucjan Żeligowski, member of the National Council of the Polish Government in Exile, at London; he gained fame as a military commander during the establishment of the Polish Republic after World War I.

⁴⁸ Following the capture of Warsaw by the Red Army on January 17, 1945, the Polish Provisional Government moved from Lublin to Warsaw.

(2) Naming the five persons within Poland whom we propose to invite for consultation;

(3) Similarly naming the three Poles from London;

(4) Pointing out that these men both within Poland and abroad are being invited for consultation and not necessarily representative members of the new government;

(5) Indicating a readiness to receive any observations which the Polish Government cared to make on the above.

A telegram along the above lines is being sent today.

No public statement has been agreed to so far and I hope you will agree that no information about our discussions should be given out in Washington.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/2-2445 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

LONDON, February 24, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received February 25—1:40 a. m.]

Poles 25. Mikolajczyk has given me a copy of a memorandum⁴⁹ which he gave Eden⁵⁰ yesterday following their conversation a couple of days ago with regard to invitations from the tripartite commission at Moscow looking toward formation of a reorganized Polish Government.

Its substance is as follows:

If invited by the full tripartite commission, the persons given in Annex 1⁵¹ (he believes) are ready to take part in the consultations with the commission. But their ultimate consent must depend on fulfillment of the following conditions:

(1) The list of the persons to be invited must be made known beforehand to those participating.

(2) Their departure from England to the conference will take place immediately on notification of the arrival in Moscow of the

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵¹ Not printed; Mikolajczyk proposed that the following persons be invited by the tripartite commission in Moscow from among Polish political leaders in exile at London: from the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe), Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and Wladyslaw Bartnicki; from the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partja Socjalistyczna), Jan Stanczyk, Adam Ciolkosz, and Ludwik Grosfeld; from the Christian Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy), Karol Popiel and Zygmunt Kaczynski; from the National Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe), Marjan Seyda, Bohdan Winjarski, G. Czeslaw Meissner, and Lucjan Rybinski; non-party, Stanislaw Grabski and Tadeusz Romer; representing the Poles in Germany, Arka Bozek.

representatives of the political parties from Poland whose names have been previously agreed on.

(3) In order to assure such conditions at the conference that decisions may be taken freely the representatives from Poland and London must be accorded the right of free communication between themselves before and during the conference. Moreover all who participate must be given a guarantee of an unhindered departure in a direction which they themselves will determine.

(4) The representatives from London must be given the possibility of free communication with their colleagues inside Poland.

In principle all the genuine representatives of the political parties both inside Poland and abroad ought to take part in the consultations. Hence invitations should be extended to the persons in London (Annex 1) and those in Poland (Annex 2).⁵²

(5) The London representatives in the conference will be informed in advance of the attitude of the British and United States Governments concerning the recognition of the Polish Government to be formed in Poland, the political guarantees and the economic and financial assistance to be accorded to Poland, the future of the Polish armed forces abroad, the termination of the Polish Government in London, et cetera, et cetera.

Commenting on the points in the memorandum he had given Eden, Mikolajczyk said regarding point 1 that he regarded it as essential to have ahead of time the list of persons to be invited to Moscow.

He might otherwise find himself there dealing only with Bierut⁵³ and some persons who had been handpicked by the Lublin group.

Regarding point 2, he also considered it essential that the Poles to be invited from London should know before setting out that those invited from Poland had arrived.

The Soviets might otherwise say they had been unable to get in touch with them and they had thus been unable to come.

As to point 3, it was clear that the Poles could not come to any satisfactory decisions unless they could communicate freely with each other.

He had had the experience on a previous visit to Moscow of not being able to talk to other Poles. He thought it also evident that they should be allowed freely to leave.

⁵² Not printed; Mikolajczyk proposed that the following persons from among politicians within Poland be invited by the tripartite commission in Moscow: From the Peasant Party, Wincenty Witos, Kazimierz Baginski, Jozef Niecko, Adam Bień, Władysław Kiernik; from the Polish Socialist Party, Zygmunt Zulański, Zygmunt Zaremba, Kazimierz Puzak, and Antoni Pajdak; from the Christian Labor Party, Jozef Chaciński, Franciszek Urbański, Kwasiborski, Ignacy Sikora, and Piwowarczyk; from the National Democratic Party, Wojciech Trampeczynski, Stanisław Zielinski, Stanisław Jasiukowicz, Aleksander Zwierzynski, and Knopczynski; from the Democratic Party, Adam.

⁵³ Bolesław Bierut, President of the Polish National Council and leader of the Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza), the party of the Polish Communists.

As for point 4, the British had arranged for him to communicate with personalities inside Poland; this was especially necessary since the present Polish Government was sending reports that were not helpful and it was necessary for him to be in a position to explain and persuade.

He thought it necessary to insist on all these safeguards because even now there were attacks on him from Communist quarters here in England which were perhaps inspired and designed to make him more amenable.

As for point 5, Mikolajczyk spoke of his interest in having some idea in advance of the attitude of the United States and British Governments concerning recognition of the Polish Government to be formed in Poland, political guarantees and economic and financial assistance to be accorded to Poland, the future of the Polish armed forces abroad and the termination of the Polish Government in London.

I explained that I had no new information beside what was given in the communiqué. He also wondered whether conversations and exchanges when he was in the government still applied. He referred, for example, to the President's letter to him of November 17 last⁵⁴ delivered by Ambassador Harriman and to statements which touched on the question of post-war economic reconstruction. I pointed out that in that letter the point was made that such assistance was "subject to legislative authority" and that it was in fact very difficult to say in advance precisely what action might be taken.

If there are any observations which the Department feels I could convey to Mikolajczyk, I feel sure he would appreciate them.

Mikolajczyk was particularly concerned regarding the Polish armed forces [*forces?*]. They were being stirred up not only by the present situation but also by exaggerated accounts from the present Polish authorities regarding executions and deportations in Poland. Some of the Generals were very sensible. He included Kopanski⁵⁵ and Tabor⁵⁶ among them. They were exercising a calming influence. The problem for the future was also a most difficult one since the armed forces [*forces?*] were bound by their oath to the President.⁵⁷ He hoped that it would be possible to get a sufficiently representative political grouping in Poland so that the Polish President

⁵⁴ *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. III, p. 1334.

⁵⁵ Gen. Stanisław Kopanski, Chief of the Polish General Staff.

⁵⁶ Pseudonym for Brig. Gen. Stanisław Tatar, one-time Chief of Staff of the Polish Underground Army.

⁵⁷ Władysław Raczkiewicz, President of the Polish Government in Exile at London.

might somehow be induced in time to turn over the power to a suitable person.

Repeated Moscow as 68.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/2-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 27, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received February 28—6:40 a. m.]

557. ReEmbs 540, February 24, 3 p. m. Yesterday evening I received a note from Molotov enclosing the text of a telegram received today from the Polish Provisional Government through the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw in reply to the telegram of February 24 sent to them by the commission. In this message, signed by Bierut, the Polish Provisional Government acknowledges receipt of the telegram in question and agrees to send its representatives to the proposed consultation in Moscow but considers it necessary to make the following observations:

“(1) The participation of democratic leaders expressing the will of the people and defending the principles on which the decisions of the Crimea Conference were based is required in the proposed consultation. Unfortunately, due to the political one-sidedness of the selection, this condition is not met by the list of persons proposed in your letter.

(2) Concerning the whereabouts of Mr. Wincenty Witos on Polish territory the Polish Provisional Government has no information. If however, he is in Poland, the fact that he is concealing himself after the liberation of the country from the German occupants, whereas the whereabouts of Mr. Witos was known to everyone during the German occupation, makes his participation in the consultation impossible in our opinion.

It is considered expedient by the Polish Provisional Government to bring into the consultation democratic representatives of various political tendencies in Poland and proposes the following candidates: (names in reverse order) 5. Sigismund Palczak.⁵⁸ 4. The writer Sophia Nalkowska.⁵⁹ 3. The writer Viktor Jan. 2. Professor Stanislae [Stanislaw Kutrzeba]. 1. Professor Sigizmund Szymanowski.⁶⁰

(3) The Polish Provisional Government considers it necessary to point out with reference to the participants in the conference from abroad that Mr. Mikolajczyk in several recent press statements has come out sharply against the decisions of the Crimea Conference

⁵⁸ Zygmunt Felczak, member of the Christian Labor Party and for a time in 1942 the Delegate in Poland of the Polish Government in Exile at London.

⁵⁹ Zofia Nalkowska, a foremost Polish novelist and playwright with liberal political sympathies.

⁶⁰ Zygmunt Szymanowski, Professor of Bacteriology at Warsaw.

and thereby has disqualified himself as a possible participant in the consultation, in our opinion.

As regards Mr. Romer, he does not represent any democratic tendency in Poland and the democratic spirit which permeated the decisions of the Crimea Conference is contradicted by his activity.

We propose that the following persons from London be invited, considering that the selection of persons for the consultation should take into consideration those groups of Poles which take a positive attitude toward the decisions of the Crimea Conference, or at the very least take a neutral attitude, (names in reverse order) : General Zeligowski, Mr. Kolodzei, Secretary of the Polish Seaman's Union, Mr. Grabski.

(4) The following are authorized by the Polish Provisional Government to proceed to Moscow for the consultation (names in reverse order) : Rola Zymerski,⁶¹ Osobka-Morawski,⁶² Bierut. After determination of the participation in the consultation we are prepared to fix the time of arrival at Moscow.[""]

HARRIMAN

860C.01/2-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 27, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 9 : 39 p. m.]

565. For the Acting Secretary from Harriman. ReEmbs 557, February 27, 11 a. m. Clark Kerr and I made it plain to Molotov at our meeting today that we considered Bierut's reply indicated that he and his associates had a completely false understanding of the agreement reached in the Crimea. After some discussion it was agreed that a telegram should be sent to the Polish Provisional Government, paraphrase of which follows: ⁶³

"We have received your telegram which raises questions which in our opinion call for direct oral discussion. We therefore invite the following representatives of the Polish Provisional Government to come to Moscow as soon as possible: Messrs. Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, Rola-Zymierski. The first announcement of your arrival in Moscow will be published after our meeting with you and we request you to pursue a similar course with regard to publication in Poland."

Clark Kerr and I submitted additional names of Poles as suggestions for consideration of the commission to be invited for consultation.

⁶¹ Col. Gen. Michal Zymierski (pseudonym Rola and sometimes identified as Rola-Zymierski), Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces and Minister of Defense of the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw; Deputy President of the Polish National Council; leader in the Polish Workers' Party.

⁶² Edward Bolesław Osóbka-Morawski, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lublin Polish Provisional Government.

⁶³ In telegram 469, March 2, to Moscow, the Department stated that it was pleased to learn of the agreement reached by the Commission concerning the reply to be made to the Provisional Government (860C.01/2-2745).

No action was taken, Molotov agreeing to give the names his consideration. The list is as follows: "From London: Stanzyk⁶⁵ (Socialist), a Christian Labor Party man (I proposed Popiel⁶⁶), Seyda⁶⁷ (National Democrat). From Poland: Chacinski⁶⁸ and Urbanski⁶⁹ (Christian Labor Party); Zielinski⁷⁰ and Trampeczynski⁷¹ (National Democrats; I took exception to Trampeczynski because of his age); Adam⁷² (Democrat); Baginski⁷³ (Peasants Party); Zaremba⁷⁴ (Socialist)." It is not our expectation that all of these men will or should be invited to Moscow, and we expect to get the reaction of the Warsaw Poles before anyone is invited. Molotov continues to agree that we in no sense shall be bound by the views of the Warsaw Poles.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/2-2445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1945—10 p. m.

455. ReEmbs 540, February 24, 3 p. m. Dept concurs with the steps taken by you at the first meeting of the Polish Commission and was pleased to learn of the affable atmosphere and flexibility shown in these preliminary discussions.

British Embassy has made available to Dept a copy of ForOf telegram to Clark-Kerr 746, February 18. In general Dept concurs

⁶⁵ Jan Stańczyk, General Secretary of the Polish Trades Union Congress, member of the Executive Council of the Polish Socialist Party and former Minister of Labor and Social Welfare of the Polish Government in Exile (resigned November 1944).

⁶⁶ Karol Popiel, Chairman of the Christian Labor Party in Exile, Minister of Reconstruction for Public Administration in the Polish Government in Exile (resigned 1944).

⁶⁷ Marian Seyda, member of the Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party and Minister of Preparatory Work for the Peace Conference in the Polish Government in Exile (resigned November 1944).

⁶⁸ Jozef Chaciński, Chairman of the Christian Labor Party in Poland and participant in the anti-German underground within Poland during World War II.

⁶⁹ Franciszek Urbański, responsible Secretary of the Christian Labor Party in Poland and participant in the anti-German underground within Poland during World War II.

⁷⁰ Stanisław Zielinski, former member of the Polish Sejm and Polish Consul General in Berlin before World War II.

⁷¹ Wojciech Trampeczynski, former President of the Polish Senate and a person of great prestige within Poland.

⁷² Pseudonym of the Acting Chairman of the Democratic Party within Poland and a member of the underground Council of National Unity (Rada Jedności Narodowej). Mikołajczyk, who first advanced the name of this person (see footnote 52, p. 126), did not know his real name.

⁷³ Kazimierz Bagiński, Vice President of the underground Council of National Unity and Vice President of the Polish Peasant Party within Poland.

⁷⁴ Zygmunt Zaremba, Chairman of the Polish Socialist Party within Poland and prominent in the anti-German underground.

in the positive instructions as to procedure given to Clark-Kerr which seem to constitute a general framework in which the Commission should carry out its duties. You should concert with him in the formulation of proposals along the following lines:

1. The various Polish leaders themselves should be encouraged to agree on the composition of the Government with the Commissioners acting as arbiters to insure that the Government which is set up will not only be representative of all democratic elements in Poland but also, because of its membership, will command respect in Polish circles abroad and particularly with the Polish forces fighting in the West. In this connection it would be most helpful if a high-ranking Polish General from the West, acceptable to the Soviet Government, could be included in the Government of National Unity in order that the Polish forces in the West might maintain their morale in the fight against the Germans and have sufficient faith in the new Government to return to their homeland upon the termination of hostilities.

2. Any individual Pole proposed by any of the three commissioners should be eligible to be invited for consultation unless conclusive evidence is produced to show that he does not represent the democratic elements in the country.

3. The three commissioners should request the authorities of the Provisional Government in Lublin to suspend legal proceedings and administrative measures against individuals save for crimes against the law or against the Red Army pending formation of the new Polish government.

It is Depts feeling that every effort should be made to maintain flexibility in the negotiations in order that agreement can be reached on a group of Poles who will be genuine representatives of the various democratic elements of the population.

GREW

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁷⁵

LONDON, 28 February, 1945.

901. 1. Accept my deep sympathy in your personal loss through the death of General Watson.⁷⁶ I know how much this will grieve you.

2. You will probably see the accounts of our three days' debate⁷⁷ which began yesterday. Today 21 Conservatives are moving a hostile

⁷⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁷⁶ Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, Military Aide and Secretary to President Roosevelt, who died on February 20, 1945.

⁷⁷ For the record of the House of Commons debate regarding the Crimea Conference (February 27–March 1, 1945), see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 408, cols. 1267–1675 *passim*.

amendment in favour of Poland,⁷⁸ and Greenwood,⁷⁹ who speaks for the Labour Party, made a foolish and hostile speech.⁸⁰ We shall no doubt defeat the amendment by an overwhelming majority.⁸¹ Nevertheless there is a good deal of uneasiness in both parties that we are letting the Poles down, etc.

3. In these circumstances it is of the utmost importance that as many representative Poles as possible should be invited as soon as possible to the consultations in Moscow and, above all, that Mikolajczyk who is the leading test case should be invited. The London Polish Government is of course trying to prevent any Poles leaving here for Moscow or Poland, and is playing for a breakdown.

4. Clark Kerr telegraphs that Molotov spontaneously offers to allow British and American observers to go into Poland and see what is going on for themselves. I think this is of the highest importance. Nor can I feel that the acceptance of the offer would imply any recognition of the Lublin Government. There are many stories put about of wholesale deportations by the Russians and of liquidations by the Lublin Poles of elements they do not like, and I have no means of verifying or contradicting these assertions.

5. I do hope you have benefited by the voyage⁸² and will return refreshed. The battle seems to be going well and I propose to visit the front at the weekend, seeing both Eisenhower⁸³ and Montgomery.⁸⁴ I cannot help feeling there might easily be a good break through in the west. Every good wish to you and all. I hope Harry⁸⁵ is recovering.

860C.01/2-2845

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 28, 1945.

The Polish Ambassador⁸⁶ called this afternoon at his own request and left with me the attached three documents.⁸⁷ He said he hoped

⁷⁸ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 408, cols. 1421-1422.

⁷⁹ Arthur Greenwood, Member of Parliament for Wakefield; Deputy Leader and Acting Chairman of the Labour Party.

⁸⁰ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 408, cols. 1295-1303.

⁸¹ The amendment was defeated 396 to 25. See *ibid.*, cols. 1515-1520.

⁸² Returning to the United States following the conclusion of the Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt travelled from Alexandria, Egypt, to Norfolk, Virginia, aboard the cruiser U.S.S. *Quincy*.

⁸³ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

⁸⁴ Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, Commander in Chief, British 21st Army Group.

⁸⁵ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

⁸⁶ Jan Ciechanowski.

⁸⁷ None printed. One was a commentary regarding Prime Minister Churchill's

that they could be brought to the attention of the President before he made his speech which he understood from the radio is scheduled for tomorrow.⁸⁸ He also hoped that the United States Government might find it possible to halt the continuing arrest, execution, etc. of members of the Polish underground home army by the Soviet authorities as set forth in the papers he left with me. I told the Ambassador that I would see that these papers were given consideration by the proper authorities and if possible would be shown to the President although I could not guarantee that the President would see them before he made his speech tomorrow.

The Ambassador then said that he wished to express the personal hope that the United States Government having now taken the responsibility in regard to the future Government of Poland, a step which he knew was welcomed all over the world, would really implement this responsibility and not accept any "face saving" government but would genuinely press for a really representative Polish Government. I told the Ambassador that I was sure that the United States Government would certainly live up to any responsibility which it had assumed.

In conclusion the Ambassador said that he thought careful study should be given to the question of the role of the President of the Polish Republic in connection with any provisional government. He felt that the legal continuity of the office of the President, which at the present time was occupied by Mr. Raczkiewicz, was a factor of real political importance and a bargaining weapon in the hands of the British and American Governments.

C. E. BOHLEN

statements on the Polish question in a speech in the House of Commons on February 27, 1945. A second transmitted information obtained by the Polish Government in Exile at London regarding the totalitarian nature of the Polish Provisional Government established in Warsaw. The third document transmitted information obtained by the Polish Government in Exile regarding reprisals by the Communist-dominated government in Poland against the Polish Underground Army, deportation and abuse of Polish citizens, and devastation of natural resources within Poland.

⁸⁸ For text of President Roosevelt's message reporting on the Crimea Conference, delivered before a joint session of Congress on March 1, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 4, 1945, p. 321.

860C.01/3-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 1, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 4:20 p. m.]

597. At a meeting of the Commission on Poland on February 27, Molotov suggested the advisability of Clark Kerr and myself sending representatives to Poland to obtain first-hand information. It was agreed that this question should be held in abeyance but that it might be desirable to give it consideration at a later date. Clark Kerr has today received a telegram from Mr. Churchill stressing the importance of having our representatives in Poland and directing him to send representatives promptly. We hope to have another meeting today with Molotov and if Clark Kerr and Molotov agree on the procedure for sending representatives, I plan to detail Secretary of Embassy, Francis B. Stevens, and a naval officer attached to the Naval Mission here who has lived in Poland and speaks a little Polish, to proceed to Warsaw at such time as may be agreed to. It will, of course, be understood that these British-American delegates will be the personal representatives of Clark Kerr and myself as members of the Commission and in no sense representatives of our Governments accredited to the Warsaw Government.

Clark Kerr and I both feel that the presence of such representatives within Poland will serve to supply us with authoritative first-hand information for use in our discussions here.

It is my plan that if this is done, Durbrow⁸⁹ will take over during Stevens' absence the work the latter is now doing in Moscow in connection with the Commission.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/3-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 2, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received March 3—7:45 a. m.]

610. For the Acting Secretary. British Ambassador received a message late in evening of February 28 from Eden stating that he regretted that the British Ambassador had agreed to call the Warsaw

⁸⁹ Elbridge Durbrow, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, then in Moscow to assist Ambassador Harriman in the meetings of the Commission on Poland.

Poles to Moscow prior to the extension by the Commission of an invitation to other Polish leaders from liberated Poland, explaining that this would confirm the worst fears of certain members of the House and thereby cause the British Government further difficulties. Clark Kerr was therefore instructed to insist that the Commission before the arrival of the representatives of the Warsaw Government invite these other Polish leaders to come to Moscow at once.

We therefore had a meeting late last night lasting three and a half hours to discuss the proposal of the British Government. The discussion confirmed my view that Molotov would take no action without previous consultation with the Warsaw Poles even in the selection of the independent Poles to be invited to Moscow. He was willing to invite only persons who were on the list submitted by the Warsaw Government as contained in my 557, February 27, 11 a. m. You will realize that the five names suggested by Bierut from western Poland included only one of those proposed by us, namely Professor Kutrzeba, and four other persons regarding whom we have absolutely no information and who have never been publicly known to be active in politics. The names from London included only one that we had suggested, namely Grabski.

At one time Molotov suggested that we limit our invitation at this time to Kutrzeba, Grabski and General Zeligowski. He firmly resisted the invitation to Mikolajczyk contending against all argument, including the reading of Mikolajczyk's statement to the press,⁹⁰ that Mikolajczyk had publicly disavowed the Crimean decision.

As Mikolajczyk has refused to come to Moscow until after the arrival of the Poles from Warsaw, Clark Kerr explained that he was

⁹⁰ In his telegram Polish Series 16, February 16, 1945, the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile, who repeated his telegram to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, reported the text of a letter by Mikolajczyk which appeared in the London *Daily Herald* on February 16. In this letter, Mikolajczyk denied a statement carried in the *Daily Herald* on February 14 that the Crimea decisions on Poland were based on Mikolajczyk's own suggestions. Mikolajczyk's statement read in part as follows:

"On the frontier question I maintain the view that the three great powers should share responsibility in the frontier settlement in which Poland should also participate.

"I maintain also the view that by such a settlement the frontiers of Poland in the east as well as the west and north should be fixed simultaneously. Moreover, I always held that at least Lwow and the oilfields should remain within Poland.

"On the second subject—the question of the government—I have pronounced myself in public in favour of convening a round-table conference of all the leaders of the Polish underground in Warsaw and of basing the government in Poland on all democratic elements and guaranteeing to such a government the means of unhampered action.

"I have never suggested that this should be accomplished by the broadening and reorganization of the so-called Provisional Government in Lublin." (740.0011 E.W./2-1645).

For full text of the Mikolajczyk letter as well as the *Daily Herald* statement to which it was a reply, see Edward J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 352.

suggesting at this time the extending of invitations only to Poles from within Poland, and we both stated categorically that we would not agree to the extension of any invitations to London Poles unless Mikolajczyk was included. Molotov therefore agreed to limit the discussion to the inviting of Poles from within Poland. After hours of discussion it was obvious that we could come to no agreement. Molotov kept insisting that he would not invite Poles to Moscow until he had direct knowledge that those individuals were in sympathy with the Crimea decision. He contended that he had no information about any of the men on our list except Professor Kutrzeba and admitted that until he had consulted the Warsaw Government he would be unable to include any others.

The upshot of the conversation was agreement between Clark Kerr and Molotov to put off the invitation of the Warsaw Poles. I objected to the delay and insisted that the commission should be ready to work independently of the opinion of the Warsaw Government, but Molotov was adamant. Under the circumstances I agree to join in a telegram to Bierut requesting the postponement of the visit to Moscow.

I am not able to judge the reactions in England as described by Eden's message but from the standpoint of the negotiations here I regret that it has not been possible for us to bring the Warsaw Poles to Moscow at this stage and have a blunt talk with them. Their telegram has indicated that they do not accept the spirit of the Crimea decisions and I still feel it is essential to talk with them and Molotov together in order to find out whether there is any basis at all for agreement.

It is still my conviction that the Russians cannot afford to let the Crimea decisions break down. On the other hand it is apparent that Molotov is under instructions from Stalin and his associates to give as little ground as possible in the direction of bringing in elements not under Soviet control and to fight every inch of the way. It is equally my intention, unless I am instructed otherwise, not to be a party to inviting any Poles outside the Warsaw Government unless the group includes a reasonable number of independent leaders who are well known to the outside world, even though several of the list suggested by Warsaw might also be included. In addition I will not agree to inviting any Poles from London unless Mikolajczyk is included.

I feel we are going through the usual Russian tactics of attempting to wear us down. I am not yet pessimistic over the outcome, though I cannot help but be resentful of the tactics employed. The only good news I can give of the talk last night is that Molotov was obviously making every effort to keep the conversation in a friendly tone.

Molotov has agreed to attempt to inform himself regarding the names we have proposed within Poland and at our next meeting he will inform us whether he will agree to the inviting of a representative list. I have maintained that he should agree to invite anyone that Clark Kerr and I feel will be useful. On the other hand, I have told him that I would be similarly ready to invite anyone that he wished to bring. Molotov's only answer is the continued reiteration of his position that we should invite only Poles known to support the Crimea decisions.

We also had a brief talk regarding sending British and American representatives to Poland (reEmbs 597, March 1, 3 p. m.).

Molotov appeared less interested than in our last talk and asked Clark Kerr to advise exactly what our representatives were to do if they went to Poland. Clark Kerr is cabling the Prime Minister in order to be sure that he covers the ground Mr. Churchill has in mind.

Unfortunately Clark Kerr is undergoing a slight operation to his eye which will lay him up for three or four days and thus delay further meetings.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/3-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 3, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received March 3—1:55 p. m.]

613. For the Acting Secretary. There is a difference in the English and Russian texts of the Crimea communiqué regarding Poland which has only recently come to light. You will note that in the English text of the communiqué appears the statement "to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government, etc." whereas in the Russian draft this is worded "consult in Moscow in the first instance with members, etc". Molotov is making a great point of this phrase "in the first instance" and is interpreting it in its broadest possible implications that we must consult the Warsaw Poles in the first instance on all questions.

The question may be somewhat academic as Clark Kerr and I have agreed that the Commission should meet with the Warsaw Poles before meeting with any other Poles. However, it would be helpful in our discussions if the Secretary, Matthews⁹¹ or Bohlen could advise

⁹¹ H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, accompanied President Roosevelt to the Crimea Conference.

me what was intended by this phrase when it was inserted in the first draft submitted to Molotov at Yalta.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/3-245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1945—7 p. m.

482. ReEmbs 597, March 1, 3 p. m. Department approves of your proposal to send Stevens and a naval officer to Poland. Department does not, however, agree with the instructions of the Foreign Office to Clark-Kerr no. 1022, March 2, and have so informed the British Embassy here. We feel it would be a mistake to press at this time for a high level mission to Poland whose functions would include preparations for the elections. We do not believe that the Russians or the Lublin Poles would agree to such a mission now and to raise the matter would probably prejudice the sending of personal representatives by Clark-Kerr and yourself. After a new Polish Government is agreed upon, we could consider whether a mission of this kind should be established. A further objection is that the presence of such a mission might prejudice our efforts to avoid the premature holding of an election. It would seem sufficient to state that your representatives are proceeding to Poland to report to you on present conditions in Poland.

The Department is somewhat disturbed at the general attitude of the British Foreign Office toward the work of the Polish Commission. We do not agree that you should assume that Molotov is the advocate for the Lublin Poles and that you and Clark-Kerr represent other Poles. Whatever Molotov's position may be in fact, we believe it important that the Commission should endeavor to operate as a unit. We believe that such was the intent of the Crimea decisions and that it is only in this way that success can be achieved.

Dept approves the positions you have taken in the Commission as reported in your 610, March 2, 4 p. m. However, while we can see the advantages in having a blunt talk with the Lublin Poles in Moscow at this stage, we feel that the effect abroad and on other Polish groups would be very unfortunate and even dangerous. It would be difficult to persuade the world and non-Lublin Poles that in these prior consultations the Lublin Poles had not laid down to their satisfaction the conditions of negotiations. We think it important that the Commission in Moscow should draw up the first list of Poles from the three groups mentioned in the Crimea communiqué who are to participate

in the initial negotiations before and not after the arrival of the Lublin Poles. There would be no objection to the latters' arrival at Moscow several days ahead of the others.

The foregoing observations are for your general guidance as to our views here. They are designed to be flexible, and we will continue to leave to your discretion their application in negotiation.

GREW

860C.01/3-345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 3, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

618. ReEmbs 610, March 2, 4 p. m. I am naturally concerned over the present prospect of the protracted nature of the work of (Polco)⁹² the Commission on Poland. In this connection I wish to refer to Schoenfeld's telegram to Moscow, No. 68, February 24, 10 p. m., sent to Department as Poles 25, in which he advises that Mikolajczyk has made five conditions to his acceptance of the invitation by the Commission to come to Moscow for consultation. If condition 2 is accepted, namely, that he will not leave England before being advised that representatives from within Poland have already arrived in Moscow it is obvious that our discussions will be considerably delayed. It may be necessary to invite a few from within Poland in the first instance and add additional invitations at a later date. In any event it is going to be extremely difficult to obtain Molotov's approval to the inviting of Mikolajczyk for the reasons stated by Marshal Stalin at Yalta and because of his subsequent unfortunate statement to the press and doubly so if Mikolajczyk makes conditions and shows reluctance as to his coming.

It seems to me that if Mikolajczyk sincerely wishes to cooperate with the decisions taken at the Crimea he should agree to come without making conditions. Although it may be natural for him to request us to give him information on whom he may expect to meet in Moscow we should not agree that his acceptance is conditioned on his approval of the other conferees.

It goes without saying that it is the obligation of the Commission to arrange for free communications between the representatives from London and from Poland throughout the discussions. On the other

⁹² Telegram 465, March 2, 1945, 2 p. m., to Moscow requested that the code word Polco be inserted within the first paragraph of telegrams relating to discussions on formation of a Polish provisional government (860C.01/3-245).

hand it is extremely insulting not only to the Soviet Government but to the British and American Governments as well that he should even raise the question of a guarantee of unhindered departure from Moscow. We can, however, not guarantee him the right to enter Poland as that will be between him and the new Polish Government. When it comes to the question of free communications with colleagues inside Poland, this is an impossible thing to guarantee. Physical communications in Poland are very bad and at best impossibly slow. It seems to me his condition No. 5 regarding the attitude of the British and United States Governments, concerning the recognition of the Polish Government to be formed in Poland, the political guarantee and the economic and financial assistance and the future of Polish armed forces abroad, the termination of the Polish Government in London, et cetera, are matters that are either difficult to deal with at this time or should be developed in the course of the consultations in Moscow.

To sum up, I am pessimistic about getting the approval of Molotov to inviting Mikolajczyk unless he shows a disposition to cooperate in implementing the Crimean decisions.

I therefore recommend that this question be taken up with the British Foreign Office and every attempt be made by the British and ourselves to bring Mikolajczyk into a realistic and cooperative frame of mind. I feel that if necessary it should be pointed out to him that if he approaches these negotiations suspicious not only of the Russians but also of the British and ourselves we can not invite him to Moscow and that the reasons for his being excluded will be publicly stated at the time other Poles are invited from London.⁹³

Sent to Department as 618, repeated to London as 91.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/3-345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1945—midnight.

492. Reurtel 613, March 3, 3 p. m. With reference to the difference in word order in the English and Russian texts of the Crimea communiqué regarding Poland both Bohlen and Matthews are positive

⁹³ Telegram 510, March 5, to Moscow, stated that the Department concurred in the views set forth in this telegram regarding the conditions laid down by Mikolajczyk for his acceptance of an invitation to Moscow, but felt it would not be advisable to discuss the matter with Mikolajczyk until the Commission had determined the list of Poles to be invited for consultation in the first instance (860C.01/3-545).

that the words "in the first instance" were inserted into the communiqué for the definite purpose of allowing the Commission, if it so desired, to move on to Warsaw to continue its work. There was never any question of the words being interpreted to mean that the Lublin Poles should be consulted first. You will also recall that the Russian version of the Agreement was a translation from the English and not the other way around.

GREW

860C.01/3-445 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 4, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received March 5—1:00 a. m.]

629. Polco. Re Department's 482, March 3, 7 p. m. I feel certain the Department is correct in opposing the British proposal to request Soviet approval for a high powered mission to go to Poland. I am satisfied that Molotov would not agree to it and that even to make the suggestion at this time would be confusing and not back the work of the Commission. At our last meeting Molotov cooled off on his suggestion made at the previous meeting that Clark Kerr and I send representatives to Poland. I feel that this was because Clark Kerr, on instructions from Prime Minister, proposed sending "four or five trusted men". Molotov, quite naturally I felt, asked what they were to do. Thus Molotov's suspicions have been aroused that the British have different objectives than he had originally in mind and I am not now sure that we can get his agreement to send even one representative.

For Department's information I have consistently maintained the position in the Commission's discussions that we are working as one rather than as advocates for the different Polish groups. Molotov so far has outwardly accepted this position although it now seems clear that he and the Lublin Poles are working together along lines agreed to when the latter were here in mid February.⁹⁴

I appreciate greatly the guidance the Department has given me and its willingness on the other hand to leave to my discretion the conduct of the negotiations. Unfortunately Clark Kerr is handicapped by being directed at every turn by the Foreign Office based on information always a little late. Clark Kerr has kindly shown me all of his cables from the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister

⁹⁴ President Bierut, Prime Minister Osobka-Morawski, and Colonel General Żymierski visited Moscow from February 14 to February 20, 1945, during which time they had conversations with Marshal Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov.

and it seems that Downing Street is viewing the work of the Commission more from the standpoint of the debate in the House of Commons than from the urgent need of making progress in implementing the Crimea agreement.

This is going to be difficult at best and I feel it is of the utmost importance that if the discussions here are unduly protracted to the point of public criticism our record should be very clear that it was due to the Soviet Government or the Poles and not the fault of the British or ourselves.

Clark Kerr is recovering satisfactorily from his operation and we expect to have a meeting tomorrow. It seems clear that our first immediate question is agreement on what independent Poles from within Poland we are to invite to Moscow for consultation. It is my intention to press Molotov for agreement to invite a representative list and if successful to agree to have the Warsaw Poles proceed promptly to Moscow.

Sent to Department, repeated to London as 93.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/3-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 6, 1945—2 a. m.

[Received March 6—1 a. m.]

636. Polco. We had three more unproductive hours of discussion at the meeting of the Commission on Poland this evening, going over much the same ground as last time.

The British Ambassador and I proposed that the Commission invite the five men from within Poland originally named by the President at Yalta⁹⁵ and indicated a willingness to agree to the inviting of any other Poles from Poland whom Molotov might wish. I argued for the Department's suggestion that the Commission agree to invite any Poles whom anyone of the three of us considered useful for consultation. Molotov brushed all arguments aside saying that he did not know enough about any of our suggestions to allow him to agree to their being invited except Kutrzeba for the reason that he was acceptable to the Warsaw Poles. He suggested that they might not be truly democratic. When queried about Prince Sapieha he said

⁹⁵ In a letter to Marshal Stalin, dated February 6, 1945, President Roosevelt named Archbishop Sapieha, Witos, Zulawski, Buyak, and Kutrzeba as persons who would be "desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support. . . ." For complete text of the letter, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 727.

his information indicated he was not truly democratic as he had once opposed the increase of public schools as being a luxury.

Molotov made two counter proposals: 1) That we invite the Warsaw Poles to Moscow at once and get from them first hand information about various Poles under consideration although he readily acquiesced that the Commission should not be bound by the Warsaw opinion. If we did not get Warsaw's advice, however, we might make a mistake and find a Fascist in our midst. He consistently denied that he had adequate information on these people and repeatedly suggested that the best way to get such information was to bring the Warsaw Poles to Moscow for consultation.

In justification of this position he cited the words "in the first instance" in the communiqué. This gave me an opportunity to explain the meaning in accordance with Department's 492, March 3, midnight. At first he challenged strongly our interpretation but when I pointed out that our obligation in the communiqué was to consult the Warsaw Government about its reorganization and not about whom we should invite he dropped the argument.

When Clark Kerr and I firmly stated that our respective Governments were unwilling to ask Warsaw Poles to come to Moscow until invitations had been extended to other representative Poles from within Poland on account of the unfavorable reaction in public opinion this would create in England and the United States, Molotov made his second proposal: 2) That we limit our invitations as a first step to the Warsaw representatives and four other Poles acceptable to the Warsaw Government, namely from within Poland, Kutrzeba and any one of the other four suggested by Warsaw and from London, Grabski and General Zeligowski. Clark Kerr and I bluntly pointed out to Molotov the absurdity of this suggestion.

I agreed to limit our invitations to four at this time if Mikolajczyk and Grabski were named from London and Kutrzeba and one of the other men of our list from within Poland, indicating, however, that I was ready to consider adding any names which Molotov might suggest from within Poland. Molotov refused to consider Mikolajczyk until we had had a chance to talk to the Warsaw Poles.

Clark Kerr then again proposed that we ask at this time only Poles from within Poland, attempting to get Molotov to broaden his selection. Molotov maintained the position that he could not agree to inviting any Poles from within Poland except from the list of five suggested by the Warsaw Government until we had had an opportunity to talk the matter over with the Warsaw Poles face to face.

Every argument Clark Kerr and I advanced was brushed aside. For example I told him that I knew the President would be shocked

to learn of Molotov's obstruction to the progress of the work of the Commission in objecting to our calling representative Polish democratic leaders to Moscow. I pointed out that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the inviting of Sapieha and Witos to Yalta and I failed to understand why Molotov now went back on this position. In reply he said that the communiqué was the "anchor" for the Commission's work and that no other conversations at Yalta had a bearing.

At no time did Molotov budge an inch from the position he had taken at our last meeting, although at all times he refused to allow the conversation to become in any way acrimonious.

In view of the deadlock Clark Kerr and I finally agreed to report Molotov's position to our Governments.

In closing Clark Kerr mentioned the question of a British mission going to Poland as a means of getting more information. Molotov interrupted by stating he did not feel he could now even take this question up with the Warsaw Government because of Mr. Eden's recent "offensive remarks" about the Warsaw Government in the House.

I will comment in another message tomorrow on my reaction to this impasse.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/3-745 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State

LONDON, March 7, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received March 7—5:10 p. m.]

Poles 35. ReDepts Poles 5, March 5, midnight⁹⁶ and Moscow's 618 to Department and 91 to London March 3, 7 p. m. I cannot avoid the conclusion that it would be singularly unfortunate if an invitation were not extended to Mikolajczyk to attend the initial consultations which the Moscow Commission will have with the Poles.

If Mikolajczyk should feel that he could not accept such an invitation because his conditions were not adequately met (my Poles 25 to Department and 68 to Moscow, February 24 (10 p. m.) the burden of refusal would in that case rest on him and not on us.

It is my guess that his "conditions" were not to be regarded as rigid and that if the points were informally discussed with him he would be reasonable.

I regard it as genuinely important that he should be present at Moscow. Among the Poles here who are sincerely seeking a settle-

⁹⁶ Not printed.

ment he is the dominant force. He is one of the few who sees the over-all picture. He has a full knowledge of the facts, is resourceful and basically constructive. He would doubtless be a highly useful source of knowledge and of suggestions for the Commission. Despite his strong sense of independence I believe he is a realist. His cooperation would be of great value and his endorsement of the results of the discussions would carry weight with substantial sections of opinion Polish and otherwise.

His absence from the discussions, on the other hand, would, I fear, invite considerable criticism.

Repeated to Moscow as 92; sent Department as Poles 35.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/3-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 7, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received March 8—1 : 38 p. m.]

667. Polco. The following are my comments and recommendations in regard to the situation of the Commission on Poland as last reported in my 636 of March 6, 2 a. m. As background, it is my belief that the tactics of Molotov and the Warsaw Government were agreed to when Beirut and company were in Moscow immediately after the Crimea Conference. It seems probable they consider time is playing in their favor. Every day the Lublin Government is becoming more and more the Warsaw Government and the rulers of Poland. From eyewitness reports I am told that governmental machinery is being established under the direction of Warsaw throughout the recently liberated areas. I have no information on how far to believe the stories emanating from London of persecution of political opponents in the recently-liberated areas. It certainly was true that in the Lublin days, individuals accused of connection with the political murders of Russians and Poles were harshly dealt with. The Warsaw Government, however, is undoubtedly making every effort to break up the opposition by persuasion, by threats and by publicly discrediting the more independent-minded in the way it has attempted to do with Mikolajczyk.

Since the Polish people fear the Russians and are inclined to be suspicious of the "Lublinites", these latter may figure that if they should permit the coming to Moscow of strong opposition leaders, these men would become the champions of Polish independence from Russian domination in the eyes of the people and thus the task of the Warsaw

Government to obtain leadership would be made materially more difficult. In addition, if they had to face truly strong opposition leaders in Moscow, it would be necessary for them to make a much more drastic reorganization of the Government than if they could induce the Commission to limit its invitations to those more amenable to their way of thinking. Thus it would seem that the agreement reached between the Lublinites and the Kremlin was that every effort should be made to obstruct the inviting to Moscow for consultation of the courageous and independent opposition leaders.

If Molotov is successful in inducing us to invite the Lublinites to Moscow before inviting any outside Poles, he will be in the position of refereeing a discussion between Clark Kerr and myself on the one side and the Lublinites on the other, in which the Lublinites will present charges sincere or trumped up, against each of our dangerous candidates. He would not have to take responsibility for presenting these charges himself. In spite of this I must confess that I would have liked to have faced these men and Molotov together in order to understand fully what we were up against. I realize, however, that this appears no longer possible since the British Government has taken such a strong attitude against it, supported by the Department's instructions in cable No. 482, March 3, 7 p. m.

I therefore recommend against receding, at this time, from the position we have taken during the last two conferences, namely, that the Commission must at least invite a representative group of independent Poles before allowing the Warsaw representatives to come to Moscow. As a first step, I recommend that we follow one of two courses: (1) That Clark Kerr and I, on instructions from our Governments, should insist that the principle be accepted by the Commission that each member shall have the right to name a certain number of individuals to be invited for consultation with the Commission. It might be agreed that the first list should be relatively small in the first instance and subject to expansion at a later date after preliminary consultations with the Warsaw representatives and the independent groups; (2) that Clark Kerr and I should insist on Molotov's acceptance of a limited number of our nominees, say two from London and two from within Poland, offering Molotov the right to invite one from each area, leaving open for future agreement the manner in which we would expand the list after consultation with these Poles and the Warsaw representatives. Perhaps we might be instructed to try both courses. If plan 2 is to be pursued, I would recommend inviting Mikolajczyk and Grabski from London, and from Poland Kutrzeba and one of the strictest individuals from the dozen or so names that we have given Molotov. (See cable No. 565, February 27, 7 p. m.) Mikolajczyk undoubtedly is the most important figure. Both Molo-

tov and the Lublinites are now basing their objection to him on the grounds that he has come out publicly against the Crimea decision. Even though this contention is not correct, his public statement was sufficiently unfortunate to give some grounds for their argument. I strongly advise, therefore, that pressure be brought to bear on Mikolajczyk to come out with a simple, forthright, unqualified statement to the effect that in the interests of the future of Poland, he is ready to support the Crimea decision and come to Moscow if invited. To be of any value, there can be no word of doubt or qualification. In other words his statement must without reservation accept the Crimea decision but not express approval of it. I hope he can be induced to make this statement within the next 48 hours.

My third alternative if 1 and 2 fail, is a compromise; namely, that we agree to invite the Warsaw representatives to Moscow first and listen to anything they have to say, but that Molotov on his part should now agree in writing that after we have heard their views, each member of the Commission shall have the right to invite any democratic leaders from within Poland or abroad whom he considers useful for consultation. Under this plan each member of the Commission would have to submit his candidates to the Commission, listen to the comments of the others, give a certain time for investigation but then be free, if he persists in his desire, to extend an invitation.

I do not like to even suggest the thought of a breaking down of our conversations but I strongly recommend that we not pursue a course on which we would not be willing to rest our case if Molotov continues to be unreasonable.

It would be most helpful to have an early reply.

HARRIMAN

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁹⁷

LONDON, 8 March 1945.

905. [The first three numbered paragraphs of this telegram are printed on page 505.]

4. The news from Moscow about Poland is also most disappointing. I must let you know that the government majorities here bear no relation to the strong undercurrent of opinion among all parties and classes and in our own hearts against a Soviet domination of Poland.

Labour men are as keen as conservatives, and Socialists as keen as Catholics. I have based myself in Parliament on the assumption that the words of the Yalta declaration will be carried out in the letter and

⁹⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

the spirit. Once it is seen that we have been deceived and that the well-known communist technique is being applied behind closed doors in Poland, either directly by the Russians or through their Lublin puppets, a very grave situation in British public opinion will be reached.

How would the matter go in the United States? I cannot think that you personally or they would be indifferent. Thus just at the time when everything military is going so well in Europe and when the Japanese policy is also satisfactorily arranged, there would come an open rift between us and Russia not at all confined, in this country at any rate, to government opinion, but running deep down through the masses of the people.

5. After a fairly promising start Molotov is now refusing to accept any interpretation of the Crimea proposals except his own extremely rigid and narrow one. He is attempting to bar practically all our candidates for the consultations, is taking the line that he must base himself on the views of Bierut and his gang and has withdrawn his offer that we should send observers to Poland.

In other words, he clearly wants to make a farce of consultations with the "Non-Lublin" Poles—which means that the new government in Poland would be merely the present one dressed up to look more respectable to the ignorant and also wants to prevent us from seeing the liquidations and deportations that are going on and all the rest of the game of setting up a totalitarian regime before elections are held and even before a new government is set up. As to the upshot of all this, if we do not get things right now, it will soon be seen by the world that you and I by putting our signatures to the Crimea settlement have under-written a fraudulent prospectus.

6. I am in any case pledged to Parliament to tell them if the business of setting up a new Polish government etc. cannot be carried out in the spirit of the Yalta declaration. I am sure the only way to stop Motolov's tactics is to send a personal message to Stalin and in that message I must make clear what are the essential things we must have in this business if I am to avoid telling Parliament that we have failed.

I think you will agree with me that far more than the case of Poland is involved. I feel that this is the test case between us and the Russians of the meaning which is to be attached to such terms as Democracy, Sovereignty, Independence, Representative Government and free and unfettered elections.

I therefore propose to send to Stalin a message on the lines set out below. It is as you will see based on the ideas in Eden's telegram to Halifax number 2078⁹⁸ which has been communicated to State

⁹⁸ Not printed.

Department. I hope you will be ready to send Stalin a similar message containing the same minimum requirements. I shall not send my message till I hear from you.

Message begins.

7. "I am sorry to say that the discussions in the Moscow commission on Poland show that M. Molotov has quite a different view from us as to how the Crimea decision on Poland should be put into effect. As you know, nobody here believes that the present Warsaw administration is really representative and criticism of the decision in Parliament to the line that the discussion in Moscow would not result in a really representative government being set up and that, if this was so, all hope of free elections disappeared: All parties were also exercised about the reports that deportations, liquidations and other oppressive measures were being put into practice on a wide scale by the Warsaw administration against those likely to disagree with them.

Feeling confident of your cooperation in this matter, Eden and I pledged ourselves to Parliament that we would inform them if the fears of our critics were fulfilled. I am bound to tell you that I should have to make a statement of our failure to Parliament if the commission in Moscow were not in the end able to agree on the following basis:

(a) M. Molotov appears to be contending that the terms of the Crimea Communiqué established for the present Warsaw administration an absolute right of prior consultation on all points. In the English text the passage of the communiqué in question, of which was in American draft,⁹⁹ cannot bear this interpretation. M. Molotov's contention therefore cannot be accepted.

(b) All Poles nominated by any of the three governments shall be accepted for the consultations unless ruled out by unanimous decision of the commission, and every effort made to produce them before the commission at the earliest possible moment: The commission should ensure to the Poles invited facilities for communicating with other Poles whom they wish to consult whether in Poland or outside and the right to suggest to the commission the names of other Poles who should be invited to its proceedings. All Poles appearing before the commission would naturally enjoy complete freedom of movement and of communication among themselves while in Moscow and would be at liberty to depart whither they chose upon the conclusion of the consultations. M. Molotov has raised objections to inviting M. Mikolajczyk but his presence would certainly be vital.

(c) The Poles invited for consultations should discuss among themselves with a view to reaching agreement upon the composition of a government truly representative of the various sections of Polish opinion present before the commission. The discussions should also cover the question of the exercise of the presidential functions. The commission should preside over these discussions in an impartial arbitral capacity.

⁹⁹ This clause reads: "which was an American draft," in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, 1953), p. 422.

(d) Pending the conclusion of the commission's discussions the Soviet Government should use its utmost influence to prevent the "Warsaw" administration from taking any further legal or administrative action of a fundamental character affecting social, constitutional, economic, or political conditions in Poland.

(e) The Soviet Government should make arrangements to enable British and American observers to visit Poland and report upon condition there in accordance with the offer spontaneously made by M. Molotov at an earlier stage in the commission's discussions.

8. We must not let Poland become a source of disagreement and misunderstanding between our two peoples. For this reason I am sure you will understand how important it is for us to reach an early settlement on the basis of the Yalta decision, and it is because I am confident that you will do your utmost to bring this about that I am now telegraphing you." *Ends.*

9. I should be grateful to know your views. Pray let this telegram be between you and me.

10. Many congratulations on your statement to Congress. Every good wish.

860C.01/3-845 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1945—7 p. m.

537. The following instructions have been shown to the British Embassy here for transmission to London. It is expected that Clark Kerr will receive instructions along the same general lines. Please communicate to Mr. Molotov in the manner and at the time you deem best the following views of the United States Government in connection with the current negotiations on the Polish question :

"The United States Government is concerned at the difficulties which the Moscow Commission has encountered in its first efforts to carry out the terms of the Crimean decision on Poland. It is felt that a clear statement of the understanding of this Government not only as to the intent and purpose of the decision but also the role of the Commission itself would be of value in overcoming these difficulties which appear to be in large measure a question of interpretation.

The decision on Poland reached by the three heads of Government in the Crimea was based on the common declared policy of the three countries to facilitate in every way possible the emergence after this war of a strong, independent, and democratic Poland with the free and unfettered right of the Polish people to choose for themselves the Government and institutions under which they are to live. This common objective was seriously prejudiced by the fact that there was a divergence in the policies of the United States and the United

Kingdom on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other as to what constituted the governmental authority of Poland. In addition the dangers to Allied unity inherent in such a situation were fully recognized by the three heads of Government at the Crimea. The problem confronting the three Governments at the Crimean Conference was thus related to the question of the provisional governmental authority of Poland during the interim period pending the establishment of conditions which would permit the holding of free elections inside Poland. The Crimean decision in the first place was designed to afford a practical solution of the problem of the provisional authority of Poland. The discussions in the Crimea made it obvious that neither the United States Government nor the British Government considered the provisional governmental authority now functioning in Poland as sufficiently representative to consider according it recognition as the Provisional Government of Poland. The Soviet Government for its part made it equally clear that it would not consider recognizing in that capacity the Polish Government in London. In the circumstances the only solution was the one reached, namely, that the three Governments would agree to assist in the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of national unity 'which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland'. This new Government of national unity was to be made broadly representative of democratic elements of the Polish state by a reorganization of the existing provisional authority functioning in Poland with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad. An essential feature of the Crimean decision was that this new provisional government should be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three larger powers. In order to facilitate the formation of this interim government the Commission in Moscow was created. It would appear obvious that the Commission could not discharge responsibility placed upon it nor could the basic objectives as set forth above of the Crimean decision be achieved if any one of the three groups of Polish democratic elements from which the reorganized government is to emerge were permitted to dictate to the Commission which individuals from the other two groups were to be invited to Moscow for consultation. It would, therefore, appear logical that in the discharge of its responsibilities the Commission in Moscow should as a first step reach a mutual agreement as to what Polish representatives should be invited to come to Moscow to consult on the formation of the new provisional government of national unity. Agreement on such a list would, of course, not involve any commitment on the actual composition or basis of the new Provisional Government.

In the opinion of the United States Government, as an essential condition for the successful negotiations in Moscow for the formation of the new Provisional Government as well as for the eventual carrying out by that new government of its pledge of the 'holding of free and unfettered elections' as provided in the communiqué, there should be the maximum amount of political tranquility inside Poland during the period of negotiations. The United States Government, therefore, suggests that the Commission request the rival political groups to adopt a political truce in Poland and to refrain reciprocally from

any activities or actions which might hamper the unity of all democratic Polish elements both within and without Poland. The United States Government believes that if in the first stage the Commission would adopt as a basis the considerations suggested above, the negotiations would begin in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Crimean decision. The execution of the agreement on Poland reached by the three heads of Government at the Crimea will be watched by the entire world as an indication of the reality of the unity there so successfully established between the three principal Allies."

GREW

860C.01/3-945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1945—8 p. m.

Poles 7. An impasse has been reached in the negotiations of the Polish Commission as Molotov insists on either prior consultation with the Lublin Poles or upon inviting for consultation only those Polish leaders which they have approved. Molotov has refused to consider inviting Mikolajczyk until the Lublin Poles have been consulted contending that by his statement to the press, Mikolajczyk has publicly disavowed the Crimea decision. In view of the course which the negotiations have taken and Molotov's obvious effort to have the negotiations take the form of the enlargement of the Lublin Government, Dept more than ever attaches highest importance to the inclusion of Mikolajczyk in the consultations. Harriman has suggested that Mikolajczyk be urged to issue a public statement to the effect that in the interests of the future of Poland he accepts the Crimea decision without reservation. He feels it should be simple, forthright, and unqualified and that although it can contain no word of doubt it need not express approval of the Crimea decision. Harriman considers it important that this statement be made immediately.

Please see Mikolajczyk and inform him that his statement to the press has been interpreted in some quarters as a denunciation of the Crimea decision and by inference a refusal to accept it as a basis, thus rendering him ineligible for participation in the Moscow discussions which are based on that decision. It would therefore be most salutary as a means of refuting any such inaccurate interpretations if Mr. Mikolajczyk would consider making his position clear in a public statement. He might, for example, state unequivocally that he accepts the Crimea agreement as a basis for discussion and is therefore quite prepared to proceed to Moscow to take part in the consultations there. He would not, of course, thereby limit his free-

dom of action in the discussions themselves. If Mikolajczyk appears to be favorably impressed with your informal suggestion, you should impress upon him the desirability of quick action.

GREW

860C.01/3-745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1945—8 p. m.

548. Dept agrees with the considerations set forth in your 667, March 7, 8 p. m. You will have seen that the two alternative courses of action which you propose as a first step both fall within the scope of instructions contained in the Depts 537, March 8, 7 p. m., and you may put forward either or both proposals. Before proposing your third alternative you should again consult the Dept.

Schoenfeld is being instructed to urge Mikolajczyk to issue a statement accepting the Crimea decision without reservation.

GREW

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*¹

LONDON, 10 March 1945.

907. 1. I have now read the instructions to Mr. Harriman which were shown to our Ambassador today. I need not say how cordially I agree with all the first part of these instructions, but I am distressed at the conclusion which I fear may lead us into great difficulties.

I do not know what the answer of the London-Polish Government would be to a request for a political truce. They continue to assert, with a wealth of detail, that their friends in Poland are being arrested, deported and liquidated on a large scale. At the best they would make conditions of an impossible character.

2. As to the Lublin Poles, they may well answer that their government can alone ensure "The maximum amount of political tranquility inside", that they already represent the great mass of the "Democratic Forces in Poland" and that they cannot join hands with *émigré* traitors to Poland or fascist collaborationists and landlords, and so on according to the usual technique.

3. Meanwhile we shall not be allowed inside the country or have any means of informing ourselves upon the position. It suits the Soviet very well to have a long period of delay so that the process of

¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

liquidation of elements unfavorable to them or their puppets may run its full course.

This would be furthered by our opening out now into proposals of a very undefined character for a political truce between these Polish parties, (whose hatreds would eat into live steel) in the spirit and intent of the Crimea decision and might well imply the abandonment of all clear-cut requests such as those suggested in my last telegram to you. Therefore I should find it very difficult to join in this project of a political truce.

4. I have already mentioned to you that the feeling here is very strong. Four ministers have abstained from the divisions and two have already resigned.

I beg therefore that you will give full consideration to my previous telegram number 905 and will suspend the delivery of the latest Hariman instructions till I have received your reply and can reply to it.²

860C.01/3-1045 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 10, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received March 10—6:05 p. m.]

Polish Series 36. At his request I saw Sir Orme Sargent³ this noon. Christopher Warner⁴ was also present. We discussed the question of a possible British approach to Mikolajczyk (your 1822, March 9, 11 p. m.⁵) similar to that contemplated by your Polish Series 7, March 9, 9 [8] p. m. Gallman⁶ had previously discussed the matter with Sargent.

The latter said that on March 6, Clark Kerr had sent a similar telegram. The Foreign Office had thus far taken no action. Sargent seemed skeptical as to the value of such an approach.

During the conversation I read our suggestion that Mikolajczyk "might for example state unequivocally that he accepts the Crimea agreement as a basis for discussion and is therefore quite prepared to proceed to Moscow to take part in the consultations there".

² In telegram 555, March 10, 1945, 3 p. m., to Moscow, the Department requested that no action be taken on the instructions contained in its telegrams 537, March 8, 7 p. m., and 548, March 9, 8 p. m., until the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr) had received his instructions (860C.01/3-1045).

³ Superintending Under Secretary of State of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office.

⁴ Head of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office.

⁵ Not printed; it stated that the matter of an approach to Mikolajczyk regarding a public statement should be taken up with the British Foreign Office before Schoenfeld acted on his instructions (860C.01/3-945).

⁶ Waldemar J. Gallman, Counselor of Embassy at London.

Sargent recalled that Mikolajczyk had indicated willingness to go to Moscow subject to certain conditions (my Polish Series 25 to Department and 68 to Moscow February 24, 10 p. m.). Sargent regarded those conditions as quite reasonable. In view of those conditions he doubted whether Mikolajczyk could be asked to state publicly that he was "quite prepared to proceed to Moscow". He likewise questioned whether such a statement would be generally advantageous.

Sargent thought it might be possible to consider a statement along the lines of the first part of our above quoted suggestion i.e. acceptance of the Crimea Agreement as a basis for discussion. Warner said the Foreign Office would naturally wish to go along with the Department but he did not think they would wish to press Mikolajczyk to make a statement.

Sargent said that thus far the Russians had not accepted any of the persons on the British and American lists. As he recalled they had included only one aged professor who had been suggested for the "presidential council". Warner said that if the Russians did not want Mikolajczyk they would find three or four other excuses. Both Sargent and Warner agreed that it was of great importance that Mikolajczyk should be invited. Sargent thought that for British opinion Mikolajczyk's presence would count for 90%.

In view of the large political implications Sargent said he would discuss the matter with Mr. Eden and would communicate with me again. Mikolajczyk is out of town at the moment. If Mr. Eden should take a negative view regarding a British approach in this matter does the Department desire me to approach Mikolajczyk notwithstanding?

[SCHOENFELD]

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ⁷

WASHINGTON, 11 March 1945.

713. Your 907. I had drafted and released for transmission my reply ⁸ to your 905, March 8, before I had received your 907 of March 10. I did not hold up on my first message as I don't believe that the main issues in that reply are basically affected by the points you raise in your 907.

With reference to your observations on the last part of the instructions to Ambassador Harriman in regard to a political truce in Poland, I can assure you that our objectives are identical, namely, to bring

⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁸ President Roosevelt's telegram 714, March 11, to Prime Minister Churchill, *infra*.

about a cessation on the part of the Lublin Poles of the measures directed against their political opponents in Poland to which you refer and vice versa. The only difference as I see it is one of tactics. You would prefer that the demand in regard to the Lublin Poles be put squarely to the Soviet Government as such whereas we feel that the chances of achieving our common objective would be immeasurably increased if it were done under the guise of a general political truce. You will recall at Yalta that Stalin made quite a point of the "terrorist" activities of the underground forces of the London Government against the Red Army and the Lublin Poles. Whether or not these allegations have any foundation in fact is beside the question since it is definitely the position of the Soviet Government. In view of Stalin's attitude we feel we would be inviting certain refusal if we merely demanded that the Lublin Poles alone be forced to cease their persecutions of political opponents. Furthermore, we must be careful not to give the impression that we are proposing a halt in the land reforms. This would furnish the Lublin Poles with an opportunity to charge that they and they alone defend the interests of the peasants against the landlords. However, in view of your feeling on this point we have made sure that Harriman will not deliver those instructions until Clark Kerr has received his. I would also be very glad to consider any suggestions which you may have in order to strengthen this point bearing in mind the considerations which I have set forth above.

The question of sending in observers is being pressed by Harriman under other instructions. We feel, however, that more would be accomplished by pressing for low level observers at this point who would certainly see as much if not more than some more spectacular body. If you feel strongly that some reference to observers should go into the present instructions to Harriman, I will have no objection. Since we wish to get on as speedily as possible with the business of the Commission in Moscow, I would appreciate your letting me have urgently your views on my two messages so that instructions can be issued to Harriman and Clark Kerr for transmission to Molotov.

ROOSEVELT

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ⁹

[Extract] ¹⁰

WASHINGTON, 11 March 1945.

714. Your 905.

As to the Polish negotiations in Moscow I most certainly agree that we must stand firm on the right interpretation of the Crimean decision. You are quite correct in assuming that neither the Government nor the people of this country will support participation in a fraud or a mere whitewash of the Lublin Government and the solution must be as we envisaged it at Yalta. We have recently sent instructions to Harriman, a copy of which has been given to your Embassy here, to address a communication to Molotov making this clear and in general very much along the lines of the Foreign Office's suggestions contained in the telegram to Halifax to which you refer. I understand that Clark Kerr will be instructed along similar lines. In the circumstances I feel that it would be much better to await the result of these steps by our Ambassadors before either you or I intervene personally with Stalin particularly since there is no question of either of our Governments yielding to Molotov's interpretation. I feel that our personal intervention would best be withheld until every other possibility of bringing the Soviet Government into line has been exhausted. I very much hope, therefore, that you will not send any message to Uncle Joe at this juncture—especially as I feel that certain parts of your proposed text might produce a reaction quite contrary to your intent. We must, of course, keep in close touch on this question.

ROOSEVELT

860C.01/3-1045: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1945—7 p. m.

Poles 8. Reurtel 36, March 10, 8 p. m. Dept is agreeable to limiting suggestion to Mikolajczyk to proposal that he make a statement unequivocally accepting the Crimea decision as a basis for discussion. In fairness to Mikolajczyk, we feel that he should be informed of the manner in which his earlier statement is being used against him and

⁹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹⁰ The omitted portion of this telegram is printed on p. 509.

you are authorized so to inform him and make the suggestion referred to above even though the British are unwilling to take similar action.

GREW

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ¹¹

WASHINGTON, 12 March 1945.

715. Your No. 909 ¹² points directly to an urgent necessity of our taking every practicable means of accomplishing the corrective measures in Poland that are envisaged in the agreements reached at Yalta.

The Yalta agreements, if they are followed, should correct most of the abuses alleged in your 909.

In my opinion as expressed in my 714, we should leave the first steps to our Ambassadors from which we may hope to obtain good results.

When and if it should become necessary because of failure of the Ambassadors we may have to appeal to Marshal Stalin for relief for the oppressed inhabitants of Poland.

ROOSEVELT

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ¹¹

LONDON, 13 March 1945.

910. 1. Your numbers 713, 714 and 715.

I thank you for your full and considerate replies to my various messages on Poland. We can, of course, make no progress at Moscow without your aid, and if we get out of step the doom of Poland is sealed.

A month has passed since Yalta and no progress of any kind has been made. Soon I shall be questioned in Parliament on this point and I shall be forced to tell them the truth. Time is, of course, all on the side of Lublin, who are no doubt at work to establish their authority in such a way as to make it impregnable.

2. I am willing to defer addressing Stalin directly for the time being on this subject. But, in that case, I must beg you to agree that the instructions to our Ambassadors should deal with the points which I

¹¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹² Dated March 10, 1945, not printed; it forwarded a summary of information received from within Poland regarding the oppressive character of Soviet Russian and Communist Polish rule in Poland. The information had been transmitted to Prime Minister Churchill by the Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, Tomasz Arciszewski.

have proposed to put to Stalin in (a) to (e) of paragraph 7 of my number 905.¹³

You say that some of these might have the opposite effect to what we intend. I wonder which you have in mind. We might be able to improve the working [*wording?*]. But I am convinced that unless we can induce the Russians to agree to these fundamental points of procedure, all our work at Yalta will be in vain.

3. When the discussions following Yalta began at Moscow, we had a perfectly simple objective, namely, to bring together for consultation representative Poles from inside Poland and elsewhere and to promote the formation of a new re-organized Polish Government sufficiently representative of all Poland for us to recognize it.

A test case of progress in this direction would be the inviting of Mikolajczvk and two or three of his friends who have resigned from the London Polish Government because they realize that a good understanding must be reached with Russia.

4. I fear that your present instructions to Averell will lead to little if any progress on all this, as the only definite suggestion is that there should be a truce between Polish parties. Here we should enter ground of great disadvantage to us both. The Russians would almost at once claim that the truce was being broken by the Anti-Lublin Poles and that Lublin therefore could not be held to it.

I have little doubt that some of the supporters of the Polish Government in London and more particularly the extreme right wing underground force, the so-called N.S.Z.,¹⁴ are giving and would give the Russians and Lublin ground for this contention.

As we are not allowed to enter the country to see what the truth is, we shall be at the mercy of assertions. After a fortnight or so of negotiations about the truce, we shall be farther back than in the days before Yalta when you and I were agreed together that anyhow Mikolajczyk should be invited.

5. At Yalta also we agreed to take the Russian view of the frontier line. Poland has lost her frontier. Is she now to lose her freedom? That is the question which will undoubtedly have to be fought out in Parliament and in public here.

I do not wish to reveal a divergence between the British and the United States Governments, but it would certainly be necessary for me to make it clear that we are in presence of a great failure and an utter breakdown of what was settled at Yalta, but that we British have not the necessary strength to carry the matter further and that the limits of our capacity to act have been reached.

¹³ Dated March 8, p. 147.

¹⁴ Narodowe Sily Zbrojne (National Armed Forces).

The moment that Molotov sees that he has beaten us away from the whole process of consultations among Poles to form a new government, he will know that we will put up with anything. On the other hand, I believe that combined dogged pressure and persistence along the lines on which we have been working and of my proposed draft message to Stalin, would very likely succeed.

6. We are also in presence of the Soviet memorandum of March 9 about inviting representatives of the Lublin Poles to San Francisco.¹⁵ This would amount to a *de facto* recognition of Lublin. Are we not both pledged not to recognize the Lublin Government until it has been re-organized in accordance with the declaration and spirit of Yalta, and consequently to continue to recognize the London Polish Government as the only one in existence.

The only possible course if no agreement is reached is to invite neither of the present Governments. This is in fact the line agreed upon between us. On the other hand, this very invitation question is well-suited to bring matters to a head at the Moscow conference and make the Soviets see that they must reach a fair and honourable conclusion in accordance with the decisions of Yalta.

7. I trust Harry is progressing. It is very disappointing that he should have had so serious a setback. When he first arrived in London he was better than I had seen him for years.

Kind regards.

860C.01/3-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 13, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received 11 : 05 p. m.]

2614. ReEmbs 2580, March 13, noon.¹⁶ Warner's confirmation letter has now been received to the effect that Mr. Eden reluctantly has reached the conclusion that it would be wrong for the British to adopt the Department's suggestion that Mikolajczyk should be approached at this time with a view of his making a public statement accepting the Crimea decision without reservation. Warner states that a similar suggestion to that made to the Department by Harriman was made on March 6 by Clark Kerr but that it had been felt :

¹⁵ For documentation regarding the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25-June 26, 1945, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff. ; for the Soviet memorandum of March 9, see *ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁶ Not printed ; it reported that British Foreign Secretary Eden was against saying anything to Mikolajczyk at present about a public statement (860C.01/3-1345).

a. That Mikolajczyk could hardly be expected to make a statement which would render his own position vis-à-vis many of his compatriots much more difficult.

b. That it would hardly be in the interests of a settlement of the Polish question along the lines of the Crimea decision that he should risk prejudicing his influence with many Poles, since if a representative new government can be set up in Poland, Mikolajczyk's participation could be of great importance and it would be desirable that he should have the maximum amount of backing from Poles.

c. That Mikolajczyk could not be expected to state publicly that he was ready to go to Moscow at once without also stating the three conditions which he had already put to us; he could thus hardly be expected to say that he accepted the Crimea decision without reservations.

d. That Molotov's point about Mikolajczyk's statement in the press as [*is*] only an excuse for trying to bar Mikolajczyk from the discussions before the Commission and that even if Mikolajczyk could be persuaded to make a statement of the kind suggested, it is by no means impossible that Molotov would find another reason for black-balling him;

e. Finally that it would really be very difficult to suggest to Mikolajczyk that he should make this statement at the present time when no progress at all has been made with the discussion between Molotov and our two Ambassadors; Mikolajczyk would naturally ask what progress had been made in the discussions between Molotov and the Ambassadors in Moscow; we should not be able to give him any reassuring information since no progress has been made.

Warner adds that on learning of the Department's suggestion the matter was very carefully reconsidered by Mr. Eden but the above arguments in his view remain conclusive against approaching Mikolajczyk. Warner concluded that the Foreign Office would be interested to hear, in due course, whether or not Schoenfeld takes up the matter with Mikolajczyk.

WINANT

860C.01/3-1345

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

At the opening of the Crimean Conference discussions on Poland, the United States Delegation put forward, in agreement with the British Delegation, the proposal that a body of respected and well-known figures, not necessarily political, should be set up in Poland as a first step to the re-organization of the government. This proposal was subsequently dropped.

The difficulties now ahead of us in effecting the formal transfer of authority from the Polish President in London to some body in War-

saw after the setting up of the Provisional Government of National Unity, have become even clearer than they were at the outset. Apart from the general attitude of the President and Polish Government in London (which is to do all they can to make the Crimean Settlement break down, and to make the fullest possible use of their constitutional position in order to do so), the Polish forces owe allegiance to the President to whom they take the oath. General Anders¹⁷ immediately after the announcement of the Crimean Settlement reaffirmed publicly the allegiance of the Polish forces under his command to the President and to the London Government "appointed by him". This matter of allegiance to the President is said to carry great weight with all ranks of the Polish forces.

Moreover, if the question of the exercise of the Presidential powers in Poland is not settled in the discussions of the Moscow Commission but is left open, Bierut and his supporters may be counted upon to twist the situation to their own advantage. It is even conceivable that the Russians and Bierut will contend that he is, and remains, the Acting President and could not possibly give up that position. The Government would then presumably be *his* Government and, in default of specific provisions to the contrary (on which it might be difficult to get agreement) it would probably be possible for him to get rid of such Ministers from the Provisional Government of National Unity as he wanted to eject or at any rate, very much to curtail the power of the Government and the influence of the Poles of our choice.

In these circumstances the Foreign Office thinks that the Presidential powers in Poland should be exercised by a small Presidential Council of respected figures. So far as they can see, and Monsieur Mikolajczyk agrees, there is no constitutional way of transferring the Presidency from President Rackewiecz either under the 1935 or even under the 1921 Constitution.¹⁸ For this reason it seems better that the Presidential functions should repose in a small Council in Poland rather than in one individual.

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1945.

¹⁷ Lt. Gen. Władysław Anders, Commander of the Polish Second Corps in Italy, who became Acting Commander in Chief of Polish Armed Forces on February 26, 1945, by decree of the President of the Polish Government in Exile at London.

¹⁸ For text of the Constitutional Act of April 23, 1935 (in Polish), see *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Journal of Laws), 1935/No. 30, text 227. For text of the Constitution of March 17, 1921 (in Polish), see *ibid.*, 1923/No. 23, text 376.

860C.01/3-1445 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1945—noon.

1948. ReEmbs 2616, March 14, 11 a. m.¹⁹ Dept feels that Schoenfeld should carry out his instructions. We feel that Mikolajczyk should at least be given the opportunity of offsetting the effects of his earlier statement and both Harriman and Clark-Kerr feel that a statement by him would assist the negotiations. The statement need make no mention of his willingness to go to Moscow. In view of the great importance which this Government attaches to Mikolajczyk's participation in the discussions in Moscow, we feel that every step possible should be taken to prevent his being excluded from the consultations.

STETTINIUS

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²⁰

WASHINGTON, 15 March 1945.

718. I cannot but be concerned at the views expressed in the second paragraph of point 5 of your 910. I do not understand what you mean by a divergence between our Governments on the Polish negotiations. From our side there is certainly no evidence of any divergence of policy. We have been merely discussing the most effective tactics and I cannot agree that we are confronted with a breakdown of the Yalta agreement until we have made the effort to overcome the obstacles incurred in the negotiations at Moscow. I also find puzzling your statement in paragraph 4 that the only definite suggestion in our instructions to Averell is for a political truce in Poland. Those instructions, of which you have a copy, not only set forth our understanding of the Yalta agreement but they make the definite point that the Commission itself should agree on the list of Poles to be invited for consultation and that no one of the three groups from which the reorganized Government is to emerge can dictate which individuals from the other two groups ought to be invited to Moscow. I must in all fairness point out that while fully aware that time is working against us Averell has had his instructions since March 9 but has not acted on them at your request in order that other points could be included. Our chief purpose at that time was and remains without giving ground to get the negotiations moving again and tackle first

¹⁹ Not printed; it stated the opinion that Schoenfeld should not approach Mikolajczyk regarding a public statement until the Department had had time to consider the British Foreign Secretary's views on the matter (860C.01/3-1445).

²⁰ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

of all the point on which they had come to a standstill. I cannot urge upon you too strongly the vital importance of agreeing without further delay on instructions to our Ambassadors so that the negotiations may resume. The need for new instructions to our Ambassadors arose out of the unwillingness of Molotov to accept our proposal concerning the list of Poles to be invited in the first instance. Since our Ambassadors informed him that the matter was being referred to their Governments, the negotiations are held up pending those instructions. With this in mind I have examined the points which you propose to submit to Stalin in your 905 and have the following comments to make:

We are in agreement on point (*a*) and this is covered in our instructions to Averell.

I cannot believe that Molotov will accept the proposal contained in point (*b*) that any Pole can be invited unless all three members of the Commission object and I am opposed to putting forward such a suggestion at this time as it would, in my view, almost certainly leave us in a stalemate which would only redound to the benefit of the Lublin Poles. I also think the demand for freedom of movement and communication would arouse needless discussion at this state in the negotiations.

On point (*c*) we are agreed that the Poles invited for consultation should discuss the composition of the Government among themselves with the Commission presiding in an impartial arbitral capacity so far as possible. Harriman has already been instructed to this effect but feels, and I agree, that this might be pressed later.

I have covered your point (*d*) in my previous message and continue to feel that our approach would be better calculated to achieve the desired result. With reference to point (*e*) you will recall that this had been agreed to by Molotov who took fright when Clark-Kerr revealed that you were thinking of a large special mission. I am willing to include in Averell's instructions the wording you propose in point (*e*).

Please let me know urgently whether you agree that in the light of the foregoing considerations, our Ambassadors may proceed with their instructions.

I heartily agree that we cannot invite the Lublin Poles to San Francisco and the State Department is coordinating a reply to the Soviet note with your Foreign Office.²¹

²¹ In an *aide-mémoire* to the Soviet Embassy, dated March 29, 1945, the Department of State refused to agree to the extending of an invitation to the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw to attend the San Francisco Conference. For text, see vol. 1, p. 164.

Harry is getting along well. There is nothing seriously wrong with him and he is getting a good rest.

ROOSEVELT

860C.01/3-1545

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*²²

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Stettinius
Polish Ambassador
Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane²³

The Ambassador started the conversation by saying that Mr. Grew and other officers in the Department whom he had seen had expressed their regret that they could not discuss with the Ambassador the happenings at Yalta and had referred the Ambassador to the Secretary. Mr. Ciechanowski, while realizing how pressed the Secretary is for time, felt that he owed it to his Government in London to report the Secretary's views regarding the Yalta Conference especially in view of the very critical situation in which Poland now finds itself. The Ambassador said that he would not be frank if he did not express his grave apprehension regarding the unilateral developments subsequent to the Yalta Conference which indicate that the principles enunciated in the communiqué are being ignored. He referred specifically to the arbitrary setting up of a new Rumanian Government and the arbitrary donation by Stalin of Transylvania to Rumania. He said that as the United States is the only country of the three represented at Yalta which does not take unilateral action in Europe, it is of the utmost importance to Poland that the United States Government should know the views of the Poles. Furthermore, the Ambassador continued, he wished if it were possible to explain to his countrymen the point of view of our Government which he fears will be misunderstood if what has happened now in Rumania will be permitted to happen in Poland.

The Ambassador said that what he feared most of all was that the Government which would be set up in accordance with the Yalta communiqué would be composed, as is the present Lublin Government, of elements which are not in the least democratic and which are controlled by Moscow. He said that even the Polish nationality of

²² See Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory* (New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1947), pp. 362-364, for a description of a meeting which the Polish Ambassador had with the Secretary of State on March 14, presumably the same meeting described in this memorandum of conversation.

²³ Ambassador-designate to Poland.

some members of the Lublin Government can be questioned and that they are all Communists.

The Secretary said that the gist of what happened at Yalta so far as Poland is concerned was an agreement that a new government be set up composed of Poles from within and without Poland and that elements of the Lublin Government should be represented. It was agreed, the Secretary continued, that a commission composed of Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr should meet in Moscow following the Crimea Conference and invite various elements to come.

The Polish Ambassador interrupted at this moment to inquire whether any Poles had arrived in Moscow. With the Secretary's permission, Mr. Lane replied that as yet none had arrived in as far as official messages to the Department indicated.

The Secretary said that at the Yalta conversations, emphasis was placed on the word "new" in describing the government which was to be set up. He said furthermore that emphasis was placed on the holding of secret elections to elect a permanent government.

The Ambassador expressed doubt that any free or secret elections could be held especially if the United States did not have observers in Poland. He inquired whether it was our intention to send observers to make certain that elections would be freely held.

This question was not answered as the Ambassador immediately inquired whether Mr. Mikolajczyk was going to Warsaw. The Secretary replied that both the President and he had emphasized at the Yalta Conferences the importance of Mr. Mikolajczyk being included, as it was felt that he was one of the outstanding Polish leaders. The Secretary observed, "He is a grand man", and he expressed the opinion that it would be essential for the success of the negotiations for Mr. Mikolajczyk to be consulted.

The Ambassador then inquired regarding the progress of the negotiations. The Secretary said that due to his absence from Washington he was not aware of all the details and requested Mr. Lane to comment regarding the progress. Mr. Lane said that there had not been any meetings for a few days. He understood that Ambassador Clark Kerr had been forced to undergo an operation on his eye. This undoubtedly may have resulted in some delay. Mr. Lane said, however, that several meetings had taken place between the three commissioners.

(The conversation was interrupted several times by the Secretary having been called to the telephone, once by an extended long distance conversation with Mayor Roger Lapham of San Francisco.)

The Polish Ambassador expressed keen disappointment that the Polish Government in London had not been invited to the San Francisco Conference. He pointed out that Poland had declared war against Japan three days after Pearl Harbor,²⁴ had been the first power to fight against the Nazis, had suffered more than any other nation in percentage of persons killed, imprisoned and deported, was the only occupied country which had no Quislings, and even today Polish troops are continuing to fight outside of Poland against the enemy. He said that it would be very difficult to explain to his people why Poland is not represented.

Mr. Lane said that during the Secretary's absence Acting Secretary Grew had expressed the hope to the correspondents for background that the new Provisional Government of National Unity in Poland would be set up prior to April 25 so that Poland could be represented at the Conference.

The Ambassador expressed his great gratitude to the Secretary for receiving him at a moment when he realized the Secretary is very much occupied with other matters, but because of the tremendous importance not only to Poland but to the world that the Yalta decisions should not be disregarded he wished again to impress on the Secretary his apprehension as a result of the unilateral action in Rumania. The Ambassador said that he would continue to do all he could to maintain the traditional friendship between Poland and the United States but it would be very difficult for the Poles both within and without Poland to understand any attitude of acquiescence on our part with the setting up of a Communist government and the holding of farcical elections in Poland.

The Secretary expressed agreement as to the importance of carrying out the Yalta agreement and expressed the hope that the negotiations now being held in Moscow would result in a representative government being formed.

860C.01/3-1645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1945—9 p. m.

617. The following is a paraphrase of the President's reply to the Prime Minister's message no. 910 which I presume you have seen:

[Here follows a paraphrase of President Roosevelt's message No. 718, March 15, 1945, to Prime Minister Churchill, printed on page 163.]

In accordance with the President's statement to the Prime Minister

²⁴ Reference is to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

the instructions to you contained in the Department's 537, March 8, 7 p. m., are amended to include the following:

"The United States Government requests that the Soviet Government make the necessary arrangements for American and British observers to visit Poland and report to the British and American members of the Commission upon conditions there."

STETTINIUS

860C.01/3-1645 : Telgeram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 16, 1945—midnight.

[Received March 16—11:28 p. m.]

Poles 40. I saw Mikolajczyk today and discussed with him the possibility of his making a public statement to offset the effect in some quarters of his letter to the *Daily Herald* (my 16 February 16²⁵). I explained the situation in accordance with your Poles 7, March 9, 9 [8] p. m., as modified by your Poles 8, March 12, 7 p. m., and your 1948, March 14, noon.

Mikolajczyk said he did not consider it wise to make such a statement at this time. He felt that his letter did not justify the interpretation put on it. In his opinion a public statement would not advance the general situation. It would be "political suicide" and it would do no good. The Russians would merely use it against him and would put him in an impossible position.

He, of course, considered the Crimea decisions as affording a basis for discussion. He knew that at any meeting with the Poles in Moscow Molotov's first question would be: Were they prepared to accept the Curzon Line? ²⁶ He had been mentally prepared to go along with the idea at such a meeting provided that the true independence of Poland were assured and a broadly based democratic government was worked out. All of his efforts had been directed toward bringing about early action. Important sections of opinion in Poland itself also hoped for prompt action. But he knew no progress had been made.

He was very concerned by the delay. The Lublin Government were obviously seeking to delay matters. They had at first supported the Crimea decisions. Then their propaganda began to claim that they were to continue as the Polish Government with the addition of a few people. Mr. Eden, on the other hand, had made it clear in the

²⁵ Not printed, but see footnote 90, p. 135.

²⁶ See footnote 27a, p. 116.

House of Commons debate²⁷ that there was to be a reorganized government.

A secret report received here was to the effect that Bierut, following his recent visit to Moscow,^{27a} had said they would seek to delay the reorganization as long as possible. Meantime, they would remove as many leaders in Poland as possible and the rest they would try to bend to their will. They realized that in the end they would have to accept some new people but when consultations were eventually held they would thus be able to deal with the situation.

This report Mikolajczyk said, appeared to be borne out by what was actually happening. A report dated March 10 from inside Poland stated that five members of the Council of National Unity²⁸ had been arrested. The message urged that the Polish authorities here take action with Britain and the United States, adding that if current practices continued the Moscow commission would in time find few leaders to invite for consultations. Mikolajczyk also referred to the reported arrest of Madame Walcovicz the wife of one of the four Ministers of the Polish underground government.²⁹ This message urged that the Soviets be informed of her identity and of the names of the four Ministers. According to Mikolajczyk this has been taken up with the British and United States Governments and he understands the British have sent appropriate instructions to Ambassador Clark Kerr.

Mikolajczyk said that the actions of the Lublin group and the policy of the Arciszewski Government were producing the paradoxical situation where both were contributing to the same results, that is they were delaying the carrying out of the Crimea decisions. Lublin had in fact ceased to attack Arciszewski and had begun again to attack him.

The delay had also been unfortunate in its effect on some of the Polish groups in the United States who had at first taken a moderate

²⁷ February 27–March 1, 1945. For record of the debate regarding the Crimea Conference, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 408, cols. 1267–1675 *passim*.

^{27a} See footnote 94, p. 141.

²⁸ The Homeland Political Representation of the Polish People (*Krajowa Reprezentację Polityczną Narodu Polskiego*) composing the leadership of the political groupings of the anti-German, non-Communist underground in occupied Poland, was transformed into a Council of National Unity (*Rada Jedności Narodowej*) by a decree announced on January 9, 1944 by the Delegate of the Polish Government in Exile at London. This Council of National Unity served as a clandestine "parliament" for the non-Communist, London-oriented underground within Poland and competed with the National Council of the Homeland (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) sponsored by the Soviet Union which had been established on January 1, 1944.

²⁹ Walkowicz was the pseudonym of Adam Bień, one of the four members of the non-Communist underground Council of Ministers of the Homeland (*Krajowa Rada Ministrów*) in German-occupied Poland, established on May 3, 1944 by a decree of the President of the Polish Government in Exile at London.

attitude but had since grown more uncompromising. The delay had thus strengthened the position of the opponents of a settlement and reinforced those elements who had claimed that there was no goodwill on the part of the Soviets in seeing the Crimea decisions carried out. At the same time the position of those who had been working for a settlement was being weakened.

There was the further unfortunate result that the Poles were likely to be prevented from being represented at the San Francisco Conference. It would be regrettable if they were put in the same position as the Baltic States with Russia speaking for them. He thought this would cast a shadow over the conference.

I reverted to the possible value of a public statement and said that we attached the greatest importance to his being at the consultations and that in fairness to him we felt that he should be informed of the manner in which his earlier statement was being used against him. Mikolajczyk said he was aware that Marshal Stalin had said at the Crimea Conference that he (Mikolajczyk) was hard to deal with and made so many conditions. He felt that a public statement would not advance matters at this time. He remarked that the recent Bulgarian Premier had signed what he had been told to sign and had been executed anyway.³⁰ He said he might himself be shot but he would have to act in accordance with his honest convictions.³¹

[SCHOENFELD]

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*³²

LONDON, 16 March 1945.

912. 1. Thank you for your No. 718 of 16 [15] March. I am most relieved that you do not feel that there is any fundamental divergence between us and I agree that our differences are only about tactics.

You know, I am sure, that our great desire is to keep in step with you and we realise how hopeless the position would become for Poland if it were ever seen that we were not in full accord.

2. Just before getting your telegram, I received from Clark Kerr the draft of the communication he thinks we should make to Molotov. This was drawn up after long talks with Averell but, of course, does not commit him.

³⁰ For documentation regarding the arrest and execution by the Communist-dominated Bulgarian government of former government leaders, see vol. iv, pp. 154-157.

³¹ For Mikolajczyk's explanation of his refusal to issue a declaration at this time as described in a document from his own private files, see Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy*, pp. 363-364.

³² Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

We are instructing Halifax to show Clark Kerr's proposed communication immediately to Stettinius and if possible to you. I like Clark Kerr's draft and must earnestly beg you to consider whether you cannot accept our proposals in this modified form. I hope that when Stettinius has been through it with Halifax you will see your way to instruct Averell to put in the same, or at least a very similar, communication.

3. Halifax will explain to you in detail our views upon the various points the inclusion of which I still consider essential. I welcome your agreement on point (a).

With regard to point (b), what happens if Molotov vetoes every one of our suggestions? And secondly, what is the use of anyone being invited who has no freedom of movement and communications? We had in fact not understood that Molotov had disputed this latter point when it was raised with him earlier but Mikolajczyk has made it a condition of going to Moscow and I gravely doubt whether we could persuade him to leave unless we had some definite assurance to convey to him.

Equally it is in order to reassure the anti-Lublin Poles whom we want to see invited that I should like to come to an agreement with Molotov in regard to the character of the discussions and the commission's arbitral capacity (my point (c)).

If you feel strongly against mentioning the matter of the presidential function at this stage I will give way although it is a matter of great practical importance which the Poles must not be debarred from discussing.

In regards point (d) I fear I cannot agree that your truce plan would achieve the desired result. How can we guarantee that nothing will be said or done in Poland or by the Polish Government's supporters here, which the Russians could not parade as a breach of the truce?

I fear that the truce plan will lead us into interminable delays and a dead end in which some at least of the blame may well be earned by the London Polish Government. I fear therefore that it is impossible for us to endorse your truce proposal, for we think it actively dangerous.

I beg you once more most earnestly to consider whether you cannot accept the revised version of (b) included in Clark Kerr's draft. This would give us something on which to base the work of our observers (point (e), on which I am very glad to see that we are in agreement).

4. At present all entry into Poland is barred to our representatives. An impenetrable veil has been drawn across the scene. This extends

even to the liaison officers, British and American, who were to help in bringing out our rescued prisoners of war. According to our information the American officers as well as the British who had already reached Lublin have been requested to clear out.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviets fear very much our seeing what is going on in Poland. It may be that apart from the Poles they are being very rough with the Germans. Whatever the reason, we are not to be allowed to see. This is not a position that could be defended by us.

860C.01/3-1845 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1945—1 p. m.

640. We have concerted with the British Embassy here the following instructions which supersede those contained in Department's 537, March 8, 7 p. m. and last paragraph of Department's 617, March 16, 9 p. m. We understand that after clearance in London identical instructions will be sent to Clark Kerr. When he has received them please communicate them to Molotov in the manner and at the time you deem best.³³

In the event that it still proves to be impossible to agree upon the Poles to be selected you are authorized to put forward either or both of the first two alternatives suggested in your 667, March 7, 8 p. m.

1. United States Government is concerned at the difficulties which the Moscow Commission has encountered in its first efforts to carry out the terms of the Crimean decision on Poland. It is felt that a clear statement of the understanding of this Government not only as to the intent and purpose of the decision but also the role of the Commission itself would be of value in overcoming these difficulties which appear to be in large measure a question of interpretation.

The decision on Poland reached by the three heads of Government in the Crimea was based on the common declared policy of the three countries to facilitate in every way possible the emergence after this war of a strong, independent and democratic Poland with the free and unfettered right of the Polish people to choose for themselves the Government and institutions under which they are to live.

³³ In his telegram 826, March 20, 1945, 7 p. m., Ambassador Harriman reported that the statement of U.S. views on the work of the Polish Commission had been forwarded to Molotov in the form of a memorandum under cover of a letter dated March 19 (neither printed). The British Ambassador had received similar instructions and had communicated the views of the British Government to Molotov. (860C.01/3-2045)

This common objective was seriously prejudiced by the fact that there was a divergence in the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other as to what constituted the governmental authority of Poland. In addition the dangers to Allied unity inherent in such a situation were fully recognized by the three heads of Government at the Crimea. The problem confronting the three Governments at the Crimean Conference was thus related to the question of the provisional governmental authority of Poland during the interim period pending the establishment of conditions which would permit the holding of free elections inside Poland. The Crimean decision in the first place was designed to afford a practical solution of the problem of the provisional authority of Poland. The discussions in the Crimea made it obvious that neither the United States Government nor the British Government considered the provisional governmental authority now functioning in Poland as sufficiently representative to consider according it recognition as the Provisional Government of Poland. The Soviet Government for its part made it equally clear that it would not consider recognizing in that capacity the Polish Government in London. In the circumstances the only solution was the one reached, namely, that the three Governments would agree to assist in the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of national unity "which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland". This new Government of national unity was to be made broadly representative of democratic elements of the Polish state by a reorganization of the existing provisional authority functioning in Poland with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad. An essential feature of the Crimean decision was that this new provisional government should be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three larger powers. In order to facilitate the formation of this interim government the Commission in Moscow was created. It would appear obvious that the Commission could not discharge responsibility placed upon it nor could the basic objectives as set forth above of the Crimean decision be achieved if any one of the three groups of Polish democratic elements from which the reorganized government is to emerge were permitted to dictate to the Commission which individuals from the other two groups were to be invited to Moscow for consultation. It would, therefore, appear logical that in the discharge of its responsibilities the Commission in Moscow should as a first step reach an agreement as to what Polish democratic leaders should come to Moscow to consult together with representatives of the Polish Provisional Government with a view to the forma-

tion of a new government of national unity. Agreement on this step would of course not involve any commitment on the actual composition of the new government.

In discussions which have already taken place in the Moscow Commission on Poland it has been suggested by the Soviet Government that terms of the Crimea Communiqué established for present Warsaw Administration a right to prior consultation. As British and United States representatives on Commission have already explained the text of the Crimea Communiqué cannot in the view of the United States Government bear this interpretation. The relevant passage of the Communiqué came from an English text originally proposed by American delegation. In the English text the words "In the first instance" come before the words "in Moscow" and could therefore only relate to the fact that consultations of the Commission were to begin in Moscow but could later be transferred elsewhere. The consultations were however clearly stated to be with three specified categories of Poles, one of which was "Members of present Provisional Government". There is nothing in English text to suggest that they should take place with present Provisional Government before "other Polish Democratic leaders from within Poland and abroad". The United States Government cannot therefore agree to Commission's embarking upon prior consultations with members of present Provisional Government.

2. In the view of the United States Government all Poles nominated by any of the three Governments should be accepted for consultation unless conclusive evidence is produced to show that they do not represent the democratic elements in the country. It should be for the Commission alone and not for the Provisional Governmental authority now functioning in Warsaw to decide this matter. The United States Government would consider it contrary to the spirit of the Yalta meeting for any one of the Commissioners to exercise a veto and are confident that a unanimous decision of the three Commissioners will be possible. Every effort should be made to produce the Polish leaders whom they wish to consult at the earliest possible moment and the Commission should ensure to them the right to suggest to the Commission the names of other Poles who they think should be invited to any such proceedings. All Poles appearing before the Commission would by that very fact naturally enjoy the facilities necessary for communication and consultation among themselves in Moscow.

The United States Government wishes to repeat in this connection that it regards participation of Mr. Mikolajczyk in consultations as vital to the success of the work of the Commission. Mr. Mikolajczyk is generally regarded in the United States as the outstanding Polish

Democratic leader whose whole record bears out his desire to facilitate a lasting settlement of Polish problems on terms of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union. The United States Government therefore regards as indispensable that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Mikolajczyk with other Polish Democratic leaders from Poland and abroad to join in Moscow consultations from the outset.

3. It is the understanding of the United States Government that Polish leaders invited for consultation should discuss among themselves with a view to reaching agreement on the composition of a Government fully representative of the various democratic sections of Polish opinion. The Commission should follow these discussions in the impartial capacity of an arbitrator.

4. In as much as it was agreed in the Crimea communiqué that the new situation of Poland called for the establishment of a new and more broadly based Polish Provisional Government pledged to holding of free elections as soon as possible it follows in the view of the United States Government that any arrangements for measures affecting the future of the Polish state should await so far as possible the establishment of that Provisional Government and be subject to final confirmation after the elections. As provided in the communiqué it is the opinion of the United States Government that there should be the maximum amount of political tranquility inside Poland during these political negotiations. The United States Government therefore assumes that no action will be taken by provisional authorities in Poland against any individuals or groups there or otherwise which might disturb the atmosphere in which the present negotiations are taking place and so prejudice their successful outcome. If as may be expected this is also the view of the Soviet Government the United States Government trusts this will be made clear to the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw. For its part the United States Government will similarly use its good offices with the Polish Government in London.

The United States Government wishes to revert to a suggestion first put forward by Mr. Molotov that British and American observers should visit Poland to report upon conditions there. It is convinced it is essential to the work of British and United States representatives on commission that they should be in a position to receive direct reports from their representatives in Poland. The United States Government must therefore urgently press Soviet Government to make the necessary arrangements to this end.

5. The United States Government believes that if in the first stage the Commission would adopt as a basis the considerations suggested above, the negotiations would begin in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Crimean decision. The execution of the agreement on

Poland reached by the three heads of Government at the Crimea will be watched by the entire world as an indication of the reality of the unity there so successfully established between the three principal Allies.

ACHESON

S60C.01/3-2345 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 23, 1945—5 a. m.

[Received 10 a. m.]

869. Polco. ReDeptel 640, March 18, 1 p. m. I have received an *aide-mémoire* from Molotov dated March 22 reading in paraphrase:

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following in connection with the work of the Moscow Commission, which has not been able to assure the carrying into effect of the decisions of the Crimea Conference concerning Poland.

1. An agreement was reached at the Crimea Conference between the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union to the effect that the present Polish Provisional Government (PPG) should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis which would include democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles from abroad. Thus, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference, a new reorganized Polish government which would be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be formed on the basis of the present provisional government existing in Poland. Any other interpretation of the decisions of the Crimea Conference would be a violation of these decisions. It is therefore fully natural that in the decisions of the Crimea Conference the Polish *Emigré* Government is not mentioned at all, whereas the PPG is considered in the decisions as the nucleus of the above-mentioned Government of National Unity. The Soviet Government sees in this a recognition on the part of the British and American Governments also of the fact that only the PPG, which is exercising state authority in the entire territory of Poland and has acquired great authority among the Polish people, by drawing in new democratic forces from Poland and from abroad, will become the government resting on a wider base which is also the goal of the three Allied Governments in their decisions on the Polish question at the Crimea Conference.

To consider after this that the PPG in Warsaw is only one of the three groups of democratic Poles, as is done in the memorandum of the American Ambassador of March 19,³⁴ would be entirely incorrect. This would be a violation of the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question with which the Soviet Government could not agree in any way.

³⁴ See footnote 33, p. 172.

2. The Polish Commission in Moscow created by the Crimea Conference should be guided in all its work by the decisions of this conference. The first task facing the Commission—i.e. the carrying on of consultations with the PPG and other democratic leaders from Poland and from abroad—should be carried out in accordance with this. Meanwhile, notwithstanding the efforts of the Soviet representative, the Commission has not done this.

In the published text of the Crimean decisions, as is well known, it is pointed out that the Commission is empowered "to consult in Moscow in the first instance" with members of the PPG and with other Polish democratic leaders within and without Poland. It follows from this that the Commission should consult in the first instance with the PPG. This was also accepted by the Moscow Commission in its first decisions of February 24 and 27 whereby it invited the PPG representatives to proceed to Moscow without delay for consultation. This invitation, however, was withdrawn after a few days on the insistence of the British representative on the Commission. The obligation to consult in the first instance with the PPG arises from the very sense of the decisions of the Crimea Conference inasmuch as the final goal of the consultation is the reorganization of the PPG into a government of national unity which, according to the decision of the Crimea Conference, should be formed on the basis of the provisional government now existing in Poland. According to the sense of these decisions, the consultation with other Polish democratic leaders should serve to supplement the consultation with the PPG with a view to the reorganization of this government on a wider basis through the inclusion in it of democratic leaders from Poland and Poles from abroad. Furthermore, according to the Crimea Conference, the Polish Provisional Government is to be consulted as such and also such other Polish leaders as can be considered to be democratic leaders. Since the members of the Moscow Commission should work as a commission, the fair decision of the question as to which particular Polish leaders should be invited for consultation would be that which is accepted by all three members of the Commission in accordance with the Crimea Conference resolution.

If the Moscow Commission acted otherwise, following the proposal of the American Ambassador in his memorandum of March 19, which at a number of points varies from the Crimea decisions, the Commission would not fulfill the obligations imposed upon it. Thus the adherents of the Polish *Emigré* Government, such as Arciszewski, Raczkiewicz, Anders, *et al.*, who are clearly hostile to the Soviet Union and to the decisions of the Crimea Conference cannot be summoned for consultation even though they call themselves democrats. It is obvious that also other opponents of the Crimea decisions, such as for instance Mikolajczyk, do not fall within the category of Polish leaders consultation with whom could assist in the fulfillment of the Crimea decisions.

The Soviet Government expresses its confidence that the decisions concerning the conducting of the consultations unanimously accepted by all the members of the Commission will assure in the fullest measure the fulfillment of the resolutions of the Crimea Conference concerning Poland.

3. The Soviet Government has learned with amazement of the statement of the American Government concerning the intention to send British and American observers to Poland,³⁵ inasmuch as this proposal can sting the national pride of the Poles to the quick, the more so since in the decisions of the Crimea Conference this subject is not even touched upon. In any event the American Government could best explore this question if it were to address itself directly to the PPG.

4. In accordance with the consideration set forth above, the Soviet Government proposes in the interests of the successful work of the Moscow Commission that the following principles be unanimously recognized:

a. The Commission in its work should take as its point of departure the basic principle of the Crimea Conference that the PPG is the base for the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, which will include in its composition democratic leaders from Poland and Poles from abroad.

b. The Commission should urgently proceed to the holding of the consultations which it is directed to hold, for which it should first of all summon the PPG representatives.

c. The Commission should also urgently summon for consultation those Polish leaders from Poland and from abroad concerning whom there is already agreement on the part of all three members of the Commission.

d. Thereafter the Commission should decide the question of calling in other Polish democratic leaders from within and without Poland, consultation with whom should also be recognized by the Commission as desirable in the interests of the fulfillment of the Crimea decisions.

It is the opinion of the Soviet Government that the realization of these proposals would assure the fulfillment of the Crimean decisions concerning the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and the subsequent free elections in Poland. This is the duty of the Moscow Commission. It corresponds to the interests both of the Allied powers and of a democratic Poland. *End paraphrase.*

Molotov states he has sent an identic *aide-mémoire* to the British Ambassador.

HARRIMAN

³⁵ At the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Yalta Conference, February 8, 1945, Stalin is reported to have said that "he did not see why Great Britain and the United States could not send their own people into Poland." See *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 779 and 789.

860C.01/3-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 24, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

894. Polco. At the meeting last night of the Polish Commission as indicated in my telegram reporting the details of the discussion,³⁶ it was agreed that Clark Kerr and I should set our hand to a revision of the four principles suggested by Molotov in paragraph 4 of his *aide-mémoire* of March 22. The following three points which are given in reverse order represent the redraft agreed upon with Clark Kerr:

3. The Commission should also decide the question of the summoning of additional Polish Democratic leaders from Poland and abroad, consultation with whom is recognized by the Commission as desirable in the interests of the fulfillment of the decisions of the Crimea conference. In this connection, full weight should be given to the desire of any member of the Commission to call any particular Polish Democratic leader whom he may consider to be of value for the purpose in view.

2. The Commission should immediately proceed to the holding of the consultations with which it has been charged, for which purpose representatives of the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland should be summoned together with a representative group of other Democratic leaders from Poland and abroad. (A combination of Molotov's second and third principles.)

1. The Commission should base its work upon the following principle underlying the decision of the Crimea conference on Poland: the new government of national unity is to be made broadly representative of all democratic elements of the Polish state by a reorganization of the provisional government now functioning in Poland with the inclusion of Democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad.

Clark Kerr is submitting the three points to London for approval. I would appreciate receiving the Department's comments prior to our next meeting on March 26.

HARRIMAN

³⁶ Telegram No. 882, March 24, 1 p. m., not printed; it reported that the Commission on Poland held another 3-hour conversation on the night of March 23 with little profit and that the most serious difference of opinion remained on the question of inviting the Warsaw Poles to Moscow in the first instance, before extending invitations to other Polish leaders (860C.01/3-2445).

860C.01/3-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 25, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received March 25—7:45 p. m.]

906. Polco. ReEmbtel 882, March 24, 1 p. m.³⁷ At the meeting of the Polish Commission on March 23 Molotov seized on every possible issue to raise objections to our interpretation of the Crimea declaration and to our proposals for procedure. He insisted that his memorandum of March 22 (reEmbtel 869, March 23, 5 a. m.) setting forth the view of the Soviet Government represented the correct interpretation of the Crimea declaration and criticized the interpretation given in our memorandum (reDeptel 640, March 18, 1 p. m.). He again refused to discuss seriously the names of Poles to be invited for consultation and gave every evidence of a desire to resort to delaying tactics with respect to this particular point.

Molotov began the discussion by asking whether the Commission should continue its work. Clark Kerr and I both stressed the importance which our governments attached to the Polish question and the desirability of reaching an early settlement. Molotov then introduced the Soviet contention that the Warsaw Government should serve as the "basis" for the formation of a new Polish Government. Throughout most of the discussion Molotov endeavored to obtain our agreement to this contention and also to his proposition that the Warsaw Poles should be consulted in the first instance. Moreover, he refused to admit that the other two democratic elements mentioned in the Crimea declaration were on a par with the Warsaw Poles. I firmly rejected Molotov's arguments and stated that the United States Government could not accept these contentions. I reminded Molotov that at Yalta there had been considerable discussion on the wording of the declaration and that the word "enlarged" as suggested by the Soviet delegation had been rejected and the word "reorganization" substituted.

I added that no useful purpose would be served by trying to introduce the word "basis" into the discussions and that the Crimea decision should stand as written.

Molotov introduced the point raised in his memorandum that not all Polish Democratic leaders could be invited for consultation since the members of the London Government who considered themselves Democrats would thereby be included. Clark Kerr and I both made it perfectly clear that neither of our governments had ever considered

³⁷ See footnote 36, p. 179.

inviting the leaders of the London Government. I stated that in the opinion of my government, Democratic Poles of varying viewpoints should be invited for consultation, but that any who are still irreconcilably hostile to friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union should be excluded. I emphasized our insistence that Mikolajczyk as the outstanding Polish Democratic leader outside of Poland be included. Molotov took exception to this, dropping his previous argument that Mikolajczyk had opposed the Crimea declaration and asserting that at the time of both his visits to Moscow last year³⁸ Mikolajczyk had inspired terrorist acts against Red Army officers in Poland. Both Clark Kerr and I refused to admit the validity of this charge.

Molotov then referred to the four points set forth in his memorandum and asked whether Clark Kerr and I would accept them as a basis for the Commission's work. We each said that we were unable to accept point (a) and suggested that a paragraph be substituted for it based on the language in our memorandum. We proposed the following wording: "the new Government of National Unity is to be made broadly representative of Democratic elements of the Polish State by a reorganization of the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland with the inclusion of Democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad." Molotov was non-committal but asked that our suggested redraft be submitted to him in writing for his consideration. Clark Kerr proposed that points (b) and (c) of Molotov's memorandum be revised and combined, and we undertook to submit a revised version of these points as well.

I suggested that in the interests of making progress in our work we proceed to the consideration of the names of Poles to be invited and asked Molotov whether he had now received sufficient information to express an opinion on the 15 or 20 names we had submitted to him at various stages. He said that he had not and again insisted on the necessity of inviting Poles from Poland and abroad acceptable to the Warsaw Government. In this connection he again emphasized that the Commission should work "as a commission" and referred to Churchill's statement to this effect made at the farewell luncheon at Yalta. He recalled that at the first meeting the Commission had invited the Warsaw Poles to Moscow for consultation but that the invitation had been withdrawn at the following meeting on the insistence of the British Ambassador. Clark Kerr explained that when

³⁸ Mikolajczyk, who was then Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, visited Moscow from July 30 to August 10, 1944, when he conferred with Marshal Stalin and also with members of the Soviet-sponsored Lublin Committee, and in mid-October 1944 when he conferred with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. For documentation regarding these visits, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 1298-1315 and 1321-1328.

it became clear that the other two Democratic elements of Poles were not to be invited simultaneously with the Warsaw Poles he had, on instructions from his government, insisted that the invitation to the Warsaw Poles be withdrawn. I reminded Molotov that in the Commission a telegram³⁹ of February 24 to the Warsaw Government, eight names of Democratic leaders in Poland and abroad had been "named" for invitation. Molotov had signed that telegram but after undefined objection from Warsaw Molotov had objected to all but the two accepted by Warsaw. I suggested that if some of the original nominees could not be found, other persons representing the same political groups might be substituted for them. On Molotov's inquiry I said that we had little information concerning the persons proposed by the Lublin Government but that we understood the writer Jan Victor was a good man but he was not a political leader. He could not be accepted, as a substitute for persons on our list. If Witos, for example, could not be found, Kiernik⁴⁰ might be a satisfactory substitute. I also stressed the importance of inviting a churchman and suggested the names of Bishop Lukomski⁴¹ and Bishop Adamski⁴² as possible substitutes for Bishop Sapieha if he was not available. Molotov was non-committal regarding all of these persons, as well as Zulawski whom I also mentioned.

Molotov constantly declines to distinguish between Poles to be invited for consultation and candidates for the reorganized government. It is obvious that he has no interest in discussions with Poles of various groups and desires only to invite to Moscow a few prospective members of a reorganized government acceptable to the Warsaw Government.

At the outset of the meeting both Clark Kerr and I informed Molotov that sufficient time had not elapsed for us to receive the reaction of our governments to his memorandum of March 22 and we agreed to discuss this matter further at our next meeting on Monday⁴³ providing instructions had been received. I hope that the Department will be able to give me an expression of its views on Molotov's memorandum before that time. At the Monday meeting we shall also discuss again names of men to invite for consultation. I made it plain that I would be willing to agree to a list of men only if as a group they were representative of all Democratic opinion as distinguished from satellites of the Warsaw Government.

HARRIMAN

³⁹ For discussion of the contents of this telegram, see telegram No. 540, February 24, 3 p. m., from Moscow, p. 123.

⁴⁰ Władysław Kiernik, member of the Peasant Party.

⁴¹ Bishop of Lomza.

⁴² Stanisław Adamski, Bishop of Upper Silesia.

⁴³ March 26.

860C.01/3-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 26, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 9:15 p. m.]

912. Polco. Clark Kerr has shown me his recent telegram outlining the British Government's reaction to Molotov's memorandum and the questions discussed at the meeting of the Commission on March 23 and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Department's 704, March 25, 8 p. m.,⁴⁴ we have postponed the meeting scheduled for today.

On the basis of the tenor of the discussions so far, I feel that it would be useless to continue to argue over the interpretation of each word in the Yalta declaration on Poland and abstract points of procedure since this discussion could continue for weeks and get nowhere.

As I see it we should reach agreement with the British to make it plain to Molotov that if any progress is to be made, we should concentrate in attempting to reach agreement as a Commission on the following points:

1. On the basis of the Yalta declaration, we should agree to invite simultaneously to Moscow three groups of Poles, one representing the Warsaw Government, the second composed of representative members of the democratic Polish elements in Poland including a churchman, and four or five democratic Poles from London including Mikolajczyk. Until we have made it absolutely clear to Molotov that we can accept no other basis for the consultations, we will continue to argue at cross purposes.

2. Once we have reached agreement on point (1), we should then concentrate on the selection of the individuals who are to come to Moscow representing each of the three groups. In this connection, we should make it clear to Molotov that we have no objection to inviting any members of the Warsaw Government or other Poles acceptable to that Government whom Molotov may desire but that it must agree to the Commission's inviting for consultation a well-balanced group of Poles from Poland and abroad whom we consider to be representative of the different Polish democratic political elements and who are not already tied in with the Warsaw Government. In regard to Mikolajczyk's new list contained in the British Government's telegram to Washington on March 24,⁴⁵ I feel that Miko-

⁴⁴ Not printed.

⁴⁵ The British had met with Mikolajczyk and reviewed with him the lists of persons to be consulted by the tripartite commission in Moscow from among political leaders within Poland and in London. As a result, Mikolajczyk had drawn up a second, shorter list which contained the following names: Witos, Bagiński, Bień, Zulawski, Zaremba, Pajdak, Chaciński, Jankowski, Urbański, Trampczyński, Jasiukowicz, Zielinski and Adam.

lajczyk's approach is unrealistic and aims too much at perfectionism. While it might be helpful from his point of view to have all of the underground leaders brought here for consultation, I feel most definitely that if we attempted to carry this out we would cause undue delay in getting at the heart of the problem, which is to start consultations as soon as possible with representative Poles who, while they may not in every case be the most prominent leaders of their parties, are representative Poles and not Comintern agents. I feel that from the names we have already suggested, we can agree upon such a list of representative Poles and therefore I recommend that Clark Kerr and I be permitted to press this point with Molotov and endeavor to get him to agree to a list of five Poles from Poland and five from London, all of whom are on Mikolajczyk's lists but not necessarily in all cases his first choice.

3. It should be agreed in principle by the Commission that after consultations begin, other leaders can be invited if advisable.

4. I feel that while we should continue to press for permission to send our observers to Poland, we should not, in view of Molotov's present attitude on this point, insist upon this as a prerequisite to agreement on the other points. We could give in on this point as a *quid pro quo* to Molotov's agreeing to allow a representative group of Poles to come from Warsaw who would be in a position to advise us regarding the present temper and feeling of the Polish people.

5. After invitations have been issued to all three groups, I feel that as a practical matter, the Commission should meet the Warsaw representative first in order to apprise them of the realities of the Yalta agreement as the British and we understand it.⁴⁶

HARRIMAN

860C.01/3-2645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1945—7 p. m.

717. Dept fully concurs with the considerations set forth in your 912, March 26, 3 p. m. We consider that the redraft of Molotov's points, reported in your 894, March 24, is satisfactory as a basis for discussion provided it is made clear to Molotov that we have not receded from our position on the other points contained in Department's 640, March 18, 1 p. m. We also are anxious that the Com-

⁴⁶ In his telegram No. 931, March 27, 2 p. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that he had reconsidered this point (5) and felt that the question of whether all three groups of Poles should be called before the Commission at the same time should be left for further determination depending upon developments (860C.01/3-2745).

mission proceed with its work and agree that the question of observers and the question of a truce in Poland might best be deferred, possibly until the Warsaw Government Poles appear before the Commission. We consider it essential that the Commission not lose further time in discussing points of procedure, and we will endeavor to obtain British agreement.

GREW

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁴⁷

LONDON, 27 March 1945.

925. 1. I am extremely concerned at the deterioration of the Russian attitude since Yalta.

2. About Poland, you will have seen that Molotov in his reply to the agreed communication made to him by our Ambassadors on the 19th March,⁴⁸ and in their discussion on the 23rd March, returned a series of flat negatives on every point he dealt with and ignored others.

He persists in his view that the Yalta Communiqué merely meant the addition of a few other Poles to the existing administration of Russian puppets and that these puppets should be consulted first. He maintains his right to veto Mikolajczyk and other Poles we may suggest and pretends that he has insufficient information about the names we have put forward long ago.

Nothing is said about our proposal that the commission should preside in an arbitral capacity over discussions among the Poles. Nothing on our point that measures in Poland affecting the future of the Polish State and action against individuals and groups likely to disturb the atmosphere should be avoided.

He ignores his offer about observers and tells us to talk to the Warsaw puppets about this. It is as plain as a pike staff that his tactics are to drag the business out while the Lublin Committee consolidate their power.

3. Clark Kerr's proposal for dealing with this was to try by re-drafting to build something on the four-point formula included in Molotov's reply. We cannot see that any real progress towards getting an honest Polish settlement can possibly be made in this way.

It would merely mean that we allowed our communication to be sidetracked, negotiated on the basis of Molotov's wholly unsatisfactory reply and wasted time finding formulae which do not decide vital points. We therefore instructed Clark Kerr that he should not proceed on this basis, and that we are discussing matters with you.

⁴⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁴⁸ Regarding the agreed communications to Molotov, see telegram 640, March 18, to Moscow, and footnote 33, p. 172.

4. As you know, if we fail altogether to get a satisfactory solution on Poland and are in fact defrauded by Russia, both Eden and I are pledged to report the fact openly to the House of Commons. There I advised critics of the Yalta settlement to trust Stalin. If I have to make a statement of facts to the House, the whole world will draw the deduction that such advice was wrong. All the more so that our failure in Poland will result in a set-up there on the new Roumanian model.^{48a}

In other words, Eastern Europe will be shown to be excluded from the terms of the Declaration of Liberated Europe⁴⁹ and you and we shall be excluded from any jot of influence in that area.

5. Surely we must not be manoeuvred into becoming parties to imposing on Poland, and on how much more of Eastern Europe, the Russian version of democracy? (You no doubt saw Vyshinsky's⁵⁰ public explanations in Roumania of this doctrine). There seems to be only one possible alternative to confessing our total failure. That alternative is to stand by our interpretation of the Yalta declaration.

But I am convinced it is no use trying to argue this any further with Molotov. In view of this, is it not now the moment for a message from us both on Poland to Stalin? I will send you our rough idea on this in my immediately following. I hope you can agree.

6. I see nothing else likely to produce good results. If we are rebuffed, it will be a very sinister sign, taken with the other Russian actions at variance with the spirit of Yalta; such as Molotov's rude questioning of our word in the case of Crossword,⁵¹ the unsatisfactory proceedings over our liberated German prisoners, the *coup d'état* in Roumania, the Russian refusal to allow the declaration on liberated Europe to operate, and the blocking of all progress in the EAC⁵² by the Russians.

^{48a} For documentation concerning the efforts of the United States in behalf of the establishment of democratic government in Rumania, see pp. 464 ff.

⁴⁹ For text of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, included as part V of the Communiqué issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin at the conclusion of the Crimea Conference, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 971-973.

⁵⁰ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁵¹ Code name for the approach by German military authorities to Allies in February and March 1945 to arrange for the surrender of German military forces in Italy. For documentation on the surrender of these forces, see vol. III, pp. 717 ff.

⁵² For documentation regarding United States participation in the work of the European Advisory Commission, see *ibid.*, pp. 1 ff.

7. What also do you make of Molotov's withdrawal from San Francisco? ⁵³ It leaves a bad impression on me. Does it mean that the Russians are going to run out or are they trying to blackmail us? As we have both understood them, the Dumbarton Oaks ⁵⁴ proposals, which will form the basis of discussion at San Francisco, are based on the conception of great power unity.

If no such unity exists on Poland, which is after all a major problem of the post war settlement—to say nothing of the other matters just mentioned—what, it will legitimately be asked, are the prospects of success of the new world organization? And is it not indeed evident that, in the circumstances, we shall be building the whole structure of future world peace on foundations of sand?

8. I believe, therefore, that if the success of San Francisco is not to be gravely imperilled, we must both of us now make the strongest possible appeal to Stalin about Poland and if necessary about any other derogations from the harmony of the Crimea. Only so shall we have any real chance of getting the world organization established on lines which will commend themselves to our respective public opinions.

Indeed, I am not sure that we should not mention to Stalin now the deplorable impression Molotov's absence from San Francisco will cause.

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ⁵⁵

LONDON, 27 March 1945.

926. 1. My immediately preceding telegram. Could we not both tell him that we are distressed that the work of the Polish Commission is held up because misunderstandings have arisen about the interpretation of the Yalta decisions? The agreed purpose of those decisions was that a new Government of National Unity was to be established after consultations with representatives of Lublin and other Democratic Poles which both our Governments could recognize.

⁵³ For the memorandum dated March 23, 1945, by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, in which the Acting Secretary informed the President that Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador, would head the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco Conference, see vol. 1, p. 151: for further documentation regarding the attendance at the San Francisco Conference of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov, see *ibid.*, pp. 156 and 165. See also Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter; The Role of the United States 1940-1945* (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 628-630.

⁵⁴ For documentation regarding conversations on international organization at Dumbarton Oaks, August 21-October 7, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 713 ff.

⁵⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

We have not got any reply on the various Polish names we have suggested, pleading lack of information. We have given him plenty of information. There ought not to be a veto by one power on all nominations. We consider that our nominations for the discussions have been made in the spirit of confidence which befits allies; and of course there could be no question of allowing Lublin to bar them. We will accept any nominations he puts forward, being equally confident that the Soviet Government will not suggest Pro-Nazi or Anti-Democratic Poles.

The assembled Poles should then discuss the formation of a new government among themselves. The Commission should preside as arbitrators to see fair play. Monsieur Molotov wants the Lublinites to be consulted first. The Communiqué does not provide for this. But we have no objection to his seeing them first.

We cannot authorize our representatives to do so since we think it contrary to the spirit of the Communiqué. Also, to our surprise and regret, Molotov, who suggested at an earlier stage that we might like to send observers, has now withdrawn the offer.

Indeed, he appears to suggest that it had never been made, and has suggested that we should apply to the present Warsaw Administration. Stalin will understand that the whole point of the Yalta decision was to produce a Polish Government we could recognize and that we obviously cannot therefore deal with the present administration.

We feel sure he will honour the offer to send observers, and his influence with his Warsaw friends is so great that he will overcome with ease any reluctance they may show in agreeing.

2. Also, Stalin will surely see that while the three great allies are arranging for the establishment of the new Government of National Unity, those in power in Poland should not prejudice the future. We have asked that the Soviet Government should use their influence with their friends in temporary power there. Stalin will, we feel confident, take steps to this end.

3. Stalin will find all this set out in most reasonable terms in our communication of the 19th March. Will he cast his eye over it and judge whether our suggestions are not all in line with the spirit of the Yalta decision, and should they not all be met by our ally in order that the aim of the Yalta settlement of Poland, viz., the setting up of a representative government which Britain and the U.S.A. can recognize, may be carried out without further delay?

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ⁵⁶

WASHINGTON, 29 March 1945.

729. Your 925 and 926. I have likewise been watching with anxiety and concern the development of Soviet attitude since the Crimea Conference. I am acutely aware of the dangers inherent in the present course of events not only for the immediate issues involved and our decisions at the Crimea but also for the San Francisco Conference and future world cooperation. Our peoples and indeed those of the whole world are watching with anxious hope the extent to which the decisions we reached at the Crimea are being honestly carried forward. For our part (and I know for yours) we intend to shirk no responsibility which we have assumed under those decisions. I agree with you that we should not neglect any step calculated to demonstrate to the Soviet Government the vital importance of their doing likewise. It is for this reason and because of the magnitude of the issues involved that I consider it essential to base ourselves squarely on the Crimea decisions themselves and not allow any other considerations, no matter how important, to cloud the issue at this time. I have this particularly in mind with respect to the Polish negotiations.

You will recall that the agreement on Poland at Yalta was a compromise between the Soviet position that the Lublin Government should merely be "enlarged" and our contention that we should start with a clean slate and assist in the formation of an entirely new Polish Government. The wording of the resulting agreement reflects this compromise but if we attempt to evade the fact that we placed, as clearly shown in the agreement, somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the other two groups from which the new Government is to be drawn I feel we will expose ourselves to the charge that we are attempting to go back on the Crimean decision. It by no means follows, however, and on this we must be adamant, that because of this advantage the Lublin group can in any way arrogate to itself the right to determine what Poles from the other two groups are to be brought in for consultation. For the foregoing reasons I feel strongly that we should first of all bring the matter to a head on the question that falls clearly within the Yalta agreement, namely, our right to call for consultation a group of Polish leaders that are truly representative and that it is for the Commission and the Commission alone to decide which Poles are representative. Our Ambassadors in Moscow appear to be in agreement that we should proceed on the basis of their redraft, designed to reconcile our basic instructions with the points put forward by Molotov. They will at the same

⁵⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

time make it absolutely clear that we have not receded in the slightest from the other points in our instructions of March 19⁵⁷ and shall revert to them at a later stage.

I do feel the other questions of procedure and the proper time for reopening the other points can be safely left to our Ambassadors. They know exactly what we think and feel on the entire question and I am personally completely confident that under no circumstances will they take any step or agree to anything which would impair the objectives we both seek. For example, I believe that if we can get Soviet agreement to the principle that the Commission and the Commission alone shall determine what Poles shall be invited for consultation and a definite list is drawn up and invitations issued then consultation with the Lublin Poles first might even afford certain advantages. They could be told how we interpret the Yalta decision and thus avoid the danger of having the question of interpretation become a matter of dispute between the Polish groups themselves. I feel subject to your approval that our Ambassadors should proceed along this line to bring our differences with Molotov into sharp focus without waiting for us to concert our messages to Stalin. Averell is ready to go ahead on this basis if we can obtain your concurrence which I earnestly hope you will give.

I agree with you, however, that the time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broader aspects of the Soviet attitude (with particular reference to Poland) and my immediate following telegram will contain the text of the message I propose to send.⁵⁸

I hope you will let me have your reaction as soon as possible.

ROOSEVELT

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁵⁹

LONDON, 30 March 1945.

928. 1. Thank you for your 729 and 730.⁶⁰ I am glad you agree that the time has come for us both to address Stalin directly. We consider the draft in your 730 is a grave and weighty document and, although there are a few points in which it does not give full expression to our own views, we will whole-heartedly accept it and I will also endorse it in my parallel message to Stalin, the text of which I will send you before it goes.

⁵⁷ For the instructions, see telegram 640, March 18, 1 p. m., to Moscow, p. 172.

⁵⁸ Telegram 730, March 29, not printed. For text of message as sent to Marshal Stalin on April 1, with notation of changes from this draft, see p. 194.

⁵⁹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁶⁰ Latter not printed, but see footnote 58, above.

2. Perhaps however before deciding on your final text you would consider the importance of making it clear that we shall not enter into any arrangements with the Lublinites before the arrival of our own Poles. There is no harm in discussing with the Lublinites, but I am sure that Mikolajczyk for instance will stipulate that the field shall be open when he arrives. We should be glad if you would provide for this in your draft.

3. More important still is to get rid of Molotov's veto on our candidates. You indicate this in a most polite manner, but would it not be well to emphasize the point by adding a sentence at the appropriate place to the effect that none of the three of us should veto each other's candidates? Otherwise he will simply veto every one that the Lublin Poles wish him to.

4. Finally, could you not mention in the last paragraph of your draft that it was Molotov himself who originally made the suggestion of observers?

5. I do not ask you to delay the dispatch of your draft on account of these desired additions by us. We leave it in your hands. Meanwhile I agree that our two Ambassadors should give Molotov the redraft of the latter's basic principles, making it clear in doing so that we have not receded in the slightest from the other points in our instructions of March 19th and will revert to them at a later stage.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁶¹

LONDON, 31 March 1945.

929. Following is text of message I propose to send to Stalin. Please let me know what you think. I will not send it off till I hear from you. Text begins:

Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Personal and Top Secret.

1. You will by now I hope have received the message from the President of the United States which he was good enough to show to me before he sent it.

It is now my duty on behalf of His Majesty's Government to assure you that the War Cabinet desire me to express to you our whole-hearted endorsement of this message of the President's, and that we associate ourselves with it in its entirety.

2. There are two or three points which I desire specially to emphasize. First, that we do not consider we have retained in the Moscow discussions the spirit of Yalta nor indeed, at points, the letter. It was never imagined by us that the commission we all three appointed with so much good will would not have been able to carry out their part swiftly and easily in a mood of give and take.

⁶¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

We certainly thought that a Polish Government "new" and "reorganized" would by now have been in existence, recognized by all the United Nations. This would have afforded a proof to the world of our capacity and resolve to work together for its future. It is still not too late to achieve this.

3. However, even before forming such a new and reorganized Polish Government, it was agreed by the commission that representative Poles should be summoned from inside Poland and from Poles abroad, not necessarily to take part in the government but merely for free and frank consultation.

Even this preliminary step cannot be taken because of the claim put forward to veto any invitation, even to the consultation, of which the Soviet or the Lublin Government do not approve. We can never agree to such a veto by any one of us three. This veto reaches its supreme example in the case of Monsieur Mikolajczyk who is regarded throughout the British and American world as the outstanding Polish figure outside Poland.

4. We also have learned with surprise and regret that Monsieur Molotov's spontaneous offer to allow observers or missions to enter Poland has now been withdrawn. We are therefore deprived of all means of checking for ourselves the information, often of a most painful character, which is sent us almost daily by the Polish Government in London.

We do not understand why a veil of secrecy should thus be drawn over the Polish scene. We offer the fullest facilities to the Soviet Government to send missions or individuals to visit any of the territories in our military occupation.

In several cases this offer has been accepted by the Soviets and visits have taken place to mutual satisfaction. We ask that the principle of reciprocity shall be observed in these matters, which would help to make so good a foundation for our enduring partnership.

5. The President has also shown me messages which have passed between him and you about Monsieur Molotov's inability to be present at the conference at San Francisco. We had hoped the presence there of the three Foreign Ministers might have led to a clearance of many of the difficulties which have descended upon us in a storm since our happy and hopeful union at Yalta. We do not however question in any way the weight of the public reasons which make it necessary for him to remain in Russia.

6. Like the President, I too was struck with the concluding sentence of your message to him. What he says about the American people also applies to the British people and to the nations of the British Commonwealth with the addition that His Majesty's present advisers only hold office at the will of the Universal Suffrage Parliament.

If our efforts to reach an agreement about Poland are to be doomed to failure, I shall be bound to confess the fact to Parliament when they return from the Easter recess. No one has pleaded the cause of Russia with more fervour and conviction than I have tried to do. I was the first to raise my voice on June 22, 1941.⁶²

⁶² For Prime Minister Churchill's radio speech of June 22, 1941, following the German invasion of Soviet Russia, see Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance* (Boston, 1950), pp. 371-373.

It is more than a year since I proclaimed to a startled world the justice of the Curzon Line for Russia's western frontier,⁶³ and this frontier has now been accepted by both the British Parliament and the President of the United States.

It is as a sincere friend of Russia that I make my personal appeal to you and to your colleagues to come to a good understanding about Poland with the western democracies and not to smite down the hands of comradeship in the future guidance of the world which we now extend.

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ⁶⁴

WASHINGTON, 31 March 1945.

732. Thank you for your 928 of March 30 in regard to my proposed message to Stalin. I am very pleased to find that we are in such substantial agreement. I have carefully considered the helpful suggestions that you have made, and I am making the following three additions to cover the points you raise.

In regard to the point raised in your paragraph 2 I am adding immediately after the words "Yalta decisions on this point" the following sentence: "It is of course understood that if the Lublin group comes first no arrangements would be made independently with them before the arrival of the other Polish leaders called for consultation."

In your paragraph 3 after the words "accorded the same confidence", I am adding the phrase "and that any candidate for consultation presented by any one of the Commission be accepted by the others in good faith".

In regard to your point 4 after the words "permitted to visit Poland", I would add the following sentence: "As you will recall Mr. Molotov himself suggested this at an early meeting of the Commission and only subsequently withdrew it".

I have just received your 929, and as I concur in your proposed message, I have sent mine to Stalin with the foregoing additions.

ROOSEVELT

⁶³ For text of Prime Minister Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on February 22, 1944, publicly advocating the Curzon Line as the Polish eastern frontier, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 397, cols. 697-698.

⁶⁴ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)* ⁶⁵

WASHINGTON, 1 April 1945.

218. I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view the development of events of mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta. The decisions we reached there were good ones and have for the most part been welcomed with enthusiasm by the peoples of the world who saw in our ability to find a common basis of understanding the best pledge for a secure and peaceful world after this war. Precisely because of the hopes and expectations that these decisions raised, their fulfillment is being followed with the closest attention. We have no right to let them be disappointed. So far there has been a discouraging lack of progress made in the carrying out, which the world expects, of the political decisions which we reached at the Conference particularly those relating to the Polish question. I am frankly puzzled as to why this should be and must tell you that I do not fully understand in many respects the apparent indifferent attitude of your Government. Having understood each other so well at Yalta I am convinced that the three of us can and will clear away any obstacles which have developed since then. I intend, therefore, in this message to lay before you with complete frankness the problem as I see it.

Although I have in mind primarily the difficulties which the Polish negotiations have encountered, I must make a brief mention of our agreement embodied in the declaration on liberated Europe. I frankly cannot understand why the recent developments in Rumania should be regarded as not falling within the terms of that agreement. I hope you will find time personally to examine the correspondence between our Governments on this subject.

However, the part of our agreements at Yalta which has aroused the greatest popular interest and is the most urgent relates to the Polish question. You are aware of course that the Commission which we set up has made no progress. I feel this is due to the interpretation which your Government is placing upon the Crimean decisions. In order that there shall be no misunderstanding I set forth below my interpretation of the points of the agreement which are pertinent to the difficulties encountered by the Commission in Moscow.

In the discussions that have taken place so far your Government appears to take the position that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which we agreed should be formed should be little more than a continuation of the present Warsaw Govern-

⁶⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

ment. I cannot reconcile this either with our agreement or our discussions. While it is true that the Lublin Government is to be reorganized and its members play a prominent role it is to be done in such a fashion as to bring into being a new Government. This point is clearly brought out in several places in the text of the agreement. I must make it quite plain to you that any such solution which would result in a thinly disguised continuance of the present Warsaw regime would be unacceptable and would cause the people of the United States to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed. It is equally apparent that for the same reason the Warsaw Government cannot under the agreement claim the right to select or reject what Poles are to be brought to Moscow by the Commission for consultation. Can we not agree that it is up to the Commission to select the Polish leaders to come to Moscow to consult in the first instance and invitations be sent out accordingly. If this could be done I see no great objection to having the Lublin group come first in order that they may be fully acquainted with the agreed interpretation of the Yalta decisions on this point. It is of course understood that if the Lublin group comes first no arrangements would be made independently with them before the arrival of the other Polish leaders called for consultation.⁶⁶ In order to facilitate the agreement the Commission might first of all select a small but representative group of Polish leaders who could suggest other names for the consideration of the Commission. We have not and would not bar or veto any candidate for consultation which Mr. Molotov might propose being confident that he would not suggest any Poles who would be inimical to the intent of the Crimean decision. I feel that it is not too much to ask that my Ambassador be accorded the same confidence and that any candidate for consultation presented by any one of the Commission be accepted by the others in good faith.⁶⁷ It is obvious to me that if the right of the Commission to select these Poles is limited or shared with the Warsaw Government the very foundation on which our agreement rests would be destroyed. While the foregoing are the immediate obstacles which in my opinion have prevented the Commission from making any progress in this vital matter there are two other suggestions which were not in the agreement but nevertheless have a very important bearing on the result we all seek. Neither of these suggestions has been as yet accepted by your Government. I refer to (1) that there should be the maximum of political tranquility

⁶⁶ The foregoing sentence was added to the draft in response to a suggestion from Prime Minister Churchill; see message 928, March 30, from Churchill to Roosevelt, p. 190 and Roosevelt's reply in message 732, March 31, *supra*.

⁶⁷ The part of this sentence beginning with "and that any candidate . . ." was added to the draft in response to a suggestion from Churchill. See preceding footnote.

in Poland and that dissident groups should cease any measures and countermeasures against each other. That we should respectively use our influence to that end seems to me so eminently reasonable. (2) It would also seem entirely natural in view of the responsibilities placed upon them by the agreement that representatives of the American and British members of the Commission should be permitted to visit Poland. As you will recall Mr. Molotov himself suggested this at an early meeting of the Commission and only subsequently withdrew it.⁶⁸

I wish I could convey to you how important it is for the successful development of our program of international collaboration that this Polish question be settled fairly and speedily. If this is not done all of the difficulties and dangers to Allied unity which we had so much in mind in reaching our decision at the Crimea will face us in an even more acute form. You are, I am sure, aware that genuine popular support in the United States is required to carry out any Government policy foreign or domestic. The American people make up their own mind and no Governmental action can change it. I mention this fact because the last sentence of your message about Mr. Molotov's attendance at San Francisco⁶⁹ made me wonder whether you give full weight to this factor.

ROOSEVELT

860C.01/4-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 3, 1945—4 a. m.
[Received 4:05 a. m.]

1021. Commission for Poland met for 2 hours tonight. No agreement was reached on any point. Molotov rejected our redraft of his "principles" for the work of the Commission. In the discussion of individuals to invite for consultation he firmly resisted Clark Kerr's and my insistence on Mikolajczyk and tried to pin us down to an admission that our insistence on one man, Mikolajczyk, was preventing the Commission from functioning. He refused to answer Clark Kerr's counter question as to whether the Soviet Government refused to permit Mikolajczyk to come to Moscow by contending that before deciding that question we should ask a small group first without him.

⁶⁸ The foregoing sentence was added to the draft in response to a suggestion from Churchill; see footnote 67, p. 195.

⁶⁹ See telegram of March 27 from Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt, quoted in telegram 727, March 29, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, vol. I, p. 165.

I asked him about his attitude toward the other four names we had proposed for consideration to be invited from London, namely Popiel, Stanczyk, Seyda and Grosfeld. He replied that the Warsaw Government had objections to all of our suggestions except Grabski.

In reply to our question as to what he specifically proposed doing, Molotov went back to a suggestion that he made a month ago, that we should invite the three representatives of the Lublin Government, Grabski and our choice between the two men the Warsaw Government had suggested from London, namely General Zeligowski and Kolodziej, and from within Poland Kutrzeba and one of the other Poles proposed by the Warsaw Government. I pointed out that this meant the Warsaw Government would be represented by five men and other Polish elements would be represented only by two. He countered that when we got these seven men in Moscow we could discuss with them what others we should invite. He intimated that if we could persuade the Warsaw Poles to agree to invite Mikolajczyk he would not object. Clark Kerr and I stated categorically that such a procedure would not be acceptable to our governments.

When he was asked to give us another alternative Molotov's only suggestion was that we invite the Warsaw Poles alone.

Tonight he was much firmer than ever in his opposition to Mikolajczyk and more open in his insistence that the opinion of the Warsaw Poles should be our guiding influence as it was their government which has to be reorganized "in accordance with the Crimea decision". He declined to discuss the President's and Prime Minister's messages as "it was inappropriate to do so as a member of the Commission since they were addressed to Marshal Stalin".

No arrangements were made for a further meeting of the Commission as there appeared no basis for it at the present time.

Judged on the conversation tonight we are at a breaking point. However, it has been my experience in dealing with the Soviets in the past 4 years that sometimes they are the toughest just before they are ready to make substantial concessions, providing they find they can't move us. Stalin's reply to the President and the Prime Minister may well follow the line of Molotov's adamant attitude tonight or it may give us some loophole on which to base future discussions. If Stalin's reply gives no concrete basis for future discussions we are faced with the decision of what we wish to put forward to Molotov in the next Commission meeting as the definite position of our two Governments on which we are prepared to break if necessary. I still believe that, confronted with a definite and firm position on our part, there is a chance at least that the Soviet Government may yield and allow the negotiations to continue.

If Stalin's message is unsatisfactory another course which should be given serious consideration would be to order me home immediately for consultation. Aside from my belief as previously expressed that it is important that I have an opportunity to talk with you and the President about our relations in general, I think the mere fact that I was called home at this time with no Polish Commission meeting scheduled might have a salutary effect.

HARRIMAN

860C.014/4-445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1945—6 p. m.

791. Please inform the Soviet ForOf that the American Government has received several press and radio reports attributed to responsible officials of the Provisional Polish Government now functioning in Warsaw to the effect that certain territories in the Soviet Military Zone including the Free City of Danzig, and several regions in Lower and Upper Silesia which were included in pre-1937 Germany have been formally incorporated into Poland. You should request the ForOf to furnish at its early convenience for the enlightenment of the American Government appropriate information with respect to the present status of the Free City of Danzig and pre-1937 German territory now in the Soviet Military Zone.

Your personal comments upon this subject as well as any information the Embassy may be in a position to obtain would be welcome.

ACHESON

860C.01/4-445

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State*⁷⁰

[WASHINGTON,] April 4, 1945.

SIR: I am instructed by my Government to bring the following most urgent matter to your attention:

⁷⁰ A memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, Llewellyn E. Thompson, dated April 4, recorded a conversation with the Polish Ambassador as follows:

"The Polish Ambassador stated that he had wished to hand the attached note personally to the Secretary but in view of the great importance which he attached to its receiving prompt consideration and the fact that he would probably not be able to see the Secretary without some delay as he realized the Secretary was very busy, he was leaving it with me. He said he hoped it would be brought to the attention of the Secretary, and, if possible, he would like the President also to know about it.

"I replied that I would see that the note received prompt attention." (860C.-01/4-445)

At the request of the Polish Underground State in Poland, the Polish Government informed the British Government of the names of Vice Premier Jankowski, Delegate of the Polish Government in Poland, and of the other three Ministers ⁷¹ who represent the Polish Government in the Underground State in Poland. In accordance with the request of the Polish Government, acting in understanding with the Underground State in Poland, this information was communicated by the British Government to the Government of the USSR.

From information received from Poland in the middle of March, 1945 the Polish Government learned that Colonel Pimienkov of the Soviet NKVD ⁷² had suggested that the Delegate of the Polish Government in Poland should enter into conversations with General Ivanov, the Representative of the High Command of the I-st Byelorussian front with a view of discussing "matters of first rate importance". Colonel Pimienkov added that the Delegate of the Polish Government would be guaranteed personal safety.

On April 1st, Prime Minister Arciszewski received in London the following information contained in a telegram from Poland: A meeting took place between the Delegate of the Polish Government and Colonel Pimienkov on March 17th. In the course of the conversation Colonel Pimienkov urged the necessity of disclosing the identity of the Polish Political Parties and insistently stressed the necessity of unification of all democratic groups. He likewise insistently demanded that a meeting between himself and the Commander of the dissolved Polish Home Army ⁷³ should take place.

On his part, the Delegate of the Polish Government requested among other matters that facilities be granted by the Soviet authorities for a Delegation from Poland to go to London to communicate and discuss matters with the Polish Government.

On March 18th, Colonel Pimienkov held separate conversations with Delegates of the Polish Peasant Party, the National Democratic Party, the Democratic Party and the Labor Party. The subjects discussed by Colonel Pimienkov in these conversations were similar to those he had raised in his conversation with the Delegate of the Polish Government.

⁷¹ Adam Bien, Stanislaw Jasiukowicz, and Antoni Pajdak.

⁷² People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del), Soviet agency charged with state security and police. In the copy of letter of March 6 to Vice Premier Jankowski, released to the press by the Polish Ministry of Information in London on June 13, 1945, the Soviet officer signed himself: Pimienov, Colonel of the Guards. For a partial text of the letter of March 6, see Bronislaw Kusnierz, *Stalin and the Poles: An Indictment of the Soviet Leaders* (London, Hollis & Carter, 1949), p. 230.

⁷³ Brig. Gen. Leopold Okulicki.

On March 20th, Colonel Pimienkov informed the Delegate of the Polish Government that his request that a Delegation consisting of twelve persons be allowed to go by plane to London for contact with the Polish Government had been granted.

On March 27th, the Delegate of the Polish Government, the Commander of the Polish Home Army dissolved by the Polish Government, as well as Mr. Puzak,⁷⁴ representative of the Polish Socialist Party, went to Pruszkow⁷⁵ where they had been invited allegedly for further conversations, this time with General Ivanov, Representative of Marshal Zhukov.⁷⁶ They did not return from this appointment.

On March 28th, the three remaining Ministers of the Polish Government in the Underground State, together with two representatives each of the National Democratic, the Peasant, the Labor and the Democratic Parties, and one interpreter, went to Pruszkow for conversations with General Ivanov. They likewise did not return and have sent no information regarding their fate either to the organizations which they represent, or to their families.⁷⁷

Thus, information is entirely lacking about fifteen prominent leaders of Polish political life.⁷⁸ There is reason to believe that they were driven away by automobile from Pruszkow on the 29th of March.

The Polish Government has communicated all the above enumerated facts on April 1st to the British Government asking for its immediate intervention in Moscow. The British Government promised to intervene without delay.

Acting on instructions of my Government, I have the honor to submit these very disturbing facts to your attention and to ask for

⁷⁴ Kazmierz Puzak, President of the Polish underground parliament, the Council of National Unity (Rada Jednosci Narodwej) and General Secretary of the Polish Socialist Party.

⁷⁵ Town near Warsaw.

⁷⁶ Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Commander of the First Byelorussian Front.

⁷⁷ In addition to Bien, Jasiukowicz, and Pajdak, the Polish leaders who disappeared on March 28 were: Zbigniew Stypulkowski, member of the presidium of the National Democratic Party; Kazimierz Kobylanski, a member of the Council of National Unity and a member of the National Democratic Party; Kazimierz Baginski, Vice President of the Council of National Unity and Vice Chairman of the Peasant Party; Stanislaw Mierzwa, member of the Central Committee of the Peasant Party; Jozef Chancinski, Chairman of the Christian Labor Party; Franciszek Urbanski, Executive Secretary of the Christian Labor Party; Eugeniusz Czarnowski, leader in the Democratic Party; Stanislaw Michalowski, leader in the Democratic Party; Jozef Stemler-Dombski, Vice Director of the Department of Information of the underground government. In addition to these leaders, Aleksander Zwierzynki, Vice President of the Council of National Unity and Chairman of the National Democratic Party, had been arrested by the Soviet authorities on March 8.

⁷⁸ As was later learned, the 16 Polish leaders (with the inclusion of Zwierzynski) had in fact been arrested by Soviet authorities and had been flown to the Soviet Union to await trial for alleged anti-Soviet activities. The arrest, imprisonment, and trial of these Polish leaders are described by one of those arrested, Zbigniew Stypulkowski, in his book *Invitation to Moscow* (London, Thames and Hudson, 1951), pp. 211 ff.

your intervention with the Government of the USSR in this urgent matter.

While the Polish Government hitherto lacks definite information regarding the fate of its Representatives in Poland, it has reason to fear that the Soviet authorities may have used the stratagem of inviting these prominent political leaders allegedly for conversations in order to arrest them and possibly to deport them. It is to be feared that henceforth any conversations which the Soviet authorities may carry on with them will take place in isolation and under pressure.

I have the honor to stress the gravity and urgency of this matter.

Accept [etc.]

JAN CIECHANOWSKI

860C.01/4-745 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1945—7 p. m.

813. The Polish Ambassador a few days ago informed the Dept that a group of underground leaders who had entered into negotiations with the Soviet military authorities in Poland had disappeared. We are also informed that similar information including names originating with Polish authorities at London had been cabled on April 2 to Clark-Kerr by the ForOf with instructions to query the Soviet ForOf. Press reports datelined London⁷⁹ now state that these leaders are engaging at Moscow in negotiations with the Russians for the reorganization of the so-called Lublin Government. Confidential and allegedly non-Polish sources here make similar allegations which are received with a certain reserve.

Dept leaves to your judgment whether it would serve a useful purpose to make a similar inquiry of the ForOf.

STETTINIUS

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁸⁰

[Translation]

In connection with your message of April 1 I consider it necessary to make the following remarks on the question of Poland.

⁷⁹ See the *New York Times*, April 7, 1945, p. 7.

⁸⁰ Transmitted to President Roosevelt under cover of a letter dated April 9, 1945, from the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, not printed. Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

Matters on the Polish question have really reached a dead end.

Where are the reasons for it? The reasons for it are that the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow—members of the Moscow Commission have departed from the principles of the Crimea Conference and have introduced into the matter new elements not provided by the Crimea Conference.

Namely: *a)* At the Crimea Conference all three of us considered the Provisional Government of Poland as the government functioning in Poland at the present time which is subject to reconstruction and which should serve as kernel of the new government of national unity. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow depart from this principle, ignore the existence of the Provisional Polish Government, do not notice it, at the best—put a sign of equality between singletons [*individuals*] from Poland and from London and the Provisional Government of Poland. Besides, they consider that the reconstruction of Provisional Government should be understood as its liquidation and formation of an entirely new government. Besides, the matter reached such a state when Mr. Harriman stated in the Moscow Commission: “It is possible that no member of the Provisional Government will be included in the composition of the Polish Government of National Unity.”⁸¹

Naturally, such a position of the American and British Ambassadors cannot but cause indignation on the part of the Polish Provisional Government. As regards the Soviet Union, it certainly cannot agree with such a position, as it would mean direct violation of the decisions of the Crimea Conference.

b) At the Crimea Conference all three of us agreed that not more than five persons from Poland and three persons from London should be called for consultation. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow have departed from this position and demand that each member of the Moscow Commission be given the right to invite an unlimited number of people from Poland and from London.

Naturally, the Soviet Government could not agree with this as the summons of people should be carried out according to decisions of the Crimea Conference, not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, namely by the Commission as such. But the request of an unlimited number of persons summoned for consultation contradicts the plans of the Crimea Conference.

c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that in accordance with the meaning of the decisions of the Crimea Conference such Polish leaders should be invited for consultations who, firstly,

⁸¹ Quotation marks not included in the original Russian.

recognize the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the decision on the Curzon Line, and, secondly, are really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government insists on this as blood of the Soviet troops abundantly shed for the liberation of Poland and the fact that in the course of the last 30 years the territory of Poland has been used by the enemy twice for attack upon Russia,—all this obliges the Soviet Government to strive that the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland be friendly.

But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow do not take this into consideration and strive that Polish leaders should be invited for consultation regardless of their attitude towards the decisions of the Crimea Conference and the Soviet Union.

Such, in my opinion, are the reasons hindering the solution of the Polish question on the basis of mutual agreement.

In order to leave the dead end and reach a harmonious decision it is necessary, in my opinion, to undertake the following steps:

- 1) To agree that the reconstruction of the Provisional Polish Government means not its liquidation but just its reconstruction by way of broadening it, bearing in mind that the kernel of the future Polish Government of National Unity should be the Provisional Polish Government.

- 2) To return to the projectings [*provisions*] of the Crimea Conference and to summon only eight Polish leaders, five of whom should be called from Poland and three from London.

- 3) To agree that, under any conditions, a consultation with representatives of the Provisional Polish Government should be carried out, bearing in mind that this consultation with them should be carried out first of all as the Provisional Polish Government is the greatest force in Poland as compared to those singletons [*individuals*] who will be called from London and from Poland and whose influence on the population of Poland cannot be compared with the tremendous influence which the Provisional Polish Government enjoys in Poland.

I draw your attention to this point as, in my opinion, any other decision on this point can be perceived in Poland as an insult to the Polish people as an attempt to force upon Poland a government formed without taking into consideration the public opinion of Poland.

- 4) To summon for consultation from Poland and from London only such leaders who recognize decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and are really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

- 5) To carry out the reconstruction of the Provisional Polish Government by substituting [*replacing*] some of the present ministers

of the Provisional Government by new ministers from among Polish leaders not participating in the Provisional Government.

As regards the numerical correlation [*ratio*] of old and new ministers in the composition of the Polish Government of National Unity, there could be established approximately a similar correlation [*ratio*] which was realized in respect to the Government of Yugoslavia.⁸²

I think that, taking into consideration the above-stated remarks, a harmonious decision on the Polish question can be reached in a short time.

APRIL 7, 1945.

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ⁸³

[Translation]

I have received your message of April 1⁸⁴ on the Polish question. In my message to the President⁸⁵ on this question, which I am also sending to you, I am answering to all principal questions connected with the work of the Moscow Commission on Poland. As regards other questions, which you touch upon in your message, I have to say the following:

1. The British and American Ambassadors—members of the Moscow Commission do not want to regard the Provisional Polish Government and insist on inviting for consultation Polish leaders regardless of their attitude toward the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and toward the Soviet Union. They insist on obligatory invitation to Moscow for consultation for instance Mikolajczyk, doing this even in an ultimative form, not taking into consideration that Mikolajczyk openly spoke against the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland. However, if you consider it necessary, I would be ready to influence the Provisional Polish Government to remove its objections against the invitation of Mikolajczyk, provided the latter would make a public statement about the recognition by him of the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question and that he supports

⁸² For a description and analysis of the United Yugoslav Provisional Government which was sworn into office on March 7, 1945, see telegram 849, April 12, 1945, 8 p. m., to Moscow, p. 1219. For documentation regarding the concern of the United States with the internal conditions in Yugoslavia and the recognition of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, see pp. 1208 ff.

⁸³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Forwarded to the President by Soviet Ambassador Gromyko under cover of a letter dated April 9, not printed, in pursuance of instructions of Marshal Stalin.

⁸⁴ The text of Churchill's message to Stalin of April 1 had been transmitted to President Roosevelt in the Prime Minister's message 929, March 31, p. 191.

⁸⁵ *Supra*.

the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

2. You wonder why the Polish theatre of military events should be secret. In reality there is no secret. You overlook the circumstances that sending to Poland of British observers or other foreign observers is considered by the Poles as insult to their national dignity, and if one bears in mind, that the present attitude of the British Government to the Provisional Polish Government the latter considers as unfavorable. As regards the Soviet Government, it cannot but take into consideration the negative attitude of the Provisional Polish Government toward the question of sending foreign observers to Poland. Besides, you know, that when a different attitude is shown to the Provisional Polish Government it is not hindering entry into Poland of representatives of other nations and does not create any obstacles for them as it is in the case with representatives of the Czechoslovak Government,⁸⁶ the Yugoslav Government⁸⁷ and others.

3. I had a pleasant talk with Mrs. Churchill. She made a great impression on me. She has transmitted to me your gift. Permit me to thank you from the bottom of my heart for the gift.

APRIL 7, 1945.

860C.014/4-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 9, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received April 9—9:40 a. m.]

1091. ReDeptel 791, April 4, 6 p. m. I have written Molotov⁸⁸ simply requesting information as to the facts underlying the press reports concerning the present status of Danzig and pre-1937 German territory now in the Soviet military zone.

There can be little doubt, however, regarding the accuracy of the reports which have reached the Department. The Polpress⁸⁹ material reported in my 983 and 984, March 30,⁹⁰ has been confirmed by

⁸⁶ The Czechoslovak Government in Exile, at London, announced on January 31, 1945, its decision to recognize the Lublin Committee as the Polish Provisional Government.

⁸⁷ The Yugoslav Government on March 30, 1945, announced its intention to recognize the Warsaw regime as the Polish Government.

⁸⁸ For text of Ambassador Harriman's letter of April 8, 1945, to Molotov, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 743, footnote 4.

⁸⁹ Official Polish Press Agency.

⁹⁰ Neither printed. Telegram 983 reported that news releases by the official press agency of the Warsaw Provisional Government described in detail the formal transfer to Poland of Upper Silesia and indicated that large parts of Lower Silesia, Western Pomerania, and East Prussia had also been transferred to Poland and placed under Polish administration; telegram 984 transmitted excerpts from these news releases. (860C.014/3-3045)

numerous Polish newspapers subsequently received at Embassy. A special edition of *Dziennik Zachodni* published in Katowice on March 25 is dedicated to the "Opole⁹¹ Lands". It describes the incorporation ceremony and publishes photographs of Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, Rola-Zymierski and Zawadzki,⁹² all of whom participated, and of the ceremony itself. *Glos Ludu* (organ of Polish Workers Party⁹³) for March 20 published on front page Polpress item from Katowice entitled "Piastr⁹⁴ Silesia returns to Poland" which describes ceremony and summarizes speeches of government leaders. Edition for following day contains leading article entitled "Piastr Silesia returns to Poland" which describes ceremony and summarizes speeches of government leaders. Edition for following day contains leading article entitled "Silesia returns to Poland" justifying this step and pointing out that Opole Silesia is returning to the motherland after seven centuries of German slavery.

With regard to Danzig, Stalin's order of the day of March 30 announcing capture of Danzig stated that national flag of Polish state had been raised over city. Article in *Pravda*⁹⁵ on March 31 entitled "Danzig" stated that Danzig has again become Polish and that "the Danzig problem has been finally liquidated". *Pravda* for April 2 published long Tass⁹⁶ item from Warsaw dated March 31 reporting radio speech of Osobka-Morawski on occasion of liberation of Danzig. Osobka-Morawski is reported as stating that Danzig has again been returned to the Polish republic. The Council of Ministers has issued a decree creating province of Danzig as an inalienable part of the Polish republic. A Woyewode and Mayor of Danzig have been appointed who will exercise authority in the province and city in the name of the Polish republic. Osobka-Morawski is reported as stating that by this historic act the aspirations of the Polish people and the promises of its Allies, in particular the promise of Marshal Stalin, have been fulfilled. In addition to Danzig the Mazovian⁹⁷ lands, lower and upper Silesia, have been returned to Poland, and the time is not distant when the Polish frontiers will be established on the Neisse, Oder and Baltic.

⁹¹ In Upper Silesia; in German, Oppeln.

⁹² Aleksander Zawadzki, Woyewode (Governor) of Silesia and a leader in the Polish Workers Party.

⁹³ The party of the Polish Communists.

⁹⁴ Polish royal dynasty which established the Polish state in the middle of the 10th century and ruled Poland, which at times included Silesia, until the middle of the 14th century.

⁹⁵ Newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

⁹⁶ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union.

⁹⁷ Mazovia was an ancient Polish principality east of the Vistula River which became the province of Warsaw. Reference here, however, may be to Mazuria (Masuria), the southern portion of East Prussia.

In my letter to Molotov I referred to the *Pravda* version of Osobka-Morawski's speech as providing apparent confirmation for the reports which have reached the Department.

The British Ambassador, under instructions from his Government (reEmbs 936 March 27, 6 p. m.⁹⁸) has addressed to Molotov a letter to which he has had no reply referring to these reports and expressing confidence that they must be inaccurate because of our agreements reached in EAC⁹⁹ and at Yalta.¹ In view of all of the above and since it is unlikely that Molotov will reply to my letter in the near future, I recommend that I receive detailed instructions to send a further communication to Molotov on the assumption that these reports are substantially accurate. I further recommend that we face now and determine what steps we should take on this question since it is probable that the Soviet Government will stand firm on the actions already taken and in addition turn over to Polish administration unilaterally German territory up to the Oder-Neisse Line.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/4-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 9, 1945—10 p. m.
[Received April 9—7:31 p. m.]

1101. ReDepts 813, April 7, 7 p. m. In my conversation with Vyshinski this afternoon on other matters, I asked him about rumors that had come to the attention of the Department to the effect that the Soviet Government had brought to Moscow certain Polish underground leaders and were negotiating with them regarding the broadening of the Warsaw Government. Vyshinski scoffed at this and said that the London Poles were proficient in starting rumors. As

⁹⁸ Not printed; it reported that the British Ambassador, in a letter to Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov, had requested comments regarding reports that the Soviet Government had agreed to hand over to the Polish Provisional Government territory in Silesia which had been German before 1939 (860C.01/3-2745).

⁹⁹ For text of the Protocol between the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin", signed at London, September 12, 1944, and the Amending Agreement, signed at London, November 14, 1944, both prepared and adopted by the European Advisory Commission, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071*, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5 (pt. 2), pp. 2078-2092. For documentation regarding United States participation in the work of the European Advisory Commission, including the negotiation of the agreement on zones of occupation in Germany, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. 1, pp. 1 ff., and *ibid.*, 1945, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

¹ See bracketed note, p. 121.

the British Ambassador has already written to the Foreign Office regarding the disappearance of these leaders, I did not consider that any useful purpose would be served by my taking up this aspect of the question. I have just learned from Clark Kerr that he was called over by Vyshinski earlier in the afternoon and took the occasion to press him for a reply to his letter on the disappearance of these leaders. He reports that he has never seen Vyshinski so ill at ease, that he disclaimed any personal knowledge and states that it was a subject that Clark Kerr must take up with Molotov direct.

HARRIMAN

860C.014/4-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 10, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received April 10—5:05 p. m.]

1116. ReDepts 791, April 4, 6 p. m. and reEmbs 1091, April 9, 9 a. m. Clark Kerr has just given me a copy of a letter received from Molotov expressing the latter's surprise at the request Clark Kerr had sent him on March 25 requesting information about the transfer of Silesia to Polish administration.

Molotov stated that the German population of both Polish and German Silesia had withdrawn with the retreating German Army and that only the Polish population remains so that it is most desirable for the civil administration to be in the hands of Polish administrators. He contended that this did not conflict in any way with the agreements reached by the three Governments regarding the occupation of and the control machinery for Germany since neither these agreements nor the Crimea decision treated with the question of administration in occupied German territory. Referring to the Crimea decision relative to the final settlement of the western Polish boundary which is to be postponed until the peace conference, Molotov stated that this had no relation to the present question since the organization under the above-mentioned circumstances of the Polish administration in the ancient Polish territory of Silesia cannot in any way be connected with, nor is it to be identified with, the question of the future frontiers of the Polish state.

HARRIMAN

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ³

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] 10 April 1945.

739. I assume Stalin repeated to you his reply to my message ⁴ on Poland, since he sent me his reply to yours.⁵ We shall have to consider most carefully the implications of Stalin's attitude and what is to be our next step. I shall, of course, take no action of any kind, nor make any statement without consulting you, and I know you will do the same.

ROOSEVELT

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ⁶

LONDON, 11 April 1945.

944. Your 739. 1. Stalin sent me a copy of his reply to your message on Poland.⁷ He also sent me an additional private message, of which the last sentence in Para 1, if seriously intended, would be important. I send this message in my immediately following.⁸ Please let these personal introductions to his official messages be guarded absolutely as between you and me.

2. I have to make a statement in the House of Commons next Thursday⁹ and of course I shall like to know your views about how we should answer Stalin as soon as possible. I have a feeling that they do not want to quarrel with us, and your telegram ¹⁰ about CROSSWORD may have seriously and deservedly perturbed them. Our angle of approach and momentum remain exactly what they have been in both the matters under dispute as set forth in our telegrams.

³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The draft text of this message was telegraphed to the President at Warm Springs, Georgia, at 10:14 a. m., April 10, accompanied by the following message from the Secretary of State to the President: "In view of the statement in the Prime Minister's message to Stalin that he might have to make a public announcement in the House of Commons on a breakdown of the Polish negotiations, we feel that it would be wise for you to send, if you approve, the following cautionary message to the Prime Minister to make sure that he does nothing along those lines without consultation." The President's telegraphic approval of the message to Churchill was received at 11:30 a. m. the same day, and the message was sent from Washington to London at 12:32 p. m.

⁴ Reference is to Roosevelt's message of April 1, p. 194, and Stalin's reply of April 7, p. 201.

⁵ See Stalin's message of April 7 to Churchill, p. 204, and footnotes 83 and 84.

⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁷ See footnote 4, above.

⁸ No. 946, April 11, not printed.

⁹ April 19.

¹⁰ For President Roosevelt's telegram to Marshal Stalin, dated April 4, see vol. III, p. 745.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*¹²

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] April 11, 1945.

742. Your 944. I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten out as in the case of the Bern meeting.¹³

We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct.

ROOSEVELT

860C.01/4-1045 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London*¹⁴

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1945—2 p. m.

Poles 10. Ambassador Harriman has been informed of the concern felt in London Polish circles about the reported disappearance of Underground leaders in Poland. It is expected that Harriman will report to the Department any information becoming available in Moscow regarding their whereabouts and activities. However, Department does not propose at present time to protest to or inquire of Soviet authorities with regard to this development, awaiting possible clarification by other means. You may communicate to Mikolajczyk (reurtel 47, April 10, 10 p. m.¹⁵) as much of the above as you deem desirable adding that you will be glad to send on to him promptly any information received from Moscow regarding the welfare of Witos and the other leaders. Sent to London (Poles), repeated to Moscow.

STETTINIUS

¹² Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹³ During February and March 1945, Allied military and intelligence officials met clandestinely in Switzerland with German military authorities from Italy to consider the possibility of arranging the surrender of German armies in Northern Italy. The meetings, which had no immediate issue and were broken off, gave rise to a diplomatic exchange with the Soviet Government regarding alleged efforts to negotiate a separate peace with Germany. For documentation regarding this incident and other aspects of the surrender of Germany, see vol. III, pp. 717 ff.

¹⁴ Repeated to Moscow on the same date, as telegram 846.

¹⁵ Not printed; it reported information from Mikolajczyk to the effect that the Peasant Party leader, Wincenty Witos, had been arrested. In his telegram Polish Series 55, May 4, 4 p. m., the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile reported information from Mikolajczyk that Witos had been released after 5 days during which he had conferred with representatives of the Warsaw government who proposed that Witos assume the premiership of a Polish Provisional Government (860C.01/5-445).

860C.01/4-1345 : Telegram

*President Truman*¹⁶ to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)

[WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1945.

[1.] I am grateful for your message of sympathy¹⁷ to me and to this nation. In the presence of the great irreparable loss which we have suffered which I know you feel as deeply as I do, I wish to send you this personal message of assurance that with God's help I will do everything in my power to move forward the great work to which President Roosevelt gave his life. At no time in our respective histories has it been more important that the intimate, solid, relations which you and the late President had forged between our countries be preserved and developed. It is my earnest hope that before too long in the furtherance of this that we can arrange a personal meeting. In the meantime there are, however, urgent problems requiring our immediate and joint consideration. I have in mind the pressing and dangerous problem of Poland and the Soviet attitude towards the Moscow negotiations. I am, of course, familiar with the exchanges which you and President Roosevelt have had between yourselves and with Marshal Stalin. I also know in general what President Roosevelt had in mind as the next step. I shall send you in my immediately following telegram my suggestions, in line with President Roosevelt's thoughts, as to the replies which might be made to Stalin's messages of April 7 on Poland.

You can count on me to continue the loyal and close collaboration which to the benefit of the entire world existed between you and our great President.

860C.01/4-1345 : Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)

[WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1945—4: 30 p. m.

[2.] Stalin's replies to you and to President Roosevelt make our next step of the greatest importance. Although with a few exceptions he does not leave much ground for optimism, I feel very strongly that we should have another go at him. I have very much in mind your observations in your no. [929?] to President Roosevelt on the

¹⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and was succeeded in the Presidency by Harry S. Truman. The file copy of this message is not signed, but President Truman noted at the end "Approved H S T".

¹⁷ For Prime Minister Churchill's message of April 13 to President Truman, see Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 480, and Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), p. 20.

danger of protracted negotiations and obstructionist tactics being utilized to consolidate the rule of the Lublin group in Poland and I recognize the compulsion you are under to speak in the House of Commons. I feel, however, that we should explore to the full every possibility before any public statement is made which could only be as matters now stand to announce the failure of our efforts due to Soviet intransigence. Once public announcement is made of a breakdown in the Polish negotiations it will carry with it the hopes of the Polish people for a just solution of the Polish problem to say nothing of the effect it will have on our political and military collaboration with the Soviet Union. I suggest for your consideration, therefore, that we send a joint message to Stalin over both our names to be delivered personally by our Ambassadors in reply to his messages to us. I give you below for your consideration a suggested text of this joint message. If you agree that a joint message is desirable I hope you will go over most carefully the following proposed text and let me have as soon as possible your comments and suggestions so that we can without delay get it off to our Ambassadors for delivery to Stalin.

[Here follows text of joint message, printed in Annex 2 to memorandum of April 15 by the Secretary of State to President Truman, page 219, with changes indicated in footnotes.]

123 Harriman, W. Averell/4-1445 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1945—3 p. m.

867. Your 1161 and Department's 863, April 13, 10 p. m.¹⁸ Stalin's reversal of decision naturally alters the considerations which led to our disapproving your return home at this time. With Molotov coming I feel it would be very desirable and appropriate for you to accompany him to Washington. You are, therefore, authorized if Molotov is definitely coming to accompany him to Washington. We feel it would be most desirable if you would emphasize to Stalin, if you could see him before departure, and to Molotov that the problem between our two countries which was causing President Roosevelt before his death the greatest concern was the failure thus far of the Polish negotiations. We suggest in this connection that you ask

¹⁸ Telegram 1161, April 13, from Moscow, is printed in vol. 1, p. 289. Telegram 863, April 13, to Moscow, not printed, asked Ambassador Harriman to convey to Marshal Stalin the information that the President would look forward with pleasure to a visit by Molotov to Washington (033.6111/4-1345).

Stalin and Molotov to review with this in mind the President's message of April 1, which sets forth in full his considered opinion on this subject.¹⁹

For your own information this subject may come up in discussion with Molotov when he is in Washington and we feel that it would be well to have as much preparation as possible done by you in Moscow with Stalin before you leave. The news that Molotov is prepared to come to Washington and San Francisco is, of course, highly gratifying but the Polish issue remains the most dangerous of the problems which face us in our relations with the Soviet Union.

We hope you will bring Durbrow with you as he is urgently needed here. Also, if Page²⁰ could be spared he could be most useful at San Francisco, but we leave that entirely to your discretion.

STETTINIUS

860C.01/4-1445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 14, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received April 14—8 p. m.]

1168. I have given careful consideration to Stalin's replies to the President and the Prime Minister and I feel they contribute little of a concrete nature which would be helpful in solving the Polish question except of course for the significant fact that Stalin has indicated that he will use his influence with the Warsaw Government to make it withdraw its objections to inviting Mikolajczyk.

This concession by Stalin again opens the door a crack from the impasse we reached at the last meeting of the Commission, and therefore may mean that the Soviets can be induced to make further concessions to the degree necessary to find common ground for a solution satisfactory to us. On the other hand an analysis of Stalin's message clearly shows that his statements are based upon willful distortion of the facts either by himself or by Molotov in his reports of our conversations.

In this connection it is possible that the Soviet authorities may be trying to force some of the democratic Polish leaders, reported now arrested and in their hands, to join the Warsaw Government in order that they may thereby claim that it has been broadened by the Poles themselves since the American and British Ambassadors adopted an attitude on the Commission which made it impossible for it to func-

¹⁹ President Roosevelt's message of April 1 to Marshal Stalin, p. 194.

²⁰ Edward Page, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy in Moscow.

tion. I believe this to be a possibility since the Soviet Government has not categorically denied to the British that the Polish leaders have been arrested or that they are in consultation with either the Warsaw or Soviet Governments. Furthermore, this may be the case because of the insistence in Stalin's message that the Commission has not been able to make progress since the British and American Ambassadors have "departed from the presentation of the case by the Crimea Conference".

As regards Stalin's point (a) Clark Kerr and I have a number of times at every meeting made it clear that not only should representatives of the present Warsaw Government be of course fully consulted but that its members should "play a prominent role" in the creation of the new Government as the President stated in his last message to Stalin on this subject.²¹ At our last meeting I insisted on reading the fourth paragraph from the President's message in order to make our position absolutely clear, not only on this point but also as regards the type of solution the United States Government expected the Commission to attain.

The statement attributed to me in Stalin's message is also not true. It represents a willful and deliberate distortion. At the fifth meeting when Molotov insisted that the Warsaw Government should be the "basis" of the new Government of National Unity I stated that I did not feel that any useful purpose would be served in introducing a new word into the Crimea decision which would require further definition. I reminded Molotov that the Soviet Government had proposed the word "enlarged" at Yalta and that after full discussion it had finally been agreed to use the word "reorganized". In discussing the meaning of the word "reorganize" I pointed out that it was a word of broad meaning. A government could be reorganized by the change of only one or two Ministers in a Cabinet or by replacing most of the Ministers. Molotov then asked laughingly whether I meant by that that the Warsaw Government was to be liquidated. I made it clear to him on several occasions during this meeting that I had made no such suggestion, always emphasizing the important part the Warsaw Poles would play. All of the British and American representatives present at this meeting concur that there could be no question but that Molotov had understood what I meant.

In regard to point (b) in Stalin's message it should be pointed out that at Yalta there was never any discussion as to the exact number to be invited. Particularly there was no understanding that only eight were to be invited by the Commission. On the other hand Clark Kerr and I have never at any time indicated that we wished

²¹ Telegram 218, April 1, p. 194.

to have an unlimited number of persons from Poland and London summoned for consultation. On the contrary, while we have suggested approximately twenty names of persons who might be suitable for consultation we have always made it clear that we were not suggesting that all of them be invited and indicated that we hoped that Molotov would accept from this list approximately five leaders from London and five from Poland, not associated with the Warsaw Governments, to come here to consult with representatives of the Warsaw regime. We have also reiterated to Molotov that if he felt it would be advisable to invite more representatives from the Warsaw Government than the three we had suggested that we would have no objection. We have, however, indicated that if, after the initial consultations take place, it should be deemed necessary to invite other democratic leaders, full consideration should be given to this possibility. Molotov himself has consistently agreed in principle with this.

Concerning point (c) in Stalin's message, Clark Kerr and I have stated innumerable times that we wished only to invite Polish leaders who were prepared to cooperate in carrying out the Crimea decision and who earnestly desire Poland to have friendly relations with the Soviet Union. We have assured Molotov many times that we would not invite Arciszewski or any other members of the present London Government. From Molotov's statements to us it seems evident that Stalin's definition of a person desiring friendship with the Soviet Union is one who is ready to subordinate himself to the will of the Soviet Government.

The following are my comments on Stalin's five recommendations:

1. We have already made it as clear as words can do so that in conformity with the Crimea decisions the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis and that members of this Government should play a prominent role in the new Government. While it might appear superficially that we are in general agreement on this point, I feel that if we accept Stalin's use of the word "kernel" we will find that he will interpret this as meaning that we have agreed that only minor changes should be made in the present Warsaw regime. I therefore recommend that we should remain firm on the wording as contained in the 4th paragraph of the President's message to Stalin and make it absolutely clear that this is the only interpretation of the Crimea decisions we can accept.

2. Although Stalin's meaning is not quite clear on this point there appears to be little doubt that when he suggests that five people be invited from Poland he intends to include therein three representatives of the Warsaw Government, plus Kutrzeba already agreed upon

by us and one of the other persons suggested by the Warsaw Government. Regarding the three from London he most likely is thinking of including at least one of Molotov's suggestions who are already committed to the Warsaw regime. In this case there would be at most three individuals from the names suggested by us from both London and Poland. Such a solution would obviously not be acceptable.

Since Stalin's message on this point is ambiguous and can be interpreted as granting us the right to invite three persons from London and five from Poland, of our own selection, I feel that tactically it would be advisable in any reply for us to assume that this latter interpretation is what he suggested.

I recommend, therefore, that we should remain firm in insisting that from three to five persons from London and an approximately equal number from Poland who are independent of the Warsaw regime should be invited for consultation. We should also make it clear that if it should be deemed necessary, the Commission should have the right subsequently to invite other Polish democratic leaders. In making this clear to the Soviet Government we should indicate that we have no objection to the inviting of additional persons associated with or named by the Warsaw Government if Molotov desires them. In this connection, I have contended without success at the Commission meetings that the term "other Polish democratic leaders" was clearly intended to mean persons not already affiliated directly or indirectly with the Warsaw regime.

3. While I feel that it might have been advisable at the beginning of the discussions to talk with the Warsaw Poles first and explain to them our interpretation of the Crimea decision, I do not feel, in view of the recent developments in the discussions, that we should consult with the Warsaw Poles before we have agreed upon an acceptable list of other Polish leaders who should be invited at the same time as the representatives of the Warsaw regime. In view of the reliable reports we have received from liberated prisoners of war and other foreign observers in Poland I do not believe that much credence can be given to Stalin's contention that the Warsaw Government enjoys tremendous influence in Poland except as a result of the support of the Red Army and Navy and also partially by the land reforms.²²

²² In September 1944, the Communist-dominated Lublin Government proclaimed a land reform law providing for the confiscation of large estates and the enlargement of small holdings.

4. We have always insisted that we only desired to invite democratic Polish leaders who are willing to accept the Crimea decision and earnestly desire to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. There would be no differences regarding this point if the Soviet Government will permit us to invite a sufficient number of other leaders who are not foils of the Warsaw Government.

5. In this point it seems to be clear that Stalin is asking us to agree to the establishment of a thinly disguised version of the present Warsaw regime. This would appear to be confirmed by the reference to the composition of the Yugoslav Government. We should remain firm in our insistence that we cannot accept a mere whitewash of the Warsaw regime.

Stalin's contention that the Warsaw Government would be offended if we insisted on sending observers there, cannot be taken on its face value. The real reason for this attitude may be found in the various reports from foreign observers we have received recently indicating that the Warsaw regime has little backing in the country and therefore the Soviet Government apparently does not desire us to obtain confirmation of this fact on the spot.

In view of Stalin's qualification regarding Mikolajczyk's acceptability I recommend most strongly that he be induced to make a statement similar to the declaration of the 14 members of the Polish National Council in London reported in Schoenfeld's 111, March 27,²³ or that he adhere to this declaration. If Mikolajczyk does this Stalin would find it difficult to refuse to permit him to come.

If we do not recede from the basic positions suggested above, I do not feel that we should insist upon Stalin's full acceptance of our interpretations of the Crimea Conference, the important thing is to get a representative group of Poles here so that the consultations can begin. I feel however that since the question is now being discussed at the high level, no useful purpose would be served for the commission to meet again until a firm agreement has been reached on a higher level regarding the number and names of the persons to be invited for consultation.

HARRIMAN

²³ Not printed; it reported that 14 members, or nearly one-half of the Polish National Council in London, which had been dissolved on March 21, 1945, had signed a declaration, dated March 26, dissenting from the policy pursued by the Arciszewski government and urging the importance of implementing the Crimea decisions (860C.00/3-2745).

860C.01/4-1545

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1945.

Mr. Eden²⁴ has given me for transmission to you the attached personal and top secret message from the Prime Minister.

Mr. Eden has discussed with us the point that the Prime Minister has in mind in regard to the joint message to Stalin on the Polish question. It involves only one change of a minor nature which we feel is an improvement and provides greater clarification. This change will be found on page 4 under point 1 regarding the Poles to be invited for consultation. Instead of leaving it up to Stalin to select one Pole from inside Poland we submit a list of four from which he can choose one.

I am attaching, therefore, suggested instructions to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow for him to deliver to Marshal Stalin together with the British Ambassador, if they have not left yet with Molotov,²⁵ the joint message from you and the Prime Minister with the slight revision which the Prime Minister has suggested.

If you approve of the dispatch of the message in the manner suggested you could send it immediately through the Map Room in its present form. We have promised to notify Eden immediately when you have approved this message for transmission. I shall do this when I have heard from you or the Map Room that the message has been dispatched.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Annex 1]

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

[LONDON, April 15, 1945.]

3. It gave me great pleasure to receive your message Number 1 and I am thankful indeed for expressions of friendship and comradeship which it contains. I reciprocate most cordially.

2. I have just read draft of joint message which you propose we should send to Stalin. In principle I am in complete agreement with its terms but there is one important point which Eden will put before you, and as you and he will be able to discuss the text together any points of detail can I am sure be adjusted. I will consult the Cabinet on Monday²⁶ if final draft reaches me by then and I hope we may

²⁴ Foreign Secretary Eden had arrived in Washington on April 15 to attend President Roosevelt's funeral and to confer with the Secretary of State prior to the opening of the United Nations Conference on April 25.

²⁵ For information regarding the plans to leave Moscow, see telegram 1151, April 13, 11 a. m., from Moscow. p. 825.

²⁶ April 16.

despatch message with our joint authority on that very day, as I strongly agree with you that our reply is of high urgency. Moreover, it is important to strike the note of our unity of outlook and of action at the earliest moment.

3. Meanwhile Eden will no doubt discuss with you our impressions of what is actually happening in Moscow and Warsaw. As I see it, the Lublin Government are feeling the strong sentiment of the Polish nation, which though not unfriendly to Russia, is fiercely resolved on independence, and views with increasing disfavour a Polish Provisional Government which is, in the main, a Soviet puppet. They are, therefore, endeavouring in accord with the Soviet Government, to form a government more broad-based than the present one, by the addition of Polish personalities (including perhaps Witos) whom they have in their power but whose aid they seek and need. This is a step in the right direction but would not satisfy our requirements or decisions of Crimea Conference.

4. Eden saw Mikolajczyk before his departure and Mikolajczyk promised to make declaration desired of him in Stalin's private introductory telegram to me dated April 7 which I repeated to President Roosevelt in my No. 946.²⁷ I hope to have this afternoon the form of his declaration which he will publish in his own Polish paper here next Thursday.²⁸ This, if satisfactory, can be telegraphed to Stalin Monday either simultaneously with or as part of our joint message and if it is not satisfactory I will wrestle with him to make it so and thereafter repeat to you.

[Annex 2]

Draft Message From President Truman to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) ²⁹

You are instructed together with the British Ambassador who will receive similar instructions to arrange immediately for an interview with Marshal Stalin and hand to him the following text of a

²⁷ The Prime Minister's message No. 946 to President Roosevelt, not printed; for text of the message of April 7 from Stalin to Churchill, see p. 204.

²⁸ In the course of an interview on the evening of April 15 at the country estate, Chequers, Prime Minister Churchill persuaded Mikolajczyk to issue a public statement accepting the Yalta agreements on Poland. For accounts of this interview and the text of the resultant declaration, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 488-489; Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy*, pp. 367-369; and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression* (New York and Toronto, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948), p. 114. Mikolajczyk subsequently also published a signed article in his newspaper *Jutro Polski* on April 19 which tended to accept further the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern frontier. This second Mikolajczyk statement is quoted in Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 489-490.

²⁹ The date of this telegram as sent was presumably April 16, 1945.

joint message from the Prime Minister and myself. If you are unable to see Marshal Stalin before your departure, you and the British Ambassador should transmit the message to Marshal Stalin through the appropriate channels. (In the event that Ambassadors Harriman and Clark Carr [*Kerr*] have departed the Chargé d'Affaires with his British colleague should address a joint communication to Marshal Stalin transmitting the message from the President and the Prime Minister.[.]

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER
FOR MARSHAL STALIN

"We are sending this joint reply to your messages of April 7 in regard to Polish negotiations for the sake of greater clarity and in order that there will be no misunderstanding as to our position on this matter. The British and United States Governments have tried most earnestly to be constructive and fair in their approach and will continue to do so. Before putting before you the concrete and constructive suggestion which is the purpose of this message we feel it necessary, however, to correct the completely erroneous impression which you have apparently received in regard to the position of the British and United States Governments as set forth by our Ambassadors under direct instructions during the negotiations. It is most surprising to have you state that the present Government functioning in Warsaw has been in any way ignored during these negotiations. Such has never been our intention nor our position. You must be cognizant of the fact that our Ambassadors in Moscow have agreed without question that the three leaders of the Warsaw Government should be included in the list of Poles to be invited to come to Moscow for consultation with the Commission. We have never denied that among the three elements from which the new Provisional Government of National Unity is to be formed the representatives of the present Warsaw Government will play, unquestionably, a prominent part. Nor can it be said with any justification that our Ambassadors are demanding the right to invite an unlimited number of Poles. The right to put forward and have accepted by the Commission individual representative Poles from abroad and from within Poland to be invited to Moscow for consultation cannot be interpreted in that sense. Indeed in his message of April 1 President Roosevelt specifically said 'In order to facilitate the agreement the Commission might first of all select a small but representative group of Polish leaders who could suggest other names for consideration by the Commission.' The real issue between us is whether or not the Warsaw Government has the right to veto individual candidates for consultation. No such interpretation in our considered opinion can be found in the Crimea decision. It appears to us that you are reverting to the original position taken by the Soviet delegation at the Crimea which was subsequently modified in the agreement. Let us keep clearly in mind that we are now speaking only of the group of Poles who are to be invited to Moscow for consultation. With reference to the statement which you attribute to Ambassador Harriman it would appear that real misunderstanding has occurred since from his re-

ports to his Government the remark in question would appear to refer to the Polish Government in London and not as you maintain to the Provisional Government in Warsaw.³⁰

You mention the desirability of inviting eight Poles—five from within Poland and three from London—to take part in these first consultations and in your message to the Prime Minister you indicate that Mikolajczyk would be acceptable if he issued a statement in support of the Crimean decision. We, therefore, submit the following proposals for your consideration in order to prevent a breakdown with all its incalculable consequences of our endeavors to settle the Polish question. We hope that you will give them your most careful and earnest consideration.

1. That we instruct our representatives on the Commission to extend immediately invitations to the following Polish leaders to come to Moscow to consult: Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, Rola-Zymerski, Bishop Sapieha; one representative Polish political party leader not connected with the present Warsaw Government (if any of the following were agreeable to you they would be agreeable to us: Witos, Zulawski, Chacinski, Jasiukowicz);³¹ and from London, Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and Stanczyk.

2. That once the invitations to come for consultation have been issued by the Commission the representatives of Warsaw could arrive first if desired.

3. That it be agreed that these Polish leaders called for consultation could suggest to the Commission the names of a certain number of other Polish leaders from within Poland or abroad who might be brought in for consultation in order that all major Polish groups be represented in the discussions.

4. We do not feel that we could commit ourselves to any formula for determining the composition of the new Government of National Unity in advance of consultation with the Polish leaders and we do not in any case consider the Yugoslav precedent to be applicable to Poland.

We ask you to read again carefully the American and British messages of April 1 since they set forth the larger considerations which we still have very much in mind and to which we must adhere."

860C.01/4-1645: Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 16, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 7:15 p. m.]

Poles 51. I saw Mikolajczyk this noon. He told me he had given out his statement³² publicly proclaiming his acceptance of the Crimea

³⁰ This sentence was omitted in the version of the message as delivered to Stalin on April 18, 1945.

³¹ The clause in parentheses replaced the clause "to be proposed by you" in the draft sent by President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill in telegram 2, April 13, p. 211.

³² Regarding Mikolajczyk's public statement of April 15, see footnote 28, p. 219.

decisions concerning Poland (my 51 to Department, 135 to Moscow, April 16³³) on rather short notice.

He said that just before leaving for Washington Friday³⁴ evening, Mr. Eden had discussed with him a message received by Churchill from Marshal Stalin. In that message Stalin had referred to British insistence on Mikolajczyk's inclusion in the Moscow consultations looking toward the formation of a new Polish Government. Stalin had said he would try to prevail on the Lublin Poles not to oppose Mikolajczyk's inclusion, though the latter had given no indication that he was not sabotaging the Crimea decisions. Eden suggested that in order to disarm this opposition Mikolajczyk make a suitable public statement. Mikolajczyk told Eden that articles carried in his weekly paper *Jutro Polski*, organ of the Peasant Party, indicate that he accepted the Crimea decisions. Eden suggested publication of a signed article. Mikolajczyk agreed to publish one in this week's issue of *Jutro Polski*. This is to appear on next Thursday.³⁵

Yesterday (Sunday) Mikolajczyk saw Churchill at Chequers.³⁶ Field Marshal Smuts³⁷ was also there. Churchill told Mikolajczyk the signed article would be too late. He therefore suggested a public statement at this time. According to Mikolajczyk, both Churchill and Smuts felt such a statement would be of real value and were optimistic about its effectiveness.

Mikolajczyk said he had his own doubts in the matter. Insofar as he was concerned, the Russians were quite capable of saying that they had not asked him for a statement and that it was too late to include him anyway. It was also not excluded that they might use it in order to influence the current conversations which were apparently in progress with the Polish underground leaders. He also realized that by issuing such a statement he would be attacked as "traitor" in many Polish quarters. Incidentally, he foresaw controversy over it in the meeting of the American Polish Congress scheduled to take place in Chicago on April 22. But he did not wish to stand in the way of British and American efforts to bring about a solution of the Polish question. He thought no single individual should be an obstacle. He therefore issued the suggested statement on Sunday evening.³⁸

³³ In a telegram to the Department, also numbered 51, repeated to Moscow as 135. Chargé Schoenfeld transmitted the text of Mikolajczyk's public statement of April 15 accepting the Yalta agreements on Poland. (860C.01/4-1645)

³⁴ April 13.

³⁵ April 19. For the text of the Mikolajczyk statement, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 489-490.

³⁶ See footnote 28, p. 219.

³⁷ Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs, and Minister of Defense of the Government of the Union of South Africa.

³⁸ April 15.

Mikolajczyk also thought Churchill wished to have it in connection with the statement which it was announced he would make on Poland in the House of Commons this week.³⁹ "Speaking quite frankly", he also thought the British might have wanted it in an effort to forestall a possible foreclosure of the situation by an announcement of an arrangement between the Lublin elements and the Polish underground leaders outside the procedure contemplated by the Crimea decisions. There seemed to be some ground for believing that the Russians contemplated an early announcement. He understood Reuters⁴⁰ had recently received a stand-by notice from their correspondents in Moscow for an important announcement. It was possible that this related to the Polish situation. I mentioned to Mikolajczyk his previously expressed opinion that the Polish underground leaders would be unlikely to accept an arrangement outside the Three Power Commission (my Poles 49 to Department, 132 to Moscow, April 13, 7 p. m.⁴¹). He confirmed that that was his opinion. He had seen the rumors carried in the British press yesterday about Wojciechowski⁴² being envisaged as the President of the new Polish Government and Wihos [Witos] as Premier or Vice Premier. The Polish underground leaders might, of course, change their earlier attitude. They might, for example, be influenced by the terror in Poland and the desire of the Polish people for some solution whereby it might be abated. But he had no definite information.

Repeated to Moscow as 136, sent Department as Poles 51.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/4-1645: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 16, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received April 16—11:25 a. m.]

1189. Molotov is planning to leave for Washington at dawn tomorrow, Tuesday, April 17 in Hurley's⁴³ plane.

He insists on going via Alsib⁴⁴ as it is a Soviet route. I am trying

³⁹ On April 19 Prime Minister Churchill postponed his statement on Poland (see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 410, cols. 402-405).

⁴⁰ British news agency.

⁴¹ Not printed.

⁴² Stanislaw Wojciechowski, President of Poland, 1922-1926.

⁴³ Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Ambassador to China, was at this time in Moscow to discuss the Chinese situation with officials of the Soviet Government and with Ambassador Harriman.

⁴⁴ i.e., Alaska-Siberia.

to work out the fastest schedule possible but at best it will take him 2 days longer than across the Atlantic.

Only Clark Kerr and I are also planning to leave tomorrow morning via Bari, Casablanca, Azores and with luck we are scheduled to arrive Washington Wednesday evening.

I saw Stalin last night with Hurley and after the discussion on China brought up Poland. I emphasized President Roosevelt's deep concern over the Polish question, restating the position he had taken at the Crimea and in his last telegram on Poland.⁴⁶ I cleared up some of the accusations made against the British Ambassador and myself by Stalin in his message and made Molotov admit them. Stalin said he thought that a solution could be reached quickly and suggested the Yugoslav formula. I stated that the situation was not comparable for the reasons given by President Roosevelt. In spite of Molotov's initial objection Stalin stated that Molotov's presence in the United States gave a splendid opportunity to attempt to reach an understanding since not only could he discuss the question with President Truman but also with Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius, and Clark Kerr and myself. The members of the Polish Commission would also be there. All involved except Churchill and himself would be present.

This morning Clark Kerr has shown me the President's message to the Prime Minister on a suggested joint reply to Stalin as well as several cables from Eden to the Prime Minister suggesting amendments.

In view of my talk with Stalin last night and the fact that Molotov is leaving for Washington tomorrow morning, and if it is believed to be desirable to send a joint message to Stalin at this moment, I recommend that reconsideration be given to the first proposal in the President's suggested draft, even with the proposed British amendment. I feel strongly that it is essential to the success of the consultations with the Commission in Moscow that we should have a really representative group of Polish leaders from within Poland at the beginning of the consultations and therefore recommend that the list of Poles from Poland be expanded to five persons not associated directly or indirectly with the Warsaw regime. In the discussions in Washington with Molotov it may become desirable to make further concessions, but only after obtaining his agreement to Proposal Three.

I further recommend that reference to quotation of my alleged statement (see my 1168, April 14, 9 p. m.) regarding the liquidation of the Warsaw Poles be deleted.

HARRIMAN

⁴⁶ President Roosevelt's telegram 218, April 1, to Marshal Stalin, p. 194.

860C.01/4-1645 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1945—4 p. m.

882. Your 1189 arrived after the proposed joint message had been approved by both the Prime Minister and the President and dispatched to you this morning. Time does not, therefore, permit taking up the suggestions you raise in regard to point one. If this reaches you in time, however, and Clark Kerr feels entitled to do so on behalf of the Prime Minister, we have no objection to the deletion of the reference to your alleged statement regarding the Warsaw Government.

STETTINIUS

760C.61/4-1645 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, April 16, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received April 16—6:26 p. m.]

1198. Assistant Commissar Vyshinski requested me to call this afternoon. He stated that recently in Poland there had been a great public demand for the conclusion of a Soviet Polish treaty of mutual assistance and that Soviet circles were in favor of such a treaty. He attempted to justify this move on the fact that Poland, a country which had a common frontier with the Soviet Union, had often served as an important "invasion corridor" and that since the Soviet Government was greatly assisting the Poles in supplying arms and in the rehabilitation of their country it was desirable to place Soviet Polish relations on a more legal basis. Such a treaty, which would be similar to the Czech and Yugoslav treaties,⁴⁷ would serve this purpose. He requested me to inform my Government that the treaty is now being prepared.

⁴⁷ For text of the treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar collaboration, with protocol, between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed at Moscow on December 12, 1943, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlv, p. 238, or Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. i, No. 4 (July 1948), p. 228. In regard to the negotiation of this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iii, Index, p. 1131, entries under "Czechoslovakia: Relations with Soviet Union." For text of the treaty of friendship, mutual aid, and postwar cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Regency Council of Yugoslavia, signed at Moscow on April 11, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 22, 1945, p. 774, or Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. i, No. 4 (July 1948), p. 231. For documentation regarding the negotiation of this treaty, see *post*, pp. 1218-1223, *passim*.

Vyshinski evaded my question as to when the treaty would be signed. I said that I would inform my Government what he told me; however, speaking personally I felt confident that my Government would prefer holding it up until the new Polish Government had been formed. I continued that according to my personal opinion the world would interpret the signing of such a treaty before the formulation of the new Government as an indication that the Soviet Government did not intend to carry out the Crimea decision. Vyshinski maintained that the Crimea decisions did not preclude the conclusion by the Soviet Union of a treaty with Poland or any other country and that such a treaty would not be a contradiction of the decisions. He reiterated that Soviet Polish relations had developed to such a point that it was impossible to postpone the conclusion of the treaty which would clarify these relations especially at a time when the Soviet Government was assisting Poland to such a great extent. I said that as I had no instructions I of course could not discuss this question; however, I would ask that my Government be given the privilege of expressing its views on the treaty before signature. Vyshinski said that he had no authority to discuss my request. I asked him to convey my request to his Government.

Sent to Department as 1198, repeated to London for Schoenfeld as 161.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/4-1745 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 17, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received April 17—8:42 a. m.]

1205. Joint message from the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin referred to in the Department's 882, April 16, 4 p. m., was not received here until after Ambassador Harriman's early morning departure. Accordingly I am preparing together with my British colleague to transmit the message jointly to Marshal Stalin through the Foreign Office. We propose to delete the reference to Ambassador Harriman's alleged statement. Molotov's plane was warming up at the airfield when Ambassador Harriman's plane departed this morning, and I believe that Molotov took off shortly thereafter. As the Department is aware, he will not be arriving in Washington for some days. In view of this fact, and of the fact that the two Ambassadors have now departed, the British Chargé⁴⁸ and I assume that the de-

⁴⁸ Frank Roberts.

livery of the message to Stalin is no longer of the same extreme urgency.

It has occurred to me furthermore that the Department might wish—before delivery of the message is finally effected—to give consideration to the possible implications of this morning's announcement (reported in an *en clair* press message⁴⁹) of the continued firm insistence of the Soviet Government, despite our opposition, on the representation of the Warsaw Government at San Francisco, and likewise to the communication made to Ambassador Harriman by Vyshinski yesterday (see Embassy's 1198, April 16, 7 p. m.) concerning the forthcoming conclusion of a Soviet-Polish pact.

In the light of the above, the British Chargé and I have agreed that in the absence of further instructions we will submit the message to the Foreign Office for transmission tomorrow morning, April 18. This will give our respective Governments time to inform us should there be any necessity for a revision of our instructions. I am sure this will occasion little if any real delay in the treatment of the message in the Soviet Government. There are several indications that intense activity went on all night in the Kremlin and Foreign Office, prior to Molotov's departure; and it is not likely that any of the leading people will be on hand again before late this afternoon or this evening.⁵⁰

HARRIMAN

760C.61/4-1645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1945—7 p. m.

899. ReEmbs 1198, April 16, 7 p. m. Please inform Vyshinski that this Government is very much disturbed by the indication that the Soviet Government is considering the conclusion of a treaty of mutual assistance with the governmental authority now functioning in Poland and also inform him that it is therefore requested that any action be deferred until this Government has had an opportunity to present its views to Mr. Molotov.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Telegram 1203, April 17, from Moscow, not printed.

⁵⁰ Telegram 892, April 17, 2 p. m. to Moscow, stated that the Department felt it of the utmost urgency that the joint message from President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill be delivered to Marshal Stalin (860C.01/4-1745). In his telegram 1229, April 18, 10 a. m., the Chargé reported that the joint message had been delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry for transmission to Marshal Stalin (860C.01/4-1845). The message as delivered omitted the sentence referring to alleged statements by Ambassador Harriman; see footnote 30, p. 221.

⁵¹ In his telegram 1231, April 18, noon, the Chargé reported that a communication had gone forward to Vyshinski in pursuance of the Department's instructions (760C.61/4-1845).

For your information: I have discussed this matter with Mr. Eden today, and he is sending similar instructions to the British Embassy in Moscow.

STETTINIUS

860C.01/4-1745

Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1945.

MR. STETTINIUS: Yesterday evening about seven o'clock Mr. Allen⁵² of Mr. Eden's staff telephoned me to say that they had received from Clark Kerr an urgent telegram suggesting certain changes in the joint message from the President and the Prime Minister to Stalin on Poland. Mr. Allen said that he understood that we received a similar message from Harriman.⁵³ I told him this was the case, that Harriman's telegram had been received in the middle of the afternoon and that in view of the time element, since the two Ambassadors were leaving on the morning of the 17th, the Secretary had decided that it was impossible to get clearance for any changes of substance. I said, however, that we had authorized Harriman, if Clark Kerr felt able to do so for the Prime Minister, to delete the sentence which referred to an alleged statement of Harriman himself.

I told Mr. Allen furthermore that in regard to the change of substance in the number of Poles, namely, that five non-Lublin Poles should be invited to the first consultation from within Poland, we had doubts as to whether this would be wise since it would mean that in the first group there would be eight non-Lublin Poles and only three Lublin Poles. I told him that although this, of course, was a personal opinion I felt that any such weighting of the consultants against Lublin would insure Stalin's refusal of the proposal and also expose us to the charge which he had previously made to President Roosevelt that we were attempting to interpret the Crimea decision in such a way as to eliminate the Lublin Government.

Mr. Allen said that he saw that point very clearly but that Clark Kerr had strongly recommended against anything that looked like a concession and that Mr. Eden shared his views. I pointed out to Mr. Allen that on Sunday⁵⁴ when Mr. Dunn⁵⁵ and I had discussed

⁵² William Denis Allen, Acting First Secretary in the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office.

⁵³ Telegram 1189, April 16, 4 p. m., from Moscow, p. 223.

⁵⁴ April 15.

⁵⁵ James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State.

the question with Mr. Eden we had agreed that the list of Poles in the joint message was satisfactory and that it had also been approved by the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. I concluded by saying that I felt that since it was then 3:00 a. m. in Moscow of the day on which the Ambassadors would depart it would physically be very difficult to make any change and told him that in any case if Mr. Eden felt sufficiently strong about it he should communicate with the Secretary. I said I would be available that evening if I were needed. I heard nothing further from Mr. Allen.

C[HARLES] E. B[OHLEN]

860C.014/4-1045 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1945—7 p. m.

905. Dept is considering action such as you recommend in final paragraph of urtel 1091, April 9, 9 p. m. The inquiry suggested in our telegram 791, April 4, 6 p. m. was intended primarily to clear the way for such action by putting the Soviet Government on notice as to our interest and by obtaining from Molotov a statement of the Soviet position on territories involved and of the political and legal basis, if any, alleged in justification of their reported transfer to the Warsaw Provisional Polish Government. Molotov's reply to Clark Kerr (reported in your 1116, April 10, 9 p. m.) is rather vague and boils down to the assertion that the territories involved have been placed, provisionally or otherwise, under Polish administration as a matter of practical necessity. A reply by Molotov to your inquiry as to the precise status of the territories would still be most helpful here, and it is hoped that it will be forthcoming without undue delay.

STETTINIUS

860C.014/4-1845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 18, 1945—midnight.

[Received April 18—11:59 p. m.]

1251. My next following message transmits the text of the reply received from Vyshinski to Ambassador Harriman's inquiry of April 8 concerning the possible incorporation into Poland of certain territories in the Soviet military zone in Germany.

It will be seen that Vyshinski in this reply makes the following three points:

1. That in the districts in question the German population has left and only the Polish population remains behind.
2. That the Polish population constitutes the basic population of these areas, and
3. That the transfer of the areas to Polish civil administration "has no relation to the question of boundaries".

I wish to point out that none of these points can be substantiated.

With respect to the first point, there have been numerous indications in the Soviet press that while large numbers of Germans have indeed fled at the approach of the Red Army there are also considerable numbers which have remained behind.

Secondly, as the Department is aware, it is not generally true that the Poles constitute the basic element of the population in any of these districts.

Thirdly, with respect to the assertion that the establishment of Polish civil administration in these areas has no relation to the question of boundaries, I wish to make the following comments:

a. This is flatly contradicted by the manner in which these transfers have been portrayed to the Polish and Russian peoples. All the resources of a controlled press in both countries have been mobilized to make it clear to the public that these were straight cessions of territory in the most formal sense of the term. Such words as "final" and "inalienable" have been liberally used. I refer in this connection to Mr. Harriman's telegram 1091, April 9, 9 a. m. [*p. m.*], in which examples were given of the press treatment both in Poland and Russia of the ceremonies of transfer of administration. Since the date of despatch of that telegram a considerable amount of further material of this sort has been received in the Embassy. If, therefore, there is any sincere incogitation [*inclination*] on the part of either Russian or Polish authorities to view these arrangements as temporary and provisional this has been assiduously concealed from the public in these countries, and it is clear that the changes are being deliberately presented to the Polish and Russian peoples in such a way as to prejudice politically any removal of the territory at a later date from Polish administration.

b. The Department will wish to give particular attention to the implications of this situation from the standpoint of reparations, bearing in mind that the Russians have made it evident that Poland, in their opinion, should be one of the principal reparations-receiving powers. It is difficult to see how the existence of Polish administration in these districts could fail to operate in such a way as to remove the areas effectively from the reparations-paying sections of German territory.

c. While this Embassy does not have the EAC documents bearing on this question, we understand from the British that the EAC agreements actually stipulated that no part of Germany should be handed over to the "administration of a power not represented on the commission". If this is correct, even though the Russian thesis that this has nothing to do with boundaries were accepted, it would still not

operate to justify the turning over of the areas unilaterally to Polish administration.

KENNAN

862.014/4-1845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 18, 1945—midnight.

[Received April 18—10:40 p. m.]

1252. The following is the text of a letter received from Vyshinsky in reply to the letter addressed to him by Ambassador Harriman on April 8 concerning assignment to Poland of German territories in the Soviet military zone.⁵⁷

“In acknowledging receipt of your letter of April 8 in which you refer to press and radio reports concerning the incorporation of Danzig and certain regions of lower and upper Silesia into Poland, I have the honor to communicate the following. It is well known that the German population of Silesia is leaving with the withdrawing German troops and that only the Polish population remains behind. The greater part of the German civilian population has also evacuated from Danzig to Germany. In these circumstances the urgent necessity arose for the creation of a civil administration from Poles who constitute the basic population of above mentioned areas. The direction of civil affairs in Silesia and Danzig has also been transformed to the competence of this Polish civil administration, all of which has no relation to the question of boundaries.”

KENNAN

760C.61/4-2045

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1945.

Participants: The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Grew
Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

After the Secretary presented Ambassador Harriman to the President the latter said that he wished to thank the Ambassador for the great service he had done for him in connection with Molotov's coming to the San Francisco Conference. He said that he deeply appreciated this and he wished to congratulate the Ambassador and

⁵⁷ For text of Ambassador Harriman's letter of April 8 to Foreign Commissar Molotov, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 743, footnote 4.

to express the hope that he would return to Moscow and continue his excellent work. Ambassador Harriman said that he had felt that that was the most appropriate suggestion he could make when Marshal Stalin had indicated his desire to make some gesture. He said that he had not felt it possible to do anything about the Polish question since Stalin was merely speaking of a gesture.

At the President's request Ambassador Harriman then made a brief report on his opinion of the present problems facing the United States in relation to the Soviet Union. He said that he thought the Soviet Union had two policies which they thought they could successfully pursue at the same time—one, the policy of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain, and the other, the extension of Soviet control over neighboring states through unilateral action. He said that he thought our generosity and desire to cooperate was being misinterpreted in Moscow by certain elements around Stalin as an indication that the Soviet Government could do anything that it wished without having any trouble with the United States. He said that he thought the Soviet Government did not wish to break with the United States since they needed our help in order to reduce the burden of reconstruction and that he felt we had nothing to lose by standing firm on issues that were of real importance to us. The Ambassador then outlined a number of the specific difficulties which he had recently encountered in Moscow and described the deterioration of the Soviet attitude since the Yalta Conference. The President said that he was not in any sense afraid of the Russians and that he intended to be firm but fair since in his opinion the Soviet Union needed us more than we needed them. Ambassador Harriman said that he believed that some quarters in Moscow believed erroneously that American business needed as a matter of life and death the development of exports to Russia. Mr. Harriman said that this was of course not true but that a number of Russian officials believed it. The President again repeated that he intended to be firm with the Russians and make no concessions from American principles or traditions for the fact of winning their favor. He said he felt that only on a give and take basis could any relations be established.

Ambassador Harriman said that in effect what we were faced with was a "barbarian invasion of Europe", that Soviet control over any foreign country did not mean merely influence on their foreign relations but the extension of the Soviet system with secret police, extinction of freedom of speech, etc., and that we had to decide what should be our attitude in the face of these unpleasant facts. He added that he was not pessimistic and felt that we could arrive at a workable basis with the Russians but that this would require a reconsideration

of our policy and the abandonment of the illusion that for the immediate future the Soviet Government was going to act in accordance with the principles which the rest of the world held to in international affairs. He said that obviously certain concessions in the give and take of negotiation would have to be made. The President said that he thoroughly understood this and said that we could not, of course, expect to get 100 percent of what we wanted but that on important matters he felt that we should be able to get 85 percent.

The Ambassador then outlined briefly the issues involved in the Polish question explaining his belief that Stalin had discovered from the Lublin Poles that an honest execution of the Crimean decision would mean the end of Soviet-backed Lublin control over Poland since any real democratic leader such as Mikolajczyk would serve as a rallying point for 80 or 90 percent of the Polish people against the Lublin Communists. He said it was important for us to consider what we should do in the event that Stalin rejected the proposals contained in the joint message from the President and the Prime Minister and if Molotov proved adamant in the negotiations here in Washington.

He said he would like to inquire in this connection of the President how important he felt the Polish question was in relation to the San Francisco Conference and American participation in the world organization. The President replied immediately and decisively that in his considered opinion unless settlement of the Polish question was achieved along the lines of the Crimean decision that the treaty of American adherence to a world organization would not get through the Senate. He added that he intended to tell Molotov just this in words of one syllable.

The Secretary inquired whether if Molotov was so late in arriving in Washington there would not be sufficient time for any real discussion between the Foreign Ministers, if the President would desire that the conversations on Poland be continued in San Francisco. The President replied that he thought that was a good idea.

Ambassador Harriman inquired whether or not we would be disposed to go ahead with the world organization plans even if Russia dropped out as he had understood from the Secretary. The President said that the truth of the matter was that without Russia there would not be much of a world organization.

In concluding the interview the President stated that he fully realized that he was not up on all details of foreign affairs and would rely on the Secretary of State and his Ambassadors to help him in this matter but that he did intend to be firm in his dealings with the

Soviet Government. He said he hoped to see the Secretary and Ambassador Harriman again before Molotov arrived.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

760C.61/4-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 21, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received April 21—12:10 p. m.]

1289. With further reference to the Department's 899, April 17, 7 p. m. and my 1231, April 18, noon⁵⁸ and 1286, April 21, 1 p. m. concerning the possible conclusion of a Soviet-Polish pact,⁵⁹ the following is the substance of the letter just received from Vyshinski:

"The signature of a pact between the Soviet Union and Poland in the spirit of the treaties already concluded with Great Britain,⁶⁰ Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia is completely timely and corresponds in full to the aspirations and vital interests of the Polish and Soviet peoples. Such a step would therefore be entirely natural and should not arouse any anxiety inasmuch as it is directed toward the strengthening of friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

"The above considerations and the fact that the Soviet Government has already informed the Polish Provisional Government of its agreement to the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance do not permit the postponement of the signature of this treaty,⁶¹ which undoubtedly has great importance for the further strengthening of the United Nations.

"I would be grateful to you, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, if you would bring the above to the attention of the American Government."

The British Chargé has received a similar communication.

[KENNAN]

⁵⁸ Latter not printed, but, see footnote 51, p. 227.

⁵⁹ Not printed; it reported receipt of a negative reply from Vyshinsky to the American request that no action be taken toward the conclusion of a pact with Poland pending discussions with Molotov in Washington (760C.61/4-2145).

⁶⁰ For text of the treaty of alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe, and collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, signed at London on May 26, 1942. see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353; see also telegrams 2897 of May 24, 1942, and 2922 of May 26, 1942, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 558 and 564, respectively.

⁶¹ For text of the agreement regarding friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic (National Council of the Homeland), signed in Moscow on April 21, 1945, see Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I, No. 4 (July 1948), p. 231, or United Nations Treaty Series, vol. XII (1948), No. 70, p. 391.

760C.61/4-2245

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant
to the Secretary of State*⁶²

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1945.

Participants: The President
Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Molotov
Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Pavlov⁶³
Mr. Bohlen

The President greeted Mr. Molotov warmly and said he was glad to welcome him to the United States. After an exchange of amenities and questions in regard to Mr. Molotov's trip by air, the President said that he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that he had the greatest admiration for Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Republic and that he hoped that the relations which President Roosevelt had established between our two countries would be maintained. Mr. Molotov said he brought greetings from Marshal Stalin and that he was very pleased to hear personally from the President that he intended to continue the policy of friendship which had been that of President Roosevelt. The President said he stood squarely behind all commitments and agreements taken by our late great President and that he would do everything he could to follow along that path. Mr. Molotov said that the Government and people of the Soviet Union share that hope and he was sure that they could work out successfully any difficulties which lay in the path. The President agreed and said that we must work out these difficulties. Mr. Molotov replied that he felt that there existed a good basis in the Dumbarton Oaks plan and the Crimea decisions. The President repeated that he stood by the decisions and intended to carry them out. Mr. Molotov expressed his agreement and added that the Crimean decisions were sufficiently clear to overcome any difficulties which had arisen. The President then said he wished to mention the most difficult question relating to the Crimean decisions and that was the Polish matter. He said that the proper solution of the Polish question was of great importance because of its effect on American public opinion and that in his opinion it was the most important that faced us. Mr. Molotov replied that he knew this was an important question for the United States

⁶² For President Truman's account of this conversation, see *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. I, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 75-76.

⁶³ Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov, translator and interpreter in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and Secretary to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov).

but that it would be understood that it was even more important for the Soviet Union; that Poland was far from the United States but bordered on the Soviet Union and this Polish question was therefore vital for them. He added that he thought the Crimea decisions provided a suitable basis for a solution. The President agreed and said that in its larger aspects the Polish question had become for our people the symbol of the future development of our international relations. He repeated that he intended to carry out to the full, both the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the Crimean decision. He said there were a number of minor matters in respect to San Francisco which he hoped that the Foreign Ministers would be able to settle here in Washington. Mr. Molotov replied that he thought an agreement could easily be reached on these points provided that the views of the Soviet Union were taken into consideration. The President said that they should discuss all these matters further, to which Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Molotov observed that the Soviet Government attached the greatest importance to the San Francisco Conference. The President said that the American people did likewise. Mr. Molotov remarked that with the military developments of recent weeks, political questions become even more important than they had been before. The President agreed and said that was one reason why he had wanted to talk to him. Mr. Molotov said that the discussions between the three Heads of State had always been fruitful and had led to good agreements. Mr. Molotov then inquired whether the agreements in regard to the Far Eastern situation made at Yalta⁶⁴ still stood. The President replied that they did and repeated that he intended to carry out all of the agreements made by President Roosevelt. He then proposed that they drink a toast to the health of Marshal Stalin to which Mr. Molotov replied that they should drink a toast to the three Heads of State, President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

The conversation then became general with a toast drunk to the three Heads of State. During this conversation, however, Mr. Molotov remarked that, as he had told Ambassador Harriman, he only expected to spend a few days in San Francisco.

Also, the President said he hoped before too long to see Marshal Stalin and perhaps to visit him in Russia or to receive him here as a guest. Mr. Molotov said he knew the Marshal was also eager to meet President Truman.

⁶⁴ For text of the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, signed at Yalta on February 11, 1945, by Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 984.

860C.01/4-2245

*Minutes of First Meeting Regarding the Polish Question*⁶⁵

Principal Participants:

Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Eden
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Harriman
Sir Alexander Cadogan⁶⁶
Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr

(The first part of the Polish discussion, in which Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius emphasized the extreme displeasure of the British and American Governments at the signing of the mutual aid pact with the Warsaw Poles etc., was not recorded since the officer assigned to this task was called out on other urgent business.)

MR. EDEN stated that in the message the Prime Minister and the President sent to Marshal Stalin on April 18, the text of which Mr. Molotov has asked for, our position was made quite clear regarding the position the Warsaw Government was to play in the new Provisional Government. He then read the following passage from the message: "We have never denied that among the three elements from which the new Provisional Government of National Unity is to be formed the representatives of the present Warsaw Government will play, unquestionably, a prominent part."

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the Crimea decision says more than that. It stipulates that the present Provisional Government in Poland is to be reorganized. The Crimea decision, on the other hand, does not refer to the Polish Government-in-exile in London, instead it favors the Provisional Government in Warsaw. The American and British Governments on the other hand have assumed the attitude that the Warsaw Government is just one of the elements which is to be used to make up the new Government of National Unity.

MR. EDEN pointed out that at Crimea we tried to lay the basis for the formation of a new government in Poland to be made up in part from Poles inside and outside of Poland. He added that when Mr. Molotov has had a chance to read the joint message from the Prime Minister and the President, he will see that there are new proposals set forth therein which form a practical basis to bring about a creation of a new Government of National Unity.

⁶⁵ Meeting held at the Department of State, April 22, 1945, 9:50 p. m. to 11:40 p. m.

⁶⁶ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would like to see the message in order to study it more carefully.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that in this connection he desired to read the next to the last paragraph of the Crimea declaration on Poland. The following paragraph was read to Mr. Molotov :

“When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present provisional government of Poland, and the government of the United Kingdom and the government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.”

He pointed out that this paragraph is very clear and most important.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he agreed that this paragraph is very clear, but added that the declaration also points out how we can establish a new Polish Government of National Unity.

MR. EDEN brought out the fact that the new Treaty of Mutual Assistance just signed between the Polish and Soviet Governments indicates that the Soviet Government is satisfied with the present Warsaw Government which was certainly not the idea expressed in the Yalta declaration and is certainly not the idea of the British Government and he believed that it was not the idea of the American Government, both of which made it quite clear that they desired to see established a new government in Poland. He added that the fact that the Soviet Government had signed this treaty with the present Warsaw regime was most disquieting to his Government and he believed also to the Government of the United States.

MR. STETTINIUS confirmed Mr. Eden's statement.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that it cannot be denied that the Warsaw Government is the only one now functioning in Poland. He added that of course it would be desirable to arrive at an agreement which would meet the views of the three Governments, but stated that developments continue to take place and that Germany has found herself in a more difficult position since Crimea. Under these circumstances the wishes of the Polish and Soviet peoples to satisfy their desires to assist each other is understandable. He stated that if a new Polish Government of National Unity is formed, no one could imagine that such a new Polish government would refuse to accept the treaty which has just been signed with the Soviet Union. He pointed out, in this connection, that Poland does not border on the United States and it also does not represent a gateway through which

aggressors could attack the United States and the same applies to Great Britain. He stated that in the position in which the American and British Governments are they can put off questions for future consideration but the Soviet Government is in a different position. It is not able to postpone questions but must consolidate and improve relations brought about by the common struggle against Germany. He stated that the United States and Great Britain would act in the same way if they were in the same position as the Soviet Government.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that Mr. Molotov desired to study the joint message and he asked Mr. Eden if there were any other questions he would like to discuss at this time and added that we all desire to settle this question in an amicable way, as Mr. Molotov had pointed out.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he agreed but he desired to study the message.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that we must get a solution of this problem before San Francisco.

MR. EDEN added that while it was realized that Mr. Molotov must study the message, we must make progress in these negotiations as Mr. Stettinius had indicated since we have built the San Francisco Conference on a collaboration basis and unless we can show the world that this collaboration is real, the San Francisco Conference will suffer.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that we must do that but it should be taken into account that we must fulfill the Crimea decisions as agreed upon. He added that so far what has happened is that Poland has been refused permission to send a delegate to San Francisco which is a very bad start.

MR. STETTINIUS emphasized that we must bear in mind that this is the case since no new Polish Government of National Unity has been established. In other words, no government has been organized in Poland which we can recognize. He reiterated the fact that the United States Government does not want or intend to go against the Crimea decision.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that of course everyone respected the Governments of Bolivia and Haiti, for instance, and was pleased that representatives of these countries would be at San Francisco. On the other hand, it is regrettable that Poland would not be represented.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that we would of course be pleased to receive representatives of the new Polish Government of National Unity at San Francisco.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that it would be hard to create a new Polish government in Washington without any Poles being present here.

MR. EDEN retorted that it was also hard to create a new Polish government in Moscow.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that it had proved difficult to do this in Moscow even with Poles nearby.

MR. STETTINIUS emphasized the great importance that the United States Government attaches to the question of the settlement of the Polish problem. If we can't make some concrete progress before the San Francisco Conference it will have a very adverse effect on American public opinion and we, therefore, might find it difficult to obtain the consent of the American people to join the world organization. He then asked whether Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov would desire to resume the discussion tomorrow as planned or whether it would be best to invite Dr. Soong to come to the meeting in order to discuss procedural problems.

MR. EDEN replied that the most urgent matter was to obtain Mr. Molotov's reactions to the joint message of the Prime Minister and the President and that if it should be possible to agree on the problems set forth therein it would then be possible to discuss other matters.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he would like to do this but asked whether Mr. Stalin's message could serve as a basis for the discussions.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the joint message is a reply to Stalin's message and represents our position and goes as far as we can go to meet Stalin's problems.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he felt that if we were to study carefully Stalin's message we could draw some useful conclusions since this message set forth the position of the Soviet Government.

MR. EDEN stated that the joint message set forth our reply to the position of the Soviet Government as outlined in Stalin's message.

MR. MOLOTOV, in stating that he did not remember the exact wording of the joint reply, asked if there were any statement therein indicating that Stalin's message cannot be used as a basis. He added that perhaps we can discuss this question tomorrow since it seemed to him that Stalin's message was a very suitable basis and pointed out he was referring to the practical suggestions contained therein.

MR. EDEN stated that when Mr. Molotov reads the joint message he will see how far we have gone to meet Stalin's ideas and he will see how helpful our suggestions are.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that Marshal Stalin had recently given very careful study to the Polish question including the matter of the conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and he attaches great importance to his ideas as set forth in his message.

MR. STETTINIUS asked when it would be desirable to hold the next

meeting and it was finally agreed that they should get together at 10:30 the morning of April 23.

860C.01/4-2345

*Minutes of Second Meeting Regarding the Polish Question*⁶⁷

Principal Participants:

Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Eden
Mr. Molotov
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Grew
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Harriman
Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr
Mr. Gromyko

MR. STETTINIUS asked whether Mr. Molotov had had an opportunity to study the joint message of the Prime Minister and the President of April 18 and indicated that Mr. Eden and he would be very pleased to hear his reaction.

MR. MOLOTOV replied in the affirmative and stated that he would like to ask the following questions: In as much as the message does not specifically state that the proposal set forth in Stalin's message of April 7 cannot be accepted as a basis for discussion, he stated that it is not clear what was the meaning of point 4 in the joint message which refers to the fact that we could not commit ourselves to any formula regarding the composition of the new Polish government until the Polish leaders had been consulted. He added that he could not understand why we could not use the Yugoslav precedent to establish a new government in Poland since it is common knowledge that the Yugoslav Government was set up by agreement between the three powers. He particularly referred to the statement in the message indicating that the Yugoslav precedent was not acceptable to the British and American Governments and wanted to know why we could not use this agreement as an example since it had already proved useful in the case of Yugoslavia. He added that Stalin's proposal on this point was a concrete one and, therefore, should be accepted. He pointed out that the President's and Prime Minister's message did not contain any reasons why the Yugoslav precedent was declined. He then asked for an explanation for this attitude.

⁶⁷ Meeting held at the Department of State, April 23, 1945, 10:30 a. m. to 12:05 p. m.

MR. EDEN replied that there were two points the President and the Prime Minister had in mind in refusing to accept the Yugoslav formula: (1) That it was not applicable in the case of Poland since the Yalta declaration provided for consultation with Polish leaders before a government could be established and, therefore, we could not accept any formula until after this consultation had taken place. In the Yugoslav formula there was no provision for consultation before a commission. (2) Stalin's message refers to the numerical relationship of the various groups which would be included in the new Polish government and indicates that the proportions would be similar to the proportions in the present Yugoslav Government. We could not agree to this since we did not wish to agree with any formula until we had consulted with Polish leaders.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he supported the views of Mr. Eden and thought that his statement was very accurate.

MR. EDEN then asked what Mr. Molotov thought of paragraph 1 in the joint message and pointed out that it was an attempt to pick up Stalin's suggestion and go back to the proposals made at Yalta to the effect that five Poles should be brought from Poland and three from London for consultation.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that he would like to say a bit more regarding Yugoslavia. He stated that since he desired to make progress in the negotiations he had suggested the Yugoslav formula since this was an agreement which had been reached between the three Governments and that while no one obliges us to accept this formula for Poland he felt that by accepting this formula it would be possible to make progress and would give an opportunity to settle the Polish question. He added that if Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius did not think that this proposal was acceptable he would take notice of it, but he warned that by not accepting this proposal it would be much more difficult to reach a settlement. He reiterated that it was of course correct to take all decisions in conformity with the Crimea agreement and that of course we should consult with the Poles. He pointed out that we have very favorable conditions here in Washington with the presence of the three Foreign Ministers and the British and American Ambassadors from Moscow, but that there was one difficulty. There were no Poles here with whom to consult. He then stated that the joint message of April 18 had not arrived in Moscow until after his departure and reiterated that there are no representatives of the Polish Government so we cannot consult with them. He then insisted that without consultation with the Warsaw Poles we cannot discuss this question. He suggested, therefore, that in order to get along with this problem we

might accept his practicable solution to work out the matter by using the Yugoslav formula.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that as far as the United States Government is concerned the Yugoslav precedent is not applicable since we know that in the present Yugoslav Government there are twenty-one adherents of Tito and only six from abroad. Furthermore, since it was provided in the Yalta declaration that we should consult with Polish leaders we should proceed in conformity with that decision. He added that the joint message of April 18 was sent to Stalin only after it had been weighed most carefully and given full consideration and is the final position of the United States Government. He added that we feel it is entirely in conformity with the Yalta decision which must guide us in this matter.

MR. EDEN agreed that this was also the position of the British Government. He then asked whether Mr. Molotov would not agree, as a step forward, to inviting for consultation the leaders set forth in proposal 1 of the joint message.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the United States Government places great importance on the first proposal and that if Mr. Molotov would agree to this, the whole matter could move forward.

MR. MOLOTOV stated he wished to repeat that in proposing the Yugoslav precedent he was seeking a practical solution of the problem and added that the attitude of the Soviet Government is set forth in Stalin's message of April 7. He then claimed that in order to discuss the new proposals of the Prime Minister and the President it would be necessary to observe the rules of the Crimea decision and to consult with the Warsaw Poles, in the first instance. He again stated that before he had consulted with the Warsaw Poles he would not dare state his opinion in regard to the proposals in the joint message. He added, however, that this did not exclude consultation with other Poles later.

MR. STETTINIUS asked whether Mr. Molotov could not agree to carry out the Crimea decisions and consult with democratic groups from within and without Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that of course it goes without saying that consultations should be held with different groups but he could not make any comments on the British and American Governments' proposals until he had consulted with the Warsaw Poles.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the joint message was sent on April 18 and that, therefore, Stalin could have had time to consult with the Warsaw Poles if he so desired, although the Yalta declaration did not provide that such consultation should take place. He added that he could not understand how Mr. Molotov felt he could settle the

Polish question by the Yugoslav formula without consulting Warsaw, while at the same time he insisted he would have to consult Warsaw before he could comment on proposal 1 of the joint message.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Yugoslav precedent is a concrete example of how we could arrive at a solution without calling in Poles. He added that in the meantime the solution of the Polish question is no less important to the Soviet Union, which is most anxious to bring about the formation of an acceptable Polish government. He asked, therefore, how it was that the three Governments could agree on the Yugoslav question but refused to use that as a precedent to solve the Polish question. He pointed out that the British and American Ambassadors⁶⁸ as well as others are now in Belgrade where they can report on the situation and thus the Yugoslav question has moved forward and he added that if we could solve the Polish question the British and American Ambassadors could proceed to Warsaw. He asserted that if we declined to accept the Yugoslav precedent we cannot get on with the Polish question.

MR. EDEN emphasized that this was an entirely new proposal since there had been no mention of the Yugoslav formula at Yalta.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that we might go back and start out with a new proposal.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the new Yugoslav Government was formed on the basis of an agreement between Tito and Subasic⁶⁹ which the British and American Governments subsequently agreed to, while in regard to Poland provision was made for consultations with Poles first and that Stalin at Yalta had agreed to this.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he could not object to this, but stated that he could not accept the British and American proposals until he had consulted with the Warsaw Poles, adding that here in Washington we could not consult with representatives of the Warsaw regime and that without Poles we cannot settle the Polish question.

MR. EDEN asked exactly what Mr. Molotov wanted us to agree to in the Yugoslav precedent. Did he want us to agree to the same proportions as in the Yugoslav formula or what?

MR. MOLOTOV replied that if the three Governments would use the Yugoslav formula to solve the Polish question and establish the same

⁶⁸ R. C. Skrine Stevenson and Richard C. Patterson, Jr., respectively.

⁶⁹ On November 1, 1944, Josip Broz Tito, President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, and Dr. Ivan Subasich, Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, signed an agreement providing for the form of a United Provisional Yugoslav Government. For text of the agreement, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 251-253. The new united government was established at Belgrade on March 7, 1945, with Tito as Prime Minister and Minister of War, and Subasich as Minister for Foreign Affairs. For documentation regarding the conclusion of the Tito-Subasich agreement and the establishment of a United Provisional Yugoslav Government, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 1378-1398 and 1417-1446, and *post*, pp. 1174 ff.

proportions as those in the present Yugoslav Government he felt that the Warsaw Poles would agree.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he was bewildered by the position taken by Mr. Molotov since he had just read the Crimea decision which made it very clear as to what had been agreed upon and that now we were definitely getting away from it and working on something new. He then read the second paragraph of the Crimea decision which provides for the Commission to consult with representatives of the Warsaw regime as well as Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and abroad.

MR. MOLOTOV reiterated that the Soviet Government had suggested the Yugoslav precedent in order to make a practical step forward. He added that in his view this proposal fully corresponded with the Crimea decision but that he did not exclude that a different path could be followed. He then pointed out that in reexamining the Crimea decision we should start with paragraph 1 which provides for the reorganization of the "provisional government which is now functioning in Poland". He added that if we did this we might produce a more practical solution, but he again stated that we must first consult with the Warsaw Poles which we can't do here.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the first proposal in the joint message called for the same number of Poles for consultation as Stalin had suggested and that there were no new names in our list so that the Soviet Government, which has known these names for more than two months, has had plenty of time to consult the Warsaw Poles. He added that in regard to Mikolajczyk he wished to point out that since Mr. Molotov's departure from Moscow Mikolajczyk had made a statement in which he unqualifiedly accepted the Yalta decision.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether Mikolajczyk had agreed to the Curzon Line.

MR. EDEN replied in the affirmative and stated that the Prime Minister had sent another telegram to Stalin ⁷⁰ pointing this out.

MR. MOLOTOV asserted that if any specific persons are to be consulted they should not be only those recommended by the President and Prime Minister but others might be asked, but he added again that the Soviet Government would like to consult with the Warsaw Poles.

MR. STETTINIUS then read point 3 of the joint message which provides that other Poles may be subsequently invited for consultation.

⁷⁰ For text of Prime Minister Churchill's message of April 22, 1945, to Marshal Stalin, see *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945* (Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957), vol. I, document No. 436, p. 329. (Hereinafter cited as *Stalin's Correspondence*).

MR. MOLOTOV reiterated for the Soviet Union that the Soviets could not invite any Polish leaders without first consulting with the Warsaw Poles.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that this puts us in a very difficult position since at Yalta we agreed to invite various groups for consultation and that the Commission should have the right to invite representatives of various Polish groups.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that the Commission had the right to invite anyone, but it could not do this without first seeking the advice of the Warsaw Poles.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that there was no such undertaking in the Crimea decision.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that in the Yalta declaration it was provided that the present government now functioning in Warsaw should be reorganized and that that government was specifically mentioned in the declaration while no reference was made to the Polish Government in London and, therefore, we cannot reorganize the Warsaw Government without consulting with it.

MR. STETTINIUS agreed that we should consult with the Warsaw Government representatives regarding the reorganization of the government to create a new Government of National Unity but that there was nothing in the Yalta agreement which indicated in any way that we should first consult with the Warsaw Government as to who was to be invited to Moscow to discuss the question with the Commission.

MR. MOLOTOV again replied that since it was the Warsaw Government which was to be reorganized we should consult with them in the first place before any reorganization could take place.

MR. EDEN replied that such a procedure would amount to giving a veto to the Warsaw Government on those democratic Poles the British and American Governments wished to invite to Moscow for consultation.

MR. MOLOTOV contended that consultation and veto are two different things.

MR. EDEN then stated that since Yalta we had endeavored to canvass for names of suitable democratic Polish leaders to be brought to Moscow for consultation.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that discussions had taken place about the original names as well as new names and that other names may still be added, but he again insisted that it would be necessary to consult with the Warsaw Government regarding this matter which he held was the common intent of all three Governments.

MR. EDEN stated that if we were to adopt this procedure we would make no progress.

MR. STETTINIUS asserted that it was his belief that we should consult here in Washington without having to seek the ideas of another government.

MR. MOLOTOV asked how can we settle the Polish question without Poles.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that it was absolutely clear in conformity with the Crimea decision that we were to consult with three groups and that the Warsaw Poles were to be one of these groups. He added that this was made absolutely clear at Yalta and in the declaration and it was understood that members of the Commission could make recommendations to their respective Governments.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it appeared to him that we were bound to consult with Bishop Sapieha but not bound to consult with the Warsaw Poles. He then corrected himself and stated that he should have referred to the Bishop as Prince Sapieha.

MR. EDEN stated that this was not so since it was absolutely clear that among those to be called for consultation were representatives of the Warsaw regime.

MR. MOLOTOV reiterated that it appeared that we are engaged in reorganizing Prince Sapieha but not the Warsaw Government.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that we had agreed that the Warsaw Poles might come first to Moscow provided invitations had been issued to the other representative democratic leaders.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the issue is one of reorganizing the present Polish Government and that if it is desired that the Warsaw Government be considered as just one of the groups similar to the Sapieha group or other groups of Poles the Soviet Government could not agree to this procedure.

MR. STETTINIUS asked whether we could not make a public statement indicating that in Washington we had reviewed the Yalta decision and that the American and British Ambassadors to the U.S.S.R. were returning to Moscow to carry on the work of the Commission and that we could give out the names of those to be invited for consultation. He added that such an announcement would have a great effect on the eve of the solemn proceeding to take place at San Francisco for the establishment of world peace and that in issuing such a statement the doubts which are now present would be quelled and it could be no longer said that it was impossible for us to reach an agreement.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was bound to say that if we adopt any decisions which violate the Crimea decision it would have a most adverse effect on Soviet public opinion.

MR. STETTINIUS assured Mr. Molotov that we desired to abide by the Crimea decision.

MR. MOLOTOV reasserted his belief in the Crimea decision but added that at Yalta we did not hesitate to mention the Warsaw Government, but now the British and American Governments desired to forget it and wished to consider that Government only as one of the groups to be consulted and not as a Government.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that that was not our interpretation of the agreement.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the Crimea decision refers to the Warsaw Government and makes no mention whatsoever of the Arciszewski Government or Mikolajczyk nor any mention of Prince Sapieha. He added that if it was now the intention to forget about the Warsaw Government the Soviet Government could not agree to this since such a procedure would make such a solution impossible.

MR. STETTINIUS assured Mr. Molotov that we had no intention of forgetting the Warsaw Government, but reminded him that the Crimea decision provided that there was to be a new Provisional Polish Government of National Unity.

MR. MOLOTOV concurred.

MR. STETTINIUS insisted that we must make it quite clear that there was to be a new government in Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that if it was impossible to move forward he hoped that we would take the suggestions already made by the Soviet Government as being the only practicable ones and that we should, therefore, begin consultations with the Warsaw regime as soon as possible.

MR. EDEN reminded Mr. Molotov that the joint message of April 18 contained specific proposals in conformity with the Crimea decision but that we had so far received no reply to it nor had Mr. Molotov commented on it. He added that if the Soviet Government should accept these proposals we can go forward, but that if they did not accept them, what would Mr. Molotov propose we should do.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that his previous statements had made absolutely clear the ideas of the Soviet Government to the effect that we should consult with the Warsaw Government first. He added that if this did not take place it would be impossible to make any progress in negotiations in Washington.

MR. STETTINIUS asked if Mr. Molotov's comments constitute the official reply to our proposals.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he was not endeavoring to answer the joint message but only endeavoring to give an explanation of the question raised.

MR. EDEN stated that he had no idea what to say since it was evident that we cannot make any progress.

MR. MOLOTOV then referred to the possibility of accepting the Yugoslav precedent as the formula to work on here. After doing this, we could then consult with the Warsaw Government.

MR. EDEN pointed out that this would be against the Crimea decision.

MR. MOLOTOV disagreed since the Yugoslav governmental question had been settled by common agreement between the three powers and no one has yet tried to explain why the Yugoslav solution is not acceptable.

MR. EDEN said he thought he had already explained this.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that Mr. Eden had only referred to formal motives, adding that he felt that if we did agree on the Yugoslav formula to establish a new Yugoslav Government he could not understand why the same procedure should not be followed in regard to Poland. If we did this, the American and British Ambassadors would be in Warsaw as they are now in Belgrade and we could go forward with this. He asked again why we could not accept the Yugoslav formula.

MR. EDEN replied that it was quite different in regard to Poland since it had been agreed between the three powers that before establishing a government there should be consultation between three groups of Poles including those from abroad.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that of course consultation is necessary.

MR. EDEN stated that in the case of Yugoslavia all we had done was to approve the agreement reached between two Yugoslav groups and he pointed out that in the case of Poland there was no such agreement.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that we should continue our consultation.

MR. STETTINIUS again reminded him that the joint message was sent after the points contained therein had been most carefully considered and that this is the final position of the United States Government and is in conformity with the Yalta agreement. He added that he felt obliged to call the attention of Mr. Molotov to the fact that over two months had passed since the Commission started its work and so far no Poles had been consulted.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the Moscow Commission had made an attempt to invite the Warsaw Poles for consultation but that London had cancelled it so that this procedure was called off. He pointed out that this was done at the insistence of the British Government and not the American Government and that the Soviet Government had agreed to abide by the wishes of the British Government. He added that this first step was made but it had to be cancelled although the Commission thought this was a good step, so that in actual practice the Commission had been prevented from taking the first step.

MR. EDEN emphasized that the reason this proposal had been cancelled was because it was learned that it was to be an exclusive consultation with the Warsaw representatives.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was anxious to start the consultations with the Warsaw Poles and then consult with the other Polish groups later.

MR. EDEN pointed out that as of today all we have is a proposal that the Warsaw Government have the power to veto any persons whom the United States and British Governments desire to invite for consultation.

MR. MOLOTOV again stated that there is a difference between consultation and veto.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he could not understand why at Yalta the Soviet Government had not insisted that permission be obtained from the Warsaw Poles before consideration was given to inviting representative Poles for consultation.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that it follows from the spirit of the Crimea decision that we must consult with Warsaw first.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that Mr. Harriman had just reminded him that Stalin at Yalta was ready to invite Bishop Sapieha and Witos for consultation without first asking the approval of the Warsaw Government.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that it was possible that these men may come to Moscow for consultation.

MR. EDEN asked where Witos and the other Polish leaders were at this time.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had no recent information since he was travelling for a long time although he believed that these leaders were at their homes in Poland.

MR. STETTINIUS asked whether Mr. Molotov would agree to a public statement before the San Francisco Conference to the effect that the three Governments concur that the Crimea decision is still in force, that the various groups are to be invited to Moscow and that the consultations will continue.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had no objection to the first part, but added that we had not reached agreement on the second part.

MR. STETTINIUS asked whether we could agree to say that the names of persons to be invited to Moscow for consultation would be settled before Mr. Molotov leaves for San Francisco.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that this could not be done without consultation with the Warsaw Poles.

MR. STETTINIUS asserted that he is most anxious to indicate to the world that we are working in collaboration and unity, particularly prior to the solemn task just facing us of setting up a world organiza-

tion. He added that if we cannot prove to the world that we are working in collaboration with each other it will put in jeopardy the establishment of the world organization.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that we could prove to the world our collaboration when we had achieved a settlement of the Polish question but this could not be done without first consulting the Warsaw Poles.

MR. STETTINIUS reiterated that the United States Government had no intention of ignoring the Warsaw Poles.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that it appeared now that we did not wish to reorganize the Warsaw Government but just wished to consider them as one of the groups to be consulted and that this was not in conformity with the Crimea decision.

MR. EDEN drew attention to the passages in the joint message which refer to the Warsaw Poles.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that it would be best to read the Crimea decision which was agreed to by the three Governments instead of reading from the joint message which was only agreed to by two of the Governments and which seems to ignore the Warsaw Poles.

MR. EDEN replied that we have never denied that the Warsaw Poles would play a prominent part in the reorganized government and read passages from the joint message confirming this.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Crimea decision does not refer to the representatives of the Warsaw Poles but to the present government now functioning in Poland and he added that it appeared now that the British and American Governments were ashamed to refer to this as a government.

MR. STETTINIUS asked whether Mr. Molotov was under the impression that the new Government of National Unity was just to be a continuation of the present Warsaw Government.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the new Polish government is to be set up on the basis of the Warsaw Government with new groups taking part in it and added that this attitude is the final position of the Soviet Government as stated in Stalin's message of April 7.

MR. EDEN replied that the joint message of the Prime Minister and the President constitutes our final position on this question.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that as regards the joint proposals it would be necessary to consult with the Warsaw Poles since there are certain specific questions which involve them.

MR. STETTINIUS: Have you any further points to discuss?

MR. EDEN: No.

MR. MOLOTOV: No.

MR. STETTINIUS: Let us adjourn now so that I can report to President Truman. I will let you know when we can meet later today.

760C.61/4-2345

*Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Meeting at the White House, April 23, 1945, 2 p. m.*⁷¹

Present: The President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of War ⁷²
 The Secretary of Navy ⁷³
 Admiral Leahy ⁷⁴
 General Marshall ⁷⁵
 Admiral King ⁷⁶
 Mr. Dunn
 Ambassador Harriman
 General Deane ⁷⁷
 Mr. Bohlen

THE SECRETARY OF STATE told the meeting that Mr. Molotov had arrived in good spirits yesterday and had had a good talk with the President yesterday evening but that at the Foreign Ministers meeting later great difficulties had developed over the Polish question. The continuance of the meeting this morning had produced no improvement and a complete deadlock had been reached on the subject of the carrying out of the Yalta agreement on Poland. The Secretary said that the truth of the matter was the Lublin or Warsaw Government was not representative of the Polish people and that it was now clear that the Soviet Government intended to try to enforce upon the United States and British Governments this puppet government of Poland and obtain its acceptance as the legal government of Poland. He said that as they all recalled at Yalta an agreement had been reached regarding the formation of a new Polish Government representative of the people by means of the reorganization of the present provisional government in consultation with other Polish democratic leaders. He said it had been made plain to Mr. Molotov how seriously the United States Government regarded this matter and how much public confidence would be shaken by our failure to carry out the Crimean decision.

⁷¹ See also the accounts of this meeting in Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 77-79, and *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 48-51.

⁷² Henry L. Stimson.

⁷³ James V. Forrestal.

⁷⁴ Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

⁷⁵ General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

⁷⁶ Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.

⁷⁷ Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had told Mr. Molotov last night that he intended fully to carry out all the agreements reached by President Roosevelt at the Crimea. He added that he felt our agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been a one way street and that could not continue; it was now or never. He intended to go on with the plans for San Francisco and if the Russians did not wish to join us they could go to hell. The President then asked in rotation the officials present for their view.

MR. STIMSON said that this whole difficulty with the Russians over Poland was new to him and he felt it was important to find out what the Russians were driving at. He said in the big military matters the Soviet Government had kept their word and that the military authorities of the United States had come to count on it. In fact he said that they had often been better than their promise. He said it was important to find out what motives they had in mind in regard to these border countries and that their ideas of independence and democracy in areas that they regarded as vital to the Soviet Union are different from ours. Mr. Stimson remarked that they had a good deal of trouble on minor military matters and it was necessary in these cases to teach them manners. In this case he said that without fully understanding how seriously the Russians took this Polish question we might be heading into very dangerous water. He remarked that 25 years ago virtually all of Poland had been Russian.

MR. FORRESTAL said that he felt that this difficulty over Poland could not be treated as an isolated incident, that there had been many evidences of the Soviet desire to dominate adjacent countries and to disregard the wishes of her allies. He said he had felt that for some time the Russians had considered that we would not object if they took over all of Eastern Europe into their power. He said it was his profound conviction that if the Russians were to be rigid in their attitude we had better have a show down with them now than later.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that in regard to Mr. Stimson's question as to the issues and the motives he felt that when Stalin and Molotov had returned to Moscow after Yalta they had been informed by Bierut (the present head of the provisional government) concerning the situation in Poland and had realized that the provisional government was in a shaky condition and that the introduction of any genuine Polish leader such as Mikolajczyk would probably mean the elimination of the Soviet hand-picked group. He remarked that the real issue was whether we were to be a party to a program of Soviet domination of Poland. He said obviously we were faced with a possibility of a real break with the Russians but he felt that if properly handled it might be avoided. The President said that he had no

intention of delivering an ultimatum to Mr. Molotov but merely to make clear the position of this Government.

MR. STIMSON observed that he would like to know how far the Russian reaction to a strong position on Poland would go. He said he thought that the Russians perhaps were being more realistic than we were in regard to their own security.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had left Yalta with the impression that the Soviet Government had no intention of permitting a free government to operate in Poland and that he would have been surprised had the Soviet Government behaved any differently than it had. In his opinion the Yalta agreement was susceptible to two interpretations. He added that he felt that it was a serious matter to break with the Russians but that we should tell them that we stood for a free and independent Poland.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE then read the part of the Yalta decision relating to the formation of the new Government and the holding of free elections and said he felt that this was susceptible of only one interpretation.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he was not familiar with the Polish issue and its political aspects. He said from the military point of view the situation in Europe was secure but that they hoped for Soviet participation in the war against Japan at a time when it would be useful to us. The Russians had it within their power to delay their entry into the Far Eastern war until we had done all the dirty work. He said the difficulties with the Russians such as in the case of CROSSWORD usually straightened out. He was inclined to agree with Mr. Stimson that possibility of a break with Russia was very serious.

MR. STIMSON observed that he agreed with General Marshall and that he felt that the Russians would not yield on the Polish question. He said we must understand that outside the United States with the exception of Great Britain there was no country that understood free elections; that the party in power always ran the election as he well knew from his experience in Nicaragua.⁷⁸

ADMIRAL KING inquired whether the issue was the invitation to the Lublin Government to San Francisco. The President informed him that that was a settled matter and not the issue. The issue was the

⁷⁸ In the spring of 1927, Mr. Stimson served as a special emissary to Nicaragua for President Coolidge. For documentation on the Stimson mission, see *Foreign Relations, 1927*, vol. III, pp. 318-349.

execution of agreements entered into between this Government and the Soviet Union. He said he intended to tell Mr. Molotov that we expected Russia to carry out the Yalta decision as we were prepared to do for our part.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN then remarked that while it was true that the Soviet Union had kept its big agreements on military matters that those were decisions which it had already reached by itself but that on other military matters it was impossible to say they had lived up to their commitments. He said for example over a year ago they had agreed to start on preparations for collaboration in the Far Eastern war but that none of these had been carried out. He asked General Deane to express his opinion.

GENERAL DEANE said that he felt that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific war as soon as it was able irrespective of what happened in other fields. He felt that the Russians must do this because they could not afford too long a period of let down for their people who were tired, there was only a short season in which offensive action against Manchuria was possible and that they would not dare attempt a Bulgarian gambit in the Far East. He said he was convinced after his experiences in Moscow that if we were afraid of the Russians we would get nowhere and he felt that we should be firm when we were right.

THE PRESIDENT then thanked the military representation and said that he felt that he had their point of view well in mind and would ask the Secretary of State and his advisers to stay behind to work out the details of his forthcoming talk with Mr. Molotov.

The President then said that he was satisfied that from a military point of view there was no reason why we should fail to stand up to our understanding of the Crimean agreements and he requested the Secretary of State to prepare for him (1) a statement to be handed to Mr. Molotov for communication to Marshal Stalin, (2) a list of points he might mention orally to Mr. Molotov and (3) a draft of a statement to the press. He said he would be prepared to receive the Secretary of State and his advisers just as soon as this could be done and afterwards he would see Mr. Molotov. The Secretary agreed and said he would have the drafts in the President's hands by 5:00 o'clock.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

760C.61/4-2345

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant
to the Secretary of State*⁷⁹

[WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1945.

Participants: The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Molotov
Ambassador Harriman
Ambassador Gromyko
Admiral Leahy
Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Bohlen

After greeting Mr. Molotov the President said that he had been sorry to learn that no progress had been made towards a solution of the Polish question. Mr. Molotov said that he also regretted that. The President then stated that the proposals contained in the joint message from himself and the Prime Minister were eminently fair and reasonable and that we go as far as we can to meet the desires of the Soviet Government as expressed in the message which Marshal Stalin sent on April 7. He emphasized that the United States Government could not agree to be a party to the formation of a Polish Government which was not representative of all Polish democratic elements. He added that the United States Government was deeply disappointed that the Soviet Government had not found it possible to carry out the consultation with representatives of the Polish Government other than those who were not officials of the Warsaw regime. He said that the United States Government is determined together with other members of the United Nations to go ahead with plans for the world organization no matter what difficulties or differences may arise with regard to other matters. He felt nevertheless that the failure of the three principal allies who had borne the brunt of the war to carry out the Crimea decision with regard to Poland will cast serious doubt upon our unity of purpose in regard to postwar collaboration. He mentioned that in his last message to Marshal Stalin on April 1 President Roosevelt had made it plain that no policy in the United States whether foreign or domestic could succeed unless it enjoyed public confidence and support. He said that this applied of necessity to economic collaboration as well as political. The President added

⁷⁹ See also the accounts of this meeting in Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 412-413, and Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 79-80.

At the direction of President Truman, an outline of the points made by the President was sent on the same day to the British Embassy for Mr. Eden.

that legislative appropriation was required for any economic measures in the foreign field and that he could not hope to get these measures through Congress unless there was public support for them. He concluded by expressing the sincere hope that the Soviet Government would keep these factors in mind in considering the request that the British and American proposals in the joint message from himself and the Prime Minister on Poland be accepted and that Mr. Molotov be authorized to continue the discussions in San Francisco on that basis. He then handed to Mr. Molotov with the request that it be transmitted immediately to Marshal Stalin the attached message.

Mr. Molotov asked if he could make a few observations. Mr. Molotov said that he hoped he expressed the views of the Soviet Government in stating that they wished to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain as before. The President said he agreed; otherwise, they would not be talking today. Mr. Molotov continued that he had been authorized to set forth the point of view of the Soviet Government. The basis of collaboration had been established and that although inevitable difficulties had arisen the three Governments had been able to find a common language and that on this basis they had been settling these differences. He said the three Governments had dealt as equal parties and there had been no case where one or two of the three had attempted to impose their will on another. He said this was the basis of cooperation and the only one acceptable to the Soviet Government.

The President agreed and said that all we were asking was that the Soviet Government carry out the Crimean decision on Poland.

Mr. Molotov said that as an advocate of the Crimean decisions his Government stood by them and that it was a matter of honor for them; that his Government felt that the good base which existed was the result of former work and offered even brighter prospects for the future. He said that the Soviet Government was convinced that all difficulties could be overcome.

The President replied with great firmness that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that it only remained for Marshal Stalin to carry it out in accordance with his word.

Mr. Molotov replied that Marshal Stalin in his message of April 7 had given his views on the agreement and he personally could not understand why if the three Governments could reach an agreement on the question of the composition of the Yugoslav Government the same formula could not be applied in the case of Poland. The President replied sharply that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that it only required carrying out by the Soviet Government. Mr. Molotov said that his Government supported the Crimean de-

cisions and then said that he could not agree that an abrogation of those decisions by others could be considered as a violation by the Soviet Government. He added that surely the Polish question involving a neighboring country was of very great interest to the Soviet Government.

The President repeated that as he had said last night the United States Government was prepared to carry out loyally all the agreements reached at the Crimea and he only asked that the Soviet Government do the same. The President said that he desired the friendship of the Soviet Government, but that he felt it could only be on the basis of mutual observation of agreements and not on the basis of a one way street. In conclusion he arose and handed to Mr. Molotov the press release⁸⁰ which he stated he intended to release to the press this evening. Mr. Molotov read the release and thanked the President for the information.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

[Annex]

President Truman to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)

[WASHINGTON, April 23, 1945.]

There was an agreement at Yalta in which President Roosevelt participated for the United States Government to reorganize the Provisional Government now functioning in Warsaw in order to establish a new Government of National Unity in Poland by means of previous consultation between representatives of the Provisional Polish Government of Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders from Poland and from abroad.

In the opinion of the United States Government the Crimean decision on Poland can only be carried out if a group of genuinely representative democratic Polish leaders are invited to Moscow for consultation. The United States Government cannot be party to any method of consultation with Polish leaders which would not result in the establishment of a new Provisional Government of National Unity genuinely representative of the democratic elements of the Polish people. The United States and British Governments have gone as far as they can to meet the situation and carry out the intent of the Crimean decisions in their joint message delivered to Marshal Stalin on April 18th.

⁸⁰ For text of the press release regarding consultations with the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, issued by the White House on April 23, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 29, 1945, p. 802.

The United States Government earnestly requests that the Soviet Government accept the proposals set forth in the joint message of the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. And that Mr. Molotov continue the conversations with the Secretary of State and Mr. Eden in San Francisco on that basis.

The Soviet Government must realize that the failure to go forward at this time with the implementation of the Crimean decision on Poland would seriously shake confidence in the unity of the three Governments and their determination to continue the collaboration in the future as they have in the past.

860C.01/4-2345

*Minutes of Third Meeting Regarding the Polish Question*⁸¹

Principal Participants:

Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Eden
Mr. Molotov
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Harriman
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Gromyko

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he felt it would be a good idea to finish with the Polish question and added that he could say nothing more than the President himself had stated this afternoon to Mr. Molotov, but he understood that Mr. Eden desired to clear up a few points.

MR. EDEN stated he would like to clear up the question of Mikolajczyk and the matter of the Curzon Line. He then asked his interpreter to read Stalin's message to the Prime Minister and the latter's reply regarding this question.

(Marshal Stalin's message⁸² regarding Mikolajczyk replied to the Prime Minister's message of April 15 which contained the text of the statement made by Mikolajczyk⁸³ in which he indicated that he fully accepted the Crimean decision. Stalin asked to have the full text of the statement and desired to have further clarification as to whether

⁸¹ Meeting held at the Department of State, April 23, 1945, 9 p. m. to 9:35 p. m.

⁸² For Marshal Stalin's message of April 17, 1945, to Prime Minister Churchill, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 489, or *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, document No. 428, p. 324.

⁸³ For Prime Minister Churchill's message of April 15 to Marshal Stalin, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, document No. 425, p. 322. For text of the Mikolajczyk public statement, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 489, or Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, p. 114.

Mikolajczyk accepted the Curzon Line as the definitive frontier between the two countries. The Prime Minister replied⁸⁴ that he had given Stalin the full text of Mikolajczyk's statement in his message of April 15 and added that Mikolajczyk agrees to the entire Crimean decision and accepted the Curzon Line as a frontier. He told Marshal Stalin that if Mikolajczyk had not accepted the Curzon Line the Prime Minister would not have sent his message containing Mikolajczyk's statement.)

Mr. MOLOTOV remarked that from the text of the telegram it did not appear that Mikolajczyk had said that he accepted the Curzon Line but that the Prime Minister had stated that Mikolajczyk accepted this solution, and he asked whether Mikolajczyk had made a definite declaration on this point.

Mr. EDEN replied that the Prime Minister had talked to Mr. Mikolajczyk who made the statement to him, and he added that he would send Mr. Molotov the text of an article written by Mr. Mikolajczyk which appeared on April 19 and which clearly indicated that he accepted the Curzon Line.⁸⁵ Mr. Eden then added that Mr. Stettinius had told him about the statements made to Mr. Molotov by the President this afternoon to the effect that the final position of the United States Government with regard to the Polish matter was expressed in the joint message sent by the President and the Prime Minister on April 18. Mr. Eden stated that he wished to make absolutely sure what the position of the Soviet Government was in order that he might send an accurate report to the War Cabinet. He then stated that this morning Mr. Molotov had indicated that we could either accept the Yugoslav formula or consult in the first instance with the Warsaw Poles, if we wished to reach a solution of the Polish problem.

Mr. MOLOTOV replied that we could accept either proposal.

Mr. EDEN remarked that Mr. Stettinius had already explained that we could not do this, and he added that Mr. Molotov had said that the Soviet Union could not reply to the joint message until they had consulted with the Warsaw Poles. He stated that his understanding of the Soviet position was that they would consult with the Warsaw Poles and then would let us have their considered reply to the joint message so that the matter could be further discussed at San Francisco.

Mr. MOLOTOV stated that not only should the Soviet Union consult with the Warsaw Poles but also the Commission.

⁸⁴ For Prime Minister Churchill's message of April 18 to Marshal Stalin, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, document No. 429, p. 324. In his message to Marshal Stalin dated April 22, Prime Minister Churchill quoted a public statement by Mikolajczyk which appeared in his newspaper *Jutro Polski* on April 19 and in which Mikolajczyk accepted the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern frontier. For Churchill's message quoting the text of the Mikolajczyk statement, see *ibid.*, document No. 436, p. 329.

⁸⁵ See footnote 84, above.

MR. EDEN asked if this meant that the Commission could not do anything until they got back to Moscow.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that we can't settle this without the Poles.

MR. EDEN stated that the United States and British Governments have sent a joint message to Marshal Stalin and that according to Mr. Molotov the Soviet Government could not reply until they had consulted with the Warsaw Poles, and therefore he presumed that the Soviet Government would consult with the Warsaw Poles and give us their reply in a few days.

MR. MOLOTOV asserted that, as Mr. Churchill had indicated at the Crimea, the Commission should work as a commission and not on an individual basis and that if the members of the Commission should start individual consultations, this would mean the breaking up of the Commission, and he asked whether Mr. Eden wished to end the Commission.

MR. EDEN replied that this was a fantastic misstatement of what he had said. He reminded Mr. Molotov that we had addressed a joint message to Moscow and we only asked for a reply. He again asked that the Soviet Union consult with the Warsaw Poles and send an answer to this message. He further stated that he could not accept that no reply be sent to the joint message until Mr. Harriman, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr. Molotov had returned to Moscow, as Mr. Molotov had intimated a few minutes ago.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he would no longer endeavor to interpret the ideas of Mr. Eden and added that Mr. Eden was telescoping two questions which were separate and distinct. He continued that he wished to follow his own ideas and discuss the two questions, one being the question of a reply, which is the business of Marshal Stalin, and the second is the question of consultation with the Warsaw Poles. He added that he had not been instructed to discuss the correspondence between the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin, and indicated that Marshal Stalin himself would write the reply to the joint message. As regards consultation, that is a matter for the Commission to handle unless the Commission has been dissolved, which he hoped was not the case.

MR. EDEN replied that he had not mixed Stalin's message with the question of consultation but that it was Mr. Molotov who had said that he could not give us a reply to proposal number one in the joint message without first consulting with the Warsaw Poles. He added that all he desired to have was an early reply to the joint message since until we get that we cannot make any further progress in regard to the Polish question.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had not been authorized to give an answer for Marshal Stalin who will reply to the message when he is ready.

MR. EDEN remarked that it would appear therefore that it would not be possible to make any progress either here or in San Francisco.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that if it was really desired to make progress, progress could be made. If it was not desired to make progress, of course there would be none.

MR. EDEN remarked that unfortunately he could not draft Marshal Stalin's reply here.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Union had indicated its position on more than one occasion and its position was based on the Crimea decision.

MR. EDEN stated that no progress would be made until we had a reply from Marshal Stalin.

MR. MOLOTOV assured him that Marshal Stalin would reply.

MR. STETTINIUS asserted that no further progress could be made until an answer was received and urged Mr. Molotov to see that an early reply was forthcoming.

MR. MOLOTOV promised to do this.

[For the exchange of remarks regarding the Polish problem between the Secretary of State and Foreign Commissar Molotov during a conference held in San Francisco on April 24, 1945, see the memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 24, 1945, volume I, page 380.]

860C.01/4-2445: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

[LONDON,] April 24, 1945.

14. I have carefully considered message you have handed to Molotov for Marshal Stalin⁸⁶ and have brought it before the War Cabinet who have authorized me to inform you of their entire agreement to the course that you have adopted. I shall now therefore send to Marshal Stalin message contained in my immediately following telegram.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ *Ante*, p. 258.

⁸⁷ Telegram No. 15, April 24, not printed. For text of Prime Minister Churchill's message of April 24 to Marshal Stalin, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 492.

860C.01/4-2645

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman*⁸⁸

[Moscow,] 24 April 1945.

I have received your joint with Prime Minister Churchill message of April 18, and have also received on April 24 the message transmitted to me through V. M. Molotov.

1. From these messages it is clear that you continue to consider the Provisional Polish Government not as a kernel for the future government of national unity, but just like one of the groups equal to any other group of Poles.

Such an understanding of the position of the Polish Government and such an attitude towards it is very difficult to reconcile with the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland. At the Crimea Conference all three of us, including also President Roosevelt, proceeded from the fact that the Provisional Polish Government, as the one now operating in Poland and enjoying the confidence and support of the majority of the Polish people, should be the kernel, i.e. the main part of the new reorganized government of nation unity. You, evidently, do not agree to such an understanding of the matter. Declining the Yugoslav example as a pattern for Poland, you thereby confirm that the Provisional Polish Government cannot be considered as a basis and kernel for the future government of national unity.

2. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that Poland borders with the Soviet Union, what cannot be said of Great Britain and the United States.

The question on Poland has the same meaning for the security of the Soviet Union as the question on Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain.

You, apparently, do not agree that the Soviet Union has a right to make efforts that there should exist in Poland a government friendly toward the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet government cannot agree to existence in Poland of a government hostile toward it. Besides everything else, this is demanded by the blood of the Soviet people abundantly shed on the field of Poland in the name of liberation of Poland. I do not know whether there has been established in Greece a really representative government, and whether the gov-

⁸⁸ Text of this document was quoted by the White House to the Department of State in a memorandum, dated April 26, 1945, by Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs. Text of this message was transmitted in telegram UNCIO 5, April 26, to the Secretary of State in San Francisco where he was Chairman of the United States delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization (860C.01/4-2445).

ernment in Belgium is really democratic. The Soviet Union was not consulted when these governments were being established there. The Soviet Government did not lay claim to interference in these affairs as it understands the whole importance of Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain.

It is not clear why, while the question on Poland is discussed it is not wanted to take into consideration the interests of the Soviet Union from the point of view of its security.

3. Such conditions must be recognized unusual when two governments—those of the United States and Great Britain—beforehand settle with the Polish question in which the Soviet Union is first of all and most of all interested and put the government of the USSR in an unbearable position trying to dictate to it their demands.

I have to state that such a situation cannot favor a harmonious solution of the question on Poland.

4. I am ready to fulfill your request and do everything possible to reach a harmonious solution, but you demand too much of me. In other words, you demand that I renounce the interests of security of the Soviet Union, but I cannot turn against my country.

In my opinion there is one way out of this situation; to adopt the Yugoslav example as a pattern for Poland. I believe this would allow to come to a harmonious solution.

860C.01/4-2945 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

[LONDON,] 28 April 1945.

20. 1. I have decided to send Stalin the message contained in my immediately following telegram, in answer to his message to me of April 25th⁸⁹ of which the British Embassy will give you the text.

2. I do not know whether Stalin has sent you a similar answer but in any case I hope you will agree to my answering independently

⁸⁹ For text of Marshal Stalin's message of April 24 to Prime Minister Churchill, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, document No. 439, p. 330. Portions of the message are also printed in Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 492-493.

In a memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State dated April 27, H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, pointed out that Marshal Stalin's message to Prime Minister Churchill contained an interesting difference from his reply to President Truman. In his message to Prime Minister Churchill, Marshal Stalin expressed his willingness to "recommend" to the Warsaw Government that Mikolajczyk be invited to Moscow for consultation. Mr. Matthews presumed that the same suggestion was not contained in the message to President Truman because Mikolajczyk's name had been specifically raised in earlier messages only by Prime Minister Churchill and by President Roosevelt. (860C.01/4-2745)

so as to enable me to put the specifically British case. I naturally would be very glad if you could support me by sending Stalin a message on similar lines.

860C.01/4-2945: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

LONDON, 29 April 1945.

21. The message referred to in my number 20 follows.

1. I thank you for your message of April 24th. I have been much distressed at the misunderstanding that has grown up between us on the Crimean agreement about Poland. I certainly went to Yalta with the hope that both the London and Lublin Polish Governments would be swept away and that a new government would be formed from among Poles of good-will, among whom the members of M. Bierut's government would be prominent. But you did not like this plan, and we and the Americans agreed therefore that there was to be no sweeping away of the Bierut government but that instead it should become a "new" government "reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad". For this purpose M. Molotov and the two ambassadors were to sit together in Moscow and try to bring into being such a government by consultations with members of the present provisional government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad.

2. The commission then would have to set to work to select the Poles who were to come for consultations. We tried in each case to find representative men, and in this we were careful to exclude what we thought were extreme people unfriendly to Russia. We did not select for our list anyone at present in the London Polish Government, but three good men, namely Mikolajczyk, Stanczyk and Grabski, who went into opposition to the London Polish Government because they did not like its attitude towards Russia, and in particular its refusal to accept the eastern frontiers which you and I agreed upon, now [*not?*] so long ago, and which I was the first man outside the Soviet government to proclaim to the world as just and fair, together with the compensations, etc. in the west and north. It is true that Mikolajczyk at that time still hoped for Lwow, but as you know he has now publicly abandoned that claim.

3. Our names, for those from inside and outside Poland, were put forward in the same spirit of helpfulness by the Americans and ourselves. The first thing the British complain of is that after nine weeks

of discussion on the commission at Moscow, and any amount of telegrams between our three Governments not the least progress has been made because M. Molotov has steadily refused in the commission to give an opinion about the Poles we have mentioned so that not one of them has been allowed to come even to a preliminary round-table discussion. Please observe that these names were put forward not as necessarily to be members of a new and reorganized Polish government but simply to come for the round-table talk provided for in the Crimean declaration out of which it was intended to bring about the formation of a united provisional government, representative of the main elements of Polish life and prepared to work on friendly terms with the Soviet government, and also of a kind which we and all the world could recognize. That was and still is our desire. This provisional government was then, according to our joint decision at the Crimea, to pledge itself to hold "a free and unfettered election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot", in which "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates". Alas, none of this has been allowed to move forward.

4. In your paragraph 1. you speak of accepting "the Yugoslav precedent as a model for Poland." You have always wished that our private and personal series of telegrams should be frank and outspoken. I must say at once that the two cases are completely different. In the case of Poland, the three powers reached agreement about how we should arrange for the emergence of a new government. This was to be by means of consultations before our commission between representatives of the Bierut government and democratic Polish leaders from inside and outside Poland. In the case of Yugoslavia, there was nothing of this kind. You seem now to be proposing that after your representative on the Moscow Poland commission has made it impossible to start the conversations provided for in our agreement, that the agreed procedure should be abandoned. Thus we British feel that after all this time absolutely no headway has been made towards forming the "new" and "reorganized" Polish Government, while on the contrary the Soviet Government have made a 20-years treaty⁹⁰ with the present provisional Polish Government under M. Bierut although it remains neither new nor reorganized. We have the feeling that it is we who have been dictated to and brought up against a stone wall

⁹⁰ The agreement regarding friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic (National Council of the Homeland), signed on April 21, 1945, was to remain in force for 20 years from the moment of signing.

upon matters which we sincerely believed were settled in a spirit of friendly comradeship in the Crimea.

5. I must also say that the way things have worked out in Yugoslavia certainly does not give me the feeling of a 50-50 interest and influence as between our two countries.⁹¹ Marshal Tito has become a complete dictator. He has proclaimed that his prime loyalties are to Soviet Russia. Although he allowed the members of the royal Yugoslav Government to enter his government, they only number 6 as against 25 of his own nominees. We have the impression that they are not taken into consultation on matters of high policy and that it is becoming a one-party regime. However I have not made any complaint or comment about all this, and both at Yalta and at other times have acquiesced in the settlement which has been reached in Yugoslavia. I do not complain of any action you have taken there in spite of my misgivings and I hope it will all work out smoothly and make the Yugoslavs a prosperous and free people, friendly to both Russia and ourselves.

6. We could not, however, accept the "Yugoslav model" as a guide to what should happen in Poland. Neither we nor the Americans have any military or special interest in Poland. All we seek in material things is to be treated in the regular way between friendly states. Here we are all shocked that you should think that we would favour a Polish Government hostile to the Soviet Union. This is the opposite of our policy. But it was on account of Poland that the British went to war with Germany in 1939.⁹² We saw in the Nazi treatment of Poland a symbol of Hitler's vile and wicked lust of conquest and subjugation, and his invasion of Poland was the spark that fired the mine. The British people do not, as is sometimes thought, go to war for calculation but for sentiment. They had a feeling which grew up in years that with all Hitler's encroachments and doctrine, he was a danger to our country and to the liberties which we prize in Europe,

⁹¹ In regard to the proposal to share wartime influence between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on the basis of proposed percentages in the Balkan countries, including Yugoslavia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 112-131, *passim*. See also *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, The Macmillan Company 1948), vol II, pp. 1451-1459, and Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 72-81, 226-235. The substance of the arrangements, particularly concerning Yugoslavia, was given in Churchill's speech of January 18, 1945, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 407, cols. 398-399. For reports on discussions of Balkan affairs during the visit of Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow in October 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1004-1024, *passim*.

⁹² For documentation regarding the invasion of Poland by Germany and entry of the British and French into the war, September 1-16, 1939, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 402 ff.

and when after Munich⁹³ he broke his word so shamefully about Czechoslovakia, even the extremely peace-loving Chamberlain⁹⁴ gave our guarantee against Hitler to Poland. When that guarantee was invoked by the German invasion of Poland, the whole nation went to war with Hitler, unprepared as we were. There was a flame in the hearts of men like that which swept your people in their noble defence of their country from a treacherous, brutal and, as at one time it almost seemed, overwhelmingly German attack. This British flame burns still among all classes and parties in this island, and in its self-governing dominions, and they can never feel this war will have ended rightly unless Poland has a fair deal in the full sense of sovereignty, independence and freedom on the basis of friendship with Russia. It was on this that I thought we had agreed at Yalta.

7. Side by side with this strong sentiment for the rights of Poland, which I believe is shared in at least as strong a degree throughout the United States, there has grown up throughout the English-speaking world a very warm and deep desire to be friends on equal and honourable terms with the mighty Russian Soviet Republic and to work with you, making allowances for our different systems of thought and government, in long and bright years for all the world which we three powers alone can make together. I, who in my years of great responsibility have worked faithfully for this unity, will certainly continue to do so by every means in my power, and in particular I can assure you that we in Great Britain would not work for or tolerate a Polish government unfriendly to Russia. Neither could we recognize a Polish government that did not truly correspond to the description in our joint declaration at Yalta with proper regard for the rights of the individual as we understand these matters in the western world.

8. With regard to your reference to Greece and Belgium, I recognize the consideration which you gave me when we had to intervene with heavy armed forces to quell the EAM⁹⁵-ELAS⁹⁶ attack

⁹³ The Munich Agreement, signed on September 29, 1938, between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, regarding the cession by Czechoslovakia to Germany of the Sudeten German territory; for text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 1014, or *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. II (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), p. 627. For documentation regarding the German-Czechoslovak crisis, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 483 ff.

⁹⁴ Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, May 28, 1937-May 10, 1940.

⁹⁵ Ethnikon Apeletherotikon Metopon (National Liberation Front), the Communist-controlled resistance organization in Greece.

⁹⁶ Ethnikos Laikos Apeletherotikos Stratos (National People's Liberation Army), the military organization of the EAM.

upon the centre of government in Athens.⁹⁷ We have given repeated instructions that your interest in Roumania and Bulgaria is to be recognized as predominant. We cannot however be excluded altogether, and we dislike being treated by your subordinates in these countries so differently from the kindly manner in which we at the top are always treated by you. In Greece we seek nothing but her friendship, which is of long duration, and desire only her independence and integrity. But we have no intention to try to decide whether she is to be a monarchy or a republic. Our only policy there is to restore matters to the normal as quickly as possible and to hold fair and free elections, I hope within the next four or five months. These elections will decide the regime and later on the constitution. The will of the people expressed under conditions of freedom and universal franchise, must prevail; that is our root principle. If the Greeks were to decide for a republic, it would not affect our relations with them. We will use our influence with the Greek government to invite Russian representatives to come and see freely what is going on in Greece, and at the elections I hope that there will be Russian, American and British commissioners at large in the country to make sure that there is no intimidation or other frustration of the free choice of the people between the different parties who will be contending. After that our work in Greece may well be done.

9. As to Belgium, we have no conditions to demand though naturally we should get disturbed if they started putting up V-weapons, etc. pointed at us, and we hope they will, under whatever form of government they adopt by popular decision, come into a general system of resistance to prevent Germany striking westward. Belgium, like Poland, is a theatre of war and corridor of communication, and everyone must recognize the force of these considerations without which great armies cannot operate.

10. As to your paragraph 3, it is quite true that about Poland we have reached a definite line of action with the Americans. This is because we agree naturally upon the subject, and both sincerely feel that we have been rather ill-treated about the way the matter has been handled since the Crimea Conference. No doubt these things seem different when looked at from the opposite point of view. But we are absolutely agreed that the pledge we have given for a sovereign, free, independent Poland with a government fully and adequately representing all the democratic elements among Poles, is for

⁹⁷ For documentation regarding the policy of the United States with respect to the question of the political organization of Greece following liberation from German occupation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 84 ff.

us a matter of honour and duty. I do not think there is the slightest chance of any change in the attitude of our two powers, and when we are agreed we are bound to say so. After all, we have joined with you, largely on my original initiative early in 1944 in proclaiming the Polish-Russian frontier which you desired, namely, the Curzon line including Lwow for Russia. We think you ought to meet us with regard to the other half of the policy which you equally with us have proclaimed, namely, the sovereignty, independence and freedom of Poland, provided it is a Poland friendly to Russia. Therefore HMG cannot accept a government on the Yugoslav precedent in which there would be four representatives of the present Warsaw provisional government to every one representing the other democratic elements. There ought to be a proper balance and a proper distribution of the important posts in the government; and this result should be reached as we agreed at the Crimea by discussing the matter with true representatives of all the different Polish elements which are not fundamentally anti-Russian.

11. Also, difficulties arise at the present moment because all sorts of stories are brought out of Poland which are eagerly listened to by many members of Parliament and which at any time may be violently raised in Parliament or the press in spite of my deprecating such action and on which M. Molotov will vouchsafe us no information at all in spite of repeated requests. For instance, there is the talk of the 15 Poles who were said to have met the Russian authorities for discussion over 4 weeks ago, and of M. Witos about whom there has been a similar but more recent report; and there are many other statements of deportations, etc. How can I contradict such complaints when you give me no information whatever and when neither I nor the Americans are allowed to send anyone into Poland to find out for themselves the true state of affairs? There is no part of our occupied or liberated territory into which you are not free to send delegations, and people do not see why you should have any reasons against similar visits by British delegations to foreign countries liberated by you.

12. There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist parties in many other states, are all drawn up on one side, and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and their associates or dominions are

on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history. Even embarking on a long period of suspicions, of abuse and counter-abuse and of opposing policies would be a disaster hampering the great developments of world prosperity for the masses which are attainable only by our trinity. I hope there is no word or phrase in this outpouring of my heart to you which unwittingly gives offence. If so, let me know. But do not I beg you, my friend Stalin, under-rate the divergencies which are opening about matters which you may think are small to us but which are symbolic of the way the English-speaking democracies look at life.

860C.01/4-3045

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1945.

I have just learned from our Delegation at San Francisco that they expect today to finish a draft reply to Stalin's message of April 25 [24] regarding Poland. You will recall that Stalin's reply did not advance the solution of the question in any way since he did not accept your suggestions and those of the Prime Minister for consultation and again brought up his proposal that the Polish question be settled in accordance with the precedent established for the creation of the recently formed Yugoslav Government. The draft reply to Stalin's message, which is being drawn up in San Francisco, will of course be submitted for your comments and approval. I understand that it is contemplated that this reply will be comparatively brief indicating that Stalin's proposals are not acceptable.

I have also learned from San Francisco that as far as Mr. Eden is aware, the Prime Minister's proposed message to Stalin,¹ which was submitted to you yesterday for your approval, has already been sent to Marshal Stalin.

JOSEPH C. GREW

¹ Prime Minister Churchill's message of April 28 to Marshal Stalin was transmitted to President Truman as the Prime Minister's telegram No. 21, April 29, *supra*.

860C.00/5-245

*Memorandum of Conversation*²[Extract]³

Present: The Secretary of State	Ambassador Gromyko
Mr. Eden	Mr. Sobolev ⁴
Mr. Molotov	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Dunn	Mr. Podtserob ⁵
Ambassador Harriman	Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson ⁶
Sir A. Cadogan	

THE SECRETARY said that the purpose of this meeting was to study the Polish question. He and Mr. Molotov had had a friendly conversation last evening on the prospects of the Conference and they had both expressed the hope that a solution of the Polish question could be found. Since the last meeting on this subject we have received Marshal Stalin's reply to the joint British and American message. We do not consider that this reply advances the matter. As we have pointed out before, the failure to carry out the Yalta decision has resulted in a situation which is receiving the serious consideration of the United States Government. Mr. Harriman will soon return to Moscow—of course, not before the departure of Mr. Molotov—and will present the views of the United States Government to the Polish Commission. We all have in mind the importance of finding a solution of this problem.

MR. MOLOTOV said that some progress had been made. Mr. Mikolajczyk was a stumbling block in Moscow. This had now been settled. There was no objection to his being invited for consultation in view of the declaration he had made.

THE SECRETARY said this was very gratifying. We had not known this before.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Government had previously objected to Mikolajczyk because he had expressed objections to the Crimea decisions. He had subsequently changed his views, possibly with Mr. Churchill's help.

² Meeting held May 2, 1945, 11 a. m., at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California; one of a series of meetings between United States, British, and Soviet officials held during the course of the United Nations Conference at San Francisco.

³ For another portion of this memorandum, see vol. III, p. 112.

⁴ Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in London and member of the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco Conference.

⁵ Boris Fedorovich Podtserob, secretary and translator for Foreign Commissar Molotov.

⁶ Political and Liaison Officer to the United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference.

MR. EDEN pointed out that there had been a genuine misunderstanding of Mikolajczyk's position which arose because of the fact that his first statement had been made in reply to a letter which he had received.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he was anxious to make some progress on the Polish question at the Conference.

MR. EDEN inquired whether we could decide on the names of the Polish leaders to be invited for consultation.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the agreement on Mikolajczyk represented some progress and it was difficult for him to take steps on another question. He wished now to consider what we could do for the Poles at this Conference.

THE SECRETARY inquired what would be Mr. Mikolajczyk's status.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he would be invited for consultation with the Moscow Commission.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that we have always been ready to consult with the Lublin Poles once the list of other Polish leaders to be invited for consultation was decided upon.

MR. MOLOTOV said it was not necessary to agree upon the full list in advance. We could have some Polish leaders and the Lublin Poles.

MR. EDEN said this would be satisfactory if we could agree here upon the list. We have already agreed upon the Warsaw leaders and Mr. Mikolajczyk.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that there was no objection to Grabski. Possibly some candidate could be indicated by the Warsaw Government.

MR. EDEN suggested Stanczyk.

MR. MOLOTOV pressed for someone who had been proposed by the Warsaw Poles and mentioned General Zelegowski.

MR. EDEN pointed out that Stanczyk was a Socialist who had broken with the Socialists who supported the present Prime Minister of the London Polish Government. He was greatly liked by Mr. Eden's Labor colleagues in the British Government and it would be a great help to get him invited.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought one of the three Poles to be invited from London could be chosen from among the names suggested by Warsaw. Otherwise, we could let the Moscow Commission decide the matter.

MR. EDEN suggested that four be invited from London.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that we had agreed to inviting three from London and five from Poland.

MR. EDEN replied that this was based on the proposal that the three from London be chosen from those not supporting the Warsaw Government.

MR. MOLOTOV said it was better at this stage to confine ourselves to three—Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and one to be selected by Warsaw upon whom we could all agree. Then he could ask Moscow if they approved of this proposal.

MR. EDEN inquired about the Poles from within Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV said this was for the Commission to decide. If we could agree on whom we are to invite from London and do something for the Poles at this Conference, that would represent some progress. He could not agree on the names of Poles from within Poland without consulting the Warsaw Poles who should be invited to Moscow.

MR. EDEN pointed out that it was necessary to know who was coming from Poland. If Stanczyk were not invited, it would be necessary to know if a Socialist from within Poland was being invited.

MR. MOLOTOV said Stanczyk's name had not been given before.

MR. EDEN pointed out that he was mentioned in February and in the joint message.

MR. MOLOTOV said his name was not mentioned at the Crimea. It was not possible to invite representatives of a single group.

MR. EDEN said that Stanczyk was not from the same group as Mikolajczyk.

MR. MOLOTOV said we might have representatives from within Poland who would be Socialists.

MR. HARRIMAN pointed out that Zulawski, who was a prominent Socialist, had been mentioned.

MR. MOLOTOV said it was better to discuss this in Moscow than to take counsel with the Poles. He was not talking of an ideal solution, but of some progress. He hoped that Moscow would confirm the view he had expressed and that it would be possible to do something for the Poles at this Conference.

MR. EDEN said that we could not invite Poles here until we have a Polish Government which we all recognize.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that Argentina had been invited and said that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provide for every new member of the Organization being invited by agreement of the five great powers. It had also been agreed that only those who had declared war before March 1 were to be invited to the Conference. This principle had been violated, but as regards Poland we could not make even one step forward. He was confident that the Soviet Govern-

ment was not the only one which would be embittered by this. Could we not find what step we could take forward?

THE SECRETARY said this was very clear. We could carry out the Crimea decision on consultation with democratic leaders from within and without Poland who would form the new Provisional Government of National Unity which we would all recognize and which would immediately take its place at the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV said the Crimea decision did not state that it was impossible to invite the present Provisional Government if the new Government had not been established. He had not pointed this out at the Conference because he was reluctant to emphasize our differences. He would inform Moscow of this conversation. Perhaps he would receive some instructions before he left San Francisco.

MR. EDEN said we were in a difficult situation. It was important to show the world that we were moving toward agreement.

MR. MOLOTOV asked what could we do here in the absence of the Poles. He was assured that if Mikolajczyk were invited, that would constitute a great step forward.

THE SECRETARY said we had not previously heard of the approval of Mikolajczyk.

MR. MOLOTOV said he was informed that Stalin had written to Prime Minister Churchill on this matter.⁸ He repeated could we not take some step forward at this Conference.

MR. EDEN said that supposing it were possible to agree on the Poles from within Poland and the two Ambassadors return to Moscow, could they not agree on a new government before the end of the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired how we could settle this matter without the Poles. He suggested a more modest program which was:

1. Decide which three Poles we invite from London.
2. The Moscow Commission members proceed to Moscow and there decide whom to invite from within Poland.
3. The Polish Government be invited to the Conference on the condition that their delegation be reconstituted when the Polish Government is reorganized.

Perhaps we might think of these suggestions.

THE SECRETARY said he thought we had gone as far as we could now and that we should consider the problem and meet again.

MR. EDEN said it was difficult to agree on the people from London without knowing who was coming from within Poland. Mikolajczyk would be certain to ask whom he was to meet.

MR. MOLOTOV said that Mikolajczyk was always inclined to delay matters.

⁸ Apparently, reference is to Marshal Stalin's message of April 24 to Prime Minister Churchill; see footnote 89, p. 264.

PART II

MR. MOLOTOV inquired when the Soviet amendments could be discussed.

THE SECRETARY proposed, and it was agreed, that a meeting for this purpose be held at 9:00 p. m. He had four additional points which he wished to mention briefly. We were receiving many questions about the fifteen Polish leaders who had disappeared. The State Department had no information on the matter.

MR. MOLOTOV said he also had no information, but would get in touch with Moscow.

MR. EDEN also expressed the interest of his Government in this question.

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862.014/4-1845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1945—6 p. m.

1000. Please seek an early interview with Vyshinsky and deliver a written memorandum reading somewhat as follows:

The Government of the United States America has received and taken due note of the communication setting forth the status of the Free City of Danzig and certain pre-1937 German territory now under Soviet occupation which was addressed in April 1945 by Vyshinsky to Mr. Harriman and which read: (Quote text in your 1252, April 18, midnight.⁹)

The statement of the Soviet Government to the effect that the establishment and the competence of the indigenous Polish civil administrations set up in Soviet-occupied German territory have no relation to the question of boundaries of Poland is welcomed by the American Government. In such circumstances, it is the understanding of the Government of the United States that the occupied German areas so administered remain effectively under Soviet occupation with the local administration entrusted as a matter of convenience to indigenous Polish officials who are in no way agents of or responsible to the Provisional Polish Government now functioning in Warsaw but who act as administrative officials for the Soviet Union as occupying power. Thus the presumption of the American Government in regard to German territory so administered is that it remains enemy territory under Soviet occupation and subject to the agreements and understandings of the Allied powers with respect to occupied German territory.

After presenting this memorandum you should state orally that your Government is naturally desirous that the status of enemy ter-

⁹ *Ante*, p. 231.

ritory under Allied occupation should not be changed unilaterally by an occupying power without prior consultation and agreement between the several United Nations directly concerned. In concluding your visit, you should add that you would be happy to transmit to your Government any further comments in the premises that the Soviet Government may desire to communicate through you.

Please report telegraphically action taken and, for the Department's records, transmit by air mail pouch copies of all the communications between the Embassy and the Foreign Office on this subject. The comments in the Embassy's telegrams nos. 1091 and 1251^{9a} have been very helpful and were much appreciated here.

GREW

862.014/5-445 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 4, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received May 4—3:30 p. m.]

1467. Personal for Durbrow.¹⁰ Since I cannot take action before Monday on Department's 1000, May 3, 6 p. m., concerning Polish administration in certain German districts I am taking the opportunity to let you know how I feel about it. This instruction is one which it would cause me considerable anguish to carry out. I have in mind the interpretation the Russians will put on our action if we feign ignorance or disbelief of a situation which neither the Soviet Government nor the Warsaw Government has been at any pains to conceal and which is common knowledge to every sparrow in eastern Europe. When the Warsaw Government has passed a decree incorporating certain of these districts formally into its own state system; when this has been duly reported by the *Pravda* itself; when we have photographs showing the leaders of the Warsaw Government participating in the ceremonies of incorporation of the territories into Warsaw Poland; when we know that both provincial and municipal officials have been appointed directly by the Warsaw authorities; when we see that Drobner,¹¹ until recently a Cabinet member of the Warsaw regime and by no stretch of the imagination an "indigenous official", has been appointed Mayor of Breslau; when we would not be able to point to a single difference in treatment between these districts and the remaining portions of Poland under Warsaw rule—when all these facts are before us, I fail to see how we can seriously pretend to believe that

^{9a} *Ante*, pp. 205 and 229, respectively.

¹⁰ Elbridge Durbrow, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs.

¹¹ Boleslaw Drobner, a left-wing Polish Socialist who had been in charge of labor welfare, social security, and health in the Polish Committee of National Liberation at Lublin but was not included in the Polish Provisional Government established on December 31, 1944.

local administration has merely been entrusted as a matter of convenience to indigenous Polish officials in no way agents of or responsible to the provisional government now functioning in Warsaw. For us to take this position could only mean to the Russians that we are eager to sanction their unilateral action but are afraid to admit this frankly to our own public and that we will leap at the pretext, however flimsy, to conceal the real situation.

I feel that this sort of connivance on our part at Soviet attempts to mask the real nature of their activities in Eastern Europe creates a most deplorable impression on the Soviet mind and one which cuts smack across our present line of policy toward other questions involving Poland and Central Europe.

It seems to me the best thing we and the British could do at this stage would be to recognize the Soviet action in Eastern Germany for what it is, to express publicly our regret over this unilateral evasion of our agreements concerning the treatment of Germany and to make it plain that we now consider ourselves free to dispose of German territory in the west to our Western Allies on similar conditions, without reference to the views of the Soviet Government. This solution would not restore the *status quo ante* in Eastern Germany; but it would at least make the best of a bad situation, give us a chance of acquiring some needed merit in the eyes of our Western Allies and teach the Russians an overdue lesson.

If you give me the word I will proceed to act on this instruction without further remonstrance but I would appreciate your confirmation that the Department has really given thought to all its angles and implications and that an official questioning of my instructions on my part would not be useful.¹²

KENNAN

860C.01/5-445

*Memorandum by the Appointed Ambassador to Poland (Lane) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹³

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1945.

On April 5, 1945 I submitted a memorandum¹⁴ (supported by a chronology, regarding the proposed establishment of a United States

¹² Telegram 1018, May 5, 1 p. m., to Moscow directed the Chargé to withhold action on Department's telegram 1000 pending the receipt of further instructions (862.014/4-1845).

¹³ According to Ambassador Lane, the Acting Secretary of State read this memorandum in the Ambassador's presence and agreed with it fully. See Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People* (New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948), p. 107.

¹⁴ For text of pertinent portions of Ambassador Lane's memorandum of April 5, see *ibid.*, pp. 86-88.

Embassy in Poland) to the Secretary setting forth my recommendations on the Polish question. The essence of my discussion of the problem is contained in the last two paragraphs, with footnote, of the memorandum :

“Appeasement or apparent appeasement can be as dangerous to United States interests in 1945 as it actually was in 1940 and 1941.

“Sooner or later the facts regarding the Soviet actions in Poland, as well as elsewhere, and the deterioration of Soviet-American relations will become more fully known to the American public. The question arises as to when it would be advisable in our national interest to place publicly the responsibility for the difficulties in the settlement of the Polish problem squarely on the Soviet Government, where it belongs. Such a public statement should refer to the efforts on our part at Yalta and elsewhere to effect the closest possible working agreement with the Soviet Government. It should indicate how greatly we regret having been brought to the conclusion, by the recent actions and attitude of that Government, that it is not equally concerned in the importance of effectively carrying out the terms of the Crimea agreement. Consideration should be given to the advisability of specifically referring to the breakdown of the Moscow conversations and the evident intention of the Soviet Government and the puppet regime now set up in Warsaw to prevent democratic Poles from outside of Poland taking part in the formation of a representative Polish Government.*”

Since April 5 there have taken place the abortive conversations in Washington with Molotov and Eden, the further telegraphic exchanges between President Truman, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, and the present conversations at San Francisco between the three Foreign Secretaries.

The San Francisco conversations have been characterized, both officially and in the press, as presenting a more hopeful picture of the Polish question because of the reported willingness of Marshal Stalin to permit Mikolajczyk and perhaps Grabski or Stanczyk to proceed to Moscow in accordance with the terms of the Yalta agreement. The record does not, however, justify optimism. No American or British observers of the Moscow commission have been permitted to enter Poland to investigate conditions; 15 Polish underground leaders, under assurances of their personal safety, left for a conference with Soviet authorities on March 29 and have not been heard from since; in other “liberated” countries in which Soviet military forces have control, our representatives are confronted with the greatest obstacles in obtaining

*The technical steps to be taken would include acceptance of the resignation of the Ambassador, assignment of the staff in Washington to other duties, and leaving a chargé d'affaires ad interim near the Polish Government in London. [Footnote in the original.]

information. Even should Mikolajczyk proceed to Moscow, what assurance can we have that he will be allowed to participate in the formation of a free, democratic and independent government or that he will not disappear in the same manner as the 15 underground leaders? In my opinion Stalin, sensing that President Truman intends to adopt a strong stand with respect to Poland, is now endeavoring to temporize by offering a concession, already agreed upon at Yalta.

I view with grave apprehension any public manifestation of hopefulness on our part. Not only is such an attitude an encouragement to the Soviet Government to persist in its present policy to prevent the formation of a truly democratic and independent government but it gives to the American people an erroneous impression of the present state of relations between Great Britain and ourselves, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other.

There is only one satisfactory solution: to stand firm on our final position as communicated in President Truman's message of April 18 and in Mr. Churchill's telegram of April 28 to Marshal Stalin.¹⁶ Any deviation or compromise on our part will be interpreted as weakness by the Soviet Government and will merely serve to encourage it to make further demands or conditions. It would, furthermore, be disastrous to the prestige and interests of the United States.

I recall your telling me on April 25 at Blair House that the Department would maintain a strong position with respect to Poland. Since my convictions conform so fully to such a stand, I feel the present moment appropriate for me to state that it is only on the basis of the maintenance of this position that I could conscientiously continue in my present position.

ARTHUR BLISS LANE

860C.01/5-445

*President Truman to the Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*¹⁷

[WASHINGTON,] 4 May, 1945.

Replying to your message of 24 April, Prime Minister Churchill has sent me a copy of his message to you of April 28. Since you are

¹⁶ Prime Minister Churchill's message of April 28 to Marshal Stalin was transmitted to President Truman as the Prime Minister's telegram No. 21, April 29, p. 265.

¹⁷ The Secretary of State, in his telegram 19, May 2, 1945, from the United Nations Conference at San Francisco to the Acting Secretary of State, reported on his meeting of May 2 with Foreign Commissar Molotov and Foreign Secretary Eden and concluded as follows: "In spite of the lack of progress here, I believe the President should now acknowledge Marshal Stalin's message and I am sending a proposed text in my next following telegram. I feel that it would be helpful for the President to make clear to Marshal Stalin that we have no intention of inviting the Warsaw Poles to the conference." (860C.01/5-245)

aware of the position of the United States Government from the messages you have received from President Roosevelt and myself, I need hardly tell you that in regard to the reorganization of the Polish Government I agree with the views Mr. Churchill has expressed in his message of April 28. This Government still considers that the Crimea decisions constitute a fair basis for the settlement of the Polish question and should be carried out.

The meetings of the three foreign secretaries on the Polish matter have not yet produced a formula which is satisfactory. I consider it of the utmost importance that a satisfactory solution of the problem be worked out as soon as possible. I must tell you that any suggestion that the representatives of the Warsaw Provisional Government be invited to San Francisco, conditionally or otherwise, is wholly unacceptable to the United States Government. To do so would be the acceptance by the United States Government of the present Warsaw Provisional Government as representative of Poland which would be tantamount to the abandonment of the Yalta agreement.

500.CC/5-445

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State*¹⁸

Present—The Secretary	Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Eden	Ambassador Gromyko
Mr. Molotov	Mr. Dunn
Lord Cranborne ¹⁹	Mr. Pavlov
Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Birse ²⁰
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Bohlen

THE SECRETARY said that he had asked Mr. Molotov to meet with him and Mr. Eden to discuss the Polish question. He said that at their last meeting Mr. Molotov had intended to consult his Government in regard to certain suggestions which had been put forth. Last night, however, just before his dinner, Mr. Molotov had told him that he understood, as did Sir Archibald Clark Kerr that the Polish leaders concerning whom an inquiry had been made for some time by the British and American Governments, had been arrested on charges of

¹⁸ Meeting held May 4, 1945, 10 p. m., at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California.

¹⁹ Viscount Cranborne, British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Delegate to the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco.

²⁰ Major Birse, interpreter for the United Kingdom delegation to the San Francisco Conference.

diversionist acts against the Red Army. He had conveyed this information to President Truman who had been seriously disturbed at the implication of this action of the Soviet Government and had also talked the matter over with Mr. Eden. He had felt it was necessary, under the circumstances, to have a frank discussion.

MR. EDEN said that Mr. Molotov would recall that when he saw him yesterday afternoon at the Soviet Consulate, he had asked about this group of Poles and Mr. Molotov had no information to give him. However, later in the evening, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr had told him of Mr. Molotov's news. He said he must tell his two friends that he was very gravely perturbed at Mr. Molotov's announcement. He said he wished to emphasize that they knew nothing about General Okulicki and had not made inquiries about him. However, if the sixteen included those about which inquiry had been made to the British Government, he must say that he was astounded and shocked since the British Government knew them to be patriots and democrats who had outstanding records of resistance to the Germans and who, furthermore, stood for friendly relations with Russia. It was for this reason that we considered some of those leaders suitable for inclusion in the list for consultation with the Moscow Commission. He said the British Government must ask Mr. Molotov for the fullest information concerning these men, the circumstances of their arrest, et cetera.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had not had the information yesterday afternoon when Mr. Eden called and that he had only received the telegram containing the news before dinner and had immediately told Mr. Stettinius and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. He said that the telegram did not contain names or details but since it was in answer to his message regarding the fifteen Poles who were said to have disappeared, he inferred that it referred to them. He said the telegram stated sixteen had been arrested by the Soviet military authorities and would stand trial for diversionist acts committed against the Red Army which had led to the death of more than one hundred officers and men. He said that many English newspapers had published very one-sided information concerning this matter and had not mentioned General Okulicki. He said this man was the principal figure in the group and was well known to the Soviet authorities as an open enemy of the Soviet Union. He had been Chief of Staff to General Anders. Mr. Molotov added that in addition to the activities which had caused the death of one hundred officers and soldiers under the direction of General Okulicki they had operated an illegal radio station on Polish territory. Under these conditions, it was not to be expected that the Soviet authorities would remain indifferent or inactive; that in any event, the facts would come out in the trial. Mr. Molotov concluded

by saying that he could understand that the President should be upset at this development but he repeated his statement that the Soviet authorities had no other course.

MR. EDEN repeated that he wished again to state that he knew nothing of General Okulicki and for all he knew he might be guilty but as to the others it was a different matter. He said that he knew the arrest of these democratic leaders would create a most disturbing impression in England and he believed also in the U. S. This action on the part of the Soviet Government would certainly not help a solution of the Polish matter. He must ask for the fullest information from Mr. Molotov and until he had consulted his Government, he could not continue conversations here in regard to Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the British Government should inform themselves in regard to the activities of General Okulicki.

MR. EDEN repeated that they had no reports concerning his activities and that their interests centered in the others who were regarded as patriotic and democratic Polish leaders, friendly to Russia. He said that the British had been very anxious to work with the Soviet Union and had done everything possible to that end, but frankly, it was difficult to believe, with the exception of General Okulicki, that these democratic leaders had been guilty of the charges.

MR. MOLOTOV said that General Okulicki was well known as an enemy to the Soviet Government. In regard to the others, it was possible that not all would be equally guilty. In any event, this would emerge in the proper time at the trial. He added that some of the men arrested might be on the British list for consultation but the majority were not.

MR. EDEN said he had one other question; namely, was there any truth in the report that these Poles had been approached by General Ivanov with a view to discussing a basis for broadening the present provisional Government? He said that reports indicated that this contact had been made at the end of March.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that General Ivanov had no authority or right to carry on political [discussions?].

MR. EDEN said he merely wished to know whether the fourteen Poles about whom inquiry had been made had gone with General Ivanov.

MR. MOLOTOV said he did not know the details but repeated that General Ivanov had no political mission. He then repeated what he had said before about General Okulicki and the holding of the trial at which proof of the charges would be examined.

THE SECRETARY said that he could only associate himself with what Mr. Eden had said and add that this development would have a most unfortunate effect on American public opinion.

MR. MOLOTOV said he regretted that but he again wished to state that there had been one-sided reports in the British press since no mention had been made of General Okulicki who was the leading figure and a well known enemy of the Soviet Union. He said the other men arrested had been connected with General Okulicki. He repeated that the Soviet authorities could not remain indifferent with over 100 officers and men murdered as a result of the activities of these Poles as Russia had had many casualties in this war and the life of every soldier was dear to her.

THE SECRETARY said that he must repeat that this would have a disturbing effect on American opinion in the U. S. and neither the Government nor the people of this country would understand why, at this time, the Soviet authorities should prosecute democratic Polish leaders.

MR. MOLOTOV said he was sure that Marshal Stalin would inform President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill directly about this matter.

In conclusion, both THE SECRETARY and MR. EDEN said that until they had an opportunity to consult with their Governments and to receive a full explanation from the Soviet Government, the conversations on Poland would have to be suspended.

MR. EDEN added that it would be difficult to explain why it had taken the Soviet Union so long to reply to the inquiry from the British Government which had first been made over four weeks ago.

740.00119 EW/5-545 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

[Extract—Paraphrase]

[LONDON,] May 5, 1945.

33. I am very much obliged to you for number 25.²² I am also most concerned about the fate of the 15 Polish representatives in view of statement made by Mr. Molotov to Stettinius at San Francisco that they had been arrested by the Red Army, and I think that you and I should consult together very carefully upon this matter. If these Poles were enticed into Russian [hands] and are now no longer alive, one cannot quite tell how far such a crime would influence the future. I am in entire agreement with Mr. Eden's views and actions. I hope he will soon pass through Washington on his homeward journey and that you will talk it all over with him.

²² Not printed: it quoted for Churchill's information the text of Truman's message of May 4 to Stalin, p. 280.

860C.01/5-545

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman*²³

[Translation]

Since you are interested in the Polish question and should be familiar with Mr. Churchill's message to me concerning this question, dated April 28,²⁴ I feel it appropriate to transmit to you the full text of my reply to Mr. Churchill, sent to him on May 4, 1945.

MAY 5, 1945.

[Enclosure—Translation]

Copy of Message From the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)

I have received your message of April 28, 1945, on the subject of the Polish question.

I am obliged to say that I cannot agree with the arguments which you advance in support of your position.

1. You are inclined to regard the suggestion that the example of Yugoslavia should be taken as a model for Poland as a repudiation of the procedure agreed between us for the creation of a Polish Government of National Unity. This cannot be admitted. The example of Yugoslavia is important, it seems to me, first of all because it points the way toward the most expedient and practical solution of the problem of establishing a new united government, when a governmental organ exercising state authority in the country is taken as a basis for this.

2. It is quite clear that unless the presently acting provisional Polish government, based on the support and trust of the majority of the Polish people, is taken as the basis for the future government of national unity, there is no possibility of expecting a successful solution of the problem placed before us by the Crimean Conference.

I am unable to share your views on the subject of Greece in the passage where you suggest that the Three Powers should supervise elections. Such supervision in relation to the people of an Allied State could not be regarded otherwise than as an insult to that people and a flagrant interference with its internal life. Such supervision

²³ Transmitted on May 5, 1945, to the Acting Secretary of State by the Soviet Chargé, Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov.

²⁴ See Prime Minister Churchill's telegram 21, April 29, to President Truman, p. 265.

is unnecessary in relation to the former satellite States which have subsequently declared war on Germany and joined the Allies, as has been shown by the experience of the elections which have taken place, for instance, in Finland;²⁵ here elections have been held without any outside intervention and have led to constructive results.

Your remarks concerning Belgium and Poland as theatres of war and corridors of communication are entirely justified. It is a question of Poland's peculiar position as a neighbor State of the Soviet Union which demands that the future Polish government should actively strive for friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, which is likewise in the interest of all other freedom-loving nations. This is a further argument for following the example of Yugoslavia. The United Nations are concerned that there should be a firm and lasting friendship between the Soviet Union and Poland. Consequently we cannot be satisfied that persons should be associated with the formation of the future Polish government who, as you express it, "are not fundamentally anti-Soviet," or that only those persons should be excluded from participation in this work who are in your opinion "extremely unfriendly towards Russia." Neither of these criteria can satisfy us. We insist, and shall insist, that there should be brought into consultation on the formation of the future Polish government only those persons who have actively shown a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union and who are honestly and sincerely prepared to co-operate with the Soviet State.

3. I must comment especially on paragraph 11 of your message, in which you mention difficulties arising as a result of rumors of the arrest of fifteen Poles, of deportations and so forth.

As to this, I can inform you that the group of Poles to which you refer consists not of fifteen but of sixteen persons, and is headed by the well-known Polish general, Okulicki. In view of his especially odious character the British Information Service is careful to be silent on the subject of this Polish general, who "disappeared" together with the fifteen other Poles who are said to have done likewise. But we do not propose to be silent on this subject. This party of sixteen individuals headed by General Okulicki was arrested by the military authorities on the Soviet front and is undergoing investigation in Moscow. General Okulicki's group, and especially the General himself, are accused of planning and carrying out diversionary acts in the rear of the Red Army which resulted in the loss of over 100 fighters and officers of that Army, and are also accused of maintain-

²⁵ The March 16-17 Finnish elections resulted in substantial gains for left-wing parties inclined toward more friendly relations with the Soviet Union; large gains were made by the Communist Party. For an appraisal of these Finnish elections, see telegram 128, March 23, 5 p. m., from Helsinki, vol. iv, p. 611.

ing illegal wireless transmitting stations in the rear of our troops, which is contrary to law. All or some of them, according to the results of the investigation, will be handed over for trial. This is the manner in which it is necessary for the Red Army to defend its troops and its rear from diversionists and disturbers of order.

The British Information Service is disseminating rumors of the murder or shooting of Poles in Sedlitz. These statements of the British Information Service are complete fabrications, and have evidently been suggested to it by agents of Arciszewski.

4. It appears from your message that you are not prepared to regard the Polish Provisional Government as the foundation of the future Government of National Unity, and that you are not prepared to accord it its rightful position in that Government. I must say frankly that such an attitude excludes the possibility of an agreed solution of the Polish question.

MAY 4, 1945.

[For statement by the Secretary of State at San Francisco on May 5, 1945, regarding the concern of the United States Government over the arrest of prominent Polish democratic leaders by Soviet authorities, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1945, page 850.]

500.CC/5-745

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Acting Secretary of State

The Polish Ambassador presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honor to bring the following to his attention.

On May 6th, 1945 the Polish Government sent the following appeal to Secretary of State Stettinius in San Francisco in his capacity of Chairman of the United Nations Conference :

“The declaration made at San Francisco by Mr. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Secretary of State Stettinius and Mr. Eden, that a group of Polish democratic leaders has been arrested by Soviet authorities on the charge of ‘diversionary activities’ against the Red Army, has confirmed the worst fears of the Polish Government. The Polish Government has been keeping the American and British Governments informed of the true state of affairs in this connection ever since the second half of February when the Soviet Government first invited Mr. Jankowski, the Vice Premier of the Polish Government, and Major General Leopold Okulicki, former Commander-in-Chief of the disbanded Home Army, to initiate conversations which later were held between March 17 and 27 with the above men-

tioned Vice Premier of the Polish Government, its three Ministers²⁶ who were active in Poland and leaders of Political Parties. The Soviet authorities emphasized the necessity of reaching an understanding 'in order to clear the atmosphere to let the parties which remained underground to come into the open and join in the common current of democratic forces of independent Poland.' Anxious to prove their best intentions to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union and trusting in the guarantee of personal safety accorded them by General Ivanov together with the promise to provide them with air transport to enable them to go to London for consultations with the Polish Government and Polish political circles and then to return to Poland, the fourteen Polish leaders accompanied by an interpreter, arrived on March 27 and 28 at Pruszkow near Warsaw for a meeting with General Ivanov.

"In the light of the above facts it is quite evident that in first inviting the Polish leaders to the conference and then arresting them, the Soviet authorities abused the good faith of the Polish Delegates and broke the promises accorded to them.

"After over a month's silence, to raise unfounded charges against men who for five years had led the struggle of the Polish Nation against the Germans and who later, from March, 1944 until January, 1945, gallantly supported the Red army in armed combat, cannot convince anyone who is impartial and honest. The Soviet accusation is directed against the best sons of Poland who fought for true independence of their country and for real democracy. They are now facing the grave danger of a trial without the possibility of defense and of a verdict in camera. Therefore the Polish Government urgently appeals to the Governments of all the United Nations to do all that is in their power to induce the Soviet Government immediately to set free the leaders of the Polish Underground Movement and to guarantee personal safety to them and to their families."

This message of the Polish Government was handed to the Secretary of State on May 7th, 1945 by Mr. Władysław Sokołowski, Consul General of Poland in San Francisco.²⁷

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1945.

862.014/5-845 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1945—11 a. m.

1033. Please seek an early interview with Vishinsky and deliver to him a written memorandum reading in substance as follows:

²⁶ Adam Bien, Stanisław Jasiukowicz, and Antoni Pajdak.

²⁷ A covering letter from Mr. Sokolowski requested that the Secretary of State communicate the message to the heads of all the delegations to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco.

“The Government of the USA has received the communication setting forth the status of the Free City of Danzig and certain pre-1937 German territory under Soviet military occupation which was addressed on April 17, 1945 by Vishinsky to Mr. Harriman. (Your tel. 1252, April 18 midnight.)

The United States Government fails to understand the statement in Mr. Vishinsky's letter to the effect that the establishment and competence of the Polish civil administrations set up in the Free City of Danzig and certain Soviet occupied German territory have no relation to the question of the future boundaries of Poland. This statement and other statements in Vishinsky's communication give rise to the impression that the Free City of Danzig and occupied German areas so administered remain effectively under Soviet military occupation with the local administration thereof entrusted only as a matter of convenience to indigenous Polish officials who are in no way the agents of or responsible to the Provisional Polish Government now functioning in Warsaw. The United States Government is unable to reconcile the assertions of the Soviet Government with the numerous reports and public statements made to the effect that the Polish Provisional Government now functioning in Warsaw has by decree formally incorporated into its state system certain enemy territory occupied by the Red Army and has appointed Poles from Poland proper as municipal and provincial officials to administer such enemy territory as integral parts of Poland. Moreover, additional reports from Poland ascribed to official sources there indicate among other things that the Provisional Polish Government now functioning in Warsaw is (1) setting up its complete state apparatus and enforcing its laws in these areas, (2) engaged already in a large scale transfer of Poles from other areas to this enemy territory and (3) planning the extension of its administration over additional enemy territory now under Soviet military occupation. Such reports declare that these and similar acts attributed to the Provisional Polish Government now functioning in Warsaw have been effected with the full knowledge and approval of the Soviet occupation authorities.

In the above circumstances, the United States Government informs the Soviet Government that changes such as these in the status of occupied enemy territory arising from the unilateral action of the occupying power without prior consultation and agreement between the several United Nations concerned disregard the principles upon which the agreements setting up the control machinery for Germany²⁸ and the Protocols on the occupation were based. The Government of the United States wishes to make it clear that the Free City of Danzig and occupied German territory now subjected to Polish administration, as well as all other enemy territory held by the Red Army, remain in fact enemy territory under Soviet military occupation, and must be held as such pending the conclusion of such agreements and understandings as may be reached after full and complete consultation and deliberation between the Allied powers concerned.”

²⁸ For text of the agreement between the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on control machinery for Germany, signed in London, November 14, 1944, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 124; TIAS, No. 3070; or 5 UST 2062.

After presenting the memorandum you may in your discretion furnish Vishinsky orally with citations to articles in the Soviet and Polish press of the type mentioned in the Embassy telegrams Nos. 1090 [1091?] and 1674 [1467?] of April 9 and May 4, respectively. You should likewise inform him that your Government is naturally prepared to recognize the western frontier of Poland when delimited in accordance with the applicable decisions of the Crimea Conference but that we must until such time insist that no transfer be made of enemy territory under Soviet occupation to the Polish Provisional Government now functioning in Poland.

GREW

860C.01/5-945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SAN FRANCISCO, May 9, 1945.

[Received May 9—9:01 p. m.]

9. It is proposed that Ambassadors Harriman and Clark Kerr proceed to London to explore in conversations with the Prime Minister and Mikolajczyk the possibility of agreeing directly upon a new provisional government of national unity based on agreement as to the actual persons making up the government and the cabinet positions they would occupy. It would, in any event, be useful to know what Mikolajczyk's minimum requirements are. Harriman would report back to Washington, and, upon the basis of his reports, he would be given instructions concerning further conversations in Moscow. Harriman will discuss this more fully with you and the President.

In preliminary conversations here on the suggested talks in London, Eden seemed to be favorable, subject to the approval of the President and Prime Minister.

Please inform the President of the foregoing.

[STETTINIUS]

[For documentation during May 1945 with respect to the deadlock in the negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union regarding the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as a factor in the convocation of a tripartite conference of the Heads of Government at Potsdam, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945*, volume I, pages 3-20, *passim*.]

500.CC/5-945

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State*³⁰

Present—The Secretary	Dr. Bowman ³¹
Mr. Eden	Mr. Allen
Mr. Dunn	Mr. Bohlen
Ambassador Harriman	Mr. Thompson
Ambassador Clark Kerr	Mr. McCloy ³²

THE SECRETARY said that he had asked Mr. Eden to come to consider further steps in relation to the Polish problem. Ambassador Harriman outlined the present position and said he felt, despite the Prime Minister's cable,³³ that the proposal to telescope the stage of consultations with the stage of the formation of the government was a good one and not a step backward. If we did nothing now, the matter might die and it was important to maintain our position and not give the impression by silence that we were accepting the Soviet thesis as set forth in Marshal Stalin's cable.³⁴ He said he was not concerned so much about the details of the percentage of non-Lublin representation as he was to see Mikolajczyk. He had always been afraid that we might make some agreement which Mikolajczyk would not or could not accept and thus lose our greatest asset. He thought it would be a good idea if he and Clark Kerr were to go to London, see Prime Minister Churchill and Molotov in regard to the type of reorganization of the Polish Government which would be acceptable and then after referring to Washington, with the approval of the President and the Prime Minister, put it personally before Stalin when they returned to Moscow. In reply to the Secretary's question, Ambassador Harriman explained that it was not a new proposal to take to Stalin but a telescoping of some steps in the process. He said he felt that Stalin cared more for the general state of relations with the U. S. and Great Britain than Molotov, and it was possible that Stalin would prefer on balance a partially friendly Poland to a fully controlled Poland which they would regard as entirely friendly at the expense of strain in his overall relations with the U. S. and Great Britain. He said that while the

³⁰ Meeting held May 9, 1945, 11 a. m., at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California.

³¹ Isaiah Bowman, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State and Adviser to the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference.

³² John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.

³³ Reference may be to Churchill's telegram of May 4 to Eden, the text of which was subsequently transmitted to President Truman in Churchill's telegram 41, May 11, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. 1, p. 6.

³⁴ Presumably, the reference is either to Stalin's message of April 24 to Truman, p. 263, or to Stalin's message of May 4 to Churchill, a copy of which was transmitted to Truman on May 5, p. 285.

three heads of government would undoubtedly have to discuss this subject when and if they met, he felt they would not have time in any such meeting to go into great detail and it would, therefore, be invaluable to have some preliminary work done so as to narrow the issues for their consideration. At Mr. Eden's suggestion, Mr. Allen read the text of Stalin's last reply to Prime Minister Churchill.³⁵ The Secretary observed that since this reply had come prior to their talk with Molotov on the subject of the sixteen Poles, Stalin's reference to this matter could not be taken as an answer to our request for a fuller explanation.

MR. EDEN then remarked on the question of the meeting of the three heads of government that yesterday he had spoken with Mr. Molotov concerning the Foreign Ministers meeting some time in the near future in London and found him responsive. He also found Mr. Molotov responsive to the idea of a Big 3 meeting. In the circumstances, Mr. Eden felt that there was a possibility that the Prime Minister did not want to put forward any plan in regard to Poland before he and the President had met with Stalin. He added, however, that this possibility did not in any way affect the desirability of the two Ambassadors going to London to see the Prime Minister and Mikolajczyk.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said he would go to London with a complete open mind but that he did feel some ground must be prepared before the Big 3 meeting. In any event, he thought it very important that Stalin should realize that the Polish question was a very serious one.

THE SECRETARY said he did not believe it possible for the President to consider meeting the Prime Minister and Stalin before the end of the San Francisco Conference. There was some discussion at this point as to the length of the Conference and the amount of paper work that had to be done. The Secretary remarked in this connection that the Secretariat had processed 800,000 pieces of paper in five languages yesterday and he felt that the organization of the Secretariat was an exceptionally efficient one.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN returning to the subject of Poland said that his plans were to leave San Francisco this afternoon and to spend a couple of days in Washington, then on to London and to France to see General Eisenhower, and finally back to Moscow.

MR. EDEN said he thought it would be well for him to let the Prime Minister know they were coming, subject, of course, to the approval of President Truman.

MR. DUNN inquired whether or not we should attempt to go forward

³⁵ Presumably, reference is to Stalin's message of May 4 to Churchill, a copy of which was transmitted to Truman on May 5, p. 285.

with the Polish matter until we had heard from the Russians in regard to the sixteen arrested Poles.

MR. EDEN answered that he had understood that conversations in San Francisco only had been terminated by this subject and we should wait and see what developed on this matter to which Ambassador Harriman agreed.

AMBASSADOR CLARK KERR remarked that there had been some indications that some of these Poles might be let off because of lack of evidence.

Department of Defense Files

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman

[Moscow,] 10 May 1945.

I have received your message of May 5 on the Polish question.

The day before I sent you the text of my reply to Mr. Churchill to his message of April 28 on the same question. This text, I hope, you have now received.

Therefore it seems to me that there is no necessity to dwell again on this question. I think it necessary to add only the following.

As it seems to me you do not agree to regard the Provisional Polish Government as basis for the future government of national unity and do not agree that the Provisional Polish Government should occupy in this government a place which rightfully belongs to it. I must say that such a position does not give opportunity to reach a harmonious solution on the Polish question.

862.014/5-1145: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 11, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received May 11—5:10 p. m.]

1540. Pursuant to instructions set forth in Department's 1033, May 8, 11 a. m., I saw Vyshinski this afternoon, delivered to him a memorandum along the lines set forth in the Department's telegram and read the contents of it to him in Russian. He was clearly disconcerted by this communication and it was difficult to make anything definite out of his remarks, which were somewhat confused. After reading him the document, I stated that I could show him numerous reports indicating that these districts had been placed under the authority of the Warsaw Government. He replied by saying that re-

ports of this nature were well known to his Government; that it was entirely natural that things should be this way; that it was impossible to prevent a local Polish administration from recognizing the authority of the Polish Government which was recognized by the Soviet Union. He added ironically that after all Russia could hardly be expected to ask Polish officials to acknowledge the authority of the London Government in the existing circumstances.

I said that I took it from his words that he acknowledged that these territories had been turned over to the authority of the Polish Provisional Government. To this he replied hastily that he was not prepared to acknowledge or deny anything whatsoever, that his Government would have to have time to acquaint itself with the communication that I had made, that he was not authorized to make any official statements about it at this time, and that he would submit it to his Government. He stated that he thought, however, that his communication of April 15 would effectively answer my *aide-mémoire* and that the Soviet Government would have nothing to add to that. I told him that I did not think his communication of April 15 would answer our questions at all and pointed out that it was specifically the statements made in that letter that we failed to understand.

He then said that his communication of April 15 had related only to Danzig and that the future of that city was not finally settled. He reiterated that the Soviet authorities had found it necessary to set up a Polish administration there and he thought it natural that that administration should recognize the authority of the Warsaw Government. I pointed out that neither his note nor my *aide-mémoire* related solely to the question of Danzig. I said that it was not a question of the establishment of a local administration. We, too, had set up civil administrations with the help of local inhabitants in our zone of occupation in Germany and, incidentally, had been severely criticized for doing so by Soviet publicists such as Ehrenburg. The question was to whom such civil administration should be subordinated. We could understand that it might be responsible to the local Russian commanders but we could not understand its being made responsible to other authorities not concerned with the occupation of Germany. In this connection I repeated that we had numerous reports which indicated that this last was exactly what had been done in the districts of Poland to which I referred.

Vyshinski then said that there were all sorts of press reports and that one could not put much credence in them, particularly in some of them that came from America. I replied that however that might be, I did not think he would be inclined to dispute the seriousness of the Polpress as a source and I read to him an item which had appeared in Polpress for March, to the effect that Bierut, Osobka-Morawski,

and Rola-Zymierski had participated in ceremonies at Katowice on the occasion of the incorporation of Silesia into Poland and that Morawski had also visited Gleiwitz and Zazhe where the military commandants had transferred their power to him and to the Silesian Woewode Zawadski.

Vyshinski then remarked that it had been decided at the Crimea Conference that Poland should get these lands. To this I replied in the sense of the last sentence of the Department's telegram under reference.

I told him in conclusion that for our Government these territories were still parts of Germany occupied by Soviet forces, and that we would be able to view them only in this light in connection with any questions that might arise in connection with them, until such time as it might be agreed otherwise after due consultation and deliberation.

Sent to Department as 1540; repeated to Paris for Murphy ³⁷ as 111.

KENNAN

740.00119 E.W./5-1445: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts] ³⁸

Moscow, May 14, 1945—noon.

[Received 1:07 p. m.]

1563. Personal for Ambassador Harriman. There are several matters connected with our work which are causing me some concern. I am not wiring about them officially for fear that I might unwittingly put statements on record which are counter to your views. I hope you will not mind, however, if I put my thoughts frankly before you in this manner for whatever use you can make of them.

• • • • •

3. Poland. Steve ³⁹ and I get the impression from information telegrams we have received that you and Clark Kerr intend to undertake on your return negotiations looking to direct agreement on the composition of a future Polish Government. From our limited point of vision here we question the advisability of such a move. It seems to us that there could be no better vindication of the correctness, from Russia's standpoint, of the policies the Soviet Government has followed with respect to Poland since the Crimea Conference

³⁷ Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser for Germany.

³⁸ For the portions of this telegram here omitted, dealing with the activities of the Moscow Reparations Commission and the question of the Control Commissions in Bulgaria and Hungary, see vol. III, p. 1211, and vol. IV, p. 813, respectively.

³⁹ Presumably, the reference here is to Francis B. Stevens, Second Secretary of Embassy and Vice Consul in Moscow.

than if we were now to take the initiative in reopening talks with them particularly on a basis other than that agreed at the Crimea. We are never going to have at this juncture anything like a free Poland. In the face of this situation, our position today is a clear one on which we can safely rest our case. If we join with the Russians in cooking up some façade government to mask NKVD control (and that is all they would agree to today) and then help them to put it across by recognizing it and sending our representatives there to play their part in the show, all the issues will be confused, and we shall have tacitly given the stamp of approval to the tactics which were followed by the Russians in March and April in connection with the work of the Commission.

KENNAN

862.014/5-1545 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, May 15, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received May 15—6:41 a. m.]

1580. British Chargé⁴⁰ has sent a long note to Vyshinski setting forth British position regarding establishment of Polish civil administration in Soviet occupied German territory. While the note is less vigorous than the representations made by me on the basis of the Department's 1033 May 8, 11 a. m. it follows in general a parallel line. Roberts states that his Government finds it difficult to reconcile the numerous official statements of the Provisional Government with the assumption of the British Government that local administration in these areas was being entrusted to Polish officials simply on grounds of convenience, that such officials are agents of the Soviet Government as occupying power and not responsible in any way to Polish authority, and that the authority of the Control Commission would extend to these areas within Germany's pre-1937 frontiers just as to American and British zones and other parts of Soviet zone. He asks whether, since administration of these territories is being entrusted to Polish officials, the Soviet Government accepts responsibility for their acts and if not, what the position of the Soviet Government on this question is. He also inquires whether the Soviet Government agrees that the provision of the Crimea Declaration on

⁴⁰ Frank Roberts.

Poland for final delimitation on Poland's western frontiers at the peace conference is interpreted to mean that none of the measures now being effected by Polish authorities within pre-1937 Germany can be understood to establish incorporation of this territory into the Polish state. Finally, he asks for information about the present status of Danzig and the extent of the areas within pre-1937 Germany in which Polish administrative responsibility has been established.

Roberts expects to discuss this matter orally with Vyshinski in a day or so.

KENNAN

862.014/5-1745 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 17, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received May 17—7 p. m.]

1632. ReDeptel 1033, May 8, 11 a. m. and reEmbtel 1540, May 11, 8 p. m. Vyshinski has replied in a note dated May 16 to the memorandum I left with him concerning the establishment of a Polish civil administration in Danzig and certain pre-1937 German territories under Soviet military occupation.

In his reply, which refers only to the establishment of a Polish civil administration in Danzig, Vyshinski states that it is quite natural that the Polish civil administration acting under the direction of the provisional Govt is functioning according to Polish law. He denies that this circumstance can be considered to disregard the principles on which the agreements for establishing control machinery for Germany and the protocols on German occupation were based. In justification of this position he cites the military necessity which he advanced in his letter of April 15 (reEmbtel 1252, April 18, midnight). He insists that it is necessary to keep this fact in mind since the Crimea decision recognized that Poland must receive substantial additional territory to the north and west which, he says, thus not only does not exclude but presupposes the possibility of a Polish administration functioning in this territory. He again emphasizes as self-evident that the final determination of Poland's western boundary will be made at the peace settlement as envisaged in the Crimea decision. *End Summary.*

Dept will note first, that in this note Vyshinski refers only to Danzig and does not mention pre-1937 German territory, second that he does not deny the correctness of any of the statements made in the Dept's 1033, May 8, 11 a. m., concerning measures which have been taken to

transfer these territories to Polish administration, and third that he does not reject our contention that these territories remain in fact enemy territory under Soviet military occupation and must remain as such pending conclusion of final agreements between the Allied powers concerned.

The Soviet Govt may be expected not to overlook the parallel between the situation in Poland and that in the Dodecanese Islands where, according to British press reports available here, the Greek Regent⁴¹ has planted the Greek flag, notwithstanding the position taken by the American Govt as outlined in the Dept's 1050, May 10, 4 p. m.⁴² The London *Daily Worker*⁴³ has reportedly already contrasted this action in the Dodecanese with Allied policy toward Tito⁴⁴ in Venezia Giulia.⁴⁵

KENNAN

740.00119 EW/5-2345: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]⁴⁶

PARIS, May 23, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received May 23—9:50 p. m.]

2913. For the President from Harriman.⁴⁷

I also had a long talk with Mikolajczyk who is most pessimistic about developments in Poland because of the arrest of the Independent Democratic leaders and the solidifying of the Communist program and control of the Warsaw Govt. At the same time he is completely out of sympathy with the unrealistic attitude of the London Polish Govt. His only hope is, of course, that you and Churchill can ameliorate the present trend and prepare the way for free elections by permitting open discussion in Poland.

[Harriman]

CAFFERY

⁴¹ Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens.

⁴² Not printed, but see memorandum to the British Embassy, April 27, and footnote 90, vol. VIII, last section under Greece.

⁴³ Newspaper of the British Communist Party.

⁴⁴ Marshal Josip Broz Tito, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.

⁴⁵ For documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the control of Venezia Giulia, see vol. IV, pp. 1103 ff.

⁴⁶ Another portion of this telegram is printed in *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 20.

⁴⁷ Ambassador Harriman had stopped in London and Paris en route to Moscow from Washington.

[According to a statement released to the press by the White House on May 23, President Truman had requested Mr. Harry Hopkins, Adviser to the President, to undertake a special mission to Moscow. Mr. Hopkins was to proceed in company with Ambassador Harriman to Moscow to converse with Marshal Stalin upon matters under discussion between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States. For text of the announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1945, page 953. Mr. Hopkins left Washington on May 23 and arrived in Moscow on May 25. Between May 26 and June 6, he had six conversations with Marshal Stalin. He left Moscow on June 7 and arrived in Washington on June 12. For further documentation regarding Mr. Hopkins' mission to Moscow, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, volume I, pages 21-62. See also Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948), chapter XXXV.]

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645 : Telegram

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, to the President

[Extract] ⁴⁸

[Moscow,] May 26, 1945.

262101. Tonight Harriman and I saw Stalin and Molotov.⁴⁹ Stalin told us that he had cabled you relative to the pending meeting.⁵⁰ He clearly indicated that he was anxious to meet you.

We outlined the gravity of the feeling in America at great length and expressed as forcibly as we could the viewpoint that you wished us to convey. The importance of the Polish business was put on the line specifically. Stalin listened with the utmost attention to our description of the present state of American public opinion and gave us the impression that the drift of events disturbed him also.⁵¹

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⁴⁸ For the portion of this telegram here omitted, dealing with the establishment of the Allied Control Council for Germany, see vol. III, p. 309.

⁴⁹ Foreign Commissar Molotov left the San Francisco Conference on May 8 and returned to Moscow. Regarding his departure, see vol. I, pp. 650-652.

⁵⁰ i.e., the Potsdam Conference. In a letter to Ambassador Harriman dated May 26 (*Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 85), Molotov explained that the message referred to was not from Marshal Stalin to President Truman but from Molotov to Mr. Joseph E. Davies, Special Representative of President Truman. For documentation regarding the physical arrangements for the Potsdam Conference, see *ibid.*, pp. 85 ff.

⁵¹ For the record of this conversation held at the Kremlin, May 26, at 8 p. m., see memorandum by Charles E. Bohlen, May 26, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 24.

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645: Telegram

*Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, to the President*⁵²

[Extract]

[Moscow,] May 28, 1945.

Then, for the second time, we took up the question of Poland. I told Stalin in unmistakable terms how greatly you were disturbed with the action of the Soviet Government in relation to Poland. I told him that American public opinion could not understand the position the Soviet Union was taking and that it was bound to have a profound effect on future American cooperation with the Soviet Union. While I was careful to avoid any implications of a threat to Russia, I did nevertheless acquaint him fully with the gravity of the situation as you expressed it to me. I told him that we had no selfish economic interest in Poland, that we surely did not support any *Cordon Sanitaire*, but that we wanted a genuinely free election and had surely no desire to see the new Poland antagonistic to Russia.

I tried both last night and the night before to impress on Stalin that the American people would not support a policy in Poland which was directed entirely by the Soviet Union and that it must be a genuinely cooperative understanding such as we had worked out at Yalta. On both occasions Stalin has listened very attentively to my outline of your position and I gained the feeling that he was impressed with what I said.

I urged Stalin to put his own mind to a solution of the Polish problem which carried out the spirit of the Yalta Agreement. He suggested that the appropriate approach to a solution would be to agree on the composition of the reorganized Polish Government. I shall try to induce him to clarify this further at an early meeting. The implications of his reaction to the Polish matter are complex and I would prefer not to attempt to analyze and interpret his position until I can see you personally. Under any circumstances I am sure that the Polish matter cannot be settled while I am here and I intend to advise Stalin that I am going to report his position fully to you. Harriman and I intend to have one more discussion about Poland with Stalin, and I shall bring back to you our final considered opinion.

⁵²This is the paraphrase of a message which reported on a conversation between Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Harriman, Marshal Stalin, and Foreign Commissar Molotov, held at the Kremlin, May 27, at 8 p. m. For the record of this conversation, see memorandum by Charles E. Bohlen, dated May 27, 1945, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. 1, p. 31.

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645

*Memorandum of the Fourth Hopkins-Stalin Conversation at the Kremlin, May 30, 1945, 6 p. m.*⁵³

[Extracts]

Present: Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
Ambassador W. A. Harriman
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
Marshal Stalin
Mr. V. M. Molotov
Mr. Pavlov⁵⁴

MR. HOPKINS then said he would like to continue the discussion on Poland. He said first of all he would like to make a general observation. Historically speaking the people of Russia and, since the revolution, the people of the Soviet Union, had distrusted successive Polish Governments and to some extent the Polish people. Likewise, for many years the Polish people had feared Russia and since the revolution the Soviet Union. He said that [at] their first meeting he had indicated to Marshal Stalin as clearly as he could that the United States was not only not interested in the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* around Russia but on the contrary was aggressively opposed to it; that the United States had no economic interests of substantial importance in Poland and that we believed that the United States, the Soviet Union and England in working together to help create a new Polish state that would be friendly to Russia could have an immense moral and political effect in the task of bringing about genuine Polish-Soviet friendship. He said that the Soviet Union alone working directly with Poland would find this a more difficult task and in those circumstances Poland might remain a troublesome and even threatening area for Russia. However, if the three nations genuinely get together and are associated with the creation of a new Polish state we believe that would have a most helpful effect in the establishment of a friendly and independent Poland which would be genuinely friendly to the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN said he agreed. That there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Government to exclude her Allies England and America from participation in the solution of this problem.

MR. HOPKINS inquired if the Marshal believed it would be a fact that the United States and British participation would be helpful.

⁵³ Memorandum prepared by Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State.

⁵⁴ Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to Marshal Stalin.

MARSHAL STALIN said that undoubtedly the solution would carry more weight if it was tripartite.

MR. HOPKINS said he would like to accent once again the reasons for our concern in regard to Poland, and indeed, in regard to other countries which were geographically far from our borders. He said there were certain fundamental rights which, when impinged upon or denied caused concern in the United States. These were cardinal elements which must be present if a parliamentary system is to be established and maintained. He said for example :

(1) There must be the right of freedom of speech so that people could say what they wanted to, right of assembly, right of movement and the right to worship at any church that they desired ;

(2) All political parties except the fascist party and fascist elements who represented or could represent democratic governments should be permitted the free use, without distinction, of the press, radio, meetings and other facilities of political expression ;

(3) All citizens should have the right of public trial, defense by counsel of their own choosing, and the right of habeas corpus.

He concluded that if we could find a meeting of minds in regard to these general principles which would be the basis for future free elections then he was sure we could find ways and means to agree on procedures to carry them into effect. He then asked the Marshal if he would care to comment in a general sense or more specifically in regard to the general observations he had made concerning the fundamentals of a new Polish state.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that these principles of democracy are well known and would find no objection on the part of the Soviet Government. He was sure that the Polish Government, which in its declaration had outlined just such principles, would not only not oppose them but would welcome them. He said, however, that in regard to the specific freedoms mentioned by Mr. Hopkins, they could only be applied in full in peace time, and even then with certain limitations. He said for example the fascist party, whose intention it was to overthrow democratic governments, could not be permitted to enjoy to the full extent these freedoms. He said secondly there were the limitations imposed by war. All states when they were threatened by war on [*and?*] their frontiers were not secure had found it necessary to introduce certain restrictions. This had been done in England, France, the Soviet Union and elsewhere and perhaps to a lesser extent in the United States which was protected by wide oceans. It is for these reasons that only in time of peace could considerations be given to the full application of these freedoms. For example he said that in time of war no state will allow the free unrestricted use of radio transmitters which could be used to convey information to the enemy. With

reference to freedom of speech certain restrictions had to be imposed for military security. As to arrest, in England during the war individuals dangerous to the state had been arrested and tried in secret; these restrictions had been somewhat released [*relaxed?*] but not entirely repealed in England since the war in the Pacific was still going on.

He said, therefore, to sum up: (1) during time of war these political freedoms could not be enjoyed to the full extent, and (2) nor could they apply without reservations to fascist parties trying to overthrow the government.

MARSHAL STALIN continued that he wished to give a few examples from Russian history. He said that at the time of the revolution the Russian communist party had proclaimed the right of freedom of religion as one of the points of their program. The Russian Patriarch and the entire then existing church had declared the Soviet Government an anathema and had called on all church members not to pay taxes nor to obey the call to the Red Army but to resist mobilization, not to work, etc. He said what could the Soviet Government do but to in fact declare war on the church which assumed that attitude. He added that the present war had wiped out this antagonism and that now the freedom of religion, as promised, could be granted to the church.

MR. HOPKINS said he thoroughly understood the Marshal's opinions. He added that when he had left the Crimea Conference President Roosevelt had thought the Polish matter was virtually settled. He had been relaxed and pleased over the situation. Mr. Hopkins said he and all the other American representatives thought the same and felt that in very short time Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr would be able to carry out the Crimea Decision. Since that time he had been sick and out of touch with Washington and had only followed events from the press and from personal letters which he had received from time to time. He must confess that he had been bewildered and disturbed that one thing after another seemed to occur to prevent the carrying out of the decision which all had thought was clear and sure. He said that if, with his knowledge, he had been bewildered as to the real reason for this it was easy to imagine how bewildered and concerned the masses of people in the United States were over the situation. Mr. Hopkins said that he must say that rightly or wrongly there was a strong feeling among the American people that the Soviet Union wished to dominate Poland. He added that was not his point of view but it was widely held in the United States and that friends of international collaboration were wondering how it would be possible to work things out with the Soviet

Union if we could not agree on the Polish question. Mr. Hopkins added that for himself he felt very strongly that if we could find a meeting of the minds on the substance of what we wished to see in the new Polish state we should be able to overcome the difficulties. He himself had had difficulty in understanding the immediate causes of disagreement, namely interpretation of wording such as the role of the existing government in the future Provisional Government of Poland. He concluded that he felt that the three great powers should in a short time be able to settle this matter.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was true but it was necessary for all three Governments genuinely to wish to settle this matter. If one of them secretly did not wish to see it settled then the difficulties were real.

MR. HOPKINS replied that as far as the United States Government was concerned we had no interest in seeing anyone connected with the present Polish Government in London involved in the new Provisional Government of Poland and he did not personally believe that the British had any such idea.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that nevertheless a representative of the London Government had been suggested by the British and American Governments. He had in mind a representative of the London Government in Poland who was involved in the illegal internal administration of Poland.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that no name from the London Government had been at any time suggested.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he must state that the facts were different since Jankowski had been mentioned and that he was not only Deputy Prime Minister of the present Polish Government but also head of the illegal internal administration in Poland which took its orders from the London Government. He said Jankowski was also connected with the Polish Home Army headed by General Okulicki who had been involved in Axis sabotage against the Red Army. He added that furthermore Jankowski shared the views of the present Polish Government, namely that the Crimea Decision represented another partition of Poland.

After some discussion with Ambassador Harriman on this subject MARSHAL STALIN said it was possible that Ambassador Harriman did not know of Jankowski's connections with Okulicki but that the Soviet Government did.

MR. HOPKINS said he wished to state here and now that the United States did not desire to have involved in the execution of the Crimea Decision any present agents of the London Government, whether in Poland or without.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was very good news.

MR. HOPKINS continued that he knew that [*what?*] President Roosevelt had in mind and that President Truman has in mind no attempts on the part of our Government to suggest anyone even for consultation who is against the Crimea Decision. He said, furthermore, he knew that President Roosevelt and now President Truman had always anticipated that the members of the present Warsaw regime would constitute a majority of the new Polish Provisional Government. He said he wished to state that without equivocation. He said he feared Marshal Stalin had obtained the impression that we and the British were attempting to get people in for consultation who were known to be hostile to the Soviet Union. Nothing could be farther from our thoughts and if there were any names on the list submitted who were known to be agents of the present Polish Government and who were hostile to the Soviet Union we would certainly be glad to consider removing those names. He inquired whether it would not be possible for he and Marshal Stalin to sit down and in a completely informal and unofficial manner discuss the possibility of summoning eight or ten Poles to work with the Commission to form a new Provisional Government. He said he found it difficult to discuss the question of the number of ministries which should be occupied by the non-Warsaw Poles at this time. He felt it would be better to have this emerge as a result of consultation of representative Polish leaders.

MARSHAL STALIN said that at Yalta it had been decided to call eight Poles for consultation apart from the representatives of the Warsaw Government. Five of these eight to come from Poland and three from London. He said it was of course understood these discussions would not be decided by majority vote and that he was prepared to consider agreeing unofficially on the basis of personal exchange of views with Mr. Hopkins the individual Polish leaders who might be summoned for consultation with the Commission.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that he thought that on that basis some progress could be made. That the most important names from our point of view were Mikolajczyk, Witos and Zulawski.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Witos had said that he was too old to consider an important government post and that he had designated Mikolajczyk as his deputy. He said that from London Mikolajczyk, Grabski and either Kolodzei or General Zeligowski could make up the three.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN replied that Mikolajczyk, when he saw him in London, had been very anxious to bring with him a socialist leader from London and had suggested Stanczyk.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Stanczyk had at one time proposed to close down the seaman's union in Poland and for that reason a portion of Poland's labor was against him. He said, however, that he thought that Zeligowski was a good man and that there was no objection to Mikolajczyk or Grabski.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN replied that he had bad news in that he had heard Grabski was too ill to travel.

MARSHAL STALIN said he was prepared tomorrow to discuss with Mr. Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman the exact list of persons who might be invited for consultation and he felt that there should be eight exclusive of the representatives of the Warsaw Government.

MR. HOPKINS again emphasized that he could only speak for himself and that it would be an exchange of views and that he could not of course, even by implication, say anything on behalf of Great Britain.

MARSHAL STALIN said he fully understood and agreed with Mr. Hopkins's statement.

MR. HOPKINS said that when he left here, which would be after they had thoroughly explored the Polish situation, he hoped to stop in Berlin, if the Marshal would give his permission, and see what Berlin looked like. He said it was purely a matter of personal curiosity and he would be glad to see Marshal Zhukov.⁵⁵

MARSHAL STALIN said immediately that Mr. Hopkins could certainly stop in Berlin if he so desired.⁵⁶

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Marshal planned to give a dinner for Mr. Hopkins on Friday night if that was agreeable.⁵⁷

MR. HOPKINS expressed his appreciation and said he would be delighted to attend.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be at 6:00 p. m. tomorrow, May 31st.

⁵⁵ Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany; Commander in Chief, Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany.

⁵⁶ Mr. Hopkins visited Berlin briefly on June 7.

⁵⁷ For Mr. Hopkins' report on his conversation with Marshal Stalin during dinner at the Kremlin on the evening of June 1, see Hopkins' telegram 031100, June 3, to President Truman, p. 318.

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645 : Telegram

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, to the President

[Extract]⁵⁸

[Moscow,] May 30, 1945.

[301835.]

I completed the exposition of your position relative to Poland with Stalin. The conference tonight⁵⁹ was encouraging. It looks as though Stalin is prepared to return to and implement the Crimea decision and permit a representative group of Poles to come to consult with the Commission. We are having what both Stalin and I emphasized would be an informal exchange of views on possible candidates to come here for consultation with the Tri-partite Commission at an early date. In preparation for this exchange of views, Harriman will go over with the British Ambassador the list of candidates which we and the British have already submitted.

S60C.01/6-145 : Telegram

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, to the President

[Moscow,] 31 May 1945.

010020. In our two previous conferences about Poland, Stalin made it clear that he was ready to talk business at once as to the names of the Poles both in London and with Poland proper who were not members of the Lublin Government that would be invited to Moscow to meet with the Polish Commission and consult about the organization of the temporary government for Poland.

At our meeting this evening⁶⁰ I proposed informally to Stalin the following names: From London, Mikolajczyk, Grabsky and Stanczyk. From within Poland, Witos, Archbishop Sapieha, Zulawski, Kutrzeba and Trampeczynski.

Stalin then indicated that he wanted three or four from the existing provisional government in Poland and under no circumstances more than four. I suggested that he name additional people either in London or within Poland who were not members of the provisional government. Stalin's reply to that was that they wished to have only three people from London not in the existing government and only five people from Poland not in the existing government.

⁵⁸ Another portion of this telegram is printed in *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 88. The text was communicated to the Secretary of State by Admiral Leahy in a memorandum of May 31 (740.00119 Potsdam/5-3145).

⁵⁹ See memorandum of the fourth Hopkins-Stalin conversation, May 30, *supra*.

⁶⁰ References is to the fifth Hopkins-Stalin conversation, May 31, p. 309.

The names which we submitted are names which had been previously approved by the United States Government and the British. After submitting these names, Stalin submitted a counterproposal as follows: From London, first Mikolajczyk, second Grabski or Stanczyk, third Kolodzei. It should be borne in mind that we have reports Grabski is quite ill and might not be able to come under any circumstances. This means that we get two out of the three from London that we recommended. Stalin did not disguise the fact that Kolodzei although not connected with the Lublin government was a Communist sympathizer.

From within Poland Stalin suggested: first Archbishop Sapieha or Witos but not both. It seemed to us that he prefers Witos and there [are] considerable merits to this because of Witos' healthy influence on Mikolajczyk. Second he agrees to Zulawski. Three he agrees to Kutrzeba. For the other two members he suggests Kolodzierski and Adam Krzyzanowski. Stalin stated that the last two suggestions were non-party members and not affiliated in any way with the provisional government. The Embassy at Moscow has info only in regard to Adam Krzyzanowski. That info is favorable (re Depts 613, March 16, 6 p. m.⁶²) Regarding Kolodzierski we have no info other than the fact that Stalin said he was a Doctor of Economic Science, former Director of the Library of the Diet and present Chairman of the Cooperatives.

I believe that this is a satisfactory list and I urge that you approve it.⁶³ If you do, then correct time is now. I think it extremely important that you press Churchill immediately for his approval and have Schoenfeld see Mikolajczyk at once in order to get his agreement. In recommending this to you, I believe that this carries out the Yalta agreement in all its essential aspects. Harriman and the other officers of our Embassy concur.

I told Stalin tonight of the unfavorable reaction of American public opinion due to the arrest of the 14 [16?] Poles, making it clear to him that we had no interest whatsoever in General Okulicki. I told him further that we had no specific knowledge of our own about the merits of the arrests but that there was a widespread impression in America that these arrests were for political reasons. He indicated that the majority of those arrested were charged only with the operation of illegal radio transmitters which had been proscribed by the Red Army. He said that in view of the end of the war there was a good prospect of leniency for these.

⁶² Not printed; it transmitted biographical information on Adam Krzyzanowski (860C.01/3-1245).

⁶³ In a telephone conversation with Mr. Hopkins on June 1, President Truman approved the list. See Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 263.

Tomorrow night I am going to do everything I can to get Stalin to agree to an amnesty in the interest of the success of the negotiations for those Poles who are charged merely with the operation of illegal wireless transmitters. I do not know how he will react to this, but you can be sure that I will do the very best I can to get him to agree that such action on his part in regard to these prisoners would greatly facilitate the acceptance by the United States, Great Britain and Mikolajczyk of the proposed list of consultants.

I had intended to leave here Saturday afternoon, June 2, but before then, I hope. Therefore, you can cable me urgently whether you approve my proposed line of action. If you think it wise, I will of course remain here until you have had time to hear from Churchill and Mikolajczyk with regard to the group to be invited for consultation with the Moscow Commission. Both Harriman and I think it quite possible we are very close to an agreement and he, Harriman, believes I should remain until the matter is settled, assuming that it can be done in a few days.

I shall also try to telephone you at ten o'clock your time tomorrow, Friday morning, to find out whether you want me to remain here.

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645

*Memorandum of the Fifth Hopkins-Stalin Conversation at the Kremlin, May 31, 1945, 6 p. m.*⁶⁴

Present: Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
 Ambassador W. A. Harriman
 Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
 Marshal Stalin
 Mr. V. M. Molotov
 Mr. Pavlov

Mr. HOPKINS said that if the Marshal was agreeable he was ready to discuss the list of those Poles who might be suitable to be invited to Moscow to consult with the Commission and with representatives of the Warsaw Government. He said that as an informal subject for discussion we thought that we might invite the following five Poles from inside Poland:

Witos	Archbishop Sapieha
Zulawski	Tramieczynski.
Kutrzeba	

He pointed out that this was the Crimea list except that Tramieczyn-

⁶⁴Memorandum prepared by Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State.

ski had been substituted for Professor Bujak; that from London the following might be invited :

Mikolajczyk
Grabski
Stanczyk

Mr. Hopkins added that if this list was acceptable there would be no objection on our part to the Warsaw Government bringing anyone else with them they wanted from Poland and, if they desired, Kolodzei from London.

Mr. Molotov said would it not be possible to agree that apart from the representatives of the Warsaw Government there would be only eight Poles, five from within Poland and three from London brought for consultation.

Mr. HOPKINS said he thought it would be desirable to recognize that once the first consultations had taken place it might be found desirable to invite other Polish leaders from within Poland.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that if this were done it might lead to a delay in setting up the new government.

In reply to Mr. Hopkins's inquiry Marshal Stalin said that there would be three or four and not more than four representatives of the Warsaw Government.

Mr. Molotov then said that they proposed the following should be invited, apart from the representatives of the government :

From London : Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Kolodzei, making a total of three.

From inside Poland: Archbishop Sapieha or Witos, Kutrzeba, Zulawski, Professor Kolodzierski, Director of Economic Science of the Diet and Chairman of the Cooperative Society; and Adam Krzyzanowski, Rector of the University of Cracow.

Mr. Molotov said that thus all the principal political trends of Poland would be represented.

Mr. HOPKINS said that he thought this might be difficult but that what objection would there be to increasing the number and accepting our list and then if the Soviet Government desired, add one more from London and two more from Poland, the new names proposed by Mr. Molotov.

Both MARSHAL STALIN and Mr. Molotov said they felt it would be necessary to limit those to be invited apart from the representatives of the Warsaw Government, to eight, five from within Poland and three from London.

MARSHAL STALIN pointed out that Zulawski was a socialist and so was Stanczyk and that either one could represent the socialist party.

Mr. HOPKINS replied that he felt it was not a serious difficulty and

that it would make really very little difference whether we added a few more names.

MARSHAL STALIN said that that might be true but he felt that considerable concessions had already been made to the United States point of view. He said that the Soviet Government had strongly objected to Witos, Zulawski, Stanczyk and Mikolajczyk but that now they were prepared to accept them.

MR. HOPKINS said that one of the difficulties would be that the changes on our list would require cabling to Washington and London and with due respect to Mr. Molotov, once these questions got into the foreign office both here in Moscow and in London and Washington, it would lead to long discussions and much cabling. He repeated that he felt it was a matter of relative unimportance compared to the main business at hand since, after all, these people were only coming to consult, and the Commission, of which Mr. Molotov was the Chairman, would be the final deciding authority.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the majority of the persons suggested by the United States had been accepted.

MARSHAL STALIN said flatly that they could not go beyond the limits of the proposal advanced by Mr. Molotov.

MR. HOPKINS pointed out that we had no objection to any number coming from Warsaw and he was very much afraid that this new proposal would lead to protracted discussions.

MARSHAL STALIN said that by inviting all those suggested we would in fact be placing the Polish Government under the control of this consulting body who would decide its fate. At least that is what everyone did think. It was for this reason that it was necessary not to have too many conservatives. He said the additional names they had suggested from inside Poland were non-party people and that the only one who had party affiliations was Kolodzei from London, who, although not a communist was a communist sympathizer. On the other hand, on our list the socialist party would be represented by Zulawski and the peasant party by Mikolajczyk.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said he wished to ask a question. He said he had never met Witos and since Marshal Stalin had said that he considered himself too old to take a government post would he not be merely here in the capacity of advisor to Mikolajczyk and would not his advice be good.

MARSHAL STALIN said it is true that Witos himself had told them that he was too old to accept governmental responsibility and it was of course quite possible that Witos would have a good influence on Mikolajczyk.

In reply to Ambassador Harriman's question, MR. MOLOTOV said

that Trampczynski, in addition to being eighty years old had also been a former member of the Prussian Diet and German Reichstag. There was some question as to whether Professor Bujak was one of those Poles arrested but it developed that it was Puzak and not Bujak.

MR. HOPKINS said he would like to consider Mr. Molotov's proposal and submit it to Washington.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that in regard to those from London they had accepted two-thirds of our suggestions.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN then mentioned that Jankowski had never been on any of the lists submitted by either the British or American Governments for consultation.

MARSHAL STALIN admitted that a mistake had been made. That he had thought the name had been proposed orally. He said he apologized; it was a simple mistake. He added however, that there had been others on the list who had been among those arrested, namely, Urbanski, Baginski and Jaskiukowich.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN pointed out that the mistake apparently rose from the British communications in March to Mr. Molotov giving information concerning members of the Polish Home Army at the time of its disbandment. He emphasized that at no time had even any inquiries been made about General Okulicki.

MARSHAL STALIN said this was true but that Jankowski and the others were connected with General Okulicki.

MR. HOPKINS then said on the subject of the arrests of Poles, that the United States had no direct knowledge concerning these arrests nor the merits of the case; that they had heard from the British Government that these men had allegedly been invited by properly authorized officers of the Soviet Army to come for consultation with a view to joining in some appointed movement inside Poland and that after having been invited they had allegedly been arrested. He said whether or not this was true, these arrests coming on top of all our inability to agree on the Polish question had produced the most unfortunate effect in American public opinion and that in the eyes of the American people it looked as though at least some of these men had been arrested for political reasons. This had contributed to the general difficulties which he had emphasized to the Marshal at their previous meetings and had merely added fuel to the flames.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in his opinion the death of a hundred Red Army officers and men which had been caused by these men should have aroused resentment and sympathy in public opinion. The Red Army was liberating Poland and these men had shot them in the back. He said any government would have taken the same

course as had the Soviet Government. He mentioned that the Soviet Union was not Albania. He said he did not guarantee that there would not be further arrests if these acts were continued against the army.

MR. HOPKINS inquired whether all these men were charged with the same crimes.

MARSHAL STALIN replied no, that some were only charged with operation of illegal wireless transmitters. He said some, in fact the majority, were charged only with the illegal operation of wireless transmitters. He said this was not true of General Okulicki and some others. They had been looking for General Okulicki for some time. Marshal Stalin emphasized that no negotiations had taken place with these arrested Poles and that none could have taken place. He said it was possible that one or two officers had talked with them on their own responsibility but that no one had been authorized, nor could have been authorized to hold discussions with these men.

MR. HOPKINS said he was afraid this question would interfere with the course of the negotiations on the substance of the Polish matter and he inquired whether it would not be possible to handle the cases of those arrested Poles who were not involved in plotting the murders of Red Army officers in such a way as not to interfere with the discussions.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not see why these arrests should interfere with the negotiations, but in regard to the cases of those charged only with the illegal operation of radio transmitters, since their offenses had been committed during the war which was now over it might be possible to treat them with leniency, but that in any event they would have to stand trial. He went on to say that he knew General Eisenhower had arrested saboteurs in the rear of the army and that certainly the British had done so in Greece where much blood had been spilled, and he anticipated similar arrests in Denmark. He said the Soviet Government had never questioned the right of military commanders to protect their rear.

It was agreed that if Mr. Hopkins received a reply from Washington tomorrow that there would be another meeting and that Mr. Hopkins would let the Marshal know as soon as the reply was received.

860C.01/6-145 : Telegram

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, to the President

[Moscow,] 1 June 1945.

010930. Supplementing my 010020. On reconsideration, Harri-
man and I believe the best plan would be that at the dinner which

Stalin is giving for me tonight I should find an appropriate occasion to press hard for the release of the majority of the arrested Polish political leaders who Stalin said were charged only with illegal operation of wireless transmitters. I will tell him that I intend to leave Saturday⁶⁶ to report to you and unless these prisoners are released I am not hopeful of getting agreement on starting the consultations on the basis of the list of names he has offered. I shall urge him strongly to take this action. If he specifically asks for a day's delay I shall of course remain until Sunday. The above program is on the assumption that you do not instruct me otherwise. In which event I will of course remain.

860C.01/6-345

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1945.

53. Harry Hopkins has just sent me a most encouraging message about the Polish situation. As perhaps you know, Stalin has agreed to invite to Moscow for consultation, in conformity with our interpretation of the Yalta agreement, the following Poles from London: Mikolajczyk, Grabski or Stanczyk, and Kolodzei. He has also agreed to invite for the consultations the following non-Lublin Poles from inside Poland: Archbishop Sapieha or Witos, Zulawski, and Kutrzeba, as well as two non-Party men—Kolodzierski and Adam Krzyzanowski, the latter two being Stalin's candidates. We know little about the last two men except that Stalin stated that Kolodzierski was a Doctor of Economic Science, former Director of the Library of the Diet, and present Chairman of the Cooperatives. Hopkins and Harriman approve of the list of names agreed upon and I have informed Hopkins of my whole-hearted approval.

I feel that this represents a very encouraging, positive step in the long drawn out Polish negotiations, and I hope that you will approve the list as agreed to in order that we may get on with this business as soon as possible.

In regard to the arrested Polish leaders, most of whom were apparently charged only with operating illegal radio transmitters, Hopkins is pressing Stalin to grant amnesty to these men in order that consultations may be conducted in the most favorable atmosphere possible.

⁶⁶ June 2.

I am submitting the list to Mikolajczyk and urging that he accept it. I hope you will use your influence with him to the same end. I have asked Hopkins to remain in Moscow at least until I hear from you regarding this matter.

I am sure you will appreciate the necessity for an early reply to this message.

860C.01/6-145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1945—noon.

Poles 17. Harry Hopkins has obtained Stalin's agreement to inviting the following Poles to Moscow for consultation :

From London : Mikolajczyk, Grabski or Stanczyk, and Kolodzei.

From inside Poland : (non-Warsaw Poles) Archbishop Sapieha or Witos, Zulawski and Kutrzeba as well as two non-party men, Kolodzierski and Adam Krzyzanowski. The latter two were proposed by Stalin and we have little information regarding them except that Stalin stated that Kolodzierski is a Doctor of Economic Science, former Director of the Library of the Diet and present Chairman of the Cooperatives.

Hopkins and Harriman believe that this is a satisfactory list and carries out the Yalta agreement for consultation as we interpreted it. The President has approved of the list and has urged Prime Minister Churchill to approve it.

You are instructed to immediately discuss this proposal with Mikolajczyk and strongly urge him to give his concurrence to the list of names as proposed.

If you feel it is advisable you may also tell Mikolajczyk that Hopkins is going to do everything he can to get Stalin to agree to an amnesty for all the arrested Polish leaders who are charged only with having operated illegal radio transmitters. (Stalin indicated that the charge against the majority of these leaders was only for operating illicit radio stations.)

Please telegraph urgently Mikolajczyk's reply.

GREW

860C.01/6-245 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld)
to the Secretary of State*⁶⁷

LONDON, June 2, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received June 2—4: 40 p. m.]

Poles 62. Your 17, June 1. Mikolajczyk signifies his concurrence in the list of names proposed but desires to offer the following comment.

Grabski is ill and will probably be unable to travel in the near future. Stanczyk should, therefore, be invited. This is also preferable in one sense since he is a leader of the Socialist Party and a representative of the Trade Unions, whereas Grabski is non-party. As regards Sapienha or Witos, Mikolajczyk feels Witos as the leader of the Peasant Party would be preferable. Sapienha is of course important but is not a party leader. Moreover he would probably have to consult the Vatican, which might or might not approve. This might result in delay.

Mikolajczyk notes that two of the major parties, i.e., Christian Labor and National Democrats, are unrepresented. He would like to appeal at least for inclusion of representatives of former, and suggests Popiel in London and Piwowarczyk in Cracow. Their presence would be valuable in assuring the cooperation of the large and influential Roman Catholic element.

Kolodziej is a special case. He represents no substantial Polish element abroad. He was secretary of the Polish Seamen's Union in London and sought to bring the Union under the control of the Lublin group. He failed in this and was expelled from the Union. This question was also injected into the World Trade Unions Congress last February. Mikolajczyk states Kolodziej is personally inconsequential, is a creature of the Lublin Group and his inclusion is designed to lower the prestige of the real Polish Party leaders who are to be invited to Moscow from London.

Mikolajczyk states, however, that irrespective of whether the foregoing suggestions are acted on, he will go to Moscow for consultations if he is invited by the Three Power Commission. He assumes that all the Poles invited for the consultations will be allowed to meet freely and to discuss matters among themselves without restriction.

He desires to record his hope that by the time the consultations take place, the majority at least of the arrested Polish leaders will have been released. On this point he expresses concern about the use of

⁶⁷ The Mikolajczyk-Schoenfeld meeting discussed in this telegram is also described on the basis of information drawn from the Mikolajczyk private files in Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy*, pp. 384-385.

the word "amnesty". He points out that under Russian law this term has a special meaning. In Russia person who is amnestied is not relieved of guilt, can at any time be politically disqualified and can still be kept in detention. The Russians insisted on the use of this term for the Poles held in Russia in the Polish Soviet treaty of July 30, 1941.⁶⁸ This led in practice to serious controversy and while many were released thousands were not. He, therefore, hopes the term "amnesty" will be avoided.

Sent to Dept as Poles 62, repeated to Moscow as 183.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.00/6-445 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman*⁶⁹

[LONDON,] 2 June 1945.

67. Your Number 53.

1. Harry Hopkins has made very remarkable progress at Moscow and I am entirely in sympathy with what he has already achieved.

2. Mikolajczyk has sent you his comments on the list and he has also given them to us. Cannot these points be cleared up by Harry, if his health can stand it before he leaves? The word "amnesty" should be interpreted as including "release."⁷⁰ I am having the matter examined in more detail by the Foreign Office, and am quite ready to put additional pressure on Mikolajczyk if he makes needless difficulties. Indeed you can count upon me to support you in the very considerable forward movement you have initiated.

3. As Anthony Eden is now laid up for a few weeks and cannot do any official work, the burden falls on me at a rather rough moment. I may telegraph to you tomorrow the more detailed views of the Foreign Office.

⁶⁸ For text of the agreement for mutual aid, between Poland and the Soviet Union, signed at London on July 30, 1941, with protocol, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxliv, p. 869. Also see telegram 3292, July 30, 1941, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. i, p. 243.

⁶⁹ Transmitted to the Secretary of State under cover of a memorandum by Adm. William D. Leahy, dated June 4, not printed.

⁷⁰ In his telegram to Prime Minister Churchill, dated June 6, Mr. Hopkins said in part: "I want you to know that I have not the vaguest notion what the word amnesty means and I hope the British cabinet did not spend too much time debating this one. The only thing I ever said to Stalin was to let those poor Poles out of the jug. If you should find out what the technical definition of amnesty is won't you please let me know." (740.00119 (Potsdam)6-645) For complete text of this message, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 583.

860C.01/6-345 : Telegram

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, to the President

[Moscow,] 3 June 1945.

031100. At Stalin's dinner on Friday night,⁷² I took the occasion to talk to him privately. I again impressed on him as earnestly as I could the unfavorable effect produced in America by the detaining of the 14 [16] political leaders within Poland. I specifically exempted from the discussion anyone charged with killing Russians and confined my discussion to those who were charged only with possession of illegal radio transmitters. I told him that I believed we would have no insurmountable difficulties with getting the list of names approved for the group to consult with the Moscow Commission if these men could be released. I made it perfectly clear to him that, while we knew nothing of the merits of the case based on our own investigation, the offenses apparently seemed far more serious to the Soviets than they did to us. I made it clear that public opinion in America considered that these men were arrested for political purposes and took the occasion to tell him that I shared that view.

I told him further that if this preliminary consultation was not settled prior to your meeting in Berlin it would stir up endless trouble and probably take most of the time of the Berlin meeting.

I told him that our fundamental interest was in a good working relationship with the Soviet Union after the war and reminded him that he and his representatives had repeatedly stated that they wished to have a close and friendly relationship not only with us but with all the peace loving nations. I finally told him that he must believe me when I stated that our whole relationship was threatened by the impasse over Poland. I stated, however, that Poland was only a symbol and that the United States had appropriate interest in all countries in this part of the world. I suggested that he release these particular prisoners outright and that he find a way to do it that would clearly indicate his desire to meet us part way.

Stalin said that he was unwilling to order these particular Poles released. He claimed that he had information in regard to these prisoners which was not available to us and stated that all of them were engaged in "diversionist" activities. He said he believed that the United States Government had been misinformed in regard to the facts and that the statements of the Polish London Government were inaccurate. Nevertheless, Stalin said that he believed me when I told him this matter was having an unfavorable effect on public opinion

⁷² For Mr. Hopkins' memorandum of his conversation with Marshal Stalin at a private dinner at the Kremlin on June 1, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 57.

in America and he assumed the same was true in Great Britain. And therefore he was inclined to do whatever he could to make it easy for Churchill to get out of a bad situation. But he insisted that the men must be tried, though he stated they would be treated leniently.

I told him that I regretted his decision to try these particular prisoners and asked him, if he was determined to do so, when the trials would be held, reminding him that so long as this was hanging in the air it was bound to create friction between all of us. He replied that he did not know about the timing of the trials but that he would find out and let me know.

He listened very attentively to everything that I had to say and I gained the impression that he is going to consider the move which the Soviet Union will make and that I would hear from him at an early date. While he at no time retreated from his position that he intended to try these prisoners, I gained the impression that he wanted time to discuss the matter with his associates. At noon, Moscow time, Sunday ⁷³ I have not yet heard from him.

In discussing the list of names for consultation he volunteered the information that he would not insist upon Kolodzei, Communist Polish sympathizer in London, providing the British objected and that he would be ready to consider another name.

860C.00/6-445 : Telegram

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, to the President

[Moscow,] 3 June 1945.

031900. We have seen a copy of Schoenfeld's cable to the Department ⁷⁴ commenting on his interview with Mikolajczyk. The British Ambassador has received and shown us a copy of the Prime Minister's number 67 to you. Harriman and I hope you will agree that the matter relating to the list of names to consult with the Moscow Commission be not conditioned upon the release of the Polish leaders. We also hope that you can induce Churchill to make the same decision.

We shall, of course, continue to press vigorously for release of the Poles, but we think it would be a mistake to make this a condition to agreement on the list of names and the starting of the consultation in Moscow promptly.⁷⁵

In the light of what Stalin told me Friday night that he would be willing to give further consideration to a name other than the Com-

⁷³ June 3.

⁷⁴ Telegram Poles 62, June 2, 6 p. m., from London, p. 316.

⁷⁵ Mr. Hopkins repeated the view expressed in this paragraph in his message to Prime Minister Churchill, dated June 3; see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 583.

munist sympathizer Kolodzei from London, I shall endeavor to get him to substitute Popiel whose name has already been agreed upon by both the United States and British Governments. Or if this fails to try to get Kolodzei's name dropped entirely. While this would mean there would be only two from London the elimination of Kolodzei would undoubtedly save a lot of headaches. I can give you no assurance that either of these can be done but I intend to try.

The important things now are : (1) That we get British approval of the whole list including Kolodzei so that we can close on that basis if necessary, and (2) agreement to separate the release of the prisoners from the list of names.

I simply do not know what Stalin is going to do about these prisoners but I think we have made some impression on him. In case Churchill advises you that the above course of action is satisfactory to him, then I shall close the matter of the list at once and in so doing shall make perfectly clear to Stalin that the future negotiations will be made more difficult if the matter of the release of the prisoners is not settled satisfactorily.

860C.00/6-445 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

[Extract] ⁷⁶

LONDON, 4 June 1945.

72. 1. I send you in my immediately following the text of a message prepared in the Foreign Office, with which I am in general accord, dealing principally with the views and wishes put forward by Mr. Mikolajczyk. As these are set forth in considerable detail, I am also sending them to Lord Halifax for transmission to the State Department. This fulfils my undertaking to you in my No. 67 replying to your No. 53.⁷⁷

2. I agree with you that Hopkins' devoted efforts have produced a breaking of the deadlock. I am willing that the invitation should be issued to the non-Lublin Poles on that basis, if nothing more can be gained at this moment. I also agree that the question of the 15 or 16 arrested Poles should not hamper the opening of these discussions. We cannot, however, cease our efforts on their behalf. I will therefore join with you, either jointly or separately, in a message to Stalin accepting the best that Hopkins can get, provided of course

⁷⁶ Other portions of this telegram are printed in *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. 1, p. 92.

⁷⁷ Of June 2 and June 1, pp. 317 and 314, respectively.

that our Ambassadors are not debarred from pressing for further improvements in the invitations once conversations have begun again.

3. While it is prudent and right to act in this way at this moment I am sure you will agree with me that these proposals are no advance on Yalta. They are an advance upon the deadlock but we ought by now, according to Yalta and its spirit, to have had a representative Polish Government formed. All we have got is a certain number of concessions on outside Poles to take part in preliminary discussions out of which some improvements in the Lublin government may be made.

I cannot feel therefore that we can regard this as more than a milestone in a long hill we ought never to have been asked to climb. I think we ought to guard against any newspaper assumptions that the Polish problem has been solved or that the difficulties between the Western Democracies and the Soviet Government on this matter have been more than relieved. Renewed hope and not rejoicing is all we can indulge in at the moment.

.

860C.00/6-445 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

LONDON, 4 June 1945.

73. Following is text of message prepared in the Foreign Office referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. *Begins:*

1. Following are M. Mikolajczyk's views on new proposals as expressed to us on June 2nd.

2. (a) M. M. and M. Stanczyk would be prepared to accept invitation to participate in discussions in Moscow on sole condition that invitation is issued by the Commission of Three in conformity with the Crimea decision.

(b) M. M. points out however that the list of candidates for the discussions now proposed excludes any representation of the Christian Labour Party and the National Democratic Party altogether. He considers representation of the Christian Labour Party most important, since although a progressive party it represents the religious elements: If it were excluded conversations could not be considered really representative of popular opinion in Poland, which would thus be split. M. M. does not believe that there will be real difficulty in persuading the Russians or Lublin to accept M. Popiel the Christian Labour Leader in this country and the Reverend Piwowarczyk, a progressive and representative priest for Cracow, as representative of the party at the conversation. M. M. urged that a strong effort should

be made to secure Russian agreement on this point although he did not make it actually a condition of his own acceptance.

(c) M. Grabski is very ill and beside M. M., M. Stanczyk should therefore be invited from London. M. Kolodzie, who was leader of the Polish Seamen's Union here but was expelled from posts after declaring himself in favour of Lublin, represents nobody, according to M. M.: But latter does not object to his being invited.

(d) Of candidates from inside Poland M. Witos cannot of course be excluded and therefore Archbishop Sapieha who otherwise would be suitable, must be dropped. M. M. said that of remainder only M. Zulawski is a real party representative: Others suggested are however distinguished figures and can be accepted.

(e) M. M. stated that M. Trampczynski, venerable and highly respected National Democrat in Poland, has recently been allowed to give an interview to the Lublin Press Agency which has been published in spite of the fact that it expressed some criticism of the present administration. In these circumstances, M. M. thinks it quite possible that he would be accepted by Lublin and by the Russians as a candidate for the conversations, thus securing representation for the National Democrat Party, which would otherwise be unrepresented. M. M. would be much in favour of this being suggested.

(f) M. M. assumes that all those participating in the conversations in Moscow would be guaranteed: (1) Freedom of movement and discussion during the conversations and (2) Freedom from arrest and from interference during and after the conversations, including the right to go wherever they wish outside Russia and Poland when the conversations in Moscow are over. M. M. would like this to be agreed by the Russians.

(g) As regards the arrested party leaders, M. M. would not wish to await their release, but he considers their release absolutely necessary in order to create appropriate conditions for the conversations and he points out that it would not be sufficient that Stalin should agree to Mr. Hopkins' request that they should be granted an amnesty, since the Russian interpret an amnesty as not excluding detention and isolation. M. M. said that in negotiating the Stalin-Sikorski agreement,⁷⁸ the Russians insisted on the use of the term amnesty for the

⁷⁸ Presumably, the reference here is to the agreement for mutual aid between Poland and the Soviet Union, signed at London on July 30, 1941, with a protocol. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxliv, p. 869. See also telegram 3292, July 30, 1941, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 243. The wording of the secret protocol to this treaty is printed *ibid.*, p. 244, footnote 92. This agreement was signed by General Wladyslaw Sikorski, then Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, and Ivan Mihailovich Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom; it was not signed by Stalin. Stalin and Sikorski did sign the declaration of the Governments of the Soviet Union and Poland concerning friendship and mutual assistance in Moscow on December 4, 1941, but that declaration made no reference to amnesty.

Poles in Russia and consequently large numbers of them were kept in isolation and not released.

3. M. M. made it plain that, while he felt bound to accept the invitation to Moscow, subject to the single condition of its being issued by the Commission of Three he was not hopeful of the result. He thought that the Russians under pressure were merely giving way as regards the conversations knowing that the subsequent step, the formation of a government, was the only point that really mattered.

4. We have now heard from the U. S. Chargé d'Affaires to Polish Government that M. Mikolajczyk expressed very similar views to him.⁷⁹ Only differences of any importance were:

(1) In reply to question, M. Mikolajczyk definitely expressed concurrence in proposed list of candidates for conversations:

(2) As regards (*d*) above, M. Mikolajczyk only said that M. Witos would be preferable to Archbishop Sapieha:

(3) M. Mikolajczyk did not mention M. Trampeczynski to U. S. Chargé d'Affaires at all:

(4) As regards (*f*) above, M. Mikolajczyk merely said that he assumed all the Poles invited would be allowed to meet freely and discuss among themselves without restrictions:

(5) As regards (*g*) above, M. Mikolajczyk said that he hoped that by the time the conversations in Moscow took place, the majority at least of the arrested leaders would have been released and proceeded to make and emphasise the point about an amnesty, as he did to us.

5. M. Mikolajczyk's points under paragraph 2 (*a*)-(*g*) above all seem to us reasonable. As regards (*a*) it is no doubt intention that the invitation should be issued by the Commission of Three. We hope that President Truman will be ready to instruct Mr. Hopkins to try to secure Russian acceptance of Christian Labour Party and National Democrat Party representatives mentioned under (*b*) and (*e*). While it is not essential that all four parties should be represented at the conversations, it would clearly make far better impression on Poles generally and on world opinion, if they were. While attitude of extreme Nationalist Right Wing of National Democrat Party makes its exclusion excusable, exclusion of Christian Labour Party and thus of direct representation of very important religious element would be really unfortunate. As regards (*f*) above it will be remembered that early in discussions of Commission of Three M. Molotov treated it as a matter of course that participants in conversations should be free from restrictions, so this point should present no difficulty: But having regard to the arrest of the 15 political leaders and Russian attitude of Poles generally we feel that M. Mikolajczyk is entitled to be reassured

⁷⁹ Regarding the conversation between Mikolajczyk and Mr. Schoenfeld, see telegram Poles 62, June 2, 6 p. m., from London, p. 316.

on this point. We agree with M. Mikolajczyk in attaching importance to (g).

6. While in no way minimising the value of Mr. Hopkins' admirable work or importance of resolving the deadlock with the Russians and of getting them back to basis of Crimea agreement, we cannot but agree with M. Mikolajczyk that Russian agreement to opening of conversations before the Commission of Three (which should have taken place over 3 months ago) will represent no real advance in Polish question if the Soviet Government do not allow these conversations to result in formation of a government in which non-Lublin elements are adequately represented and can exercise real influence and which can ensure conditions for election on proper basis. We should not disguise from ourselves that we shall have to keep up pressure on the Russians to secure these real results and it would no doubt be a tactical mistake vis-à-vis the Russians and of world opinion, when the news comes out, to give the impression publicly that the Polish question is solved. We propose to take the line here of guarded satisfaction that the present deadlock has been resolved, but to point out that this is only the first, long delayed step, towards tackling the problem of forming a new Polish Government in accordance with Crimea agreement.

860C.01/6-445

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*⁸⁰

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1945.

I went to the President this morning with Ambassador Lane, who wished to talk over some of the issues with regard to Poland. Mr. Lane feels that our attitude towards Soviet Russia in connection with the Polish issue should be integrated with the many other issues in Central Europe, particularly the Soviet blackouts in the Balkan states and the states of Central Europe. The President said that he had precisely the same opinion and that this would be the fundamental subject which he intended to discuss at the Big Three meeting. There was some further talk with regard to the arrest of the 16 Poles and the choice of Poles for consultation in setting up a unified Polish government. It was felt that, while Mr. Hopkins is still negotiating in Moscow and while the San Francisco Conference is still going on it would be desirable not to exert too much pressure. The President,

⁸⁰ For additional details regarding this conversation, see Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, pp. 114-115.

however, left Mr. Lane in no doubt as to his intention to insist on the eventual removal of the Soviet blackout in the countries mentioned.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

862.014/6-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 4, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received June 5—10: 05 p. m.]

1891. ReEmbtel 1580, May 15, 11 a. m. Brit Ambassador has received letter dated May 30 from Vyshinski in reply to note dated May 14 concerning establishment of Polish administration on German territory occupied by Red Army. Vyshinski states that Soviet Govt cannot agree to wide interpretation functions of Control Committee set forth in British note which assumes that supreme authority of Allies over Germany as a whole must be extended to separate zones of occupation in all respects. He admits the validity of this principle only in relation to questions which are common to all Germany, and adds that any other conception would make the realization by the Allied Powers of authority in their respective zones meaningless.

Vyshinski denies that representatives of Polish administration on German territory occupied by Red Army may be characterized as agents of the Soviet Govt. He says that Polish administration is operating under direction of Polish Provisional Govt and performing its functions on territory under its authority in conformity with Polish laws. This situation was caused by circumstances arising out of the war. It must also be remembered that Crimea decisions on Poland recognize that Poland is to receive substantial increases of territory in north and west. This is confirmation that Crimea decisions do not exclude but rather presuppose possibility of functioning of a Polish administration in this territory. Existence of Polish administration at the present time cannot be considered as predetermining future disposal of these territories which is a subject for settlement at the peace conference as provided in Crimea decision.

Vyshinski asserts that statements made by representatives of Provisional Govt concerning Danzig and certain agricultural districts of Polish Pomerania cannot be regarded as proof that question of Poland's western frontiers is to be regarded as already disposed of.

Vyshinski then states that in light of the foregoing, question of responsibility of Soviet Govt for activity of Polish officials in these areas hardly needs further explanation. In conclusion he says that

in present circumstances and in view of considerations set forth by him there are no grounds for raising and even less for discussing question of so-called free city of Danzig.

Sent Dept., rptd Paris for Murphy 155.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/6-345 : Telegram

*President Truman to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to the President,
at Moscow*

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1945.

283. I am very pleased with your continued and strenuous efforts reported in your messages of June 3 to induce Stalin to release at least some of the detained Polish political leaders before consultations begin. I feel that you should continue in the same vein in the hope that Stalin will agree to the release of the majority of these men. I fear that if Stalin does not make some concession to us on this point the otherwise favorable reaction, which will come when it is known that consultations are to begin, will be jeopardized in the eyes of a large part of American public opinion. I also fear that if the majority of these men are not released this question is liable to be one of the principal points of discussion during at least the initial stages of the consultations rather than the real point at issue—the creation of a new Polish Government of National Unity. If you feel it is advisable, I suggest that you also endeavor to meet Mikolajczyk's suggestion that Stalin release some of the held Polish political leaders rather than grant them amnesty as he first suggested. As you know the Prime Minister has also suggested that an effort be made to meet Mikolajczyk's suggestion on this point.

If, however, you feel that the possibility of initiating consultations may be jeopardized by insisting on the release of some of the political leaders, you may separate the question of the release of the prisoners from the question of the list of names of persons to be invited for the consultations. If your further efforts to obtain Stalin's agreement to the release of these men are not immediately successful I hope you will continue to impress upon him the adverse effect this will have in the United States.

I also feel that it would be very helpful if you could obtain the inclusion of Popiel in the group from London. The inclusion of Popiel with Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk would mean that the most important Polish political parties would be represented and this would help to create favorable reaction among Polish circles abroad. I feel it would be advisable to eliminate Kolodzei if you can arrange it, but

if it is necessary to include him in the group from London in order to get Popiel I do not believe we should object.

You are doing a grand job. I am repeating this message to Churchill and am expressing the hope that he will agree with my suggestions.

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645 : Telegram

President Truman to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to the President, at Moscow

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1945.

284. The following message refers to your No. 051120⁸¹ and my No. 283.

The recommendations you make for personnel to be invited for conference in regard to the formation of a Polish Government have my full approval.

Do the best you can to obtain agreement on the points made by Churchill in his Number 72 and those made by Mikolajczyk in Schoenfeld's message⁸² which you have seen and which was sent to the State Department.

Then return to Washington at any time convenient to you.

860C.01/6-345 : Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1945.

58. Thank you for your encouraging message no. 67⁸³ expressing your concurrence with the efforts Harry Hopkins has made in Moscow to get on with the Polish business.

I am repeating in my next message⁸⁴ my reply to Harry Hopkins' latest communications in regard to this matter. I sincerely hope that

⁸¹ Mr. Hopkins' message No. 051120, June 5, to President Truman read as follows:

"I have been shown by the British Ambassador the text of Churchill's personal message No. 72 of June 4 to you. I feel it is desirable for me to have a final conference with Stalin as soon as possible and in light of the Prime Minister's message I hope you may find it possible to send me today your final instructions." (740.00119 Potsdam/6-645)

⁸² Apparently reference is to telegram Poles 63, June 3, 1945, midnight, from London, which transmitted the record of an interview between Mikolajczyk and Sir Orme Sargent, Superintending Under Secretary for the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office. The record of this interview with Mikolajczyk was transmitted to President Truman by Prime Minister Churchill in his message 73, June 4, p. 321.

⁸³ Dated June 2, p. 317.

⁸⁴ President Truman's message No. 59 to Prime Minister Churchill, dated June 6, 1945 (not printed), quoted President Truman's message No. 283, June 5, to Mr. Hopkins, p. 326.

you concur in my suggestions. I would appreciate receiving any comments you may care to make.

740.00119 Potsdam/6-645

*Memorandum of the Sixth Hopkins-Stalin Conversation at the Kremlin, June 6, 1945, 6 p. m.*⁸⁵

[Extract]⁸⁶

Present: Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
 Ambassador W. A. Harriman
 Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
 Marshal Stalin
 Mr. V. M. Molotov
 Mr. Pavlov

MR. HOPKINS said if it was agreeable to Marshal Stalin he wished to pursue and he hoped to reach a conclusion in regard to the Polish matter they had already discussed. He said he hoped it would be possible to reach an agreement between themselves in regard to lists of Poles to be invited to Moscow to consult with the Commission and the representatives of the Warsaw Government. He said he had anticipated some difficulty in regard to the list from London due to the fact that there was no representative of the Christian Labour Party on the list. The representative of this party, it was felt, would strengthen the list and give more weight to the decision reached after the consultations. He said there were two ways of settling this: (1) to substitute Popiel for Kolodzei, or (2) simply to add Popiel to the list to be invited from London.

MARSHAL STALIN said he much preferred to remain within the limits set at the Crimea Conference, namely five from within Poland and three from London. He said if we departed from these limits there would be no end to the discussions and additions. He said further if it was felt that Popiel was essential he could be substituted for Stanczyk or Grabski. He would have no objection to that.

MR. HOPKINS remarked that Grabski was ill and could not come.

MARSHAL STALIN continued that if there was objection to Kolodzei he could be replaced by Julian Zakowski. He said that Zakowski was an engineer teaching at Liverpool University and a non-party man.

MR. HOPKINS said that he had no information concerning Zakowski and would like to check, but suggested that they agree on the list from

⁸⁵ Memorandum prepared by Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State.

⁸⁶ For other portions of the record of this meeting, see Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 910-912, and *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 60.

Poland since that was apparently acceptable to all and that from London it be agreed that Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk and either Kolodzei or Zakowski come. He said he could tell Marshal Stalin on behalf of the United States and British Governments that such a list would be acceptable.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed to this.

MR. HOPKINS said he assumed that the Commission would promptly issue invitations to these eight Poles and of course to the representatives of the Warsaw Government to come to Moscow for consultation.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

MR. HOPKINS continued that President Truman and the Prime Minister would send messages to Marshal Stalin officially confirming this list. He added that his mission here had not been to attempt to settle the many problems involved in the Polish question. That would be a matter for the Commission and the Poles invited for consultation to go into. He said that while this meeting of minds in regard to the list was a great step forward it was obviously not a solution to the Polish question. He added that it was of course understood that during these consultations no decision would be reached which did not have unanimous approval of the three members of the Commission, of which Mr. Molotov was Chairman.

MARSHAL STALIN said this was correct.

MR. HOPKINS then said that Marshal Stalin would recall that at one of their first meetings he had said that the atmosphere of the consultations would be greatly helped from the point of view of the United States Government if some satisfactory solution could be found in regard to the majority of arrested Poles who were only accused of the operation of illegal radio transmitters. He said he did not intend to go into the details of this subject again but merely wished to emphasize its importance from the point of view of United States public opinion and to express the hope that Marshal Stalin could find his own way to accommodate this feeling and take it into consideration.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he would take Mr. Hopkins's statements fully into consideration in regard to this question.

MR. HOPKINS expressed his thanks for the Marshal's statement.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he wished to thank Mr. Hopkins for his great assistance in moving forward the Polish question.

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860C.01/6-745 : Telegram

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, to the President

[Moscow,] 6 June 1945.

062100. Harriman and I had a final meeting with Stalin and Molotov this evening.⁸⁷ I impressed on Stalin that we preferred Popiel in place of Kolodzei. He replied that he did not want more than three members from London but that if we wanted Popiel instead of Stanczyk that was all right with him.

He said that would only agree that Kolodzei be replaced by Julian Zakowski, who Stalin said was an engineer teacher at Liverpool University, and non-party. I told him that inasmuch as we did not know of him we would like to have the opportunity of checking. It was felt that the Polish members from England would be Mikolajczyk, Stanczyk and either Kolodzei or Zakowski. It is important therefore to check at once on Zakowski and for us to determine whether we wish him rather than Kolodzei. Our judgment here is that on the basis of Stalin's information he would be far more desirable than Kolodzei. It is important that this be correlated with the British and Mikolajczyk at once.

We agreed upon the members from Poland as follows: Witos, Zulawski, Kutrzeba, Kolodziński, Krzyżanowski.

It was agreed that these eight persons together with three or four from the Lublin Government would be invited promptly by the Moscow Commission to come to Moscow to start the consultations. I told Stalin that you and Churchill would send him a formal message confirming this list.

I regret that I was unable to induce Stalin to add a Christian Labor member to the list, but Stalin was adamant about limiting the membership of the consulting committee to three from London and five from Poland. We could have had Popiel, but that would have meant throwing Stanczyk overboard. Since Mikolajczyk insists on Stanczyk, it seemed best to leave him.

I told Marshal Stalin that my mission here had not been to go into the many problems which will be involved in the settlement of the Polish problem, and that although our meeting of minds here was a great step forward, it was obviously not the final solution, which would be up to the Commission in consultation with the Poles invited here; and of course no decision would be taken during these consultations which did not have the unanimous approval of the 3 members of the Commission. I, therefore, believe that if the Commission

⁸⁷ For a partial record of this meeting, see Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 910-912.

should agree unanimously to invite additional people in for consultation, that can be done. However, I want to impress upon you that Stalin has repeatedly stated that he would like to have the group confined to three from London, five from Poland, plus the Lublin representatives. At this point, I told Stalin that I was authorized on behalf of the United States Government and the British Government to agree to the list.

I then raised again as forcibly as I could the question of the majority of the Polish prisoners now under arrest, who were accused of operation of illegal radio transmitters. I strongly emphasized that the atmosphere of the forthcoming consultations would be seriously hampered by this and urged him to find in his own way a solution of this question. Marshal Stalin replied that he would take what I had said fully into consideration. In reply to my thanks he expressed his appreciation and satisfaction with the forward move in the solution of the Polish question. Harriman and I gained the definite impression that Stalin was going to do something about the prisoners. We have no idea how or when he will do it.

We then laid out to him the impasse at San Francisco over the voting procedure. Stalin had not understood the issues. After considerable discussion in which Molotov took an active part, Stalin overruled Molotov and agreed that the American position was acceptable to him. Harriman should be informed if Gromyko does not receive instructions promptly.

I am leaving Moscow tomorrow morning for Berlin and will see Eisenhower⁸⁸ in Frankfurt. I should be home within a week.

860C.01/6-745 : Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)

[WASHINGTON,] 7 June 1945.

63. I have just received another message from Harry Hopkins on the Polish matter. He reports that Stalin was adamant in refusing to substitute Popiel for Kolodzei. He insisted that the London list be limited to three and the only concession he will make is to substitute Julian Zakowski for Kolodzei or Popiel for Stanczyk. Since Mikolajczyk insists on Stanczyk, Hopkins believes we should leave him on the list instead of substituting Popiel. According to Stalin, Zakowski is a teacher of engineering at Liverpool University and is non-party. We have no precise information regarding him but perhaps Mikolaj-

⁸⁸ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. For Mr. Hopkins' memorandum on his meeting with General Eisenhower on June 7, see Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 913-914.

czyk can give us some guidance as to whether it would be better to accept Zakowski for Kolodzei.

The tentative list agreed to at Moscow is now composed of Mikolajczyk, Stanczyk, Kolodzei or Zakowski from London; Witos, Zulawski, Kutrzeba, Kolodzierski and Krzyzanowski, non-Lublin Poles from Poland, plus three or four Lublin representatives. Hopkins pointed out to Stalin that although the tentative agreement on the list was a great step forward it is not a final solution which depends upon the Commission in consultation with the Poles, and he made it clear that no decision would be taken during the consultations which did not have the unanimous approval of all three Commissioners. He pointed out that, while by unanimous decision it might be possible to invite additional people for consultation, Stalin seemed to be standing firm on inviting only three from London and five from Poland to represent the non-Lublin groups. Hopkins told Stalin that he was authorized by the United States and British Governments to agree to this list subject to the decision as to whether we prefer Zakowski for Kolodzei.

He again took up the question of the release of the majority of the political leaders accused of operating illegal transmitters and while Stalin did not make a commitment on this point, Harriman and Hopkins gained the impression that Stalin was going to do something about them.

I am sure that you will agree that this is the best solution we can hope for in the circumstances and I shall appreciate it if you will let me know urgently whether you feel we should agree to Kolodzei or Zakowski. I am putting this same question up to Mikolajczyk with whom I am sure you will discuss the matter.

TRUMAN

860C.01/6-845 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 8, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received June 8—9 p. m.]

Poles 65. Your 18, June 7.⁸⁹ Mikolajczyk states (1) he prefers Zakowski to be invited to the Moscow conversations instead of Kolodzeij, since the former is less known and his inclusion will create less

⁸⁹ Not printed; this telegram repeated information contained in President Truman's telegram 63 to Churchill, June 7, *supra*, and added: "Please ascertain from Mikolajczyk whether he prefers that Kolodzei or Zadowski be invited from England and report whether Mikolajczyk still agrees to go to Moscow to consult with the persons whose names are now on the list." (860C.01/6-745)

violent reaction here; and (2) he still agrees to go to Moscow to consult with the persons listed, if invited to do so by the Commission of Three.

Zakowski, Mikolajczyk states, is an architect, works in the Polish Ministry of Information in London (section for study of post war reconstruction of industry) and has occasionally gone to Liverpool to lecture before the Polish section of the School of Architecture there. In London, he has never disclosed his political views. He was thought to lean toward the Socialists but was not a member of the Party. The clue to his real political attitude is doubtless to be found in the fact that he worked before the war in the cooperative society in Warsaw, together with Obsubka-Morawski, Premier of the "Lublin Govt" and Tolwinski, present mayor of Warsaw.

Mikolajczyk states he was hopeful Stalin would agree to invite Popiel and is keenly disappointed over his non-inclusion. He indicated that if he had realized it was possible, he would have been inclined to include Popiel instead of Stanczyk, thus having three of the four principal Polish political parties represented in the conversations instead of only two. He considers it unwise to suggest such a change now but would wish the Commission of Three, if it thinks it possible, to try once more to secure the inclusion of Popiel as a fourth representative from London.

As regards the arrested Polish political leaders, Mikolajczyk states he has been less hopeful than the impression Hopkins and Harriman seem to have gained. He has been inclined to think that Stalin would not do anything about those leaders until the Moscow meeting is held, in part because the Polish Govt in London has been pursuing the propaganda line that no Pole from London would go to Moscow as long as the arrested leaders are not released. It has been his feeling that if the conversations should progress successfully (and he has serious doubts about this), Stalin would release some at least of the arrested political leaders. If not, the Soviets would simply hold them and say they were guilty.

Mikolajczyk desires to stress that with so few party leaders, it is important that all the persons on the list shall actually arrive for the conversations. It should not turn out that the Soviets later say some have been unable to come because they cannot be found or prevented by health or other reasons. He suggests the point is pertinent in the light of the report of the attempted arrest of Zulawski by the NKVD⁹⁰ (my 56, May 6, to Dept, 162 to Moscow⁹¹) and the possibility he may

⁹⁰ People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union (Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del).

⁹¹ Not printed; it transmitted information from Mikolajczyk regarding further arrests and attempted arrests of non-Communist political leaders within Poland (860C.01/5-645).

be in hiding. Even with the full list, it is difficult to be optimistic about the eventual outcome of the conversations. As matters stand, the Peasant Party is represented by Witos and himself, and the Socialist Party by Stanczyk and Zulawski. The other persons on the list from inside Poland are doubtless good men but have no party backing and may find it difficult to resist pressure.

Mikolajczyk also desires to raise the question of (1) facilities for travel; (2) living and office accommodations in Moscow. I said I would inquire though I imagined the British would take care of (1) and the Soviet Govt of (2). He says he cannot be quite sure, especially as in this instance he will not of course be travelling, as in the past, as Polish Prime Minister. "Perhaps," he said, "I shall need the same help as my friend Dimitrov".⁹²

He and Stanczyk are seeing Prime Minister Churchill tomorrow at luncheon.

Repeated to Moscow as 191.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/6-945 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

[LONDON,] 9 June 1945.

80. Thank you for your numbers 58, 59⁹³ and 63 about the Polish negotiations. I assume that you will have received my numbers 72 and 73 which contained my views in this matter in the light of our consultation with Mikolajczyk.

I have also heard from our Ambassador at Moscow about Harry Hopkins' latest conversation with Stalin on the 6th June. I agree with you that he has obtained the best solution we could hope for in the circumstances, although he has not obtained substantial satisfaction on any of Mikolajczyk's points summarized in my Number 73. The Foreign Office have explained the resulting situation to Mikolajczyk who confirms that he and Stanczyk are still ready to go to Moscow in response to an invitation from the Commission of Three. As regards the third Pole from abroad, he has expressed a preference for Stalin's new candidate Zakowski rather than Kolodzei. I have accordingly instructed Clark Kerr to inform Stalin that I confirm my

⁹² Late in May 1945, Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov, a leader in the Bulgarian Agrarian Party, sought refuge in the home of the United States Representative in Bulgaria, Maynard Barnes, in order to escape probable arrest by the Communist-dominated Bulgarian Government. For documentation regarding the granting of asylum to Dimitrov, see telegram 268, May 24, 1945, 11 a. m. from Sofia, vol. iv, p. 220, and succeeding documents.

⁹³ Message No. 59, June 6, not printed; it quoted President Truman's message No. 283, June 5, to Mr. Hopkins, p. 326.

acceptance of the following list of candidates to be invited by the Commission: Mikolaczyk, Stanczyk, Zakowski, Witos, Zulawski, Kutrzeba, Krzyanowski, and Kolodzeiski plus three or four representatives of the Warsaw Provisional Government. I am telling our Embassy at Washington to show to the State Department for your information the instructions which I have sent to Clark Kerr.

860C.01/6-945 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1945—11 a. m.

1260. The President has directed me to inform you that he agrees to the Polish Commission issuing invitations to the following persons for consultation in Moscow: Mikolajczyk, Stanczyk, Zakowski, Witos, Zulawski, Kutrzeba, Krzyanowski, and Kolodzeiski plus three or four representatives of the Warsaw Provisional Government.

Churchill has just telegraphed the President that he has instructed Clark Kerr to inform Stalin of the British Government's agreement to the above list.

GREW

860C.00/6-1145 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to
President Truman*

[Moscow,] June 9, 1945.

091416Z. In my telegram of yesterday, number 080900Z,⁹⁴ regarding Harry's visit I failed to comment on the discussions with Stalin about the arrested Polish political leaders. Stalin took a very firm position that diversionist activities of Poles behind the Red Army was entirely a Soviet matter. It became clear that Stalin would not, as a matter of pride, and prestige, deviate from this point.

I feel Harry handled this question extremely shrewdly. He presented at several of the earlier meetings in no uncertain terms the importance of the matter and then at the last meeting put it up as a matter which, if dealt with generously by Stalin, would be of great value in the eventual solution of the Polish question. Stalin reacted favorably and I would frankly be surprised if he did not make some helpful gesture in this connection.

[HARRIMAN]

⁹⁴ For the telegram from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to President Truman, dated June 8, 1945, giving a brief report on Mr. Hopkins' mission to Moscow, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 61.

860C.01/6-1145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 11, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received June 11—9 p. m.]

2014. Polco. ReDepts 1260, June 9, 11 a. m. Polish Commission met today and agreed to send invitation to individuals agreed upon. Exact wording of invitation is contained in my next following message.⁹⁶

This invitation will be delivered to the persons within Poland, through the offices of the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw⁹⁷ and to the Poles in England through the British FO.

We further agreed that a public statement should be made by the three Govts based on the wording of the invitation and including the names of the persons to be invited for release in the morning newspapers in the three countries Wednesday June 13. The exact text of the release is being drafted and I will telegraph it tomorrow.⁹⁸ The above date was fixed in order to give time for the delivery of the invitations before any public announcement.

Rptd to London as No. 266 for Winant and Schoenfeld.

HARRIMAN

⁹⁶ Telegram 2015, June 11, 11 p. m., not printed. The text of the invitation to be sent to the Polish leaders reads as follows:

"The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr and the Ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. W. A. Harriman, authorized by the Crimea Conference of the three Allied powers to consult with members of the Provisional Polish Govt and with other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad concerning the reorganization of the Provisional Polish Govt on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles from abroad, and concerning the formation of a Polish Provisional Govt of National Unity would like to meet with you on this question and request you to arrive in Moscow on June 15 of this year."

The invitation was signed by Molotov, Clark Kerr and Harriman. (860C.01/6-1145)

⁹⁷ Viktor Zakharovich Lebedyev, who was named Ambassador in January 1945 and arrived in Warsaw in February.

⁹⁸ Telegram 2032, June 12, 6 p. m., from Moscow, not printed; for text of the statement, issued for simultaneous release in Washington, London, and Moscow at 7 p. m., Eastern War Time, June 12, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 17, 1945, p. 1095.

860C.01/1-1345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London*⁹⁹

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1945—1 p. m.

Poles 19. Your Poles 66, June 13.¹ Please discuss with Mikolajczyk the refusal of Zakowski to proceed to Moscow and ascertain his reaction to this decision. Dept feels that, if Zakowski persists in his refusal to proceed to Moscow, it would be best for Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk to proceed alone. Dept hopes that Mikolajczyk and the British will concur in this recommendation. For your information, if the Soviet Government insists on substituting Kolodzei Dept feels we should endeavor to induce them to drop this request, but if they insist it is felt we should accept Kolodzei in order that there may be no delay in starting the consultations. Please consult with Ambassador Winant on this matter in order that he may discuss the matter with the British Government.

This message is being repeated to Moscow with instructions to Hariman to endeavor to obtain Soviet consent to the above suggestions, if the Soviets bring up the question.

GREW

*Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman*²

[WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1945.

One of the difficulties in negotiating the Polish agreement in Moscow was that President Truman had sent me without discussing it in advance with Churchill. Altho, at the time of my departure, he acquainted him with my impending visit to Moscow, no British representative was present at any of my conferences with Stalin and I was in no position to deal directly with Churchill. Fortunately, Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador to Moscow, was an old friend of mine and quite in sympathy with my visit and I am sure he reported very fully to the British Foreign Office and Churchill. And, more than that, he was making recommendations to Churchill urging the British to back us up. I began to hear from Kerr that Churchill was obviously quite disturbed about the whole business but there was not

⁹⁹ Repeated as telegram 1286 to Moscow with the addition of the following paragraph: "If the Soviet authorities bring up this matter, please endeavor to obtain their concurrence with the first suggestion contained in this message."

¹ Not printed; it reported that Zakowski had informed the British Foreign Office that he must decline the invitation to go to Moscow for conversations looking toward a reorganized Polish Government since he was not a politician and did not feel able to assume this responsibility (860C.01/6-1345).

² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

very much he could say because it was probably to his political interest to get agreement on the Polish question before the British elections.

When I reached Frankfort³ there was an urgent telephone message from Churchill which I answered and in which he insisted on my going to London. I stalled about this, telling him my health was not too good and that I thought I ought to get right back but would let him know, and that under any circumstances I would not go without the approval of the President. I felt it unwise for me to go to England and see Churchill before reporting to Truman, so I gave Churchill no encouragement. Churchill wired Truman and Truman replied in the negative to Churchill. I was not acquainted with this until I got to Paris when Churchill again called me and told me the answer had come from Truman and expressed great regret at the decision and acted a little petulant about it over the telephone. I told him, however, that there was nothing I could do about it and, under any circumstances, my health was such that I felt I should not do anything but go right home.

860C.01/6-1345

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1945.

The Polish Ambassador called at his request to discuss the latest developments in the Polish question.

He was quite frank in expressing his feeling that he did not expect a satisfactory solution from the coming talks among the Polish leaders in Moscow. His principal complaint was that we had consented to hold the talks before obtaining the release of the sixteen Polish leaders. The Ambassador felt that this was the only significant thing which had come out of the talks in Moscow, namely, that we had consented to continue the talks regarding Poland despite the fact that the Polish leaders were still under arrest. The Ambassador felt that in doing this we had made it impossible to reach a solution of the question because he could not imagine that Mr. Mikolajczyk could proceed with the talks while his colleagues were in jail in Poland.

I told the Ambassador that Mr. Mikolajczyk had consented to take part in the conversations in Moscow although the leaders had not been released.

In answer to the Ambassador's arguments to the effect that we had conceded too much to the Soviets solely to get on with the business regarding Poland, I stated that to adopt a negative attitude in this mat-

³ On June 7.

ter would get us nowhere, would give the Lublin Government time to consolidate its position, and that, therefore, I felt that a definite positive step forward had been taken in arranging for the consultations in complete conformity with our interpretation of the Yalta agreement. The Ambassador was disappointed at the choice of many of the people called to the consultations since some of them were too old and therefore he felt that they were not mentally capable of resisting the demands of the Soviet and Lublin representatives. I explained to the Ambassador that Mikolajczyk had stated definitely that he desired to have Mr. Witos take part in the consultations and he also approved of Kutrzeba, although both were quite elderly. The Ambassador made the interesting observation that Kolodzierski, who was for many years the Librarian of the Polish Parliament, was the man who was always consulted by all political parties in connection with the formation of governments. The Ambassador stated that he was of a left-wing frame of mind, associated with the Socialists but had actually never taken an active part in Socialist Party politics. He added that Kolodzierski, in his opinion, was the most important political figure from inside Poland who is to attend the consultations.

The Ambassador, during the three-quarters of an hour talk, endeavored to point out various "weapons" that we had which, if we should choose to use them, would bring the Soviets to reason. Most of them, if carried through to their logical conclusion, would mean that we would have to fight the Soviet Union, although the Ambassador did not go that far.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

860C.01/6-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 14, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received June 14—9:32 a. m.]

2069. Polco. I have received this morning a letter from Molotov advising that Messrs. Zulawski, Krzyzanowski, Kutrzeba and Kolodzewski have accepted the invitation of the Commission to come to Moscow. Kutrzeba arrived yesterday with the four representatives of the Warsaw Govt and the other three will arrive today.

Molotov further states that a Soviet officer delivered the written invitation personally to Witos on June 12 near the town of Tarnow. Witos expressed himself to the officer as grateful for the invitation but stated that unfortunately his health did not permit his being present at the consultation, participation in which he considered it to be the

duty of every sincere Pole. Molotov further points out that no written reply has so far been received from Witos.⁴

Sent Dept 2069, rptd to London for Winant and Schoenfeld as 276.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/6-1445: Telegram

The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 14, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received June 14—5:30 p. m.]

Poles 67. Your June 13.⁵ I have discussed Zakowski's refusal to go to Moscow with Mikolajczyk and also with Ambassador Winant.

Mik states Brit yesterday wired Clark Kerr suggesting that Popiel be selected in Zakowski's place. Mik says if this is impracticable, he thinks it preferable that only he and Stanczyk proceed to Moscow from London but if the Soviets seek to include Kolodziej, this will not deter them from going. Mik states, however, that a far more serious setback has occurred. Witos is reported to have stated orally to the Soviet official who delivered the invitation to him that while he regarded it as the duty of every patriotic Pole to accept such an invitation he was personally not well enough to travel to Moscow. Mik understands that Clark Kerr has consequently suggested that it may be necessary to fall back on Archbishop Sapiiha.

Mik states he would regard Sapiiha's presence as desirable but this would not solve his own problem. If Witos could not be present, there would as matters now stand be no member of the Peasant Party from inside Poland with whom he could consult. This would produce a serious situation for him. The question might then arise whether he truly represented the views of the Peasant Party inside Poland. Kowalski, one of the Lublin representatives, formerly Secretary of the Agricultural Section of the Comintern and now claiming to be the Secretary of the Peasant Party, might deny that Mik represented the real views of the party since he had not been in the country and might claim that he (Kowalski) did represent those views. Kowalski could not, however, take such a position with Witos or a suitable representative of the party from inside Poland.

In the circumstances, Mik proposes that he be assured of an opportunity to go to Tarnow to consult with Witos before he takes any

⁴ For Witos' letter to the Three Power Commission declining to take part in the deliberations on the question of the creation of a Polish Government of National Unity, see Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, p. 116.

⁵ Telegram Poles 19 to London, p. 337.

final decisions in the consultations at Moscow and that Kiernik, a Peasant Party leader, be invited to participate in the conversations if Witos cannot be present. Mik states that if there is objection to his going to Poland to consult with Witos, he desires to insist that Kiernik be invited to take part in the Moscow conversations. He does not see how there could be objection to his seeing Witos if the reason for Witos' non-participation lies in considerations of health. Alternatively, if it is not considered practicable to invite Kiernik, then Mik insists on being allowed to consult with Witos before taking any final decisions in Moscow. In short, he would like both things but must insist on one.

Mik states that there is a further reason why he must consult the party inside Poland. He recalls that when Witos was taken from his home late in March and offered participation in the Lublin Govt, he replied that before taking a position he had to make certain conditions, namely, that he must have the opportunity to consult the Peasant Party and that Mik must be in the Govt (my 55, May 4 to Dept, 158 to Moscow⁶). Mik points out that if Witos with his great prestige refused to take a position without consulting his party, Mik naturally cannot lay himself open to the charge of ignoring the party and the country.

Kiernik is understood to have been arrested (my 56 to Dept, 162 to Moscow, May 6⁷). He was, however, not one of the 16 arrested leaders and his arrest so far as I know, has never been made public by the Soviet authorities.

In view of these developments and the necessity for time to consider Mik's proposals, the departure of Mik and Stanczyk which was fixed for June 15 has been delayed.

Sent Dept as Poles 67; repeated to Moscow as 201.

[SCHOENFELD]

860C.01/6-1545: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 15, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received June 15—10:38 a. m.]

2092. Polco. Re Schoenfeld's Poles 67, June 14, to Dept. I cannot find words to express my concern at Mikolajczyk's unwillingness to come to Moscow unless his conditions have been fulfilled. His condi-

⁶ Not printed; it reported on a message which Mikolajczyk had received from Poland regarding a meeting between Wincenty Witos and representatives of the Polish Provisional Government (Lublin Poles) (860C.01/5-445).

⁷ Not printed; it reported on information which Mikolajczyk had received from Poland regarding the arrest of Polish non-Communist leaders including Kiernik (860C.01/5-645).

tions in themselves seem reasonable and some solution satisfactory to him should be possible after his arrival.

All of the other Poles are now in Moscow and the atmosphere that would be created by his refusal to come until his conditions are met would certainly impair his influence and in fact jeopardize the success of the consultations themselves. I urge that strong pressure be brought today in London by Winant and Schoenfeld to induce Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk to leave for Moscow tomorrow morning, Saturday, without fail. The Brit Ambassador is cabling the FonOff in the same sense. The Brit Ambassador and I will see Molotov this afternoon to discuss the possibility of making special arrangements which would permit Witos to come to Moscow, as well as the alternative suggestions made by Mikolajczyk. We are not, however, informing Molotov that Mikolajczyk is making his departure conditional on acceptance of one of his alternatives as we are satisfied that if we did so his influence in the consultations would be gravely impaired.

Stalin has stated that he objected to inviting Mikolajczyk again because of past experience with him. To use Stalin's own words "he has missed the bus every time and will continue to do so". The disclosure of his present position to the Russians would confirm their opinion of him as a man with whom they will find it very difficult to work. It is the Brit Ambassador's and my strong opinion that the best hope of success in resolving the difficulties involved in the formation of a new govt is for Mikolajczyk to come to Moscow at once⁸ and deal with all of the complicated problems here in the atmosphere created by Hopkins' talks with Marshal Stalin.

Sent Dept as 2092, rptd London for Winant and Schoenfeld as 282.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/6-1445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1945—1 p. m.

Poles 20. The Department is repeating to you its telegram to Moscow in reply to Poles 67, June 14, and Moscow's 282 of June 16 to you.⁹ For the reasons given by Harriman, please impress on Mikolajczyk the necessity for him and Stanczyk to proceed to Moscow

⁸ For an account of the meeting between Prime Minister Churchill and Mikolajczyk on the evening of June 15 at which the Prime Minister convinced Mikolajczyk that he must proceed to Moscow for the consultations scheduled there, see Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy*, pp. 388-389.

⁹ Moscow's 282 of June 16 to London was the same as Moscow's 2092, June 15, to the Department, *supra*.

as soon as possible. He should not delay his departure beyond June 16. You should also inform him of the tenor of the instructions given to Harriman urging him to press for the acceptance by the Commission of one of Mikolajczyk's three proposals contained in your Poles 67, June 14, in the event that it is not possible to make arrangements to bring Witos to Moscow. Please coordinate with Ambassador Winant in regard to this matter.

Repeated to Moscow.¹⁰

GREW

860.C.01/6-1545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1945—1 p. m.

1312. Dept is of the opinion that the proposals made by Mikolajczyk, as reported in Schoenfeld's 201, June 14, to you,¹¹ are reasonable in view of the inability of Witos to attend the consultations. Dept feels that any one of the three alternatives proposed by Mikolajczyk are acceptable and, if you concur, suggests that you should take up with the Commission which one of the alternatives should be accepted. You should press to have at least one of them accepted in order that the consultations may begin as soon as possible.

Dept does not feel that anything would be gained by backing the British suggestion that Popiel be selected to take the place of Zakowski.

Reurtel 2092, June 15, Dept is telegraphing Winant and Schoenfeld, instructing them to impress upon Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk that they must proceed to Moscow immediately and to inform them that you have been instructed to urge the Soviet Government to accept one of Mikolajczyk's three proposals in the event it proves impossible to bring Witos to Moscow.

Repeated to London for Schoenfeld as Poles 21.

GREW

¹⁰ As telegram 1311, June 15.

¹¹ Same as telegram Poles 67, June 14, 7 p. m., from London, p. 340.

860C.01/6-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 15, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received June 15—2:30 p. m.]

2104. Polco. ReEmbs No. 2092, June 15, 3 p. m. Clark Kerr and I met with Molotov this afternoon.¹² We agreed to send another message to Witos urging him to reconsider his decision not to come to Moscow, emphasizing the importance we placed on his presence and offering to make every arrangement for his comfort and medical attention both on the trip and while in Moscow. It was agreed that if Witos finally decided that he could not come Kiernik should be invited as his substitute. Molotov took the position that the question of Mikolajczyk seeing Witos in Poland should be left until after the consultations were in progress.

In connection with Molotov's agreement to Kiernik, Clark Kerr and I agreed to the issuance of an invitation to Kowrdzei [*Kolodzeij*] in place of Zakowski. He refused to reconsider Popiel.

The Commission will receive all of the Poles tomorrow, Saturday, at 7 p. m., therefore it is urgently essential for Mik and Stanczyk to leave London early tomorrow morning. It would seem desirable to bring Kolodzeij if possible. The FonOff is to extend the invitation to him. We will meet first with the representatives of the Warsaw Government on Monday and subsequently with the others.

At the Brit Ambs suggestion Molotov agreed to a rotation of the chairmanship between the members of the Commission. Because in conversation with Stalin, Hopkins had referred to Molotov as chairman, I expressed my opposition but accepted the vote of the majority.

Sent to Dept as 2104; London as 286.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/6-1545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1945—5 p. m.

1314. British Embassy here has informally brought to attention of Dept a summary of the instructions sent by the Foreign Office to Clark Kerr¹³ outlining the objectives which the British Government

¹² Further details of this meeting are given in Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference* (Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 206-207.

¹³ For a description of the British Foreign Office instructions to Ambassador Clark Kerr, see *ibid.*, pp. 203-204.

hopes to obtain in connection with the settlement of the Polish question by the Polish Commission. The British Embassy official suggested that the Department might care to send similar instructions to you.

While Dept appreciates the motivation which undoubtedly prompted the Foreign Office to send these detailed instructions to Clark Kerr, it is informing the British Embassy that Dept does not feel it necessary to send such detailed instructions to you in connection with your work on the Polish Commission since you are fully familiar with the objectives we are striving to attain in regard to Poland and therefore it does not feel that we should tie your hands in this regard by specific detailed instructions at this time.

Repeated to London for information of Ambassador and Schoenfeld.

GREW

860C.01/6-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 15, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received June 15—6:30 p. m.]

6089. Poles 68, June 15, 1 p. m.¹⁴ Warner^{14a} has just told us that F O is in sympathy with Mikolajczyk's view that the holding of the trials at the very time consultations are to be held would create an "unwelcome atmosphere". Warner added that F O had under consideration a message to Clark Kerr on the subject. Whether the message in its final form would go beyond asking Clark Kerr to try to get further details about the trials, he could not say. In any event the message when despatched would be repeated to the Brit Emb at Wash.

Warner also told us that the News Dept of the F O had been directed to reply to inquiries regarding the change in Mik's travel plans, that the delay in Mik's departure was due to an "unexpected development", this "unexpected development" being Witos' inability, because of ill health as orally explained by him to the Russians, to go to Moscow.

Sent Dept as 6089; rptd Moscow as 205.

WINANT

¹⁴ Not printed; it reported that Mikolajczyk had informed the British Foreign Office of his worry and apprehension concerning a Soviet announcement indicating that the trial of the 16 arrested Polish leaders would coincide with the Moscow consultations of Polish leaders with the Tripartite Commission on Poland (860C.01/6-1545). Radio Moscow had announced on June 14 that the investigation of the arrested Polish leaders had been completed and that they would soon be tried by the Soviet Supreme Military Court.

^{14a} Christopher F. A. Warner, head of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office.

860C.01/6-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 16, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 8:20 p. m.]

2121. Polco. I greatly appreciate the Deptstel 1314, June 15, 5 p. m. re FonOff instructions to Clark Kerr.

Although the objectives of the ForOff as outlined to Clark Kerr are, as I understand them, entirely proper and generally in accord with ours, the ForOff goes further in giving Clark Kerr detailed instructions as to how to handle the negotiations in order to attain these objectives. This procedure frequently had put him in the position of being compelled to take matters up, against his own best judgment, which are not opportune or appropriate and frankly has set back the work of the Commission.

I will attempt to maintain the position that the Commission initial role is one of mediator between the Poles and to avoid taking definite positions except on matter to which we are already generally committed until the issues are more clearly drawn. At this stage I will consult the Dept for instructions.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/6-1745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 17, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received June 17—5:10 p. m.]

2136. Polco. Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk arrived Saturday¹⁵ afternoon in time for reception given by Molotov to all of the Polish delegates. The cordiality with which the members of the different groups met each other was significant and the informal conversations indicated that they all realized the vital importance of the conference coming to a successful conclusion. The four Poles from within Poland, including the two named by Molotov, showed an almost emotional desire to see broader representation in the new Govt. Rzymowski,¹⁶ Warsaw Foreign Minister was also present.

I had a long talk with Bierut and as a result invited him and Morawski to lunch today. They both showed a keen desire to get Ameri-

¹⁵ June 16. According to telegram No. 6096, June 16, 1 p. m., from London, Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk left London at about 7 a. m., June 16 (860C.01/6-1645).

¹⁶ Wincenty Rzymowski, who became Foreign Minister on May 2 when Premier Osobka-Morawski relinquished that post.

can cooperation and support both moral and economic in the stupendous job they have in reconstructing life in Poland. Although they would not admit that the people in Poland were not back of the Warsaw regime, Bierut made it plain that they were ready to compromise in bringing into the Govt new personalities to satisfy American opinion.

They showed considerable suspicion of the British, principally because they evidently consider the association with the London Govt is close and that the British support the terrorist activities of the London Govt agents which have continued up till the present. They stated however that the Warsaw Govt recently had offered an amnesty to Partisans who would lay down their arms and as a result the London Govt had published throughout Poland an order to the underground to do so. Bierut also said that the American Army was interposing no difficulty to Poles who wished to come back to Poland whereas the British Army was obstructing.

Bierut said that it was their policy not to prosecute those who had different political views as long as they did not participate in subversive activities. He explained that it had been agreed that during military operations the NKVD would operate in protection of the rear of the Red Army but now that hostilities had ceased the Soviet Govt would shortly terminate this agreement.

In response to my offer to answer any question that Bierut might have, he asked our attitude towards the Polish claims to the Oder-Neisse Line. I told him that we were committed to compensation to Poland by incorporation of part of East Prussia and also territory to the west, but that we had been surprised that their demands had gone beyond the Oder line. We considered that this question should be settled in connection [with the peace]¹⁷ although it might be discussed at the forthcoming Berlin meeting. He asked permission to show me the maps and data supporting their claims, to which I agreed.

He then asked whether we were prepared to give Poland economic aid and emphasized the importance of this to Poland. I told him that UNRRA¹⁸ and the Red Cross were prepared to give relief and that either through the World Bank or, if legislation were obtained, through the Export and Import Bank,¹⁹ we were sympathetically disposed to assist. Bierut spoke of the desirability of a commercial treaty which would allow development of trade in both directions

¹⁷ Bracketed insertion on basis of copy of telegram in Moscow Embassy files.

¹⁸ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. For documentation regarding the participation by the United States in the work of UNRRA, see vol. II, pp. 958 ff.

¹⁹ The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 was approved on July 31, 1945, increasing the lending authority of the Bank, and for other purposes (59 Stat. 526).

in order to give Poland an opportunity to buy American products she so vitally needed.

He showed interest in our attitude on restitution and reparations and mentioned that in 1939 Poland had had 40,000 motor vehicles whereas since the Germans had taken most of them away there were only 3,000 left. He spoke optimistically about the future increase in agricultural production that would come from the land reforms but emphasized the difficulty of reestablishing production in the areas in the Vistula Valley which had been fought over and were still heavily mined, and the present shortage of meat, fats and transport.

He also expressed a desire for American technical experts to assist in reestablishing and expanding Polish industry.

As to the consultations, I expressed the hope that the Poles would agree on a settlement among themselves. He said that this was also his hope and that he had called a meeting of all the Poles this afternoon to begin the conversations.

We discussed UNRRA and the Red Cross, covered in separate cables.²⁰

They remained some 3 hours, appeared to be grateful for the opportunity to have a frank talk, and seemed to appreciate my invitation to come again when other questions develop which they would like to discuss.

I will see Mik and Stanczyk tonight at dinner at the Brit Amb and hope to see the 4 Poles from within Poland tomorrow. I thought it best tactically to talk to Bierut and Morawski first.

Lieutenant Tonesk²¹ was extremely helpful in the manner in which he handled the interpreting.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/6-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 18, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received June 19—6:55 a. m.]

2150. Trial of 16 arrested Poles opened in Moscow this morning. Proceedings were held in one of smaller lecture halls in House of

²⁰ In telegram 2161, June 19, 6 p. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported his conversation with President Bierut of June 17 as it touched upon the subject of Red Cross aid to Poland; the Ambassador had stated that the continuation of the relief program to Poland was dependent on the admission of Red Cross representatives to Poland and urged President Bierut to reconsider the Polish Government's policy of refusing entry permits to Red Cross representatives (811.142/6-1945).

²¹ Lt. William J. Tonesk, U. S. Navy, aide and interpreter to Ambassador Harriman in the sessions of the Three Power Commission on Poland.

Trade Unions which had been transformed into court for occasion. Trial was attended by all the fanfare usually surrounding events which Soviets intend to exploit for propaganda purposes. Searchlights played on court and accused and activity of cameramen deprived ceremony of all dignity and made it difficult to follow proceedings. Although admission was by pass and documents were carefully verified, entire foreign press corps was present and correspondents were permitted to enter and leave at will to file flash stories. Majority of audience consisted of unidentifiable Soviets who presumably will be described as representatives of "social organizations".

Clark Kerr and I learned yesterday that trial would begin today, and carefully considered question of attending.²² I took position that in view of Stalin's assurances to Hopkins my attendance might be interpreted as casting doubts on Soviet good faith and I decided not to attend but to send Stevens to follow the proceedings. Clark Kerr likewise decided against attending and sent his Counselor and two officers of the Embassy.

Fifteen of sixteen accused (one²³ was reported to be ill) were marched in between NKVD guard and seated in crudely built wooden dock where they were attended by two NKVD guards with fixed bayonets. They were well dressed, apparently well nourished, seemingly composed and gave no indication of mistreatment.

In opening trial, President of the Court²⁴ announced that accused would be permitted to make statements in their own defense and that defense counsel had been appointed for those who desired it. Several of the accused including Okulicki had rejected offer of counsel and elected to defend themselves. Court then proceeded to hear lengthy indictment by prosecutor outlining charges against accused. Subject to confirmation when record of trial²⁵ is published these charges in the main consisted of six counts:

- (1) Organization of subversive activities in rear of Red Army
- (2) Deceiving of Soviet Command regarding alleged dissolution of Home Army

²² In his telegram 2140, June 18, 5 p. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that invitations had been extended to him and to the British Ambassador to attend the trial of the 16 Poles (860C.01/6-1845).

²³ Antoni Pajdak.

²⁴ Col. Gen. (of the Judicial Service) Vasily Vasilyevich Ulrich, President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

²⁵ For the official record of the trial, see *Trial of the Organizers, Leaders and Members of the Polish Diversionist Organizations in the Rear of the Red Army on the Territory of Poland, Lithuania, and the Western Regions of Byelorussia and the Ukraine; Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. June 18-21, 1945*, Verbatim Report (London, New York, Melbourne, Sydney, Hutchinson & Co., n.d.).

- (3) Execution of terroristic and diversionary acts in rear of Red Army
- (4) Maintenance and operation of illegal radio transmitters and caching of supplies of arms
- (5) Conduct of espionage activities on behalf of London Govt
- (6) Publication of underground newspapers containing propaganda directed against Soviet Union and Red Army.

Indictment contended that Underground Govt had fostered formation of independence organization "Niepodleglosce" and planned organization of military political committee to foment uprising in Poland in event of attempt to Sovietize country. It was also charged that Underground Govt had cooperated with Germans and advocated Polish-German alliance against Soviet Union. Principal charges were levied against Okulicki as Commander-in-Chief of Home Army and Jankowski, Bien and Jasiukowicz as Ministers in Underground Govt. Others were charged with being accomplices in carrying out policies formulated by four principal accused.

After charge had been read accused were asked individually whether they admitted their guilt. Replies in several cases were inaudible, but as nearly as could be determined only one of accused returned clearly negative answer. Majority admitted their guilt without reservation while some qualified their admissions.

First of accused to be examined was Jasiukowicz who was still on stand at lunch interval. His general line was to throw blame on Okulicki and Jankowski and to deny his own responsibility for anti-Soviet Policy of Underground Govt. He alleged that he himself favored friendly and sincere relations between Poland and Soviet Union.

During examination of Jasiukowicz he stated that Okulicki had been of opinion that Military Political Commission should continue to function even if govt. of national unity was established based on Crimea decision, to be used in event that policies of new govt. were not acceptable to political parties represented in Committee.

It is difficult to see how conduct of the trial during the present conversations in Moscow can fail to have a most unfortunate effect on the non-Warsaw Poles and greatly diminish prospects for a satisfactory understanding.²⁶

Repeated to London for Schoenfeld as 293.

HARRIMAN

²⁶ The trial was concluded on June 21. Because of illness, Pajdak was not tried. Three of the defendants (Michalowski, Kobylanski and Stemler-Dombski) were acquitted; the other twelve were condemned to imprisonment ranging from 4

860C.01/6-1945 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1945—7 p. m.

1346. Following is a summary of a telegram dated June 15 from Osubka-Morawski and Rzymowski sent in clear from Warsaw addressed to the "United States Government", which is not being answered:

Begin Summary: Since the Control Council for Germany has been established,²⁷ it is now possible to settle problems such as repatriation of Polish citizens now in areas occupied by the Allies and the identification of Polish property unlawfully taken by Germans. For this, it is necessary that representatives of the Polish Provisional Government be present. These should enjoy complete freedom of movement, be enabled to deal with technical aspects, and should be engaged in finding out scattered Polish property. Procedure suggested is to send Military Mission of Polish Provisional Government to the Control Council as anticipated in Article 5 of the agreement on Control Machinery for Germany. Problem of Poland's participation in Reparations Committee also brought forward as vital and burning one for the Polish nation and directly bound with problem of reconstruction. It is also difficult to imagine effective working of Inter-Allied Commission for investigation of German crimes without participation of representatives of Government of Poland on territory of which Nazis committed most of their crimes. In putting forth these problems Polish Provisional Government is firmly convinced that a positive solution will be important contribution to work of reconstruction of

months to 10 years. Telegram 1428, June 27, 3 p. m., to Moscow presented observations based on incomplete reports which were indicative of preliminary reaction in Washington to the Moscow trial; the telegram read in part as follows: "Trial appears to be primarily political in nature and directed more against Polish Government in London and its supporters of Polish and other nationality in Western World than against defendants. It seems designed in part at least to discredit, in advance of its formation, any block which might endeavor in future to make use of an unreconciled Poland as an anti-Soviet spearhead. . . . Mildness of sentences appears a concession to our representations and intervention and an effort to propitiate an aroused public opinion in the Western democracies. . . . It is felt strongly here that Soviet authorities displayed a disheartening lack of cooperative spirit in refusing to answer our requests for information about the missing Poles and in staging this trial at the very moment you were engaged as member of the Polish Commission in critical conversations looking towards a solution of the Polish question." (860C.01/6-2145)

²⁷ The Allied Control Council for Germany did not begin its operations until July 30, 1945. For documentation regarding the participation by the United States in the activities of the Council, see vol. III, pp. 820 ff.

countries experiencing German aggression and will assist in effecting permanent and friendly collaboration of Allied nations. *End summary.*

You may, in your discretion, in the course of conversations with Osubka-Morawski express surprise that he should feel called upon to send such a message just prior to the opening of the Polish Commission's consultations and point out to him that since this Government does not recognize Polish Provisional Government, it cannot accept this message or its implication. You may also mention that request for privilege for representatives of Polish Provisional Government to roam around in Allied-occupied territory appears strange when even minimum of contact of American officers with liberated prisoners-of-war in Poland was not granted; that matter of reparations is being dealt with on tripartite basis in conformity with Crimea decision and that claims of receiving nations will be fully considered; and that the War Crime Commission which most of the United Nations have joined is bending and will continue to bend every effort to assist in bringing to justice and punishment every war criminal regardless of the location of his crimes and for the most effective attainment of this objective will welcome the participation of official representatives of the Polish Government of National Unity when it is constituted as envisaged in the Crimea Agreement.

GREW

860C.01/6-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 21, 1945—midnight.

[Received June 22—12:50 a. m.]

2218. Polco. The Poles have come to an agreement among themselves which was reported to the Commission tonight.²⁹ The Presidium of the National Council will consist of Bierut, President, Witos, Szwalbe³⁰ and Grabski, Deputy Presidents, and three additional present members.³¹ This body is the source of power of the Govt when the Council is not in session.

²⁹ For an account of the deliberations among the Poles for the establishment of a Provisional Government of National Unity, see Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, pp. 124-129.

³⁰ Stanisław Szwalbe, a left-wing Socialist.

³¹ The three other Deputy Presidents of the National Council were Roman Zambrowski, a leader in the Polish Workers' Party, Marshal Rola-Zymierski, and Romuald Mikler of the Democratic Party.

In the Govt Morawski remains as Prime Minister, Gomulka,³² Workers Party, remains as Vice Prime Minister, Mikolajczyk becomes Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture. The other Ministers³³ remain substantially unchanged except that Kiernik, Peasant Party, becomes Minister of Public Administration, Stanczyk becomes Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, Thugutt, Peasant Party from London will be Minister of Posts and Telegraph, Wycech, Peasant Party from within Poland will be Minister of Education, and Kolodziejski, nonparty, will be Minister without Portfolio. Thus there will be six new Ministers out of a total of twenty. Popiel, Christian Labor, will be invited to return to Poland and take part in public affairs. It is Mikolajczyk's hope that Popiel will be given a ministerial portfolio at a later date.

Mikolajczyk and Kiernik, representing the Peasant Party, have not done badly in that they have introduced four new Peasant leaders. The Socialists, however, did not take a very strong position and Stanczyk is the only new Socialist Minister. They hope that after the new Govt is organized the old time Socialists will be able to increase their influence.

The Commission accepted the settlement reached among the Polish conferees and a meeting will be held tomorrow, Friday evening, to agree on the public announcement.³⁴ In the meantime no publicity is to be given. I request urgent instructions but unless I receive contrary instructions by 8 o'clock Moscow time, 1 o'clock Washington time, I shall accept the settlement as complying with the Yalta formula.³⁵

Clark Kerr and I made it clear that the formation of the Provisional Govt of National Unity was only the first step and that the Yalta decision would not be fulfilled until the holding of a truly free election.

There are some additional understandings on which agreement has been reached in principle only, such as that the National Council shall be reorganized to include fair representation of the different parties represented in the Govt and that the men for the underministerial posts shall be selected in the same proportion as the distribution of the ministerial posts.

The fundamental basis of the reorganized gov't is that the Workers Party, the Peasant Party and the Socialist Party shall each have six

³² Władysław Gomułka, Secretary General of the Polish Workers' Party.

³³ For a list of the Ministers in the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. 1, pp. 719-720.

³⁴ For text of the communiqué on the question of the formation of a Provisional Polish Government of National Unity, agreed to by the Three Power Polish Commission for release on June 23, see telegram 2231, June 23, 1945, from Moscow, *ibid.*, p. 722.

³⁵ In telegram 1370, June 22, 3 p. m., to Moscow (*ibid.*, p. 720), the Department concurred in the Ambassador's action in accepting the settlement.

portfolios and two are to be held by other democratic parties. Both Mikolajczyk and the old line Socialists not now affiliated with the Warsaw Govt hope that they can replace at a later date some of the weaker men holding portfolios but there is no assurance that this will be done.

In frankness I must report that this settlement has been reached because all the non-Lublin Poles are so concerned over the present situation in Poland that they are ready to accept any compromise which gives some hope for Polish independence and individual freedom.

At the meeting tonight I asked assurance that the principal parties concerned would pledge the maintenance of the basic agreement until a free election could be held. Definite assurances were given. I also asked assurances of freedom of assembly and discussion prior to the election and for amnesty for persons accused of political offenses within Poland. These were answered in generalities only but Bierut assured me privately after the meeting that the principle of amnesty was already accepted and that he expected 80% of those now under arrest in Poland would be released.

Clark Kerr acted as chairman tonight and stated that the Brit Govt would accept the settlement and extend immediate recognition to the new govt.

One could not fail to gain the impression that Molotov and the Warsaw Poles were in high spirits and that the other Poles were seriously concerned but hoped that because of the trust they had shown in the good faith of Moscow the Poles would gain a freer hand to conduct their own affairs. I personally am much relieved that there is a settlement agreed to by the Poles themselves and see no reason why we should not accept it. On the other hand we must face the fact that the Poles are counting on us for continued interest in insuring a free election.

Rptd London for Winant and Schoenfeld as No. 311.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/6-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 23, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3:05 p. m.]

2233. Polco. ReEmbtel 2218, June 21, 12 midnight repeated London as 311. In view of the importance of Thursday's meeting I desire to submit a fuller account to supplement my earlier telegram.³⁶

³⁶ Telegram 2218, *supra*; for another description of this meeting, see Feis, *Between War and Peace*, pp. 208-211.

Clark Kerr who was in the chair in accordance with the agreed rotation of chairmen opened the meeting by reviewing the terms of the Yalta formula. He recalled that three steps in the Yalta agreement provided for (1) the invitation to Poles from various groups for consultation (2) the establishment of provisional govt of national unity and (3) the holding of free and unfettered elections in Poland.

He then expressed satisfaction that Poles had reached agreement among themselves and asked Bierut for a report. Bierut read statement which had been agreed upon by all the Poles outlining proposed reorganization of provisional govt in manner already reported. In reply to Clark Kerr's question Bierut described functions of Polish National Council as supreme legislative organ and of Council's Presidium which functions as interim legislative organ between regular Council sessions.

Asked for his views Mikolajczyk expressed his agreement with settlement reached and his confidence that it was one of best paths to free and independent Poland. He said it would assure participation in govt of great democratic parties and masses of Polish people. Mikolajczyk called for close relations with Soviet Union, treaties of alliance with Britain and France and sincere friendship and cooperation with the United States as well as collaboration with all Slav peoples. He said that in joining the Govt of National Unity he understood he and his colleagues acquired right to advance claim of Polish nation to western boundaries envisaged by Yalta Conference and for earliest possible return to Poland of democratic Poles. He asked Bierut to confirm his understanding that inclusion of Popiel in Govt had not been excluded as possibility and that National Council would be widened on basis of proportional representation and participation of all democratic parties.

In reply Bierut made a long statement asking great powers to support in principle Polish demands on western boundaries. Bierut also confirmed Mikolajczyk's understanding on possibility of including Popiel and broadening of National Council.

At this point Clark Kerr said he desired to reassure Bierut on two points. Speaking as British Ambassador he said Bierut and his colleagues might rest assured that as soon as new Govt was established British Govt would recognize it and appoint an Ambassador in Warsaw. He added that he understood his Soviet colleague presented no problem in this matter and requested my views. I felt that Clark Kerr was proceeding with undue haste and limited myself to the statement that the Crimea decision stood and that the American Govt would determine its position when the new Govt was formed. I gave assurance that the news that agreement had been reached between the Poles themselves would be welcomed in Washington.

Molotov confirmed Clark Kerr's views about the Soviet attitude pointing out that his Govt recognized Provisional Govt and would continue friendly relations with the new Govt. Soviet Govt would welcome formation of new Govt and render it every support.

On Bierut's second point concerning western boundaries Clark Kerr assured Bierut that when new Govt was formed British Govt would be prepared to consult with it on this point. He added that British Govt would regard Polish claims with sympathy. He reminded Bierut that Yalta formula provided for decision of boundary question at peace conference but advised Osobka-Morawski to raise question as soon as new Govt was constituted.

Molotov said that Soviet Govt's attitude on western boundaries was based on Crimea decision. His Govt considered that Polish claims to Oder Neisse Line were fully justified and well founded.

When asked by [*my*] views I said I had nothing to add to the terms of the Crimea decision.

Clark Kerr then asked various of the other Poles to lay their views before the Commission. A number of them spoke, all pledging support to the new Govt of National Unity and urging friendly relations between Poland and the three great powers. They emphasized the difficulties facing the new Govt and need for outside assistance.

Clark Kerr said he had not called on other representatives of the Provisional Govt for their views since he assumed they were in agreement with Bierut. Osobka-Morawski at this point asked permission to speak and put forward the claims of Poland regarding repatriation of Poles, participation in Reparations Commission and participation on War Crimes Commission which were the subject of his telegram to United States Govt reported in Depts 1346 June 19, 7 p. m. Clark Kerr pointed out that these matters did not fall within competence of Commission and Molotov while expressing sympathy for Osobka-Morawski's request and suggesting that they be referred to their Govts by Commission members supported him. Clark Kerr stated that he would refer Osobka-Morawski's request to his Govt and recommend that they be given sympathetic consideration. I made no commitment.

Clark Kerr said he should like to be able to inform his Govt that parties had pledged themselves to maintain agreement until elections were held. Molotov had no comment and I propounded a similar question pointing out that I did not refer to future changes in ministerial posts but to observance of the basic principles of agreement reached between parties. In reply Bierut said that agreement having been reached they would strive to achieve lasting unity, hold free elections and broaden the legislative organs along the lines agreed to.

Mikolajczyk subscribed to this statement on behalf of his party and said he felt he expressed opinion of other parties as well.

I emphasized importance we attach to participation of Christian Labor Party in new Govt and then raised question of assurances of freedom of assembly and freedom of discussion during election campaign and the proposal for amnesty for persons charged with political offenses. Before giving Bierut a chance to answer my questions Molotov stated he did not wish to discuss future activities of new Govt but expressed his confidence on basis of agreement already reached that it would find correct solution for problems which it faced. He again stated that new Polish Govt would enjoy full confidence of Soviet Govt, confidence in democratic forces of new Poland and in their abilities and possibilities. Clark Kerr said his Govt would approach new situation in same spirit as Soviet Govt and would treat new Govt with fullest confidence. He also associated himself with my plea for broadminded understanding and generosity. Bierut taking his lead from Molotov limited his reply to generalities expressing his confidence that the Poles would be able to solve all the difficult problems facing them in the spirit of the agreement.

Remainder of meeting was devoted to discussion of press release concerning agreement reached.³⁹ It was decided that the Poles would redraft their statement today and that text of press release would be worked out before Commission meeting the following evening. Report on this meeting will follow.

Sent Dept 2233 repeated London for Winant and Schoenfeld 316.

HARRIMAN

860C.01/6-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 23, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received June 24—2:20 a. m.]

2239. Polco. At the final meeting of the Commission last night I presided. The communiqué was first considered and agreed to as subsequently released. Kolodziejski was dropped from the list of new Ministers as he has declined to serve for personal reasons. Bierut, supported by Mikolajczyk and the other Poles, argued for the elimination of "Provisional" in the title of the new Govt since this would add to the prestige and effectiveness of the Govt. As this subject had been discussed between myself and Vyshinski in the afternoon and he had agreed to the retention of the word, I assumed Soviet support and

³⁹ See footnote 34, p. 353.

stated that the title of the Govt had been decided upon at Yalta by the three Heads of Govt after thorough consideration. In spite of my agreement with Vyshinski, Molotov supported Bierut. He admitted that my position was literally in accordance with the Crimea decision, but suggested that the 3 Govts might be consulted on this point. As to the Soviet Govt he said there was no objection to dropping the word. Clark Kerr supported my position, but agreed to refer the question to his Govt. He pointed out, however, that this would cause a delay of 24 hours. I then stated that because of the difference in time between Moscow and the US it would be impossible for me to obtain an answer under 48 hours at best. Thereupon Molotov withdrew his suggestion. I asked Bierut whether the Poles accepted the title as laid down in the Crimea decision. He agreed but proposed that the new Govt when organized should approach the three Govts with the proposal that the word "Provisional" be eliminated. Molotov agreed. I did not oppose this but explained that the Crimea decision would not be fulfilled until free elections had taken place to establish a permanent Govt and indicated that I did not wish to hold out any hope that my Govt would view with favor a change from the decision of President Roosevelt on this question. I asked Bierut whether he agreed that the word "Provisional" would not be changed without the approval of the British and American Govts. Bierut answered in the affirmative.

It was agreed that the Polish text of the agreement would be the official text for the Poles to use among themselves in order to avoid any misunderstanding in the translation.

I then asked my colleagues whether they accepted the agreement reached among the Poles. Molotov expressed full agreement. Clark Kerr said he had received instructions from his Govt to accept the settlement but that in extending approval Mr. Churchill wished to point out that the British Govt was not committed to recognize the new Govt until satisfied that it had been "properly formed" in conformity with the first two paragraphs of the Crimea decision. In the view of the Brit Govt this included formal acceptance by the new Govt of pledge to hold free and unfettered elections etc., (following the wording of the Crimea decision). Clark Kerr then referred to the assurances that Bierut had given me last night that the new Govt accepted the undertaking to hold free elections as provided but asked for a definite pledge. Thereupon followed an argument between Clark Kerr, Molotov and Bierut, the latter showing some irritation at the lack of confidence of the British. Clark Kerr backed down and simply asked Bierut whether he accepted the Crimea decision on this point. When he obtained an affirmative answer he stated that

the Brit Govt accepted the settlement and would recognize the new Govt. He said he was completely satisfied with Bierut's statement and assured him that the Brit Govt would extend recognition.

I stated that I accepted the settlement as a member of the Commission; that I had not yet heard from my Govt but that my Govt was committed to the Crimea decision and when the new Govt was formed as therein provided my Govt would carry out its undertakings.

I said that there were some statements made at the previous meeting by the Poles in regard to supplementary understandings which had been reached but which I had found were not included in the written statement and I wished clarification of these understandings in order that I might accurately report them to my Govt. I referred specifically to Bierut's statement the preceding night in regard to the National Council and asked whether I was correct in my understanding that the membership of the National Council would be broadened on the same democratic basis as the Govt. Bierut referred to the additional members of the Presidium as stated in the written agreement. I inquired further regarding the membership of the Council itself. Thereupon Molotov interrupted and he [*we?*] had a long argument as to whether it was appropriate to inquire into the private affairs of the Polish Govt. I maintained my position that it was quite proper for my Govt to be fully informed concerning all the agreements that had been reached among the Poles. Mikolajczyk said that he thought the Poles had nothing to hide and that it was a question which should be discussed inasmuch as the National Council was the supreme authority of the Polish Govt. Bierut thereupon confirmed and amplified his statement of the night before, explaining that there were now only 140 members of the Council and that its base would be broadened through the local councils in order to bring in wider representation from groups not now represented, that all of the conferees in Moscow would be invited to join the Council and that the question would be given further consideration on their return to Warsaw.

I then asked what the understanding was in regard to Under-Ministerial posts. Molotov again interrupted and said that he did not see why we should pry into the business of the Poles as this question had not been previously raised and that he was thoroughly satisfied. (I had raised this question as I had been informed by Mikolajczyk that Bierut had agreed to a proportional distribution of the Under-Ministerial posts but that Bierut had failed to report this at the previous meeting.) I pressed Bierut for a reply to my question. Bierut did not reply directly but stated that there was work enough in Poland for all competent men and that they would bring in all democratic elements that would contribute to the competence of the Govt, but that

appointments should be based on individual ability rather than party affiliation. This was a democratic principle. Mikolajczyk agreed generally but pointed out that in democratic govts recognition was given to the relative popular strength of the different parties and that this principle should also be recognized. Bierut rejoined that their agreement to work together was firm and that he was sure they could settle this question among themselves without Allied interference.

I stated that I wished to make myself clear— that I had asked these questions in order that my Govt might understand fully the agreement that had been reached among the Poles themselves and the manner in which they intended to attain the unity which was our common objective.

The meeting closed with expressions of mutual thanks and confidence in the settlement that had been reached. After the meeting I entertained all participants at the Embassy.

I believe that the discussion about the supplementary understandings, although Molotov objected to it, was useful. After the meeting I was profusely thanked by almost everyone of the outside Poles. They expressed the belief that it would assist them in obtaining a fair interpretation of the verbal understandings that had been reached.

Molotov's remarks unfortunately give us a clue that he may resist the carrying out of the understanding reached at Yalta that our Govts would continue to interest themselves in developments in Poland through our respective Ambassadors in Warsaw. I feel that it is of the utmost importance that our Ambassador reach Warsaw at as early a date as possible after the formation of the new Govt. I believe further that it is of real importance that I see him personally prior to his arrival in Warsaw in order that I can give him a detailed account of the discussions here.

Bierut and his associates have made it clear in private conversations with me that they desire and need American moral and economic support and are ready to establish closer and franker relations than Molotov appears at present to wish. The other Polish leaders from within Poland for their part have made it plain that their only hope of attaining independence and reasonable personal freedom is if the Brit and American Govts continue to interest themselves in the implementation of the agreements reached.

Sent to Dept, rptd to London for Schoenfeld as 317.

HARRIMAN

[For documentation regarding the Polish Government and elections, the liquidation of the affairs of the Polish Government in Exile

in London, and Poland's frontiers and areas of Polish administration in occupied Germany, particularly during the period of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, volume I, pages 714-784, and volume II, pages 1104-1153. For the minutes and other records of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference, July 16-August 2, 1945, between President Truman, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill (later Prime Minister Attlee), with their advisers, see *ibid.*, volume II, pages 31-606, *passim*. For the decisions with regard to Poland in the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Conference, signed by President Truman, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Attlee on August 1, 1945, see *ibid.*, pages 1490-1492. For the decisions with regard to Poland in the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, issued as a communiqué dated August 2, 1945, see *ibid.*, pages 1508-1509. For Stanislaw Mikolajczyk's notes on a meeting of the Foreign Ministers and on Polish-American and Polish-Soviet conversations at the Berlin Conference, see *ibid.*, pages 1517-1542. For additional details and subjects regarding Poland considered at this Conference, see *ibid.*, entries in index under Poland.]

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO ASSURE THE FULFILLMENT BY THE POLISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT⁴¹ OF THE YALTA AND POTSDAM AGREEMENTS REGARDING POLAND; DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR POLAND

860C.50/8-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, August 6, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received August 7—8:32 a. m.]

29. The following telegram sent to Moscow as 20, August 6, 1 p. m. In cordial conversation with Bierut⁴² at which Rzymowski,⁴³ Modzelewski,⁴⁴ Tonesk,⁴⁵ also present (my telegram to Department 25, August 4,⁴⁶ repeated to you⁴⁷ as 16, August 5), I touched all eight points

⁴¹ For documentation relative to the participation of the United States in the negotiations regarding the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, see pp. 110 ff.

⁴² Boleslaw Bierut, President of the National Council of the Homeland (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) in the Polish Provisional Government.

⁴³ Wincenty Rzymowski, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁴ Zygmunt Modzelewski, Polish Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁵ Lt. William Tonesk, U.S. Navy, aide and interpreter to Ambassador Lane; as of October 26, 1945, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in the American Embassy in Poland.

⁴⁶ Not printed; in this telegram Ambassador Lane reported on the presentation of his credentials to President Bierut on August 4.

⁴⁷ Ambassador W. Averell Harriman at Moscow.

Department's telegram 3234, July 12 to Paris⁴⁸ in brief detail as follows:⁴⁹

1. We are supplying two-thirds of UNRRA⁵⁰ finances and almost hundred percent of materials for Poland. Naturally Bierut was not responsible for delay in UNRRA getting to Poland⁵¹ but in no way was United States Government responsible. I think they got my meaning.
2. We might help through Eximbank⁵² if you would tell us their specific requirements and also give us some facts re financial situation.
3. We would be glad to facilitate foreign exchange through exports especially coal and could consider triangular transactions if desirable.
4. 1,000 trucks almost ready if representative can be sent to negotiate and sign contract.⁵³ List of available trucks delivered.
5. Reparations must be discussed in Moscow (nothing was said of Government's projected trip to Moscow August 6).
6. Interest was expressed in improving treaty of 1931⁵⁴ which I emphasized is still in force.
7. Economic experts should be exchanged.
8. Telegram should be sent to Paris authorizing visas for Bauer and Grady.⁵⁵

Bierut then at my request gave me following commitments:

1. We can have Consulates at Gdansk, Cracow, Lodz, Poznan and Breslau.
2. We can have radio station in Embassy both transmitting and receiving.
3. We can fly ATC⁵⁶ planes into Warsaw without previous permission.
4. United States newspaper correspondents can enter Poland and report (to avoid possible difficulties or misunderstandings I suggest that each case be taken up specifically with Embassy).

⁴⁸ *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. I, p. 788.

⁴⁹ For a more detailed description of this conversation, see Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People* (New York, Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948), pp. 141-148.

⁵⁰ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. For documentation regarding the participation by the United States in the work of UNRRA for the year 1945, see vol. II, pp. 958 ff.

⁵¹ Regarding the delays experienced by UNRRA representatives in obtaining permission to enter Poland, see Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 143.

⁵² Export-Import Bank of Washington.

⁵³ For previous documentation regarding plans to provide Poland with 1,000 surplus Army trucks to be supplied on dollar credit terms, see telegram 154 July 28, 1945, from the Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs, Frank W. Fetter, to Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton at Babelsberg, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1153.

⁵⁴ Treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights between the United States and Poland, signed June 15, 1931; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1931, vol. II, p. 938.

⁵⁵ Dr. J. H. Bauer, a representative of the American Red Cross and a specialist in public health, and his assistant, Harry P. Grady, had been waiting in Paris for visas for Poland since early July 1945.

⁵⁶ Air Transport Command.

5. Polish Government delighted to have Congressional Committee (Department's telegram 3445, July 24, to Paris⁵⁷). Polish Government and I agree that members should see Warsaw, Lublin and Majdanek concentration camps. I think they should also see Gdansk and certain other regions if time permits.

I did not mention elections at this meeting believing it unwise to irritate an already sore spot. If I thought that the Poles were really masters in their own house, I would feel differently in proffering advice.

LANE

860C.20/8-645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane)

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1945—8 p. m.

18. Action reported in urtel 27, August 6, noon⁵⁸ approved. Department feels that Embassy should not take an active part at this stage in discussions relating to the repatriation of Polish soldiers in the West.⁵⁹ You should, however, take advantage of suitable occasions to stress discreetly the desirability of the Polish Government's giving assurances that soldiers electing to return will be guaranteed the same personal and property rights as other Polish citizens and that they will not be penalized in any manner for their former allegiance.

BYRNES

⁵⁷ Not printed; it stated that the Department attached great importance to the trip of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House of Representatives which included a stop at Warsaw scheduled for August 18-19 (120.1/7-2445). The subcommittee consisted of Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton of Ohio, and Congressmen Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota, Thomas S. Gordon of Illinois, and Joseph F. Ryter of Connecticut. In his telegram 163, August 28, 4 p. m., the Ambassador in Poland reported on the reception given to the subcommittee on August 27 by President Bierut (860C.00/8-2845). This reception (erroneously dated September 27) is described in Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 179.

⁵⁸ Not printed; it reported a conversation between the Ambassador and Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski, Minister of National Defense in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. The Ambassador had inquired whether their oath to the President of the Polish Government in Exile in London would permit Polish troops abroad to return to service under the present Government in Poland, and Marshal Rola-Zymierski had replied that if the Polish troops abroad were advised to obey his orders, the greatest part of the problem would be solved. (860C.20/8-645)

⁵⁹ The decisions of the Conference of Berlin relative to Poland, included as part IX of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, dated August 2, 1945, stated that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were ". . . anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens." (*Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1508).

860C.00/8-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, August 22, 1945—noon.

[Received August 28—5:30 p. m.]

124. Premier Osobka-Morawski⁶¹ in long talk with me yesterday welcomed visit Congressional Committee and arrival press association representatives to allay misunderstandings in US regarding present conditions in Poland and policy Polish Government. He said that prior to 1939 US had little confidence in Poland and therefore Poland was unable to obtain economic advantages which other European nations were given. He is anxious to create confidence in Poland so that investments from US will be attracted.

I said that in my opinion news blackout in Poland, since departure of Germans, is largely responsible for suspicions in US but that likewise inability of American Red Cross and UNRRA to obtain visas to come into Poland over long period of months had created impression, even in some US Government circles, that there must be something which Polish Government or other authorities wished to conceal from US. Giving facilities to newspaper correspondents to see conditions for themselves should in my opinion dispel any feeling of uncertainty in US.

Emphasizing that I was speaking privately and not under instructions I said that I was very much disturbed regarding present economic and financial policy of the Polish Government which, if allowed to continue, would undermine confidence in Poland and would discourage investment of American capital in reconstruction of Poland. I referred to arbitrary issuance of different rates of exchange for separate transactions as announced by Finance Minister.⁶² Morawski claimed to know nothing of this but admitted he is not an economist. I then referred to Polish agreement with Soviet Union

⁶¹ Edward Bolesław Osobka-Morawski, Prime Minister in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

⁶² In his telegram No. 85, August 13, the Ambassador in Poland reported on a speech made August 9 by Konstanty Dabrowski, Minister of Finance in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. In his speech Finance Minister Dabrowski stated that the Government did not intend to establish a general rate of exchange for the zloty (the Polish currency) in relation to other currencies. (860C.51/8-1345) For a summary of the speech, see Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 155.

regarding export of coal in return for goods,⁶³ this being nothing but clearing agreement along lines of Nazi and Fascist commercial policy and contrary to our foreign economic policy of encouraging free private trade among nations. I observed this why barter arrangement is producing no foreign exchange for Poland.

Morawski said that Poland wishes to encourage private trade which in past was conducted principally by Jews who have now virtually entirely disappeared. Government will, however, encourage re-establishment of private trade provided it is serious and not speculative. He divided Polish internal trade into three parts: (1) Government supply centers; (2) cooperatives and (3) nonspeculative private trade.

I informed Morawski that Government had yesterday offered to give to Diplomatic Corps rate of exchange of 150 to dollar. I said that as present black market rate is over 200 this would seem inevitable [*inequitable?*] and would not encourage American businessmen and correspondents to come to Poland. Furthermore, it would not encourage persons of Polish descent in the US to send financial assistance to families in Poland, this having been in the past a considerable source of Polish foreign exchange. He said that no foreign exchange policy yet determined by Government and he invited our suggestion.

Morawski said he would give very serious consideration to my observations. In the meantime, I should be grateful if Department would give me such instructions as it considers appropriate regarding effect of present Soviet controlled economic policy on our future economic relations with Poland and specifically with respect to financial assistance which may be contemplated by our Government through Export-Import Bank. In other words, I believe that the present is a timely moment in which to impress upon the Polish Government that if it expects our wholehearted assistance the cooperation between the two countries must not be unilateral.

LANE

⁶³ On July 7, 1945, the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and the Soviet Government concluded a trade agreement which provided for Polish exports to the Soviet Union of five million metric tons of coal and other materials in return for Soviet deliveries of various materials and goods.

860C.01/10-145

*The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to the Secretary of State*⁶⁴

WARSAW, 8 Sept. 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you, that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity would like to call the attention of Your Excellency to the following facts:

1. Notwithstanding the clearly and unequivocally formulated resolutions of Potsdam, the so-called "Government" of Mr. Arciszewski,⁶⁵ though now deprived of formal recognition, in fact, still continue to exist and to discharge in a somewhat limited scope their former functions. It is an acknowledged fact, that the so-called "Government" of Mr. Arciszewski still continue to reside in London and to maintain official relations with some diplomatical representatives, by this fact enjoying a series of customary privileges.

2. The so-called "Government" of Mr. Arciszewski determinedly circulate the version, that, notwithstanding their lack of recognition by the Great Powers, they remain in possession of supreme command over the Polish Forces at present in Great Britain and on the Continent. A typical example of this state of affairs is General Bor-Komorowski's order of the 28th of August 1945, wherein he still styles himself Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army subordinated to the "Government" of Mr. Arciszewski.

The logical consequence thereof is the discriminatory elimination of soldiers and officers who wish to return home, and their confinement to special camps. This, of course, tends to terrorize the rest and to transform the Army with but a recently glorious past, into docile tools spreading unrest and irritation all over Europe.

⁶⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch No. 40, October 1, 1945, from Warsaw; in the despatch, Ambassador Lane reported delivery of the Polish note to the American Embassy in London on September 13 for transmission to the Secretary of State, who was in London for the First Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, September 11-October 2, 1945 (860C.01/10-145). At the Fifth Meeting of the First Plenary Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, September 15, 1945, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov supported the request of the Polish Provisional Government that the question of the Polish *émigré* government in London be examined by the Council. Consideration of the question was postponed until the Sixth Meeting of the Council on September 17, at which time it was agreed to accept the British proposal that the matter be dealt with through diplomatic channels and only be brought before the next session of the Council if the parties concerned were not satisfied. See vol. II, pp. 202 and 203.

⁶⁵ Tomasz Arciszewski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile in London. The United States Government recognized the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity on July 5, 1945, and, at the same time, terminated relations with the Polish Government in Exile. For documentation regarding the liquidation of the affairs of the Polish Government in Exile, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, pp. 714-741, and vol. II, pp. 1104-1135.

3. At the same time, the emissaries of the Arciszewski "Government" well provided with large sums of money, lead among the *émigrés* Poles, and especially among the Poles in the British and American zones of occupation in Germany, fierce campaigns slandering the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and the state of things in Poland. That serves as a background for enrolment activities in order to enlist men into military organizations, which cannot obviously lead to anything else but conspiring against peace and organizing all kinds of provocations and outrages, the aim of which is to stir up incidents or raise conflicts between the Allies.

4. The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity are in possession of undeniable proof, that the "Government" of Mr. Arciszewski are still yet in position to send their emissaries to Poland and to communicate with them through the wireless.

The Polish authorities have actual proof of the existence in Poland of wireless stations which receive their instructions from the "Government" of Mr. Arciszewski. The Polish authorities are furthermore informed of their wave-lengths, their signals and codes.

The said agents of the Arciszewski "Government" in utilizing for their own ends the whole Hitlerite arsenal, endeavour to raise dissensions in the country and to disturb what is desirable to all: the consolidation and the work of peaceful reconstruction. They do so by sowing hatred, trying to provoke anti-semitic riots, opposing the repatriation and the resettlement of the population and exhorting to civil war.

5. It is also not an unimportant fact, that the men of confidence of the "Government" of Mr. Arciszewski still continue to exercise their control in several agencies and institutions under the protection of the Treasury Commission, and, that the Arciszewski "Government" still control the activities of the Social Assistance. This undeniably helps to artificially uphold their otherwise dwindling influence among the Polish emigration and, at the same time heavily encumbers the financial position of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, to which any form of control over these organizations is denied.

6. The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity are compelled to state, that the state of affairs as above described is not favourable to the bringing about of the so sincerely wished for stability of conditions and rapid return to normal peace-time activities.

The further "de facto" sufferance of the "Government" of Mr. Arciszewski and of their having supremacy over the Polish military units—which are being turned into incubators of anti-democratic and fascist ideologies—must cause restlessness and irritation and so must result in what is contradictory to the spirit of the Potsdam resolutions.

7. Simultaneously, the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity state that, under the resolutions of Yalta and Potsdam to which they have consented, they enforce the principles of democratic freedom, ensure the free activities of democratic parties and render possible the publishing of a vast number of newspapers of various shades of opinion. They have also enacted the amnesty. The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity endeavour to hasten the repatriation of Polish citizens, try to overcome economic difficulties being the results of war and of the huge devastations caused by the German occupation. They also aim at bringing back, in the shortest possible time, normal conditions of life which should enable the having free and unfettered elections to the Diet.

8. In view of what has been said above and in expectation that, at the session of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs various problems of the post-war period shall be discussed and settled in the spirit of the Potsdam resolutions, the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have the honour to request to hasten the decision, that by now has matured, namely, to wind up the "Government" of Mr. Arciszewski completely and finally and to deprive them of all the prerogatives which they are still enjoying illegally and to the detriment of the cause of peace.

Especially, in logical consequence to the winding up of the Arciszewski "Government", the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity expect a decision in the matter of the transfer of command over the Polish Forces abroad to the plenipotentiary representatives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army. It is understood, that the officers and soldiers who do not wish to pass under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army should be demobilized and placed in camps without the competence of the Polish Commander-in-Chief.

The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity are deeply convinced, that this way of settling the matter would invaluablely contribute to the cause of Peace and to the firm establishment of the democratic system in Poland and in all Europe.

860C.01/9-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, September 10, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received September 16 —7 : 20 a. m.]

233. Acting Foreign Minister ⁶⁶ informs me that a note ⁶⁷ has been sent to you as well as to Messrs. Bevin ⁶⁸ and Molotov ⁶⁹ protesting regarding the continuance in London of the Arciszewski Government. He said that that Government still enjoys extraterritorial rights including privileges of diplomatic pouch and right of communicating by radio with the underground in Poland. I ventured the personal opinion that this would appear to be a matter between the British and Polish Governments and not one which is the responsibility of the United States Government which like the British and Soviet Governments no longer recognizes the Government in London.

Modzelewski replied that under Yalta ⁷⁰ and Potsdam⁷¹ agreements dissolution in London Government was contemplated and that all three Governments have equal responsibility. I said that recognition of Warsaw Government automatically terminated official status of London Government and that I did not recall any provision of Yalta or Potsdam decisions which would prevent London group from carrying on political activities locally.

Modzelewski took position that funds under control of British Treasury are still being used by London Government to meet expenses of its diplomatic missions abroad and of carrying on propaganda against the legal Polish Government.

He added that attitude of United States had been entirely correct in its relations with Arciszewski Government and that our action in

⁶⁶ Zygmunt Modzelewski, Polish Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁷ Note of September 8 from the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to the Secretary of State, *supra*.

⁶⁸ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁹ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁰ For the Declaration on Poland, included as item VI of the Report of the Crimea Conference, issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin as a communiqué on February 11, 1945, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 973-974.

⁷¹ For the declaration with regard to Poland in the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, issued as a communiqué dated August 2, 1945, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, pp. 1508-1509.

blocking Polish funds in United States⁷² and in refusing to permit former Polish Ambassador in Washington to dispose of Polish Embassy property immediately prior to recognition⁷³ is very much appreciated by Polish Government. Minister said he wished to advise me of foregoing in view of my projected visit to London⁷⁴ which he welcomed as it would enable me to give to the Secretary of State "an objective account of conditions here including the existence of liberty of the press and the opening of the doors to foreign correspondents".

I said that I had already informed my Government regarding the favorable action taken towards AP, UP and IMS[*INS?*]⁷⁵ correspondents but that I am not convinced that there is liberty of the press in Poland. I admitted that there exists freedom of religion but that according to my best information parties which may not agree entirely with the Government cannot express themselves publicly. Modzelewski took position that with exception of NSZ⁷⁶ underground which is according to him a Fascist organization and which circulates clandestine documents, all parties are free to publish newspapers. I could not, of course, quote Mikolajczyk,⁷⁷ Kiernik⁷⁸ and Popiel⁷⁹ all of whom inform us that Peasant and Christian parties are not able to abolish [*establish?*] their respective organizations and cannot exercise right of assembly.

LANE

⁷² All Polish assets in the United States had been frozen by the Treasury Department on June 14, 1941. Throughout the war, however, official agencies of the Polish Government in Exile were allowed to carry on financial transactions under general licenses granted by the Treasury Department. Prior to the recognition of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, these general licenses were cancelled, but reasonable legitimate operating and liquidation expenses of agencies in the United States of the Polish Government in Exile at London were permitted under special Treasury licenses. A memorandum by Elbridge Durbrow, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, dated September 24, 1945, recorded that the Treasury Department estimated Polish assets in the United States amounted to \$31,000,000, approximately \$28,000,000 of which was in gold held by the Federal Reserve Bank (860.51 FC 60C/9-1845).

⁷³ Telegram 1483, June 30, to Moscow, reported that Polish Ambassador Ciechanowski was willing to relinquish the Embassy building and archives but could not turn them over directly to representatives of a Government which he did not recognize. The Department was prepared to allow the Polish Ambassador reasonable time to pack his personal effects and then to have the Embassy building left in charge of a custodian who in turn would transfer the property to a representative of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. (860C.01/6-2945)

⁷⁴ Ambassador Lane went to London on September 12 to confer with the Secretary of State; he returned to Warsaw on September 18.

⁷⁵ Associated Press, United Press, and International News Service, respectively.

⁷⁶ Narodowe Siły Zbrojne (National Armed Forces).

⁷⁷ Stanisław Mikolajczyk, Vice Premier and Minister of Agriculture in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity; leader of the Peasant Party.

⁷⁸ Władysław Kiernik, Minister of Public Administration in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity; leader in the Peasant Party.

⁷⁹ Karol Popiel, leader of the Christian Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Pracy or "Party of Work").

800.4016 D.P./9-1145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, September 11, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received September 12—3:10 p. m.]

238. Yesterday two members of the Polish Ukrainian minority called and informed that Russians are beginning to transfer forcibly remaining Ukrainian population (totaling about 1 million persons) from Poland to Russia.⁸⁰ They claimed to have been sent by the Bishop of Przemyśl, Josephat Kocylowski, who wished them to appeal to Americans and British to intervene with view to protecting the intelligentsia of this minority. Bishop expressed little hope of preventing transfer of peasants to USSR but is anxious to help intelligentsia at least to remain in Poland. Apparently most of latter wish to remain if they can, as is case of one of emissaries who was member of Second International and had been Ukrainian deputy in former Polish Sejm.

He stated that he would doubtless be liquidated upon arrival in USSR.

Both informants said only hope of minority lies in ability of United States and England to cause USSR to desist from this forcible transfer of population against will of those involved.

To Dept as No. 238 and to London as No. 25 from Lane.

LANE

⁸⁰ An agreement, with protocol between the Soviet Union and the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity concerning the right to relinquish Soviet citizenship on the part of persons of Polish and Jewish nationality [*sic*] living in the Soviet Union and their removal into Poland, and the right to relinquish Polish citizenship on the part of persons of Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, Ruthenian, and Lithuanian nationality living in Polish territory and their removal into the Soviet Union, was signed in Moscow on July 6, 1945. For text of the agreement, see *Izvestia*, July 7, 1945. For a description of the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1946, p. 395. In telegram 2686, July 27, from Moscow, it was reported that a joint Soviet-Polish Commission for Evacuation had been formed in accordance with the July 6 agreement (760C.61/7-2745). On October 30, 1945, the Vice Wojewod of Krakow informed an officer of the American Embassy that 3000 repatriates were being received from the Soviet Union daily and that some 400,000 had been received over a 4-month period (Polish Embassy Files: 800).

Agreements on evacuation of populations had been concluded on September 9, 1944, in Lublin between the Polish Committee of National Liberation on the one hand and the Ukrainian and White Russian Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hand, and on September 22, 1944, between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. For details regarding the September 9, 1944, agreement, see telegram 3484, September 14, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 1432.

860C.00/9-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, September 20, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received September 21—2 p. m.]

271. Mikolajczyk called on me this morning. Following is summary of his remarks:

(1) Most important matter is withdrawal of Red Army from Poland. Lublin group⁸¹ in Govt unwilling to press Soviet Govt for withdrawal despite commitment made by Stalin at Potsdam.⁸² Mikolajczyk states that obviously it is not in interest of Communist minority to withdraw sustaining Soviet force.

(2) Govt is not anxious for displaced persons and Polish Army abroad to return to Poland. Propaganda is being circulated through Communist press not only here but in France that US is preventing Poles from returning.⁸³

(3) As Polish Govt is committed to hold elections they will be held and probably by November. Mikolajczyk is far more hopeful than formerly regarding possibility of holding free elections but it is essential that Soviet Army be withdrawn beforehand.

(4) Despite efforts of Govt party to place onus on Mikolajczyk, Kiernik and Witos⁸⁴ for split in Peasant Party⁸⁵ Mikolajczyk says

⁸¹ Reference to the Polish Committee of National Liberation which had been established in Kholm (Chelm) by a decree of July 21, 1944, by the National People's Council of Poland. It soon transferred its activities to Lublin. For a description of the establishment of this "Lublin Committee", see telegram No. 2736, July 24, 1944, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. III, p. 1425.

⁸² For statements made by Generalissimus Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, during the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the Tripartite Conference of Berlin regarding the maintenance of Soviet military forces in Poland along the two lines of communications from the Soviet Union to Germany, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, pp. 519 and 534. For the record of a discussion on August 1, 1945, at Babelsberg, between President Truman and his advisers and a delegation of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity at which President Truman informed the Poles of the Soviet intention to maintain lines of communication across Poland, see memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Mikolajczyk, *ibid.*, p. 1540.

⁸³ In his airgram A-28, September 4, 1945, the Ambassador in Poland reported on a formal call he had made on Vice Premier Mikolajczyk in the course of which the Vice Premier had stated that although the Government indicated continually that it welcomed the return of displaced persons and repatriated Polish soldiers, the fact was that the Government greatly feared the return of persons whose political views were possibly hostile and who might turn an election against the Government (860C.00/9-445). For additional documentation regarding the question of the return of Polish displaced persons from Germany, see vol. II, pp. 1187-1191, *passim*.

⁸⁴ Wincenty Witos, Vice President of the Presidium of the National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and titular head of the Peasant Party. Witos had served as Premier of Poland in 1921-22, 1923, and 1926.

⁸⁵ Prior to the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in June 1945, a Communist oriented and supported group had organized

that people are not deceived and that Mikolajczyk and his followers still have support of almost all peasants in country.

(5) Mikolajczyk confirms impression which I have obtained in other quarters that present policy of Govt is to create political uncertainty and economic chaos. Policy of Govt to terrorize the population through security police is having little effect. Polish people will resist to the last.

(6) Food situation may become critical in the next few months due to Soviet depredations and present lack of organization in agriculture. He does not however believe sugar shortage as critical as reported from other Polish Govt sources. Chief lack will be bread, meats, and fats.

(7) He has finally received permission to publish Polish Peasant Party newspaper. He admits however difficulty in obtaining newsprint and suitable skilled labor.

(8) Attempt of Soviet Union to dominate Polish Navy by gift of 23 vessels manned by Soviet officers has fallen through and ceremony which had been scheduled at Gdansk has been cancelled. Soviet Govt finally realized that Polish insistence on independence would prevent domination by Soviet Navy.

Mikolajczyk said that situation in Poland is following same pattern as in Bulgaria⁸⁶ and Yugoslavia⁸⁷ and that Poland is the turning point. For this reason he hopes that US and British Govts will stand firm in insisting on independent Poland and free elections. He said he is hopeful that situation will develop favorably especially if US Govt and people will not lose interest in situation. He said that present Communist clique in Govt and Soviet Govt are hopeful that American people will as so often in the past lose interest in the Polish question and allow matters to drift. He earnestly expressed hope that our Govt and British Foreign Office would insist to Molotov that Stalin's promise made at Potsdam to withdraw Russian Army except for two lines of communications be fulfilled at once. He said that for the following three reasons he is far more hopeful regarding Poland than he has been regarding Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and other satellite countries:

(1) The size and population of Poland give it greater opportunity of resistance.

agrarian political forces in Poland and had taken the name of the long-established agrarian political organization in Poland, the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe). When leaders of the old Peasant Party, including Mikolajczyk and Kiernik, returned from exile in June 1945, they refused to join the pro-Communist Peasant Party. Instead, Mikolajczyk and Kiernik, together with Witos, took the lead in organizing the non-Communist agrarian forces into a separate political party which, on September 22, 1945, took the name Polish Peasant Party to distinguish it from the pro-Communist faction.

⁸⁶ For documentation regarding the situation in Bulgaria, see vol. iv, pp. 135 ff.

⁸⁷ For documentation regarding the situation in Yugoslavia, see pp. 1208 ff.

- (2) Polish people will never surrender.
 (3) Russia is realizing from trouble being created in Soviet Union by one million deported Poles what a headache intransigent Poles can be.

As I reported to the Secretary in London ⁸⁸ Mikolajczyk previously impressed me as being discouraged and depressed. Today however he was hopeful and his old fighting self, confident that the situation would develop satisfactorily. He said however that moral support of United States of America and Great Britain is essential. I reiterate hope expressed in London that to bolster hopes of Mikolajczyk and his followers we will strongly press for withdrawal of Soviet Army.

Sent to Dept as 271, repeated to London for the Secretary as 36.

[LANE]

860C.50/9-2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane)

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1945—8 p. m.

130. Urtel 124, Aug. 22. Following is the position of Dept with regard to Eximbank loans to Poland. This Govt wishes speedy reconstruction of Polish economy and its prosperous further development. It is willing on certain conditions to lend financial assistance in order to aid Poland in reaching this end. This Govt's foreign credit policy is part of its general foreign economic policy which aims at a freely growing volume of multilateral foreign trade and relatively free capital movements on the basis of non-discrimination.

Dept appreciates that Poland's present position is difficult and that for the next few months bilateral clearings, compensation agreements, and similar discriminatory devices may be not easy to avoid. The important consideration is that such arrangements should not prejudice Poland's participation in any multilateral agreement designed to attain the objectives set forth in Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreements which have been concluded with most of the United Nations including Poland.⁸⁹

Close economic relations between the United States and Poland will not develop, and financial assistance to Poland will remain small, unless Poland is prepared to give assurances that it will, after a reasonable period of transition, abstain from discrimination in trade and investment, and in particular continue to accord to nationals and

⁸⁸ For Ambassador Lane's description of his meeting with the Secretary of State in London on September 13, see Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 175.

⁸⁹ For text of the Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Poland, signed at Washington, July 1, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 257, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1542.

corporations of the US treatment as favorable as that accorded to nationals and corporations of any other country with regard to all forms of commercial activity, consistent with the treaty of June 15, 1931; that it will not accord to any country exclusive positions in Poland's national economy, will refrain from use of quotas and exchange control as instruments of a discriminatory commercial policy, and refrain from engaging in bilateral clearing and compensation agreements and endeavor at the end of the period of transition, to relinquish or appropriately modify any arrangements which are incompatible with the foregoing commitments. Both US and Poland should agree to enter into negotiations with a view to attaining the objectives set forth in Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement, and Poland should give assurances that, during the aforementioned period of transition, it will, in general, avoid the introduction of new barriers to trade other than those of a temporary and emergency character, whether in the form of tariff, quantitative restrictions, exchange controls, discriminations, or other measures which are more restrictive of trade or more burdensome than those provided under the existing statutes.

Other nations seeking loans from the US are also being asked to give assurances that they will avoid new barriers to trade and will negotiate immediately with the US with a view to attaining the objectives of Article VII. This Govt will be prepared to open negotiations for a loan to Poland on the foregoing basis.

At your discretion you are authorized to communicate the foregoing to the Polish Govt. In the course of any such conversations emphasis should be given to the fact that this Govt desires to see an increasing participation of Poland in the world economy and you may indicate also that Poland's implementation of the assurances asked of her will naturally have an important bearing on the attitude of the US toward any requests by Poland for further assistance.

With reference to your specific question concerning effect of Soviet policy on our relations with Poland, additional information will follow.

Negotiations for a loan would be conducted in Washington. Dr. Rajchman, Polish delegate to UNRRA has approached Dept ⁹⁰ under instructions from his Govt, he says, regarding immediate credits of \$190 million plus eventual reconstruction loans of \$500 million more. Dept pointed out that International Bank will soon be available to supply some of Poland's credit needs. The memo and figures he sub-

⁹⁰ Dr. Ludwig Rajchman presented the proposals of the Polish Government during a conversation with Emilio G. Collado, Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy, on September 7, 1945.

mitted⁹¹ follow closely the material presented by Minister Minc at Potsdam.⁹² Dr. Rajchman stated he was urging Minister Minc to come to US. Dr. Rajchman urged that US send a mission of six key people to Poland for 6 weeks to make thorough survey of Polish reconstruction needs and programs. He expressed hope US could furnish Army truck transportation experts to organize trucking services. He said that immediate need in reconstruction of Warsaw is to remove the ruins and said it would be fine if US Army with their bulldozers and other equipment could clean up the city. Dept agreed to study these matters and discuss them with him soon.

Repeated to Moscow.

ACHESON

860C.00/9-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, September 25, 1945—noon.

[Received September 26—10:50 p. m.]

296. Mytel 291 of Sept. 24, 7 p. m.⁹³ In talk with Bierut Sept. 24 I stressed my apprehension regarding economic situation in Poland referring to lack of rate of exchange, uncertainty as to Govt policy in nation[al]izing property and seeming impossibility under present conditions for private trade to function. Bierut admitted disorganization and lack of experience of Govt in economics and said that matter of general rate of exchange would have to be postponed pending commencement of exports from Poland. As to remittances from US, books would be opened here for recipients for amount of remittance thus enabling them to purchase merchandise locally at Govt stores at favorable prices. Dollar value of purchases would be debited against amount of remittance until latter was liquidated. Bierut admitted that this would virtually be the establishment of a rate of exchange even though the actual rate would not be specifically stated. He said Govt does not wish to admit existence of black market rate and added, in reply to my observation, that the zloty is tied to the ruble, that Govt's economic policy is guided, and, although he did not say so, it was obvious he meant from the east. I said, however, that it is

⁹¹ Not printed.

⁹² For records of the economic conference between American and Polish officials held on July 28, 1945, during the Potsdam Conference, on which occasion Hilary Minc, Minister of Industry in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, presented the Polish economic position, see the United States delegation memorandum of July 28, 1945, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 455, and the memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Mikolajczyk, of the same date, *ibid.*, p. 1532.

⁹³ Not printed; it reported that the Ambassador in Poland had had a 2-hour talk with President Bierut (860C.00/9-2445).

essential for Americans visiting Poland, such as businessmen and correspondents, to have means of obtaining local currency. Bierut said that a quota of foreign exchange might be established for Embassy which we could allot to visiting Americans. I indicated that this would probably not be feasible and told him that because of our inability to obtain a rate of exchange to cover Embassy expenses we are now going to make arrangements on the open market. He made no objections to this proposal but promised to call Minister Finance who would call me yesterday. (I have, however, not yet heard from him.)

As to nationalization policy he said that all foreign owned property which is still being used for same purpose as before war will be restored to owners intact. On other hand property which had been converted to other uses and had been improved could not justifiably be returned. I said that this would work hardship on owners who were not responsible for action of Germans in making alterations to property and that if property were expropriated by Government adequate compensation should be made. Bierut said that Government's difficulty is that whole country was disorganized on departure of enemy and that Government's only possible policy was to take over all property whether state or private owned. Private property is being restored to owners on receipt of proof of ownership except in case of industrial property if it had been improved during absence of owners.

I stressed unfortunate effect on relations between the two countries if economic uncertainty bordering on chaos allowed to continue. He admitted this and asked me to assure my Government that Government's economic policy will, when formed, be more similar to that of US than to Soviet Union.

He said that agrarian reform has important sociological aim, the elimination of the aristocratic land owning class as a political factor in national life. The roots which this class grew between 1926 and 1939 will be difficult to extirpate.

I said that without desiring to interfere in internal political affairs I wished to make some observations relating thereto. I referred to Yalta decision providing that American Ambassador should report on conditions and said that I could not faithfully do so unless I had full discussions with him from time to time. He indicated acquiescence.⁹⁴ I first thanked him for action in permitting American correspondents to come to Poland. He replied thanks were appreciated but unnecessary as Polish Government was only fulfilling prom-

⁹⁴ In this telegram No. 561, November 15, noon, the Ambassador in Poland reported that during a conversation on November 14, President Bierut spontaneously stated that his Government accepted the principles and provisions of the Yalta decision respecting Poland and would fulfill them (860C.01/11-1545).

ises made at Moscow and Potsdam. I then said that I am not convinced of freedom of press in Poland, that newspapers all take same editorial line, that some parties apparently unable to reach the public through the press. Furthermore, I am concerned over the arrests of persons for purely political reasons. I felt that if this condition were known in the US most unfortunate effect would be created towards Polish Government. I said that I had reported to the Secretary of State in London my concern over political conditions in Poland which did not seem to ensure the right of parties opposed to Government to have equal rights in the elections. I likewise said to Bierut that continuance of Red Army in Poland and incorporation of Russians into Polish Army were unhealthy conditions.

Bierut admitted that press is not entirely free although he said that out of 110 newspapers in Poland 20% are Catholic-controlled and therefore in opposition to Government. He said that there is no joint editorial policy of Government papers but that Government could not tolerate attacks made on it by "Fascist" elements which attempted to destroy present Government. I replied that use of term "Fascist" was very elastic and that some have defined "Fascist" as a person who is not in 100% agreement. I said I feared that this interpretation was being used by Polish Government. He denied this but said that there are members of Sanacja⁹⁶ who are fighting Government with arms and are in clandestine radio communication with London. He defines these persons as Fascists. He asked me to bring to his attention any concrete cases of persons imprisoned because their political thoughts are contrary to Government. He said he would take immediate action to remedy any such cases. He admitted that "Fascists" are imprisoned and would continue to be as he did not propose his Government to allow itself to be destroyed by its enemies. This admission indicates to me what the real policy of the Government is regarding freedom of speech and free elections.

He said Polish Government had protested against leniency on part of Soviet authorities towards Soviet officers and men who had committed acts of violence. Polish Government had asked Soviet Government to supply officers to train Polish Army just as French had been so requested in 1918.⁹⁷ About 10% of officers in Polish Army are Russian but will be reduced as quickly as possible.

Bierut said that Poland must depend on its friendship with Soviet Union. At times this friendship is under strain due to pressure put

⁹⁶The "Sanitation Party", the popular name for the "Non-Party Bloc of Cooperation with the Government" which supported the regime of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski and its successors in Poland between World Wars I and II.

⁹⁷Regarding the organization of the Polish Army in France during World War I, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1. pp. 878-881.

upon Poland. If, however, this pressure were resisted forcibly it would mean war and the extermination of Poland. He said that friendship with Russia should not exclude friendship with the US. In fact majority of Polish people desire to mold Poland on US pattern both economically and politically. I assured him that our Government also desired Poland and Russia to be on friendly terms as had been stated at Yalta and Moscow Conferences.

He complained bitterly to me as he had to Eisenhower⁹⁸ regarding British attitude towards Polish Army abroad. He said that British Government is putting obstacles in way of Poles' return and allowing Polish officers to terrorize men who expressed desire to return. I said that I could not speak for British Government but I had obtained impression in London from British officials that British Government desired to liquidate all military forces under British control at earliest moment, possibly not only because of tremendous expense involved but because of constant headaches of administration. I said that I was convinced of good faith of British Government in this regard. Bierut did not comment but said that US Government had acted with entire correctness regarding Polish troops and DPs⁹⁹ under US control.

Interview was cordial and frank but I stressed my view that continuance of chaotic economic condition as well as lack of personal liberty and danger to private individuals might eventually create serious situation in US towards Poland. I referred to refusal of many Poles to settle Pomerania and East Prussia because of Soviet troops there and to nightly shooting in Warsaw streets even in front of our hotel. He said Government appreciates lack of safety and is issuing regulations shortly providing for drastic punishment of offenders. In reply to his query whether I consider that terror reigns in Poland I said "not exactly terror but fear and great uncertainty as to economic future".

He ended interview by asking me to regard it as informal and expressed hope of further talks in near future.

Sent to Department as 296 repeated to London for Secretary as 41 and to Moscow as 57.

LANE

⁹⁸ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General, United States Forces in the European Theater, and Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces of Occupation in Germany. For a description of General Eisenhower's visit to Warsaw on September 21, see Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, pp. 176-178.

⁹⁹ Displaced persons.

860C.918/9-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, September 26, 1945—noon.

[Received 6:20 p. m.]

304. When Keith¹ presented September 24 to Zebrowski of Foreign Office, Allen of Associated Press, Arnot of United Press and Hill of *New York Times*, Zebrowski indicated that copy of American correspondents should be submitted to Foreign Office for approval prior to transmission. It developed during discussion that Tass² sends dispatches without reference to Polish authorities. Keith pointed out that it was his understanding that the freedom of the press as referred to in the Potsdam Declaration did not contemplate censorship. He also said that United States correspondents might in event of censorship being applied leave country and file stories from abroad. Because of importance of clarifying this issue at once an appointment was made for me to see Modzelewski September 25.

I expressed surprise to Modzelewski that question of censorship had been raised especially in view of President Bierut's assurances to me on previous day that Polish Government had as a matter of course carried out its obligation made at Potsdam.³ I referred to article 9 section A, paragraph 4 of Potsdam Communiqué "that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during elections." Modzelewski said that nobody in Poland was talking about elections here and that he could not admit that the present is a period before the elections. After remarking that Polish elections are now being discussed abroad I inquired why the Potsdam decision had not been made more precise as to the period before the elections in which American press representatives should be permitted within the country. I said that it is obvious that the present moment is a period "before the elections" and that any attempt to deny this would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Potsdam Agreement. I said that I must insist that the agreement be respected.

Modzelewski then said that no censorship was contemplated but merely "control" (the conversation was in French). I said that "control" is an elastic term and I desired to know exactly what he had in mind. He said that Polish Government merely wished to know what the correspondents were sending, that no objection would be made to any expression of opinion even if derogatory to the Government or statement of facts if exact. I said that the newspaper correspondents

¹ Gerald Keith, Counselor of Embassy.

² Official news agency of the Soviet Union.

³ See telegram 296, September 25, noon, from Warsaw, *supra*.

would be the first to deplore the transmission of inexact messages and felt sure their principals in the US would not permit correspondents to remain in Poland if they sent erroneous information.

Modzelewski referred to broadcast from London covering report by Allen of Associated Press from Warsaw to the effect there was shooting followed by cries in Warsaw streets. He said that it is true that there is shooting in Warsaw but no cries. I said that if he would occupy a room as I did in front of Polonia Hotel⁴ he would hear shooting and cries every evening, that I had seen persons shot from my own window. I said that Allen merely reported factually. Modzelewski finally admitted that what he wished to prevent was transmission of copy detrimental to Polish-United States relations. I said that I could assure him that none of the correspondents here now nor their principals desire to damage our relations nor am I here for that purpose but on the contrary to improve them. It was agreed that if Modzelewski had any complaint regarding deliberate attempt of correspondents to injure relations between Poland and United States he would notify me and I would make recommendations based on my judgment of the facts to the Department for eventual transmission to the principal of the correspondent in the United States.

I said that up to then I had spoken on behalf of the correspondents. Now I wished to speak on behalf of Poland. If Polish Government adopts any measures to repress reporting of what is going on in Poland effect in United States would be disastrous. I reminded Modzelewski that he is not familiar personally with United States and for that reason he cannot appreciate seriousness with which suppression of freedom of expression is regarded in our country.

I trust in view of this conversation that there will be no further question of suppression of news from Poland. It is possible furthermore as in the case of Allen's despatch broadcast from London that news stories from American correspondents in Poland will reach the outside world without supervision and I made no agreement to have United States newspaper copy submitted to Foreign Office although I will advise American correspondents of Modzelewski's remarks.

I should appreciate it if Department would notify Associated Press, United Press and *New York Times* of foregoing with request that it be treated as confidential.

[LANE]

⁴Location of the offices of the American Embassy and the residence of the American Ambassador.

860C.50/10-145

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Pierson Underwood of the War Areas Economic Division

[WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1945.

Participants: Dr. L. Rajchman
Mr. Gilpatric⁶
Mr. Underwood

Dr. Rajchman, of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, outlined his Government's views regarding their most urgent present needs. The most pressing he said, was the repair and re-equipment of the Baltic ports. These were heavily damaged in the fighting and now lack breakwaters, cranes and many essential harbor installations, which were either destroyed or taken away, so that traffic through the ports is still on a limited scale. The next most urgent need is rolling stock, especially cars, for the railways. The Poles have surplus coal which they are anxious to send abroad, either to accumulate foreign exchange or in turn for other needed commodities, but the transportation bottleneck hampers them severely. In this connection, Dr. Rajchman said he did not see how it would be possible at present to supply coal to Italy. Sending it by sea is out of the question because the Baltic ports are already or will soon be overtaxed by shipments to Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Sending the coal overland he also thought impossible because of the lack of freight cars. The distance is too great and the time required for "turn-around" of the cars, too long. Under these circumstances, he suggested shipping coal to Austria, as being relatively close to the Silesian fields. He also asked about shipments of coal westward through the military zones of Germany. This is a matter which would have to be decided by the zone commanders in the field, and Mr. Gilpatric said he would look into it and inform Dr. Rajchman of the present status. Asked about Poland's joining ECO,⁷ Dr. Rajchman said he understood it was a purely advisory organization and did not appear to consider the matter relevant. (This is not correct, especially with regard to Germany and Austria, where the recommendations of ECO, Mr. Stillwell⁸ states, are practically mandatory. This matter, however, was not discussed further in the conversation of October 1). Returning to the question of railway cars, Dr. Rajchman said they were urgently needed for another purpose, viz. to bring back displaced Poles from Germany. The need in this case is for closed carriages. Open cars are being used at present but will not be feasible in cold weather.

⁶ Donald S. Gilpatric, Chief of the War Areas Economic Division.

⁷ European Coal Organization. For documentation regarding participation by the United States in this organization, see vol. II, pp. 1411 ff.

⁸ James A. Stillwell, adviser, War Areas Economic Division.

The question is urgent because of Poland's great need of manpower, not only for the mines but for all industrial purposes.

Dr. Rajchman brought up the subject of credits, saying that Poland would like to have an initial loan of \$380 million (of which \$190 million would be repaid by means of exports) and an ultimate total loan of \$700 million. He said economic aid to Poland would be in accord with the Potsdam agreements. Mr. Gilpatric said that since he had just returned from abroad he did not know the present status of Poland's application but would look into it and discuss it further with Dr. Rajchman as soon as possible.

Dr. Rajchman also brought up the subject of UNRRA, expressing disappointment that a Canadian rather than an American had been appointed chief of mission to Poland. He said his government had no objection to General Drury⁹, but would withhold formal consent to his appointment until they were informed of the names of his two deputies. Mr. Gilpatric said he thought the failure thus far of the U.S. to get top-flight Americans for UNRRA posts was serious, and that it was unquestionably urgent that we remedy this in future.

Dr. Rajchman said that he wished to return to Poland as soon as possible after completing the organization of the Polish Supply Mission, perhaps within the next two or three weeks, but was reluctant to return without some tangible evidence of progress in getting aid for Poland in her present difficulties. Mr. Gilpatric assured him the Department would do all it could to assist, and agreed to meet Dr. Rajchman again on Thursday, October 4, to discuss these matters further.

PIERSON UNDERWOOD

860C.24/10-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, October 4, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 5—3:45 p. m.]

347. Mytel 342, Oct 3, noon.¹⁰ I had further conversation with President Bierut, Oct. 3. After informing him of conversation Oct 2 with Minc and Rola-Zymierski I told him that developments in Poland today give me increasing concern. I said that there are three factors in situation which are disturbing:

⁹ Brig. Gen. Charles Drury. For a brief description of General Drury's problems as director of the UNRRA mission in Poland, see Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, pp. 214-215.

¹⁰ Not printed; it reported on a conversation with Minister of Industry Minc and Marshal Rola-Zymierski; Minc said he would make a formal request to the United States for a 500 million dollar economic credit; Marshal Rola-Zymierski emphasized the need for clothing for the Polish Army of 350,000, including militia (860C.24/10-345).

(1) Lack of reasonable rate of exchange. I said that this question although of great importance from practical point of view was in my opinion not so vital as second and third points. Although Foreign Office had over a month ago offered us rate of 150 zlotys to dollar now only 100 was offered. Foreign Office now suggesting establishment of Govt store at which diplomats can make purchases at reduced prices and arranging for more normal prices in Hotel Polonia where all foreigners would have to live and board under this plan. I said that this was merely following Soviet plan to restrict activities of foreigners and to make difficulties for American businessmen and correspondents coming to Poland. I said that unless suitable rate is fixed I would probably lose large number of my staff. I recalled that President had at last week's interview¹¹ emphasized that Poland did not wish to adopt Soviet economic system but from our recent observations it appears that she is doing so specifically through clearing agreements and suppression of private foreign trade.

(2) Lack of freedom of press. I regarded this situation as even more serious than foregoing. Furthermore, it is contrary to Potsdam Agreement. I related to Pres conversation with Modzelewski described in mytel 104 [304], Sept 26, noon. I observed that tactics of Foreign Office were not only obstructive but would if successful create a serious antagonism in US towards present Polish Govt. I said that I felt it far better for correspondents to tell the truth even though unpleasant rather than to have whispered and distorted versions of happenings here reported by word of mouth. I said that I could not imagine anything more unpropitious at the very moment when Poland desires to obtain a large credit from the US for activities of American correspondents to be impeded. I said that I had insisted that no censorship be imposed on American correspondents and that I assume they would be able to continue reporting without any impediment whatever.

(3) Arrests by security police. I said that I had spoken to President last week regarding the situation approaching terror existing in Poland. Since that time 10 persons presumably American citizens had been reported to Embassy arrested for political reasons. I gave to President a list of persons arrested which I will report in separate telegram.¹² I said that besides my official interest in fate of these American citizens I am seriously concerned with fate of many thousands of Poles who had been arrested for political offenses without trial and held incommunicado (news of these arrests will undoubtedly make most unfortunate impression on American people and I reminded him that opposition had been expressed in US to proposed grant of one billion dollar credit to Soviet Govt¹³ and one reason in my opinion

¹¹ See telegram 296, September 25, noon, from Warsaw, p. 376.

¹² Telegram No. 353, October 6, 10 a. m., from Warsaw, not printed. It reported the names of 10 American citizens who had been arrested in Poland for political offenses; it further reported that President Bierut had said he would investigate these cases at once, and if the persons mentioned were American citizens and had been arrested for political crimes, they would be released immediately. (360C.1121/10-645)

¹³ For documentation regarding the conclusion of wartime assistance from the United States to the Soviet Union and consideration of a supplementary agreement for extension of aid for postwar reconstruction and credits, see pp. 937 ff.

was reports of lack of freedom of speech and of political arrests in Soviet Union. I said I hoped that he would understand what I meant. He said he understood perfectly.

In reply to three points which I raised President admitted that we have legitimate complaint regarding no existence of reasonable rate of exchange and he authorized me to take up this phase of the problem with Minc which I shall do. He said he appreciated that nonexistence of rate of exchange could have very serious effect on negotiations for credit.

As to situation of correspondents he confirmed former assurances that they are free to report what they wish but he hoped that reporting would not be slanted in such a way as to discredit present Govt in the eyes of the US. He requested my cooperation in impressing on correspondents necessity of reporting objectively. I said that I felt sure that correspondents appreciated this. On the other hand I suggested that President receive American correspondents in a group to explain to them his point of view. I felt sure they would report his statements correctly. He said he would be glad to receive them. I said that what disturbed me was evident policy on part of Foreign Office to prevent news about Poland from reaching outside world.

As to arrests President promised to investigate immediately 10 cases cited of alleged American citizens. He also promised to investigate detention incommunicado of Thaddeus Halpert Folier private secretary to Paderewski¹⁴ who had been tentatively employed by WSA.¹⁵ He said that if the cases cited by me involved American citizens arrested for political reasons they will be released at once. He admitted that great difficulty is being experienced in Poland regarding administration. He said that I was correct in describing situation as one approaching terror by [*but*] that Govt will not persecute anyone for political opinions.

I said that I realized both from statements made by President to me last week and also from reports and observations that Govt itself is not responsible for all of arrests which in many cases such as that of Halpert were probably instigated by non-Polish authorities. This situation, however, cannot give sense of security within the country or satisfaction in the US which desires a free and independent Poland.

President then referred to great benefits which would accrue to US through granting of credit. He said that favorable action would result in creating universal gratitude in Poland towards US and would help to put Polish industry on its feet. He said that refusal to grant

¹⁴ Ignacy Jan Paderewski, renowned concert pianist, a leader of the Polish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and briefly Premier of Poland during the same year. Paderewski died in the United States in 1941.

¹⁵ Presumably, War Shipping Administration.

credit would not be understood in view of repeated assurances of American friendship. I said that in my opinion three conditions which I had outlined would probably greatly influence our Govt in extending credit.

At the close of our interview I said specifically that I could not recommend the granting of any credit which would be used for the benefit of the security police if that body is responsible for the many arrests of private citizens for political reasons. I said that the granting of such a credit by the US Govt for the benefit of the political police would be interpreted in Poland as acquiescence on our part of activities which are repulsive to the American people. The President endeavored to excuse activities on ground that Poland is in state of transition after 6 years of foreign occupation and that they will not be continued permanently. He asked me if I considered detention of 1000 Poles for political reasons to be unwarranted. I replied in affirmative.

It was obvious from my talk which was cordial throughout that in addition to practical benefit this Govt is most desirous of obtaining a large credit to indicate to the Polish people its friendship with the US Govt and thereby to solidify its position politically within the country.

I shall telegraph my views regarding the credit after further talk with Minc.

LANE

860C.5084/10-1145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1945.

Mr. Berard¹⁶ called to discuss with me the question of a Polish decree which, according to the French Ambassador in Warsaw,¹⁷ will be issued shortly nationalizing all key industries of Poland, including textile plants.¹⁸ Mr. Berard stated that this information had been received by the French Ambassador when the Polish Foreign Office informed him that they would have to cancel the proposed visit of an economic industrial committee to visit Poland to discuss the textile industry and French interests therein. The Foreign Office stated that

¹⁶Armand Berard, Counselor of the French Embassy.

¹⁷Roger Garreau.

¹⁸For text of the law of January 3, 1946, concerning the nationalization of basic branches of the national economy, see Samuel L. Sharp, *Nationalization of Key Industries in Eastern Europe* (Washington, Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1946), p. 75.

they could not receive the committee since the Polish Government was about to issue a decree nationalizing all industries, including the textile industry.

Mr. Berard stated that the French Government had decided to protest to the Polish Government against this decree in an effort to prevent its being issued, if possible. The French Government is also approaching the Belgian and British Governments to ask them to associate themselves with this French *démarche*. He stated that the French Government desired to protect the considerable French investments in Poland and felt that because of the large Belgian and British investments, the latter governments might be willing to send in parallel protests.

Mr. Berard asked whether the United States Government was planning to take any action in connection with the possible confiscation of American properties in Poland, although he did not ask that we associate ourselves with the French protest. I told Mr. Berard that we had, as far as I was aware, no information regarding the proposed Polish decree although I stated that in view of the announced policies of the Polish Government it had been anticipated that all basic industries, banks, insurance companies and public utilities might be nationalized. I added that I personally felt that there was little that could be done about this if the Polish Government decided to do it. In the event that this action should be taken and American properties should be nationalized, I expressed as my personal opinion that we would at least demand full compensation for American owners of such properties. I stated further that as far as I was aware we did not contemplate any action which might attempt to prevent the Polish Government from nationalizing basic industries but stated that if they should nationalize industry in general we might perhaps consider taking up the question with the Polish Government.

Mr. Berard asked me whether I thought that this action by the Polish Government was taken at the request of the Soviet Government. I replied that I had no information which would indicate that this was the case but that I could not imagine that the Soviet Government would be against such action.

In the course of the conversation I discussed with Mr. Berard the whole question of the economic blackout which apparently is being imposed by the Soviet Government in eastern and southeastern Europe and I informed him that while, as far as I knew, no definite policy had been fixed by the United States Government in this regard, we did not look with favor on this development and it was possible that we might endeavor to work out arrangements in this area

by which all countries would have an equal opportunity to purchase and sell in this area.

There is attached a draft telegram to Mr. Lane,¹⁹ asking him to report on the developments referred to by Mr. Berard.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

860C.51/10-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, October 13, 1945—noon.
[Received October 15—6:35 a. m.]

403. I have just returned from 6-day trip to Katowice, Krakow, Oswiecim,²⁰ Wroclaw²¹ and Lodz. At Krakow I had extended conversations with Professor Kutrzeba,²² Archbishop Sapieha,²³ former Premier Wincenty Witos and Professor Zulawski, President of the old Polish Socialist Party. At Wroclaw I spoke with General Rumel²⁴ defender of Warsaw in 1939. All five confirmed definite feeling which Embassy has had for some weeks to the effect that there is no freedom of press and that terroristic activities of security police are demoralizing the country.

Emphasizing my statement was personal and confidential I said to each of five persons mentioned that in my opinion a great mistake would be made if we granted credit of half billion dollars to Poland at this time: (1) lack of rate of exchange prevents the establishment of private trade between Poland and the US; (2) granting of credit to a country which prevents freedom of press either through censorship or refusal to allot sufficient newsprint would be greatly resented by American people and (3) American people abhor terroristic activities of secret police which are reminiscent of Nazi regime. I said that I appreciated that there is a cogent argument on the other side namely that if we refused to extend credit Poland will be more than ever economically dependent on Soviet Union. I asked each of five for their frank opinion.

It is significant that all answered in virtually the same manner: Poland would never understand our granting a credit at this time as it would be interpreted as an acquiescence on our part in nondemocratic

¹⁹ Not attached to file copy, and no telegram on this subject appears to have been sent.

²⁰ In German, Auschwitz.

²¹ In German, Breslau.

²² Stanisław Kutrzeba, Polish jurist, historian, and educator; President, Polish Academy of Science and Letters.

²³ Adam Stefan Sapieha, Archbishop of Kraków.

²⁴ Maj. Gen. Juliusz Rommel.

and brutal practices which exist in Poland today.²⁵ They said that the Polish people understands clearly present developments and would appreciate our stand which would be quickly known in declining to give financial aid to a Government which has only the support of a very small majority of people (Archbishop Sapieha said that 10 percent would be a very liberal estimate of people backing Government).

The fact that Rola-Zymierski (mytel 342, October 3, noon ²⁶) stated that portion of credit would be partially used to maintain army of 350,000 men including security police is further valid reason for our declining to accede to Polish Government request.

I am apprehensive that even if we should extend only a small portion of credit requested we will have allowed the Government and its mentors to the east to put their foot in the opened door. This would in turn involve further requests for our material assistance and would indicate to Polish people that we do not appreciate the true situation in the country.

Accordingly, I should deeply appreciate telegraphic instructions from the Department authorizing me to convey to President Bierut and other officials of the Government the deep concern of the Government of the US over developments in Poland; that while we appreciate the great difficulties under which the Provisional Government is laboring as a result of the destruction created in Poland we feel that Polish Government has a definite obligation under the Yalta decision which resulted in the recognition of the Government by Great Britain and the US. Also under the Potsdam assurances to maintain freedom of the press as well as liberty of speech; that information which has come to the Embassy from many well-informed sources in Poland gives us grave doubt as to the intentions of the Polish Government in these respects; that the Government of the US feels that the Congress and people of the US would not approve the extension of credit facilities to a Government which has not accorded to the people of Poland Democratic facilities such as freedom of speech and of the press which are among the main bases of the American conception of democracy. We also have received with apprehension reports that the Polish Government intends to nationalize foreign-owned property without adequate compensation.

I feel that unless we speak clearly and emphatically to the Polish Government at this moment, when the regime here is requesting defi-

²⁵ In his telegram No. 602, November 27, 11 a. m., the Ambassador in Poland reported that during a conversation with Vice Premier Mikolajczyk, the latter had expressed his entire agreement with the views expressed here, and Mikolajczyk had added that the Polish people would understand the action of the United States, which they would prefer even though it might result in the loss of much needed material assistance (860C.00/11-2745).

²⁶ See footnote 10, p. 383.

nite financial assistance, we will be losing an opportunity to make felt our prestige and at the same time we may be able, as has been shown on other occasions in Soviet-controlled territory, to influence conditions for the better by taking a strong determined stand against any movement to stifle democratic life in Poland.²⁷

[LANE]

860C.51/10-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, October 14, 1945— 11 a. m.

[Received October 30—12:25 p. m.]

408. Foreign Office in note dated October 10 refers to unofficial conferences between members of American delegation and those of Polish delegation at Potsdam regarding imminent negotiations at Washington on subject of credit to Poland and exchange of goods.²⁸ Note states regardless of ultimate result of such negotiations Government desires to purchase on credit materials declared surplus by American Army and for this purpose Zygmunt Jan Modzelewski proceeded to Paris on October 10 (my telegram 351, October 5²⁹).

Note requests that Export-Import Bank advance credit of 50 million dollars be opened immediately for purchase of such surplus army materials and states this sum would subsequently be included in global credit for which negotiations are to take place in future.

In considering this request it is hoped that Dept will take into consideration recommendations made in my telegram No. 403 of October 13, noon.

The advancing of a 50 million dollar credit at this time might be interpreted as a tacit admission that we are prepared to meet Poland's credit needs *in toto*.

[LANE]

²⁷ In telegram 450, October 22, from Warsaw, Ambassador Lane reported that Stanislaw Grabski, Vice President of the Polish National Council of the Homeland, had recently expressed to him the opinion that it would be a great mistake if the United States Government extended any credits to Poland until freedom of the press was restored and until the terroristic activities of the security police were terminated (860C.51/10-2245).

²⁸ See footnote 92, p. 376.

²⁹ Not printed; it reported that Modzelewski was expected to go to Paris, together with several vehicle experts, to arrange contracts for surplus American army material (860C.24/10-545).

860C.5034/10-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, October 15, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received October 15—3:07 p. m.]

413. I stated to Minister Minc today that although I had had conversations on the general subject of nationalization of industry with President Bierut, Minister of Finance, and himself, I had no precise knowledge of Polish Govt's intentions. I added that probably he would be asked in Washington regarding Govt's policy and that this would undoubtedly have a bearing on our Govt's policy of granting credits.

Minc replied that Polish Govt had decided to nationalize all key industries including mines, metallurgical and textile factories as well as petroleum industry. He said that procedure to be followed has not yet been adopted. As to compensation he said that the respective Ministries would be empowered to negotiate with former owners.

Left memorandum with Minc based on Dept's 162, Oct. 3, 11 a. m.³⁰ regarding desire to obtain permission for engineers of Silesian Holding Company to examine company properties. Minc said it would be preferable for them to come to Poland after nationalization decree is issued which will probably be before his departure for Washington so that they may then negotiate with Govt as to compensation.

In reply to my query he said that only the key industries will be nationalized and that small private businesses will be left intact. He said that the decree will define what constitutes a key industry and added that few of key industries are American owned.

It is evident from my talk with Minc that Polish Govt has definitely decided to embark on nationalization policy. I feel, therefore, that in addition to the points emphasized in my 403 Oct. 13, noon, we should notify Polish Govt that we will insist on adequate compensation for any American owned industries which may be nationalized. The Dept may wish to consider the advisability of our suggesting to Polish Govt that until we have been informed of precise terms of nationalization decree and precise means by which compensation is to be made our Govt would not be disposed to grant credits.

As it will be difficult for us to determine to what extent United States may be discriminated against today until the Polish Govt furnishes us with the terms of their commercial arrangements with other Govts as requested by us, I recommend our making the furnishing of

³⁰ Not printed.

such information as a further condition to our favorable consideration of the recent requests for credits.³²

LANE

860C.51/10-2545

Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of Foreign Economic Development (Young) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] October 25, 1945.

As you know, the Secretary has approved a list of countries to participate in the \$100 million cotton credit established by the Eximbank. Included in the list is Poland.

Since the Secretary approved the inclusion of Poland, we have received telegrams from Warsaw, Nos. 412³³ and 413 of October 15, and Nos. 450 and 451 of October 22,³⁴ urging that no credit be extended to Poland at the present time. Ambassador Lane feels that we should make clear to the Poles that no credit is forthcoming until they change their policy with respect to such things as freedom of the press, arrests by security police, reasonable exchange rates and treatment of American property and trade.

Mr. Durbrow of EE³⁵ has sent me a memorandum³⁶ recommending that no credits be extended to Poland at present.

We have accordingly asked the Eximbank to defer any action on cotton or other credits to Poland. If the Secretary feels that we should move ahead with cotton or other credits to Poland, will you please let me know.

³² Telegram 412, October 15, from Warsaw, reported that a meeting had been held at the French Embassy in Warsaw attended by representatives of the British, French, Belgian, and United States Missions at which the question of the nationalization of property was discussed. At the meeting, it had been agreed that the Missions should request their respective Governments to instruct them to make oral representations to the Polish Government regarding the expropriation. (860C.5034/10-1545)

³³ See footnote 32, above.

³⁴ Telegrams 450 and 451 not printed; with regard to telegram 450, see footnote 27, p. 390; telegram 451 reported that the local press was publishing news to the effect that the Export-Import Bank was granting a cotton credit to eight countries including Poland (860C.51/10-2245).

³⁵ Division of Eastern European Affairs.

³⁶ Dated October 17, 1945, not printed.

860C.00/10-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, October 27, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received October 28—3:03 p. m.]

477. British Ambassador ³⁷ informs me that Oct 25 he told Bierut under instructions from Bevin that it was hoped elections would be held by February; that electoral provisions of Constitution of 1921 and electoral law of 1922 would be upheld; that Popiel's Christian Labor Party would be given opportunity to organize; and that sufficient newsprint would be made available to all parties.

According to Bentinck, Bierut said that elections could not be held until middle of 1946 due to transport difficulties and impossibility of repatriating Poles from abroad before that time; that electoral provisions cited would be upheld; that he hoped Popiel and Feldeczak faction of CLP ³⁸ would fuse; and that sufficient newsprint would be furnished all papers although Govt could not subsidize them.

Bentinck said to me he had no confidence in Bierut's assurances due to latter's reputation for evasion. He agreed with my personal opinion that it is a mistake for us to urge on Poles a definite date for elections so as not to assume responsibility for results of future conditions which we cannot predict. He said his Govt suggested February because it was Mikolajczyk's idea.

The coincidence of dates suggested will in my view be helpful neither to Mikolajczyk nor the British Govt and I would suggest that we avoid suggesting any date or approximate date to Polish Govt.

LANE

860C.00/10-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, October 27, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received October 28—6:30 a. m.]

482. Speech of First Vice President Gomulka ³⁹ summary of which is transmitted in my press telegram 468, October 25 ⁴⁰ is most signifi-

³⁷ Victor F. W. Cavendish-Bentinck.

³⁸ Christian Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy).

³⁹ Władysław Gomułka, Vice Premier and Minister of Recovered Lands in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity; Secretary General of the Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza), the party of the Polish Communists. In his telegram 101, August 19, 10 a. m., the Ambassador in Poland stated that Gomułka impressed him as being the dominant personality of the Government (860C.00/8-1945).

⁴⁰ Not printed; it summarized Gomułka's speech as published in the Warsaw newspaper *Głos Ludu* on October 22, 1945 (860C.00/10-2545).

cant political development since our arrival here and has widespread implications. The fact that Gomulka accuses Mikolajczyk of being the Trojan horse for reactionary elements at a time when Mikolajczyk is out of the country and is representing Polish Govt as delegate to Food and Agriculture Conference at Quebec ⁴² indicates breach which exists within the Govt itself. It is obviously an attempt to discredit Mikolajczyk nationally and to prepare the way for elimination of Mikolajczyk branch of Polish Peasant Party (it is significant in this connection that during General Eisenhower's visit Bierut presented Banczyk ⁴³ and not Mikolajczyk to Eisenhower as Chief of Polish Peasant Party and that the news film of meeting of September 1st [21st] reported in mytel 197 September 4, 3 p.m.,⁴⁴ gave sound recording of all speeches made with exception of that of Mikolajczyk. From sources within and outside of Govt we are informed that Gomulka is the most powerful person within the Govt and is the directing force of Govt policy. We are told that he has the closest relations with the Kremlin. Tonesk reports that during Moscow conversations between Polish leaders which led to formation of Provisional Govt of National Unity, Gomulka was reported to have visited Stalin on several occasions without other Poles being present. His speech should therefore be interpreted as reflecting views of Kremlin and indicating intention of latter to liquidate Mikolajczyk politically.

Consensus of persons with whom we have spoken here and throughout the country is that if free elections were held now, Govt would not receive more than 10 or 15% of votes. One member of Govt close to controlling Lublin group is reported to have admitted that Govt would be lucky to obtain 1% of total. As it is obvious that Soviet Govt desires present group to remain in power, it will presumably take every feasible step to obtain this end. Many observers of whom I am one are of opinion that there is no present possibility of free elections in Poland as they would not be in the interest of this Soviet controlled regime. Gomulka's speech and remarks of other politicians indicate purpose of Govt is to submit one list to the electorate composed of members of Govt-controlled Polish Workers Party,⁴⁵ Polish Socialist

⁴² Reference here is to the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations held in Quebec, October 16–November 1, 1945.

⁴³ Stanislaw Banczyk, Chairman of the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe). This was a Communist inspired and supported organization which had taken the name of a long-established agrarian political organization in Poland. The old, non-Communist Peasant Party, under the leadership of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, changed its name to Polish Peasant Party in September 1945. Early in November 1945, Banczyk resigned from the Peasant Party and joined Mikolajczyk's Polish Peasant Party.

⁴⁴ The reference to telegram 197, September 4, is in error. The visit to Warsaw by General Eisenhower and his party was reported in airgram A-119, September 24, from Warsaw and telegram 293, September 25, from Warsaw, neither printed (811.2360C/9-2445 and 811.2360C/9-2545, respectively).

⁴⁵ The party of the Polish Communists.

Party⁴⁶ and Rump Peasant Party now headed by Wincenty Barnowski (Banczyk now being reported to have merged with Mikolajczyk). This would be a step towards the political elimination of Mikolajczyk and of others opposing domination by Communist group composed of Bierut, Gomulka, Berman,⁴⁷ Minc, Modzelewski and Olszewski.⁴⁸ If such a situation should develop as now appears to be probable, we would be faced with a flagrant and barefaced violation of the Yalta decision which the present Provisional Govt accepted in its entirety. It was on the acceptance of the Yalta Agreement that our recognition was based.

There are other developments directed against the United States and Great Britain which give me apprehension. The propaganda against "the western bloc" and against "Anglo-Saxon conception of democracy" would seem to be for purpose of preparing public for a stand against United States and for justification of policy which Polish Govt may be called upon to assume. Although assignment of Soviet General to each Wojewod has since been publicly denied (mytel 411, October 15, 2 p. m.⁴⁹) personal trips throughout Poland of Embassy officers and newspaper correspondents indicate policy of Soviet authorities to increase rather than decrease their control over internal conditions in Poland despite assurances given by Stalin at Potsdam that he desired to retain only two railroad lines through Poland to permit communication through Soviet Union and Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany. For instance, port of Stettin is completely under Soviet control as is Wroclaw.

I feel strongly that now rather than after it may be too late is the time to present our views to the Polish authorities in such a manner that there can be no doubt as to our position and I look forward to receiving the Dept's forthcoming instructions. (Deptel 216, October 23, 2 p. m.⁵⁰) In view of my frank talks with Polish authorities, the Dept may safely assume that the Polish Govt is [*in*] carrying out

⁴⁶ Pro-Communist Polish Socialists had established a political organization using the name of the traditional Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partja Socjalistyczna). Anti-Communist Polish Socialists continued to claim this party name as their own.

⁴⁷ Jakób Berman, Under Secretary of State of the Council of Ministers in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity; leader in the Polish Workers' Party.

⁴⁸ Józef Olszewski, Director of the Political Department of the Polish Foreign Office.

⁴⁹ Not printed; it reported that the Polish press on October 10 carried a news item that the Polish Government had decreed that a high-ranking Red Army officer together with a detachment of troops would be assigned to each wojewod (governor) to cooperate with Polish officials in the suppression of "banditry" (102.2/10-1545).

⁵⁰ This telegram read as follows: "Your 403, Oct. 13, The Department considering recommendations and will advise as soon as possible, Byrnes." (860C.51/10-1345)

its present policy can have no doubt in its own mind that it is contradictory to our policy of maintaining a free way of life and personal security. I realize that our policy on Poland must be in harmony with that carried out by us in other areas in which the Soviet Govt is likewise exerting its influence, and must be viewed not only in the light of the more immediate protection of those principles which our Govt holds but also of our long-range policy towards the Soviet Union. I feel that if we should temporize with the situation in Poland and in other Soviet dominated countries, we would be inviting further encroachments on the freedom of these peoples and we would find it more and more difficult to insist on our point of view. It is for this reason that I emphasize the vital importance of making known our views now rather than later.

LANE

811.91260C/10-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, October 30, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received October 31—5:20 p. m.]

498. Foreign Office has recently orally complained to us regarding news despatches of American correspondents which Foreign Office claims give erroneous and unfriendly account of conditions in Poland.

On Oct 26, Modzelewski in presence of Zebrowski complained to me specifically regarding article written by Larry Allen of Associated Press based on Govt press release that Soviet general assigned to each wojewod. This article published in *Le Monde* of Paris Oct 23 and headlined "Poland under Soviet Occupation". Modzelewski also complained regarding article by Gladwin Hill of *New York Times* indicating Poland under Soviet domination.

Modzelewski started conversation by stating that if Allen continued to write articles in this vein he could not remain in Poland. I asked him whether Polish Govt proposed to ignore terms of Potsdam Agreement guaranteeing Allied correspondents privilege to report regarding conditions here before and during elections. He avoided a direct answer but said that Allen and Hill were not "serious correspondents." I took exception to this remark as being an affront not only to two well-known correspondents of excellent reputation but to the organizations which they represented. Modzelewski finally changed his attitude but asked that the Govt's point of view be also given by Allen in his despatches. I agreed to make such a request of Allen who tells me that he has always offered to transmit any statements which the Govt may make available to him. He kindly agreed to

approach the Foreign Office and send any statements which it wished to make on general conditions without however prejudicing his right to report other viewpoints.

After Modzelewski had made his complaint I said that I had something to say regarding unfriendly articles which had recently appeared in the Polish press. If there were freedom of the press in Poland, I continued, I would make no objection to articles unfriendly to the US but as I knew from statements made to me by Minister of Propaganda that the Govt controls *Czytelnik* which publishes a satirical weekly *Szpilki*, in which offensive cartoons regarding the US had appeared, it is obvious that these had appeared with Govt consent. (As a matter of fact anti-British articles are more numerous and hostile than those against US.) When Modzelewski denied lack of freedom of press I quoted President Bierut as having admitted to me that freedom of press does not exist here according to our conception.

It was evident from my talk with Modzelewski that what he most resented in Allen's and Hill's articles was references they had made to unrest in country and possible revolt against present regime.⁵² Reports of impending difficulties for Provisional Govt are increasing and undoubtedly give Govt much concern.

LANE

360C.1121/10-3145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, October 31, 1945—noon.
[Received November 1—10:51 a. m.]

508. On October 26 I presented note to Foreign Office regarding 13 presumptive American citizens whose arrests in Poland have been reported to us. This list included Lalik and Chmielowiec who have been released (mytel 420, October 16, 3 p. m.⁵³). I pointed out in note that only three notes sent to Ministry had been answered and that of three replies received, none stated: (1) Basis for accusations against persons involved (2) whether accused had enjoyed freedom of access to Polish courts of justice guaranteed to American citizens under article 1 of treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights (3) what steps had been taken to effect release of persons mentioned in view of absence of charges made through normal judicial channels.

⁵² In his telegram 587, November 20, 5 p. m., the Ambassador in Poland reported on Foreign Minister Rzymowski's heated and bitter complaints regarding several allegedly "lying" accounts by American correspondents in Poland (811.91260C/11-2045). For a description of this meeting and a somewhat earlier one with Jakób Berman, see Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 187.

⁵³ Not printed; the Ambassador reported having received from the Polish Foreign Office notes regarding three American citizens arrested by Polish authorities (360C.1121/10-1645).

Note expressed my deep concern regarding inadequate information received from Polish Govt as well as fact that none of persons arrested had communicated with Embassy while under detention thus giving rise to belief that they were prevented from doing so. I said that I was further disturbed by reiterated reports that claimants to American citizenship imprisoned for alleged political offenses are generally held incommunicado and have on occasion been physically maltreated by police authorities in attempt to extract information from them.

My note concludes by requesting at the earliest date a full report of present status of each person mentioned as well as confirmation of oral statement made to me by Modzelewski on October 19 that officers of this Embassy would be permitted to interview all persons claiming American citizenship held under arrest by Polish authorities.⁵⁴

Prior to interview with Modzelewski, I had seen Minister of Justice⁵⁵ who offered to exercise good offices with Minister of Security⁵⁶ to obtain release of presumptive American citizens. Minister said that such an arrangement would have to have approval of Foreign Office which had not informed Justice of arrests mentioned. He said that police system has unfortunately temporarily replaced judicial procedure in Poland.

Modzelewski later told me that all cases had been referred to Ministry of Justice.

I have endeavored for past 2 weeks to have interview with Minister of Security or with his deputy. All requests have been evaded by various excuses.⁵⁷

Copy of note being forwarded by despatch.⁵⁸

LANE

860C.00/10-2745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane)

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1945—8 p. m.

254. Reurtel 477 of October 27. Dept agrees that it is inadvisable to urge definite date for elections upon Polish Government. However,

⁵⁴ In airgram A-504, December 17, the Ambassador reported that in a conversation with the Polish Foreign Minister he again had requested to be permitted to interview presumptive American citizens under arrest (360C.1121/12-1745).

⁵⁵ Henryk Swiatkowski.

⁵⁶ Stanislaw Radkiewicz, who was also a leader in the Polish Workers' Party.

⁵⁷ An unsigned and undated memorandum transmitted to the Department in despatch 86, October 31, 1945, from Warsaw, lists 15 separate occasions between October 13 and October 23 when Lieutenant Tonesk tried unsuccessfully to obtain an appointment for the Ambassador at the Ministry of Security (360C.1121/10-3145).

⁵⁸ Despatch 86, October 31, not printed

Dept believes that you should take advantage of any suitable opportunity to remind the Polish Government that under the Yalta and Potsdam agreements it is pledged "to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates" and, in your discretion, to point out that such elections would undoubtedly contribute materially to popular support in this country for any program of aid to Poland which might be under consideration.

BYRNES

860C.00/11-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, November 6, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 5:40 p. m.]

527. Mytel 238, September 11. Embassy is now informed by members of the clergy that Bishop Kocylowski of Przemysl has himself been arrested and deported to Russia. Increasingly graphic reports of disorders in Galicia continue to reach the Embassy and a number of Ukrainian claimants to American citizenship⁵⁹ report that they only succeeded in reaching Warsaw by escaping from railway stations where they were concentrated prior to being deported to the USSR.

Resurgence of antagonism between Poles and Ukrainians has apparently resulted in many open clashes. Vice Wojewod of Krakow⁶⁰ has informed officer of Embassy that Ukrainians are receiving arms from USSR. Some Polish officials place blame on Ukrainians themselves but appeals reaching this Embassy from Ukrainian population suggest that Polish authorities and Soviet Commission charged with supervising exchange of population between Poland and USSR have been unduly harsh in handling situation.

According to Archbishop Sapieha the Uniat Church is suffering persecution at the hands of the Russians in former Polish Galicia. He states that some two to three thousand priests have already been imprisoned.

⁵⁹ In his telegram 578, November 17, 1945, 2 p. m., Ambassador Lane reported having received a copy of a letter from the Polish Foreign Office requesting the Polish Ministry of Public Administration to inform authorities executing the Polish-Soviet exchange of population agreement that Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians and others who had grounds for considering themselves American citizens were to be regarded as American citizens and were not subject to eviction (360C.1121/11-1745).

⁶⁰ Zygmunt Robel.

I have instructed the Military Attaché⁶² to proceed to the south-eastern area of Poland to make an investigation of the situation.⁶³

LANE

860C.51/11-845

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1945.

In the course of an extended conversation with Mr. Mikolajczyk⁶⁴ he made the following comments on the economic situation in Poland. Since this was an entirely private conversation and he spoke most frankly, he asked that his remarks be kept in strict confidence.

Mr. Mikolajczyk expressed the sincere hope that arrangements could be made to grant credits to Poland as soon as possible since he was convinced that the granting of such credits from the west would constitute one of the best assurances that Poland would in fact regain her independence. He added that the Soviet Government had made many resounding promises of economic aid to Poland, such as the one that they would rebuild half of Warsaw, but that in fact none of these promises had been fulfilled, nor did he believe that any would be fulfilled in the near future. For this reason he felt it desirable for the United States and other countries in the west to make available to Poland as soon as possible goods on credit terms in order to show the Polish people that the west has an interest in them and their independence, and in order to show them that promises made by the west are fulfilled as expeditiously as possible. He added that he felt it was worth while from both political and economic points of view to assume even more than ordinary risks in granting credits to Poland and he expressed the firm conviction that these credits could be repaid.

In this connection he stated that while at Potsdam discussions⁶⁵

⁶² Col. Walter R. Pashley.

⁶³ Telegram 557, November 14, 11 a. m., from Warsaw, reported on the Military Attaché's observations during a trip from Krakow to Przemysl. Colonel Pashley found the area completely dominated by the Soviet military, but did not personally see any cases of forcible deportation. The same telegram reported that a Polish Foreign Office official had admitted that under the agreement with the Soviet Union, the latter had the right to deport Ukrainians on the grounds that they were Soviet citizens. (860C.00/11-1445)

⁶⁴ Vice Premier Mikolajczyk visited Washington following his attendance at the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization meeting at Quebec. During a courtesy call on Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Mikolajczyk touched briefly on the Polish economic problems detailed in this memorandum. The Under Secretary's memorandum of conversation of November 8 concluded as follows: "I made no particular comments on any of the questions raised by Mr. Mikolajczyk." (860C.01/11-845)

⁶⁵ See footnote 92, p. 376.

had taken place regarding the possibility of granting credits of \$300,000,000 to \$400,000,000 but he did not feel that it was absolutely essential to grant such large credits if, for other reasons, we would not be in a position to do so. He stated that if, in addition to the considerable aid being given by UNRRA, the Polish Government could purchase approximately \$150,000,000 worth of a few basic goods, reconstruction could begin and the country be started on the road to full recovery. He stated that the most essential needs of the country at the present time were the following:

- (1) Cranes and cargo-handling equipment for ports.
- (2) Railway transportation (cars and locomotives).
- (3) Draft animals and tractors (7000 tractors are expected to be received from UNRRA and the bare minimum requirements would be at least 7000 additional units, with the hope that eventually 35,000 units could be made available.)
- (4) Trucks, jeeps, et cetera.
- (5) Construction equipment, bulldozers, cement mixers, et cetera.

Mr. Mikolajczyk explained that his country, of course, needed many other types of goods but he felt that with an adequate supply of the five types enumerated above great progress could be made.

Mr. Mikolajczyk stated that UNRRA supplies were arriving in greater quantities and were being handled much more smoothly at the present time. He also stated that the Polish people looked upon the UNRRA insignia as a holy sign which would mean their salvation. He admitted that there had been abuses and that further controls were obviously necessary but he hoped that the amount of UNRRA supplies could be increased to the maximum and if, for other reasons, it might not be possible to give considerable credits, that nevertheless the Polish people could be given further aid by adding to the planned UNRRA shipments. He stated that one of the principal things which UNRRA could do at the present time would be to increase the livestock and draft animal deliveries since the prewar herd had been reduced by 75 percent. In this connection he stated that the Red Army was not at present making further inroads into the herd except for a small amount of slaughtering.

Mr. Mikolajczyk explained in detail the reason why the Polish Government had consented to deliver to the Soviet Government 12 million tons of coal a year. Shortly after the establishment of the new government the Soviet authorities had suggested an exchange of stock in the Eastern Galician potash and oil deposits (which incidentally belonged to Poland previously) for Polish-owned stocks in German concerns in the newly acquired German territory in the west. Since this would have meant large Soviet control in Polish factories with only slight possibilities of the Polish Government's exercising any

influence in the potash or oil industries of Eastern Galicia, Mr. Mikolajczyk led the fight to reject this offer. He was successful in having the offer turned down but was forced, as *quid pro quo*, to sign a commercial agreement providing for the delivery of 12 million tons of coal a year against the delivery of manufactured and other goods from the Soviet Union. He stated that since the coal arrangement was only a short-range agreement, he felt it advisable to make this sacrifice for the time being, rather than permit the Soviet Government to have permanent control of the industries in Poland. He regretted that in the coal arrangement he had also been forced to accept a very low value for the coal shipments. Under the agreement, coal which is sold by the Polish Government to other countries at \$8.20 a ton is delivered to the Soviet Government for \$1.20 a ton. Despite this low evaluation which was to be paid in Soviet goods, practically no goods have been delivered to Poland from the Soviet Union. He added, however, that despite the large commitments to Russia and other countries, there is still sufficient coal in Poland to make available considerable quantities to the west, the main difficulty being transportation.

Mr. Mikolajczyk recounted an interested sidelight on the reparations which Poland is to receive. According to the Soviet calculations Poland should receive approximately \$350,000,000 in reparations from Germany. The Soviet authorities, however, stated that since they had arranged to have large sections of eastern Germany annexed to Poland and that since these areas contained factories and equipment valued at \$950,000,000, Poland had already been paid three times the reparations which were due her and therefore, in theory, she should receive no further reparations. The Soviet authorities, nevertheless, stated that since they did not wish to prevent Poland from getting any reparations they would endeavor to see that approximately \$350,000,000 worth of reparations are paid to Poland. Mr. Mikolajczyk pointed out that this was a very empty gesture since, if the Polish Government furnishes 12 million tons of coal a year to the Soviet Union for the five years of the agreement at the very reduced price, the Soviet Government would receive in value over \$400,000,000 gratis. Mr. Mikolajczyk expressed the hope that since the Soviet Government had not fulfilled its part of the commercial agreement by sending in manufactured goods to pay for the coal even at the reduced price, it might eventually be possible for the Polish Government to abrogate the agreement because of Soviet non-fulfillment of the bargain.

I informed Mr. Mikolajczyk that as far as I was aware the United States Government in general would be willing to encourage the granting of credits to Poland. I added, however, that before it would

be possible to do this there were certain matters which would have to be worked out—namely:

- (1) An equitable rate of exchange.
- (2) Abrogation of preclusive trade agreements with the U.S.S.R. or other countries.
- (3) Presentation of concrete evidence showing that Poland would be able to produce a sufficient amount of goods to service and repay the credits.
- (4) Make available accurate information on the economic stability and developments in the country.

I told him that the United States Government was greatly concerned about the efforts of the Soviet Government to bring about an economic bloc in Eastern Europe by concluding bilateral treaties which in effect tend to exclude all other countries from having an equal opportunity to trade in the area. I pointed out that there had been considerable Congressional criticism of the Soviet economic policy in Eastern Europe and that it therefore might be difficult, if not impossible, for the executive branch of the government to grant credits to Poland or other countries in the area until the policies of the countries concerned made it clear that these policies were not contrary to the basic economic policies of the United States.

Mr. Mikolajczyk stated that he realized there might be difficulties on this score but again expressed his conviction that the granting of credits by the United States would be one of the most important steps to insure that the Polish people could regain their independence. I again expressed the opinion that unless the four points enumerated above were met, it might prove most difficult to grant any credits.

In regard to land reform, Mr. Mikolajczyk stated that the Lublin group had endeavored to split the peasantry by pitting the landless peasants against those who had farms. He explained that this had not worked since the entire peasantry was in fact practically on the same level, the former rich peasants having lost most of their business, except for their land, and that they were all actually starting out from scratch, which prevented any basic rivalry from developing between the two groups. He explained that this situation had been brought about by the fact that the government was paying only twice the prewar prices for farm products while it charged five times prewar prices for manufactured goods. In other words, the prices of products of the farms from both the rich and the poor peasants were so low that they both had approximately the [same?] standard of living. He stated that the land reforms in Poland proper had not worked out well, had caused dissatisfaction among all groups, and therefore, since they were sponsored by Lublin, that group had lost practically all prestige with the rural elements. At one time the

Lublin group was endeavoring to keep intact the large estates in the newly acquired German territories in order to make them into what would be the equivalent of Soviet state farms. Mr. Mikolajczyk had vigorously opposed this development and had finally made arrangements for the splitting up of the estates in order to give individual plots to settlers coming from east of the Curzon line.⁶⁶

860C.00/11-945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[WASHINGTON,] November 9, 1945.

Last evening I spent over two hours alone with Mr. Mikolajczyk and discussed with him at length various phases of the Polish situation and developments in that country. He was most frank during the entire discussion and because of this, he asked me to take more than usual precautions to see that his remarks received only very limited distribution.

Political Questions

Mr. Mikolajczyk stated that he wished to start from the beginning and discuss political developments from the time the Polish Government of National Unity was set up. He stated that at Moscow, until almost the last minute when agreement was reached, the Lublin Poles did not wish to set up a Government of National Unity and it was only because of the insistence of the Americans and British that Stalin finally turned the tide by giving his approval to the plan that was finally worked out. It was obvious that the Lublin Poles felt that if other political leaders were included in the government they (the Lublin Poles) would in all probability lose what little hold they had on the people. He added that his suspicions in this regard were more than confirmed after he got to Warsaw, when the Lublin Poles tried in every way to freeze him out of the picture by trying to force him to join the Rump Peasant Party which had been established under Lublin with stooges.⁶⁷ He not only resisted this but was successful in forcing the Lublin group to permit him to set up a completely independent party.

In regard to political parties, he stated that a good part of the Rump Peasant Party has now joined his Peasant Party and that he

⁶⁶ Regarding the Curzon Line, see footnote 27a. p. 116. In the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Polish Republic on the Soviet-Polish State Frontier, signed at Moscow on August 16, 1945, the Curzon Line, with certain deviations specified in the treaty, became Poland's eastern frontier. For text of the treaty, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. x. No. 61, p. 193.

⁶⁷ See footnote 85, p. 372.

has actually been embarrassed by the large number of workers' groups which have themselves set up Peasant Party groups in their factories. He explained that he did not wish to encourage this development since he wished to keep his party as the agrarian movement and not have it become the catch-all for all the groups who were against the communists. He therefore is making every effort to encourage the development of the Christian Labor Party led by Mr. Popiel, which has not as yet been recognized by the government as an independent party, and the Socialist Party as the two parties which should represent the urban classes. He asserted that it was his belief that the government would eventually have to recognize the Christian Labor Party and he said a most interesting development is taking place in the Socialist Party. This party which in its Lublin version was hardly distinguishable from the Communist Party is now, because of pressure from the rank and file, assuming more and more the same position it had before the war. He added that the Socialist Party was split into two distinct groups, with a small minority endeavoring to hold the original Lublin line, and the other group forced by strong pressure from the rank and file, taking on the same character as it had in the 1930's. He pointed out that even Osubka-Morawski, who in the beginning played the Lublin game to the hilt, is now acting as a loyal Polish Socialist.

Because of these developments Mr. Mikolajczyk believes that if elections were to take place now the Communist Party would receive not more than two percent, while if the elections had taken place four months ago they might have received a maximum of 20 percent. He stated that the principal reason for this was the extremely unethical conduct of the Red Army in Poland. He pointed out that the Polish people had suffered great hardships and indignities at the hands of the Germans for six years, which made them appreciate more than ever what it was to be free and independent, and that when the Red Army liberated them they would immediately regain their freedom and independence. On the contrary, instead of receiving aid and assistance from the Red Army and regaining their independence, they learned that their "friendly liberators" treated them in many ways even worse than the Germans had. This development has had such a profound effect on the entire population that Mr. Mikolajczyk is certain that unless the Soviet authorities decide to increase greatly the Red Army forces in Poland and carries on a reign of terror and suppression, there is no possibility of Poland's going communist.

It is for this reason that he is convinced that the United States and British Governments should immediately use their full influence to see that the Red Army leaves Poland. He stated in this connection that he had been told by the President and Mr. Attlee at Potsdam

that Stalin had promised categorically that the Red Army would leave before the end of the year and he therefore felt that we should remind the Soviet Government of this promise and use all appropriate pressure to bring this about. He stated that in actual fact a large part of the Red Army had left the country and that at present there are less than 300,000 men stationed in Poland. Despite the fact that the number of Red Army troops is not large he nevertheless felt that it would be difficult to have free elections as long as the Red Army remained in the country.

On the basis of the arrangement made by Mr. Mikolajczyk shortly before his departure from Warsaw, the amount of land held by the Red Army for purposes of cultivation had been reduced to approximately 12,000 hectares and he therefore felt that except for the food that is raised on this land, Poland would no longer be drained of its food resources to feed the Red Army. He added, however, that the Red Army is still slaughtering some cattle for feeding its forces.

In connection with the general political situation he said that he was in personal secret contact with agrarian leaders in other Balkan countries and was gratified to learn that the situation developing in Poland is similar to that in the other areas, namely, that the non-totalitarian left is gaining in prestige. He stated that it was his belief that the Lublin Poles are very much worried about the developments unfavorable to the communist policies and that for this reason they desire to postpone the elections until next June or July in the hope that unforeseen developments will take place, such as a possible break-up in Big Three collaboration, which would permit the Polish Communists to regain lost ground and actually make a much better showing in the elections than they could at present. In this regard he stated that the Lublin Poles at first were very much elated with the results of the British and French elections since they believed that these two countries would look with more sympathy on the communist elements in Poland than the previous governments had. They now realize that this was wishful thinking and that the elections had actually encouraged the non-communist democratic elements.

I asked Mr. Mikolajczyk when he thought it would be appropriate to hold elections in Poland. He replied that since it had been informally suggested at Potsdam that the elections take place in the early part of next year, he believed that it would be advisable to hold the elections in February-March of 1946. He explained that he felt that to delay the elections any longer would give the Lublin group more time in which to force upon the country basic decrees which would tend to crystallize policies which in fact were detrimental to the best long-range interests of the Polish people. He therefore, ex-

pressed the hope that the United States and British Governments would press now for the withdrawal of the Red Army and as soon as this had been accomplished, press for the holding of elections early next year.

In this connection Mr. Mikolajczyk stated that he hoped that arrangements could be made to induce the Polish army in the west to return to Poland as units rather than as individual displaced persons. His feeling in this regard is based upon the theory that if the troops come back as units, many of the units can be incorporated immediately into the Polish Army and thus act as a democratic corps in the army which is at present composed of a large number of men who have received full Soviet indoctrination.

He also expressed the hope that a large proportion of the displaced persons could be induced to return to Poland and he stated that he felt that by next spring a large proportion of them would be willing to return. He felt, in regard to the army in the west as well as the displaced Poles, that their presence is needed by the democratic forces in the country. He asserted, however, that despite the many statements made by the Government that the return of the Poles in the west was desired, this was not their desire since the Lublin group feared that their prestige would be lowered by the return of these persons. He stated that since he had induced the underground army to come out of hiding and assume their normal life as artisans, policemen, government officials, et cetera, the strength of the democratic groups had been greatly increased. He also favored this move since it automatically withdrew one of the principal propaganda weapons from the Lublin group who, while the home army was in hiding, had made use of that fact to claim that the reactionary elements in London were still in control of a large part of the population and were endeavoring to overthrow the new government.

Mr. Mikolajczyk again expressed his appreciation for the arrangements that were made at Potsdam to turn over to the Polish administration the eastern territories of Germany. He explained that if it had not been possible to arrange this, the millions of Poles coming from east of the Curzon line could not have been resettled since central Poland is too overpopulated to have permitted adequate resettlement. He stated that so far, about 1,500,000 Poles from east of the Curzon line have been resettled in what is now western Poland. He added that depending upon the way in which the option provisions of the Soviet-Polish repatriation treaty are applied, there would be between a million and two million additional Poles who would be eligible to return to Poland from the areas east of the Curzon line. He pointed out that while the new Polish areas had been stripped to a consider-

able extent of removable goods, the houses were intact, and except in the Silesian area, no Germans remained since they had fled with the advance of the Red Army. On the other hand, the fields in the new areas have not been cultivated and consequently were badly overgrown with weeds and a great deal of work had to be done to put the fields in shape for planting. It was for this reason that he hoped that through UNRRA and through credits arrangements could be made as soon as possible to obtain a large number of draft animals and tractors.

He said that during his trips throughout the country he had been very deeply impressed with the high morale of the people in general, despite the sufferings they have undergone since 1939. They all are willing to work. I asked Mr. Mikolajczyk whether, in the event that a truly representative government should be set up in the near future, it might not be blamed for the continued privations and hardships which are bound to come and thus be discredited and throw the population into the arms of the communist groups. He replied most emphatically that this would not be the case. He explained that he had had overwhelming evidence from all areas of the country that the people realize the difficulties under which he and the democratic leaders are working and the enormous problems ahead for the entire nation, which cannot be solved in short order. He stated that the people had given concrete assurances that they are willing to make further sacrifices for a year or more provided, in the end, they could really attain their freedom and Polish sovereignty. It is for this reason that Mr. Mikolajczyk pleaded most earnestly for credits to permit the people to work effectively and start on the road back to prosperity.

Having just talked to two Polish rabbis about the plight of Polish Jews, I asked Mr. Mikolajczyk about this situation and, in particular, about the alleged pogroms. He stated categorically that the allegations that there had been pogroms were not true. To prove his point he stated that he was in Radom and in Cracow when two of the alleged pogroms were supposed to have taken place. Instead of pogroms he explained that what had actually taken place were anti-Lublin group riots. He explained that in both cities Jews who are confessed communists and members of the Lublin group had endeavored to hold communist propaganda rallies and that the people became so incensed at the statements made by these leaders that rioting took place and these Jewish communist leaders were attacked. He stated that since there is a considerable Jewish element in the Lublin group, a certain amount of resentment has grown against these particular Jews. On the other hand, he stated that Dr. Sommerstein,⁶⁸ the famous Polish Zionist

⁶⁸ Emil Sommerstein, imprisoned in the Soviet Union at the beginning of World War II; he later served as the head of the Department of War Reparations in the Communist-dominated Polish Committee of National Liberation.

leader, had told him that it was regrettable for the large majority of the Jews that there were so many prominent Jewish leaders in the Lublin group, which gave the impression that the Jews in general were favorable to Moscow. Mr. Mikolajczyk stated that he had suggested to Dr. Sommerstein that it might be worth while, in order to overcome this situation, to pass special decrees favorable to the Jews and assuring them equality. Dr. Sommerstein was not in favor of this move since he stated he was not in favor of encouraging Jews to remain in Poland. He desired to have them obtain permission to emigrate to Palestine. Dr. Sommerstein explained that he favored the emigration of Jews from the country since there were so few of them left, and those that were left had in most instances lost all the members of their families and therefore, psychologically, they could not return to their homes and take up life anew because of the haunting memories of the atrocities committed against members of their families.

[For the Polish record of an audience given Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczyk by President Truman on November 9, see *aide-mémoire* from the Polish Embassy, December 5, printed on page 428.]

860C.51/11-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, November 9, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 11—10:40 a. m.]

543. In talk November 7 of more than one hour with Rajchman he urged on me need for granting credits to Poland. He said he had received cool reception in Washington and he would be glad to know reasons therefor. I said that I could not answer for Washington but I could say that as I had previously mentioned to him I personally was opposed to credits being granted until four questions are satisfactorily solved: Rate of exchange, nationalization of industrial property, freedom of press and terroristic arrests by security police.

1. Rajchman replied that rate of exchange question could be solved easily by Polish Government granting to us an unlimited credit in zlotys, amount of which would be refunded once Poland becomes member of International Stabilization Fund.⁶⁹ Not knowing details of conditions of Polish adherence thereto I did not comment on this point.

⁶⁹ i.e., International Monetary Fund.

2. Rajchman said that after long talk with Mine he is convinced that Polish Government wishes to meet our views regarding adequate compensation for properties which are to be nationalized.

3. As to freedom of press he said that American correspondents are perfectly free to report information even though not agreeable to Polish Government. I agreed that this is now the case and I said that I would likewise report to Dept that freedom of press in Poland appears now to be greater than before. I said however that I felt sure that this condition is partly due to our representations in the matter. He expressed agreement with me that great frankness in our relations with Polish Government would have salutary effect. I am glad to record that there has been an improvement with respect to freedom of expression of press: more newspapers have appeared and criticism of the Govt on the part of the Catholic *Tygodnik Powszechny*⁷⁰ had been printed. Furthermore American correspondents have freely reported re conditions in Poland.

4. Rajchman claimed he had no information regarding the arrests of Americans and others. On November 6 Berman admitted to me that arrests for political offenses are taking place and said that it would be "illogical not to take action against our adversaries". I replied that this condition would not be understood by United States public and that if known it would have very unfortunate effect on United States relations with Poland.

He said that in his opinion elections could not take place prior to middle of calendar year of 1946. One reason was lack of transport. I said I had recommended to Dept that 3-year credit for 1000 trucks which had been previously promised in Paris should be granted⁷¹ this being in addition to trucks obtained by Polish Govt. from UNRRA.

I am strongly of the opinion that maintenance of firm attitude against suppression of liberties will have most important effect here as is already noticeable with respect to liberalization of press comments. In order faithfully to carry out Dept's policy I feel that I should be in a position to receive personally from Dept detailed instructions regarding relationship of Polish situation to our international relationships as a whole. I likewise believe it would be advantageous to Dept if I could give orally my impressions of a nation

⁷⁰ A Catholic weekly newspaper published in Kraków.

⁷¹ In his telegram 470, October 25, 6 p. m., the Ambassador in Poland reported that the Poles had shown no desire to conclude the 1000-truck deal in its original form and the trucks originally segregated for the purpose had been returned to the general pool of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission: the Ambassador stated that the delay had been and continued to be due to the failure of the Poles to state what they wanted (860C.24/10-2545). In telegram 262, November 9, 4 p. m., to Warsaw, the Department concurred in the Ambassador's recommendation that the 3-year credit, without down payment, continue to be extended to Poland for the purchase of 1000 trucks (860C.24/11-945).

which has been cut off from normal communication with the US for almost 6 years. Furthermore I feel that my position vis-à-vis Polish Government would be strengthened following my return.

I recommend that I be instructed to proceed to Washington about Dec. 1st for consultation for a period not exceeding 10 days. If Dept concurs I would bring Lovell⁷² with me to arrange many administrative problems which confront us here.

LANE

860C.51/10-2245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane)

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1945—7 p. m.

263. Urtel 403 Oct 13. Dept at present inclined to view that in general, economic rather than political questions should be tied to Eximbank credit negotiations with foreign Govts. One of primary purposes advancing credits is to promote economic foreign policy framed to further economic interests this country. (See Deptel 130, Sep 21) Art VII Lend Lease Agreement contemplates agreements in accordance with principles stated therein which embody US economic foreign policy. Dept is of opinion that precedent of US-UK credit negotiations⁷³ should be followed with other applicants, namely that understandings should be arrived at concurrently with credit agreement, aimed at settling outstanding economic problems between two countries and at ensuring that borrower will not follow policies in international trade basically inimical to US economic foreign policy and thus to US interests. This would include supplying of pertinent economic data regarding details commercial arrangements with other Govts. Also important that credits should be advanced only under conditions that give promise of enabling borrower to service and repay them through normal processes international trade.

Dept inclined to view that when Poles raise question of credits again you should inform them that consideration of any credit presupposes satisfactory arrangements along lines above indicated. This would not preclude attaching political considerations to granting of credits (urtel 482 Oct 27), but until final determination this point Dept prefers to avoid linking political questions with credits except for you to imply that apart from the economic considerations, the granting of a credit may be seriously jeopardized if the record of the Polish Govt for the fulfilment of its obligations is impaired by

⁷² Alfred H. Lovell, Jr., Third Secretary of Embassy.

⁷³ For documentation regarding negotiations relating to the extension of credit to the United Kingdom, see vol. vi, pp. 1 ff.

a failure to adhere fully to its acceptance of the Yalta agreement and to its Potsdam commitment as to elections and its further Potsdam commitment as to the freedom of the Allied press. It would be appropriate to observe in this connection that if the policies of the Polish Govt should create conditions under which free and unfettered elections would be an impossibility, and this fact became known to the American people, under our system it could not be ignored by this Govt. when considering a Polish application for credits.

With reference to Polish plans of nationalization it is position of Dept (urtels 412 ⁷⁴ and 413, Oct 15) that this is an internal affair of Polish Govt, provided that in all cases where properties of American nationals are affected, directly or indirectly, by nationalization, adequate, effective and prompt compensation be made to American owners of properties concerned.

For your info arrangements referred to urtel 451 Oct 22 ⁷⁵ are going ahead as to other countries mentioned, but Eximbank is deferring all action on credits to Poland.

In view above Dept of course would not favor (urtel 431 Oct 18 ⁷⁶) any credits to be used for Polish army supplies.

Your comments would be appreciated.

BYRNES

860C.51/11-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, November 13, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 8:35 p. m.]

552. I agree fully with the Department that, in general, economic rather than political considerations should control the granting of Export Import Bank credits to foreign governments. The situation, however, related to the forthcoming request for probably half a billion dollars credit on part of Provisional Polish Government is not a normal one and is one which has far-reaching political implications which involve the very existence of Poland as a sovereign nation.

In accordance with Department's request, I submit my comments on views expressed in Department's 263, November 9, 7 p. m.:

1. Polish Government, being provisional by agreement with Yalta Powers, would naturally make political capital of receipt of credit for long range purposes which might or might not be approved by the Government constituted following the forthcoming elections. (As

⁷⁴ See footnote 32, p. 392.

⁷⁵ See footnote 34, p. 392.

⁷⁶ Not printed.

reported in my press telegram No. 550, November 12,⁷⁷ press announced economic delegation leaving for Washington to obtain credit for Polish reconstruction.)

2. There seems at present little if any hope of "normal processes of international trade" with Poland and I see no likelihood of the borrower being able to service and repay the credits as long as Polish economy is patterned along Soviet lines.

3. Extension of credit at this time when terroristic activities on part of Polish security police and Soviet NKVD⁷⁸ are taking place in all parts of country (telegram regarding recent trip of Military Attaché will follow⁷⁹ showing intolerable conditions in southeast Poland as result of complete Soviet domination and resulting terrorism in that region) would indicate acquiescence on our part in Government and Soviet acts against freedom of speech and other human liberties. Department will recall from my 403, October 13, that outstanding leaders in Krakow including late Vice-President Witos⁸⁰ expressed themselves to me accordingly.

4. The following local political developments as directed by Soviet controlled Government group indicate the trend towards a single list in the elections and a consequent muzzling of those who may not vote the Government ticket: limiting the number of parties to six,⁸¹ the announcement that a PPA [*PPR?*] and PPS will be united in the elections,⁸² virtual impossibility to obtain employment or lodging or UNRRA supplies except on open market for those not affiliated with government or with government controlled parties.

5. Perhaps the most cogent argument for withholding a credit to this regime at this time is that it is not master in its own house. It

⁷⁷ Not printed.

⁷⁸ People's Commissariat of the Internal Affairs (Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del), the agency of the Soviet Secret Police.

⁷⁹ Telegram 557, November 14, 11 a. m., from Warsaw; for a summary of this telegram, see footnote 63, p. 400.

⁸⁰ Polish Vice President Wincenty Witos died October 31, 1945.

⁸¹ In telegram 553, November 13, 3 p. m., the Ambassador in Poland reported having been informed by Jacob Berman that on November 5 a meeting of the Council of Ministers was held at which it was decided to limit the number of parties in Poland to the following six: Polish Workers' Party (the party of the Polish Communists), Polish Socialist Party (pro-Communist socialists), Polish Peasant Party (Mikolajczyk's party), Peasant Party (pro-Communist peasants), Democratic Party, and United Labor Party (the fusion of the two groups of the Christian Labor Party) (860C.00/11-1345). In telegram 528, November 6, the Ambassador had reported that Warsaw newspapers of November 4 carried the announcement of a decision of the Presidium of the National Council of the Homeland that the national social and political structure was sufficiently provided for by the already active political parties and attempts to establish new political parties would be opposed (860C.00/11-645).

⁸² In airgram A-386, November 14, the Ambassador in Poland reported that a resolution had been passed at a recent meeting of the Polish Socialist Party declaring that the Polish Socialist Party would combine its election tactics with those of the Polish Workers' Party with the aim of creating an election bloc of all "democratic parties" (860C.00/11-1445).

requires the Red Army here to maintain it in power. The Soviet Government obviously desires a puppet government here in order that Soviet effectual control of the country may continue to be exercised. It does not seem logical therefore, to assume that there is any possibility of holding free and unfettered elections with secret ballot as long as the Red Army remains in Poland. (It is understandable that Stalin may require two lines of communication between Soviet Union proper and Soviet occupied zone of Germany but it is unreasonable that there should be Soviet troops in every village which members of our staff have visited throughout the country and that in some sections as Stettin, Wroclaw, Poznan and southeast Poland the supreme authorities are Soviet.)

Under the circumstances, Department will appreciate that any credits extended to this regime will be under control, if not actually for benefit, of Soviet authorities who have been and are still moving eastward by train and by trucks huge amounts of material from Poland both from the east and west of Oder.

6. I reported in mytel 543, November 9, 1 p. m., that I had noted a liberalization of restrictions on freedom of press. I attribute this perhaps immodestly to our having hammered away regarding our displeasure over lack of personal liberty and repercussions which knowledge of such conditions would have in US and hence on possibility of Poland obtaining financial assistance. Despatches from American correspondents have perhaps been more helpful in this regard. I fear, however, that if we relax in our resistance, and certainly the extension of a credit would be interpreted as such, against the despotic rule which is now being perpetrated here we shall not succeed in fulfilling our publicly expressed policy: the maintenance of a strong, free and independent Poland.

LANE

860C.50/11-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, November 14, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received November 15—11:13 a. m.]

559. In interview with President Bierut November 14 I discussed Polish Economic Mission to Washington⁸³ and possibility of obtaining credits from US as follows: While we are most sympathetic to present difficulties which Polish Government is facing there are certain

⁸³ Headed by Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, this mission was officially described as intending to conduct conversations in the United States in the matter of obtaining credits for equipment and supplies for the rebuilding of the Polish economy.

conditions in country having relation to holding of elections which give us concern. According to our system, Government in considering extension of credits would be influenced by consensus of Congress and Congress would be affected by consensus of people. If American people felt that undemocratic processes obtain in a foreign country, the displeasure of the people would have an effect on our Government's position.

I said that I had been glad to report to my Government that I had noted the liberalization in restrictions on the press but that I regretted that I had had to report that there existed a continuance and even an increase of terroristic activities of the security police including arrests for political offenses. And although my Government had not as yet determined its position regarding credits in general it would not now extend credits for the use of Polish Army. I said that I interpreted this negative action as being indicative that we disapprove of terroristic activities of security police (Deptel 263, November 9). I said that I had only just received this word and that I wished to convey it to the President before anyone else in the Government should learn of it.

Bierut replied by saying that from 1936 to 1939 US extended credits to Poland even though Polish Government then was far less democratic than Government today. He referred to difficulties which Government had had in organizing police, that it had been forced to accept all volunteers without checking their ability or background and that many members of the police have been arrested and even executed as a result of their misdeeds. He said that only 6 months ago Poland was being overrun by fighting armies and that these factors should be taken into consideration.

I repeated that we have the greatest sympathy with Poland's present difficulties. We are, however, also deeply concerned with the holding of free and unfettered elections and I do not perceive how it is possible to have such elections if police continue to arrest political opponents of the Government and with the presence of the Soviet Army in the country.

The President replied somewhat heatedly that if Poland must accept an Allied Power's activity in the internal affairs of Poland as a price for economic assistance then Poland would prefer not to have such assistance. He immediately softened this remark by inquiring whether the US would like to receive assistance from even its best friend on terms which were not pleasant to the US.

I decided that it would be preferable not to carry on further this phase of the discussion it being perfectly clear that my point had been made.

I said that while we do not wish to suggest that elections should be held at any particular time the people of the US are, of course, very much interested in the holding of elections in Poland and that I have an obligation to report to my Government regarding conditions relative to the holding of elections in accordance with the provisions of the Yalta decision. I said, however, that I did not believe that free elections could be held as long as the Soviet Armies remain in Poland in the numbers which now exist. I expressed my understanding that Marshal Stalin at Potsdam had agreed to limit Soviet forces in Poland to the maintenance of two lines of communications. I added that there are far greater numbers. I and other members of my staff had traveled about the country and we had observed Soviet troops in command in almost every village. I specifically mentioned Colonel Pashley's recent trip to Southeast Poland (mytel 557, November 14⁸⁴).

The President replied that he of course would wish that there should not be one foreign soldier in Poland. But Poland is on very close terms with Soviet Union, is indebted to it and is not in a position to suggest that Soviet troops be withdrawn. There are, however, only one-third as many Soviet troops in Poland today as there were 3 months ago and certainly they are being reduced continually. In reply to my question he said he did not know how many troops were in Poland today. He said that at Potsdam the Western Allies did not wish Poland to extend its frontiers to the west but that Russia, of course, supported the Polish claims and consequently Poland is not in a position to complain regarding Soviet troops within the country. America he said is strong enough to be in a position to quarrel with Russia if it wishes but Poland is such a close neighbor that it is not in a position to complain.

I said that as President Roosevelt emphasized at Yalta we desire Poland and Russia to be on friendly terms and that certainly the US wishes to have the friendliest relations with Russia. I expressed hope therefore that Bierut would not heed reports circulating that US wishes difficulties and even war with Soviet Union. Withdrawal from Europe and demobilization of our forces is proof of our attitude.

I asked President whether in his opinion free elections could really be held in Poland if a foreign army were in occupation.

Bierut replied that, of course, it would be preferable if no Soviet troops whatever were here during elections but that it was shown both in Hungary and Rumania⁸⁵ that free elections can take place

⁸⁴ See footnote 63, p. 400.

⁸⁵ The general election in Hungary on November 4, 1945, appeared to be free from direct interference and resulted in a substantial defeat for the Hungarian Communists and their allies. See telegram 886, November 9, from Budapest, vol. iv, p. 904. No election, however, had been held in Rumania.

even with a foreign army of occupation present. As to Poland he felt sure that late spring or early summer when the elections will be held there will be a minimum number of Russian troops here.

Before taking leave of President I expressed concern regarding pressure either through terror or other economic means to force persons to join Government parties. I referred to difficulties of non-party members obtaining UNRRA goods and to recent specific instances in Hotel Polonia of discharging servants who refused to join Government party. The President admitted that abuses existed as in all countries but that as there are only 600,000 members of six recognized parties this charge must be untrue as 10 million people are benefitting from UNRRA supplies. He promised, however, to look into any specific case of injustice which I might bring to his attention.

I assured him that because of 72 percent interest of the US in UNRRA I am as interested as he in success of UNRRA Mission to Poland.

Sent to Department as 559, repeated to Moscow as 89.

LANE

860C.00/11-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, November 16, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received November 17—10:45 a. m.]

568. British Ambassador showed me yesterday despatch to Foreign Office dated November 14 which will probably leave for London 16th referring to action of National Council of Homeland in limiting number of political parties to six⁸⁶ (PPR (Polish Workers' Party) PPS (Polish Socialist Party) PSL (abr unknown⁸⁷) SL (abr unknown⁸⁸) Democratic Party and United Labor Party⁸⁹). In his despatch Bentinck refers to elimination from officially accepted parties Na-

⁸⁶ Regarding the limitations imposed upon Polish political parties, see footnote 81, p. 413.

⁸⁷ The abbreviation is for the Polish Peasant Party (Polska Stronnictwo Ludowe), the party of Mikolajczyk.

⁸⁸ The abbreviation is for the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe), the Communist-dominated peasant political organization.

⁸⁹ In his telegram 497, October 30, 4 p. m., Ambassador Lane reported having been informed that Karol Popiel had agreed to merge his Christian Labor Party with that portion of the same party headed by Zygmunt Felczak; the Ambassador further reported that the party would henceforth be called the "United Labor Party" as Felczak, who was a Communist, insisted on eliminating the word "Christian" (860C.00/10-3045).

tional Democrat Party⁹⁰ (originally party of Dmowski⁹¹ and Paderewski) and Social Democrat Party of Zulawski.⁹² Bentinck recommends that no representations be made regarding exclusion of these parties on ground that former has had fascist elements connected with it and that it has been anti-Russian in its outlook and that latter is of little importance due to poor health of Zulawski.

I told Bentinck that in my opinion limitation of parties is contrary to the spirit of Yalta Agreement and to agreement reached in Moscow⁹³ leading to formation of Provisional Govt of National Unity and that if we are to acquiesce in exclusion of a party merely because we do not think that inclusion would be wise from a political point of view, we could be faced with the same charge which is now being made against the Polish Govt of not permitting democratic parties to participate in the elections.

I suggested to Bentinck that he and I recommend to our respective Govts that they consult with one another as to whether it would not be preferable for the three Yalta Powers, or if this is not feasible, for the British and US Govts to protest to the Polish Govt regarding the arbitrary limitation of the number of parties in Poland on the ground that this is contrary to the spirit of the Yalta decision and the Moscow conversations.

Bentinck agreed to send a letter to Warner⁹⁴ of the Foreign Office giving my opinion and suggesting that it would be perhaps wise for our two Govts to consult in the matter.

I should be grateful if Dept would telegraph me whether it concurs in my views and, if so, what action it proposes to take in the matter.

Repeated to London as 76.

LANE

⁹⁰ Telegram 531, November 7, 9 a. m., from Warsaw, reported that the Polish security police had arrested numerous members of the National Democratic Party including five of seven signers of a petition requesting legalization of the party (860C.00/11-745). The National Democratic Party had been a major conservative political organization in Poland between the two world wars.

⁹¹ Roman Dmowski, member of the Polish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the founder and early leader of the National Democratic Party.

⁹² In October 1945, Zulawski announced the formation of a new socialist party, the Polish Social Democratic Party, so named to distinguish it from the Communist-dominated organization which had taken over the traditional socialist party label, Polish Socialist Party. The Polish Government, however, refused to legalize this Polish Social Democratic Party, harassed its members, and in December 1945, Zulawski concluded an agreement with the leadership of the Communist-dominated Polish Socialist Party whereby Zulawski's followers would join the legal socialist party as individuals.

⁹³ Regarding the agreement reached in Moscow on June 20, 1945, among Polish political leaders, see telegram 2218, June 21, from Moscow, p. 352.

⁹⁴ Christopher F. A. Warner, Counselor in the British Foreign Office and Head of the Northern European Affairs Department.

123 Lane, Arthur Bliss : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane)

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1945—6 p. m.

296. I am in agreement with reasons urtel 572, Nov 16⁹⁵ for revising suggestion urtel 543, Nov 9 for return to Washington about Dec 1.

On the basis of my conversation with Mikolajczyk⁹⁶ and in view of current developments, I consider that for the present it is essential for you to remain at your post in order to report without interruption on trends and developments in the country which, according to Mikolajczyk, seem to be moving slowly but surely in favor of the democratic elements. Your full, detailed and helpful reports are most useful in keeping the Dept informed of complex and changing Polish developments.

In connection with economic problems, I do not expect, under present circumstances, that we shall be in a position to grant any large-scale credits to Poland at this stage. On the other hand, consideration is being given to making available principally from surplus stocks certain types of goods, primarily trucks, bulldozers, port machinery, and perhaps farm draft animals or equipment. It is tentatively thought that credits thus extended might not exceed \$25 million, and would have to be for projects specifically approved by Embassy. It has also been proposed that a sum not exceeding this amount be devoted to a single outstanding reconstruction project, perhaps the equipment needed to restore one port. This would be apart from the Polish share of the Export-Import Bank short term cotton credit. Your comments would be appreciated.

Some such program, it is felt, without necessarily reducing Soviet influence in Poland, would tend to maintain a United States role there by letting the Polish people know that the United States has a real interest in Polish reconstruction, but would not necessarily contribute to the prestige of the present regime.

This action is contemplated on the basis of Mikolajczyk's earnest plea for limited quantities of this type of equipment, the furnishing of which he stated would be most helpful. Therefore, I do not anticipate that there will be any detailed credit negotiations here in near future regarding which we shall need your prior oral advice.

It is also realized that there are many administrative problems which remain unsolved in regard to your mission. You may be assured that

⁹⁵ Not printed; in this telegram the Ambassador stated that possible important developments in the local situation following Mikolajczyk's return from his trip to the United States convinced him he should remain at his post (123 Lane, Arthur Bliss).

⁹⁶ No record of this conversation found in Department files.

your recommendations in this regard are being given full consideration and every effort will be made to assist you in these matters.

If at a later date developments should warrant it, I might then ask you to come to Washington to discuss the Polish situation.

BYRNES

860C.00/11-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, November 28, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received November 29—2: 36 p. m.]

609. Captain Rucinski and Lieutenant Channey of our repatriation center at Dziedzice 30 kilometers north of Czech-Polish border have reported orally to me as follows regarding developments:

1. Repatriation DP's (displaced persons) from US zone virtually completed totaling 150,000. Remainder elect not to return to Poland.⁹⁷

3. DP's on arrival Dziedzice are given papers good for 2 weeks permitting them travel to their respective homes by truck plus 100 zlotychs [*zlotys*] for food. In addition Govt bank exchanges their occupation marks at rate of 50 zlotys for 100 marks (12 [apparent garble] for \$10.00 at current rate of over 400 zlotys to dollar).

3. Some DP's are forced to sign statement agreeing to work as informers for Security Police under assumed name. Form which was seen by above officers stated that penalty for divulging information is death. They personally saw two instances of forcible signing. In one instance signer broke down and begged them to help him return to Germany. Those who sign are imprisoned in cellars for 3 days or more and reimprisoned unless they bring in information after release. Security Police working under NKVD and under latter's technique.

4. In late October elections held in mines resulting in defeat of PPR candidates. PPR then called election void and in new election PPR candidate won. He and wife were murdered following day presumably by underground. Imposing funeral held all shops ordered closed about 6000 persons attending including Governor and staff guarded by militia with tommy guns. Following funeral three families suspected of complicity with underground were ordered out of their houses. Their three houses including all possessions inside were then burned to ground by Security Police.

5. Spirit of resistance of people growing in this region as during Nazi occupation. People friendly to United States but cannot under-

⁹⁷ For documentation regarding the negotiation of arrangements for the repatriation of Polish displaced persons from Germany, see vol. II, pp. 1187-1192, *passim*.

stand distribution of UNRRA supplies only to those with party affiliation. Officers were told it would be better not send anything.

Comment follows.

LANE

560C.20/11-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, November 28, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received November 29—12: 35 p. m.]

612. Although we had suspected previously that returning Poles would be terrorized on arrival in Poland the info contained in mytel 609, November 28, 11 p. m. [*a. m.*] is the first of a concrete nature which we have received. It is probably now too late to take action with respect to displaced Poles in our zone of occupation as it would appear from my informants that all or almost all Poles there who desired to be repatriated have returned to Poland. I believe, however, there are still some 13,000 Polish troops under US Army control in Italy for whose safety we have a responsibility.

While the Polish authorities have expressed resentment, at least in the case of the return of Polish troops under British control in UK, when asked to give guarantees that Poles repatriated will have personal liberty equal to that of any other Pole, I strongly feel that we are now justified in the light of the evidence (which for the safety of my informants must be kept top secret until they have terminated their mission and left Polish territory) to require of Polish authorities an undertaking that returning Poles will not be molested and will enjoy as complete liberty as any Pole already in Poland. The terms of such an undertaking if communicated orally by our authorities to each Pole about to return would have the effect of warning them of the danger which repatriation today entails and would relieve us of the charge, however unjustified, that we are in collusion with the Polish Security Police and NKVD in their terroristic activities.

In confidential and general discussion of above today with British Ambassador his attitude was "let's see what happens to 14,000 Polish troops" in Italy under British control when they return to Poland with their arms. Bentinck said that only this number out of 200,000 (including Poles from Middle East) had volunteered to return. I differ with this "let's see" attitude, as once troops arrive in Poland it will probably be too late for anyone to help them and I feel that we have a moral responsibility to those under our control. (Bentinck says Polish DP's from British zone arrived in Stettin and Gdynia only).

Because of highly secret nature of info on which above is based I have not repeated this telegram to Rome feeling that Department may first desire to discuss with War Department action to be taken.

Should Department feel it inadvisable to suggest to War Department that instructions be issued to our Commander in Italy, I recommend that I be authorized to convey to Polish Government the serious view which our Government takes of terrorist methods and that Professor Lange⁹⁸ be so advised. Lange as a self-avowed liberal will find difficulty in condoning such steps.

LANE

860C.51/11-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, November 29, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 8:50 p. m.]

614. Deptel 296, Nov. 24, 6 p. m. I am gratified that you agree with my position that under present circumstances we do not expect to be in a position to grant any large scale credits to Poland. As I have pointed out in recent messages, censorship of the press has been eased somewhat especially with regard to Catholic and Polish Peasant Party (Mikolajczyk's) papers. On the other hand, terroristic activities are increasing. I feel very strongly that any large grants on our part will be interpreted here as whitewashing or ignorance on our part of a Govt based on a Nazi or Fascist system of police control.

With respect to proposal to extend credits for surplus stocks such as trucks, bulldozers and farm equipment or draft animals I should not be opposed provided we were reasonably sure that this material would reach the peasants. I am pleased to note that these projects would be submitted to the Embassy for approval.

I heartily approve of the proposal to devote a similar sum to supply equipment for the restoration of one port. Such a proposal would not only indicate our desire to establish closer shipping ties with Poland but because of Soviet domination of the ports of Stettin, Gdynia and Gdansk it would serve notice that we do not approve of such control. It is possible that offer would be refused under Soviet pressure but such refusal would not detract from our prestige.

⁹⁸ Oscar Lange, Polish Ambassador Designate to the United States. A Pole by birth and a professor of economics, Lange came to the United States in 1934 and was naturalized in 1943. In August 1945, the Polish Provisional Government proposed Lange as Ambassador to the United States. *Agrément* for Lange's appointment as Ambassador was given on the understanding that he would relinquish his American citizenship. After a visit to Poland for consultation, Lange presented his credentials to President Truman on December 21, 1945.

There is general discontent throughout country regarding inability of public, except those holding highest category of ration cards, to obtain textiles. Unless there could be some proviso that cotton products will reach all of country regardless of ration priorities I believe it a mistake to extend even a short term credit for cotton. In addition to police methods Govt is using economic pressure to persuade population to join PPR and PPS through issuance of number one priority ration cards to their members.

As I do not wish to burden you with our administrative problems I am writing Durbrow a personal letter on this subject.

I trust that you will feel as suggested in the last sentence of your telegram that developments may perhaps in the spring warrant my being ordered to Washington. Even though the Dept may be able to evaluate situation from my cabled reports without oral consultation, it would be most helpful to me to be able to return to Poland with an exact understanding of your views as well as those of your collaborators so that I may be able faithfully to carry out your instructions.

LANE

860C.51/11-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, November 30, 1945—noon.
[Received December 1—2: 15 p. m.]

618. Deptel No. 263 of Nov. 9, 7 p. m. I informed Marshal Zymierski⁹⁹ Nov 29 regarding our inability to furnish credits for Polish Army. He expressed great disappointment.

Emphasizing I was speaking personally and not on behalf of my Govt., I expressed opinion that activities of secret police causing many arrests and much terror and even affecting American citizens might have had unfavorable effect on US Govt. I said that once it became known in the US that political arrests are as general as they are in Poland today prestige of Polish Govt would undoubtedly be adversely affected. Stating that I had previously brought this condition to the attention of President Bierut I expressed hope that Marshal Zymierski would do all in his power to put an end to present practices which are abhorrent to democratic people.

Marshal admitted to me that many arrests by security police had taken place. He mentioned recent unpleasant meeting between him and Radkiewicz, Minister of Security, when Marshal (although Vice

⁹⁹ Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski, Minister of National Defense and Vice-President of the Presidium of the Polish National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government.

President and Minister of National Defense) had called on latter. Marshal said that police had arrested cousin of his wife and that he was naturally furious. He admitted furthermore that because of suspicion that General Anders² had sent a courier to a certain house the whole house had been surrounded and that his wife's cousin although innocent had been one of those apprehended. Marshal said that cases like this must continue as long as Anders supported by Brit was encouraging armed rebellion in Poland against the Govt.

I quickly replied that British Govt like American Govt is wholeheartedly opposed to any armed rebellion and that both Bentinck and I had made this very clear in connection with insinuations which had been made to us inviting our encouragement.

Zymierski said that there are two sides to the picture: (1) the side which I see regarding arrests which he regretted but which he thought might be necessary and (2) the attempt of Anders to destroy discipline in the Polish Army (he cited case of Polish officer refusing to obey commands to place wreaths on tombs of Soviet soldiers on All Saints Day and acts of Polish soldiers desecrating graves of Russian soldiers).

He then launched bitter attack against British policy in not relieving Anders of his command but rather of increasing his prestige by permitting Polish troops proceeding to Palestine for political reasons to fight for the Arabs against the Jews. Zymierski said that if Polish troops had been brigaded with British he would have no objection but as they were under a Polish flag he felt that Polish Govt recognized by British should be consulted.

He said that General Modelski³ had proceeded to London to negotiate with British Under Secretary of War for return of Polish troops, that latter had pounded table and had told Modelski that the British Govt could insist on certain points and that there was no use arguing about it. Zymierski then ordered Modelski to return to Warsaw immediately.⁴ Marshal said he could not understand unfriendly atti-

² Lt. Gen. Wladyslaw Anders, Commander, II Polish Corps, in Italy.

³ Lt. Gen. Izydor Modelski, head of the Polish Military Mission which arrived in London in mid-October 1945 to take up with the British Government the question of the repatriation of Polish troops in England.

⁴ General Modelski and the Polish Military Mission returned to Warsaw in mid-November 1945. According to report of the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, John G. Winant, in his telegram 11732, November 8, 2 p. m., the British-Polish negotiations on the question of repatriation of Polish troops in England had deadlocked because the Polish Military Mission refused to accept the principle that all Polish soldiers expressing the wish to return home should be

tude of British Govt regarding repatriation Polish Army. He said that he was especially annoyed that the thirteen to fourteen thousand Polish troops now returning from Italy of which one thousand have already arrived at Katowice have come with very few officers. I suggested that perhaps officers might not be inclined to return. Marshal retorted that desire not to return was due to British and Anders' propaganda. He cited Anders as dictator controlling even civilian functions such as education of families of Polish Army abroad and imprisonment of officers and men holding divergent political views.

Although extremely bitter to Britain he appeared most friendly to US mentioning telegram of congratulations to General Eisenhower on his appointment as Chief of Staff⁵ and expressing hope that American Army officers would act as instructors in Polish military schools.

Zymierski promised to furnish me information justifying arrests of groups which he said were endeavoring to overthrow regime and he indicated despite disappointing news which I gave him regarding credits for Army utmost cooperation.⁶

LANE

860C.00/11-1645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane)

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1945—1 p. m

314. Urtel 568, Nov 16. While in principle Dept does not look with favor upon any limitation of political activities in Poland and will oppose any attempt to establish a unity front party system in Poland, it does not for following reasons feel that it would be advisable to protest limitation of Pol political parties as recently decreed by Council of Homeland: (1) the six political parties now established in Poland, if they are permitted to carry on their own campaigns and put forward independent platforms and separate lists of candidates, would seem to be representative of the principal democratic strata in the country; (2) because of the past record of Endeks⁷ it is not

transported to Poland. The Polish officials insisted on selecting a limited number of "technicians" who were urgently needed in Poland and leaving the question of the repatriation of others to be determined at some later time. (860C.20/11-845)

⁵ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower became Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, November 20, 1945.

⁶ Telegram 648, December 7, from Warsaw, reported that Rola-Zymierski had on December 5 again expressed his disappointment over the American refusal to extend credit for the purchase of uniforms, overcoats, and shoes for the Polish Army. The Marshal said he wished equipment for 50,000 and not for 350,000 as he first requested. Ambassador Lane reaffirmed that if Rola-Zymierski could put an end to the activities of the security police, American authorities would be willing to consider the Polish request in a much more favorable light. (860C.51/12-745)

⁷ National Democratic Party.

believed that we should put ourselves in a position of pressing for reestablishment of this party; (3) on basis of experience after last war, the fragmentation of political parties in many countries only led to instability of governments and worked against the adoption of constructive programs.

BritEmb will be advised re Dept's views as set forth above.

BYRNES

860C.00/12-445: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, December 4, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 7:47 p. m.]

628. Prior to receipt of Dept's 314, December 1, 1 p. m. British Ambassador had shown me telegram received from Foreign Office London indicating that Dept has had conversations with British Embassy Washington regarding limitation of number of political parties in Poland to six.⁸

As to the reasons advanced by the Dept for our not protesting against the limitation of the number of political parties to six I respectfully make the following comment:

(1) We understood that Zulawski as leader of the [apparent omission] exclusion on the ground that it is entitled to full political rights as one of the anti-Nazi organizations in accordance with the Yalta Declaration.

(2) As to the past records of Endeks, it has the reputation of having exposed the Sanacja. Undoubtedly the Russians would oppose the inclusion of this party on the ground that it has had an anti-Soviet orientation. Whether the National Democratic Party is of importance today is a matter of opinion but granted that even though it may not have the power which it enjoyed during the days of Grabski and Paderewski the fact that its members wish to enter into the elections entitles it to consideration from the point of view of democratic principles.

(3) In general however I feel it unwise to permit the Govt through an arbitrary decision to prevent the free development of democratic activity. Archbishop Sapiha recently complained to Keith that the limitation of the number of the parties is an illustration of the adoption of the Fascist idea which the Govt claims it wishes to eradicate. The British viewpoint seems to be that limitation of parties would be to the advantage of Mikolajczyk and his party and that Zulawski's health is so poor that he is no longer an important political figure.

⁸ See footnote 81, p. 413.

In a recent talk with Bentinck however he expressed agreement with my view in pressing for freedom for all parties and said he would request London to amend his instructions to the extent of authorizing him to make oral comment to this effect.

I trust that the Dept will reconsider its position in the light of the foregoing. I feel that by allowing the decision of the National Council of the Homeland to pass without protest we accept a responsibility of acquiescing in an action which in my opinion is undemocratic and contrary to the spirit of Yalta.

From a realistic point of view the limitation works in favor of the three stooge parties, PPS, SL and SD,⁹ all of which are practically directed by PPR and would facilitate the creation of united front party which the Dept states it will oppose. If we lose the opportunity to protest on this occasion our opinion will undoubtedly have even less influence on the next occasion when we may be called upon to voice it.

LANE

860C.00/12-545

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1945.

Participants: Mr. William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Janus Zoltowski, Polish Chargé d'Affaires
Dr. Ludwik Rajchman
(Present—Mr. Elbridge Durbrow, EE)

Mr. Zoltowski, the Polish Chargé d'Affaires, requested to see the Secretary in order to present a formal request for credits along the lines suggested by Vice Premier Mikolajczk when he talked to the President. The Secretary was unable to receive him and therefore arrangements were made for Mr. Zoltowski to call on Mr. Clayton. This afternoon Mr. Zoltowski and Dr. Rajchman called for the above purpose.

Dr. Rajchman explained at great length the needs of the Polish economy, stressing the fact that Poland needed 30,000 railway cars, primarily gondola cars, to handle coal shipments. He added that road building machinery, port facilities, certain raw materials and telecommunication equipment were also needed. He made a long plea for the granting of sufficient credits to purchase this type of goods in the United States.

Dr. Rajchman stated that he had been authorized by the Polish

⁹The Democratic Party.

Government to informally advise the United States Government that the Polish Government shortly would inform Ambassador Lane that it is prepared to make commitments regarding economic policy in conformity with the stipulations contained in article 7 of the lend-lease agreement. He added that the Polish Government had not and would not make any arrangements with any country which would give that country a monopolistic or privileged position in economic matters. He explained that while the Soviet Government had endeavored some time ago to work out an agreement which might have given it a privileged position, the Polish Government had not accepted this arrangement.

Dr. Rajchman also indicated that Poland had urgent need for fats. In this connection, he explained that because of the shortage of certain materials such as fats, the Polish Government had established a ration system, giving food to special categories of workers in the following order: 1) miners, 2) railway operators, 3) textile workers, 4) hospitals.

Mr. Zoltowski then presented an *aide-mémoire* (copy of which is attached)¹⁰ referring to the conversation Mr. Mikolajczyk had with the President on the question of credits. Mr. Clayton read the *aide-mémoire* and promised to look into the matter.

During the course of the conversation Mr. Clayton made no commitments whatsoever beyond the statement that he would look into the matter and hoped that despite the heavy demands from other sources it might prove possible to grant certain limited credits to Poland for specific purposes. He indicated that in all probability the credits would be small. Dr. Rajchman seemed to be surprised at these remarks but Mr. Clayton again reiterated that heavy demands have already been placed on United States credit facilities and, therefore, he did not anticipate that for the moment it would be possible to grant large credits to Poland.

ELBRIDGE DUBROW

860C.002/12-545

The Polish Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The President received in audience Mr. S. Mikolajczyk, Deputy Prime Minister of Poland, accompanied by Mr. J. Zoltowski, Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Poland,¹¹ on November 9, 1945.

¹⁰ *Infra.*

¹¹ For the Department's press release of September 11, 1945, announcing the appointment of Janusz Zoltowski as Chargé, which established official business relations in Washington with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 16, 1945, p. 400.

In reply to the President's questions as to the present economic and food situation in Poland, as to the progress of the work of reconstruction and as to Poland's most urgent needs in connection with rehabilitation and reconstruction, Mr. Mikolajczyk pointed out that the most urgent requirements fall under several headings:

a) a deficit in grain, expected before the August 1946 harvest, will be felt more acutely in early summer;

b) livestock was terribly depleted by the German occupation: horses are reduced by two-thirds, milk-cows by 60%, hogs by 70%, sheep by 90%.

As the result thereof milk had become a luxury, fats and meat are almost totally lacking, fertilizers have to be imported in vast amounts.

Tractors are needed in large numbers before the next sowing season.

The President was glad to hear there would be no famine in Poland during the winter months, as he feared, and expressed his desire to help Poland both by supplying tractors and grain to cover the needs during the two months preceding the harvest.

The President stated he will bring the above to the attention of the Secretary of State with the view of action being taken and instructed the Polish Chargé d'Affaires a.i. to communicate with the Secretary of State on these matters.

Continuing, Mr. Mikolajczyk stressed the urgent need of a rapid rehabilitation of the transportation system: there is a most critical deficiency of locomotives and freight cars; trucks, road building and road repairing machinery, railroad and motor car repair shops etc. are also needed.

Next in importance is the rebuilding of Polish ports, through which pass the UNRRA shipments and in the future will pass the bulk of imports of reconstruction supplies and of exports from Poland, especially coal. For this purpose dredges, scoops, cranes, etc. are urgently needed.

Third in urgency is the speediest possible rebuilding of cities, especially of Warsaw, which is beyond question the world's worst ruined capital. For this work rubble and debris removing machinery, bulldozers, steam-shovels, scoops etc. are urgently needed.

Fourthly, essential industrial equipment is required to enable the staple industries of the country to resume production on a scale sufficient to cover the domestic needs of the country.

Mr. Mikolajczyk added in conclusion that Poland was not expecting to receive all the supplies she needs as a gift, or in the form of relief, but that she was anxious to purchase them on credit extended by the

United States Government, on terms she could meet so as to be able to discharge her contractual obligations.

The President expressed great interest in Mr. Mikolajczyk's statement and declared that the United States will assist Poland as much as possible in her extremely difficult task of reconstruction, particularly by supplying on credit railroad rolling stock, motor trucks, tractors, harbor and road repairing machinery, and also equipment for clearing ruined cities and towns, especially "bulldozers".

The President reiterated his intention to discuss the matter with the Secretary of State and to request him to arrange for the extending of credits to Poland, so as to enable her to obtain supplies she urgently needs.

In concluding the audience, the President again instructed the Polish Chargé d'Affaires a.i. to call on the Secretary of State for the purpose of discussing with him the problem of credits and of supplies.

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1945.

860C.00/12-445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane)

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1945—7 p. m.

346. Dept has given further consideration to the points raised in your 628, Dec. 4, relative to decree limiting number of political parties in Poland.

In meantime Dept has learned from BritEmbs that BritAmb was informed by Mikolajczyk that he was not particularly perturbed by decree limiting to six the number of political parties in Poland and he feared that any effort made to restore Endek might be interpreted as an anti-Soviet move.

It is suggested therefore that you get in touch with Mikolajczyk to ascertain his views on this question. Unless Mikolajczyk advances good grounds for not taking such action, Dept feels that you should make oral representations in general terms along following lines: You should inform PolGov, without making specific reference to any political party, that US Gov feels that any limitation placed upon participation of all democratic parties in the elections is contrary to letter and spirit of Yalta agreement which provides for "the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible in Poland" and stipulates that "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates".

If you decide to make these representations you should concert with your Brit colleague who it is understood is to receive similar

instructions, but you should avoid giving impression to PolGov that we are making joint representations with Brit.

ACHESON

860C.00/12-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, December 19, 1945—midnight.

[Received December 21—3:15 p. m.]

693. Deptel No. 346, Dec. 13, 7 p. m. I talked to Mikolajczyk last evening re limitations of six parties. Mikolajczyk agrees that action of National Council of Homeland was unconstitutional and was contrary to letter and spirit of Yalta decision. He likewise agreed that if this action were allowed to pass without protest encouragement would be given for further limitation of parties by arbitrary action of Council.

Mikolajczyk said, however, that while he agreed in principle with our views he was fearful that if the Council should accept our protest and rescind its act of limitation Govt might create formation of further number of parties to draw votes from Mikolajczyk's party. Mikolajczyk said, however, that he is confident if elections are fair his party has an ample majority regardless of formation of other parties.

The fact that it may be to Mikolajczyk's own interest that there is a limitation of parties should not in my opinion deter us from expressing our views on a matter of principle. I feel we should at all costs avoid the impression that we are backing Mikolajczyk. Such an impression of course would not be warranted but if allowed to circulate would react against the interests of Mikolajczyk's party.

I informed Mikolajczyk that I intended to call on President Bierut prior to Dec 29 when next meeting of Council takes place and express our views. He interposed no objection.

Report on remainder of my conversation follows in my telegram 694, Dec 19, 1 p. m.¹²

I have shown above to British Ambassador who says that in view of our intention to confine our protest to an oral statement he will also request audience with Bierut and if not deliver note (mytel 654, Dec 12, 1 p. m.¹³).

LANE

¹² *Infra.*

¹³ Not printed; it reported, *inter alia*, that the British Ambassador had shown Ambassador Lane a draft note to the Polish Foreign Ministry which he proposed to deliver under instructions from London protesting the limitation imposed upon the number of political parties; the British Ambassador was deferring delivery of the note until Ambassador Lane received instructions from the Department to take parallel action (860C.00/12-1245).

860C.00/12-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, December 19, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received December 21—4:11 a. m.]

694. Mikolajczyk and his secretary Sibdak had long talk with Keith and me December 18.

Mikolajczyk said that censorship of his papers increasingly strict and that important parts of speeches which he made at Lodz Bydgoszcz and Lublin had not been allowed publication in any paper. These speeches countered attacks of Gomulka that Mikolajczyk is Trojan Horse of reaction. In speeches Mikolajczyk referred to underground work of PSL (Polish Populist Party) during entire war and pointed out that Lublin group was not even known in Poland prior to 1943.

Mikolajczyk expressed great apprehension regarding terrorism by security police. He referred to murder in Lodz of Polbiorek, General Secretary of PSL. He said that Scibiorek and Kojder, another prominent member of PSL, were murdered by security police. Latest outrage at Drujec between here and Radom was shooting of four prominent citizens two of PSL. One, however not killed and escaped. Mikolajczyk has protested violently to Govt regarding present conditions and implied clearly to us that even his life is now in danger but that "it would be impossible to kill all the peasants in Poland". He said that in past week as a result of his protests, terrorism has abated but that it may recommence at any moment.

Mikolajczyk says that PPS and Zulawski have reached an agreement by which Zulawski's followers may join PPS (Polish Socialist Party) as individuals but not as a group. Mikolajczyk says that this is victory for PPS which despite its minority among Socialists will be able to retain control. He said that PPR (Polish Workers Party) and PPS are endeavoring to persuade Mikolajczyk to join a bloc of parties "to ensure unity". (Mytel No. 693, December 19, noon [midnight?] re limitation of number of parties). Mikolajczyk has deferred making a reply saying that this matter will have to be discussed at PSL meeting which starts January 17. He intimated to us, however, that he will refuse to join bloc as his [this?] would be a step towards a single list. Mikolajczyk says that Osubka-Morawski and Szwalbe have argued that if PSL does not join bloc, and a Govt unfriendly to Soviet Union should be elected, Soviet armies will take over the country (this report appears to be generally circulated by Govt probably in order to intimidate public).

Mikolajczyk expressed belief that elections might take place earlier than had been supposed. He is convinced that Govt does not desire return of Polish troops from abroad prior to elections and that the

few who have returned from Italy have been kept out of Warsaw although those who were members of International Brigade in Spain were given official reception here. As 60 days' notice must be given before holding of elections they cannot be held prior to latter part of February. He referred to great unpopularity of Govt because of excesses committed and because of continued presence of Soviet armies. Although Marshal Zymierski boasted to him of having sent Soviet officers and men back to Russia many officers are being replaced by Russians in Polish uniforms. Feeling against Russia continually increasing due to economic domination of Poland and presence Red Army.

Mikolajczyk says that despite majority of PSL he has been offered over [*only?*] 35% representation in National Council of Homeland and that there is no representation of PSL in Presidium of Council. His request that his party be given Vice Minister National Security in order to put an end to terror was refused.

Mikolajczyk indicated that his interview with Allen of AP should not be taken too seriously. He said that interview was with a large group and questions asked were most embarrassing (mytel No. 666, December 13, 5 p. m.¹⁴).

Keith and I were impressed by Mikolajczyk's serious view of general situation and by his evident intention to fight vigorously for his party's rights.

Sent Dept as 694; repeated Moscow as 103.

LANE

860C.00/12-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, December 21, 1945—noon.
[Received December 23—5:15 p. m.]

700. [To Berlin:] Urtel No. 110, December 13, 11 p. m. repeated to Department as 1255.¹⁵ Although Polish Government both publicly and in private conversations with me has emphasized its desire that Polish Army abroad should return I am firmly of the opinion that such is not the case. My opinion which coincides with that of my British colleague is based on continual obstacles which Polish Government is placing on the return of Polish Army in UK and the

¹⁴ Not printed.

¹⁵ Not printed; it reported that the immediate families of Polish soldiers in Italy and Germany were fleeing Poland where they were in constant fear of arrest and deportation because members of their families were among the unrepatriated Polish troops; Berlin asked for information regarding the attitude of the Polish Provisional Government towards such emigration as well as with regard to the repatriation of Polish military units in Europe (860C.01/12-1345).

complaints which they have made regarding the manner in which small numbers of Polish troops in Italy have been returned to Poland.

As to the troops in UK 23,000 have volunteered to return to Poland and shipping space has been furnished by British Government. Note written by British Ambassador to Foreign Minister over 2 weeks ago was not answered; therefore, Bevin took up matter with Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Modzelewski now in London. Bentinck tells me that this conference brought no definite results. Bentinck informs me in strict confidence that British Government now intends to ship 23,000 to Gdynia and will disembark them there whether Polish Government is willing or not. As to troops in Italy Marshal Zymierski said to me that they will be returned on his terms and not on those of General Anders or the British Government.

It is evident to me from the foregoing and from remarks which have been made to me by high personages in the Polish Peasant Party that Government does not desire these troops who may be unfriendly to the present regime in Poland before and during the elections.

Sent to Berlin as 165 repeated Department as 700 to London as 87 and Moscow as 106.

LANE

860C.00/12-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, December 22, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received December 23—2: 27 p. m.]

704. Mytel No. 701, Dec 21, 6 p. m.¹⁶ President Bierut received me this morning. Foreign Minister Rzymowski was also present.

I informed President that I had instructions to express point of view of my Govt that action of National Council of Homeland in limiting number of political parties in Poland is contrary to letter and spirit of Yalta decision. I said that I was making these observations with respect to a principle rather than with regard to any specific party.

Bierut retorted that it is not customary for foreign govt to interfere in the political internal affairs of another country. He said that we would consider it irregular if the Polish Ambassador in Washington should officially object to the fact that there are only two parties in the US.

I replied that in the US there is no limitation on the number of parties and that further the Polish Govt had no responsibility with

¹⁶ Not printed; it reported that Ambassador Lane had arranged to be received by President Bierut (860C.00/12-2245).

respect to the American political system while we on the other hand have a direct responsibility under the Yalta Agreement which was the precursor to the formation of the Polish Govt.

Bierut said that his Govt was set up as a result of conference in Moscow between various Polish factions and was not due to the pressure of any one power.

The President said that the principle which I had brought up is not applicable today as Zulawski has agreed to join the Socialist group and that there were no applications from other parties pending. He said, however, that in the event that Zulawski should have asked to form a separate party the Govt would have declined. Bierut said that because of absence of applications to form new parties he considered my Govt misinformed and he wondered why I should make observations for this reason. I agreed that my observations might have no immediate practical effect but that at this moment my Govt wished to emphasize the principle involved.

He concluded the interview by requesting that I inform my Govt that Poland has strictly adhered to the principles of the Crimean Decision.

I did not consider it advisable to argue with Bierut further as to our responsibilities under the Yalta Agreement. It is of course obvious that if free and unfettered elections are to be held the principle should be admitted that any democratic and anti-Nazi party should be permitted to organize and to take part therein. Both Tonesk and I had the impression that Bierut wished to impress Rzymowski with his strict attitude towards us for the President at one point in the conversation became distinctly disagreeable. The meeting however ended amicably.

Sent to Dept as 704, repeated to Moscow as 108.

LANE

860C.20/11-2845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Poland (Lane)

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1945—7 p. m.

367. Dept has given consideration to the questions raised in your 612, November 28, relative to plight of Poles who have returned to their homeland from the west.

Dept feels that it is in our interest to encourage as many Poles as possible to return in order to assist in reestablishing a free, democratic Gov. Mikolajczyk for the same reason also expressed the hope that as large numbers as possible could return. Moreover, the PolGov has expressed a desire on many occasions to have all Poles from the west

returned. So there is no disagreement as to objectives. On the other hand, apart from information contained urtel under reference re treatment accorded Poles on their return, Dept has noted information contained in Berlin's 110 to you of December 13¹⁷ indicating considerable emigration from Poland due to alleged ill treatment by Pol authorities.

It is suggested, therefore, that you take a suitable opportunity orally to express to PolGov the following views: US Gov desires in every way to facilitate and encourage all Poles in areas under its control to return to Poland. Practical difficulties arise in carrying out the repatriation program because of reports being circulated alleging mistreatment of Poles who have already returned to Poland. Effective action on part of US authorities to assist in this matter would be greatly facilitated if PolGov would give straightforward assurances backed by a cleancut public statement that all Poles returning from abroad would be welcomed as loyal citizens and accorded equal opportunities and given same privileges as their countrymen who remained in the country during the war. You might add that since a considerable number of Poles have been able to make their way from Poland into the American zone in Germany for the alleged reason that they were in jeopardy if they remained in the country, it would be desirable from the point of view of the PolGov to make a categoric statement that any persons returning will be accorded equitable treatment.

Dept does not feel that it would be advisable at this time to tie in this suggestion with information you have received regarding terrorist acts allegedly committed against Poles returning from the west. You might at a later date let it be known that reports of this kind have reached you which, whether true or not, are not conducive to encouraging Poles to return from abroad.

ACHESON

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND RESPECTING RECIPROCAL PRIVILEGES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL, EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED AT WARSAW OCTOBER 5 AND 30, 1945

[For text of agreement, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1544, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2297.]

¹⁷ See footnote 15, p. 433.

PORTUGAL

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PORTUGAL REGARDING AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND SERVICE TO EUROPE THROUGH PORTUGAL, EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED AT LISBON MARCH 27, 1945

811.248/1-1345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal
(Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945—8 p. m.

82. The War Department desires to obtain the permission of the Portuguese Government to make landings in Lisbon of planes of the Air Transport Command on regularly scheduled flights from the United States to Paris and Rome. As Mr. George¹ is thoroughly familiar with this project he is being sent to Lisbon, accompanied by Colonel Payne,² to assist you. They expect to leave Washington the morning of the 16th by transport plane and to proceed via Casablanca.

GREW

811.248/1-1945 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Dickerson) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, January 19, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 9:39 p. m.]

128. George and I called on the Secretary General of the Foreign Office³ this afternoon by appointment in order that George might present to him the desire of the American Government as set forth in Deptel 82, January 13. Prior to making this appointment, an informal approach had been made to Salazar⁴ through his secretary in order to ascertain the method by which he desired to have the question, of which we understood Bianchi⁵ had already informed him, placed before his Government and he had indicated that it should first be discussed with Sampayo.

¹ William Perry George, Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.

² Lt. Col. Robert G. Payne of the Air Transport Command.

³ Teixeira de Sampaio.

⁴ Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of Portuguese Council of Ministers, and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ João Antonio de Bianchi, Portuguese Ambassador in the United States.

During the conversation with Sampayo, an appointment with Salazar was sought at which time George and Payne might present the matter to him more fully. Sampayo could, of course, give no definite time but indicated that he believed such a meeting might probably be set for next Wednesday.⁶ He said he would report the conversation to the Prime Minister at once but that he was quite sure it would be impossible to arrange the visit sooner.

George exposed the purpose of the proposal frankly and fully and Sampayo seemed neither surprised nor to find the proposal disagreeable. On the contrary, he seemed interested and asked a number of questions to which replies were furnished in a manner to leave him in no doubt as to the true character of our wishes. For example, he inquired as to the type of cargo these transports would carry through Portugal and specifically whether in addition to relief supplies, et cetera, it was proposed to carry military supplies. George replied in the affirmative and said that what was desired was agreement to the routing of ATC planes through Lisbon in the same unrestricted manner as on existing routes. Sampayo did not shy at this and gave the impression of being familiar at least to some extent with the character and operations of ATC. He brought up the inevitable question of neutrality and stated that the political issue would be the important one. George remarked that Portugal, of course, was officially neutral, but inquired whether it was not true that an initial departure from neutrality had been made when the Azores agreement⁷ was signed with the British, and whether at that time Germany might not from a juridical standpoint have taken the position that Portugal was no longer neutral. Sampayo made a gesture of acquiescence. George then observed that the operations in the Azores, both in Terceira and in Santa Maria, were distinctly of a military character and that the Azores were a part of metropolitan Portugal, politically and administratively. He said that, therefore, there was in fact no difference between conducting such operations in Portugal, in Europe, and in the Azores. The only difference was that operations here would be more visible, but both Germany and Japan knew of the operations in the Azores and had commented lately in their radio broadcasts on the more secret of the two operations, namely Santa Maria. Sampayo agreed, but added with a smile that the Prime Minister has his own way of drawing fine lines and is much more juridically-minded than he (Sampayo). George said that if Germany had not reacted either following the British-Azores agreement or the more recent establish-

⁶ January 26.

⁷ Agreements between the United Kingdom and Portugal concerning facilities in the Azores, signed at Lisbon, August 17, 1943, and November 28, 1944. For texts, see British Cmd. 6854: *Documents Constituting Agreements Concerning Facilities in the Azores*.

ment of our operations in Santa Maria,⁸ this evidently had not been because of any fear of being offensive, but was rather because Germany had an interest—at this point Sampayo interrupted to finish George's sentence by saying "Yes, Germany has the interest of keeping open her window to the Atlantic."

Sampayo said that, of course, the operation in Santa Maria was directed against Japan, and that Portugal had an interest of its own in Santa Maria from that standpoint.

George said that we might consider Lagens then, instead of Santa Maria, or that we might bear in mind that to us there was only one war and that Santa Maria was an instrument directed against Germany as well as Japan. He assented, saying, "In effect, yes". George did not wish to leave him in any doubt concerning operations through Santa Maria and stressed the point that there were two documents, the Timor note⁹ and the Santa Maria agreement, and that whereas Sampayo had been thinking of the Timor note, the agreement itself spoke of unrestricted use. Sampayo agreed.

DICKERSON

811.248/1-2645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Crocker) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, January 26, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 6:20 p. m.]

182. ReEmbs 128, January 19, 7 p. m. Dr. Salazar, who received George and me last evening, appeared receptive to the ATC proposal to fly into Europe via Lisbon provided a formula could be found "in keeping with Portugal's correct attitude toward the belligerents". The problem was soluble if it could be fitted into Portuguese neutrality from which, he said once more, Portugal could not deviate for mere reasons of opportunism.

The Prime Minister's many questions regarding the character of traffic crews, plans, destinations, legal setup of ATC, et cetera, revealed his receptivity if the service could be justified on humanitarian grounds (reconstruction rehabilitation). He took pains to discover whether the cargo flown for the Armed Forces was combat material (e.g. guns, munitions) or intrinsically material for the comfort or well being of personnel (e.g. food, medicines, clothing, et cetera). He was also interested in knowing what facilities ATC would require of

⁸ For documentation regarding efforts of the United States to obtain certain military privileges in the Azores, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1 ff.; for text of agreement signed November 28, 1944, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2338*, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST)*, vol. 2 (pt. 2), p. 2124.

⁹ See telegram 2678, October 6, 1944, 4 p. m., to Lisbon, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 76.

Portela Airport and whether existing runways and equipment would be adequate.

As was to be expected he also inquired how the Pan American exclusive contract would be affected and he was informed that the matter had been fully discussed with the company in the United States and that no difficulties were perceived in that direction by Pan American.

During the course of the general discussion the Prime Minister referred to the civil air agreement entered into between Spain and the United States¹⁰ and inquired whether the proposal now before him was intended to supplant a possible agreement of this kind with Portugal. He was informed that on the contrary the question of such an agreement with Portugal was now under consideration and that it was hoped to approach the Portuguese Government on this subject in the near future. This was however a matter not connected with present proposal.

The Prime Minister promised to take the problem under immediate advisement but suggested that he might need some further data and clarification before giving a reply. It is our impression that the Prime Minister will have something to say by the time George returns from Madrid, probably within a week from today.

CROCKER

811.248/1-2945 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 29, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received January 30—5:40 p. m.]

215. For Hickerson¹¹ from George. "At the end of our meeting with Doctor Salazar last Thursday,¹² which I understand has been reported by Crocker, the Prime Minister stated that our discussion of the proposal to bring the ATC through Lisbon into Europe left but one point requiring clarification. He said that should he be able to assure himself that the cargo to be transported through Lisbon by ATC planes would not be for direct military use there would appear to be no difficulty. I take it that Salazar means to go into a huddle with himself on this one point, as we made it quite clear to him that the cargo to be carried will be largely military, and that he expects to come back to us with the result of his reflections. In the previous discussion he had made it clear that he was distinguishing between

¹⁰ Air Transport Services Agreement, signed at Madrid, December 2, 1944; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 432, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1473.

¹¹ John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs.

¹² January 25.

supplies for our military establishment in Europe of general character and supplies for direct military use such as guns and ammunition.

In meeting Salazar I was accompanied and ably assisted by Crocker, Payne, and Walmsley.¹³ Doctor Salazar had his own interpreter and Walmsley served as interpreter on our side. The conversation was conducted in part through the interpreters in Portuguese and English and in part in French direct.

Butterworth took Payne and me this morning to our first meeting with Lequerica.¹⁴ This conversation was almost entirely in English and we used no interpreter. Lequerica seemed entirely receptive and stated that the policy of Spain today is to cooperate in every way possible with the United States and that General Franco¹⁵ is firm in his desire to conduct foreign policy in a manner to bring Spain nearer to us. The Foreign Minister said he favored the proposal in principle and would take it up with General Franco without delay.

There was an inevitable loss of time in Lisbon due to Salazar's absence from the city and it has therefore not been possible to confine my visit to the peninsula to one week. I mention this as it has been somewhat on Payne's mind and I hope you will agree that I should remain a few days more in Spain at the disposal of Lequerica for any further clarifications of our project following his meeting with Franco. [George.]

BUTTERWORTH

811.248/2-2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour)

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1945—7 p. m.

344. For George. Reference your telegram 401 of February 21.¹⁶ The Department, ATC, and War Department have approved the following views:

(1) It is not desired that all traffic from North America to Europe and return which might fly over Portuguese territory should be forced to stop at Lisbon since it is conceivable that this traffic may terminate at other points. Consequently, authorization to overfly Portugal without a stop at Lisbon is desired but overflight rights are not considered definitely essential if they would jeopardize consummation of the agreement. It is agreeable that we should not load or discharge cargo or passengers at Lisbon without the consent of the Portuguese Government. The payment of a nominal landing fee is satisfactory

¹³ Walter N. Walmsley, Second Secretary of Embassy.

¹⁴ José Felix Lequerica, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁵ Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

¹⁶ Not printed.

so long as the charges are reasonable. Although all aircraft will be unarmed, the crews will be in uniform and as long as there is a definite understanding that they are actually military, no objection would be voiced to subsidiary 4 of paragraph 1. You should remind Portuguese that many of the passengers will be in uniform but can be confined to the airfield limits.

(2) We cannot accept the apparent Portuguese wish to limit Santa Maria traffic. Our agreement with Portugal provides for unrestricted use and control of Santa Maria airport. We, therefore, must insist upon the separation of this problem from the issues involved in flying over Portugal. As a solution, Department is agreeable to the Portuguese, if they so desire, considering our regular use of Santa Maria as "in the emergency cases considered in the existing agreement" provided no prohibition or limitation of our rights of user in Santa Maria is incorporated in the written agreement. Further to aid you, within your discretion you might point out advantages to Portugal of having frequent schedules operating into Lisbon, reminding them that flights can be routed directly from Azores to Madrid without greatly increasing flight distance or sent from Azores to Paris non-stop.

(3) It must be recognized that any service by ATC cannot be inaugurated until facilities and improvements necessary for our operation are completed. It is doubtful that Portuguese have either facilities, equipment, or personnel with which to effect immediate improvement of the airport and installation of communications to permit early institution of service. Although the Portuguese may expect our support and the Department is willing to recommend allocation of the required construction machinery and equipment, details as to its source, manner of its shipment and immediate availability inevitably will cause delay. You should endeavor to obtain permission for military personnel in civilian clothes who might be considered the specialized technical personnel to undertake necessary construction and installation of facilities.

(4) Apparently Portuguese recognize their limitations and are seeking to effect some cover arrangement to accomplish installation and operation of communications and weather facilities. It is suggested that their national position can be preserved by organizing Portuguese company which will contract with AAF¹⁷ for installation and operation of these facilities with specialized technical personnel. Portuguese communications services have been notoriously inefficient, and to insure safe operation ATC must insist upon expeditious and accurate communications services. In any event ATC must have

¹⁷ Army Air Force.

operational control of the facilities and must be responsible for code security.

(5) We agree that all spare parts and all material generally inherent to aircraft operation will not be for national use and can remain in customs bond. However, it should be pointed out that this arrangement can become very onerous in practice. It is assumed that we will have cooperation of Portuguese officials to permit withdrawals for 24-hour operation.

(6) It is assumed that the special system of police formalities at the airport will be comparable to the arrangement with the Spanish.¹⁸ Provisions respecting transit traffic are acceptable, but likewise should be similar to Spanish arrangement.

(7) Air Transport Command must maintain operational control over its own ground crews. There is no apparent objection to having them come under the general disciplinary rules of the airport so long as this does not hinder our operation.

(8) It is suggested that termination date of agreement should be stated in terms comparable to Article III of the agreement for construction and use and control of the airport on the Island of Santa Maria:¹⁹ "This agreement shall terminate within 6 months after the termination of hostilities or the signature of an armistice with powers with which the United States is at present at war in the Far East". If Portuguese insist on 30 June 1946 termination date you should make it clear that ATC must effectively control and transmit its communications until their need for operations ceases. You should take into consideration evacuation and redeployment in this regard. This may or may not be the same time as the cessation of hostilities in Europe or a signed armistice with Germany. It should be mentioned to the Portuguese that redeployment is directly related to operations in the Far East.

GREW

811.248/2-2445 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Crocker) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, February 24, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3:55 p. m.]

429. Culbertson and Hickerson from George. ReEmbs 401, February 21, 7 p. m.²⁰ Crocker and I saw Sampayo again at his request on the 22nd and in this conversation it was evident that a deadlock had been reached. Sampayo asked me nevertheless to call another

¹⁸ See pp. 724 ff.

¹⁹ See TIAS No. 2338, or 2 UST 2124.

²⁰ Not printed.

meeting with the Portuguese Technical Committee. I told him I would do so because he advised it but not because I felt any useful purpose could be served. Payne and I consequently met the Committee again the following day and it was immediately evident that neither side had anything to offer. I told them I had asked for the meeting simply because Sampayo had advised it and for no other reason.

We nevertheless took advantage of the opportunity to go over again the question of meteorological and communications services. We made no progress.

Following the meeting I drafted a personal letter to Sampayo reviewing the position in some detail and stating that I evidently had over-estimated Portugal's interest in what I considered a very substantial and important opportunity—the material opportunity to develop and establish Lisbon on a main air route into Europe, and the moral opportunity to cooperate with us in the enterprise with which he was familiar. I said I had reached this conclusion reluctantly and was disappointed but that as agreement had not been reached on a fundamental point and as our problem was an urgent one no other course remained but for [me?] to return home at once and recommend that the ATC draw its plans along other lines than those projected. This note was delivered immediately, and I booked passage to leave Lisbon this morning. At 7 o'clock yesterday evening the Foreign Office contacted me and asked me to cancel the passage and see Sampayo again today.

I have just had a final conversation with Sampayo in which we reviewed again the fundamental question of communications. I said that the Portuguese Government had been interested in a principle, the principle of permitting or not permitting us to communicate secretly. The Government had concluded that we might communicate secretly, but only while the war continued in Europe. In other words, the qualms over this question of principle had been overcome, but strangely subjected to a time limit. I had always understood Portugal was interested in the war in the Pacific but Portugal was now in the position of asking us to reveal our secrets to the Japanese. That was what it amounted to, as the Japanese would be delighted to have the information concerning ATC movements. I said the Portuguese Government had always boasted of its logic, but that in this question there was a complete lack of logic and I would never be able to understand the position assumed.

I told him again of my distress at Portugal's casting aside this opportunity and added that it would make my position in Washington no easier. I said he would understand this. I needed arguments, and the Portuguese Government was depriving me of arguments by deny-

ing us satisfaction on what was really a very simple question. He said he realized this and that he would have another talk with the Prime Minister today. He would repeat to Salazar all of our conversations and would try to produce some light. I told him I probably would leave on Monday morning ²¹ and thanked him for his courtesies. The old man was very touching in saying good-bye to me and I got the impression that he himself sincerely wished to find some solution.

I do not think there is anything further for me to add here and I plan to return home without further delay. [George.]

CROCKER

811.248/3-645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Portugal (Crocker)

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1945—6 p. m.

388. The ATC draft agreement containing the changes quoted in your telegram no. 510 of March 6 ²² is satisfactory subject to the following provisions:

1. The Portuguese Government will liberally interpret paragraph 1, section 4, which reads "they shall be unarmed and crews shall be civilian". If it is understood that the "Civilian Crews" will actually be unarmed, military personnel in uniform as explained in Deptel 344 February 23 to Madrid repeated to Lisbon, there would be no objection by ATC or the War Department.

2. Paragraph 2 of draft reads in part "will not land at Santa Maria unless in emergency cases considered in the existing agreement". If the liberal interpretation mentioned in your reference telegram allows ATC to operate into Lisbon with all aircraft presently authorized to land at Santa Maria there would be no objection.

3. Section 3 of the draft reads in part "United States Government agrees to render all aid necessary to the Portuguese Government". This statement is too broad. The State and War Departments and ATC are agreeable to giving all possible assistance and support to any requests for necessary machinery and materials, but no assurance can be extended regarding their immediate availability.

If these questions can be solved to your satisfaction by assurances of liberal interpretations, or alteration of the text of the draft, you are authorized to conclude the negotiations by a simple exchange of notes containing the draft agreement.

Please communicate the foregoing to Payne.

GREW

²¹ February 26.

²² Not printed.

811.248/3-1745 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Crocker) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, March 17, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 4:40 p. m.]

596. ReDeptel 422, March 15, 4 p. m.²³ I called on Sampayo last evening and informed him that section 2 of the ATC draft agreement was not satisfactory. He stated that he had heard something to that effect from Ambassador Bianchi but that the telegram was not entirely clear. I explained to him that the American Government was unwilling to depend for its use of Santa Maria for ATC operations upon the assurances that a liberal interpretation would be given by the Portuguese Government to the "emergency" use of that field.

Sampayo stated the problem from a Portuguese point of view as follows: If the ATC were a military operation, he acknowledged our right to use Santa Maria but stated that in such event, permission to use the territory of metropolitan Portugal for such traffic would cut across Dr. Salazar's conception of Portuguese neutrality. On the other hand, if it were a commercial airline, while the use of the Lisbon airfield would present no difficulties, we would be excluded by the Santa Maria agreement from using that field. I observed that I felt this was creating a dilemma where none in fact existed; that for purposes of reaching a solution, it would be perfectly simple to recognize that the proposed ATC operation was neither a military nor a commercial one and that by considering it as merely a government-operated service, it should not be difficult to grant the desired permission to operate both through Santa Maria and through metropolitan Portugal.

I said that we had at no time from the very outset concealed that both military materiel and personnel would be carried in ATC planes but that as the planes would not be armed, although the crews and personnel would be in uniform, the operation as a whole had been accepted by the Portuguese as non-military in character. On the other hand, there was no question of its being a commercial enterprise.

At this point Sampayo asked me whether in my private opinion the agreement might fail if we were unable to find a solution on the point under discussion, to which I replied frankly that I had no doubt of it. He then asked whether it would be considered that Portugal would be harming American interests and contributing to a prolongation of the war if the right to use Santa Maria were not granted and I replied in the affirmative. Thinking out loud he then wondered whether a formula might be devised for him to

²³ Not printed.

submit to the Prime Minister which would grant us the right to use Santa Maria for emergency landings on the basis that the ATC service constituted an exceptional case. To this I replied that if they were prepared to grant the use of Santa Maria, it would be necessary to do so without any qualifying phrase involving the use of the word "emergency"; that if an exception could be made it should be granted without any strings to it. I said that in seeking a solution of the character which he had suggested, it should be, however, clearly understood that no feature of the ATC agreement must be considered as establishing principles or precedents for guidance at a later time; that in making this observation I had in mind future conversations looking toward a civil air agreement.²⁴ He agreed that the two matters were entirely separate.

Sampayo then stated that he would take the matter up immediately with Dr. Salazar and would let me know the result.

Colonel Payne has not yet returned.

CROCKER

711.5327/3-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Crocker) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, March 22, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

630. Dr. Salazar has at length proffered the following approved draft in substitution for the present draft of article 2 of the proposed ATC agreement:

Translation from Portuguese: "Notwithstanding the stipulation in the existing agreement relative to the Santa Maria airport, which continues in full force, the Portuguese Government in view of the very special governmental character of the service entrusted to ATC which is the object of the present agreement, gives its consent during the life of the latter that the aircraft referred to in the preceding article which have to land in the Azores and are intended eventually (*eventualmente*) to form connections through Europe with the Orient may by special exception utilize that airport."

Although we have endeavored during the past 5 days without success to obtain a simpler and more straightforward statement than the foregoing, we feel that it nevertheless meets our requirements and should be acceptable.

²⁴ An Air Transport Agreement between the United States and Portugal was signed December 6, 1945. For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 500, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1846.

The Department will note that during the life of the agreement (a) it eliminates the undesirable element of dependency upon Portuguese interpretation of the word "emergency"; (b) removes any question of limitation as to the use of Santa Maria for future movements to the Far East by ATC planes; and (c) places no restrictions in practice upon use of Santa Maria by ATC planes proceeding to and from Europe. (ReDeptel 422, March 15, 4 p. m., 2d paragraph.²⁵)

Sampayo was at great pains to explain that Dr. Salazar insisted upon including the words "eventually to form connections through Europe with the Orient" in order to furnish himself with a juridical basis however tenuous upon which to justify his cession to United States of the use of Santa Maria for ATC aircraft through Lisbon. This is, of course, illogical reasoning as the opening words of the draft substitution excepts the existing Santa Maria agreement from consideration in this connection. However, we feel there is nothing further to be gained by contesting this point and accordingly recommend its acceptance in this form. In discussing this point Sampayo observed that we were not bound by any undertaking with respect to when such service should be extended to the Orient.

Incidentally, I took occasion in talking with Sampayo today to reaffirm that the proposed ATC agreement was not to be considered as establishing any precedent in future discussions regarding commercial aviation. In fact, I remarked that I did not wish to conceal from him the fact that we would expect to discuss the use of Santa Maria in connection with a civil air agreement to which he replied frankly that this question was not a closed one.

Payne is reported to be ill and has not yet arrived.

CROCKER

811.248/3-645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Portugal (Crocker)

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1945—noon.

471. The draft ATC agreement modified as indicated in your 510, March 6,²⁶ and with the substituted article 2 quoted in urtel 630, March 22, is acceptable to the Department, ATC, and War Department. You are hereby authorized to conclude negotiations by an exchange of notes.

GREW

²⁵ Not printed; the second paragraph instructed the Chargé not to conclude agreement until article 2 requesting limitation of traffic through Santa Maria was altered (811.248/3-1245).

²⁶ Not printed.

811.248/3-2845

*The Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Salazar) to the American Chargé in Portugal (Crocker)*²⁷[Translation]²⁸

LISBON, March 27, 1945.

MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: Inasmuch as the Portuguese Government and the Government of the United States have agreed, pursuant to the request made by the latter, on the terms under which the Air Transport Command plan may be carried out through Portuguese territory in Europe, I hereby inform you on behalf of the Portuguese Government that the enclosed document and annex thereto²⁹ constitute the said agreement, which will enter into force on the date of this note and an identical note from you on behalf of the Government of the United States.

I avail myself [etc.]

SALAZAR

811.248/3-2845

*The American Chargé in Portugal (Crocker) to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Salazar)*³⁰

No. 971

LISBON, March 27, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: The Governments of the United States of America and of Portugal, having concluded an Agreement upon the terms for the operation through Portuguese territory in Europe of the Air Transport Command service, I have the honor, acting upon instructions from my Government, to confirm that the enclosed document and annex thereto constitute the above-mentioned Agreement which will take effect immediately upon this exchange of notes between us.

Please accept [etc.]

EDWARD S. CROCKER

[Enclosure]

Agreement Between the United States and Portugal Regarding Air Transport Command Service to Europe Through Portugal

Considering the terms of the request of January 25, 1945 whereby the Government of the United States seeks landing rights in Lisbon for A.T.C. aircraft in the European service;

Considering President Roosevelt's decree of 24 October 1944 in which he authorized those (A.T.C.) aircraft to augment its existing service by taking over civil transport under regulations similar to those

²⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 1650, March 28, from Lisbon; received April 6.

²⁸ Translation supplied by the editors.

²⁹ See enclosures to note No. 971, *infra*.

³⁰ Copy of note and annexes transmitted to the Department in despatch 1650, March 28, from Lisbon; received April 6.

applicable to aircraft of private enterprises, for as long a period as these latter enterprises are unable to satisfy the necessities of commercial traffic; and

Considering, on the other hand, the Portuguese Government's pledge to aid, whenever the rendering of aid is possible in the prosecution of the policy it has always defended and supported, activities of relief or reconstruction in areas affected by the war and the reestablishment of economic or other activities disorganized by the war and which are necessary to the rapid restoration of normal peacetime conditions;

The Portuguese Government and the Government of the United States agree on the following:

1—A.T.C. aircraft coming from North America to Europe and returning, for the above ends, are permitted to fly over Portuguese territory on the European continent under the following terms:

1st) In flights over Portuguese territory in Europe planes must land in Lisbon;

2nd) They shall not discharge or load passengers or freight except at the request or with the consent of the Portuguese Government in each case;

3rd) They shall pay those charges established by Portuguese laws and regulations which correspond to the services utilized, on a non-discriminatory basis;

4th) They shall be unarmed and the crews shall be civilian.

2—Notwithstanding the stipulation in the existing agreement relative to the Santa Maria airport, which continues in full force, the Portuguese Government, in view of the very special governmental character of the service entrusted to A.T.C. which is the object of the present agreement, gives its consent during the life of the latter that the aircraft referred to in the preceding article which have to land in the Azores and are intended eventually to form connections through Europe with the orient may by special exception utilize that airport.

3—Recognizing, for the execution of this agreement, the necessity of constructing certain repair shop or spare parts storage facilities, installing certain equipment, or making certain general improvements, the Portuguese Government shall, in the shortest possible time, meet these requirements.

For the utilization of these installations there shall be levied such charges or rents as may be established by the Portuguese Government on a non-discriminatory basis.

For the execution of the work outlined in the first paragraph of this article, the United States Government agrees to render all aid necessary to the Portuguese Government for the acquisition of the required machinery, equipment and materials.

4—The protective services of radio and meteorology shall be Portuguese under the conditions as set forth in the preceding article; the

United States Government agrees to authorize the Portuguese Government to contract such specialized technical personnel as may be considered necessary, both for the installation and subsequent operation of the required equipment.

5—Spare parts and, in general, all materiel inherent to aircraft will remain in customs bond since they are not for national use.

6—Transit traffic, since it does not leave the zone of customs control, will not be subject to the payment of customs duties; as for police formalities there will be accorded a special system of facilities.

7—The A.T.C. will be authorized to employ its own ground service crews who will be subject to the general airport discipline rules.

8—This accord will remain in force until 30 June 1946 unless the traffic can be turned over to private enterprises before this date.

If the traffic is returned to private enterprise before that date, this accord shall terminate as of date of such return.

LISBON, March 27, 1945.

ANNEX TO AGREEMENT

In view of the transitory and exceptional nature of this service, the Portuguese Government shall agree with the United States Government to safeguard the security of the equipment furnished, in accordance with its classification, and of the communications which are to be used only for the service of A.T.C. aircraft.

All meteorological data that can be released without prejudice to security will be furnished currently and promptly to the appropriate Portuguese authority.

All communications equipment not of a strictly secret character which has not been already acquired by the Portuguese Government in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement will be turned over to the Portuguese Government upon the termination of this Agreement at a reasonable cost price to be fixed by the two Governments. During the life of this Agreement, Portuguese technicians will be given full instructions with reference to the use and operation of such equipment.

LISBON, March 27, 1945.

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN OBTAINING USE OF AIR BASES IN THE AZORES AND CAPE VERDE ISLANDS IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

[For documentation on this subject, see volume VI, section under United Kingdom entitled "Representations by the United States to the United Kingdom for Support in Obtaining Overseas Bases".]

**AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
PORTUGAL, SIGNED DECEMBER 6, 1945**

[For text of agreement signed at Lisbon and exchange of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 500, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1846.]

**REESTABLISHMENT OF PORTUGUESE SOVEREIGNTY AND CONTROL
IN TIMOR³¹**

740.00119 P.W./8-1445

The Portuguese Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

WASHINGTON, [August 14, 1945.]

The negotiations conducted by the Portuguese Government with the United States and United Kingdom Governments, looking to the organization of an expedition to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timôr, have been overtaken by the impending surrender of Japan. The task of the Portuguese expeditionary force will thus, most probably, no longer be one of reconquest, but of mere occupation, without necessity of a training site or a point of concentration to start operations. In view of this, the Portuguese Government proposes to take the following measures:

Warships are to be sent to Timôr with the minimum of delay: "Aviso" (sloop) of 1st. class, the *Bartolomeu Dias*, will leave Lourenço Marques without delay and a second "Aviso" of 1st class, the *Alfonso de Albuquerque*, will sail in about 10 or 12 days upon completion of repairs now being undergone in dock in the Union of South Africa. Two "Avisos" of 2nd class now at Lourenço Marques will follow shortly.

In view of the uncompleted arrangements with the United States and United Kingdom Governments for transportation facilities for the troops, it has been decided that these shall be shipped on two Portuguese merchant vessels. One, the *Angola*, is in Portuguese East Africa, and the other, the *Sofala*, is on her way there.

Whether the ships sail all together or separately will depend on whatever indications the Portuguese Government may then possess regarding the eventual reaction of the Japanese troops on Timôr. If these, against all reasonable expectations, should be inclined to offer resistance, the Portuguese Government would then have to request American and British support in accordance with the framework

³¹ For documentation in 1944 regarding participation by Portugal in the war in the Pacific, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff. For earlier documentation in 1945 on this subject, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 1349 ff.

of the terms already discussed for application in the event of Portuguese Timôr's having to be reconquered.

740.00119 P. W./8-1745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, August 17, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 6 : 17 p. m.]

1749. Mathias³² just called Crocker³³ to FonOff and told him that he received the Jap Minister last night on behalf of Dr. Salazar.³⁴ The Jap told him that Tokyo had just informed him that the Jap Military Commander at Timor was being instructed to restore the Portuguese Governor in Timor to complete authority, to hoist the Portuguese flag and to place himself and troops under the Governor's orders for the purpose of maintaining order until such time as the troops could be withdrawn.

Mathias replied to him and is cabling Bianchi³⁵ substantially as follows:

The information was interesting but under the circumstances now existing was meaningless, pointing out that the Portuguese had no confirmation that (a) the orders had been given (b) that they had been received and (c) or if received that they had been executed. Mathias further told Bianchi to inform the Dept that under the circumstances the Portuguese hoped that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be willing to consider the departure of a Portuguese sloop with a small contingent of troops from Lourenço Marques yesterday as the first Portuguese step in fulfillment of the direct contribution toward the liberation of Timor envisaged in the Timor agreement.³⁶

It is clear that Dr. Salazar's present serious concern is to establish a juridical and moral basis upon which Portugal can seek invitation to participate in eventual Far Eastern settlement. This point of view was discussed at some length in an exposition made by Mathias to the British Chargé and Crocker late yesterday afternoon. Both the British Chargé and Crocker reserved comment and suggested that the presentation of this point of view be made through Palmella³⁷ and Bianchi respectively.

³² Marcello Mathias of the Portuguese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

³³ Edward S. Crocker, Second Secretary of Embassy in Portugal.

³⁴ Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³⁵ João Antonio de Bianchi, Portuguese Ambassador in the United States.

³⁶ For text of agreement between the United States and Portugal establishing form of indirect participation of Portugal in operations in the Pacific, signed at Lisbon, November 28, 1944, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2338*, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 2, (pt. 2), p. 2124. For documentation relating to the agreement, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.

³⁷ Duke of Palmella, Portuguese Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

The essence of the Portuguese position appears to be that Dr. Salazar wishes to make the point that Portugal has done and is doing everything possible to fulfill its undertaking under the Timor agreement and that it is through no fault of her own that the departure of Portuguese troops to the Far East has not taken place before this.

BARUCH

853F.00/8-1745

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Culbertson)*³⁸

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1945.

Dr. Garin³⁹ informed me on Wednesday⁴⁰ that the Portuguese Foreign Office had been informed by the British Ambassador that the British approved the Portuguese request to send warships to the Far East in order to take over Portuguese control of Timor. The British authorization was for these warships to proceed to Colombo.

A radio news item this morning stated that the Japs have announced that arrangements have been made with the Portuguese to turn over control of Portuguese territory to the Portuguese authorities. Dr. Garin has no information on this news item.

P[AUL] T. C[ULBERTSON]

740.00119 PW/8-2045

The Portuguese Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In order to re-establish order, rebuild communications and bring civilian and administrative activities back to normal, not to speak of supplying the population with the essentials of life, it is imperative that Portuguese troops urgently re-occupy Portuguese Timor.

In the hypothesis of a peaceful re-occupation, it is the opinion of the Portuguese Government that the operation should still fall under the general scheme of things in the Far East; it should therefore be integrated in the framework of agreements already reached with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by the fulfilment of the applicable provisions of those agreements. Now, in such a hypothesis, Portugal would be able to do without the allocation of a training site; she would not need military and other supplies; and she would be able to provide her own transportation facilities for the troops of occupa-

³⁸ Addressed to Director of the Office of European Affairs Matthews and Assistant Secretary of State Dunn.

³⁹ Vasco Vieira Garin, Counselor of the Portuguese Embassy.

⁴⁰ August 15.

tion. There would no longer exist, therefore, the only difficulties which, according to the most recent answer from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, still remained to be solved by later agreement among the interested countries. It would thus greatly simplify matters if the United States Government or the Combined Chiefs of Staff were to consider the announced departure for Timor of Portuguese warships as the first step in the sending of an expeditionary force, which would follow without delay.

On the other hand, there is the possibility that the Japanese should be disposed to offer resistance. In the event that this were to be verified, operations of the kind envisaged for the hypothesis of a reconquest of the island would be necessary, and Portugal would count on the support and collaboration of the Allied Powers in accordance with agreements already reached, in the conditions and at the time, that is, that the Combined Chiefs of Staff prescribe. In this hypothesis, it would be of pressing importance to conclude all necessary arrangements with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Finally there is always the possibility that even before the arrival of the Portuguese warships and expeditionary force, the Japanese on the island will have restored full powers of control to the Portuguese authorities in Timor, according to the announced orders of the Japanese Government. In this case, the situation would not be substantially altered since, once the territory had been re-occupied by Portugal, the supervising control of the Japanese forces by the Allies would offer no difficulty, as the liaison or necessary agreement could be arranged.

The aforesaid is, in the view of the Portuguese Government, the only practical way of solving the question in the prevailing circumstances./.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1945.

811.34553B/8-2445

The Portuguese Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The position of Portugal regarding the war with Japan and the reconquest or re-occupation of Portuguese Timor being a matter of frequent reference, it may be of interest to summarize its phases and implications.

As far back as June 23rd, 1943, when the Portuguese Government communicated to the British Ambassador in Lisbon their assent in principle to the British request for facilities in the Azores, they made

clear their resolve to participate in any operations for the reconquest or re-occupation of Portuguese Timor.

On October 4th of the same year, just before the Azores agreement with Great Britain was put into effect, the British Embassy in Lisbon was handed a memorandum in which the Portuguese Government repeated their desire and intention of participating in operations to liberate Timor and requested information regarding the best way of handling the matter and settling in detail the practical execution of whatever agreement might be reached.

The answer of the United States and British Governments was not forthcoming until July 7th, 1944.⁴¹ In it, Portuguese participation in eventual operations connected with the reconquest or re-occupation of Portuguese Timor was accepted in principle, and the conditions governing it were to be defined in subsequent conversations between the General Staffs.

As was informally communicated to the Portuguese Government at the time, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, when they met at Cairo, were of the opinion that Portugal's most important and immediate contribution to the war against Japan would be the granting of certain further facilities in the Azores, among them the concession of a major air base to the United States.

The way was thus paved for the Staff Conferences which began in Lisbon on September 18th, 1944, and wound up with the drafting of a document containing the Portuguese proposals regarding the co-operation of Portuguese military forces.⁴²

Meanwhile negotiations were being conducted in Lisbon for the grant to the United States of facilities in the Azores connected with the war in the Pacific; they resulted in the agreements of November 28th, 1944, with the United States and Great Britain in which: (1) both these Governments formally accepted and agreed to the participation of Portugal in whatever operations might eventually be undertaken to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor; (2) it was recognized that this participation would be in two forms: "direct" by the use of Portuguese forces, and "indirect" by granting to the United States an air base in Santa Maria for the purpose, expressly mentioned in the agreements, of facilitating the transfer of American forces to and from the Pacific theatre.

Simultaneously, an agreement was signed between Portugal and the United States giving effect to the concession of facilities on Santa Maria.

⁴¹ See telegram 2109, July 7, 1944, 7 p. m., from Lisbon, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 44.

⁴² See telegram 3043, October 2, 1944, 7 p. m., from Lisbon, and following documents, *ibid.*, pp. 73-84.

This "indirect" form of participation was, and is being, scrupulously and faithfully carried out. Its great value was repeatedly emphasized during the negotiations leading up to it. For instance, Ambassador Norweb told the Secretary General of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 25th, 1944, that the greatest, and indeed invaluable, assistance which Portugal could render in the war against Japan would be to facilitate the passage of airplanes to the Far East; and on May 23rd, 1944, the Ambassador, in conversation with Dr. Salazar, again emphasized that the "indirect" collaboration Portugal would provide through the airfield at Santa Maria would be of precious value in the Allies' struggle against Japan. On the latter occasion Ambassador Norweb referred to the desire of the United States that Portugal be represented at the peace conference dealing with the settlement in the Far East, where her interests of Macao and Timor should be defended and her position upheld, and he mentioned the mutual advantages of such representation. Similar statements were made at the State Department to the Portuguese Ambassador in Washington.

The Portuguese Government, thus, long since made clear their intention of collaborating in operations for the reconquest of Timor, and, since the Santa Maria agreement, their participation in the struggle against Japan was an effective one: "indirectly", by virtue of concessions in the Azores; "directly", by virtue of the preparation and concentration of an expeditionary force, in accord with the plans drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff, which had only been awaiting the opportune moment and order to place itself under the Allied Command.

Consequently, in the war operations against Japan, Portugal's role was integrated with the United Nations through the agreements concluded with the United States and Great Britain and her right to participate, as she has traditionally and consistently done, in conferences or acts regarding the settlement of Pacific problems is once more fully established.

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1945.

740.00119 PW/8-1445

The Department of State to the Portuguese Embassy

MEMORANDUM

With reference to the Portuguese Embassy's recent communication on the transportation of Portuguese troops to Timor, and after consultation with the American military authorities, the Embassy is informed that there is no objection by this Government to the reoccu-

pation of Portuguese Timor by Portuguese troops, subsequent to the formal Japanese surrender. Since Timor is in an area of British Commonwealth responsibility for surrender and occupation operations, the details concerning the Portuguese expedition should be arranged between the Portuguese and the British Commonwealth commander.

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1945.

753F.94/9-1045

The Portuguese Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Counselor of the Japanese Legation in Lisbon informed the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the evening of the 8th instant, that according to a communication from his Government the Governor of Portuguese Timor re-assumed full control of the administration of the whole colony on the 5th of September. This was done in accordance with a previously announced decision of the Japanese Government.

One hundred and ten Japanese soldiers under the command of a Japanese police officer were left with their arms and remained at the orders of the Governor to insure public order.

As the Portuguese radio station had been destroyed by a previous bombing, radio facilities are being restored by the use of a Japanese Navy set to operate under the orders of the Governor, and are expected to be available on the 10th instant. It is therefore hoped that from that date direct communication will be established with Macau and with the sloop *Bartolomeu Dias*, now at Colombo on its way to Timor.

It was explained that the delay between the time when the Japanese Government decided on the surrender in Timor, a decision made known to the Portuguese Government on the 16th of August, and the time when that surrender actually took place, was caused by the great difficulty in communications with Timor and by the activity involved in the preparations for the general surrender.

The Counselor of the Japanese Legation emphasized that orders for the surrender in Timor were issued prior to the act of general surrender officially declared by Japan./.

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1945.

853F.01/9-1245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Crocker) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, September 12, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 9:25 p. m.]

1924. ReEmbs 1904, September 10.⁴³ This afternoon Mathias called me to Foreign Office to say that Australian Foreign Minister's Deputy in London told Portuguese Ambassador on September 10 his Government wished to land Australian troops on Portuguese Timor immediately. Invoking Santa Maria-Timor agreement and pointing out that their agreed-upon direct participation in liberation Timor has been delayed through no fault of their own, Mathias expressed his Government's deep concern at this Australian proposal. He emphasized Portugal's desire to regain military control of Timor with Portuguese troops now en route. Portuguese Government is fully prepared formal surrender should be made by Japanese forces on Timor to Australian Delegation either in Timor itself or elsewhere. Stressing Portuguese sovereignty and sensibilities, however, Mathias made it abundantly clear Portuguese would resist by every diplomatic means at their disposal landing of Australian or other foreign troops on this territory.

British have been called in to receive similar emphatic representation and are placing matter before London. Palmella is likewise being directed to state Portuguese position to Australians in London.

Portuguese represent matter as of utmost urgency and have solicited our good offices. We may, therefore, expect them to importune us for an early expression of Department's views.

Sent Department; repeated London as 444.

CROCKER

740.00119 PW/9-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 15, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

9498. We were told today by Foreign Office official directly concerned Portuguese affairs that Portuguese Foreign Office also protested to British Embassy Lisbon against Australian decision to accept surrender Japanese in Portuguese Timor. British Foreign Office official said that in British view two issues are involved, namely, permanent Portuguese sovereignty over Timor which British do not ques-

⁴³ Not printed; the Chargé reported that the Foreign Office had informed him that Portuguese control had been reestablished in Timor (851F.01/9-1045).

tion and acceptance of Japanese surrender which Portuguese as neutrals could not properly undertake. He said British had decided to let Australians and Portuguese settle matter between themselves and that conferences were opened yesterday in London between Evatt⁴⁴ and Portuguese Ambassador. Australians will insist on accepting surrender either in Timor or on a warship off shore. British feel that Portuguese will ultimately yield on this point and expect conferences will end next week. They feel Portuguese protest was largely for the record and should be attributed to Salazar's excessively legalistic outlook.

Sent to Department; repeated to Lisbon as 203; repeated to Canberra as 1.

WINANT

740.00119 PW/9-1745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1945—7 p. m.

8075. On instruction from his Govt Portuguese Ambassador has asked Dept to support alternatives proposed by Portuguese Govt in place of Australian plan of landing Australian forces forthwith to accept Japanese surrender of Portuguese Timor.

Alternatives were said to be (1) surrender ceremony to be on an Australian cruiser in Dili Bay (2) surrender to be effected on Australian territory (3) delegation of Australian officers without any forces to join in acceptance of surrender on Timor itself.

Consideration of these alternatives is question for appropriate British Commonwealth Commander since Timor is in area of British Commonwealth responsibility for surrender and occupation arrangements, but Dept feels obliged to express its concern at proposed Australian action. Dept trusts British Government will agree with following views and will place matter before Australian Govt in such a way that latter will agree to respect spirit of commitments necessarily entered into as part of the common war effort. These call for Portuguese participation in expelling the Japs and, by inference, in surrender and occupation arrangements.

US-Brit Timor notes gave assurance of participation of Portuguese troops in any expedition to expel Japs from Portuguese Timor and Dept therefore feels that any untoward delay in arrival of Portuguese troops in Timor would be unfortunate in light of very definite language of the agreements, in exchange for which US and British Commonwealth obtained valuable facilities in the Azores.

⁴⁴ Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs.

While landing of Australian forces in Portuguese Timor in number beyond that strictly necessary for formal acceptance of Japanese surrender and assurance of security would not be contrary to Santa Maria-Timor agreements of 28 Nov 1944, such action would seem to be unjustified since there is now no question of forcibly expelling the Japs. Timor notes said that purpose of operations agreed to therein was the restoration of the territory "to full Portuguese sovereignty", and presence of excessive number of Australian troops is incompatible with that objective. Presence of any large number of Australian troops does not in any case appear to be necessary to maintain order since Commander in Portuguese Timor has already surrendered his troops to Governor of colony and Governor has been in full control since Sept. 5, according to information given by Portuguese Government. Moreover, Portuguese troops are on way to the Colony. Portuguese Govt has offered to cooperate fully in evacuation of surrendered Japs.

Incidentally, Portuguese Embassy in Washington was informed on August 27 that there was no objection by the US Govt to the reoccupation of Portuguese Timor by Portuguese troops, subsequent to the formal Japanese surrender, although it was stated then that since Timor was in an area of British Commonwealth responsibility for surrender and occupation operations, details concerning the Portuguese expedition should be arranged between the Portuguese and the British Commonwealth commander.

Communicate foregoing urgently to FonOff and say that we are instructing Embassy Lisbon (reference its tel 1924 September 12 rptd to you as 444) to inform Portuguese Govt of our position as outlined above and that we may even be obliged later to state our position publicly.

Sent London as 8075; repeated Lisbon as 1513 and Canberra as 99.

ACHESON

740.00119 PW/9-1945

The Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, September 19, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 12:40 p. m.]

1962. Governor of Portuguese Timor reports only one Japanese officer and 130 men now in colony. All of the other Japanese have gone to Dutch part of island. Governor also reports that administrative life of colony completely reestablished and that by September 21, civil reoccupation all points will be completed.

Two Portuguese warships and one transport left Colombo direct for Timor 2 days ago. Another warship and transport are ready to

leave Lourenço Marques for Timor direct and await only authorization British Admiralty.

Sense of Department telegram 1513, September 17⁴⁵ conveyed orally to Mathias [of] Foreign Office last night who extremely pleased our attitude. Formal communication will be made today.

BARUCH

740.00119 PW/9-1945: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal
(Baruch)*

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1945—6 p. m.

1524. Yesterday there was given orally to Bianchi substance of Deptel 8075 Sept 17 to London (rptd Lisbon as 1513) for communication to Ptgse Govt. You may inform FonOff orally while specific alternatives proposed by them are for discussion with Brit Commonwealth authorities, we have emphasized to Brit Govt our support of the Ptgse desire for solution which would give effect to spirit of Santa Maria agreements and that we are hopeful such a solution will be found.

ACHESON

740.00119 PW/9-2045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, September 20, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received September 20—2: 44 p. m.]

1970. Foreign Office was informed orally this morning of the substance of Deptel 1524, Sept 19, and Mathias renewed his expressions of satisfaction at the position taken by the US Govt stating at the same time that Salazar had also indicated his own satisfaction therewith. As Deptel 1524 specified oral statement of our position, formal communication mentioned in last sentence of Emtel 1962, Sept 19, has not been made. Mathias made it clear that Portuguese would like if possible to receive a note setting forth our position in this matter, feeling that it would be useful for the record and of benefit to our relations. Provided the Dept perceives no objection, Embassy considers it would be helpful if this suggestion of Mathias could be met and would appreciate Depts telegraphic instructions.⁴⁶

BARUCH

⁴⁵ Same as telegram 8075, September 17, to London, *supra*.

⁴⁶ The Department replied in telegram 1539, September 21, 4 p. m., that it believed that oral communications already made were sufficient (740.00119 PW/9-2045).

740.00119 PW/9-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Australia (Minter) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, September 21, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 1 p. m.]

148. Informally advised that Evatt at London made directly with the Portuguese Government amicable arrangements for handling Timor question. Hence last week Commander of Jap forces on the whole island went to Koepang, Dutch Timor, and surrendered to the Australian Commander there all his forces on the island, which forces said now to be straggling into Dutch territory. Australian Commander has asked permission of the Governor of Port Timor to land with a small force for relieving Australian nationals, the tending of graves, and the taking over of Jap matériel. He is now on a Corvette proceeding Dilli with a political advisor from External Affairs.

Portuguese troops said to be one week's sailing from Dilli and Minister for External Affairs advises me they expect Australian Mission to have departed before such troops arrive.⁴⁷

MINTER

⁴⁷ Portuguese troops arrived in Timor on September 28.

RUMANIA

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO ASSURE THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN RUMANIA ¹

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/1-445: Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary
of State*

BUCHAREST, January 4, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received January 5—9:10 a. m.]

11. On informing me that the French Government desires to exchange full diplomatic representations with Rumania since the two states have never been at war, the Foreign Minister ² took the occasion to urge once again a cobelligerent status for his country.

He stated since the armistice ³ "Rumania has received only a series of discouragements"; instead of the 12 divisions requested under the armistice the country maintained 14 in the front line fighting Germany and Hungary; troops suffered heavy losses because of lack of equipment; Italy had attained cobelligerent rank ⁴ although contributing proportionately less to the Allied effort than Rumania; and finally Bulgaria which had signed the armistice ⁵ later than Rumania had an official diplomatic representative in Moscow.

In light of repeated statements by Rumanian leaders concerning cobelligerency including suppressed press statement of the Prime Minister ⁶ (see my No. 82, December 30, 9 p. m.⁷) I would be interested to receive an indication of Department's attitude on the question.

BERRY

¹ For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 233 ff.

² Constantin Visoianu.

³ For text of the Allied Armistice with Rumania, signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1712; for documentation regarding the negotiation of the armistice, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 133 ff.

⁴ Regarding the recognition of Italy as a cobelligerent in the war against Germany, see the joint statement by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin concerning the declaration of war by Italy against Germany, October 13, 1943, Department of State *Bulletin*, October 16, 1943, p. 254. For documentation regarding the recognition of Italy as a cobelligerent, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. ii, pp. 367-381.

⁵ For text of Allied Armistice with Bulgaria, signed at Moscow, October 28, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 437, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1498. For documentation regarding the negotiation of the armistice, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iii, pp. 300 ff.

⁶ Gen. Nicolai Radescu.

⁷ Not printed; it reported that Prime Minister Radescu, at the request of Soviet authorities, had withheld from publication a statement critical of Soviet activity in Rumania (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/12-3044).

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-545

*King Michael of Rumania to President Roosevelt*⁸

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During the past four years, unfortunate circumstances and unworthy rulers have forced Romania to follow a policy and to fight a war which has been contrary to her tradition and her vital interests, in opposition with My will and the beliefs of the great majority of My people.

On August 23, 1944, with the help of God, I was able to bring My country back on the right way, the way which leads to the triumph of justice, to liberty of nations and to the respect of human dignity along with her natural and traditional allies.

I had the conviction that in carrying out this act in the manner which I did served the interest of not only My people, but also the people of all the United Nations. In view of these facts, I beg you to listen to the voice of the Romanian Nation. It is the voice of a Nation whose history, sufferings and qualities, make it worthy of notice. It is the voice of a Nation who has no other ideal than to rid itself through great sacrifices of the terrible weight of a recent past and thus by this to regain the modest but honorable place it deserves among all peace loving countries.

If the sacrifices which were made could be estimated as to their real value, and if our way could be made a bit easier, then being completely confident that I did the duty I was destined to do, I could wait with a clear conscience for the dawn of to-morrow.

But unfortunately I realize that this is not possible at the present moment. I have expressed My thanks to the glorious Red Army for the help given us regaining North Transylvania which has always been so dear to the hearts of all true Romanians.

At the present time, I am held by a painful and serious anxiety as to our future, having observed the attitude of various representatives of the U.R.S.S. in Romania, who in many cases have not at all understood our problems.

I wish to call Your attention to the inclosed note,⁹ which sets forth some of the reasons of My anxiety. It is for You to judge if these reasons are well founded, knowing the spirit of high justice which has governed all Your actions in the past. If You agree with the reasons

⁸ This letter was transmitted to the President under cover of a memorandum dated March 5, 1945, from William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services; the memorandum read in part as follows: "King Michael handed the letter to an OSS officer in Bucharest with the statement that he was pleased to have an opportunity to transmit his views to you unofficially." (740.00119-Control (Rumania)/3-545)

⁹ The enclosed note of 36 pages not printed.

set forth in the note, I hope You will be inspired to action, the form and time of which You alone can decide.

I am hoping that in the future Rumania can faithfully wait for the happy effects and beneficial influences of a just judgment by the President of the Great United States of America.

Therefore, I beg You Mr. President to accept the assurance of My highest consideration and of my most sincere wishes for your country and for yourself.¹⁰

MICHAEL R

Jan. 24. 1945 BUCHAREST

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/1-445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1945—9 p. m.

47. Reurtel 11 January 4. The Department recognizes that the Rumanian Government has some ground for its request for cobelligerent status. The wording of the Armistice Agreement itself (Articles I and XI) indicated that Rumania had, already at the time of signature, made a contribution to Allied military operations against Germany and under the terms of the Armistice would wage war as an active belligerent, its troops fighting under Allied (Soviet) Command. At the time of the presentation of armistice terms to the Rumanian delegates in Moscow, the latter were given to understand by the representatives of the three Allied Governments that Rumania would at some later date be granted cobelligerent status. We also feel that Rumania's actual military contribution has been such as to merit some recognition.

Although the granting of cobelligerent status to Rumania would introduce a complicating factor in the legal situation and would probably be utilized as a precedent for like requests by other ex-satelites the Department would not oppose granting Rumania cobelligerent status should the matter of a declaration to that effect by the three principal Allies be raised. We are not inclined, however, to take the initiative in recommending it. The British Embassy has informed the Department that the British Government opposes the granting of cobelligerency to Rumania chiefly because Rumanian cobelligerency would serve as a precedent for Bulgaria, to which the British do not want to grant that status.

¹⁰The final phrase beginning "and of my most sincere . . ." together with the date line were handwritten by King Michael.

We have never considered that Rumania was entitled to participate in any way in the armistice negotiations with Hungary (reurtel 10 January 4¹¹) and see no reason to change our attitude in this regard.

It is not contemplated that there should be formal diplomatic relations between Rumania and the principal Allied Governments for the present, but whether such relations will be delayed until the conclusion of peace with Rumania will depend on the situation as it develops. There would appear to be no objection to informal Rumanian representation in any of the capitals of the three principal Allied Governments if, in the opinion of the Allied Government concerned, it would facilitate the execution of the armistice agreement and the protection of that country's interests in Rumania. The matter of Rumanian representation in Moscow (reurtel 55 December 12¹²) is, in the Department's opinion, one for settlement between the Soviet and Rumanian Governments. The Department does not see any need at present for Rumanian representation in Washington (reurtel 24 November 24¹³).

Exchange of representatives between Rumania and Allied nations other than the three signatories to the Armistice is, in the Department's opinion, a matter for the decision of the three principal Allied Governments, acting in the first instance through their representative on the ACC.¹⁴ Normal diplomatic relations between such Allied nations and Rumania will presumably not be resumed until the conclusion of peace and we do not feel that Rumanian representation in those countries is necessary at the present time. (Reurtel 62, January 24¹⁵) We think it desirable, however, that Allied nations which have requested representation in Rumania, such as Greece and Belgium

¹¹ Not printed; it reported that Rumanian Foreign Minister Visoianu, in conversation with Berry on January 3, 1945, had expressed the view of the Rumanian Government that the presence on the Hungarian front of 14 Rumanian divisions had earned for Rumania a more active role in the Hungarian armistice negotiations than that of a simple observer; Visoianu also reviewed the concern of Rumania that the Soviet Union would use the Transylvania issue to bait both Hungary and Rumania (864.01/1-445).

¹² Not printed.

¹³ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 265.

¹⁴ Allied Control Commission.

¹⁵ Not printed; it reported that at a meeting with General Vinogradov on January 19, General Schuyler had supported Air Vice Marshal Stevenson's request that Greek and Belgian representatives be authorized to enter Rumania, but that Vinogradov had said that Greek and Belgian representatives should not come to Rumania in view of a statement by Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky to the Rumanian Foreign Minister that consideration would not be given to the inauguration of diplomatic relations between Rumania and the smaller nations until full diplomatic relations had been established with the larger nations (702.5471/1-2445).

(repeat Belgium, not Bulgaria as erroneously stated in second paragraph of Department's 25 January 15¹⁶), should be permitted to send consular or other civilian representatives for the purpose of protecting their interests (see Moscow's 175 January 18, 10 p. m. to Department repeated to you as 12^{16a}). You are accordingly authorized to support, in your discretion and in whatever manner may appear appropriate, the requests of such Allied states for such representation.

Resumption of diplomatic relations between Rumania and other former enemy states, such as Italy and Bulgaria, during the armistice period seems to the Department to be inappropriate. The most that should be permitted is the exchange of informal representatives (reurtel 83 December 31¹⁷).

Sent to Bucharest; repeated to Moscow.¹⁸

GREW

871.00B/1-3045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1945—8 p. m.

50. The British Government has suggested to the Department that the heads of the British and American Delegations on the ACC should inform Vinogradov¹⁹ of the reports which they have received concerning claims of Mrs. Pauker²⁰ and Gheorghiu-Dej²¹ (reurtels 59

¹⁶ Not printed; it stated that it was not feasible for the small staff of the American Mission in Bucharest to undertake the protection of the interests of the Greek and Belgian Governments, among others, and it authorized the American Mission to take such informal steps as might seem desirable looking toward the admission into Rumania of Greek and Belgian representatives (702.5471/-1-945).

^{16a} Not printed, but see footnote 48, p. 528.

¹⁷ Not printed; it reviewed the status of foreign Missions in Rumania. The Legations of Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland and Turkey continued to function. The wartime Italian Minister to Rumania was still in Bucharest. French, Yugoslavia, and Bulgarian representatives had also opened offices, but Belgian and Greek representatives had been denied permission by the Allied Control Commission to enter Rumania. A Netherlands representative had also been refused recognition by the ACC but he was remaining in Bucharest to look after Dutch interests. (706.0054/12-3144)

¹⁸ Repeated to Moscow as No. 195.

¹⁹ Lt. Gen. Vladislav Petrovich Vinogradov, Deputy Chairman (Soviet) of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania.

²⁰ Ana Pauker, leading member of the Rumanian Communist Party.

²¹ Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, leading member of the Rumanian Communist Party and Rumanian Minister of Communications.

January 23,²² 68 January 26,²³ 78 January 28,²⁴ 81 January 30²⁵) to have received Soviet approval of a plan to put a Communist government into power in Bucharest, and should then say:

“As we understand the Soviet Government supports the present Rumanian Government we assume there is no justification for these exaggerated claims made by the Rumanian Communists, but we should be grateful for any information the Head of the Control Commission may be able to give us on this subject.”

The Department is replying to the British proposal that the United States Government does not feel that it would be advisable to participate in such an approach to the Soviet authorities at this time. Information contained in your 81 January 30 on Gheorghiu-Dej's statement to the King and in your 89 February 1²⁶ to the effect that the political crisis has not materialized serve to confirm our opinion that, at least for the present, the matter should be treated as an internal Rumanian affair which does not call for consultation or action on the part of the Allied Control Commission or the Governments represented on it.

The Department would appreciate receiving your observations and recommendations as the situation develops as well as any information you and General Schuyler may obtain from conversations with Rumanian and Soviet officials.

Sent to Bucharest, repeated to Moscow.²⁷

GREW

[President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, with their advisers, met in conference at Yalta, February 4-11, 1945. The three leaders agreed upon a “Declaration on Liberated Europe” providing for joint action by the three powers in meeting

²² Not printed; in it the American Representative reported having been informed by the Rumanian Foreign Minister that the Rumanian Communists, acting under instructions brought from Moscow by Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej, intended in the next few days to create a political crisis (871.00B/1-2345).

²³ Not printed; it reported that a National Democratic Front (a union of left-wing Rumanian political parties dominated by the Communists) manifesto was expected shortly to call for a change in government (871.00B/1-2645).

²⁴ Apparent misnumbering; probably a reference to telegram 74, January 28, from Bucharest, which transmitted a summary of the program of the National Democratic Front, the text of which was published on January 28 in the official organ of the Rumanian Communist Party, *Scanteia* (871.00B/1-2845).

²⁵ Not printed; in it the American Representative reported having been informed by Marshal of the Court Negel that Gheorghiu-Dej on his return from Moscow was received by the King to whom he stated his “impression”, gained in Moscow, that a leftist government would be more successful in securing for Rumania: 1) cobelligerency status; 2) return of Rumanian prisoners of war; 3) northern Transylvania; and 4) economic assistance (871.00B/1-3045).

²⁶ Not printed; it reported that the threatened political crisis had not materialized and concluded “apparently . . . the Communists decided that they were too weak at this time to force out the Radescu government and replace it by one of their own making.” (871.00B/2-145)

²⁷ Repeated to Moscow as telegram 231.

political and economic problems of liberated Europe, in accordance with democratic principles. For text of the declaration, see item V of the Report of the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945, *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, page 971. Regarding the consideration of the declaration at the Conference, see *ibid.*, entries in Index under "Declaration on Liberated Europe," page 1002. Regarding the consideration of other issues related to Rumania, see *ibid.*, entries in Index under "Rumania", page 1013. For the undated Briefing Book Papers setting forth United States policy and attitudes on various issues related to Rumania, prepared for President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State for use at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference, see *ibid.*, pages 237-238, 238-240, and 245-248.]

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-1945: Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, February 19, 1945—midnight.

[Received February 20—6:15 p. m.]

128. General Schuyler²⁸ has transmitted an analysis of the Rumanian political situation viewed from his experience on the ACC. This message attempts to review the situation from the Rumanian point of view and to indicate the direction in which the present trends are carrying the nation.

This Mission started its work during a period of Rumanian moral depression. People were dissatisfied, but being unable by their constructive efforts to dispel their dissatisfaction they blamed the Government. Popular discontent provoked a political crisis and the resignation of the second Sănătescu government.²⁹

During the political crisis Mr. Vishinsky came to Rumania and then opened a period described now by Rumanians as the period of preparation for future events.³⁰ Visa applications from foreign correspondents were ignored. Conservative newspapers throughout the land were suspended or suppressed. Mr. Maniu was attacked increasingly by the Soviet radio and Bucharest Left press. Rumanian deliveries under articles VII, X, XI, and XII [apparent omission].

The Armistice Agreement began to be a burden of which every

²⁸ Brig. Gen. Cortland T. Van R. Schuyler, Chief, United States Military Representation, Allied Control Commission for Rumania.

²⁹ Following the palace *coup d'état* of August 23, 1944, Gen. Constantin Sănătescu held the post of Prime Minister in two successive Rumanian Cabinets until the formation on December 7, 1944, of a Cabinet headed by General Radescu.

³⁰ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, who visited Bucharest during November and December 1944, allegedly to hasten execution of the terms of the Rumanian armistice.

man bore a part. Rumanian police, *gendarmerie* and Army were drastically reduced in strength. Bessarabians, Saxons and Swabians were deported.

Next came the period of Soviet overt help to the National Democratic Front. Rumanian Communist leaders were invited to Moscow; other Left leaders were received by high Soviet officials in Bucharest. Workers' delegations were received by the (Soviet) ACC. Ample funds, newsprint and transportation were provided to the Left press. Communist Party leaders, even those participating in the present Government, were emboldened to attack publicly the Government. Mr. Maniu and other leaders who opposed the NDF were called Fascists. Apathetic street demonstrations, hostile to the Government, were described by Soviet officials as vibrant manifestations of the will of the people.

And now, according to Rumanians, the final phase, that of Soviet overt help to the NDF, is swiftly drawing to its conclusion. They point out that Soviet officers have said that General Radescu no longer has the backing of the people; that the NDF represents the true feelings of the people. The Rumanians believe the stage is being set for a minority government in Bucharest and that such a government will not prevent the country from disintegrating. They mention the report that the district of Maramures desires to join the Soviet Union.³¹ They believe that the rest of northern Transylvania, where there is no Rumanian administration, will follow at the proper time; then Moldavia.

They say that the ACC is an instrument used by the Soviet authorities to destroy the Rumanian state; that the Anglo-Americans have not taken the initiative in helping them solve any of their vital problems (control of the transportation system, the return of northern Transylvania, the return of prisoners of war, co-belligerent status) the solutions of which are so essential to the moral rehabilitation of the nation.

Every thinking Rumanian sees the necessity of a foreign policy based upon friendly relations with the Soviet Union but nearly all Rumanians want their own form of Government. They believe this impossible because of Soviet distrust of any Rumanian government that is not a Communist dominated government.

The leaders who sponsored armistice discussions in Cairo with Allied representatives,³² are baffled over the apparent Anglo-American

³¹ Telegram 123, February 19, from Bucharest, reported that the Rumanian Government was greatly concerned by the apparent Soviet sponsorship of a movement to annex Maramures prefecture, a district in northern Transylvania and under Soviet control, to the Soviet Ukrainian Republic (871.014/2-1945).

³² For documentation concerning the negotiations and contacts during the spring and summer of 1944 between Rumanian and Allied representatives regarding a Rumanian armistice, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 133 ff.

indifference to the manner in which the armistice is being executed. (See my telegram No. 52 of December 9, 7 p. m.³³) They believe that the Government's capacity of maintaining order is being drastically undermined, (see my telegram No. 105 of February 9, 5 p. m.³⁴) and that where in the past the local Communists have failed through weakness (see my telegram No. 89, of February 1, 8 p. m.³⁵) in the future they will not be permitted to fail. They have convinced themselves that they are living through the final months of their country's existence (see my telegram No. 42 of November 30, 6 p. m.³⁶).

BERRY

Department of Defense Files : Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 22 February 1945.

M 460. At my urgent request, Vinogradov called a meeting yesterday of the three chief representatives, ACC, to discuss present critical political situation in Rumania.

AVM Stevenson³⁷ presented a written protest on behalf of British Government against recent closing by ACC of a number of newspapers representing national peasant and liberal parties.

He pointed out that in many cases liaisons [*reasons?*] given did not appear to justify such harsh action, with the result that ACC was placed in position of appearing to support FND³⁸ parties as opposed to historic parties.

He urged early authorization for reopening of *Viitorul*, National Liberal paper recently closed, under allocation of available raw paper supply so as to provide corresponding amounts to newspapers representing each of the various political parties.

Vinogradov replied he would study the problem and give a full

³³ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 279.

³⁴ Not printed; in this telegram Berry reported having conversed with Prime Minister Radescu, who stated that the Soviet authorities had requested the handing over of Rumania's only tank regiment, then stationed in Bucharest; Prime Minister Radescu was quoted as concluding the conversation as follows: "You must understand my apprehension. The Soviets have reduced my police forces and taken away their right to use arms. The Rumanian Communists know that I am no longer in a position to maintain order." (740.00119 Control-(Rumania)/2-945)

³⁵ See footnote 26, p. 469.

³⁶ Not printed.

³⁷ Air Vice Marshal Donald Stevenson, British High Commissioner in Rumania.

³⁸ National Democratic Front, formed at the end of 1944 and composed of the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union, the United Trade Unions, the Ploughmen's Front, the Hungarian Popular Union, and other "left-wing" organizations.

answer later. For details on *Vittorul* closing see my M-459 dated 21st February.³⁹

As meeting progressed, reports began to arrive of actual armed conflict between FND and historic party adherents at Malaza factory, Bucharest.

(See my message M 457 dated 21st February).³⁹

Vinogradov expressed himself as opposed to civil war at all costs. He also indicated necessity under Yalta agreements for continuation of a coalition government. He said more frequent and more intimate contacts between the three chief representatives were urgently needed, and he called on us for advice and assistance.

He expressed particular pleasure at my recent suggestions for improvement of liaison between US and Russian section (see my M-445 dated 19th February³⁹) and said they would be adopted at once.

I pointed out my serious concern over entire situation and called attention to fact that in the provinces various groups representing political parties had attempted by force to take over agencies of the national government.

I expressed fear that such movements might spread rapidly with resulting serious interference with Rumania's war effort.

I urged necessity for strong action by the Allied Control Commission in an effort to avoid civil war and insure political stability in the country. Specifically, I recommended that the ACC issue a public statement to the following effect:⁴⁰

“1. That under the terms of the Yalta agreement, the Allied Control Commission has the responsibility of insuring that, until such time as free elections can be held, Rumania shall be administered by a coalition government in which all existing political parties are represented.

2. That subject to the conditions under paragraph 1, above, the Rumanian state, under its King, is entirely free to select the individuals who shall form its government in any manner in which it may see fit. Such a government, however, once formed, must show itself capable of maintaining order and carrying out the terms of the armistice.

3. That during the period of hostilities against Germany, any attempt by individuals, parties or groups of parties to overthrow the government or any of its agencies by force is considered by the Commission to be an act of sabotage against the war effort and therefore will not be tolerated. Also that the holding of mass meetings or

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ Telegram 89, February 24, 9 p. m., to Bucharest, expressed Department's approval of the proposal made by General Schuyler to General Vinogradov and approved Representative Berry's agreement to General Schuyler's taking that step (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2145).

political demonstrations at such times as may take workers from their war tasks is regarded by the Commission with disfavor."

Stevenson stated that as British Commissioner he supported in full all my statements and recommendations.

Vinogradov agreed to consider the matter carefully and to furnish a specific answer to my recommendations.

While indicating much pleasure over Vinogradov's plans for closer liaison, nevertheless on basis of past experience I am by no means certain that the full measure of cooperation desired by this delegation will be achieved.

My stenographer was present throughout interview and took shorthand notes of all conversations. Full report follows by mail.⁴²

[SCHUYLER]

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 23 February 1945.

M 464. Yesterday in view of continued tense political situation and on Mister Berry's suggestion, I made a strong plea to Vinogradov for another meeting of the three chief representatives, ACC. Instead Vinogradov arranged a meeting with me only. However AVM Stevenson, having learned of it, also showed up.

I urged immediate decision as to public announcement of Commission's attitude, along lines which I recommended at previous meeting. I pointed out once again the importance of taking all possible steps to avoid civil war and stated that responsibility for any further postponement of this important stabilizing action by the Commission must rest with General Vinogradov himself. As an example of tenseness of the situation I referred to a provocative and inflammatory article which appeared that morning in local Communist newspaper *Scanteia*. Article refers in violent tone to Fascist's crimes committed by followers of Maniu and Radescu and is by implication a call for armed uprising by workers to avenge their wrongs. I pointed out that such an article must itself have been written by a pro-Nazi with the primary intent of sabotaging Rumania's war effort and suggested strong measures by the Commission against the newspaper. Stevenson fully supported me on both counts.

⁴²The Minutes of the Joint Meeting of Senior Representatives of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania on February 21, 1945, were transmitted to the Department in despatch 132, February 22, 1945, from Bucharest; neither printed.

Vinogradov replied that my recommendations for public announcement of policy by ACC had been referred to Moscow and he could do nothing until reply is received. He accepted full responsibility in name of Malinovsky⁴³ for the delay. He said he had not read newspaper article in question, that he would study it carefully and render a decision.

I doubt that favorable action will result from either of my recommendations. However I feel this delegation has now done everything possible to avert open conflict. It is possible that by a continued display of active concern on our part the Russians may be influenced to discourage at least temporarily further local Communist aggression. NDF parties are still relatively small in numbers and I believe that any invitation [*indication?*] whatever of Russian disapproval of their present activities would cause a collapse of their current efforts to secure full governmental control. Full report of meeting follows by mail.⁴⁴ Throughout this critical period all actions taken and views expressed by me have been thoroughly discussed and coordinated with Mister Berry beforehand.

[SCHUYLER]

871.00/2-2345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)*⁴⁵

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1945—9 p. m.

86. The War Department has brought to the attention of the Department General Schuyler's telegram concerning his conversation with the King and his mother.⁴⁶ The War and State Departments agree that this is primarily a political matter and that the present telegram, which has been cleared with the War Department should serve as instructions for both Schuyler and yourself.

⁴³ Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, Commander of the Second Ukrainian Front and Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania.

⁴⁴ The Minutes of the Joint Meeting of Senior Representatives of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania on February 22, 1945, were transmitted to the Department in despatch 132, February 22, 1945, from Bucharest; neither printed.

⁴⁵ The substance of this message was transmitted to London in telegram 1433, to Moscow in telegram 422, and to Caserta in telegram 164.

⁴⁶ In telegram M-442, February 19, to the War Department, General Schuyler reported on his conversation with the Queen Mother of Rumania and King Michael in which the former expressed some apprehension as to the safety of herself and her son in view of recent developments in Rumania (Department of the Army Files). The substance of the General's message was also reported to the Department of State in telegram 667, February 23, from Caserta (871.00/2-2345).

The Declaration on Liberated Europe issued at Yalta on February 12 set forth the joint responsibility of the three Governments to enable the people of the former Axis satellite states to choose the form of government under which they will live. The three Governments agreed to concert their policies, where in their judgment conditions so require, to assist these peoples in establishing conditions of internal peace and in forming interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people. Accordingly the security of the King and his mother, which is a question closely related to the form of government, becomes a matter of direct concern to the three Allied Governments under the present system of control. This would not prejudice the operation of democratic processes at a later date if the Rumanian people should then desire to raise the question of their governmental institutions.

We think the Queen may be unduly apprehensive in believing that the Russians would hand her over to the Communists. In view of the Molotov statement of April 2, 1944,⁴⁸ that the Soviet Government was not pursuing the aim of "changing the existing social structure of Rumania" and in view of the Soviet signature of the Crimea declaration, the Department could not take a position on the institutional question which might imply the expectation of a departure from those principles on the part of the Soviet Government.

We believe that if the Rumanian Communists do make an attempt to seize power, a matter which would be of concern to the three Allied Governments, and if the personal safety of the King and his mother is threatened, responsibility for insuring their safety by providing either protection or the means of departure from the country, should rest with the ACC. Even though the Soviet element normally exercises administrative and executory functions in the ACC it is reasonable to suppose that the representatives of the three Governments would now act in a tripartite capacity on a question of this kind. The United States Government would therefore not be in a position to act independently in offering protection, but General Schuyler might participate with his Soviet and British colleagues in concerting on whatever plans future developments may require.

⁴⁸ For text of the Molotov statement regarding Rumania, as transmitted earlier to the Department by the Soviet Embassy, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, p. 165.

Using the foregoing for your guidance in any future conversations with the King or his mother, you or General Schuyler may say that this Government acknowledges the value of the King's part in the events of August 23⁴⁹ and his loyal support of the Allied cause since that time; and that we have no reason to believe that our Allies do not share our view that the King has played a worthy role and has been a stabilizing factor in Rumanian politics. He must himself be the judge of his responsibilities to his people. If the turn of events gives him reason to expect violence, this Government would prefer that the procedures then to be adopted should be concerted with the British and Soviet Governments along the lines envisaged by the tripartite declaration referred to above. It could be explained that General Schuyler would not have authority for protection of the Royal family beyond his capacity as a representative in the ACC, and that except in an extremity requiring emergency protection from physical violence, which he may give, he should first present the matter before the ACC for the consideration of his Soviet and British colleagues. The assistance which your own office might be called upon to extend would be limited of course by the informal nature of your mission.

GREW

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2445: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1945—9 p. m.

417. The British Embassy has informed the Department of instructions to Clark Kerr⁵⁰ directing him to express to Molotov his Government's serious concern regarding reports of political actions in Rumania through which an armed minority may attempt to replace by force the present coalition Government. Clark Kerr was to request the Soviet Government to prevent this eventuality and to say that his Government would be placed in an impossible position if a situation should be created in Rumania where British responsibility through participation in the ACC would be involved in permitting the establishment of a government to which it could under no circumstances give approval. The Department has been asked to request you to support this position.

⁴⁹ The Rumanian palace *coup d'état* of August 23, 1944, in which the pro-German, dictatorial regime of Ion Antonescu was overthrown and replaced by a government representing the four major political parties.

⁵⁰ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Having in mind the Department's telegram of today's date to Berry,⁵¹ repeated to you, you are authorized to express our desire to see political developments as they affect the form of government in Rumania take an orderly course under the direction of the ACC.⁵² If events should develop along contrary lines there should be full consultation among the three principal Allies as contemplated in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe.

GREW

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1945—10 p. m.

90. The Department has noted the disquieting factors in the political situation in Rumania as reported in your telegrams and Schuyler's messages. We are considering the desirability, particularly in the light of the Crimea conference, of presenting to the Soviet and British Governments concrete proposals for tripartite consultation and action on major political issues in the former Axis satellite countries during the armistice period with a view to ensuring greater political stability in those countries and establishing conditions which will make possible the free choice by these peoples of the forms of government under which they will live.

We believe that it may be useful for you and Schuyler both to be apprised of the Department's views on some of the more pressing problems in order that you may make known the American position in whatever quarters and by whatever means you may deem desirable. We hope you will have in mind particularly the following:

1. The Rumanian people should be left in no doubt of the future existence of their country as an independent state.

2. A coalition government representing all political groups and social classes is, we think, the most suitable means of affording a representative administration in the present period. We would not desire to see an exclusively National Peasant or exclusively National Democratic Front Government, and we would particularly deplore the use or display of force or any political chicanery to bring any one group into power.

3. Attempts to effect administrative changes by disorderly means or the use of force or intimidation should not be tolerated, although encouragement should be given any endeavors looking to the establish-

⁵¹ *Infra.*

⁵² On February 26, 1945, Ambassador Harriman sent a note to Soviet People's Commissar Molotov along the lines set forth in this instruction.

ment of procedures whereby local and general elections may be held on the basis of free and secret ballot or other democratic means.

4. No political groups, whether Communist or other elements, should be permitted to remain in possession of arms, all instruments of force being properly left at the disposition of the governmental authorities and every care being exercised to ensure that these authorities have at their disposal adequate forces and equipment to maintain internal order.

5. There being apparent no reason to believe that the King is not loyally serving the interests of his country and the Allied cause, and with particular reference to his role in swinging Rumania from the Nazi to the Allied camp, it is difficult to see any justification for attacks on him, particularly at this time when the procedures for ascertaining the national will have not yet been determined.

6. Not forgetting the encouragement given the Rumanians on the question of cobelligerent status by the Allied representatives at Moscow at the time of the armistice negotiations and at the same time appreciating Rumania's military assistance in the war, we think that the Rumanian desire for cobelligerent status should have sympathetic consideration.

7. We understand the Rumanian desire to extend their administration to Northern Transylvania, but hope that they realize that their agitation to this end during the period of active military operations is neither to their own advantage nor conducive to the development of mutual trust and collaboration.

8. Neither the Allied cause in general nor the Soviet interests in particular can be served by the removal from the country of essential means of production.

9. Since it is desirable for the American public and world opinion generally to be fully informed of developments in Rumania, as elsewhere, it is important that American and other correspondents should be freely admitted into the country and that their reports should be censored only on the basis of military considerations.

10. A real freedom of the press, limited only by censorship on military grounds, should be established with access to the necessary materials and facilities.

11. It is desirable that Rumania be enabled to resume trade with the outside world as soon as conditions permit.

12. Instructions and directives involving matters of policy should not be issued in the name of the Allied Control Commission without consultation with the American (and British) members of the Commission.

It is of course as a general rule desirable that the American attitude on points such as those treated above should be made known, at least

in the first instance, to the Soviet authorities rather than to the Rumanians. You will of course be guided by the trend of events in determining the emphasis or timing of your discussions, whether with the Russians or the Rumanians but the foregoing propositions appear to us to represent the best basis for reaching an agreed Allied policy on Rumanian affairs.

Sent to Bucharest; repeated for information to Moscow and Caserta.⁵³

GREW

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2545: Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, February 25, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 10:53 p. m.]

137. By 5 o'clock an estimated 20,000 persons had marched in three columns with flags, slogans and pictures from the national guard to the palaces guard. The crowd was quiet, orderly, curious and expectant. At 5:17 an exuberant Soviet officer seeing a column approaching with the Red flag at its head expressed joy by firing his revolver in the air. The palace guards and those at the nearby Ministry of Interior reacted to the sound of shooting with several bursts of machine gun fire over the heads of the crowd. Within a few seconds the entire assembly had dispersed or sought safety by assuming a prone position. There was one casualty, a man who died of heart failure. (See my telegram No. 136 of February 24, 5 p. m.⁵⁴)

When no firing was heard for several minutes a large part of the crowd reassembled. Communist Minister Patrascanu⁵⁵ made an address saying "they have [shot?] without shame the people's masses. Those who ordered this, those who carried the order out, those who are really responsible will pay with their heads. General Radescu must go. An NDF government must come for it alone is capable of weeding out the Fascists."

General Moshviyan in the name of the Soviet High Command and the ACC at 5:40 instructed the Rumanian city commander to take steps to restore order adding that if no reply was received by 6 o'clock he would be compelled to intervene. The Rumanian commander said that he would do all within his power to restore order.

⁵³ As telegrams 416 and 167, respectively.

⁵⁴ Not printed; it reported mounting evidence of Soviet support for the National Democratic Front (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2445).

⁵⁵ Lucretiu Patrascanu, Rumanian Minister of Justice and leading member of the Rumanian Communist Party.

At 8:45 a group of a few hundred National Peasant Party sympathizers while passing the palace singing the national anthem and manifesting for King and Government were fired upon with automatic weapons from a passing car. Two of the demonstrators were killed and eleven wounded.

At 10 o'clock the Prime Minister addressed the nation by radio. He stated that a handful of individuals headed by two foreigners, Ana Pauker and Luca⁵⁶ the Hungarian, were attempting to subdue through terror. He told of reports of violent attacks by the agents of these people on public buildings at Craiova, Caracal and Brasov and of his efforts to prevent disturbances in the capital. He concluded by calling on Rumanians to face the danger that he had exposed.

At one o'clock this morning Admiral Bogdenko, Acting Vice Chairman of the ACC called the Premier to Soviet headquarters and asked (1) why he had spoken over the radio without prior Soviet approval of his speech and (2) why he had used the names of Pauker and Luca. Radescu replied that (1) he was attacked personally and violently in the left press being labeled "Fascist Dictator" and he felt that he was entitled to reply by radio as that was the only means open to him since the typesetters had consistently refused to print his speeches and (2) he mentioned the names of Pauker and Luca in order to avoid naming the Rumanian Communist Party as the provoker of civil disturbances.

This morning's Communist paper *Scanteia* carries the headlines "Executioner Radescu yesterday organized a bloody massacre in palace square". It then describes how a demonstration of 600,000 peaceful and disciplined people were attacked by machine gun fire, identifying the act as part of a Nazi plan to bring disorder behind the Red Army front. It says that Radescu and his band must be removed and sent before the tribunal of the people to account for the massacre of the nation.

The same paper carried a telegram addressed to the King signed by five Ministers and three Under Secretaries. The telegram says that assassins Radescu, Nicolescu and Maniu have killed and wounded citizens, have compromised the Crown and tried to annihilate the act of August 23. The signers thus "protest against the assassination of peaceful people and demand the immediate dismissal of the government led by the executioner Radescu and the rest of the people guilty and responsible for the massacre of February 24".⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Vasile Luca, Secretary General of the National Democratic Front and leader in the Rumanian Communist Party. Luca was born in Transylvania of Hungarian (Szekler) parents.

⁵⁷ Telegram 140, February 27, 5 p. m., from Bucharest, reported that the King planned to receive separately the Ministers who urged the dismissal of General Radescu and that Radescu believed he would be unable to re-form a government and would resign shortly (871.00/2-2745).

The events of the past 24 hours have closed the negotiations which were quietly going on to reform the present coalition government. These events have brought to a crisis the tension between General Radescu and the NDF which became public knowledge during the Prime Minister's speech at the Aro Theater. The events show that a minority with the use of tactics that have proved successful elsewhere is persisting in its efforts to gain control of the Government. However as General Radescu has refused to yield, an open clash was brought about between him and the leaders of the minority. They are now seeking his dismissal by appealing to the [apparent omission]. He will not resign and as he is still supported by a majority of the Cabinet, the King may decide not to dismiss him as the left Ministers also refused to resign, it is expected locally that the violent element may resort to assassination unless Moscow directs a change in program. Significantly the demonstrations and tension of the last few days has noticeably weakened the position of the left parties [within?] the country. There is no enthusiasm shown by the people for either cause or the methods, even the demonstrators themselves being heard frequently to express disgust. While the Government's position with the people improves the violent element of the Communist Party increasing demands, distorts facts and levies charges.

Repeated to Moscow as No. 22.

BERRY

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2345: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1945—10 p. m.

440. The events in Bucharest on February 24, when anti-government agitation by minority groups created disorders involving some bloodshed, have confirmed the conviction forced upon the Department by developments in Rumania during the last few weeks that prompt and effective measures should be taken by the three principal Allies to stabilize the political situation in that country. Allied responsibilities under the Atlantic Charter,⁵⁸ obligations implied in the Rumanian armistice and the decisions taken at the Crimea Conference, as well as the practical war ends to be served, permit no escape from the responsibilities of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States for ensuring the continuity of a broadly representative governmental regime in Rumania in this period.

⁵⁸ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. The Atlantic Charter was incorporated into the Declaration by United Nations, January 1, 1942, *ibid.*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

We have felt for some time that the continued possession of arms by certain minority political elements not only constituted a serious threat to the orderly evolution of political events in the country but was unduly discriminatory and otherwise unjustified. Other factors that seemed destined to disturb the situation have been: (a) the suppression of the liberal democratic press by ACC action (as in the case of National Liberal newspaper *Viitorul*) or other means (such as denial of printing facilities by the Printers' Union); (b) inadequate means at the disposal of the government for the maintenance of order; and (c) the Allied failure to provide the Rumanians with political guidance on the basis of consultation among the three members of the Control Commission. We have not lent credence to the many reports and seeming indications of official Soviet support of the minority attacks on the government, although there remains little doubt that there have been instances in which local Soviet officials have, on the spot and on their own authority, afforded encouragement to disruptive actions. We have also noted with some concern the support given the Rumanian Communists by the official Soviet press (your 504 February 21⁵⁹ and 532 February 23⁶⁰). In particular, we are astonished to learn that General Vinogradov failed to call a meeting of the ACC on February 24 when urgently requested to do so by General Schuyler, as well as his British colleague, to consider Allied action on the rapidly developing political crisis.

Making such use as you deem appropriate of our views as given above and, having in mind the propositions contained in the Department's telegram to Bucharest of February 24, repeated to you as 416,^{60a} please inform the Soviet Government of the Department's considered opinion that: (1) the coalition form of government in Rumania should be preserved in the present period and that a National Democratic Front or other exclusive party government would be unacceptable; (2) prompt and effective measures should be taken to ensure the government adequate military means and support to enable it to restore order and maintain its authority; (3) immediate dispositions should be made to ensure freedom of the press in Rumania subject to Article XVI of the Armistice Agreement; (4) all political party or other special groups should be totally disarmed; and (5) arrangements should be made for full consultation among the three members of the

⁵⁹ Not printed; it reported on despatches published in the Moscow press on February 19 and 20 which continued the campaign of the Soviet press in agitation for replacement of the Radescu Cabinet by a government of the Soviet-oriented National Democratic Front (871.00/2-2145).

⁶⁰ Not printed; it reported that the current issue of *War and the Working Class* and *Pravda* for February 22 had devoted major articles to the political crisis in Rumania which continued the Soviet press campaign for a radical change in the Rumanian Government (871.00/2-2345).

^{60a} See footnote 53, p. 480.

ACC regarding major Rumanian political matters affecting the interests and responsibilities of the three Allied Governments.

You should say that the Department very much hopes to receive the concurrence of the Soviet and British Governments to the foregoing essential propositions on the Rumanian political situation and would welcome an indication of the Soviet views. You should, in particular, ask for assurances that the Soviet Chairman of the Commission will be given such instructions as will eradicate any doubt that the American member is in a position to have a meeting of the ACC called when in his judgment there are urgent and sufficient reasons to do so.

Sent to Moscow; repeated to Bucharest, London, and Caserta.⁶¹

GREW

Moscow Embassy Files: 800 Rumania

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) ⁶²

[Translation]

Moscow, February 27, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In connection with your letter of February 26 concerning events in Rumania ⁶³ I wish to inform you that the Soviet Government considers it very important that order and tranquillity in Rumania, which is a rear of the Red Army, be secured. However, it must be said that the present Rumanian Government has proven itself to be incapable of securing order and tranquillity in the rear of the Red Army as it has proven itself incapable of honestly fulfilling the terms of the armistice agreement. This has caused serious concern and alarm to the Soviet Government. It is necessary that the Allied Control Commission should take measures to eliminate this impermissible situation and to bring about order in the country.

With respect to the questions touched upon in the above mentioned letter concerning consultation between us with respect to the situation in Rumania, I deem it necessary to state that on the part of the Allied Control Commission measures will of course be continued to

⁶¹ As telegrams 92, 1503, and 176, respectively.

⁶² Ambassador Harriman transmitted a summary of this letter in his telegram 585, February 28, 4 p. m. (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2845). Molotov's letter to Ambassador Harriman followed to some extent the general line of Molotov's reply to British Ambassador Clark Kerr's note of February 24 on the Rumanian situation; the British note and the Soviet reply of the same date were reported in telegram 568, February 27, 10 p. m., from Moscow (140.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2745).

⁶³ See footnote 52, p. 478.

be taken to inform the Allies of the situation in Rumania in accordance with the duties of the Allied Control Commission as foreseen by the armistice agreement with Rumania.

Please accept [etc.]

V. M. MOLOTOV

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1945—1 p. m.

93. On February 24 the Department instructed Harriman to inform the Soviet authorities that we wished to see political developments as they affect the form of government in Rumania take an orderly course under the direction of the ACC (reurtels 140⁶⁴ and 142 February 27⁶⁵). He was to say that if events should develop along contrary lines, we think there should be full consultation among the three principal Allies as contemplated in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe. He was to use as background the Department's 90 to you of February 24, 10 p. m. More specific instructions were sent to him yesterday, as repeated to you in Department's 92.⁶⁶

Please inform Vyshinsky both of the substance of the Department's telegrams of Saturday⁶⁷ and of the fact that Harriman was yesterday authorized to make further representations at Moscow. You may say to him that your Government considers that the public responsibility of the three Allied Governments in the light of the Crimea Declaration requires that there be full consultation among them on matters of this kind. You may also say that up to the present moment this Government has received no information from the Soviet Government regarding its views or proposals on dealing with the Rumanian situation, but we hope that the Soviet authorities in Rumania will take no decisive action in the matter until apprised of the results of such consultation among the three Allied Governments.

In amplification of our view set forth in numbered paragraph 2 of Department's 90 you may tell Vyshinsky that we would not necessarily

⁶⁴ See footnote 57, p. 481.

⁶⁵ Not printed; it reported that Vyshinsky had arrived in Bucharest on February 27 and had been received the same evening by the King. Vyshinsky reportedly stated that the Radescu government had shown itself unable to maintain order. In the name of the Soviet Government, which had the responsibility to maintain order behind the fighting front, Vyshinsky asked that the Radescu government be dismissed and replaced by a government representing "the truly democratic forces of the country." (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2745) Telegram 144, February 28, noon, from Bucharest, reported that Foreign Minister Visoianu had personally confirmed the information transmitted in telegram 142 (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2845).

⁶⁶ See footnote 61, p. 484.

⁶⁷ February 24.

press for the continuation in power of the present government or for the inclusion of any particular individuals in a new government, but we believe that the stated Allied policy of assisting the people of former Axis satellite states in Europe to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements requires the maintenance of a coalition including all major political parties.

Sent to Bucharest, repeated to Moscow.

GREW

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-645

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Vyshinsky) ⁶⁸

BUCHAREST, February 28, 1945.

DEAR MR. VYSHINSKY: I was informed that you had arrived in Bucharest yesterday and I had hoped to be able to see you today to greet you and pass on to you information that I have received concerning the attitude of the American Government upon certain political problems in Rumania. As I understand that you are occupied and will be unable to see me today, I am taking this means to bring to your attention this information, reserving for a later date the pleasure of welcoming you personally upon your return to Bucharest.

According to instructions I have received from the American Government, my Government is of the opinion that:

1. A coalition government representing all political groups and social classes is the most suitable means of effecting a representative administration in Rumania at the present time. Until the people have had the opportunity to express their will in free elections, the American Government would not desire to see an exclusively National Peasant or exclusively National Democratic Front Government, and we

⁶⁸ Telegram 145, February 28, 1945, 5 p. m., from Bucharest, reported that Berry had tried all day without success to see Vyshinsky, and, failing that, had written to Vyshinsky along the lines set forth in Department's instructions (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2845). A copy of Berry's letter was transmitted to the Department as enclosure 1 to D-147, March 6, 1945, from Bucharest, not printed. The position of the United States Government with regard to the situation in Rumania as set forth in Berry's letter was repeated in a letter of February 28 from General Schuyler to General Vinogradov, not printed. Schuyler's letter, the text of which was transmitted in his message M 483, February 28, to the War Department, not printed, also invited attention to the fact that in conformance with the spirit of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, all instructions and directives involving matters of policy implementing the Declaration that might be issued in the name of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania should be issued only after consultation among the Soviet, American, and British members of the Commission. Schuyler expressed his readiness to discuss the action to be taken by the Commission which would insure a concert of policies on the part of the respective governments while assisting the Rumanian people in the formation of a stable and representative government. (Department of Defense Files)

would particularly deplore the use or display of force or any political chicanery to bring any group into power.

2. Attempts to bring about administrative changes by disorderly means or by the use of force or intimidation should not be tolerated. On the other hand, encouragement should be given any endeavor looking to the establishment of procedures whereby local and general elections may be held on the basis of free and secret ballot or other democratic means.

3. No political group or organization should be permitted to remain in the possession of arms. All instruments of force should be at the disposition of the governmental authorities. Every care should be exercised to ensure that these authorities have at their disposal adequate forces and equipment to maintain internal order.

Yours very sincerely,

BURTON Y. BERRY

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2845 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, February 28, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received February 28—5 : 30 p. m.]

146. During the luncheon hour Vishinsky demanded an audience with the King for 3 : 30.

According to the Foreign Minister, who was present Vishinsky began the interview by asking the King's decision on the suggestion made last evening that the Radescu government be replaced. (See my telegram No. 142 of February 27, 12 p. m.⁶⁹) The King answered that he had communicated this information to General Radescu and that he had started his consultation among party leaders for the purpose of choosing a Prime Minister designate.

Vishinsky said that such an answer was unsatisfactory. Rising and looking at his wrist watch he said "You have just 2 hours and 5 minutes to make it known to the public that General Radescu has been dismissed. By 8 o'clock you must inform the public of the name of his successor".

At this point Visoianu said the King was a constitutional monarch and as such he had to proceed in a constitutional manner. The King could not select a Prime Minister but could only consult party leaders and then follow their advice in charging someone to attempt to form a government. Vishinsky replied he did not wish to be interrupted by Visoianu not having come to hear Visoianu's ideas. He proceeded to say that General Radescu had continued protecting Fascists and, by

⁶⁹ See footnote 65, p. 485.

retiring a group of 10 officers yesterday under royal decree had performed an unfriendly act toward the Soviets. This decree must be annulled immediately.

Visoianu told me that the King acceded to this request after which Vishinsky abruptly left the room banging the door as he went.

According to Visoianu the King will announce at 8 o'clock that he has asked Prince Stirbey⁷⁰ to form a government. Prince Stirbey will accept.⁷¹

Repeated to Moscow as 28.

BERRY

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-145: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 1, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received March 1—7: 50 p. m.]

2110. Sir Orme Sargent⁷² told us this afternoon that instructions had been sent to Clark Kerr to see Molotov again regarding developments in Rumania. After having expressed concern a few days ago about developments in Rumania, Clark Kerr was told that the British Government was misinformed about recent Rumanian developments. As it was felt strongly that matters could not be permitted to rest there, Clark Kerr was instructed to emphasize to Molotov once more the British hope that the Soviet authorities would see that a coalition government, representative of all political groups, would be established and maintained in Rumania until free elections could be held. At the same time, Sargent said, the British political representative on the Control Commission in Bucharest was instructed to express this hope directly to Vyshinski.

With reference to these most recent instructions, Sargent said that he personally felt it should also have been stipulated that such a government in Rumania should have adequate armed forces at its disposal. The latest reports regarding Rumanian armed forces, Sargent added in this connection, were disturbing. Reports which had just reached the Foreign Office from Bucharest indicated that the Soviets had

⁷⁰ Prince Barbu Stirbey, a former Rumanian Prime Minister and a leading participant in the Rumanian-Allied surrender talks in Cairo and Moscow in 1944.

⁷¹ Telegram 148, February 28, 7 p. m., from Bucharest, reported that the communiqué announcing that Prince Stirbey had been asked to form a government was suppressed by the Soviet censors and that the National Democratic Front had refused to participate in a government not under their control (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-145).

⁷² British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Superintending Under Secretary of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office.

ordered the disarming of the Rumanian troops in Bucharest and a drastic curtailment of the Rumanian police force in Bucharest. At the same time, Soviet troops in the city were being reinforced.

Disturbing as the situation in Rumania is, Sargent continued, he did not see what more could at this time be done by the British and American Governments. In contrast to British and American representation on Rumania, Soviet representation there is backed by Soviet military forces. In any event, Sargent concluded, British and American positions have now been made clear to the Russian Government.

Repeated to Moscow as 80.

WINANT

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-145: Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, March 1, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 9:12 p. m.]

151. Mr. Vishinsky asked me to call at 6 this evening.

At the interview I reaffirmed the views set forth in my letter to him adding a statement regarding press matters—the necessity for taking measures promptly to ensure the freedom of the press in Rumania and the importance of permitting American correspondents to come here.

Mr. Vishinsky replied that there was very little difference in the points of view of the Soviet and American Governments and there was even less since the Yalta Conference.

In answering my question as to whether a new Prime Minister had been selected, he said that the King would make the choice after consultation with party leaders. I said I assumed that the party leaders would designate their own party candidates to serve in the government and Mr. Vishinsky replied that there were several cliques in the older parties that were Fascist and, of course, representatives from such groups would be out of place in a government bound to fight fascism.

When I said that until elections were held it seemed desirable to maintain the same proportion of representation in the government, a proportion which had been agreed upon by party leaders, he said that this could not be maintained as each party made preposterous claims but that the important point was not representation upon a quantity but a quality basis. He said that we might differ upon the definition of a coalition government but to him it meant representatives who thought similarly, chosen from several parties.

Upon the question of disarming of political groups he said that this situation was brought about by Radescu's failure and, so reacting, it would be the duty of the new government.

My general impression from the meeting was that of confirmation of the reports I have recently forwarded to the Department. Mr. Vishinsky is acting under direct instructions. He hopes to succeed saving the appearance of constitutional procedure but if necessary he will sacrifice that for a speedy solution.

Repeated to Moscow as 33.

BERRY

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-645

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Vyshinsky)*⁷³

[BUCHAREST,] March 1, 1945.

DEAR MR. VYSHINSKY: Upon my return to the Mission I learned that a telegram had just arrived amplifying the views which I had expressed to you this afternoon.

The telegram directed me to inform you that the American Government considers that the public responsibility of the three Allied governments in the light of the Crimea Declaration requires that there will be full consultation among them on matters such as the situation in Rumania today.

At the time of the writing of the telegram to which I refer, the American Government had not received information from the Soviet Government regarding its views or proposals on dealing with the Rumanian situation but my Government hopes that the Soviet authorities in Rumania will take no decisive action in the matter until apprised of the results of such consultation among the three Allied governments.

I am informed that Ambassador Harriman has been instructed to make further representations in Moscow on this subject.

Yours very sincerely,

BURTON Y. BERRY

⁷³ Copy transmitted to the Department as enclosure 2 to despatch 147, March 6, from Bucharest, not printed. In his telegram 157, March 2, 1 p. m., Berry reported that he had held his conversation with Vyshinsky (see telegram 151, March 1, *supra*) before receiving Department's telegram 93, February 28 (*ante*, p. 485), but he had written to Vyshinsky on the evening of March 1 following closely the ideas expressed in the second paragraph of the Department's telegram. In his telegram 159, March 2, 7 p. m., Berry stated that after careful consideration he had come to the conclusion that it would not serve American interests to write to Vyshinsky concerning all 12 points mentioned in Department's telegram 90, February 24 (p. 478). Telegrams 157 and 159 from Bucharest are filed under 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-245.

Moscow Embassy Files : 800 Rumania

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

Moscow, March 1, 1945.

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I have received your letter of February 27 concerning the situation in Rumania, and have brought its contents to the attention of my Government.

Meanwhile I have received a further expression of my Government's views on this subject, and I am hastening to bring them to your attention. My Government hopes that they may be given consideration by your Government without delay.

The events of the past days have confirmed my Government's conviction that measures should be taken at once by the principal Allies to stabilize political conditions in Rumania. In my Government's opinion the responsibility of the Allies under the Atlantic Charter, the obligations which are implicit in the armistice agreement with Rumania, the decisions taken at the Crimea Conference and the practical war aims permit no escape from the joint responsibility of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom for insuring the continuance of a broadly representative governmental regime in Rumania during the present period.

The following are some of the factors with respect to the present situation in Rumania which are causing concern to my Government:

1. The possession of arms by minority political elements, which my Government considers discriminatory and unjustified;
2. The suppression of the liberal democratic press by action of the Allied Control Commission or by other means;
3. The inadequate means at the disposal of the Rumania Government for the maintenance of order;
4. The failure of the Allies to give the Rumanians political guidance along lines worked out by the three members of the Control Commission in consultation.

My Government, furthermore, has been astonished to learn that General Vinogradov failed to call a meeting of the Allied Control Commission on February 24 to consider what Allied action should be taken with respect to the rapidly developing political crisis, although such a meeting was urgently requested by General Schuyler and by his British colleague. I have been instructed to request an assurance from the Soviet Government that the Chairman of the Control Commission will at once be given such instructions as will remove any doubt that the American member of the Commission has the right to have a meeting of the Commission called whenever in his judgment there are sufficient and urgent reasons for so doing.

To meet the situation with which we are now faced, it is the considered opinion of the United States Government that the following action should be taken:

1. The coalition form of government in Rumania should be preserved in the present period. It should not be replaced by a government solely of the National Democratic Front or of any other narrow political faction;
2. The Rumanian Government should be given the means to restore order and maintain its authority, to which end prompt and effective measures should be taken to ensure it adequate military strength and support;
3. Immediate steps should be taken to ensure the freedom of the press in Rumania, subject to the provisions of Article XVI of the Rumanian armistice agreement;
4. All political parties and other special groups should be completely disarmed;
5. Major political matters affecting the interests and responsibilities in Rumania of the three Allied governments should in the future be made the subject of full consultation among the three members of the Allied Control Commission.

My Government hopes that the Soviet and the British Governments will concur in the foregoing proposals, and would be glad to have an indication of the views of the Soviet Government on the subject.

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-245: Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, March 2, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 10:30 a. m.]

154. At 3 o'clock yesterday afternoon Prince Stirbey informed the King he could not form a government. Shortly afterward Vishinsky sent him word that Groza⁷⁴ was the Soviet choice. Nevertheless the King proceeded to consult party leaders. Maniu was absolutely opposed to a Groza government. Bratianu⁷⁵ in view of Soviet desire was willing to accept Groza provided historic parties were equitably represented in such a government. Petrescu⁷⁶ was willing under similar circumstances. The Communists of course were pleased with Groza but they desire an entirely new government.

⁷⁴ Petru Groza, leader of the Plowmen's Front Party (one of parties constituting the National Democratic Front) and Vice President of the Council of Ministers in the Radescu government.

⁷⁵ Dinu Bratianu, long-time President of the National Liberal Party.

⁷⁶ Constantin Titel Petrescu, President of the Social Democratic Party.

At 10 o'clock last evening the King was informed personally by Vishinsky of Soviet wishes. At that interview Vishinsky's manner was firm but not brutal. Rumanians attribute this to my visit and that of the British representative to Vishinsky in the afternoon. Perhaps these had some effect although I believe Vishinsky will carry through his program until Moscow alters his instructions.

This morning the King plans to consult Tatarescu,⁷⁷ Lupu⁷⁸ and Mihalache⁷⁹ and after noon to give Groza a limited mandate for the formation of a government. He will tell Groza of the Soviet desire Tatarescu be Vice President then proceed in the normal way to inform him of the opinions of party leaders. He will instruct Groza to form a government "broadly representative of all democratic elements in all parties".⁸⁰

Throughout the crisis the King has proceeded as a constitutional monarch. The pressure upon him for a contrary action has been tremendous. (Reference my telegram 146, February 28, 7 p. m.; 150, March 1, 5 p. m.;⁸¹ and 152, March 1, 11 p. m.⁸²) This Mission informally has been able to extend some encouragement to him and has stressed importance of proceeding constitutionally but in absence of explicit instructions I believe it would be a mistake to suggest he delay beyond the schedule indicated meeting the Soviet demand.⁸³

Repeated to Moscow as 35.

BERRY

⁷⁷ Gheorghiu Tatarescu, member of the National Democratic Front, one-time leader in the National Liberal Party (before World War II), and Prime Minister 1933-37.

⁷⁸ Nicolae Lupu, member of the Executive Committee of the National Peasant Party.

⁷⁹ Ion Mihalache, member of the Executive Committee of the National Peasant Party.

⁸⁰ Telegram 160, March 2, from Bucharest, stated that events had proceeded according to the schedule outlined in this paragraph (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-245). Groza was given the mandate to form a government on March 2. There followed several troubled days of conferences and negotiations between party leaders, between these leaders and the King, and with Soviet officials until the completed Groza government was named on March 6. The new Groza government included 14 members of the National Democratic Front out of a total of 18 Ministers. The Communist Party gained the Ministries of Interior, Justice, War, and Communications.

⁸¹ Not printed; it reported that on February 28, Soviet authorities, acting in the name of the Allied Control Commission, had reduced the strength and armament of the Rumanian police force in Bucharest; Soviet foot patrols, tanks and aircraft were very much in evidence (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-145).

⁸² Not printed; it reported authoritative information that Vyshinsky had told the King on the evening of March 1 that the person who had the confidence of the Soviet Government was Groza who alone could unite the truly democratic elements of other parties; Vyshinsky allegedly also named Tatarescu as a Vice President who would undertake a policy of friendship with the U.S.S.R. (871.00/-3-145).

⁸³ With regard to this paragraph, the Department, in telegram 104, March 3, 7 p. m., informed Bucharest that it had been informed by the British Embassy in Washington that the British Foreign Office had instructed its representative in Bucharest to advise the King "not to take irrevocable step if he can possibly help it." (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-245)

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1945—3 p. m.

99. Reurtels 150-152 March 1.⁸⁴ The various measures taken by the Soviet authorities to disarm Rumanian military units in Bucharest, to send others from Bucharest to the front, to reduce the Rumanian police and to establish Russian forces in the Rumanian military headquarters and other strategic points have attracted the Department's particular attention. We hope that these steps have been taken solely for the purpose of maintaining order in the current political crisis and that the Soviet authorities will agree and act in accordance with our view, as suggested in numbered paragraph 4 of the Department's 90, February 24, that the Rumanian Government should in normal circumstances have at its disposal adequate forces to ensure maintenance of internal order. It seems to us imperative in any case, and particularly if the Rumanian administrative authorities are to be deprived of the means of maintaining order, that all political groups still retaining possession of their arms should be disarmed at once.

With regard to Vyshinsky's proposal of Groza as Premier and Tatarescu as Vice Premier, we have, as previously indicated, no desire to indicate preferences with regard to individuals. We confirm our view, however, that the coalition form of government should be preserved and that the above-named or any other individuals should be placed in power only in case they are acceptable to all major political groups.

We hope that you will continue to provide us with as full and precise information regarding Vyshinsky's activities while in Bucharest as may be possible. We have found most helpful the comprehensive information provided in your and Schuyler's reports and have noted with appreciation your joint work in dealing with the situation in the light of the Department's instructions.

We should like you to keep in mind that any observations we may wish to make to Soviet officials concerning the application of the Yalta Declaration should be presented preferably at Moscow rather than at Bucharest.

Sent to Bucharest; repeated to Moscow.⁸⁵

GREW

⁸⁴ Telegrams 150 and 152 not printed, but see footnotes 81 and 82, p. 493; for telegram 151, see p. 489.

⁸⁵ As telegram 446.

[The Department's expectations regarding the full implementation of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe with regard to the former Axis satellite countries and the Department's views on the attitude to be taken with regard to this agreement by the American representatives in the Allied Control Commissions for Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, are set forth in telegram 55, March 3, 6 p. m., to Sofia, volume IV, page 169.]

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2845: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON. March 3, 1945—4 p. m.

481. ReEmbtel 585 February 28.⁸⁶ Molotov's reply⁸⁷ to your letter about Rumania⁸⁸ indicates that the Soviet Government takes the view that the only "consultation" required of the Soviet Government is for the Soviet representatives on the ACC in Rumania to "continue to take measures to keep the Allies informed of the situation in accordance with the Commission's obligations as set forth in the Armistice Agreement". The Department is not willing to accept this statement as a satisfactory reply to our proposal for tripartite consultation on a matter which is of great concern to all three Allied Governments, particularly in the light of the Declaration on Liberated Europe recently signed at Yalta.

In line with these principles the Department instructed Berry on February 28⁸⁹ to let Vyshinsky know that we hoped the Soviet authorities in Rumania would take no decisive action until apprised of the results of consultation on the matter among the three Allied Governments.

If you have not yet received a reply to your communication to the Soviet Government based on the Department's 440 February 27, you are authorized to point out to Molotov personally the importance which this Government attaches to an immediate exchange of views among the three Allied Governments on the Rumanian situation in view of the rapid movement of events in Rumania. Since affairs have obviously not developed in an orderly way (reDeptel 417 February 24, final paragraph), in the judgment of this Government the situation requires that the three Governments concert with a view to reaching agreement on the fundamental questions involved, on which

⁸⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 62, p. 484.

⁸⁷ Molotov's letter to Harriman, February 27, p. 484.

⁸⁸ Harriman's letter to Molotov, February 26, not printed, but see footnote 52, p. 478.

⁸⁹ Telegram 93, February 28, to Bucharest, p. 485.

the Department's position was set forth in Department's 440 February 27. With respect to point (5) of the penultimate paragraph of that telegram, you may say that we proposed consultation among the chief representatives on the ACC not with a view to obtaining any change in the present division of responsibilities in the supervision of the execution of the armistice by the ACC under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, but because this was the only means by which a ready exchange of views on the spot by representatives of the three Allied Governments could be obtained. The question of Rumania's form of government is not a matter pertaining to any clause of the Armistice Agreement and therefore is not within the jurisdiction of the ACC, but is a matter calling for direct consultation and agreement by the three Governments themselves.

In view of Molotov's statement in his reply to your letter (reurtel 585 February 28) that the ACC in Rumania "would continue to keep the Allied representatives informed", you may tell him that the Soviet Vice-Chairman of the ACC has not even kept General Schuyler informed of action taken by the ACC or by representatives of the Soviet Government in giving orders to the Rumanian authorities. In your discretion you may tell Molotov that the Department finds it difficult to reconcile Vyshinsky's intervention in Bucharest, described in Berry's telegrams 27,⁹¹ 28⁹² and 34⁹³ of February 28 and March 1, with the Allied policy of consultation agreed upon at Yalta or with Vyshinsky's own statement to Berry (Bucharest's 33 March 1⁹⁴) that there is very little difference between the Soviet and the American points of view.

With respect to the measures taken by the Soviet military authorities in Rumania (Berry's 32 March 1⁹⁵), you may state that this Government is of course aware that the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of order in Rumania rests with the Soviet military authorities and that we presume that such measures as are being taken are directed to that end. We feel, however, that the series of steps by which the Soviet authorities, since last autumn, have weakened the forces at the disposal of the Rumanian Government while certain non-official factions were allowed to possess arms has contributed to the present crisis, and that a continuation of this policy will make it difficult for a new coalition government to avoid disorders similar to those of February 24 which inevitably interfere with Rumania's concentration on the task of contributing to the Allied war effort and fulfilling the armistice conditions.

⁹¹ Same as telegram 144, February 28, from Bucharest; see last sentence of footnote 65, p. 485.

⁹² Same as telegram 146, February 28, from Bucharest, p. 487.

⁹³ Same as telegram 150 from Bucharest; see footnote 81, p. 493.

⁹⁴ Same as telegram 151, March 1, from Bucharest, p. 489.

⁹⁵ Same as telegram 152, March 1, from Bucharest; see footnote 82, p. 493.

For your own information, we naturally find it impossible to accept Molotov's argument that the Soviet Government's unilateral intervention in the Rumanian political crisis is justified by the Rumanian government's "inability to maintain order", since the Soviet Government itself is in large measure responsible for the difficult situation in which the Radescu Government found itself.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to Bucharest and London.⁹⁶

GREW

Moscow Embassy Files : 800 Rumania

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*⁹⁷

[Translation]

Moscow, March 4, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Acknowledging receipt of your letter of March 1 regarding the situation in Rumania I wish to inform you as follows:

The events which have taken place recently in Rumania show clearly that the former Radescu Government not only was not capable of maintaining peace and order in Rumania but it also, as has been shown by the facts, did not wish to do this and by its actions in every way assisted the pro-Hitlerite elements in the guise of the "Iron Guards" in becoming more active. It is well known that under instructions from Radescu there took place in Rumania criminal violence and the shooting of peaceful citizens who were demanding the dissolution of the fascist organizations and the execution of the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The Government led by Radescu endeavored, as has been confirmed by many facts which have been published in the press, to force its will by terrorist measures on the majority of the Rumanian people who were not in accord with the policies of Radescu.

It is absolutely clear that such a situation in the rear of the Soviet army could not be tolerated and must be eliminated by the forming of a government in Rumania which will be able to maintain order in the country and conscientiously fulfill the conditions of the Rumanian Armistice Agreement. This is in the general interest of the Allies.

With respect to the proposal contained in your letter regarding maintaining in Rumania of a coalition government I wish to state that the Soviet Government is of the opinion that the new Rumanian Government should be formed from representatives of the democratic

⁹⁶ As telegrams 103 and 1642, respectively.

⁹⁷ A summary of Molotov's letter was transmitted to the Department in telegram 656, March 7, noon, from Moscow, not printed.

parties and non-party individuals who are prepared in fact to cooperate in the execution of the above mentioned tasks. Only a government formed on such a basis would be able to guarantee the destruction of the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism in Rumania, to create democratic institutions according to the choice of the people as is demanded by the Crimea Declaration and to maintain in the country the necessary order and tranquility. The interests of our common struggle against Hitlerite Germany require this.

With respect to the remark contained in your letter that General Vinogradov did not call on February 24 a meeting of the Allied Control Commission I wish to state that General Vinogradov gave a suitable explanation to the American representative General Schuyler on this question. In this connection it should be borne in mind that only three days before that time, i.e. on February 21 a meeting of this Commission took place.

With respect to the proposal concerning consultations on important political questions conversations between Mr. Vyshinski, who is in Bucharest at the present time, and the American and British representatives on the Allied Control Commission are taking place on these questions.

The Soviet Government hopes that on the part of the American representative in Rumania it will meet a corresponding support and cooperation in solving the situation which has developed in Rumania.

I have sent a similar letter to the British Ambassador.

Please accept [etc.]

V. M. MOLOTOV

Moscow Embassy Files : 800 Rumania

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

Moscow, March 5, 1945.

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: You will recall that in my letter to you of February 26 I stated that if political developments in Rumania should fail to take an orderly course along the lines indicated in the Declaration on Liberated Europe issued at the Crimea Conference, my Government felt that a situation would arise which would call for full consultation between the three major Allied powers.

In my letter to you of March 1, I set forth the views of my Government on the fundamental question involved in the present phase of

the Rumanian situation, and I proposed that major political matters affecting the interests and responsibilities in Rumania of the three Allied governments should in future be made the subject of full consultation among the three members of the Allied Control Commission.

I am writing now to make it clear that my Government considers that a situation has already arisen which calls for such tripartite consultation, particularly in the light of the Declaration on Liberated Europe agreed to at Yalta, and that appropriate arrangements for such consultation should be made at once. My Government does not view the statement made in the last paragraph of your letter of February 27, concerning measures to be taken to inform the Allies of the situation in Rumania, as a satisfactory answer to our desire for genuine tripartite consultation. In the past, the Soviet Vice Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Bucharest has not kept General Schuyler informed of action taken by the Commission or by representatives of the Soviet Government in giving orders to the Rumanian authorities, and any continuation of past practices in this respect would not be acceptable to my Government as a solution of the present need for tripartite consultation.

My Government's proposal that such consultation take place among the three representatives in the Allied Control Commission is not based on the responsibilities of that body for the supervision of the execution of the armistice under the direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. In advancing this proposal, my Government proceeded from the consideration that this represented the only means by which a ready exchange of views on the spot by representatives of the three governments could be achieved. My Government does not view the question of Rumania's form of government as one pertaining to any clause of the armistice agreement and therefore does not consider it as falling within the normal jurisdiction of the Allied Control Commission. It sees no reason, however, why the three Allied representatives on that body should not meet together to discuss, on behalf of their respective governments, this problem which so clearly calls for tripartite consultation and action.

In view of the above, I hope that the Soviet Government will now take immediate steps to make this consultation possible, and that I may be advised on the nature of the steps taken, in order that I may inform my Government promptly.

[File copy not signed]

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-645

*The Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Vyshinsky) to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)*⁹⁸

BUCHAREST, March 5, 1945.

DEAR MR. BERRY: In answer to your letters of February 23 and March 1, I inform you that the contents of these letters were transmitted by me to the Soviet Government.

As for the essence of the questions touched upon in these letters, I should like to remind you that in my conversation with you on February 28,⁹⁹ I presented to you the point of view of the Soviet Government according to which in the new Rumanian Government there should be represented all the truly democratic forces of Rumania and that such a Government should be able to assure in Rumania, which is in the rear of the Red Army, order and tranquillity, and likewise to assure the honorable and conscientious fulfillment of the conditions of the Armistice Agreement. In addition to this, I consider it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that the Crimea Conference demands the uprooting of the last traces of Nazism and Fascism, which should constitute likewise the extremely important task of the new Rumanian Government.

In connection with points two and three of your letter, the principles expressed in them, as is obvious, cannot call forth any objections.

Very sincerely yours,

A. VISHINSKY

⁹⁸ Copy transmitted to the Department as enclosure 5 to despatch 147, March 6, from Bucharest, not printed. Representative Berry quoted this letter at length in his telegram 168, March 6, 1 p. m., and concluded as follows: "From this letter I infer that Vyshinsky has had his instructions confirmed by Moscow. It seems clear he plans to install a government that is wholly or predominantly NDF. It seems clear, too, that one of the first tasks of such a government will be the purging of those elements which local Communists call 'Fascist' and we 'democratic'. According to hand bills that are now being distributed, among such elements are men as Maniu, Bratianu and Radescu. If our Government officially desires to extend a hand to save such people, and particularly Maniu, who during the entire German period was the symbol of resistance, it is not too early to begin its efforts." (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-645).

⁹⁹ There is no record of a Vyshinsky-Berry meeting on February 28. The first meeting between the two men appears to be that reported in telegram 151, March 1, p. 489.

Moscow Embassy Files : 800 Rumania

*The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)*¹

Moscow, March 7, 1945.

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I have received your letter of March 4, concerning the situation in Rumania, and I note that it appears to have crossed my letter to you of March 5 on the same subject.

While I appreciate receiving the statement of the Soviet position as set forth in your letter, I do not feel that it adequately answers the request which I had put forward that arrangements be made for effective tripartite consultation and action, through the three representatives on the Control Commission, with respect to the urgent political questions now existing in Rumania. I cannot concede that the purpose which my Government had in mind in proposing such consultation could be effectively served by an occasional interview between Mr. Vyshinsky, who I understand is only temporarily in Bucharest, and the American or the British representative. If the three countries are to join, as the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe envisaged, in assisting the people of Rumania to establish conditions of internal peace and to form an interim government broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population, then their representatives must have an opportunity for regular tripartite consultation to reach agreement and to assure that appropriate measures are taken.

I wish to stress once more the importance my Government attaches to agreement among the three allied governments on a solution of the Rumanian crisis in harmony with the Crimea Declaration.

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

¹ In his telegram 656, March 7, Ambassador Harriman reported that he was replying to Molotov's letter of March 4 "since it does not adequately answer my letter . . ." He concluded with the following observation: "My experience indicates that the written word is usually more effective than presentation of our position orally in this sort of situation." (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-745) Telegram 520, March 6, to Moscow, stated that the Department awaited with great interest the reaction of the Soviet Government to Harriman's presentation of the American position on the Rumanian situation and authorized Harriman to take whatever steps were appropriate to impress upon the Soviet Government the urgency which the American Government attached to its proposals for agreement among the three Allied Governments for joint action to ensure a resolution of the Rumanian crisis in harmony with the Crimea Declaration (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-645).

Moscow Embassy Files : 800 Rumania

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
(Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*²

[Translation]

Moscow, March 7, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In reply to your letter of March 5 concerning events in Rumania, I have the honor to inform you herewith that the point of view of the Soviet Government on the situation in Rumania was exhaustively set forth in my letter to you of March 4. At the same time I presume that the question raised in your letter has lost its keenness by this time inasmuch as the government crisis in Rumania brought on by the terroristic policy of Radescu, which was incompatible with the principles of democracy, has been overcome by the formation of the new government.

Please accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-745 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary
of State*

BUCHAREST, March 7, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received March 8—6:40 p. m.]

179. For Department only. This afternoon I passed 2 hours with the King and Queen Mother hearing their account of the events of the last 8 days.

The King confirmed the facts which I reported in my telegram No. 142, February 27, midnight³ of the arrival in Bucharest of Vyshinsky and his first call at the palace.

The King said he was under the impression that Prince Stirbey was pleased when he did not succeed in forming a government. (Re my telegram No. 154 of March 2, 10 a. m.) He confirmed point by point the information supplied in my No. 146 of February 28, 7 p. m. and when it was time for me to go he took me to his study to point out the plaster that was cracked around the door frame when Vyshinsky terminated so brusquely his second interview by banging the door of the King's study.

At Vyshinsky's third audience he informed the King that he had been sent to Rumania by Marshal Stalin to convey a special message. The King's phraseology describing the message was very similar to

² This letter was summarized and partially quoted in telegram 683, March 8, from Moscow, not printed.

³ See footnote 65, p. 485.

that reported in my No. 152 of March 1, 11 p. m.⁴ He added the interesting statement that Mr. Vyshinsky had said to him that the American and British representatives had called that day (March 1) at the Soviet Legation and had made inquiries about the formation of the new Government but he had denied any knowledge of who would head the Government. Vyshinsky said he informed the King of this as a proof of Soviet Government's confidence in the King and he asked that the King respond with equal confidence in Soviet Government.

Since Stirbey, a neutral, had failed and Vyshinsky had nominated Groza in name of Soviet Government, the King felt he must charge Groza with the formation of a government. However, because of Groza's small following in the country the King limited his mandate by the language reported in my No. 162 of March 3, 6 p. m.⁵ Because of its unrepresentative character the King refused to accept the first cabinet presented by Groza and recommended discussions among the party leaders for purpose of finding another Prime Minister designate. At this stage Vyshinsky sent word that the cancelation of Groza mandate would be considered by Soviet Government as a hostile act. From that time, Saturday evening,⁶ the King said to his way of thinking he had to decide only one question, whether to get out or stay.

He said it had been authoritatively reported to me that he had decided on Monday not to accept a Groza minority government (re my telegram 167, March 5, 7 p. m.⁷) and I inquired what factors caused him to change his mind. He replied that Monday evening⁸ two reports were brought to him, one from Vyshinsky saying unless the King accepted a Groza government by the following afternoon, Vyshinsky could not be responsible for the continuance of Rumania as an independent state, and the other brought by Groza saying the Soviets had promised great improvement in relations between Soviet Union and Rumania upon formation of a NDF government. He mentioned specifically, the return of the control of the transportation system, the return of northern Transylvania and an application of the terms of the armistice with greater tolerance. The King summoned the leaders of the historic parties late Monday night (re my telegram

⁴ See footnote 82, p. 493.

⁵ The language used by the King, as quoted in telegram 162, March 3, from Bucharest, was as follows: "I charge you to form a government of large democratic concentration with the help of all parties in normal proportion so that it might result in a complete understanding and to assure a government of order and productive labor." (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-345)

⁶ March 3.

⁷ Not printed; it reported, *inter alia*, that the King had told those near him that if Groza could not form a government under the original mandate, he, the King, would again consult all party leaders with the idea of surrendering his prerogatives (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/6-545).

⁸ March 5.

171 of March 6, 7 p. m.⁹). Both he and the Queen Mother appealed to them to put aside party politics and throw their full strength into helping the country in this emergency. They agreed.

The following morning each party made stipulations and the result was no agreement could be made between NDF and historic parties. Some of his close advisors, such as Visoianu and Savel Radulescu, then urged the King to abdicate. The Queen urged a regency. Others such as the Marshal of the Court¹⁰ and the Patriarch urged him to stay on. Tuesday noon he again summoned Maniu and Bratianu. Bratianu came speaking for himself and Maniu who was bedfast. The King explained his predicament and asked Bratianu's advice as the eldest statesman of the country. Bratianu said the King should not desert the country.

In describing his thinking the King said he decided if he abdicated it would be hailed in some quarters abroad as a magnificent gesture for a principle but the Rumanian people would be no better off. If he stayed and "ate some humble pie" he might be able to do something for his people. He said he was not afraid of the Russians as when he acted on August 23 he knew the Russians would occupy Rumania but he was not so sure of the Rumanian Communists. Nevertheless he took "one of the risks of the procession and decided to stay".

I inquired if the public demonstrations and parades had helped him to make his decision. He replied that he did not know about what was going on in the streets as he was so busy with conferences within the palace.

The unexpected arrival of Marshal Malinovsky Tuesday morning the King took to be a sign of confirmation of Vyshinsky's threat. He thought the Marshal had come to preserve order while the NDF installed a Groza government by popular acclamation.

At this point the Queen asked why I had not given them an indication as to whom the American Government preferred as Prime Minister. I said I had sent the King word of our desire for a coalition government broadly representative of all political groups and social classes but that I could not suggest any personality as that would be interpreted as putting our finger into the Rumanian political broth. The King replied, "Why should you hesitate to put your finger in the broth when you know that your ally has put his hand down my throat." Tuesday afternoon the Groza government was formed and in the evening it was sworn in. An hour later Vyshinsky and Marshal Malinovsky had an audience with the King. Malinovsky read a brief political lecture to the King to the effect that order must be preserved,

⁹ Not printed; it described domestic Rumanian political negotiations of March 5-6 culminating in the announcement of the morning of March 6 that Groza had formed a government (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-645).

¹⁰ Dimitri Negel.

full concentration could not be given to front line activities if there were unrest behind the lines, that the Rumanian Government had failed in the past and that it was not going to be permitted to fail in the future. At this audience Vyshinsky was less dogmatic but the manner and conversation of both officials left no doubt in the King's mind that they had planned to install a Groza government.

When I touched upon the future the King said both Groza and Tatarescu ¹¹ had given their word that they would not start political recriminations. But he said, "I don't know whether or not Ana Pauker will approve those promises."

BERRY

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ¹²

[Extract] ¹³

LONDON, 8 March 1945.

905. 1. I feel sure that you will be as distressed as I am by recent events in Roumania. The Russians have succeeded in establishing the rule of a Communist minority by force and misrepresentation. We have been hampered in our protests against these developments by the fact that, in order to have the freedom to save Greece,¹⁴ Eden and I at Moscow in October recognised that Russia should have a largely preponderant voice in Roumania and Bulgaria while we took the lead in Greece.¹⁵ Stalin adhered very strictly to this understanding during the 30 days fighting against the Communists and ELAS ¹⁶ in the city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most disagreeable to him and those around him.

Peace has now been restored in Greece and, though many difficulties lie before us, I hope that we shall be able to bring about in the next

¹¹ Tatarescu became Vice Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Groza government.

¹² Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹³ For the remainder of this message, see p. 147.

¹⁴ For documentation regarding the policy of the United States with respect to the question of the political organization of Greece following liberation from German occupation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 84 ff.

¹⁵ In regard to the proposal to share wartime influence between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on the basis of proposed percentages in the Balkan countries, see *ibid.*, pp. 113-131, *passim*. See also *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), vol. II, pp. 1451-1459, and Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), pp. 72-81, 226-235. The substance of the arrangements was given in Churchill's speech of January 18, 1945, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 408, cols. 398-399. For reports on discussions of Balkan affairs during Churchill's visit to Moscow in October 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, pp. 1006-1019, *passim*.

¹⁶ Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (National Popular Liberation Army).

few months free, unfettered elections, preferably under British, American and Russian supervision, and that thereafter a constitution and government will be erected on the indisputable will of the Greek people, which remains our supreme ultimate objective in all cases, and with which I know you are in sympathy.

2. Stalin is now pursuing the opposite course in the two Black Sea Balkan countries, and one which is absolutely contrary to all democratic ideas. Since the October Anglo-Russian conversations in Moscow Stalin has subscribed on paper to the principles of Yalta which are certainly being trampled down in Roumania. Nevertheless I am most anxious not to press this view to such an extent that Stalin will say "I did not interfere with your action in Greece, why do you not give me the same latitude in Roumania?"

This again would lead to comparisons between the aims of his action and those of ours. On this neither side would convince the other. Having regard to my personal relations with Stalin, I am sure it would be a mistake for me at this stage to embark on the argument.

3. Again I am very conscious of the fact that we have on our hands the much more important issue of Poland, and I do not therefore want to do anything as regards Roumania which might prejudice our prospects of reaching a Polish settlement. Nevertheless, I feel that he should be informed of our distress at the developments which led to the setting up by force of a government in Roumania of a Communist minority, since this conflicts with the conclusions of the declaration on liberated Europe upon which we were agreed at the Crimea conference.

More especially I am afraid that the advent of this Communist Government may lead to an indiscriminate purge of Anti-Communist Roumanians, who will be accused of Fascism much on the lines of what has been happening in Bulgaria. This is as good as foretold in the Moscow broadcast of yesterday, the text of which I have telegraphed to our Embassy.

I would suggest, therefore, that Stalin should be asked to see to it that the new government does not immediately start a purge of all political elements which are in opposition to their views on the ground that they have been encouraged to do so by the Yalta declaration.

We will, of course, give you every support, and if you will show me the text of any message you feel inclined to send Stalin, I will also send one to him supporting it. There is, of course, complete agreement between our representatives on the spot and yours. . . .

871.00/3-645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1945—9 p. m.

114. Pursuant to Deptel 110 March 7, 8 p. m.,¹⁷ the Department has now seen General Schuyler's message to the War Department stating that, now that a Rumanian government has been formed and assumed authority, he will not in the absence of explicit instruction from the State and War Departments accede to Stevenson's requests that he support the position taken by the British Mission on the question of sanctuary or provide American protection for political refugees.

As stated in Deptel 86, February 23, we believe that, apart from the special position of the Soviet Chairman who can act also in the name of the Soviet High Command, any action taken by a member of the Allied Control Commission can be considered as having been taken only in his capacity as a member of the Commission. We accordingly are in agreement with General Schuyler's view that he should take no action having a purely American character on the matter of sanctuary, unless, of course, it should be forced upon him as a matter of necessity in extreme circumstances where lives are endangered by the immediate threat of physical violence. Since the Rumanian Government which has now come into power must bear full responsibility for its acts, including action or inaction in matters involving the protection of life, and since that government is under the control of the ACC, we believe it would be appropriate for General Schuyler to present and to hold constantly before that Commission the American view that the Rumanian authorities should not be permitted to commit or countenance physical violence or other excesses against Radescu and other Rumanian personages who for purely political reasons are not looked upon with favor by those now in power.

Because of the informal character of your Mission it can scarcely be considered as having such standing in international law as would enable it to exercise the right of asylum on grounds of extraterritoriality or immunity of domicile in the accepted sense. Even though

¹⁷ Not printed; it reported that the British Embassy in Washington had informed the Department of State that former Prime Minister Radescu had sought sanctuary in the British Mission in Rumania and that similar requests from other fugitives, including possibly the King and his mother and Maniu, were anticipated; the British Foreign Office had authorized Air Vice Marshal Stevenson to accord such sanctuary and hoped that General Schuyler would be given instructions authorizing him to support Stevenson's actions and in case of need to share the burden of providing protection in appropriate cases (871.00/2-2345).

we would expect that your Mission would in practical effect enjoy all the rights and privileges of a diplomatic mission, we believe that matters of sanctuary should as far as possible be handled by Schuyler's Mission and that neither your nor his Mission should provide protection to political fugitives except in the most extreme necessity and then only until the ACC can take the matter in hand.

The present telegram has been cleared with the War Department.

Reurtel 173, March 6.¹⁸ It is hoped that matters will not arise, at least within the next few days, to necessitate your entering into contact with the newly installed authorities in such a way as might be construed as indicating approval of the course of events and the methods employed in the last fortnight.

GREW

871.00/3-1045: Telegram

*The Rumanian Prime Minister (Groza) to President Roosevelt*¹⁹

[Translation]

BUCHAREST, March 10, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 10:50 p. m.]

THE PRESIDENT: At the moment of the installation of the Rumanian Government I send greetings to the President of the United States imbued with the highest purposes in combat by which United Nations are rendering Hitler Germany powerless. Rumanian Government gives assurance that Rumania will make all efforts to defeat fascism quickly. Rumanian Government hopes that in that way a new international situation will be created which will allow of participation in the work of organizing peaceably the world of tomorrow. Hurrah for the common combat of the peoples to render fascism powerless, hurrah for Rumanian-American friendship.

DR. PETRU GROZA

President of the Council

¹⁸ Not printed; it asked for urgent instructions as to the attitude the Department wished the American Mission in Rumania to take toward the Groza government in view of the fact that the methods used to bring that government into being were quite contrary to the Department's principles as outlined in previous telegrams to Bucharest and to Moscow (871.00/3-645).

¹⁹ This message was sent in Rumanian via commercial cable. The White House referred it to the Department of State on March 12 for translation and appropriate action. The Department recommended that no reply be made; see telegram 157, March 27, 10 a. m., to Bucharest, p. 524.

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1045: Telegram

*The Rumanian Prime Minister (Groza) to President Roosevelt*²⁰

[Translation]

BUCHAREST, March 10, 1945—7: 50 p. m.

[Received March 12—9: 30 a. m.]

THE PRESIDENT: At the time when by the consent of the Soviet Government administration by Rumania is reestablished in liberated northern Transylvania²¹ and a historic injustice is thus atoned for I must express to Your Excellency at the same time as the joy and gratitude of the Rumanian Government and people at seeing the just aspirations of Rumania accomplished in conformity with the armistice concluded with the United Nations her firm will to continue the combat against the common foe until final victory [is secured].^{21a}

PETRU GROZA

President of the Council of Ministers

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²²

[Extract]²²

WASHINGTON, 11 March 1945.

714. Your 905. I have of course had very much in mind the considerations in regard to Rumania and to the Polish question raised in your 905, March 8, and share your concern over these developments. I am fully determined, as I know you are, not to let the good decisions we reached at the Crimea slip through our hands and will certainly do everything I can to hold Stalin to their honest fulfillment. In regard to the Rumanian situation Averell has taken up and is taking up again the whole question with Molotov invoking the Declaration on Liberated Europe and has proposed tripartite discussions to carry out these responsibilities. It is obvious that the Russians have installed a minority government of their own choosing, but apart from the reasons you mentioned in your message, Rumania

²⁰ This message was sent in French via commercial cable. The White House referred it to the Department of State on March 12 for translation and appropriate action. The Department recommended that no reply be made; see telegram 157, March 27, 10 a. m., to Bucharest, p. 524.

²¹ In an exchange of messages between Prime Minister Groza and Marshal Stalin on March 8 and 9, 1945, the Soviet Government agreed to the establishment of Rumanian administration in Transylvania. Article 19 of the Allied Armistice with Rumania, September 12, 1944, had provided for the return of Transylvania (or the greater part thereof) to Rumania, subject to the confirmation of the peace settlement.

^{21a} Brackets appear in the file translation.

²² Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²³ The remainder of this telegram is printed on p. 157.

is not a good place for a test case. The Russians have been in undisputed control from the beginning and with Rumania lying athwart the Russian lines of communications it is moreover difficult to contest the plea of military necessity and security which they are using to justify their action. We shall certainly do everything we can, however, and of course will count on your support.

ROOSEVELT

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1945—8 p. m.

569. The Department does not feel that Mr. Molotov's two letters²⁴ summarized in your 656 March 7 and 683 March 8²⁵ provide any substantial reassurance with respect to the problems we have in mind in connection with Rumania. The formation of the new Government has not dissipated our concern, but merely served to strengthen our conviction that it is important immediately to arrange for Allied consultation on the Rumanian situation.

You are accordingly directed to address to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs the formal request of this Government that the Soviet Government agree that the three principal Allies should proceed immediately to consult together on the measures necessary to discharge with respect to Rumania their joint responsibilities set forth in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe. You should say that we feel strongly that recent events in that country, concerning which we were at no time consulted or adequately informed by the Soviet Government, make it necessary for representatives of the three Governments to meet and examine together the issues involved, with a view to arriving at a genuinely concerted policy and procedure in assisting the Rumanians to solve their pressing political problems and to ensuring that they are on the road to the "establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." You may add that American public opinion is watchful of our responsibilities as set forth in the Declaration with respect to the former Axis satellite states.

Although the British Government has suggested Washington as a venue, we believe that consultation on this matter can best take place in the first instance at Moscow, where you and your British colleague can engage in direct discussions with Mr. Molotov or his representa-

²⁴ For texts of Molotov's letters of March 4 and March 7 to Ambassador Harriman, see pp. 497 and 502, respectively.

²⁵ Neither printed.

tive. Please propose urgently, therefore, that dispositions be made whereby Mr. Molotov or his representative will initiate joint conversations at the earliest possible moment looking to the formulation of agreed policies and procedures for implementing the Yalta decisions in the case of Rumania. You may say that we would propose, for example, that after the general policies and procedures have been agreed upon, their proper application should be ensured by setting up in Bucharest a joint committee composed of three political representatives to be designated by the three Allied Governments respectively for the purpose.

Please stress the urgency which we attach to this matter.

Detailed instructions for your guidance will of course be forwarded if Soviet and British agreement to the consultation is forthcoming.

The Embassy in London is being requested to seek British concurrence in our proposal that the consultation take place in Moscow.

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London and Bucharest.²⁶

STETTINIUS

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 14, 1945—midnight.

[Received March 15—11:47 a. m.]

756. In accordance with the Department's 569, March 12, 8 p. m., I have today addressed to Molotov concerning our attitude to the situation in Rumania, a formal note embodying the request set forth in the Department's message. I am stating in this note that a similar proposal is being made to the British Government.

I believe we should recognize that if we are successful in arranging for such a consultation here that we will face a considered and pre-determined policy established not by Molotov alone but by the higher Soviet Governmental and party authorities. This policy is probably in line with their long-range plans established some time ago for the Balkan and eastern European states. The most, therefore, that we can expect, at least in the early stages of the discussions, is a chance to repeat orally and in greater detail the views which have already been set forth to Molotov in my letters and which Berry and General Schuyler have outlined to Soviet officials in Rumania. I recognize that the Rumanian situation is in many ways secondary in importance to Poland and if we come to a point in our relations with the Soviet Government where we feel we must make a major issue I believe that we would be on firmer grounds to do so in connection with

²⁶ As telegrams 1902 and 122, respectively.

Poland. Also, a serious and public issue over Rumania might prejudice our chances of a reasonable settlement regarding Poland. On the other hand, I heartily concur with the Department's firm position taken in regard to Rumania and agree that we should not give in and not let the situation go by default, but should continue to keep it open and press for a satisfactory solution along the lines the Department has set forth.

Should these consultations materialize, would the Department consider detailing Berry to proceed here to act as my adviser while they are in progress? I think it would be valuable to have someone who has a thorough knowledge of conditions on the spot and who can speak with authority in questions of fact, since the Soviet policy will undoubtedly be founded on the thesis that our information is incorrect.

Sent to Department as 756, repeated to Bucharest as 45 and to London as 118.

HARRIMAN

Moscow Embassy Files : 800 Rumania

*The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)*²⁷

Moscow, March 14, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: In accordance with instructions received from the Secretary of State, I have the honor to request, in the name of the United States Government, the agreement of the Soviet Government to immediate consultations between the three principal Allies with a view to determining how best to discharge with respect to Rumania the joint responsibilities of the three powers set forth in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe.

My Government feels strongly that recent events in Rumania, concerning which it was at no time consulted or kept adequately informed by the Soviet Government, make it essential that representatives of the three Governments should meet and examine together the issues involved, with a view to arriving at genuinely concerted policies and procedures in assisting the Rumanians to solve their pressing political

²⁷ Under separate cover, Ambassador Harriman addressed the following letter, dated March 14, to Foreign Commissar Molotov: "Your two letters to me of March 4 and March 7 concerning the situation in Rumania have now been given careful consideration by my Government, and I feel that I should tell you that they have not served to reassure my Government with respect to the problems in question. I have accordingly been instructed to address to you my Government's request for consultations on the measures necessary to enable us to discharge, with respect to Rumania, our joint responsibilities as set forth in the Crimea Declaration. This formal request is going forward under separate cover and I hope that it will receive the immediate attention of the Soviet Government." (Moscow Embassy Files : 800 Rumania)

problems and to assuring their progress toward the "establishment through free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people".

I may say in this connection that American opinion is watchful of the responsibilities of the United States Government with respect to the former Axis satellite states, as set forth in the Crimea Declaration.

It is the view of my Government that the consultations looking to the formulation of policies and procedures to be employed in implementing the Crimea decisions with respect to Rumania might well take place in the first instance in Moscow, between you, the British Ambassador and myself. We would propose, for example, as a second step that when such policies and procedures have been agreed upon a tripartite committee be established in Bucharest to ensure their proper application. This committee, as envisaged by my Government, would be composed of three political representatives, to be designated for this purpose by the three governments, respectively.

I wish accordingly to propose that tripartite conversations, along the lines indicated, be initiated in this city without delay, and I should appreciate receiving an early indication of the view of the Soviet Government with respect to this proposal.

My Government considers this matter an urgent one and hopes that action along the lines described above may be initiated without delay.

A similar proposal is being made to the British Government.

Accept [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2445: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*²⁸

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1945—11 p. m.

605. The Department's attitude on the question of granting co-belligerent status to Rumania was set forth in the Department's telegrams to Bucharest of January 30 and February 24, repeated to you as numbers 195 and 416. While the considerations underlying our view that Rumania's desire for such status should have sympathetic consideration remain unchanged, the Department does not consider

²⁸ Sent also to London as No. 2010 and repeated to Bucharest as No. 133. Telegram 3248, March 29, from London, reported that the sense of the Department's instruction had been conveyed to the British Foreign Office and Foreign Secretary Eden had responded in a letter of March 26 in part as follows: "I am glad to say that we are in full agreement with your Government in considering that Rumania should not for the present be granted any such status". (740.00119-Control (Rumania)/3-2945)

the present time appropriate for the Allies to take such a step, as it would be subject to interpretation as an intentional act of approval of the present authorities and by implication a disparagement of the principle of coalition government.

In order to provide a safeguard against the possible difficult situation which would be created should the Soviet Government act unilaterally and recognize Rumania as a cobelligerent without consulting the United States and British Governments, the Department would like you to inform the Government to which you are accredited that this Government believes that the present Allied policy of not granting cobelligerent status to Rumania should remain unchanged for the present and that no decision on the Rumanian request for such status except as a joint decision arrived at after consultation among the three Governments should be taken.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1645: Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, March 16, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received March 16—6:35 p. m.]

193. Rumanian political events of the past 3 weeks placed in relation to the general scheme of events in Rumania since the Soviet armies occupied the country give additional clarity to the definition of present Soviet projects and future plans. (See my telegram No. 128, February 19, 12 p. m.)

In the near future the Groza Cabinet, according to both private and public declarations of several Ministers, will proceed to the (1) expropriation of all estates of farmland in excess of 50 hectares and distribution of expropriated lands to the peasants; (2) strengthening of relations by every means between Rumania and the Soviet Union including a mutual assistance pact; (3) purging from the military and civilian services all non-Democratic (that is non-NDF) elements.

Concurrently it is expected that other forces which were set in motion by the Communists during the tenure of General Radescu will continue their activities unchecked. These forces find expression through (1) vigilance committees which preserve order in place of now inadequate police and *gendarmerie*; (2) peasant committees that expropriate and distribute land without legal authority and (3) workmen's committees which demand a voice and sometimes a dominant voice in the management of every industry. The program of these forces as nearly as I have been able to learn is the program of the local Communist Party. It includes a complete Agrarian reform, destruction of the National

Peasant and National Liberal Parties, elimination of foreign trade excepting with the Soviet Union, dissolution of the banking institutions and disappearance of the Monarchy.

In Rumania the Soviet Government now can exert pressure as required directly on the government, on the government through the ACC or on the government through the people. Both Groza and Tatarescu personally are so compromised by past activities that they are likely to act as willing servants. Should, however, they rebel it would be a simple matter as Vishinsky told Petrescu only last evening in speaking of Vice President Tatarescu "to uncover the record and act accordingly". And conditions throughout the country, which are already running toward anarchy, would make it possible at such time to set up by popular demand a Communist.

The forestalling of such an event is the chief preoccupation of nearly all Rumanian leaders. As an armistice signatory it is our concern too. At one stage it seemed it would be possible for the Rumanians themselves to arrest the communization movement and bring about the moral rehabilitation of the nation. For this they needed a little encouragement from the United Nations such as the granting of co-belligerency, the return of the control of the communication system, and the return of administration direction of the whole country.

The time has now passed when such inducements will prove effective. In fact if forces set in motion can be controlled but if they are it will be through an immediate examination of the situation in Rumania on the highest level among the Allies in the spirit of the published declaration of Yalta such as an examination to be followed at once by a setting up in Rumania of a truly tripartite commission under a revised ACC.

Repeated to Moscow as 53 and Caserta as 34.

BERRY

740.0011 E.W./3-1645 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*²⁹

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1945—midnight.

2054. The British Embassy has handed the Department a memorandum concerning the interpretation of the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe which states that even before the situation in Rumania led the U.K. government to support the U.S. government's invocation of the Three Power Declaration on Liberated Territories, the Foreign Office had been considering the general implications of the Declara-

²⁹ Repeated to Moscow as Department's No. 621.

tion and, without prejudice to what may come out of the Rumanian situation, feels it important that the U.K. and U.S. governments reach a clear idea of and agreement upon the general interpretation to be placed by them on the Declaration. The memorandum then states that in view of the very general terms in which the Declaration was drafted, the Foreign Office feels that two different interpretations can be placed on it, namely (1) that when all three governments *jointly* consider it necessary to set up some special machinery they would proceed to do so, or (2) that no unilateral action by any one of the signatory governments is permissible, as regards matters mentioned in the Declaration, in any liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe.

For your information and guidance, the Department's informal reply to the British Embassy was as follows:

"In opening paragraph of the declaration the three powers undertake an unconditional obligation to concert their policies in the following terms:

'They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in the liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.'

This obligation while unconditional is general in character.

The specific operative sections of the declaration are governed by the paragraph reading:

'When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.'

The only reasonable interpretation of this language is that all three governments must agree as a prerequisite to setting the operative sections of the declaration in motion."

STETTINIUS

Moscow Embassy Files: 800 Rumania

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) ³⁰

[Translation]

Moscow, March 17, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In connection with your letters of March 14 in which are set forth proposals of the Government of the United

³⁰ A paraphrased text of Molotov's letter was transmitted to the Department in telegram 805, March 17, 1945, midnight, from Moscow, not printed.

States of America concerning the situation in Rumania and also your letter of March 7, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

1. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that after the formation in Rumania of the Government of concentration of democratic forces which brought about the establishment of order and tranquility—this having a most important bearing on the security of the rear line communications of the Soviet armies fighting against the Germans—the situation in Rumania does not now require any special measures being taken on the part of the United States, Great Britain or the Soviet Union.

2. Furthermore it should be pointed out that in the exposition of the basic reasons of your proposals an interpretation of the decisions adopted at the Crimea Conference, as set forth in the Declaration on Liberated Europe, is included which has been broadened and which does not correspond to the facts. This Declaration, in so far as the mutual obligations of the three powers are concerned in relation to the former Axis satellite states in Europe and the measures which should be taken under certain conditions in these states, of course is based upon the presence there of Allied Control Commissions on which are imposed certain obligations in relation to these countries. Notwithstanding, the proposal of the United States Government concerning the organization in Rumania of a tri-partite Commission is directed toward the annulling of the Allied Control Commission and toward the emasculating of the role of the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission.

3. With respect to your statement that the Allied Control Commission in Rumania has never consulted with the Government of the United States of America on the recent events in that country and that the Soviet Government has not properly informed the American Government concerning these events, this statement does not conform to the facts since these events were repeatedly discussed in Bucharest by A. Y. Vyshinski and Lt. General Susaikov with the American representatives Mr. Berry and General Schuyler as well as with the British representatives, all of whom received the necessary information.

I do not deem it superfluous to cite these instances of discussion and exchange of information between the Allied representatives in Bucharest in connection with events in Rumania which as is well known are completely at variance with the situation in Italy where on no occasions have the Allied representatives on the Allied Control Commission informed the Soviet representative of important measures undertaken by that Control Commission.

In view of the above the Soviet Government cannot agree with the proposals of the American Government as contained in your above mentioned note.

V. M. MOLOTOV

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1945

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

With reference to their memorandum of March 17th³¹ expressing His Majesty's Government's agreement that any consultations regarding Roumania should be held in Moscow, His Majesty's Embassy have now been instructed to inform the Department of State that His Majesty's Government also agree that His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow should support his United States colleague in any representations which the latter may make to the Soviet Government on the basis of the Department of State's instructions referred to in the first paragraph of the British Embassy's memorandum under reference.³² Instructions are being sent to Sir A. Clark Kerr accordingly.

In informing the United States Government of the foregoing, His Majesty's Embassy have been instructed to say that, in the event of the Soviet Government's declining to participate in the proposed tripartite discussions, His Majesty's Government would greatly appreciate the opportunity of discussing the whole situation with the United States Government before a decision is taken as to their next step.

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1945.

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-2045: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 20, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received March 21—4: 05 a. m.]

829. A letter has been addressed to Molotov, in accordance with Department's 605, March 15, 11 p. m., stating our view that co-belligerent status should not be granted to Rumania at this time and that no decision on this matter should be made except after consultation. Coming after receipt of the categoric rebuff by the Soviet Government for our proposal for general tripartite consultation on Ru-

³¹ Not printed.

³² The first paragraph of the British Embassy's memorandum summarized the contents of a note of March 13 from Ambassador Winant to Foreign Secretary Eden in which Winant communicated the contents of the instructions contained in telegram 569, March 12, to Moscow, repeated to London as 1902, p. 510.

mania, I doubt that our views on the question of co-belligerency will carry much weight with the Soviet Government. There is a possibility that our representations may even encourage the Russians to proceed independently to recognize Rumania as a co-belligerent in order to demonstrate the independence of their policy.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-2145: Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, March 21, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 7:15 p. m.]

205. This Mission lately has received several inquiries concerning the resumption of trade between the United States and Rumania. As this subject must be coming increasingly before the Department the following is presented as background for the Department's discussion with American exporters.

From a strictly Rumanian point of view a desire could not be stronger for American trade. The Rumanian change over from the Axis camp has created psychologically an immense demand for American goods. At the same time exhaustion of stocks during 4 years of war has created a large physical demand for the same products. But neutralizing these demands are the heavy burdens placed recently on Rumanian economy by the obligation to meet reparation payments under article XI of the Armistice Agreement. In addition since early last autumn very heavy demands have been made upon the economy under the authority of article X and still heavier demands are now being made under article XII.

In spite of the foregoing it might be possible to look for a reopening of American trade on a small scale if it were not for political considerations. These considerations seem to indicate that Russia plans to dominate Rumanian economic life.

Some Rumanian officials have been told that any goods remaining after the conditions of the armistice have been satisfied will be absorbed by the Soviet Union under a commercial exchange agreement. These officials recall that the Rumanian trade delegation which went to Turkey was ordered by the Soviet authorities to return when the success of the mission seemed likely.

Many Rumanian businessmen believe that it is the plan of the Soviet Government to bring about paralysis of the Rumanian economic life by increasing the demands under the armistice to a point where Ru-

mania will be unable to fulfill the terms of the agreement. They point out that this would fit into the overall Soviet plan to level the economy of the frontier states to at least that of the Soviet Union. They recall that the Rumanian Communists desire to see eliminated all foreign trade except that with the Soviet Union (re my telegram No. 193 of March 16, 7 p. m.).

Rumanian political leaders, as I have frequently reported, are quite convinced that the Soviet Government is planning for the dissolution of the Rumanian State. These men openly say that even [if?] Rumania cannot [*could?*] fulfill the terms of the armistice, the armistice agreement will be denounced by Russia, and the armistice and Rumania will disappear together. This point of view is gaining adherents as heavier and heavier Russian demands become known. (Please see Egen [*Gen.*] Schuyler's telegram of March 1, 8 p. m.—567³³).

It is the considered opinion of this Mission that American manufacturers and exporters should not be encouraged to look forward to a resumption of trade unless the American Government is prepared to take a sufficiently firm stand with the Soviet Government as to bring about an understanding whereby Americans and Soviets will have equal opportunity in Rumania. As Ambassador Harriman has pointed out the taking of such a stand will bring us squarely up against the long range Soviet plans for eastern Europe. (Reference his telegram [to] the Department No. 765 [756] of March 14). These plans as they are unfolding in Rumania indicate that there are no present opportunities for trade and that eventually Americans can expect to be in no better position to take advantage of trade opportunities than they are in Soviet Union.

Repeated to Moscow as No. 54.

BERRY

740.0011 E.W./3-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 24, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 8:12 p. m.]

895. In view of the unilateral and unsatisfactory interpretations which the Soviet authorities have given to certain of the Crimean decisions and in view of the uncooperative attitude they have assumed of late, I must express my conviction that the interpretation of the

³³ Not printed.

Declaration on Liberated Europe given in the last paragraph of the Department's 621, March 16, midnight,³⁴ is not only questionable but also tactically inadvisable.

I feel that from a reading of the entire text of the Declaration on Liberated Europe it is clear that it is the intent and purpose of the Declaration that whenever any of the conditions enumerated are not being properly fulfilled, the three Governments have obligated themselves to concert in order to assist the liberated countries "to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems". Moreover, it is clear that the Declaration calls for outside intervention by the three powers and not by one power unilaterally when conditions require it. The Soviet Government therefore by intervening in Rumania admitted that conditions required such intervention and thus they failed to observe the obligation they assumed in the Declaration in concert with the other powers and countervened the operative sections of the Declaration by not concerting with us on measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibility we all assumed.

Any other interpretation of the Declaration would make it meaningless and thus one of the most widely approved actions of the Crimea Conference would be nullified.

In this connection, it will be recalled that in the Soviet Government's reply of March 17 to our proposals for tripartite discussions regarding Rumania, it was contended, that the mutual obligations of the three powers regarding former Axis satellite states is based upon the presence there of Allied Control Commissions and that the establishment of a tripartite commission concerning Rumania would undermine the power of the Allied Control Commission in that country. If this unjustified interpretation is accepted, the Declaration as regards satellite countries would be meaningless since this interpretation would be in fact a return to the position which held before the Declaration was made.

I feel, therefore, that we should continue to press for tripartite discussions regarding Rumania and if necessary at a later date be prepared to make it known that the reasons for the failure to hold such discussions was due to the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept our proposals for discussions based upon the Declaration. It is publicly known that we have asked for such discussions and to drop the matter now would not only be interpreted as weakness on our part but would tend to give the impression that by our failure to insist on such discussions we have written off the Declaration as a dead letter.

HARRIMAN

³⁴ See footnote 29, p. 515.

871.00/3-2245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1945—10 p. m.

703. Reurtel 864.³⁵ At his press conference on March 15 the Secretary told correspondents off the record that the Department had been informed by its representatives there of recent developments in Rumania and of the circumstances under which the present government was formed. He said that this Government thought some aspects of the political situation required consultation among the three Allies as contemplated by the Crimea agreement, and that we were undertaking discussions with the Soviet and British Governments with this in view. Later the same day the following statement was given out for attribution to a spokesman of the Department:

“The American representatives in Rumania have of course kept the Department informed of recent developments in that country. We think that some aspects of the political situation require consultation among the three principal Allies, and we are discussing the situation with the British and Soviet Governments.”

This public statement was contained in Department's Radio Bulletin No. 64 of March 15.

GREW

140.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)* ³⁶

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1945—6 p. m.

710. Reurtel 805 March 17.³⁷ Please inform Mr. Molotov that the United States Government is studying his reply with reference to the suggestion of this Government that under the Declaration on Liberated Europe signed at the Crimea Conference the three powers should consult with regard to the situation in Rumania, and will communicate with the Soviet Government with respect to the specific points raised by Mr. Molotov.

There are meanwhile certain points of a general nature in regard to the broad meaning and implementation of the Declaration on Lib-

³⁵ Dated March 22, not printed; the Ambassador asked that press releases and non-attributable information from the Department on the situation in Rumania be repeated to the Embassy in Moscow for guidance (871.00/3-2245).

³⁶ The substance of this telegram was conveyed by Ambassador Harriman to Foreign Commissar Molotov in a letter of March 30.

³⁷ See footnote 30, p. 516.

erated Europe which, in the light of Mr. Molotov's letter, appear to require comment and clarification by this Government.

In undertaking the commitments embodied in the Declaration on Liberated Europe signed by the three heads of Government at the Crimea Conference the United States Government considers that this agreement definitely establishes the principle of joint as against separate responsibility of the three major allies in regard to basic policies towards liberated and former Axis satellite countries in Europe. To this end the Declaration stated:

"They (the signatories) jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in Liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems."

It was not the intention of the United States Government, nor, it is believed, of either the Soviet or British Government, that the responsibility assumed under this Declaration should in any way be so construed as to weaken or supersede the authority or operation of the Allied Control Commissions in former Axis satellite states. There is indeed no conflict between these responsibilities. The Allied Control Commissions were set up by mutual agreement among the three powers with the specific function of executing and enforcing the terms of armistice, and they function exclusively on that basis. The agreement embodied in the Declaration on Liberated Europe, on the other hand, deals with the coordination of the policies of the three Governments in respect of problems of a more basic nature affecting the future development of these countries and especially the safeguarding of the right of the people concerned freely to choose through democratic processes the Government and the institutions under which they are to live. This Government sees no reason why action under the Declaration in any area should conflict with or weaken the position of an already existing Control Commission.

With reference to the situation in Italy referred to by Mr. Molotov it will be recalled that in addition to the Allied Control Commission specifically charged with enforcing the terms of the armistice there was set up following the Moscow Conference an Advisory Council for Italy, expressly to provide a convenient mechanism, long before the Crimea Declaration had established an agreed basis for consultative machinery, whereby the six governments represented in the Council could, in observing events, make known their views, and submit recommendations on political matters. In the view of this Government the Declaration on Liberated Europe adopted at the Crimea

Conference extended this principle, as adopted in regard to Italy, to include other liberated and Axis satellite countries of Europe, though the nature of the machinery through which consultation to be effected in particular instances was not specified. In the opinion of this Government such questions as the formation and character of provisional authorities, the safeguarding of the right of the peoples to hold free and unfettered elections, and similar questions of a far-reaching nature fall within the responsibilities assumed under the Crimea Declaration and cannot, therefore, be settled by the Allied Control Commissions nor by unilateral action of one of the three powers, no matter how directly concerned. Questions of the character outlined above should in the opinion of this Government be the subject of consultation and agreement among the three powers in conformity with the Declaration.

For its part the United States Government could not agree to divest itself of the responsibilities in this regard which it has assumed in the eyes of American public opinion and of the world under the Crimea decisions. It will, therefore, continue to urge upon the Soviet and the British Governments, in conformity with the Crimea decision, the application of the principles of Allied consultation and agreement with regard to any country where in its opinion conditions or developments warrant such action. In turn it would be ready at all times to apply the same principles in cases where consultation may be proposed by either of the other two signatories.

GREW

871.00/3-1345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1945—10 a. m.

157. Reurtel 181 March 13.³⁸ The Department approves your decision not to attend the celebration at Cluj. As time goes on we should like you to be guided by the practical needs of your Mission in deciding to what degree you should enter into contact with the present Rumanian authorities, keeping in mind that the essential purpose of the instructions contained in the final paragraph of Department's 114 March 9 was to avoid the implication that this Government had

³⁸ Not printed; it reported that it had been agreed by British Air Marshal Stevenson, General Schuyler, British Political Representative Le Rougetel, and the American Mission in Rumania that neither civilian nor military representatives of the American and British Missions would participate in the celebration at Cluj of the return of northern Transylvania to Rumanian administration because such participation might possibly be interpreted as tacit recognition and approval of the Groza government (871.00/3-1345).

given support or approval to the change of government in Rumania or to the methods by which it was carried out.

The British Embassy understands that the Foreign Office expects to consult with us regarding the adoption of a parallel attitude toward the Groza Government. Meanwhile, though you might reasonably refrain from intercourse of a protocol character with the new authorities, you will of course not permit a rigid interpretation of your instructions to prevent informal contacts with the government or to handicap the effective operation of your Mission.

The Department is recommending that the President make no reply to two messages from Groza dated March 10, the first conveying his greetings on the occasion of the installation of his Government and the second expressing Rumanian gratitude for the return of Transylvania. Although we understand that Le Rougetel has been directed to "inform the Rumanian Government" of Mr. Churchill's receipt of similar messages you need take no similar action in this regard unless in your judgment circumstances should make it seem desirable.

GREW

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1945—8 p. m.

164. Reurtel 190 March 15.³⁹ The Department presumes that Maniu already knows the main points of our general attitude on Rumania as set forth in Deptel 90, February 24. In any future conversations which you or General Schuyler may have with him or with other political leaders you may say also that during the armistice period our policy is based upon the armistice agreement and upon the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, and that we do not desire to intervene in Rumanian affairs except as may be necessary under the terms of those two agreements. Their attention may also be called to the Department's public statement of March 15⁴⁰ to the effect that we believe certain aspects of the political situation in Rumania at the present time require consultation among the three principal Allies.

We cannot, of course, undertake to answer all questions which Maniu has raised regarding our policy, but you may say that our present desire to see all significant political groups represented in an interim Rumanian Government, pending elections, is based on our

³⁹ Not printed; it reported on a conversation with the leader of the Rumanian National Peasant Party, Iuliu Maniu (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1545).

⁴⁰ The Department's public statement on Rumania was quoted in telegram 703, March 24, to Moscow, p. 522.

belief that the Rumanian people should be given the opportunity to choose freely the form of Government they desire and not on any policy of supporting particular groups or of preventing the introduction of any particular political or social system.

American representatives cannot of course assume the responsibility of advising Maniu or other leaders on the decisions they themselves must make regarding their position as political leaders or the future of their party organizations.

GREW

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2445 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1945.

A-42. The following sketch of the general lines of the Department's thinking on the question of Transylvania, in amplification of numbered paragraph 7 of Department's 90, February 24, may prove useful to you.

The Department did not favor the inclusion of reference to territorial questions in the armistice terms for Rumania, but the restoration of Northern Transylvania (or the major part thereof) to Rumania was one of the six points of the original armistice terms of April 1944⁴¹ which were drawn up by the Russians and to which this Government agreed without insisting on full discussion of the political aspects in view of the military advantages to be gained by the withdrawal of Rumania from the war at that moment. The reference to Transylvania in the April terms was of course a strong inducement to Rumania to surrender. The phrase "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement" was added to the original Russian draft before its transmission to the Rumanians, on the suggestion of Mr. Churchill, in which the Department concurred.⁴² This wording was kept in Article 19 of the Armistice Agreement of September 12 although in the Moscow discussions the Department proposed that the foregoing phrase be replaced by the words "deferring the definitive disposition of this territory to the peace settlement".

In view of the wording of Article 19, the Department believes that the three principal Allies, while not committed to the restoration of Rumanian sovereignty over the whole of Northern Transylvania, must

⁴¹ For text of the Rumanian armistice terms proposed by the Soviet Government in April 1944 in connection with the armistice talks held in Cairo, see telegram Yugos 84, April 8, 1944, 2 p. m., from Cairo, *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, p. 169.

⁴² The Department instructed acceptance of the military provisions of the proposed armistice, as modified by Prime Minister Churchill, in telegram Yugos 23, April 11, 1944, 10 p. m., to Cairo, *ibid.*, p. 173.

take account of that Article when the final territorial settlement is made. They are not, however, committed to the restoration of the pre-war Hungarian-Rumanian boundary. It is the Department's view that the precise location of the final boundary is a matter which should be given detailed study and on which a considered decision calculated to minimize the potentialities of the territorial issue as a disturbing factor in Hungarian-Rumanian relations, should be taken at the time peace treaties are signed with Rumania and with Hungary.

Although the Department did not agree entirely with the Soviet thesis that the determination of the time and manner of the restoration of the Rumanian administration in Northern Transylvania (reurtel 180, March 10⁴³) was a matter within the sole competence of the Soviet Government or for "negotiation between the Soviet and Rumanian Governments", we have not desired to make an issue of this point. As a step which even the Russians, according to General Vinogradov's statement to the Rumanian Government (your despatch no. 23, December 7, 1944⁴⁴), considered to be in implementation of Article 19 of the Armistice, we believe that it should properly have been taken by the ACC and that the American and British representatives on that body should have been consulted since all three Allied Governments have an interest in decisions which may have a bearing on the final territorial settlement. However, since the Soviet Government apparently acted without even informing its own representatives on the ACC and since it is difficult to argue that a decision of this kind should not be made by the power having primary military responsibility in the area in question, the Department has not considered it advisable to make any protest in addition to General Schuyler's statement to Susaikov that prior notification should have been given.

In his press conference of March 12 (see Radio Bulletin of that date) the Secretary pointed out that the transfer of administration in Northern Transylvania to the Rumanian authorities was the natural implementation of Article 19 of the Armistice. He emphasized that the transfer of territory provided in Article 19 was subject to confirmation at the peace settlement, and that the change in administration leaves unchanged the legal status of the territory in question. If Susaikov's views, as reported to the Department by Caserta, rep-

⁴³ Not printed; it reported that all Rumanian newspapers gave prominence to an exchange of telegrams between Stalin and Groza regarding the return of Northern Transylvania to Rumanian administration (871.014/3-1045).

⁴⁴ Not printed; it transmitted the text of a letter of November 28, 1944, from the Allied Control Commission's Acting President, General Vinogradov, to the then Rumanian Prime Minister Sanatescu, which stated that the setting up of Rumanian administration in Northern Transylvania was provided for under article 19 of the Rumanian Armistice Agreement and that the mode and timing of establishing such Rumanian administration would be solved in negotiations between the Soviet and Rumanian Governments (740.00119 Control (Rumania) /-12-744).

resent those of his Government, there is no difference of views among the three principal Allies on this point.

The reports of a movement for Soviet annexation of the Maramures district, described in your telegram no. 123 of February 19,⁴⁵ and your despatch no. 125 of February 22,⁴⁶ are naturally disquieting to the Department. The Department has also received various unconfirmed reports alleging that the Russians intend to return Transylvania to a Communist Hungary, to set up an independent Communist state of Transylvania, or to annex part or all of the province to the USSR. Pending the receipt of more concrete evidence of Soviet intentions, however, the Department sees no reason to question the good faith of the Soviet Government in making the pledge contained in Motolov's public statement of April 2⁴⁷ that, the Red Army having reached the "Soviet State frontier", the Soviet Government was "not pursuing the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory".

GREW

[President Roosevelt, in his message 218, April 1, 1945, to Marshal Stalin, had occasion to make brief reference to the tripartite agreement embodied in the Declaration on Liberated Europe and added the following: "I frankly cannot understand why the recent developments in Rumania should be regarded as not falling within the terms of that agreement. I hope you will find time personally to examine the correspondence between our Governments on this subject." For complete text of the President's message to Marshal Stalin, see page 194.]

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/1-1845: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1945—6 p. m.

790. ReEmbtel 175, January 18, 10 p. m.⁴⁸ When General Schuyler raised in the ACC the matter of Belgian and Greek representation in Rumania, General Vinogradov replied that representatives of the

⁴⁵ See footnote 31, p. 471.

⁴⁶ Not printed.

⁴⁷ For text of the Soviet statement of April 2, 1944, regarding Rumania, as transmitted earlier to the Department by the Soviet Embassy, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, p. 165.

⁴⁸ Not printed; it reported that the Belgian Ambassador in Moscow had on several occasions since September 1944 proposed to the Soviet Government that a Belgian agent be allowed into Rumania to protect Belgian interests there, but the Soviet Government had been unable to accede to the request; subsequently, the Belgian Ambassador had inquired informally whether the United States Government would be willing to take over Belgian interests in Rumania; Ambassador Harriman requested the Department's views on the subject (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/1-1845). General Schuyler took up the subject with General Vinogradov during a conference held on January 19.

Belgian and Greek governments should not come to Rumania at this time in view of a recent statement by Vyshinsky that "consideration would not be given to the inauguration of diplomatic relations between Rumania and the smaller (United) nations until full diplomatic relations had been established with the larger (United) nations".⁴⁹

The Belgian Government has recently informed the Department that it has designated M. Eugene Dubois to be its representative in Rumania with the title of Consul General. A similar communication has been received from Netherlands Government which has named Charles Dozy as Consul General. The Greek Government has stated that it desires to send a political representative to Rumania as well as consuls to Bucharest, Braila and Galati, but has not supplied the names of the men it proposes to appoint to those posts.

Please inform the Soviet Government that the United States Government agrees entirely with the Soviet view that there should be no renewal of diplomatic relations between Rumania and the smaller United Nations at this time, but believes that the requests of such nations for consular representation for the purpose of protecting their interests in Rumania should be given favorable consideration. Such representation appears desirable for practical reasons, especially in view of the withdrawal of the Swiss as protecting power for the interests of a number of these countries. It would relieve the ACC itself of responsibility and added work involved in protecting such interests.

In your communication to the Soviet Government you may find it useful to refer to Molotov's remark at the time of the discussion of armistice terms for Rumania (your despatch no. 1066, October 7, 1944, enclosure 5-d, page 2⁵⁰) that there would be no objection to United Nations other than the three principal Allies being represented in Rumania by consuls.

You should say that this Government believes a favorable reply should be given to the requests of the Belgian Netherlands and Greek Governments for the early entry of consular representatives into Rumania and that appropriate instructions should be sent to the ACC.

For your own information we would be disposed to look favorably on the Greek request to have a political representative in Rumania, with a status corresponding roughly to that of Berry and Le Rougetel,⁵¹ and we would also favor similar representation for other United Nations, notably France. We believe, however, that the Soviet Government should not be pressed to consent to the entry of such repre-

⁴⁹ The quotation is from the "Outline of a Conference between General Vinogradov and General Schuyler at Meeting 19 January 1945", a copy of which was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 71, January 20, 1945, from Bucharest (740.00119 Control (Rumania) /1-2045).

⁵⁰ Not printed.

⁵¹ John Heiler Le Rougetel, British Political Representative in Rumania with the rank of Minister.

sentatives until agreement has been reached on the general proposition that United Nations with substantial interests in Rumania should be allowed to send representatives there immediately in order to protect their interests.

Repeated to Bucharest, Brussels and Athens.⁵²

ACHESON

871.00/3-645 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)*⁵³

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1945—7 p. m.

180. ReDepTel 114, March 9. The British Embassy has informed the Department that AVM Stevenson has been instructed by the British Government to request in ACC that Soviet authorities agree to take necessary measures to ensure safety of General Radescu in the event that he leaves the British Mission. The British Government has requested the United States Government to send instructions to General Schuyler to support Stevenson in this matter when it is brought before the ACC.

The Embassy is being advised that you and Schuyler are authorized, when the question is raised, to inform the Rumanian and Soviet authorities, respectively, that it is our view that the Rumanian Government should be required by the ACC to give assurances that necessary measures will be taken to ensure that Rumanian political leaders who are not demonstrably Quislings or collaborationists are not subjected to physical violence, persecution or deprivation of civil rights. We consider that these assurances would cover the case of Radescu in the event that he should leave the British Legation.⁵⁴

Repeated to Moscow and Caserta.⁵⁵

STETTINIUS

⁵² As telegrams 171, 258, and 297, respectively.

⁵³ Parallel instructions were sent to Ambassador Harriman in telegram 826, April 9, 7 p. m. This telegram stated that the British Embassy in Washington had informed the Department of State that the British Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed to advise Molotov that the British were ready to terminate the sanctuary given to General Radescu if there were categorical assurances that the Allied Control Commission would take all necessary steps to protect Radescu. Ambassador Harriman was instructed to make no representations to the Soviet Government in favor of the British approach, but was authorized to state the American Government's attitude as given in the Department's instructions (871.00/3-645).

⁵⁴ Telegram 328, May 7, from Bucharest, reported that former Prime Minister Radescu was scheduled to leave the British Mission the same day and return to his home following "rather feeble assurances" from Rumanian and Soviet authorities as to his safety; after consultation between the British and American Missions, it was decided that it would be undesirable for any American action to be taken on the matter (871.00/5-745).

⁵⁵ Repeated to Moscow as 827, and to Caserta as 313.

871.00/4-1445 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁵⁶

[LONDON,] 11 April 1945.

942. Roumania: You will have seen our various telegrams to the British officers on the Control Commission in Roumania. In Roumanian affairs we have been following your lead because of what I told you in my No. 905,⁵⁷ and we shall continue to do so.

We should be grateful if you would take some of the burden of giving refuge to Roumanian personalities whom you and we have supported, should their lives be in danger.

Radescu is already on our hands. Now there is this question of the King and Queen Mother. We have unhesitatingly said that if they have no other sanctuary they may come to us. But I hope you will take some of this weight off us, as you are taking the lead in Roumania.

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/4-1245 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, April 12, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received April 13—1:45 a. m.]

264. Reference is made to Department's project to announce on March 30 resumption of postal and telegraphic communications with Rumania (reurtel 134, March 15, midnight⁵⁸); to Ambassador Har-

⁵⁶ The following memorandum, dated April 11, was sent from Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, to Cavendish W. Cannon, Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs: "The Secretary has seen the attached message from the Prime Minister and feels that it is impossible for us to accede to his request. He would appreciate your preparing a reply for the President." (871.001/4-1445) The resultant memorandum prepared by the Department of State for the President, dated April 12, reads as follows: "Attached hereto is a draft reply to Mr. Churchill's telegram no. 942, in which he proposed in effect that our representatives in Rumania not only support but take the initiative if the question of sanctuary for the King and Queen Mother arises. We feel that we ought not to accede to this request, and believe that the action we have already undertaken in Rumanian affairs may make it unnecessary to raise a special point as regards the Royal family." Attached to the Department's memorandum was a draft reply to Prime Minister Churchill. The Department's memorandum bears the following handwritten marginal note by Mr. Cannon: "This did not come to the attention of President Roosevelt before his death. The matter was redrafted as a telegram to Ambassador Winant for communication to Mr. Churchill. April 14." (871.001/4-1445) For text of the telegram to Ambassador Winant, see p. 533.

⁵⁷ Of March 8, p. 505.

⁵⁸ Not printed; this telegram, which was sent to Moscow as 606 and repeated to Bucharest as 134, directed Ambassador Harriman to inform the Soviet Government of the desire of the American Government to announce the resumption of communications with Rumania and Bulgaria. The Ambassador's communication to the Soviet Government was to be phrased in such a manner that it would constitute notification to the Soviet Government that in the absence of a reply by March 30, it would be assumed that the Soviet Government had no objection to the resumption of such communications and that control authorities in Sofia and Bucharest would give necessary cooperation. (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-745)

rorman's action in informing the Soviet Government that the US Government in the absence of any objection from the Soviets would announce the resumption of communications (Moscow's 839, March 21⁵⁹); and to my reply to Department's 154, March 22⁶⁰ to the effect that on March 28 the local Soviet authorities had received no instructions from Moscow on the subject.

After the Department made its announcement,⁶¹ reported in the Radio Bulletin, the Mission informed the Director of the Rumanian Post and Telegraph of the resumption of postal and telegraphic communications for informational and non-transactional messages. A copy of this letter, as a routine measure, was forwarded to General Schuyler and by General Schuyler to the Deputy Chairman of the ACC.

The Deputy Chairman, General Susaikov, under date of April 11 wrote General Schuyler

"The ACC at the present time considers premature the establishing of postal telegraph and radio communications between Rumania and other countries for information and private correspondence.

Instructions concerning the interdiction of such communications have been given to the Rumanian Minister of Communications.

I cannot understand why such an important and big question as the reestablishment of international communications was brought up by Mr. Berry before agencies of the Rumanian Government without the sanction of the Allied Control Commission."

Similar letter was sent by General Susaikov to the local British authorities.

An instruction to General Susaikov such as Ambassador Harriman requested on March 21⁶² would be most useful, even at this late date, first, in getting communications started again and second, in restoring our lagging prestige with the Rumanians. As mentioned in my 236, April 2, noon,⁶³ it is in our interest that the Rumanians not be given many illustrations of our being pushed around by Soviet authorities.

Repeated to Moscow as 74.

BERRY

⁵⁹ Not printed; it reported that the Soviet Government had been informed in accordance with the instructions contained in Department's telegram 606, March 15 (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-2145).

⁶⁰ Not printed.

⁶¹ For text of the Department's announcement regarding communications facilities with Bulgaria and Rumania, released to the press on March 31, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1, 1945, p. 546.

⁶² Harriman's communication to the Soviet Government regarding the resumption of communications between the United States and Rumania and Bulgaria, as reported in telegram 839, March 21, 2 p. m., from Moscow (see footnote 59, above) requested that appropriate instructions be issued to the Soviet representatives on the Control Commission in Rumania (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-2145).

⁶³ Not printed; it reported that the Soviet authorities had refused authorization to the Diplomatic Corps bound for the liberated portion of Czechoslovakia to

871.001/4-1445 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)* ⁶⁴

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1945—9 p. m.

2930. Please inform Mr. Churchill that the Department has learned of his telegram No. 942 of April 11 to President Roosevelt concerning the protection of the Rumanian Royal family, and say that this matter had already had this Government's attention, and we have sent rather full instructions to our representative in Bucharest on the protection of the Royal family or other political personalities who might fall into disfavor with the present authorities.

You may say that while these instructions do not go as far as the British instructions to Bucharest in the case of Radescu, we believe them to be adequate. We think that a matter such as the security of the Royal family is closely related to the form of government and therefore of direct and equal concern to all three Allied Governments, and that no one of us should act independently in offering refuge. General Schuyler's instructions say that if an appeal should be made to the American representative he should present the matter before the ACC for the consideration of his Soviet and British colleagues. In a subsequent telegram, as recent as April 9, our representatives have been authorized to inform the Rumanian and Soviet authorities that in our opinion the Rumanian Government should be required by the ACC to give assurances that necessary measures will be taken to insure that Rumanian political leaders who are not demonstrably Quislings or collaborationists are not subjected to physical violence, persecution, or deprivation of civil rights.

If we were sure of tripartite consultation on Rumanian affairs under the Yalta Declaration we would prefer to handle this matter on that

pass through Rumania and continued as follows: "It seems to me very important in view of our long-range objectives to maintain the prestige of our Government at a high level with the Rumanians and particularly during the present critical period when in the minds of most of them, hope is being replaced by disillusionment. I realize that in some matters where decisions must be made at the highest levels, such as the implementation of the Crimea Conference, little toward this can be accomplished directly by this Mission. However, in other matters which do not need to reach such a high level for a decision but where the approval of the Soviets is essential to the carrying through of the project, such as for example, the present subject or that of bringing ships into Constanza, it will strengthen our position if approval of the Soviets is secured before this Mission is instructed to take up the matter with the Rumanian authorities." (860F.20 Mission/4-245)

⁶⁴The substance of this telegram was repeated to Bucharest as telegram 190, April 19, 10 p. m., and to Moscow as telegram 1010, May 4, 7 p. m.

level. Our proposal has not been accepted by Moscow, but we are renewing it in stronger terms, and have already informed the Soviet Government that the American Government and people expect the three Governments to fulfil their responsibilities under the Yalta agreements.

The position of the King and the liberal political leaders is admittedly difficult, and the situation is tense. Still we hope that they are considering their responsibilities as well as their safety, and we feel that as a practical matter we should not be too eager to offer protection. With full understanding of the delicacy of their position we realize how difficult it will be to work for democratic processes and representative government in Rumania if the leaders in whom we have confidence are no longer able to exert their influence in opposition to the imposition of an authoritarian minority regime.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/4-1845: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 18, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received April 19—9: 15 a. m.]

1245. Note from Vyshinski to us dated April 14 refers to our note of March 20 informing Molotov of Department's understanding that Rumania had asked ACC for co-belligerent status and Department's opposition to change in Allied policy of denying such status: Vyshinski asserts that ACC has not been approached by Rumanian Government with request for co-belligerent status.

To Department as 1245, to London as 164, to Bucharest as 59.

KENNAN

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/4-2145: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1945—6 p. m.

926. Bucharest's 264 April 12 to Department repeated to you as 74. The Vice Chairman of the ACC in Rumania informed General Schuyler on April 13 that the ACC considered premature the reopening of commercial communications service between Rumania and other countries, and that he could not understand why such an important matter was brought up by Berry before the Rumanian Government without the sanction of the ACC.

Please communicate with the Soviet Government ⁶⁵ drawing its attention to your communication of March 21 (reEmbtel 839, March 21 ^{65a}) and to the Soviet Government's failure to reply, from which it was inferred that there was no objection to the contemplated opening of communications with Rumania, and stating that a public announcement was accordingly made on March 30. You may add that the Soviet Government apparently omitted to send to the ACC in Rumania instructions in accordance with the notice received, and request that such instructions be sent now. General Schuyler has already informed General Susaikov that this Government's action was taken on the basis of your note of March 21 to the Soviet Government.

You may say also that we fail to understand General Susaikov's statement that it is "premature" to open communications between Rumania and the United States. Rumania has been in postal communication with many other countries, both Allied and neutral, for several months, and has been in telegraphic communication with a number of these. Shipments of mail from Rumania had already been received in the United States before March 30, and private radio messages through Stockholm and other points were being accepted in Bucharest.

For your own information, our public announcement on March 30 stated that postal communications were open to Rumania but that for the present telecommunications would not be permitted. It was worded in that way because we were not sure whether telegraphic messages would be accepted at the Rumanian end. Telecommunications service with Rumania has since been reestablished without formal announcement because word was received that messages were being accepted there. No reference need be made to this in your communication to the Soviet Government, as our position will be clearer if you state merely that communications were declared open on March 30 in accordance with the advance notice given to the Soviet Government on March 21. This telegram repeated to Bucharest as Department's No. 195 of [April 21].

STETTINIUS

⁶⁵ Telegram 1369, April 26, midnight, reported that in accordance with Department's instructions, Chargé Kennan had written to Vyshinsky on April 26, reviewing in detail the American intention to resume Rumanian telegraphic and postal communications and requesting that Soviet authorities send the necessary instructions to the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (740.00119 Control-(Rumania)/4-2645).

^{65a} See footnote 59, p. 532.

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/4-2145 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania
(Berry)*

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1945—8 p. m.

197. President Roosevelt received through OSS channels a personal letter from King Mihai dated January 24, 1945.⁶⁶ The letter referred to the King's opposition to Rumania's participation in the war against the United Nations and to his bringing his country "back on the right way" on August 23, and mentioned the King's serious anxiety over Rumania's future, "having observed the attitude of various representatives of the USSR in Rumania". Enclosed with the letter was a memorandum,⁶⁷ which is a bill of particulars against the Soviet policies and actions in Rumania (reduction of the Rumanian army, holding of Rumanian war prisoners, denial of cobelligerency status, refusal to turn over Northern Transylvania, deportation of Bessarabians, deportation of Germans, support of Rumanian Communists, etc.).

It is not deemed advisable to make a formal reply to the King's letter, particularly in view of the tone and contents of the accompanying memorandum, at a time when we are seeking to reach a common ground with the Soviet Government in dealing with the Rumanian situation. We do not wish, however, by ignoring the King's letter, to strengthen any impression he may have that in the United States there is no understanding of the Rumanian problem. You are accordingly authorized to say to the King that you have been directed to inform him that President Roosevelt received his letter, and that this government is in sympathy with the desire of Rumania to regain its place among the peace-loving independent nations of the world. You should avoid any expression of views on the memorandum, merely saying, if the question is raised, that the document has been referred to the Department for study.

STETTINIUS

871.00/4-2245 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary
of State*

BUCHAREST, April 22, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received April 23—3:25 p. m.]

295. Last evening the King asked me to come and see him. He said he wished to tell me of some of the thoughts running through his mind.

⁶⁶ *Ante*, p. 465.

⁶⁷ Not printed.

The King began the conversation by saying he had signed the war criminal decree law Friday night⁶⁸ (reference my telegrams 242 of April 3, 9 p. m.⁶⁹ and 251 of April 7, 9 p. m.⁷⁰ He said he had signed only after fighting a 3 weeks' battle with the Government during which time he succeeded in eliminating from the text of the law the most objectionable features.⁷¹ The chief improvements he obtained in the recast text are: The death penalty is authorized in the case of war criminals only, the right of appeal from a people's court to a regularly constituted court is permitted; article 18, which gave people's courts power to try persons accused of disturbing the present political order, is entirely eliminated; and finally the validity of the law runs only to September 1.

The King told me he was convinced that Ana Pauker and the more radical members of the Rumanian Communist Party were out to discredit and then eliminate him. He said that lately they inaugurated a whispering campaign urging the return of his father.⁷² Of course they have no use for Carol but Carol would be more easily discredited and hence more easily eliminated than he. The King said he was bombarded by requests from the Communist members of the Government to perform unconstitutional acts. In a single day Patrascanu⁷³ had presented for signature two unconstitutional decree laws, and Teohari Georgescu,⁷⁴ two more. The King felt that such draft laws were

⁶⁸ April 20.

⁶⁹ Not printed; it reported that the King had refused to sign various decrees presented to him by Government Ministers including measures for the confiscation of rural properties, the prohibition of the carrying of firearms, and the arrest and trial of war criminals; persons near the King were convinced that these decrees were patently unconstitutional and were being presented to the King as the opening steps of a Communist-originated constitutional crisis (871.00B/4-345).

⁷⁰ Not printed; it reported that various persons near the King had visited Berry and sought to ascertain whether there had been any results from the American request to the Soviet Government for consultation on Rumanian problems; the King was reported by these visitors as unable much longer to delay decrees presented to him for signature (871.00/4-745).

⁷¹ Despatch 273, April 30, from Bucharest, reported, *inter alia*, that the King's advisers realized that if the King signed the war criminal decree in the form presented he might be signing the death warrants of many men of sincere democratic sympathies whose sole fault would lie in being considered political opponents of the Groza regime (740.00116 E.W./4-3045).

⁷² Former King Carol II of Rumania was, at this time, in exile in Brazil. A report of Carol's possible return to Rumania had already reached the Department. Telegram 92, January 14, 1 p. m., from Lisbon, reported that Archduke Otto of Austria had informed the American Chargé that he, Otto, had shown Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Salazar a copy of an agreement drawn up in Mexico City between Soviet Ambassador Oumansky and King Carol according to which Carol promised "to be amenable" in return for Soviet assistance in his restoration (871.001 Carol II/1-1445). A copy of this telegram was sent to President Roosevelt by the Secretary of State on January 17.

⁷³ Lucretiu Patrascanu, Rumanian Minister of Justice and a leader in the Rumanian Communist Party.

⁷⁴ Rumanian Minister of Interior and a leader in the Rumanian Communist Party.

presented as a maneuver in order to build up evidence that he was not responsive to the public. Moreover after studying the texts of all the laws recently presented by Communist Ministers he has come to the conclusion that they had not been drafted by these men and, perhaps by a member of the executive committee of their party.

As his relations with the Rumanian Communists have deteriorated the King said his relations with the Russian officials have improved recently. General Susaikov, dropping his glum and foreboding manner, invited him to visit a Russian air field. There he was wined, dined and toasted in an atmosphere of good fellowship. When asked if he would enjoy seeing a film, the best local cinema was emptied for his and his mother's comfort. General Susaikov yesterday at a palace luncheon arose seven times and proposed toasts to the King and the Rumanian nation. On the same occasion the Queen was assured that the resources of the Soviet Union were at their command. The King contrasted this sudden shift from austerity to friendliness toward him with the attitude of the Russians toward Rumania. He said that the Russians were making larger and harsher demands under articles 10, 11 and 12 of the armistice. He told me that Russian troops which had withdrawn from certain sections of Rumania had stripped the land of every valuable before leaving, even dismantling the Rumanian wooden barracks they had used and taking door and window frames from the stone barracks.

The King concluded his conversation by saying that he hoped the Great Powers soon would take some action in the spirit of Yalta concerning Rumania. He said that he suspected America had lost all interest in Rumania and Yalta. If there is to be action he said, it must now be initiated from the outside as the Rumanian problem, since the Vishinsky government was imposed, is no longer an internal problem but an international problem. He stated that as the country's economic and financial situation were rapidly deteriorating, action must be taken in the next few weeks or the opportunity for action will have definitely passed.

Fortunately yesterday I received Deptel 190, April 19, 10 p. m.⁷⁵ and I was able to assure the King that far from having lost interest in Rumania, we were desirous of engaging in talk, with our Allies in order to fulfill their responsibilities we had taken. I consider that I was justified in adding that, while appreciating the difficulties of the King's position, it was gratifying to hear directly from him now [*how?*] he is working for the preservation of democratic processes in Rumania, thereby fulfilling the responsibilities which his people expect of him. Although the King seemed to take courage from these

⁷⁵ See footnote 64, p. 533.

words, we must admit to ourselves that the encouragement that comes from words expressed in Bucharest at a time when action is desired in Moscow forms but a fragile bulwark for resisting the pressure of powerful groups.

Repeated to Moscow as No. 87.

BERRY

871.01/4-2445 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, April 24, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received April 24—5:50 p. m.]

301. From several sources recently I have received indirectly indications that a number of Rumanians are forcing [*forging?*] themselves into a loosely grouped organization for the purpose of resisting present trends in the country.

They appear to feel that Rumania is now being governed by the Communist Party and as a consequence the country's finances and economics are on the brink of disaster. They think that there is anarchy in the governmental administration throughout the country and chaos in the economic life.

I understand that the men who are thinking along these lines are in many cases the same as those who engineered and carried through the coup of August 23. The plan, I gather, is to stage a second coup with the tacit consent of the King.

It is difficult to believe that I and Mr. Le Rougetel, with whom I have compared notes, have indications of what is in the minds of some of the country's leading citizens without this same knowledge being available to the Soviet authorities who have working for them a large group of men whose full time is taken in learning and reporting what is being thought and done in Rumania. Of course a group planning and working toward the end indicated, if their plans were suspected by the Government, would be placing themselves directly into the hands of the Communist party which at an appropriate moment could denounce and eliminate them. A group thus branded would be a means for completely discrediting the monarch and for removing from the Rumanian political scene many people whose thoughts and plans for Rumania closely parallel our own.

Should any person whom I believe to be one of this group approach me and inform me, or even hint to me, of what they are planning, I should take the occasion to tell him that he is inviting disaster.

To bring about a change in the Government by forceful means would certainly be considered by the Soviet authorities as disturb-

ing order behind their lines of communications. Under such circumstances America could hardly do otherwise than support the action that the Soviets might take to eliminate such a condition. Therefore the Rumanians who by passive resistance or active conflict might try to bring about a change in the Government would only succeed by their actions in eliminating from the Rumanian political scene a group that it is essential to preserve for the purpose of registering its convictions in the ballot box and for supporting locally the action that the 3 Great Powers in consultation may decide to take toward Rumania.

I feel that this is the only course that is open to me, as to give a willing ear to such proposals would make me a conspirator and to listen silently without protest would make me an accomplice. If the Department holds a different view, please instruct me urgently.⁷⁶

BERRY

871.001/4-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 25, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received April 25—4: 23 p. m.]

4218. I conveyed to the Prime Minister the information in your 2930 of April 14 concerning the protection of the Rumanian Royal Family. Mr. Churchill has now informed me that he feels shelter should not be denied the King and Queen if they should seek it, and that the British representatives in Bucharest have been instructed to give them sanctuary if it is requested. He feels deeply on this subject.

WINANT

871.00/5-545

*Memorandum for President Truman by the Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler)*⁷⁷

[WASHINGTON,] 3 May 1945.

Subject: The Current Situation in Rumania

I. THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

1. Under the Armistice Agreement signed 12 September 1944, control of execution of the Armistice terms by Rumania was entrusted to

⁷⁶ Telegram 217, April 28, 7 p. m., to Bucharest, replied as follows: "The Department agrees entirely that you should take the attitude described in your 301 April 24, in case the subject is raised in your presence by Rumanians." (871.01/4-2445)

⁷⁷ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State with covering memorandum of May 5 from the White House at direction of Admiral Leahy.

an Allied Control Commission. By later supplementary agreements between the three major Allies, Soviet Russia was accorded the principal executive role on this commission.

2. In actual operation the Control Commission is dominated completely by Soviet Russia which is using the Commission as a means for promoting a rapid communization of the Rumanian state. Directives and other instructions are issued by the Commission to the Rumanian Government in the name of the three Allies, but neither the British or American Representatives are consulted in the formulation of such directives. In most instances these Representatives are not even informed as to the nature of the instructions issued.

3. Under the present Commission organization, the United States and British Representatives are not in a position to safeguard their nation's interests. The prestige of the United States is being adversely affected in both Russian and Rumanian eyes as a result of this situation and of the restrictions placed on the activities of the United States representatives by Russian officials of the Commission. Under these restrictions American newspaper men and American industrialists with important business interests in the country have been prevented from entering Rumania, and the efforts of United States Representatives to obtain information are impeded at every turn.

II. THE POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The present Rumanian Government is a minority government, imposed on the nation by direct Soviet pressure. This government is dominated by the Rumanian Communist party which probably represents less than 10% of the Rumanian population. The vast majority of the Rumanian people are intensely nationalistic and are strongly opposed to communism in any form.

2. During the past month the Rumanian Communist party has been employing every available means to insure a continuation of its newly-acquired dominant position in Rumanian politics. Measures taken include appointment of communist prefects in all *judetes* (counties), appointment of communists to important judicial posts, promulgation of laws authorizing the death sentence for political prisoners and for those convicted of membership in a "pro-fascist" organization and the formation of a "voluntary civilian" police force which is making mass arrests of persons with allegedly "fascist" connections.

3. The Rumanian King himself and also the leaders of the major political parties have discussed the current situation at length with U. S. Representatives. They have pointed out that their attitude in opposition to the present minority government and to the communist program has been based primarily on their understanding of the announced policies of the three Allies with respect to liberated Europe, particularly the Yalta Agreement and the Atlantic Charter. They

urge, of course, that the United States and Great Britain take action to implement these policies in Rumania. They emphasize that at the very least, these nations have a moral obligation to inform Rumanians at this time as to whether or not it is actually intended that these policies be applied in Rumania. They argue that any further opposition to the local communist program, if unsupported from abroad, will undoubtedly cost the lives of important Rumanian leaders and will have little effect on the ultimate fate of the nation.

III. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

1. Beginning shortly after 23 August 1944 and continuing through the present time, the Rumanian industrial and economic structure has been subjected to a continually growing pressure from Soviet Russia. For example:

a. Rumania has been required to release for transfer to Soviet Russia a large number of Rumanian citizens who on certain specified dates were residing in the provinces of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, which provinces under the Armistice Agreement have become part of Soviet Russia. Rumania has also been forced to permit Russia to deport for forced labor in Soviet coal mines some 70,000 men and women of German ethnic origin, most of whom were incontestably Rumanian citizens who had lived in Rumania all their lives, a large number of them holding key positions in Rumanian industry.

b. Rumania has been forced to release to Soviet Russia as war trophies considerable amounts of industrial equipment and supplies previously purchased from Germany by various industrial concerns in Rumania. Included among these items are quantities of oil drilling equipment, much of which was actually the property of British and American oil companies in Rumania.

c. Under the Armistice Rumania agreed to a reparations payment to Russia in various quantities of raw materials and manufactured goods amounting to three hundred million dollars in value, items to be delivered over a six-year period. Russia has forced Rumania to accept a 1938 price basis in determining quantities and items to be furnished, this, in effect, almost doubling the quantities which would have been required had present prices been taken as a basis.

d. Rumania is being required to contribute heavily to the maintenance of the Russian Armies which are operating far beyond the boundaries of Rumania. She has been forced to furnish not only food but also large amounts of manufactured articles such as bandages, overcoats, shirts, boots, saddles, etc. Since Russia has kept Rumania almost entirely cut off from trade relations with other nations, there is little possibility at present of replacing the raw materials which are being used up on these orders.

e. In order to recompense private owners and industrial concerns for items requisitioned by Russian armies, the Rumanian Government is being forced to make very large cash expenditures. Payments for requisitioned items alone, entirely apart from reparations payments, have already amounted to an equivalent of over fifty million dollars in United States currency. This constitutes one of the major factors

in the present critical financial situation. The total of bank notes in circulation has almost doubled since last September and this total is increasing alarmingly each week. In the past month the exchange value of the lei on the "free-money market" has risen from 3600 to 6000 to the United States dollar. Rumanian research agencies estimate that, as compared with 1933, the cost of living in Bucharest has increased 27-fold. If present trends continue, it is highly probable that within the next month or two Rumania will face a financial debacle similar to that recently experienced in Greece.

2. The present Rumanian Government has, of course, interposed no objection to Russia's continued exploitation of Rumania's economic wealth. The Government has, in fact, contributed to the general industrial unrest by encouraging workers' committees in various industries in their demands for participation in management and for the discharge of company officials who are not amenable to communist policies.

3. The passage of a recent law confiscating all large estates has further weakened confidence in Rumanian economy. Potential investors are now fearful that similar laws may be passed confiscating city property, banks, etc. The public is making frantic efforts to convert its assets into foreign currency.

4. Insofar as is known to the United States Representation, Russia has made no effort seriously to study the Rumanian economic situation or to limit her demands on the basis of the actual capacity of the Rumanian industrial establishment to bear the burden thus imposed. There is, in fact, increasing evidence to indicate a deliberate attempt by Russia to create economic confusion and chaos, possibly in the expectation that Rumania will thereafter prove more receptive to a communistic economy.

IV. POSSIBLE REMEDIAL MEASURES

The following remedial measures are suggested as the only practicable means of halting the present accelerated trend toward complete domination of the Rumanian nation by a small communist minority:

1. Creation of a truly tripartite Allied Control Commission for Rumania in which representatives of all three Allied Nations have approximately equal powers. (The termination of major military operations in Germany may present an appropriate occasion for demanding a reorganization of the present Commission.)

2. Immediate broadening of the present Groza Government to include proportionately representative participation by all political parties.

3. Immediate opening of commercial relations between Rumania and other Allied nations, particularly Great Britain and the United States.

4. Immediate institution of effective controls by the Allied Control Commission to halt the impending financial debacle and to alleviate the critical economic situation.

C. V. R. SCHUYLER
Brigadier General, USA

661.7131/5-1745 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, May 17, 1945—noon.

[Received 7 p. m.]

345. Remytel 294 of April 21, 7 p. m.⁷⁸ The Rumanian economic delegation has returned from Moscow having signed two agreements there dating from May 8. The first is a 1-year trade agreement⁷⁹ and the second agreement covers a 5-year period of economic collaboration.⁸⁰ Full details will follow by pouch.⁸¹

Under agreement No. 1 the Russians are to deliver the following quantities in metric tons: 25,000 of semi-manufactured steel, 60,000 of cast iron, 1,000 copper, 100 tin, 10 antimony, 4 cobalt, 70,000 anthracite coal and 50,000 coke. Other products will include carbon electrodes, electric power cables, ball bearings, filters and chemicals such as potassium chloride, phosphorus and sulphur. 40,000 tons of raw cotton from Russia are to be spun in Rumanian mills, of which 20,000 tons are to be returned to Russia as thread. Other products include tea, gum arabic, vegetable oil, cotton seeds, cigarette paper and even quantities of rubber which will be the object of a special agreement.

Rumania is to deliver 267,800 tons of petroleum products including 100,000 of motor gasoline, 10,000 kerosene, 50,000 fuel oil, 45,000 gas oil, and 39,000 lubricants. The delivery of gasoline and kerosene is dependent on the discontinuance of deliveries of these products for account of article X of the armistice agreement. Other products include 250,000 cubic meters of timber, 1,000,000 square meters of window glass, 50,000 tons of cement, 10,000 tons of tar paper and quantities of carbon black and soda.

⁷⁸ Not printed; it reported that a Rumanian delegation had left April 23 for Moscow to negotiate a Rumanian-Soviet commercial accord (661.7131/4-2145).

⁷⁹ For text of the trade agreement between Rumania and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow May 8, 1945, see *Economic Treaties and Agreements of the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe 1945-1951*, Mid-European Law Project (New York, Mid-European Studies Center, 1952), p. 73.

⁸⁰ For text of the agreement between Rumania and the Soviet Union concerning economic collaboration, signed at Moscow May 8, 1945, see *ibid.*, p. 18, and *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIX, p. 876.

⁸¹ Copies of the two agreements were transmitted to the Department as enclosures to despatch 316, May 18, from Bucharest, not printed (661.7131/5-1845).

In agreement No. 2 Rumania was told that it could expect no agricultural assistance but Russia renounced its demand under article XII of the armistice for 2000 additional tractors. A prospectus was outlined to be implemented within 2 months by a Russian Economic Commission to be sent to Bucharest which provides for Soviet participation in all phases of Rumanian industry and transport. A Rumanian-Soviet Oil Company will be organized⁸² on equal shares. The agreement states that this company is to have preferential rights in securing oil exploration concessions. Similar joint companies are to be organized for heavy industry, lumbering river, Black Sea and aerial navigation. A Soviet Rumanian bank also is planned to finance the execution of the two agreements.

Officials of the Rumanian delegation state that they received every consideration in Moscow and that they were assured the Soviet Union did not desire a preferential economic position in Rumania over America and British interests but merely equal rights. The delegation was encouraged to consider prospects for quick additional trade agreements with Poland, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary. Russians refused to discuss prospects of Rumanian trade with Turkey and the Near East and said that Rumania could surely receive all its needs from the Soviet Union and the states previously named.

Competent Rumanian economists state agreement No. 1 is not as bad as Rumanians originally feared but that it virtually monopolizes all potential Rumanian exports leaving the country without the possibility of exchanging commodities with other countries. They realistically regard Soviet assurances of equal national treatment under agreement No. 2 as impossible. With one joint Soviet Government and Rumanian company operating in each field preferential treatment is sure to result. Also the equality theory was abandoned in the agreement evolved for the joint oil company since it is to receive preferential exploratory rights.

The strongest critics of the agreements stress their essentially political implications as a Russian attempt to monopolize Rumanian markets and to restrict its trade to states in a Soviet dominated economic zone. An impression some members of the delegation received was that of Soviet desire for haste in securing actual operation of the two agreements within the shortest possible time.

Repeated to Moscow as 97.

BERRY

⁸² For text of the convention between Rumania and the Soviet Union regarding the creation of a Soviet-Rumanian company for the exploration, exploitation, refining, and marketing of crude oil and oil products, signed at Moscow on July 17, 1945, see *Economic Treaties and Agreements of the Soviet Bloc*, p. 24.

740.00116 EW/4-3045 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)*⁸³

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1945—3 p. m.

268. Department has desired to avoid taking any position on trials in former Axis satellite states of their respective nationals charged with offenses falling roughly under the heading of "collaboration with the Germans" or "responsibility for the disaster to the country". In the Department's view such trials are the domestic affair of the government concerned, and no intervention on the part of Allied governments is called for either under the terms of the armistice agreements or on any other basis, unless it should appear that the responsibilities assumed by the Allied governments under the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe are involved in any particular trial or series of trials.

The Department would prefer that you make no representation to the Rumanian Government on this subject. If, however, you become convinced that trials under new decree law of April 21 (your despatch no. 273, April 30⁸⁴) are being used by the Groza Government as a means of discrediting or eliminating on trumped-up charges of "fascist" tendencies or affiliations opposition leaders whose past record has been consistently anti-Nazi, pro-Allied and democratic, you should report relevant facts to Department requesting instructions. Pending receipt of such instructions there would be no objection to your letting it be known in Rumanian circles that it would be disturbing to this Government and to American public opinion if the present Rumanian authorities should make a mockery of the judicial process for the purpose of liquidating political opponents and establishing the regime more firmly in power.

The British Government has informed the Department of its concern over the possibility that political trials in Rumania and Hungary might be characterized by excesses such as have occurred in Bulgaria⁸⁵ and might facilitate attempts to establish single-party dictatorial regimes. The British Government is of the opinion, however, that it would be difficult to justify intervention to limit or deny the right of a government to try its own citizens for political offenses, particularly

⁸³ Repeated to Sofia as 142, and to Budapest as 49.

⁸⁴ Not printed; it reported the internal governmental negotiations which culminated in the issuance of a new government decree regarding the trial and punishment of war criminals and it transmitted a copy of the new decree as published in the *Monitor Oficial* of April 23, 1945 (740.00116 EW/4-3045). For a brief discussion regarding the preparation of this decree, see telegram 295, April 22, 11 p. m., from Bucharest, p. 536.

⁸⁵ Regarding the Bulgarian war crimes trials, see telegrams 66, February 1, 1945; 78, February 10, 1945; 183, April 5, 1945 from Sofia, vol. iv, pp. 154, 156, and 181, respectively.

before any excesses or obvious miscarriages of justice take place, and that the best course would seem to be that which the British Representative in Bulgaria followed, namely "to deal with each case as it arises, and as soon as there are indications that excesses are impending to intervene with good advice to the local government."

In reply to British request for the Department's views on this subject, the substance of the present telegram is being transmitted to the British Embassy here.

Trials of persons charged with specific criminal acts committed on United Nations territory or against United Nations nationals, or persons otherwise named as war criminals by United Nations governments or agencies are a matter for action by the United Nations in accordance with Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943⁸⁶ and other general procedures already agreed upon or still to be determined. Rumania must of course carry out its obligation under Article 14 of the Armistice to cooperate with the Soviet High Command in the apprehension and trial of such war criminals.⁸⁷

GREW

711.60/5-2845

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman*⁸⁸

[Moscow, May 27, 1945.]

More than eight months have elapsed since Romania and Bulgaria have broken off with Hitlerite Germany, have concluded armistice with the Allied states and have joined the war on the side of the Allies against Germany having detailed their armed forces for this purpose. By this they have made a contribution to the cause of defeat of Hitlerism and for the victorious completion of victory in Europe. During this time the Governments of Bulgaria and Romania have proven in reality their readiness to cooperate with the United Nations. In connection with this the Soviet Government considers it right and timely

⁸⁶ For text of the Declaration on German Atrocities, signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, and released to the press at the conclusion of the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, November 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, p. 768.

⁸⁷ The Mission in Bucharest reported in some detail upon the nine Rumanian war crimes trials held between May and August 1945. Telegram 379, June 2, noon, from Bucharest, reported that the death sentences handed down at the first trial were commuted to life imprisonment by the King after approval for such commutation was obtained by the Rumanian Government from Soviet authorities (740.00116 EW/6-245). No death sentences were handed down after this first commutation for any of the 160 war criminals brought to trial between May and August 1945.

⁸⁸ Text of the translated message as forwarded by Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy from the White House on May 28 to the Secretary of State for preparation of a draft reply.

to reestablish right now diplomatic relations with Rumania and Bulgaria and to exchange envoys.

Simultaneously the Soviet Government considers it practicable to reestablish diplomatic relations also with Finland which is fulfilling the conditions of the armistice agreement and which has taken the road of strengthening of diplomatic beginnings.⁸⁹ It seems to me possible, after a certain amount of time, to take a similar decision in respect to Hungary.

Simultaneously I am sending a similar message to Mr. Churchill.⁹⁰

701.6174/5-3045: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 30, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received May 30—1:30 p. m.]

1810. ReDepts 1165, May 28, 7:00 p. m.⁹¹ With respect to Stalin's message concerning the immediate resumption of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Rumania and Finland, to be followed after a certain period of time with a similar step regarding Hungary, it is my view that we should express agreement with Stalin's message and proceed immediately to the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations with Rumania, Finland and as soon as the Dimitrov incident⁹² is satisfactorily closed, with Bulgaria.

The above views are based on the feeling that we will find it difficult to get the Russians to agree to any real tripartite basis for action in the Control Commissions for the coming period and that we can therefore be no worse and possibly better off by handling as many questions as possible directly with the Govts concerned.

HARRIMAN

⁸⁹ For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the internal affairs of Finland and in the operations of the Allied Control Commission for Finland, see vol. iv, pp. 598 ff; for documentation regarding the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Finland, see *ibid.*, pp. 624 ff.

⁹⁰ For English text of the message from Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill, see *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945*, vol. I (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p. 361.

⁹¹ Not printed; it transmitted a paraphrase of Stalin's message of May 27 to President Truman, *supra*, and asked for comments on the proposal (701.6174/5-2845).

⁹² On the night of May 23-24, 1945, Georgi M. Dimitrov, the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party and opponent of the Bulgarian Communist-dominated regime, escaped from house arrest and was granted asylum at the American Political Mission in Sofia. Protracted discussions with the Bulgarian Government and Soviet authorities continued until the end of August 1945 when Dimitrov left Bulgaria for the United States. For documentation regarding this matter, see vol. iv, pp. 220-314, *passim*.

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/4-2645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1945—7 p. m.

1209. Re closing by Soviet representatives of direct circuits from London to Sofia and Bucharest and routing of all UK-Bulgarian messages via Moscow (Caserta's 147, Apr. 26 to you,⁹³ also Sofia's 92, Apr 16 ⁹⁴), Brit FonOff was asked for its views re having Brit Embassy in Moscow make representations to Soviets looking to restoration of these direct circuits.

Pending establishment of direct circuit between US and these countries messages to and from US may be relayed via London or Moscow. For technical reasons the circuit via London is preferable.

FonOff agreed to instruct Brit Chargé at Moscow to inform Soviets that British Govt is at loss to understand action taken by ACC in Rumania and express hope that Soviet ACC Chairman will be instructed to authorize resumption of both postal and telegraphic services. Re Bulgaria he will state that routing of UK-Bulgarian telegrams via Moscow involves technical difficulties and ask that Soviet representative (ACC) in Bulgaria be instructed to authorize early resumption of telegraphic services via direct circuit London.

London favors parallel representation by you and Brit Chargé. Please consult with him and if you have had no reply re your previous action (mytel 926, Apr 21, your 1369, Apr 26 ⁹⁵) urge upon Soviet officials concurrently with your Brit colleague necessity for immediate reopening of telecommunications service between US and Rumania. You may point out that for technical reasons it would be preferable to have messages between the United States and Bulgaria or Rumania relayed through London rather than Moscow.

Re postal service you should add that due notification was given Soviet authorities of US intention to reopen service, and it was authorized only after it became apparent Soviet officials had not indicated objections. Reiterate this Govt's failure to understand ACC (Soviet) attitude that civil communications between Rumania and US were "premature". For your info, while it was not stated postal service between US and Bulgaria was closed, Post Office reports no mail pouches received from Bulgaria this year.

Telegraph report.

GREW

⁹³ Not printed.

⁹⁴ Same as telegram 205, April 16, 11 a. m., from Sofia, vol. iv, p. 186.

⁹⁵ With regard to telegram 1369, April 26, see footnote 65, p. 535.

711.60/6-245 : Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ⁹⁶

[WASHINGTON, June 2, 1945.]

54. On May 27 Marshal Stalin proposed that our Governments establish diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and, at a later time, Hungary. He said he was sending you a similar message.

I am today replying to him as follows: ⁹⁷

"I have given considerable thought to your message of May 27 in which you propose that our Governments should at this time establish diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and, at a later time, Hungary.

"Your suggestion shows that you feel, as I do, that we should endeavor to make the period of the armistice regimes as short as possible and also give prompt recognition to all efforts which may be made by those countries which have been our enemies to align themselves with the democratic principles of the Allied nations. I therefore agree that normal relations with these countries should be established at the earliest feasible time.

"I am accordingly prepared to proceed at once with the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Finland, all the more readily, of course, because that country has not been in a state of war with the United States, but also because through their elections and other political adjustments the Finnish people have demonstrated their genuine devotion to democratic principles and procedures.

"In Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, however, I have not found the same encouraging signs. There, and particularly in the latter two countries, I have been disturbed to find governments which do not accord to all democratic elements of the people the rights of free expression, and which in their system of administration are, in my opinion, neither representative of or responsive to the will of the people. You already know, from Ambassador Harriman's note of March 14, the reasons why the United States Government considers that the political situation in Rumania should be made the subject of consultation among the three principal Allied Governments. As regards Bulgaria, you are also aware of American concern over the proposed electoral procedures and certain other political manifestations there.

⁹⁶ This message to Prime Minister Churchill and the quoted message to Marshal Stalin contained therein were drafted in the Department of State and transmitted to Admiral Leahy at the White House under cover of a memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Grew dated June 1.

⁹⁷ The quoted message from President Truman to Marshal Stalin was transmitted to Ambassador Harriman in message No. 021452, White House No. 280, June 2, for delivery to Stalin. The message delivered by Ambassador Harriman to Foreign Commissar Molotov on June 7 for forwarding to Marshal Stalin was a close paraphrase of the text printed here with one omission as noted in the telegram of June 7 from Moscow, p. 552.

"I sincerely hope that the time may soon come when I can accredit formal diplomatic representatives to these countries. To this end I am ready at any moment to have my representatives meet with Soviet and British representatives in order more effectively to concert our policies and actions in this area. I think this would be a constructive move toward the restoration of normal peacetime relations with them as independent states ready to assume the responsibilities and to share the benefits of participation in the family of nations.

"I am informing Mr. Churchill of this message to you."

Would you let me know what you think of Marshal Stalin's proposal?

711.60/6-345 : Telegram

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, and the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Truman

[Moscow,] 3 June 1945.

031300 NCR 8964. Your personal message for delivery to Stalin regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations with the former German Satellites (Message Number 021452, White House Number 280⁹⁸) was received early this morning. Unless you feel that this matter is of such urgency as to require immediate delivery of your message, we both are of the opinion that it would be wiser to delay its delivery until the discussions in regard to Poland are completed.⁹⁹ We are afraid that raising again directly from you to Stalin of the issues between us in these former enemy countries may get these issues entangled with the Polish question in Stalin's mind and prejudice the chance of an acceptable agreement at this time regarding the Polish consultations. We will await your instructions.¹

⁹⁸ See footnote 97, p. 550.

⁹⁹ Mr. Hopkins, who had undertaken a special mission to Moscow for President Truman, had proceeded to the Soviet capital in company with Ambassador Harriman to converse with Marshal Stalin upon matters under discussion between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States. Between May 26 and June 6, Mr. Hopkins had held six conversations with Marshal Stalin, dealing with a number of important issues including the matter of the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. For documentation regarding Mr. Hopkins' mission to Moscow, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945*, vol. I, pp. 21-62. For further documentation regarding the Hopkins Mission in connection with the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government, see *ante*, pp. 299-331.

¹ President Truman replied to Ambassador Harriman in telegram 281, June 4, as follows: "Replying to your 031300. You are hereby authorized to delay delivery of my message to Stalin regarding establishment of diplomatic relations with former German Satellites until you consider the time appropriate." (711.60/6-445)

740.00119 EW/6-545 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman*²

[LONDON,] June 5, 1945.

74. I fully agree that your No. 54 should await a tactical moment for its delivery.³ But do not let us lose that moment for future of the world hangs upon "countries which accord to all democratic elements of people the rights of freedom of expression." This will come up in its good time quite soon. .

711.60/6-845

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Truman*⁴

[Moscow, June 7, 1945.]

I have delivered this morning your message to Stalin, White House No. 280, June 2,⁵ regarding resumption of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

After full discussion with Hopkins and others here I took the liberty of eliminating the phrase referring to Finland not having been in a state of war with the United States as we all felt strongly that this would cause a serious misunderstanding on the part of Stalin that we did not take sufficiently into account Finland's action with Germany against Russia. As the deletion did not affect the substance of the cable I felt that you would not object to our making this change.

[HARRIMAN]

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/6-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 7, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received June 7—10:25 a. m.]

1945. It seems reasonably evident to us that Soviet Govt is for reasons of policy opposed to resumption of normal direct communications between US and Rumania and Bulgaria. We therefore ex-

² Printed from a paraphrase transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by the British Embassy on June 5.

³ In his telegram 55, June 4, President Truman informed Prime Minister Churchill that he had authorized delay in the delivery of the message to Stalin in order to avoid adverse effects on the prospects for an agreement on Poland (711.60/6-445).

⁴ Text of the message as forwarded by Admiral Leahy from the White House on June 8 for the information of the Secretary of State.

⁵ See footnote 97, p. 550.

pect slight if any results from written representations made today to Molotov in conformity with Dept's 1209 June 2.

We made the point that with termination of German war there seemed to be no valid reason for continued severance of these communications. In our opinion this is a point worth having on record.

If we continue to encounter blank wall after this, further platonic expressions of views will, it seems to us, only serve to weaken our position. In such circumstances unless some suitable *quid pro quo* could be found there would seem to be little for us to do but to apprise the American public of the lack of communications and the reasons therefor.⁶

We have discussed this problem with Brit Emb and they hold substantially same views.

To Dept 1945 rptd London 254.

HARRIMAN

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 8 June 1945.

M 1065. Mister Berry and I held a conference on 6 June with Mister Maniu, at his request. Following is brief outline of our discussion:

Maniu considers that Rumania is no longer a sovereign state. The government consists almost entirely of Russian Quislings. Under the new collaboration agreement, Russia will shortly be in control of all of Rumania's chief industries and the entire economic structure of the state will become Communized.

Several weeks ago, Maniu submitted a formal application to the government for authority to hold local meetings of National Peasant Party officials in various towns and cities in order to formulate party policies. This authority was refused by Groza on the grounds that the National Peasant Party is not represented in the government; can not be recognized as a bona fide political party.

⁶ Telegram 2352, June 30, 6 p. m., from Moscow reported receipt of a communication from Vyshinsky stating that the Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania had been instructed to take steps for the resumption of U.S.-Rumanian radio and postal communications for correspondence (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/6-3045). Earlier, telegram 427, June 22, 6 p. m., from Bucharest, had reported that on June 21 General Schuyler had been informed by General Susaikov that the Allied Control Commission had been instructed by Moscow to advise the Rumanian Government that communications could be opened with the United States and Great Britain; the A.C.C. had advised the Rumanian Postal and Telegraphic Administration to that effect (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/6-2245).

Maniu says that Petrescu, leader of the Socialist Party, is now working closely with Maniu and has indicated his willingness to withdraw from the government and from the National Democratic Front whenever such a move appears desirable in the National interest. Maniu feels that in any such withdrawal Petrescu can count on all but a small handful of individuals who constitute the extreme left wing of his party.

Maniu hinted that if he could receive Anglo-American support, his party was ready to persuade the King to dismiss the present Government and to form a new Cabinet with all parties represented. He asked what would be the reaction of the United States to such a move, assuming that Russia might endeavor to maintain the present government by force, even though it were dismissed by the King. We replied that we had no information on this point. We told him our government had already taken the position that the Groza government was not representative of all parties; that discussions on governmental levels had been going on for some time and that the United States does not yet consider this matter closed. We warned him of the possible serious consequences for Rumania of any local action which might provoke bloodshed and expressed the opinion that local disorders might well impede rather than accelerate a final agreement among the three major allies on the Rumanian situation. Maniu answered that without definite assurance of Anglo-American support, he would under no circumstances provoke a situation which could be construed as open rebellion against Russian authority.

[SCHUYLER]

711.60/6-845

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman*¹

[Moscow,] 9 June 1945.

I have received your reply message on the question of reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary.

It can be seen from your message that you also consider desirable an earliest establishment of normal relations with the said countries. However, I do not see any reasons to give any preference to Finland in this matter, which unlike Roumania and Bulgaria did not participate with its armed forces on the side of the Allies in the war against Hitlerite Germany. The public opinion of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet Command would not understand if Roumania and Bul-

¹ Text of the translated message as forwarded by Admiral Leahy from the White House on June 11 to the Secretary of State for preparation of a draft reply.

garia, whose armed forces participated actively in the defeat of Hitlerite Germany would be put in a worse position as compared to Finland.

As regards the question of the political regime, in Roumania and Bulgaria are no less possibilities for democratic elements as, for instance, in Italy with whom the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have already reestablished diplomatic relations. On the other hand it is impossible not to note that lately the political development of Roumania and Bulgaria has entered a calm channel and I see no such facts which could be cause for anxiety for the further development of democratic beginnings in those countries. In connection with this it seems to me that there is no necessity in any special measures on the part of the Allies in respect to the said countries.

That is why the Soviet Government adheres to the opinion that a further postponement of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland would not be expedient and that the question regarding Hungary could be settled somewhat later.

871.00/6-1445 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, June 14, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

410. In a series of brief trips during the past 5 weeks I have traveled accompanied by one officer or another more than 3000 miles on Rumanian roads. Some impressions which may be of use to Dept at this time, gained or confirmed by this direct contact with the country are hereinafter summarized.

The enthusiasm for the King dwarfs that for any other personality. He has measured up to the Rumanian idea of faking [*ideal of a king*].⁸ The people do not expect him to interfere in the normal processes of Govt but when events reach a stage critical for the nation they do expect him to assume leadership. They feel that he did just that on Aug 23 and that he will do it again when and if necessary.

The Groza govt is accepted like the Russian Army of Occupation as something that events beyond the control of the people have imposed upon Rumania. As yet it has limited authority in the provinces. It is however replacing career administrative officials and therefore extending its hold over the administration of the country. If this process continues some months the Communist Party, representing

⁸ Corrected on basis of copy of telegram in Moscow Embassy files (Lot 53 F 11 : File 161 B).

perhaps 5% of the people, will have had the time to integrate its members into the majority of key positions in provincial administrations. At present, however, the situation is well described by the words of a Russian commandant "gypsies and various *plugars* (Ploughman's Front agitators) are walking about everywhere, seizing land, agricultural implements and machinery and the crop without any consideration for the law".

The peasantry generally has taken a passive attitude toward the agrarian reform law. Peasants are distrustful of gifts. They recall that the property of the Jews was given to the Rumanians who after a few years' possession were obliged to return it. Only when Govt agents threaten a village that people will be imported from neighboring villages to take up the land on adjoining estates have villagers shown any alacrity in occupying large estates.

I saw no evidence of suffering from hunger. Indeed it appears that Rumania will raise this year ample food for its needs. Whether or not there will be suffering next winter will of course depend on the successful solution of the transportation problem and the tapering off of Soviet requisitioning of foodstuffs.

In the railyards at Lasi [*Iasi?*] I saw Russian bound train loads of livestock, factory machinery, household furnishings and scrap metal. I was told that 150,000 Russia bound troops passed through Focsani in the past 10 days. On the road paralleling the railroad between Fogarash and Brasov I saw Soviet sentries every 220 meters so placed to prevent the escape of homeward-bound Soviet soldiers. Rumanians recalling the looting by Soviet deserters as the armies swept westward fear the return of what they describe as "a plague of a million locusts".

In nearly every conversation Rumanians inquired "when will the Russians leave?" They all know that the presence of the Soviet Army is maintaining a leftist govt in power. Many also realized that the presence of a Soviet Army provides the most potent anti-communistic propaganda. As a result the real strength of the Communist party in Rumania, in contrast to the bluster of its leaders in Bucharest, has diminished. The realization of this may have influenced the Soviet authorities, now that a Soviet Rumanian trade agreement has been signed, to consider moderating their demands under the armistice. But reports of this changed attitude are received with reserve by Rumanians as the change may only be a tactical move and in any event the Soviet authorities can, through their puppet NDF Govt or under the trade agreement, obtain by legal means what they formerly obtained through direct pressure.

Rptd to Moscow as 108.

[BERRY]

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/6-1445 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, June 14, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received June 15—3:23 p. m.]

411. I called upon Mr. Pavlov⁹ to tell him of the receipt of my orders and to present Melbourne¹⁰ who will carry on in my absence.¹¹ In the course of our conversation I said that at home I expected to be asked questions concerning events in Rumania and such questions I felt I could answer satisfactorily but I might be asked too about future projects and on such I would appreciate his views.

Mr. Pavlov said that the primary interest of his Govt was in security. From Rumania several great invasions had been launched which had done incalculable damage to Russian life and property. Naturally, therefore, the Soviet Union would take whatever steps were necessary to see that history did not repeat itself. Thus Soviet action in Rumania had been largely dictated by the compelling need for security. He added that a secondary interest of the Soviet Govt in Rumania was in the stability of a Rumanian Govt that was friendly to the Soviet Union. The present Govt was much more cooperative than the former Govts and, being representative of democratic forces of the country, offered greater stability than any recent Govt.

He then asked me concerning the American attitude towards the present Govt. I answered that our Ambassador in Moscow on Mar 14¹² had made a formal request for consultations with the Soviet and British Govts upon the situation of Rumania, adding that it was my understanding that President Truman in a recent telegram to Marshal Stalin¹³ had made reference to this request, Mr. Pavlov indicated that this was not new information but stressed again the necessity for security for the Soviet Union.

To this I replied that it seemed to me that recent military events in Europe pretty well precluded the idea of a European aggression against the Soviet Union and as far as Rumania itself was concerned, I felt that the Rumanian people fully realized the importance of maintaining a policy of sincere friendship towards the Soviet Union. In fact, it seemed to me that the need for Soviet's friendship was suffi-

⁹ Alexey Pavlovich Pavlov, Political Adviser to the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania, Marshal Malinovsky.

¹⁰ Roy M. Melbourne, second-ranking Foreign Service Officer in the American political mission in Rumania.

¹¹ Berry departed from Bucharest on June 18 to return to Washington for consultation.

¹² See letter of March 14 from Ambassador Harriman to Foreign Commissar Molotov, p. 512.

¹³ Message from President Truman to Marshal Stalin as transmitted in a note from Ambassador Harriman to Molotov, June 7; see footnote 97, p. 550.

ciently appreciated that it would be confirmed by any freely chosen Rumanian govt. I added, as the conversation was progressing in a frank and friendly manner, that Soviet action in Rumania had more than local significance as the American press and people, having little accurate news of Rumania because correspondents were not freely admitted and freely permitted to send out their news stories, were not very understanding when a govt was installed under circumstances such as was the present Govt and particularly as that event occurred so soon after the publication of the Yalta communiqué. It seemed to me, therefore, in the interests of world-wide cooperation, that it is desirable that the three Great Powers consult on the Rumanian situation. Mr. Pavlov indicated that such reasons in the past had been pushed into the background by the compelling necessity of winning the war and establishing the security of the Soviet frontiers.

If the attitude of Soviet officials in Rumania in the past few days is a fair barometer of the attitude of the Soviet officials in Moscow, it seems to me that our point of view on the Rumanian situation, when discussed on the Moscow level, will have now a better reception than at any time in the past few months.

Rptd to Moscow as 109.

BERRY

711.60/6-945

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

Moscow, June 19, 1945.

DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I have received the following top secret message for Marshal Stalin from the President:¹⁴

"I fully agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, to which you revert in your telegram of June 9, would be a constructive step. Our exchange of messages on this subject shows that our Governments may not be approaching the matter in quite the same way because the state of our respective relations with these various states is not identical. For example, there would be no obstacle to the immediate resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Finland and, as regards Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, while our general interests are the same all around we find that the present situation has different aspects in each country.

"I am giving this matter further study. As the most practical way of coming to a uniform agreement I therefore propose that we discuss it at our forthcoming meeting."

¹⁴ Drafted in the Department of State and forwarded by Acting Secretary of State Grew to President Truman for the latter's approval under cover of a memorandum of June 18; transmitted to Ambassador Harriman in telegram 1336, June 18, printed in *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. 1, p. 182.

Will you kindly transmit this message to Marshal Stalin?

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/6-2045 : Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] June 19, 1945.

M 1106. Yesterday I informed General Susaikov by letter of information received by Mr. Berry from State Department 11 June¹⁵ to the effect that Ambassador Harriman has been requested to discuss with the Soviet Government the question of certain changes in interpretation of the Rumanian Armistice Agreement which now appears desirable as a result of cessation of hostilities in Europe. I mentioned also the viewpoint of the United States Government that the present situation requires a change in the organization of the Rumanian Allied Control Commission substantially along the lines recently proposed for Hungary, our interest and general attitude being substantially the same in all three ex-satellite states.

A few hours after delivery of my letter, I received the following note from General Vinogradov:

“In the conference on 30 May AC, speaking of the possibility of the influence of the cessation of hostilities in Europe on the execution by Rumania of the Armistice Convention, I have in no case allowed for any changes in the articles of the Armistice Convention itself, which will remain in force until the conclusion of the Peace. Signed Vinogradov.”

I consider it highly important that representatives of the United States participate in any discussions which may be held reference changes in interpretation of the Armistice Agreement. The Russian attitude here appears to be that this is a matter primarily for discussion between Russian and Rumanian representatives. I do not concur in this view. I have noted the opinion of the State Department that this is a matter for discussion and agreement between the three Allied Nations on a governmental level and shall so inform General Susaikov at our next meeting.

[SCHUYLER]

¹⁵ Presumably, reference is to telegram 1257, June 8, to Moscow, repeated to Bucharest as 288. See *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 372, footnote 6.

871.01/6-2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne)

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1945—7 p. m.

311. Dept approves position taken by you and General Schuyler with respect to Maniu's inquiry about American reaction to possible attempt by Maniu and King to replace Groza regime with new Govt at risk of open break with Russians should latter insist on maintaining present regime by force (Schuyler's M-1065 to War Dept June 8).

Dept would not wish its view that Groza Govt does not meet definition of broadly representative interim regime contained in Crimea Declaration and that manner of its installation was inconsistent with that Declaration to be taken as encouragement of local efforts to overthrow the regime by force during armistice period when ultimate responsibility for maintenance of order rests, by agreement of principal Allied Govts, with Soviet High Command in Rumania and while we are still seeking to reach agreement with the Russians on a common Allied policy on the Rumanian political situation. Should Maniu press for reply to his question on this Govt's attitude toward his contemplated action, you are authorized to reply along lines set forth in your 301, April 24, (reDeptel 217 April 28¹⁶).

It is of course impossible to keep Maniu informed of status of our negotiations with Russians on this question. He may be informed however that our policy remains as set forth in Deptel 164, March 29 (urtel 247, April 5¹⁷).

GREW

711.60/6-2545

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman*¹⁸

[Moscow,] June 23, 1945.

I have received your message of June 19 regarding reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

I take notice that you continue to study this question. However, I adhere to my previous point of view that nothing can justify any further postponement in reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania and Bulgaria.

¹⁶ Text of telegram 217 is contained in footnote 76, p. 540.¹⁷ Not printed.¹⁸ Text of the translated message as forwarded from the White House on June 25 by direction of Admiral Leahy for the information of the Secretary of State.

871.001 Carol II/6-2745: Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, June 27, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

438. Roumanian party leaders are now learning of the impending arrival of former King Carol in France and are generally disconcerted regarding the future since they conclude that Soviet insistence induced the French to permit his entry. (See my 424, June 22.¹⁹)

In view of the unsettled political state of Roumania the return of Carol to Europe undoubtedly will have disturbing internal effects here as first impressions are demonstrating. Thoughtful local sources express fears that the Russians, despite any possible previous commitments, may seek to replace King Michael by his compromised father who would be an amenable instrument in assisting in the destruction of popular sentiment toward the monarchy, the chief national rallying point under existing trying circumstances.²⁰

Rptd Moscow as 115.

MELBOURNE

[President Truman, British Prime Minister Churchill (and later Prime Minister Attlee), and Soviet Premier Stalin, with their advisers, met in conference at Berlin, July 17–August 2, 1945. Part II of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, issued as a communiqué on August 2, 1945, stated that the United States, British, and Soviet Governments had reached agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers. Part X of the Report stated that the three Governments had charged the Council with the task of preparing peace treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland; that the three Governments had agreed to examine the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland; and that the three Governments expressed the conviction that the Allied press would enjoy freedom to report developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. Part XII of the Report stated that the three Governments had agreed

¹⁹ Not printed; it reported that the British Political Representative was suggesting to his Government that intimate friends of former King Carol might have arranged for Carol to secure a visa for entry into France without the full knowledge and consent of the French Government (871.001 Carol II/6-2245). King Carol was at this time in exile in Brazil.

²⁰ Telegram 2428, July 5, from Moscow, commented that there had been no indication in Moscow of any favorable sentiment toward ex-King Carol; Ambassador Harriman was inclined to doubt that the Soviet Government would vouch for or actively associate itself in support of any monarchical pretensions (871.001 Carol II/7-545).

that revision of procedures of the Allied Control Commissions for Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary would be undertaken. For text of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, volume II, pages 1499–1512. For text of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Conference, see *ibid.*, pages 1478–1498. For references to the minutes and other records of the proceedings of the Conference and other documentation leading to these agreements, see *ibid.*, entries in index under “Rumania”, pages 1635–1636. For additional documentation for the months of June and July 1945 regarding the questions of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, the conclusion of a peace treaty, proposals to reorganize the Allied Control Commission for Rumania, and the Rumanian internal political and economic scene, see *ibid.*, volume I, pages 357–434, *passim*, and volume II, pages 686–749, *passim*.]

871.00/8–745 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, August 7, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received August 8—10:28 a. m.]

533. Potsdam Declaration has caused all Rumanian political elements to consider next few weeks as crucial since they believe before the Allied Foreign Ministers meet,²¹ definite action must be taken to consolidate or overthrow Groza govt. While the opposition looks to the King to assume the initiative in instituting a change, the govt continues to enjoy and solicit Russian support.

The National Peasant, National Liberal leaders have now confirmed to me that they are united in working for a speedy overthrow of NDF (National Democratic Front) govt. The Socialist leader Titel Petrescu has explained to me that his party although nominally a NDF member finds it impossible to continue its participation in Communist-dominated govt.

Originally opposition decided to request King this week to dismiss Groza govt to organize another comprising these three parties and Communists. This would revive original coalition responsible for *coup d'etat* August 23 and would place technicians in Ministerial posts in Provisional Govt that would organize national elections.

²¹ The first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was to be held in London not later than September 1, 1945. See Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, August 2, 1945, Part II, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1500. From September 11 to October 2, 1945, the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London to discuss the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. For documentation regarding this Conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. II, pp. 99 ff.

However, opposition circles today discussed with approval a new plan whereby they would request King to call tripartite chiefs of ACC (Allied Control Commission) to meeting to inquire of each, in light of Potsdam Declaration, whether he was satisfied with present govt or desired King to effect changes. It is reported probable that this more subtle technique may, of course, be urged upon King.

King is placed in position strongly resembling one he occupied preceding formation of NDF Govt. It is believed he will refuse to take action upon original opposition plan without approval of Russians, who imposed NDF Govt, and without gaining Anglo-American support but his attitude toward new plan is not yet known. It is thought he would make preliminary inquiries of Allied missions before addressing a formal approach. Accordingly, Dept may wish to indicate its views for guidance of this Mission and General Schuyler.

Groza govt was cheered following Potsdam Declaration by Soviet announcement of resumption of diplomatic relations with Rumania²² which was interpreted by King and political opposition as a clear intention to reinforce the present regime and to make possible the accrediting of a NDF representative to attend London Peace Treaty session of Allied Foreign Ministers.

Groza and Foreign Minister Tatarescu, to consolidate their positions, are making arrangements to proceed to Moscow separately or together. Tatarescu has even addressed a formal note to Soviet authorities stating that he "awaits proposals from the Russians" to conclude a mutual defense pact. Groza government retains and uses the great weapon of political power to bind itself to Russians by speedily forming joint Russo-Rumanian companies²³ for every phase of country's economy, by seeking to grant without question or study every Russian economic demand under armistice and by filling country's administration with Communist Party supporters who continue large-scale arrests to intimidate opposition. Government further reported to be planning a rush national election in September with hand-picked candidates to forestall any attempts by a new regime to organize free elections. This would defeat opposition plans to revise electoral law which they feel would necessitate 4 or 5 months' delay and which would give a new government time to adjust internal administration sufficiently to assure a free election.

It is apparent present regime's policy is to create an unsupportable position for any future "recognized democratic government" as provided by Potsdam Declaration with which peace treaties may be

²² The Soviet announcement of the resumption of diplomatic relations with Rumania was made on August 6, 1945.

²³ The first of the Russo-Rumanian companies was agreed to in a convention between the USSR and Rumania, signed in Bucharest July 17, 1945, regarding the creation of a Soviet-Rumanian company for the exploration, exploitation, refining, and marketing of crude oil and oil products.

concluded. Opposition considers this month to be its last great opportunity for the predictable future to change what balanced Rumanians reluctantly call a "government of traitors" for a regime that would seek to uphold principles of democracy and national integrity.

Unless significant governmental changes are made shortly by Allied agreement, thoughtful observers feel that all hope for implementing American position as elaborated in telegrams to this Mission, notably Deptel 90, February 24 will be irretrievably lost. Groza government will continue by default and expressed American political desires for Rumania will be buried beneath Soviet initiative.

Repeated to Moscow as 147.

MELBOURNE

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/8-745 : Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 7 August 1945.

M-1356. During recent months it has become increasingly apparent that the ACC for Rumania is in no sense a policy-making body. It received explicit and detailed instructions from Moscow covering every phase of its activities. The ACC Chairman has no authority to depart from these instructions in any particular. This is abundantly clear from remarks of General Susaikov himself at the recent Joint ACC Meeting, as reported in my M-1312 of 27th July.²⁴ It is assumed that ACC in Bulgaria and Hungary are subject to similar rigid control from Moscow.

Under these conditions it would seem that, even if US and British ACC Representatives were to be granted reasonable consultative and executive authority, the situation would still be far from satisfactory. We would still find it necessary to register frequent objections to instructions received from higher authority, our Russian counterparts would have no power to participate in compromise decisions, and disagreements over even the smallest details would have to be referred back to our Governments for final action. Actually, here in Rumania, I find little to object to in the manner in which General Susaikov carries out his instructions from Moscow. I do, however, find much which is objectionable in the instructions themselves. This leads naturally to the conclusion that, if such detailed instructions are to continue to emanate from Moscow, then the US and British Governments should have a share in formulating them at the source.

²⁴ Not printed.

I note that the Joint Declaration issued at conclusion of the Potsdam Conference includes a statement that revision of ACC procedures is not [*now*] to be undertaken. I therefore suggest for consideration in appropriate US agencies, the establishment in Moscow of a Tripartite Balkan Supervisory Council, with responsibility for administering the ACCs in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, for formulating Allied policies in these countries and generally for passing on to the ACCs such additional instructions and directives as may be considered necessary. Such a council should assume all the functions, with respect to Balkan ACC, which prior to cessation of hostilities were exercised by Soviet High Command. It appears particularly inappropriate that after the end of hostilities, the latter agency should continue its ACC supervisory functions. If we cannot secure full tripartite power on the proposed council, then we should at least be represented, with the right to discuss all policies and other instructions before they are promulgated and when necessary to secure delay in their issuance until after agreement by the three governments concerned has been reached.

[SCHUYLER]

871.00/8-945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne)

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1945—3 p. m.

416. Soviet Embassy on Aug. 6 informed Dept of Soviet Govt's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Rumania. This decision, while it is in conformity with Potsdam agreements (Section X of communiqué), was taken on the initiative of the Soviet Govt alone and does not imply uniformity of attitudes of three Allied Govts toward Groza regime.

Preparation of peace treaty for Rumania by Council of Foreign Ministers, in accordance with section X of Potsdam communiqué, need not be delayed by absence of diplomatic relations between Rumania and one or more of Allied Govts concerned. Potsdam agreement provides that treaty will be concluded with a "recognized democratic govt".

Dept hopes that political situation in Rumania will develop in such a way as to permit this Govt also to establish diplomatic relations with Rumania. In view of unrepresentative character of Groza Govt however Dept does not contemplate taking such a step at present time. Our attitude of reserve toward Groza Govt was made clear to Soviet and Brit Govts, as well as to Rumanians, at time it was installed. Subsequent events have merely served to confirm this opinion.

In your contacts with Rumanian officials and political leaders you should be guided by Dept's views as set forth in Deptels 90 February 24, 157 March 27 and in present tel. Should opposition leaders approach you (reurtels 533 Aug. 7 and 539 Aug. 9),²⁵ you may be guided in your statements by the consideration that it is not our purpose to discourage such leaders in their attempts to secure freedom of expression for all democratic groups or to present their case to the Rumanian people and to world opinion for a more representative Govt. Without replying directly to questions which may be put to you concerning your Govt's attitude toward a particular plan of action, you may let it be known in general terms that this Govt hopes to see established in Rumania, through the efforts of the Rumanians themselves, and if necessary with the assistance of the three Allied Govts as provided in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, a more representative regime, and that the US Govt looks forward to the establishment of diplomatic relations with a Rumanian Govt in which all important democratic parties are represented or which issues from free elections.

In such conversations as you may have you may refer to relevant parts of President's report to the nation Aug 9²⁶ (Radio Bulletin 190). Note that with reference to press correspondents (see section X of Potsdam communiqué) the President said "The three Govts agreed at Berlin that the Allied press would enjoy full freedom from now on to report to the world upon all developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland."

Sent to Bucharest, repeated to London and Moscow.²⁷

BYRNES

871.00/8-1445 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, August 14, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received 9 : 30 p. m.]

553. (Deptel 416 of August 11 and mytel 551 of August 14.²⁸ At my interview today with the King I informed him of the Department's general attitude toward Rumania. In answers to questions he was

²⁵ Latter not printed; it reported that all Rumanian opposition political leaders were awaiting, as a vital and urgent factor for Rumania's independence, an official interpretation that the Groza government was not considered as a "recognized democratic government" under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration (871.00/8-945).

²⁶ For text of President Truman's report to the nation on the Berlin Conference, delivered by radio from the White House at 10 p. m., August 9, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 12, 1945, p. 208.

²⁷ As telegrams 6818 and 1803, respectively.

²⁸ Latter not printed; it outlined the problems in bringing about a change in the Rumanian Government, as viewed by responsible Rumanian leaders (871.00/8-1445).

made acquainted with the Dept's confirmed reserve toward the Groza govt in view of its unrepresentative character. He was further told that the Potsdam agreement provided that the peace treaty would be concluded with a "recognized democratic government" and that the Department did not contemplate establishing diplomatic relations with Rumania at this time. Reference was made to the Dept's expressed political wishes for Rumania as given in Deptel 90 of Feb 24 and significant portions of the President's speech of August 9 were invoked to show the unchanged nature of the American position.

I told the King that my Government hoped, through purely Rumanian efforts, to see a more representative regime established here with which it could resume diplomatic relations. With the timing and method of any possible efforts completely in Rumanian hands, it was hoped that any eventual changes would include all important democratic parties or those issuing from free elections. Only if necessary, would the Dept wish the three Allied Governments to assist as provided in the Yalta Declaration.

The King expressed gratification at the American position and stated his personal intention to follow constitutional lines if and when responsible Rumanian political forces united in urging and formulating a more representative regime. He further asked me to present the American views to the responsible opposition leaders, that they might request audiences of him to discuss eventual Rumanian tactics. This request thus coincides with the fact that these leaders have been in virtual daily contact with this mission for further clarification of the Potsdam Declaration and the President's speech.

Tonight I expect to see Mr. Julius Maniu and tomorrow Dinu Bratianu and Titel Petrescu, as well as Prince Stirbey, whom the King wishes to know the American attitude.

If the Rumanians wish to institute changes in the present regime to one comprising all important democratic parties, I consider it may be expedient to inform a responsible Communist representative, such as Lucretiu Patrascanu, at an early date of the Department's attitude as an elaboration of the President's speech, to state that the American Government does not contemplate renewing diplomatic relations with the present regime and to emphasize that the peace treaty will be signed with a "recognized democratic government".

It should be mentioned that I am maintaining close liaison with General Schuyler on developments, as well as with the British Mission.

Rptd to Moscow as 153.

[MELBOURNE]

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/8-1445

The Acting Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I invite your attention to incoming War Department message No. 7433 of 8 August 1945²⁹ from Brigadier General C. V. R. Schuyler, Chief, United States Military Representation, Allied Control Commission, Rumania, a copy of which has been furnished to the State Department. In this communication General Schuyler makes certain recommendations concerning United States participation on the Allied Control Commissions in the Balkans.

The reports of General Schuyler over the last few months have indicated that Soviet representation on the Allied Control Commission, Rumania, is not empowered to make decisions and is in no sense a policy making body. It appears from General Schuyler's reports that every phase of Soviet participation on the Allied Control Commission is covered by detailed and explicit instructions from Moscow. A similar state of affairs is apparent from the reports of the Chiefs of the United States Military Representation in Hungary and Bulgaria. It is my understanding that the various aspects of United States participation on the Allied Control Commissions in the Balkans were to have been discussed at the Potsdam Conference, but that no revisions of their procedures were agreed between the participating nations.

General Schuyler proposes in his message that consideration be given to the establishment in Moscow of a tripartite Balkan Advisory Council which would have responsibility for administering the Allied Control Commissions in the Balkans, for formulating Allied policy in these countries, and finally for passing on to the Allied Control Commissions instructions and directives as may be considered necessary. It is General Schuyler's concept that a tripartite Advisory Council of this kind would place the United States in a position where it would be represented at the source of the political policies and directives which are developed in Moscow. Under the present conditions the United States Representative is dealing with a Russian Representative who is in effect merely transmitting and executing instructions received from Moscow.

Although General Schuyler's reports indicate that the status of the United States on the Allied Control Commission is not satisfactory,

²⁹ Same as telegram M-1356, August 7, from General Schuyler to the War Department, p. 564.

it is the view of the War Department that our Missions in the Balkans are a valuable source of intelligence.

The suggestions contained in General Schuyler's message appear to be well taken, but as this matter is one primarily embodying political implications I am submitting it to you for your consideration.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/8-1645: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne)

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1945—2 p. m.

423. Deptel 407, Aug 9³⁰ containing text of section XI of protocol agreed upon at Potsdam should correct erroneous impression (see final paragraph of Genl Schuyler's M-1356 Aug. 7), apparently due to garble, that revision of ACC procedures is not to be undertaken.

At Potsdam three Govts agreed that Soviet proposals for Hungarian ACC would be taken as basis for revision of ACC procedure in all three ex-satellites. Thus proposals given by Genl Susaikov to Genl Schuyler concerning revised procedure for Rumanian ACC enclosed with your despatch 410 July 17³¹ are not to be basis for revised ACC statutes. Susaikov's views expressed before Potsdam agreements (Schuyler's tel M-1312 July 27³⁰) that ACC meetings are informational only is of course not consistent with present agreed basis for revised procedure.

It is our view that details of revised procedure should be worked out in form of statutes at Bucharest by the three principal Allied Reps. For Genl Schuyler's guidance in such discussions we are forwarding by separate tel draft text of statutes for ACC Hungary³² in second period, based on suggestions made by Genl Key and approved by State, War and Navy Depts. This draft represents US Govt's desiderata for ACC's in all three ex-satellite states. Full discretion is given to Genl Schuyler, acting in consultation with US Mission, to make use of the draft statutes in discussions with Soviet and UK members of ACC, with a view to their adoption in so far as possible.

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 690.

³² Telegram 424, August 16, to Bucharest, not printed. For text of the Draft Statutes for the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, see vol. IV, p. 842.

Meanwhile, pending agreement on definitive statutes, Dept expects Rumanian ACC to operate on lines laid down for Hungary by Voroshilov's letter of July 12³⁴ (Deptel 407).

This telegram has been cleared with War Dept.

BYRNES

871.00/8-1745 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, August 17, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 11: 55 p. m.]

557. Thus far I have informed the King and his two principal constitutional advisors, Visoianu and Prince Stirbey, as well as Messrs. Maniu, Bratianu and Petrescu, of the tenor of the Department's telegram 416 of August 11, since these political forces have specifically inquired concerning the American attitude toward the Groza regime. The Rumanian Communists have not addressed any inquiry to learn personally the American views. (See my telegram 556 of August 16.)³⁵

During a normal meeting today with the Deputy of the Soviet political representative upon an urgent Department matter to sequester all official Japanese archives and property (re Department's telegraphic circular of August 14, 8 p. m.³⁶) in the course of a friendly conversation he mentioned rumors that "reactionary parties" were circulating to the effect that America did not intend to recognize the Groza regime. I took the occasion to say that I had received information that the American Government did not intend to renew diplomatic relations at present with Rumania in view of the regime, which it considered unrepresentative, but that I felt a peace treaty finally would be concluded by the Three Powers with a recognized Democratic government in Rumania. In the course of an administrative business interview with the secretary general of the Foreign Office, I gave the outline of the Department's attitude toward the Groza regime.

³⁴ The Soviet proposals for the Control Commission in Hungary were originally presented on July 12, 1945, in a letter from the Chairman (Soviet) of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, Marshal Voroshilov, to the American and British Representatives on the Commission. The text of the letter was transmitted to the Department in telegram 286, July 13, from Budapest, vol. iv, p. 834. The letter, only slightly revised, served as a basis of discussion during the Tripartite Conference of Berlin and was included as an annex to section XII (XI) of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Conference, August 1 (2), 1945, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1494.

³⁵ Not printed; it reported, *inter alia*, that Prince Stirbey had informed Melbourne that the Rumanian Communist leadership had been unable to send a representative to hear the American position regarding the Groza regime because Moscow had not given the necessary approval (871.00/8-1645).

³⁶ Printed in vol. VI, section under Japan entitled "Surrender of Japan . . .", Part I.

Thus, all important local elements have learned of the American position within the varying prescribed limits of the Department's instruction.

Repeated to Moscow as 156.

MELBOURNE

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 18 August 1945.

M-1446. On 17 Aug I received the following note from General Susaikov:

"The Berlin Conference has rendered a decision on the question of revised procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, according to which regulations for the ACC in Hungary were adopted as a basis for the Allied Control Commission in these countries.

In this connection, I have the honor to transmit herewith the new ACC regulations for Rumania."

The enclosure entitled "Regulations of the ACC in Rumania" and transmitted with the letter reads as follows:

"1. The Allied Control Commission for Rumania has the mission to regulate and control until the conclusion of the peace the exact fulfillment of the terms of the armistice as stated in the convention concluded on 12 Sept 1944 between the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the Government of Rumania on the other.

2. The Allied Control Commission shall be headed by a Chairman who shall be a representative of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. On his staff there shall be a Deputy Chairman of the Commission, a Political Advisor, two Assistants of the Chairman, Chief of Staff of the Commission. Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom shall be included in the Allied Control Commission. The Allied Control Commission has its own seat. The ACC will have its seat in the city of Bucharest.

3. The ACC shall consist of:

- (a) Staff
- (b) A group attached to the Political Advisor
- (c) Administrative Section
- (d) Military Section
- (e) Military Air Section
- (f) Military Naval Section
- (g) Economic Section
- (h) Transport Section

4. Until the conclusion of the peace with Rumania the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of the ACC shall regularly call meetings with British and American representatives for discussion of the many important questions pertaining to the work of the ACC. The meetings shall be called once every 10 days, and if necessary, more often.

The directives of the ACC on questions of principles shall be transmitted to the Rumanian authorities by the Chairman of the ACC (Deputy Chairman) after coordination of these directives with the British and American representatives.

5. The British and American representatives of the ACC shall take part in the general conferences of section heads and local representatives of the ACC which shall be called by the Chairman of the ACC and shall take place regularly, and will also either personally or through their representatives participate on appropriate occasions in mixed commissions set up by the Chairman of the ACC on questions connected with the execution of its functions.

6. During this period, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall have the right:

(a) To receive oral and written information from Soviet Officials of the ACC on any questions connected with the execution of the armistice convention.

(b) To submit for consideration by the Commission proposals of their governments on questions connected with the execution of the armistice convention.

(c) To receive copies of all communications, reports and other documents which might interest the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

(d) To travel freely in the country with the provision that the dates and routes of the trips be furnished to the ACC in advance.

(e) To participate in general conferences or in meetings of the section or in meetings of the section heads of Commission.

(f) To contact the agencies of the Rumanian Government through the Chairman of the ACC, Deputy Chairman and heads of respective sections.

(g) To determine the size and composition of their own representations.

All questions connected with clearances for the exit or entry of the members of the British or American Missions in Rumania will be decided upon by the Chairman of the ACC personally, within period not to exceed 1 week.

(h) To maintain direct contact with their respective governments by means of code telegrams and diplomatic pouch. The dispatch and arrival by air of mail, cargo and diplomatic couriers will be arranged by the British and American representatives of the ACC under procedure and schedules established by the ACC, and on special occasions, following a prior agreement with the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) ACC.

(i) To fix the monetary allowances to be obtained from the Rumanian Government for the expenses of their respective personnel, and to receive these funds through the Commission.

7. In order to organize local control, the ACC shall have its empowered representatives in the provinces, districts, ports and in the most important enterprises.

8. The Deputy Chairman and the Assistants of the Chairman of the ACC, as well as section heads, shall have the right to call in specialist officers through the local Military Command for consultation, inspections and investigations of special questions which may arrive in the course of the work of the ACC.

9. The liaison with Rumanian Government agencies shall be maintained by representatives of the ACC not below the rank of Commission section head, and in the provinces, districts and ports by appropriate representatives of the Commission."

For action taken by this Representation on receipt of subject letter and enclosure see my radio M-1447 dtd 18 August.³⁷

[SCHUYLER]

Department of Defense Files : Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 18 August 1945.

M-1447. In my M-1446 dated 18 August I quoted a letter and enclosure received from General Susaikov outlining new regulations for the ACC Rumania. After consultation with the acting US representative in Rumania I have this date addressed a letter to General Susaikov pointing out that his proposed new regulations are not satisfactory in that they are unduly restrictive as to the rights and privileges of the US representative.

I enclosed a set of proposed regulations for the ACC conforming closely to the proposed statutes for Hungary as set forth in State Department's message 424 dated 14th [16th] August.³⁸ I asked General Susaikov to accept these new proposals as basis for discussion at our next joint meeting now scheduled for 20th August. I have furnished the Chief British ACC representative with a copy of my communication. A similar copy is being forwarded to you by airmail.

[SCHUYLER]

³⁷ *Infra.*

³⁸ See footnote 32, p. 569.

871.00/8-2045 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, August 20, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received August 20—4: 25 p. m.]

567. At 5 p. m. the King summoned General Schuyler and myself and stated that after consultation with the four party leaders all but Communists had advised that Govt immediately be changed.³⁹ The King had called Premier Groza and formally requested him to resign and Groza had refused. King then presented to General Schuyler one of three identical, original notes invoking assistance of the three Allied Govts in forming a more representative regime as provided in Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe. Text of the note and scope of the audience will be reported by General Schuyler.

Repeated Moscow as 163.

MELBOURNE

Department of Defense Files : Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 21 August 1945.

M-1454. At 4: 30 p. m. this date, the King of Rumania invited me to his office, together with Mr. Melbourne. At that time he presented me a written document which he stated was an appeal for assistance under the Yalta Declaration to the Governments of the United States of America, Soviet Russia and Great Britain.

He informed me that immediately preceding my visit, an identical appeal had been delivered to General Susaikov for the Government of Soviet Russia, and would be presented also to Air Vice Marshal Stevenson for the Government of the United Kingdom of a translation of the King's note, which was in Rumanian, [and?] is as follows:

"Taking into consideration the report of the Conference of Berlin in accordance with which a 'recognized democratic government constitutes a condition in order that Rumania may conclude the necessary treaties of peace with the three principal Allied Powers and that Rumania may obtain the support of these powers in order to be admitted into the organization of the United Nations, and, taking into consideration the positions adopted by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Great Britain towards the Rumanian Government in its present composition, I have felt it my

³⁹ Telegram 561, August 18, from Bucharest, had alerted the Department as to the constitutional plan the King had decided to follow in requesting the resignation of the Groza government (871.00/8-1845).

duty as Constitutional Sovereign to consult, in accordance with constitutional procedure consecrated in the tradition of the country, with the political leaders concerning the situation.

"The majority of these leaders have pronounced themselves in favor of the formation of a government under conditions which will permit its recognition by the principal Allied Powers and thereby will permit the conclusion of the necessary treaties and the admission of Rumania amongst the recognized United Nations.

"In consequence, I have seen myself obliged to request the Prime Minister to make it easier for me to realize a solution in this sense through the resignation of the present Cabinet.

"The formation of such a government has not been possible because the Prime Minister did not act on this invitation.

"In these conditions, I have seen myself obliged to call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of the United States, and the Government of Great Britain, requesting them, in conformity with the decisions which they had taken together at the Crimea Conference and in the application of the common responsibilities which they have proclaimed, to have the kindness to give their assistance with a view towards forming a government which, according to the report of the Conference of Berlin, may be recognized by the three principal Allied Powers, thereby placing Rumania in a position to conclude the treaties of peace and to be admitted into the organization of the United Nations."

A statement of certain other details in connection with the conference and further action being taken by this Representation will appear in a later telegram.⁴⁰

[SCHUYLER]

871.00/8-2145 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, August 21, 1945—1 a. m.

[Received 1:35 a. m.]

568. My telegram 567 of August 20. The text of the King's note invoking the Yalta Declaration is contained in General Schuyler's telegram No. M-1454.⁴¹ The General also will report on details of the joint meeting with the King. However, there are aspects of the meeting that I deem politically advisable to report.

The King stated that the Soviet officials and Groza had emphasized the American and British position should not be taken seriously because no written communications had been received specifically outlining their attitude. The argument apparently had some effect upon

⁴⁰ See telegram M-1456, August 21, from General Schuyler to the War Department, p. 578.

⁴¹ *Supra.*

the King, although not deterring him from his action. Thus the Department may wish to issue some public statement upon its attitude toward the Groza regime or instruct me or General Schuyler to deliver a specific note to the King or to Soviet officials here. Such a public statement would have an immense country-wide morale effect.

As outlined in my telegram 551 of August 14⁴² on receipt of the Department's instructions it is impossible for a true report of the King's note to be publicized through the Rumanian press or radio because of censorship. Consequently, the Department may wish to combine an official statement of its attitude toward the Groza regime and announce the text of the King's note in a single release.

The King said General Susaikov and political adviser Pavlov belittled the importance of the London peace treaty⁴³ in his interview with them. They mentioned that he could sign treaties with all of his neighbors. As the King frankly said "they did not want me to sign peace treaties with the Anglo-Americans". This Soviet position would be consistent with the arguments advanced by Communist leader Patrascanu and Premier Groza (my telegrams 561 and 563 of August 18 and August 19⁴⁴).

The King is plagued with the question of official association with the Government. He had previously accepted a Russian invitation to be present tomorrow at the award of Soviet decorations to certain Rumanian generals to which the Government also had been invited. The Russians stated today it would be a personal insult if he did not appear. Meanwhile the King's advisors were concerned over its effect in weakening the King's constitutional action. Tonight Savel Radulescu told General Schuyler and myself that the King would risk embarrassment and attend to avoid offending the Russians, but that he would react at the lunch if any toasts were proposed to the Government. The King intends to inform political leaders of his action to avoid misunderstanding.

General Schuyler and I have been advised the King has cancelled his participation in the August 23 celebration and will probably leave tomorrow for Sinaia.

The practical problem of signing the simplest administrative decrees has arisen, such as payments to civil and army employees. Unless advised otherwise by the Allied Control Commission or the Three Powers, he intends to avoid a breakdown in the country's basic administration by signing minor decrees. Rumanians compare this situa-

⁴² Not printed, but see footnote 28, p. 566.

⁴³ The thought here is presumably the belief that a peace treaty with Rumania would eventuate from the discussions to be held at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

⁴⁴ Neither printed. With regard to telegram 561, see footnote 39, p. 574. Telegram 563, August 19, reported, *inter alia*, on a meeting between the King and Prime Minister Groza (871.00/8-1945).

tion to the King's signature of such decrees prepared by the Antonescu regime for several weeks after the *coup d'état*.

A possibility not unforeseen in political circles is that Groza actually may resign. This would clear the way for the King to proceed to the next constitutional step, namely that of consultations to form a new government, but he would not ask the Three Powers to suspend action on his appeal while he made efforts to form a government of all major political elements.

Sent Department; repeated Moscow as 164.

MELBOURNE

871.01/8-2145 : Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 21 August 1945.

M-1455. Following is the text of a letter which I have addressed this date to Colonel General Susaikov :

"I beg to inform you that I have this date received an appeal from the King of Rumania for the assistance of the Government of the United States of America, Soviet Russia and Great Britain in establishing a truly representative and democratic government in Rumania.

"This appeal is based on statements appearing in the Yalta Declaration and reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration, with reference to the joint responsibilities of our three Governments toward the ex-enemy satellite states in Europe. I understand a similar appeal has been received both by yourself and by the British ACC Representative. The King's message has been transmitted by me to my Government in Washington.

"In view of the seriousness of the issue, which has now been raised between the King of Rumania and the Prime Minister, I feel that it is the common duty of the three chief ACC Representatives to meet together at once to discuss all phases of the matter frankly and openly in order that we may jointly determine upon a suitable course of action to be followed by the Commission which will insure the maintenance of order in Rumania, uphold the authority of the King, and safeguard constitutional procedures in the nation.

"I therefore ask that a joint meeting of the three chief representatives of the Allied Control Commission be called to discuss the problem. In view of the extreme seriousness of the situation, I urge that such meeting be held not later than 3 p. m., Tuesday, 21st August."

If General Susaikov calls a joint meeting as requested, I propose to recommend that the Control Commission support constitutional procedures in Rumania by requiring the immediate resignation of the Groza government. While I do not expect Susaikov to agree to this

recommendation, nevertheless I feel it necessary to exhaust all possible means for securing a solution in the present crisis on the Control Commission level before recommending consultations on governmental levels.

[SCHUYLER]

871.01/8-2145 : Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 21 August 1945.

M-1456. During my meeting with the King, referred to in my M-1454 of this date, he gave me the following details on his conference with General Susaikov, which immediately preceded his talk with me:

Susaikov was particularly disturbed by those portions of the King's appeal which indicated

- (a) That Groza had been called upon to resign, and
- (b) That appeal for assistance had been made to Britain and America as well as to Soviet Russia.

Susaikov pointed out that the King's request to Groza, followed by Groza's refusal to resign, had played directly into the hands of Britain and America by making the continuance of the Groza regime appear as a dictatorship. Susaikov stated also that the King should have called him, Susaikov, into consultation before taking any such important step, and that there was no need to call on British and American representatives likewise for assistance. He added that both the Russian Government and he himself as Deputy Chairman of the Control Commission thought very highly of the Groza government. That government had made excellent progress on reparations payments, and on the carrying out of other armistice provisions, had executed needed internal reforms, had accomplished peace treaties with practically all of Rumania's neighbors, and had entered into beneficial collaboration agreements with Russia. He implied that, compared with these accomplishments, the question of completing peace negotiations with England and America was of secondary importance. Susaikov then stated that 2 courses were now open to the King:

1. To follow through with his present appeal,
2. To withdraw his request for Groza's resignation and call back his appeals to British and American representatives.

He urged the King to consider consequences carefully before continuing further on his present course. The King made no reply.

The King then proceeded to give me the following brief factual background of events leading up to his request for Groza's resignation:

Several days ago, his advisers informed him that since the United States Government did not at the inception, and does not now, consider the Groza regime to be able recognized democratic government for Rumania, the Groza government could not properly represent Rumania at the preparatory peace conferences. The King then called in Groza and discussed the matter in detail with him. Groza assured the King that his government was a strong one and that since he could count on full Russian support, his worries in connection with final peace consultations were groundless. Following constitutional procedure, the King then called upon his various advisers and political leaders individually for their opinions. The majority of these opinions were to the effect that the Groza government is not truly democratic and it should be replaced at this time. The King thereupon once more called in Groza, informed him of the opinions he had received, and stated that in view of these opinions and his own personal convictions, he was asking for Groza's resignation. Groza refused saying that his government is now in a stronger position than ever before and that he is convinced that it is to the best interests of the Rumanian people and of the King himself for the Groza regime to remain as the governing body for Rumania. At the conclusion of this interview, the King addressed himself in turn to the Allied Control Commission Representatives of Russia, America and the United Kingdom in Rumania. His appeals for assistance are set forth in my M-1454 of this date.

[SCHUYLER]

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 21 August 1945.

M-1458. The current position of the Groza government is anomalous and without precedent in recent Rumanian political history. On one hand the refusal of Groza to retender his mandate on request of the King is contrary to the provisions of the Rumanian Constitution. His act deprives the government of all legality and amounts to a political usurpation of power. Thus from the constitutional point of view the King would be justified in proclaiming to the people the illegality of the government, advising the highest judicial officer of the government's usurpation of power and as head of the Army taking whatever steps were necessary to enforce a constitutional governmental change.

On the other hand it appears that the King proposes none of these things. In lieu thereof he has requested the joint intervention of the United States, Great Britain and Russia under the terms of the Yalta Declaration. As conceived by the King and his advisors the existence of the Yalta Declaration together with the presence of the Allied Control Commission in Rumania affords another solution of the problems presented by the refusal of Groza to resign. Meanwhile the King will consider the Groza government as a *de facto* government to whose actions he will lend whatever royal assent is necessary to carry on the ordinary business of the Government. Except for routine activity considered necessary to maintain the government processes the King will disassociate himself from all activities of the Government.

The foregoing account of the contemplated procedure of the King was obtained at a conference last night with Savel Radulescu one of his principal advisors. The conference was held largely at my suggestion in order to secure some clarification of the King's position. I enquired particularly whether the King intended to affirm his position vis-à-vis the Government in any public proclamation or formal document. I also enquired whether the King would disassociate himself completely from all activities of the Groza government so long as it remained in power. The answers to both of these enquiries are provided by the statement of the King's intentions given above. Radulescu stated that the King intended originally to proclaim the illegality of the Government in a public declaration to the people. He was dissuaded from this course by doubt of the extent to which he could expect British backing and support. There are observable differences between the stand taken by the British representative and the position of the United States Government as conveyed by the United States representative to the King. These differences have led the King's advisors to suggest the present course.

I think the King will strive to keep his contacts with the Government to a minimum. He has already proposed to cancel the commemorative celebration scheduled for 23rd August. He intends however to attend a ceremonial luncheon given by the Russians in Bucharest today. Groza will be present and it is inescapable that both the King and Groza will attend in an official capacity. This is unfortunate but the King believes that he has been irremediably committed. Thus while the King accepted the luncheon before the governmental crisis developed he was asked at his meeting with Gen Susaikov yesterday whether he still proposed to attend. General Susaikov stated that the King's absence would be considered as evidence of hostile intent and the King replied that he would be present. It is understood that certain Rumanian generals will be decorated in proceedings held

immediately prior to the luncheon. At such ceremonies the King would ordinarily be present and that is cited as an additional reason for the King's attendance. The King and his advisors hope that he will be saved any embarrassment resulting from any attempt to compromise his position at the ceremonies by speeches, toasts or similar actions. I understand from Radulescu that this point of view of the King will be expressed to the Russians with the suggestion that any such incident would require a forthright statement by the King of his position however embarrassing such statement might prove for all concerned.⁴⁵

The chief British Military Representative delivered a communication to Gen Susaikov last night supporting my request for a conference of the Allied Control Commission not later than 1300 today. No reply has so far been received to either communication. It is important that the general meeting of the Allied Control Commission scheduled for yesterday was cancelled by Gen Susaikov on the ground of illness. He attended a conference at the palace yesterday notwithstanding.

[SCHUYLER]

871.00/8-2145 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)* ⁴⁶

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1945—8 p. m.

7108. You are requested to address a note along the following lines to the Foreign Office:

The US Rep on the ACC in Bucharest has transmitted to this Govt a communication from the King of Rumania, who has explained that he is sending similar notes to Air Vice Marshal Stevenson for the Govt of the UK and to Gen Susaikov for the Govt of the USSR. The King's communication states that he has taken into consideration the report of the Conference of Berlin in accordance with which a recognized democratic Govt constituted a condition in order that Rumania might conclude the necessary treaties of peace with the three principal Allied powers and in order that Rumania might obtain the support of these powers for admission into the Organization of the United Nations; and that he has further taken into account the position of

⁴⁵ In his message M-1462, August 22, 1945, to the War Department, General Schuyler reported that at the ceremonial luncheon on August 21, the King found himself seated between General Susaikov and Groza, and throughout the luncheon toasts were drunk to Stalin, the Red Army, the Rumanian Army, and so forth, but not to the King, an omission almost unprecedented in Rumanian society (Department of Defense Files).

⁴⁶ Sent, *mutatis mutandis*, to Moscow as 1882, and repeated to Bucharest as 442. Telegram 3021, August 23, from Moscow, reported that the note contained in this telegram had been urgently transmitted to Foreign Commissar Molotov on August 23 (871.00/8-2345).

the Govts of the US and of Great Britain in respect of the present composition of the Rumanian Govt. The King further stated that in accordance with the constitutional procedure of Rumania he proceeded to consult the political leaders concerning the situation, the majority of whom pronounced themselves in favor of the formation of a Govt under conditions which would permit of its recognition by the principal Allied powers, the conclusion of the necessary treaties and the admission of Rumania as a member of the United Nations. The King explained that in consequence he then asked the PriMin to make easier the realization of a solution in this sense through the resignation of the present cabinet. It appears that the formation of this Govt was not possible because the PriMin did not act upon this invitation. The King has therefore requested the Govt of the USSR, the Govt of the US and the Govt of Great Britain, in conformity with the decisions taken at the Crimea Conference and in application of the common responsibilities which they have proclaimed, to lend their assistance with a view to the formation of a Govt which, according to the report of the Conference of Berlin, might be recognized by the three principal Allied powers, thereby placing Rumania in a position to conclude the treaties of peace and to be admitted into the Organization of the United Nations.

The Govt of the US has already expressed the hope that the political situation in Rumania would develop in such a way as to permit it to establish diplomatic relations with Rumania which were not however possible at the present time in view of the unrepresentative character of the Groza Govt.

The report of the Crimea Conference of Feb. 11, 1945, provided that

“The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice . . .

“To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; . . . (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people . . .”

In conformity with the decision of the Conference to concert during the temporary period of instability in Liberated Europe the policies of the three Govts, this Govt is prepared to consult with respect to the existing situation in Rumania with the Govts of Great Britain and the USSR on the measures necessary to discharge the responsibilities set forth in the Declaration as quoted above. This consultation should take place at the earliest time convenient to the other two Govts and at any place which is deemed satisfactory to them. Pending the results of such consultation, this Govt is confident that the necessary

instructions will be sent to the Reprs of the three Govts on the Control Commission to refrain from any action which might complicate the solution of this problem. An early expression of the views of the British (Soviet) Govt will be appreciated. A similar communication is being addressed to the Govt of the USSR (United Kingdom).

Sent to London and Moscow; repeated to Bucharest.

BYRNES

871.00/8-2145 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, August 21, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 11:50 p. m.]

575. The King's decision to make no further comment to Premier Groza when the latter three times refused his formal request to resign has [*was*] prompted by his desire to present to the three Allied Governments the issue of an unconstitutional force impeding him in the normal discharge of his constitutional function, without desiring to widen the gap further than necessary between the opposition and the Communists. He was induced to this careful course by three main factors: (1) strong Soviet displeasure and possible serious reactions, (2) uncertainty as to the British views on it (my telegram 563 of August 19⁴⁷), (3) apparent inability of the US and Great Britain to exert any pressure upon Russia except at the conference table.

Although the King's advisers knew the United States did not favor any present Communist attacks upon the King (my telegram 563 of August 19) yet they and the opposition knew this Mission had no instructions as to American reaction if arrests or threats were made by NDF (National Democratic Front) or Soviet officials.

Local American instructions were stronger than the British since it was possible to state definitely the US did not intend establishing diplomatic relations with the NDF Cabinet; it was known the US supported the King and that the American attitude toward the NDF had been expressed locally to both the Government and the Russians.

The political opposition naturally is jubilant at the step taken by the King. But at an interview General Schuyler and myself had with Dinu Bratianu this morning, I took the occasion to emphasize that the opposition should take extra precautions to remain calm, avoiding all demonstrations, assemblies, and any pretexts that might be seized upon by the NDF or the Red Army to intervene. Also I remarked that re-

⁴⁷ Not printed; it reported, *inter alia*, that the King had been informed by the British Political Representative that the British Government did not wish to give any advice or encouragement to the King since it would be impossible to protect him from the consequences of an overthrow of the government; the British Government did not, however, consider the National Democratic Front a democratic or representative regime (871.00/8-1945).

sponsible opposition leagues should not seek to interpret the King's action as hostile to the Soviet Union, since it would be foolhardy in the present delicate situation to arouse Russian hostility when it is vital to secure Soviet cooperation at any joint conference upon Rumania. Through two responsible sources I have communicated this message to Julius Maniu.

Through an emissary Maniu stated to this Mission his conviction Groza must resign since he could not maintain a provocative attitude toward the Anglo-Americans. He has postponed a party meeting scheduled for yesterday until the King's appeal to the Three Powers is known. It is reliably reported that Mihalache Vice President of National Peasant Party has informed the King personally that he also is in complete accord with Maniu's views.

Last evening Communist Secretary General of the NDF⁴⁸ convoked a meeting which unsuccessfully attempted to draft a statement to be published saying that information received in Rumania as to the American and British attitude toward the regime was invalid because it was not written and because it was transmitted to the Government by "an inferior functionary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs". (My telegram 568 of August 21). Reportedly Tatarescu informed his dissident National Liberals that nothing was changed in the makeup of the Government.

No authoritative word has been received from Petrescu and the Socialists as to the party's intention to resign from the NDF Government.

The ideas advanced in my telegram 558 of August 17⁴⁹ as to the desirability of a technical government for Rumania as the only possible government under present conditions with a fighting chance for survival remains unchanged.

Even this government would be subjected to the most severe strains if a dissatisfied Soviet Union sought to provoke internal disorder and political agitation, to capitalize upon its serious agricultural and economic difficulties and to denounce its execution of the armistice convention.

Repeated to Moscow as 170.

MELBOURNE

⁴⁸ Vasile Luca.

⁴⁹ Not printed; it recommended that an alternative to the current Rumanian regime, in the event of an appeal by the King to the three Allied Powers under the Yalta Declaration, would be the decision by the armistice signatories to prescribe a cabinet of technicians, envisaging the nominal participation of the four major Rumanian political parties under the terms of a political truce, to implement a program prescribed by the Three Powers (871.00/8-1745).

871.00/8-2245 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, August 22, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

581. At 4:30 p. m. today Marshal of the Court read from a prepared text King's reply to the three Russian points given in my telegram 576 of August 21.⁵⁰ The text of King's reply is given in my immediately following telegram.⁵¹

General Susaikov allegedly replied to Negel that King's document was directly pointed toward the breaking of relations with the Soviet Government and clearly showed King did not consider in any manner the point of view of the USSR. He added that the Soviet Union would break relations with Rumania and, while it would not consider the King directly responsible, all advisers assisting in the composition of his note should be arrested.

At the King's request his confidential secretary conveyed the above information. He added that every conceivable pressure from NDF politicians and the Russians has been centered upon the King and his mother with scarcely veiled threats as to their impending fates and those of their advisers. It has been indicated to the Palace that arrests of proscribed advisers by the NDF would start tonight. Tatarescu is reported to have stated that former King Carol may be restored.

The King is remaining in Bucharest to be near the Foreign Missions in the event of personal difficulties, and for greater safety his advisers consider he should stay in the Royal Palace.

⁵⁰ Not printed; it reported that the King had held an audience for Soviet General Susaikov in the course of which Susaikov had urged the King to make a public declaration including the following points: That external pressure upon the King and external interference on the subject of the Rumanian Government would find an unfavorable echo in Rumanian public opinion; that Rumanian general elections will take place soon and the people will express their free will for the government of their choice; and that the King had no criticism against the Groza regime (871.00/8-2145).

⁵¹ According to telegram 582, August 22, 10 p. m., from Bucharest, the King's reply to the Soviet points was as follows:

"1) The decisions taken in common at Potsdam by the three principal Allied Powers, as well as the result of the constitutional consultations have obliged me to proceed with formation of a new government which should fulfill the conditions enabling it to be recognized by the three Allies, and to begin negotiations for peace. Consequently I have requested the Groza Government to resign. The Cabinet refusing to comply with my request, I have resorted to the procedure decided upon by the three powers in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. 2) As constitutional sovereign, I desire that free elections should take place in Rumania, and to see established as soon as possible necessary conditions for assuring complete freedom of these elections. I must however underline that this question is today in the hands of the three great powers. 3) Objection to the Groza Government is that it is not recognized by two of the three powers. To this is added the fact that the government has refused to resign." (871.00/8-2245)

The King, since his request of Groza to resign has become the primary object of pressure by the Russians and NDF. His advisers are now consulting with the Party leaders, notably Titel Petrescu head of the Socialists, to apprise them fully of the situation and to press Petrescu to implement his tacit agreement for the Socialist Party Ministers to resign from the Government.

Responsible reports state the Socialist Executive Committee and its Ministers in the Cabinet have voted in favor of this resignation, but that it is being deferred at this critical moment due to Russian and Communist intimidation of certain Cabinet members. Further developments in the Socialist position may be known tonight or early tomorrow.

Careful scrutiny of blatant Soviet intimidation efforts and those of opportunistic politicians as outlined above may indicate that the bluff factor is being relied upon to influence the Rumanians psychologically. Yet if any of the feared events occur or pressure sharply intensifies, the King may become a virtual political prisoner. He cannot be expected to withstand unremitting Soviet pressure without speedy and public external support recognizing this fact. It is not inconceivable that the course of Royal constitutional action could collapse with consequent difficulties for Rumania unless the Department may decide to issue a forthright statement or adopt other action in the light of reported circumstances.⁵²

Repeated to Moscow as 173.

MELBOURNE

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/8-1445

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received the Acting Secretary's letter of August 14, 1945, concerning the recommendations made by Brigadier General C.V.R. Schuyler, Chief, United States Military Representation, Allied Control Commission for Rumania, on American participation in the work of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

The Allied Control Commissions were established by the respective Armistice Agreements between the three principal Allied Govern-

⁵² Telegram 447, August 22, 7 p. m., to Bucharest, advised that the Secretary of State had issued a public statement on conditions in Rumania (871.00/8-2245); see bracketed note, p. 588. Telegram 604, August 25, 8 p. m., from Bucharest, reported that the statement had had a fine effect among those elements learning of it, but Rumanian Government censorship had completely suppressed it (871.00/8-2545).

ments and Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, to regulate and control the execution of the terms of those Agreements. They are not, strictly speaking, policy-making bodies, although they must necessarily interpret the armistice terms and make certain decisions involving questions of principle.

Until the end of hostilities in Europe the Allied Control Commissions in these three countries operated, in accordance with the respective Armistice Agreements, under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. The United States Government recognized that, during this period, the executory and administrative functions of the Commissions belonged properly to the Soviet military authorities. It was found necessary, however, on several occasions to disassociate this Government from decisions taken by the Soviet authorities in the name of the Allied Control Commissions, since the United States Government could not approve the principles involved.

Prior to the Potsdam Conference the Soviet Government proposed certain changes in the procedure under which the Allied Control Commissions had been operating. At Potsdam the three Governments agreed that the Soviet proposals for the Control Commission in Hungary⁵³ should be taken as the basis for a revision of the procedure of the Control Commissions in all three ex-satellite countries. This agreement is contained in Section XI of the Protocol, of which Section XII of the published communiqué is an abridgment.⁵⁴ The Soviet proposals for the Control Commission in Hungary include the provision that the agreement of all three principal representatives is required before a directive involving a question of principle is issued to the local government.

The American representatives on the three Control Commissions have recently been informed of the agreement reached at Potsdam on this subject and have been authorized by the State and War Departments to initiate discussions looking to agreement on definitive statutes under which the Commissions shall operate. The Department of State has sent forward to Budapest, Bucharest and Sofia the text of draft statutes for the Control Commission in Hungary as approved by the

⁵³ The Soviet proposals for the Control Commission in Hungary were originally presented on July 12, 1945, to the American and British Representatives on the Allied Control Commission and were transmitted to the Department in telegram 286, July 13, from Budapest, vol. iv, p. 834. These proposals, only very slightly revised, served as a basis of discussions during the Tripartite Conference of Berlin and were included as an annex to section XII (XI) of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, August 1 (2), 1945, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1494.

⁵⁴ For text of section XII of the Communiqué, see *ibid.*, p. 1511.

State, War and Navy Departments in SWNCC 151/D.⁵⁵ This text is to serve as guidance to the American representatives in discussions with their Soviet and British colleagues concerning the definitive statutes. Meanwhile, it is expected that the three Control Commissions will function on the basis of the Soviet proposals for the Control Commission in Hungary.

Since it is anticipated that the foregoing procedure will create a more satisfactory position for the United States members of the Control Commissions and provide them with greater authority, it is not considered necessary or appropriate to recommend to the Soviet and British Governments that an additional Commission be established at Moscow. It is apparent that General Schuyler's recommendations were submitted before any steps had been taken to implement the Potsdam agreement.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

[On August 22, 1945, the Secretary of State issued to the press a statement on the situation in Rumania, substantially the same as text of telegram 7108, August 21, to London, printed on page 581. For text of the Secretary's public statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 26, 1945, page 280.]

871.00/8-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 23, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received August 23—3:50 p. m.]

8577. With regard to King Michael's recent actions (your 7108, August 21) Foreign Office official today said the following:

British Government is entirely willing to have consultations at any place selected.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ For text of the draft statutes of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, see vol. iv, p. 842. SWNCC 151/D, a paper of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, not printed as such; it contained the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War referring to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Draft Statutes for Allied Control for Hungary prepared by Maj. Gen. William S. Key, June 6, 1945. For text of these draft statutes, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. i, pp. 375-377. The text of the draft statutes as ultimately approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on August 17, 1945, was transmitted to Bucharest in telegram 424, August 16, not printed.

⁵⁶ Telegram 8537, August 22, 7 p. m., from London, reported that Sir Orme Sargent, British Deputy Under Secretary of State, had expressed concern over the failure of the United States and the United Kingdom to coordinate action in Rumania and had stressed the need for coordinated action in the face of Groza's refusal to resign and the King's appeal to the Allied Control Commission (871.00/8-2245).

It does not seem likely that question will be discussed by Allied Control Commission in Bucharest and even if it were it is doubtful if any satisfactory steps would be taken.

Foreign Office does not believe that Russian Government will agree to any consultations but sees no harm in approaching it with this in view.

Questions of Rumanian Government undoubtedly will come before the meeting of Foreign Ministers in London because peace treaties with Rumania would be discussed.

Foreign Office commented that the King's action was ill timed as it would have been more effective if it had coincided with meeting of Foreign Ministers. Furthermore today a great celebration was scheduled to take place on the anniversary of Rumania's break with Germany. For past 10 days Soviets have been pouring tanks into Bucharest for celebrations and now that they are on the spot vigorous intimidation is not difficult.

WINANT

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/8-2445

Transcript of Discussion at Joint Meeting of Senior Soviet, British, and United States Representatives on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania ⁵⁷

Present: Col. General Susaikov, Deputy Chairman, ACC
Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson, British Commissioner
Brigadier General Schuyler, Chief U.S. Representative
Russian, British and United States interpreters, liaison officers and recorders.

GEN. SUSAIKOV: "I have invited General Schuyler and Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson here today to discuss one question, the question which you have raised in your letters about the present situation in Rumania in regard to the Government.⁵⁸ I now want to hear what you have to say."

GEN. SCHUYLER: "I would like to say that I have just received word from Washington that the United States has asked the Governments of Soviet Russia and the United Kingdom to consult together in response to the King of Rumania's request, in an effort to arrive at a solution to the political problem in Rumania. I have received instructions, as Chief Representative for the United States on the Con-

⁵⁷ Meeting held August 23, 1945, 3 p. m. The transcript itself is dated August 24. A copy of the transcript was transmitted to the Department as enclosure 5 to despatch 477, August 24, from Bucharest, not printed.

⁵⁸ For text of General Schuyler's letter of August 21 to General Susaikov, requesting a meeting of the chief representatives of the Allied Control Commission, see telegram M-1455, August 21, from Bucharest, p. 577.

trol Commission, to take no action here which might at all complicate the situation, which we now expect will be discussed by the three Governments concerned. I do suggest, however, that the Control Commission take the necessary action to avoid the possibility of local disturbances or bloodshed. I am informed that in certain quarters a good deal of excitement and nervousness exists. Therefore I suggest that until the completion of the expected consultations, the Control Commission take steps to prevent any political agitation or demonstrations by any of the parties concerned."

AVM STEVENSON: "I have no doubt that what General Schuyler has just said is very much in the mind of the Colonel General as our Deputy Chairman of the ACC, and beyond that I have no remarks to make except that it is a normal and reasonable view that I suppose none of us will take exception to. I would like to add that the main question has been carried, in my view, beyond the vista of this country and has been placed in the hands of the three Great Powers, and there is nothing we can do."

GEN. SUSAIKOV: "First, I would like to say that the difficulties which have arisen here have not been raised by the Soviets, but rather on the initiative of the Representatives of the ACC on the British and American side, without previously telling me about it, as the Representative of the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission.

"Second, as regards order in the country, I consider that as of today, the Government of Rumania, following the example of Petre Groza, is in a position to keep order and to control whatever disturbances occur, and there are no disturbances in the country at the present. I consider the situation to be completely satisfactory. Today's holiday has shown the unity of the Army and the people around the government of Petre Groza. The Army went on parade and saluted the government. All the higher Generals who commanded the troops were in their places. The people expressed its sympathy to the Government."

AVM STEVENSON: "The people?"

GEN. SUSAIKOV: "The people did."

AVM STEVENSON: "Expressed what?"

GEN. SUSAIKOV: "Its sympathy with the government."

AVM STEVENSON: "Could I ask how?"

GEN. SUSAIKOV: "They expressed it by speeches and things of that sort, and by watching the troops go marching past. The parade and the demonstration were carried out in an organized, disciplined way.

"I am now limiting the question to the situation within the country, and I fully understand this situation. Within the country there are the people, and the army of the people are united with the government.

"Now I will give you the official view of my Government on this question:

"The Soviet Government has examined the question regarding the Rumanian Government and expresses itself as definitely opposed to the resignation of the Groza government. This note has been brought to the notice of the King and to the notice of the Prime Minister. This is the official reply of the Soviet Government to the note received from the King. Having given the point of view of my Government, I am now unable to go any further into a discussion of the matter."

AVM STEVENSON: "May I make a comment on one of your remarks? You have accused us in your first statement of taking action outside the ACC, in that this situation arose without my apprising you. I would like to state very definitely and openly that the only action I have personally taken in this political crisis is that I was summoned to the King to receive a message from the King for transmission to my Government; that summons I answered. A similar one was handed over to General Susaikov, and you followed the same course of action as I did, in transmitting it to your Government. Therefore the assertion made by you is untrue as far as I am concerned. You should remember that this point came up before: We have in this country a political representative of His Majesty's Government, Mr. Le Rougetel, who is in touch with the Rumanian Government."

GEN. SCHUYLER: "I should like to register the same objection to General Susaikov's remark with respect to the United States Representative. Like Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson, my part has been only to receive a message from the King, which I was informed had previously been delivered to General Susaikov. I am of course entirely familiar, and have been all along, with the activities of the United States Representative to Rumania and his associates. These activities have been confined to the furnishing of information to leading Rumanians as to the attitude of the United States Government toward the Rumanian situation. This attitude has been announced publicly, and there is no secret about it. These facts were transmitted specifically by Mr. Melbourne, who is Mr. Berry's assistant, to a representative of corresponding rank on the staff of the Soviet political ACC representative. That constitutes the extent of the activities of any U.S. representatives in Rumania with which I am familiar."

GEN. SUSAIKOV: "I reject the statements of both the Air Vice-Marshal and General Schuyler on the grounds that the Allied Control Commission is the first body which should be advised of anything transpiring in Rumania. I have no more comments to make."

AVM STEVENSON: "General Susaikov's last remark relates to a question that lies in the hands of our Governments and not ourselves, and the views of my Government on this situation were expressed to the

Kremlin by our Ambassador in Moscow. I just happened to know that, and since it is a matter between my Government and the Government of the Soviet Union, I am not able to discuss that point further."

GEN. SUSAIKOV: "I have no more to add."

C. V. R. SCHUYLER

Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief Military Representative

Department of Defense Files : Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

[BUCHAREST,] 23 (22?) August 1945.

M-1468. In a conference last evening requested by Savel Radulescu and Ionitiu, advisors to the King, at which Mister Melbourne was also present, Radulescu asked whether, in case of need, United States agencies in Rumania could grant asylum to the King. I replied that in the event of an emergency in which the King might be threatened with physical harm, I was authorized to grant temporary asylum, but only until the case would be laid before the Allied Control Commission and decision reached by that agency as to further action. I pointed out that I would be bound by any such decision.

Radulescu next asked whether, if rioting occurred in or near the palace, the US Mission would send observers. I answered that in such case, as in the case of any other disturbance any place in the country, would if at all practicable detail members of this representation to observe and report upon the facts to the US Government.

Radulescu then asked what would be our action if the Russians should denounce the Armistice and actually assume full military control of the country. I replied that the Armistice has been agreed upon and signed by all three major powers, that there was not a shred of evidence to indicate that any one of such powers intended to violate or abrogate it by unilateral action, and that any such hypothesis did not warrant further discussion.

Mister Melbourne concurred in each of my replies.

In another brief meeting this morning, I reminded Mister Radulescu that the King had officially appealed to the Allied Control Commission on the basis of the Yalta Declaration, appeal was now in the hands of our three governments, and that I myself, as a member of the Commission, had no authority to advise the King or otherwise attempt to influence his further actions in the case. I indicated that in order to assist me in making clear and accurate reports to my Government,

I would appreciate receiving first hand information on all important developments and political trends at this crucial time, but I suggested that if Radulescu wished to discuss political implications or possible results of proposed courses of action, he address himself to Mister Melbourne rather than to myself.

[SCHUYLER]

871.00/8-2445 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, August 24, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 5:10 p. m.]

592. Socialist Party leader, Titel Petrescu, this morning requested meeting at his secretary's home in order to outline his position and that of his party in present political crisis. At this meeting was accompanied by Mr. Hulick.⁵⁹

Petrescu reported the tremendous Communist pressure being exerted upon him and Socialist Cabinet Ministers. Stormy sessions with other NDF (National Democratic Front) members had taken place with threats being made against him and other "traitors". Petrescu said he was standing firm and repeated the formal advice he had given to the King, namely, that the King should request the immediate resignation of Groza Cabinet. He added that he intended at earliest opportunity personally to reassure the King of his party's entire support for his continued line of action.

At a party executive committee session called yesterday afternoon and which ended at 11 this morning, a resolution was unanimously adopted which Socialist Ministers in the Cabinet were to read at a Cabinet session scheduled for noon today. Mr. Petrescu promised full text of this resolution⁶⁰ would be transmitted to this Mission and to British. He commented that the declaration would be stopped from publication by local censors but he added that he would welcome its publicity abroad.

Reading from notes, Petrescu said resolution declares Socialists consider it absolutely necessary to adopt Govt formula to be made in complete agreement with the Soviet Union, and US and Great Britain that conforms to Potsdam Declaration and thus assure a new govt that can reestablish diplomatic relations with US and Great

⁵⁹ Charles E. Hulick, Jr., Foreign Service Officer in the American Mission in Rumania.

⁶⁰ Telegram 596, August 24, 11 p. m., from Bucharest gave the text of a statement by the Rumanian Social Democratic Party calling for a government formula which would have the agreement of all three Great Powers (871.00/8-2445).

Britain, sign a peace treaty, and secure Rumania's admission into United Nations.

Secondly, Socialists believed Govt should resign immediately in order that Three Powers could find a solution in conformity with the above position.

Lastly, the party protested against the Govt in present grave circumstances for not having convoked until now a Council of Ministers in order to find a solution upon a legal governmental basis.

The Socialist leader in a sincere manner stated his conviction that it was imperative the US and Great Britain should immediately follow their intention to consult with the Soviet Union under the Yalta Declaration by taking prompt and energetic action to relieve the constant local unilateral Soviet pressure, which will increasingly serve to disorganize the opposition front.

Repeated to Moscow as 182.

MELBOURNE

871.00/8-2545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne)

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1945—4 p. m.

457. Urtel 567 Aug 20. If you have not already done so, you may inform King that his note appealing for assistance of three Allied Govts with view to formation of a Rumanian Govt which might be recognized by them has been received and that the US Govt is in communication with the Soviet and UK Govts on the subject.

Principal concern of US Govt at present juncture is, as you know, to keep the road open to a solution of Rumanian political crisis which will be acceptable to all three Allied Govts. We hope no action will be taken which might seem to give ground for Soviet suspicion that crisis was brought about by "Anglo-American intervention". Contact with Rumanian political leaders should be avoided at present stage.

In this connection we do not think that any advice or assurances should be given to the King regarding his present difficult position vis-à-vis Groza and Soviet officials or regarding contingencies which may arise with respect to his political future or personal position (Schuyler's M-1462 Aug 22^{60a}), though you may apprise him of this Govt's hope that measures which might further provoke Soviet officials will be avoided. On question of asylum, instructions contained in Deptel 86 Feb 23 remain applicable. (Your tel 583 Aug 22⁶¹).

^{60a} See footnote 45, p. 581.

⁶¹ Not printed; it asked the Department to see telegram M-1468, from General Schuyler to the War Department, p. 592.

Brit Govt has expressed willingness to consult with US and Soviet Govts on questions raised by King's appeal at any place selected. Reply of Soviet Govt to our note (Moscow's 3021 Aug 23 to Dept rpted to you as 118 ⁶²) not yet recd, though Soviet reply to King (your 588 Aug 23 ⁶³) gives indication of its probable content.

Sent to Bucharest, repeated to Moscow and London.⁶⁴

BYRNES

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/8-1545

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Balfour)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Great Britain and refers to the note of the Chargé d'Affaires dated August 15, 1945,⁶⁵ on the subject of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

The Department of State agrees that it is clearly desirable to take immediate steps to ensure a more effective role for the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the work of the Allied Control Commissions in these three countries.

It is the understanding of the Department that, in accordance with the agreement reached at Potsdam, the proposals made by the Soviet Government on July 12, 1945,⁶⁶ for the improvement of the procedure of the Control Commission in Hungary are to be taken as the basis for a revision of Control Commission procedures in all three countries. These proposals include the provision that directives involving questions of principle shall be issued to the Hungarian Government by the Chairman of the Commission only after they have been agreed to by the American and British members.

The American representatives on the respective Control Commissions have been instructed by the United States Government to initiate discussions with their Soviet and British colleagues with a view to

⁶² Not printed; it reported that the message sent by the Department for delivery to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat (see telegram 7108, August 21, to London, also sent to Moscow as 1882, p. 581) had been urgently transmitted to Foreign Commissar Molotov (871.00/8-2345).

⁶³ Not printed.

⁶⁴ Repeated to Moscow and London as telegrams 1914 and 7291, respectively.

⁶⁵ Not printed; it referred to the interest of the British Foreign Office in the views of the Department of State as to the possibility of applying to the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania and Bulgaria improvements suggested by the Soviet Government in the working of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, and it concluded as follows: "Mr. Balfour would be glad to learn the views of the Department on this question as soon as may be conveniently possible, since it is clearly desirable that full and early advantage should be taken of the present opening to ensure a more effective role for the United States and the United Kingdom missions in the work of the Allied Control Commissions in the above countries." (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/8-1545).

⁶⁶ See footnote 53, p. 587.

reaching agreement on definitive statutes for the Commissions. It is hoped that these discussions will result in satisfactory arrangements on the various difficulties, such as those connected with clearance of aircraft and personnel, which have in the past hampered the work of the American and British members.

Pending tripartite agreement on definitive statutes for the three Control Commissions, it is the understanding of the United States Government that those Commissions will function in accordance with the Soviet proposals of July 12 for the operation of the Control Commission in Hungary.

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1945.

871.00/8-2645 : Telegram

*The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to
the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, August 26, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 7:35 p. m.]

609. Deptel 457, Aug 25. At every stage of the current Rumanian political crisis all local elements were constantly reminded of the Dept's view that a solution could only be found if acceptable to the three Allied Govts.

However, in executing the instructions in Deptel 416 of Aug 11, I was handicapped because in view of stringent local censorship the Rumanian public was ignorant of fundamental publicized statements of American policy (see my despatch 465, Aug 16⁶⁷ called "Rumanian Censorship of Potsdam Declaration and President Truman's Report to Nation"). In verbally and frankly communicating the American view of the Groza govt and Dept's hope to reestablish diplomatic relations with a more representative regime I emphasized that this method was necessary because of the impossibility of having Rumanian leaders and the public learn directly through the local press and radio.

The action in communicating verbally the American position is naturally known to Soviet officials and Rumanian Communists. In this connection the respective views of the three ACC representatives were outlined in their meeting of Aug 23 and reported in General Schuyler's telegram M-1474.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Not printed.

⁶⁸ Dated August 23, not printed; it transmitted a brief summary by General Schuyler of the meeting on August 23 of the three Chief Representatives on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Department of Defense Files). For record of that meeting, see p. 589.

Aside from seeing Titel Petrescu privately at his request to secure the vital Social Party statement (mytel 592, Aug 24) I have refrained from contact with political officials since the delivery of the King's note to the ACC representatives.

The King and his advisers have always fully realized that he should not provoke Soviet officials unnecessarily and consequently several times has shown his good will. (Mytels 576 and 600, Aug 21 and 25.⁶⁹) Yet he has felt impelled after requesting Groza's resignation to make his position clear on official public occasions (mytel 589 of Aug 23⁷⁰). To counter this attitude the NDF (National Democratic Front) Cabinet has utilized the controlled press and radio to color the news of events to give the false impression that the King did not request the Govt's resignation and to insinuate that he is being controlled by external forces. As an example, the press today publicized the award by the Premier to two Soviet generals of the Rumanian orders bestowed upon them by the King with the implication that the latter also was present. (Re paragraph 1 mytel 597, Aug 24.)⁷¹

Aside from General Schuyler's telegram M-1468, Aug 22, there have been no further indications to the King regarding his personal position. General Schuyler and I fully understand that asylum arrangements for the King (Deptel 86, Feb 23) remain unchanged.

In reply to the Dept's inquiry I would like to mention that on publication of the Secretary's statement concerning the appeal of the King to the three Allied Govts, I immediately gave a copy to an emissary of the King.

Repeated to Moscow as 108 and London as 3.

MELBOURNE

871.001 Carol II/8-2745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Portugal (Crocker)

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1945—8 p. m.

1404. We have told Bianchi⁷² orally that we are disturbed over the possibility of King Carol of Rumania returning to Europe and have

⁶⁹ Neither printed. Regarding telegram 576, August 21, see footnote 50, p. 585. Telegram 600, August 25, reported that the King's aide-de-camp had been invited to the Soviet Embassy where Soviet Ambassador Kavtaradze talked for more than an hour in eulogy of the King and the Queen Mother, emphasizing the King's good qualities and expressing confidence that the current political difficulties would be overcome (761.71/8-2545).

⁷⁰ Not printed; it reported on parades and ceremonies organized by the Groza regime to celebrate the first anniversary of the Rumanian *coup d'état* of August 23, 1944, and the King's non-participation in these government-organized celebrations (871.00/8-2345).

⁷¹ Not printed; it reported that the King had declined to bestow decorations upon two Soviet generals (871.00/8-2445).

⁷² João Antonio de Bianchi, Portuguese Ambassador in the United States.

asked him to bring this matter to the attention of his Foreign Office.⁷³ Carol is supposed to sail August 28 from Rio on the *Serpo Pinto*. It is presumed that he has gotten a Portuguese visa. Please call immediately at the Foreign Office and indicate that we feel that in the light of the disturbed conditions in Rumania it would be most unfortunate for Carol to return to Europe at this time. We hope that the Portuguese Government will feel the same way and will find it possible to withdraw the visa if in fact it has already been given.⁷⁴

BYRNES

740.00119 Potsdam/8-2845

Memorandum of Conversation, by Miss Flora D. Wovschin and Mr. John S. Carlile of the International Information Division

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1945.

Participants: Mr. John Campbell, SE⁷⁵
 Mr. Horace J. Nickels, SE
 Mr. Kurt London, OWI⁷⁶
 Miss Flora D. Wovschin, INI⁷⁷
 Mr. John S. Carlile, INI

This conversation took place in Mr. Campbell's office, this date, to consider facilities for radio coverage of Rumania and to determine content of broadcasts to inform Rumanian public of facts concerning Potsdam declaration specifically affecting Rumania and ex-satellites and report of request of King Michael to invoke the Yalta declaration and Department's statement with reference thereto.⁷⁸ These consid-

⁷³ In telegram 1680, August 7, the Chargé in Lisbon had reported that Portuguese and French visas had been issued in Rio de Janeiro to former King Carol, the King's chamberlain, Ernest Urdareanu, and his mistress, Magda Lupescu, and that the King and his party planned to embark shortly by ship for Lisbon (871.001 Carol II/8-745). In response to this information, the Department, in telegram 1337, August 11, 3 p. m., to Lisbon, had stated that while Carol's return to Europe was regarded with misgiving in view of the situation in Rumania, the Department did not contemplate taking any action with respect to his trip from Brazil to France via Portugal (871.001 Carol II/8-745). Telegram 1811, August 27, 1 p. m., from Lisbon, reported that Chargé Crocker and his British colleague shared the view that the arrival of Carol in Europe would definitely create difficulties for King Michael. The Chargé expressed the view that the Portuguese Foreign Office would cancel the visa issued to Carol upon formal request from the United States Government, and he wondered whether the Department was disposed to reconsider its position and send new instructions (871.001 Carol II/8-2745).

⁷⁴ Telegram 1830, August 29, from Lisbon, reported that the Portuguese Foreign Office had informed the Embassy that the Portuguese Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro had cancelled Carol's visa and informed the captain of the *Serpo Pinto* that the vessel could not embark Carol or his entourage (871.001 Carol II/8-2945).

⁷⁵ Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs.

⁷⁶ Office of War Information.

⁷⁷ International Information Division.

⁷⁸ For the Secretary of State's statement to the press on August 22 regarding the situation in Rumania and the request of King Michael to invoke the Yalta Declaration, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 26, 1945, p. 280.

erations made urgent by telegrams 604 and 606 from Bucharest, dated August 25, 1945.⁷⁹

Mr. London reported Algiers relay available for only 15 minutes daily. He stated that news content for this period could be reduced to 5 minutes, allowing approximately 8 minutes daily to be used for an indefinite period to supply Rumanians with facts withheld from them by censorship. Mr. Campbell suggested, in view of despatch 465 from Bucharest dated August 16,⁸⁰ which reported censorship of the Potsdam declaration and President Truman's report to the nation, the 8-minute period each day be used to report fully upon the declaration and the President's address,⁸¹ the Department's statement on King and Cabinet crisis and any other pertinent matters that may come up in the meantime.

Miss Wovschin and Mr. Carlile deferred to Mr. Campbell and Mr. Nickels regarding the policy directive, but made sure that the OWI broadcasts would continue for as long as it appeared advisable and at least until reaction from Bucharest seemed to indicate otherwise.

871.00/8-3145 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, August 31, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 11:25 p. m.]

626. The present moment, while the left element of the National Democratic Front Government is preparing its next move and while King Michael awaits from the three principal Allies a reply to his letter, seems opportune to reappraise the latest phase of the chronic Rumanian political crisis.

The Department was informed that the King, after the publication of the Potsdam communiqué, consulted Rumanian political leaders, the majority of whom favored the formation of a government under conditions which would permit its recognition by all of the three prin-

⁷⁹ Neither printed; telegram 604 reported that the Secretary's statement of August 22 had had a fine effect, but in view of the strict press and radio censorship prevailing, the entire contents had been suppressed by the Government. It was recommended that the Office of War information channels be employed to inform the Rumanian public during the current political crisis (871.00/8-2545). Telegram 606 reported that President Truman's radio address of August 9 on the Berlin Conference had been suppressed for 24 hours by Rumanian authorities and had only been released after excision of all references to Rumania (103.9166).

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ For text of President Truman's report to the nation on the Berlin Conference, delivered by radio from the White House at 10 p. m., August 9, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 12, 1945, p. 208.

cipal Allies. Acting on their advice the King asked Prime Minister Groza to resign, but Mr. Groza refused. The King then appealed to the three principal Allies, through their representatives on the Allied Control Commission in Bucharest, to lend the assistance anticipated by the Yalta Declaration for such an emergency.

The key to the solution of Rumania's principal problem now rests with Washington, Moscow and London. Nevertheless, the rhythm of political activity in Bucharest has been accelerated rather than retarded by the subordination of the position of Bucharest. Leaders of all groups are jockeying for position. Opposition leaders are vigilant but impotent. Groza is alternatively [*alternately*] nervous and uncertain then boastful and pretentious. Petrescu, fighter [*fighting?*] for his political life, is using every trick in the bag to remain in power. Petrescu has hesitated to implement his party's recent declaration by calling for the retirement of the Socialist ministers in the Groza government, perhaps minding a threat the Communists made against his life. The left leaders of the National Democratic Front Government are seeking by every means to consolidate their position. And with press, radio, police, courts and army directly controlled by Communist Ministers, they are able to put up a bold but shallow front, for they know that as they increase the tempo of their ballyhoo they lose support from the citizens of the country. The swing is definitely away from the National Democratic Front Government. The King is the rallying point for all opposition.

Realizing the importance of the stake, and in order to precipitate a local solution, the Rumanian Communist Ministers are trying to cloud the real issue by exaggerating out of its true proportion a relatively minor by-product of the crisis—the decision of the King not to sign the decrees presented by the Groza government. To discredit him they whisper that state employees will not be paid because the King will not sign a decree for their payment; that the Government cannot buy grain in order to increase the bread ration as the bank cannot pay out cash without a Royal decree. They even threaten that his life will not be safe if he continues to disregard the interests of the people. But in spite of pressure and threats the King has maintained his position. He feels that if he signs one he must sign all decrees. And if he signs all he will inevitably sign some that will make him appear ridiculous in the eyes of his subjects and cast doubts abroad upon the sincerity of his actions toward the Groza government.⁸²

⁸² Telegram 628, August 31, from Bucharest, reported that General Susaikov was urging the King speedily to sign two impending decrees establishing the joint Soviet-Rumanian Bank and aviation companies. In order to avoid complicating tripartite discussions concerning Rumania, the King would welcome any observations that the Department might choose to make upon his position. (871.00/8-3145)

The common goal of the Rumanian Communists and Soviet officials in Rumania was never more apparent than now. The Rumanian Communists are out to discredit the King, to maintain the Groza government in power, and to conduct elections under that government. High Soviet officials, who apparently have been reporting back to Moscow a confirmation of the Moscow propaganda line for Rumania to the effect that the Groza government was solidly backed by the people, have been caught napping by recent events. They were surprised and horrified by the action of the King in calling for the resignation of the Groza government and in appealing to the three principal Allies. Pavlov has been recalled, whether or not because of his failure to keep Moscow correctly apprised I do not know, and is definitely leaving Rumania within the next few days. Susaikov said that he is going to save his own head at all costs and this probably means that he is going to close his eyes to the tactics used by the Rumanian Communists to maintain their position.

If Rumania is to be spared having a Communist regime fraudulently imposed upon her, it is essential that the three principal Allies act soon upon King Michael's request. The Governments of the United States and England have announced their readiness to consult. The Soviets as far as is known here have given no reply. In fact, there is a growing feeling that the Soviet Government will give United States and England the same runaround that they gave us in March when we asked for consultations on the Rumanian situation. We must avoid this or pay the penalty for failing to avoid it. The penalty in Rumania will be the disastrous undermining of our moral position in this country; the abandoning of the King in an isolated and discredited position after he had acted on good faith on the basis of our own and our Allies' statements; that continuing of a National Democratic Front Government in power, perhaps without Socialist participation, whose early action will be the confirmation of its position through fixed elections and the rapid neutralization or eradication of the influences of the Western Democracies; and, finally, the fostering of a condition that will not be conducive to lasting peace in the Balkans. This can all be avoided if we discharge the responsibility we have taken upon ourselves and insist that our Soviet Allies discharge theirs. In securing the latter we now have the advantage of the knowledge that they know, and are aware that we know, of the weakness of their present position in Rumania.

Repeated to Moscow as 194, London as 9, and Caserta as 160.

BERRY

871.001 Carol II/8-3045 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Berle)

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1945—1 p. m.

2128. Reurtel 2732 Aug 30.⁸³ You may wish to inform Carol's Rep, Mr. Urdarianu, that the US Govt has been informed that the French Govt is not prepared to authorize Carol to return to France. This Govt has been in consultation with the Brit, French and Portuguese Govts and in the light of the present situation in Rumania all Govts were in agreement that it would not be desirable at this time to add the possible further complication presented by Carol's presence in Europe where it would be difficult for him to avoid being made the center of intrigue.

It is not the intention of this Govt permanently to endeavor to prevent his return to Europe, but an indefinite delay in carrying out his plans to do so seems the only desirable step at this time.

BYRNES

871.00/9-345 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1945—5 p. m.

7550. As the British Govt is aware Soviet Govt has not yet replied to this Govt's suggestion for consultation under the Yalta declaration in respect of Rumania. We propose to address a note along the following lines to Moscow and hope the British Govt will be prepared to support this position. Early expression of its views would be appreciated.

"On August 23 in the light of the situation existing in Rumania the Govt of the U.S. proposed that the three Govts signatories of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe consult together in regard to this situation in order, as provided by the Declaration, that they might concert their policies with a view to assisting Rumania to form an interim governmental authority broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of a government responsive to the will of the people. Brit. Govt has agreed to such consultation. No reply has yet been received from Soviet Govt. Meanwhile the situation in Rumania has become more critical.

This Govt has been informed that, in order not to prejudice the decision of the three Allied Govts and in order to maintain the con-

⁸³ Not printed; in it the Ambassador reported an appeal from King Carol's chamberlain, Urdareanu, stating that Carol's only motive in returning to France was to live in his own house and that no political considerations were involved (871.001 Carol II/8-3045).

stitutional procedure the King has refrained from signing decrees presented to him by Mr. Groza who has refused the King's request to resign.

This situation obviously requires a solution which will enable Rumania to restore the normal processes of government and administration. The problem of finding a solution is now of direct concern to the Allied Govts in view of the King's appeal to them and in view of Rumania's status under the Armistice concluded with them and as a nation to which the Crimea Declaration applies. It is apparent that the King and Mr. Groza are not in a position to take effective constitutional action to settle the matter without guidance from the Allied powers.

The problem arises therefore of stabilizing the situation in Rumania. In the opinion of this Govt there should be the least possible disturbance of the normal functions of govt and administration and there should be no prolongation of the deadlock between the King and Mr. Groza. It is accordingly suggested that the three Allied Govts support the King's request for the resignation of Mr. Groza and recommend an arrangement whereby the latter could continue the routine business of administration as an interim regime refraining from legislative and administrative action of a fundamental character, pending the early formation of a Govt by constitutional processes.

US Govt would welcome early indication of Soviet Govts views on suggestions put forward above."

Sent to London, rptd to Bucharest.⁸⁴

BYRNES

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/9-345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 3, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received September 3—10:45 a. m.]

3149. Following reply received from Molotov last night to note which I addressed to him August 23 on situation in Rumania.⁸⁵

"In connection with your letter of August 23 relating to Rumania I am obliged to call attention to an inaccuracy contained in your letter, namely to the fact that you do not mention the events leading up to the submission by the Rumanian King to the American and British representatives of the messages which you speak of in your letter. According to the information at the disposal of the Soviet Government, the submission by the King of these messages was called forth by the statements which were made to the Rumanian King by the American and British representatives, insisting on the resignation of the Rumanian Government headed by Petre Groza and stating in

⁸⁴ Repeated to Bucharest as telegram 472.

⁸⁵ See telegram 7108, August 21, to London, and footnote 46, p. 581.

that connection that their Governments would not conduct with the Groza government negotiations concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty. Taking into account the position adopted by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain with respect to the Rumanian Government headed by Petre Groza, the Rumanian King addressed to the representatives of the Soviet, American and British Governments in the Allied Control Commission in Rumania the letters of which you are aware.

As you apparently know on August 23 there was held at the initiative of General Susaïkov a session of the Allied Control Commission at which General Susaïkov called the attention of the American and British representatives in the Allied Control Commission to the incorrectness of their actions, consisting in the fact that without preliminary consideration of this question in the Allied Control Commission they had set out to bring about the resignation of the present Rumanian Government thereby violating the established order of work of the Allied Control Commission. It goes without saying that such actions cannot fail to have the most unfavorable effect on the further activity of the Allied Control Commission.

With respect to the proposal set forth in your letter of Aug 23 for consultation with the Govts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Great Britain concerning the situation which has arisen in Rumania, I am obliged to state that the Soviet Govt see no serious grounds for this, for the following reasons:

1. Present Rumanian Govt headed by Petre Groza represents a democratic govt enjoying the confidence and support of wide circles of the Rumanian population. In essence the present Rumanian Govt is a govt of concentration of the democratic forces of the country;
2. The Rumanian Govt headed by Petre Groza is honestly and loyally carrying out the obligations which it incurred by the agreement concerning an armistice;
3. The Soviet Govt considers inadmissible in principle interference in the internal affairs of Rumania, which is a sovereign state.

Such is the position of the Soviet Govt in the given question. To this it should be added that the Rumanian King has officially stated to the Soviet Representative in Rumania that he has no complaints against the govt of Petre Groza.

If, however, the Govts of the United States and Great Britain insist on consultation with the Govt of the Soviet Union with relation to the situation in Rumania, the Soviet Govt expresses its readiness to enter into such consultation on condition that this consultation shall take place at some time after completion of the work of the coming session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London." *End of message.*

Sent to Department as 3149; repeated to London 432 and Bucharest 125.

[HARRIMAN]

871.00/9-445 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, September 4, 1945—10 p. m.
[Received September 5—7 : 24 a. m.]

641. Mytel 636, September 3.⁸⁶ It was publicly announced today that Rumanian official delegation left for Moscow accompanied by General Susaikov of ACC (Allied Control Commission) and Soviet Ambassador Kavtaradze.⁸⁷ Socialist Education Minister Voitec was included, allegedly on his own initiative and without a formal decision being made by his party, although it is stated he has been requested to be merely an observer and to refrain from seeking other than purely cultural statements or agreements in Moscow.

Above announcement combined with today's Govt communiqué (mytel 639 of September 4⁸⁸) is having a depressing local effect in that public feels some definite unilateral Soviet action will be made in Moscow in conjunction with the Groza region [*regime?*]. It is even said that Soviet Govt is deliberately making continuance of Groza govt a prestige question and this is interpreted locally as an open rebuff to the American request that all three Powers refrain from individual political action that might compromise tripartite discussions upon Rumania's future govt.

Since returning to Bucharest I have followed literally the Dept's instruction to avoid contact with Rumanian political leaders (reDeptel 457, August 25, 4 p. m.) while at same time Russian officials obviously have received no instruction to interrupt their daily audiences with Rumanian political leaders whose parties are represented in Groza govt. This Mission's reserved attitude has resulted in a dampening of the spirits of the democratic leaders whereas the Soviet officials' heartening attitude has encouraged the arrogance and willful misrepresentations of NDF (National Democratic Front) leaders. I fear that the continuance of our present tactics will assist in bringing about

⁸⁶ Not printed; it reported that Rumanian Foreign Minister Tatarescu had addressed a letter to Soviet Ambassador Kavtaradze apprising him of Prime Minister Groza's desire to visit Moscow to consult with Molotov on Rumanian matters before the Soviet Foreign Commissar departed for the Council of Foreign Ministers' session in London (871.00/9-345).

⁸⁷ Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Sergey Ivanovich Kavtaradze, was named Soviet Minister to Rumania on August 12, 1945. Kavtaradze, who arrived in Bucharest on August 22, was to retain his previous rank of Ambassador.

⁸⁸ Not printed; it transmitted a digest of a communiqué from Prime Minister Groza of what purported to be the unanimous conclusion of the Rumanian Council of Ministers of August 24; the communiqué reaffirmed the democratic nature and mass backing of the Groza government, reviewed the accomplishments of the regime since it took power, and reemphasized the intentions of the regime to resist efforts to overthrow it (871.00/9-445).

the defeat of the policies to which the American Govt has publicly adhered. I suggest therefore that the ban placed upon this Mission's activities be removed and that from the United States we give encouragement to the Rumanian people and leaders by more press and radio publicity on Rumanian situation and by beaming some of this publicity to Rumanian listeners.

Repeated Moscow as 199 and London as 13.

BERRY

871.00/9-445 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1945—5 p. m.

7566. Since sending Deptel 7550 Sept 3 the reply of the Soviet Govt to this Govt's suggestion for consultation in respect of Rumania has been received, copy of which was telegraphed you from Moscow.⁸⁹ We therefore propose to substitute for the draft contained in the tel under reference a note along the following lines to Moscow. An early expression of Brit Govt's views in respect to proposed note will be appreciated.⁹⁰

"With reference to Mr. Molotov's communication in response to the proposal of this Govt that consultation respecting the situation in Rumania should take place among the signatories to the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, this Govt is glad to note that the Soviet Govt expresses its readiness to enter into such consultation.

"The stipulation of the Govt of the USSR that such consultation take place after completion of the work of the coming session of the Council of Foreign Ministers imposes, however, a restriction upon that meeting which is not consistent with the agreement reached at the tripartite conference of Berlin. The Soviet Govt will recall that the Council has been charged with the task of preparing peace treaties to be concluded with 'recognized democratic Govts in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania.' Since it is intended that the preparation of a peace treaty with Rumania be discussed at the London meeting, the Govt with which the peace treaty can be concluded should naturally be the subject of discussion as well; the US Govt proposes to raise this question since it has on more than one occasion made known its view that the provisional Govt, as it was constituted under Mr. Groza, was not adequately representative of

⁸⁹ Reference is to telegram 3149, September 3, 1 p. m., from Moscow, repeated to London as Moscow's 432, p. 603.

⁹⁰ Telegram 1967, September 6, to Moscow, informed Ambassador Harriman that the British Government had agreed to the text of the proposed note and that British Ambassador Clark Kerr had been instructed to associate himself with the American action; Ambassador Harriman was instructed to deliver the note (871.00/9-545).

all important elements of democratic opinion. This view has been made clear to the Sovt Govt not only in recent communications but also at the time when the Groza regime was installed, not through the action of the ACC but at the direct instance of the Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs who informed the King that the previous Govt was not acceptable to the USSR.

"In the light of conditions now existing in Rumania it is difficult to perceive how the present crisis can be solved without guidance from the Allied powers. This Govt is confident that the Soviet Govt has similar information in respect of this state of affairs and will upon further consideration agree that the full discussion required by the terms of the Crimea Declaration take place during the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

"Pending such discussion there remains, however, the problem of stabilizing the situation in Rumania where it is apparent that the King and Mr. Groza are not in a position to take effective constitutional action. It is the opinion of this Govt that there should be the least possible disturbance of the normal functions of Govt and administration and that there should be no prolongation of the deadlock between the King and Mr. Groza.

"Since there appears to be a difference in view between the Allied Govts with respect to the degree of support which Mr. Groza enjoys from the Rumanian people, it is accordingly suggested the three Allied Govts should nevertheless agree to support the King's constitutional request for his resignation and at the same time recommend an arrangement whereby he could continue the routine business of administration on an interim basis refraining from legislative and administrative action of a fundamental character pending the early formation of a Govt by constitutional processes. This Govt would welcome an early expression of the Soviet Govt's views in respect to this interim proposal.

"In conclusion a further observation in respect to Mr. Molotov's communication must be added. He has declared that Gen Susaikov charged that without preliminary consideration of the question in the ACC the US and Brit Reps on that Commission had set out to bring about the resignation of the present Rumanian Govt, thereby violating the established order of the ACC. From the records of the Aug 23 meeting now in the possession of this Govt it appears that both Gen Schuyler and Air Vice Marshal Stevenson have rejected this accusation.⁹¹ These Reps took no action until requested by the King to forward to their Govts the communication to which Mr. Molotov refers. It is understood that the Soviet Rep performed a similar function and this Govt has been informed further that Gen Susaikov has been conferring with Rumanian political leaders on the subject of proposed changes in the Groza Govt. It is true that the American and Brit political Reps had previously informed Rumanian authorities and political leaders of the views of their Govts with respect to the Groza regime. These views have been communicated to the Soviet Govt, have been made public, and were naturally transmitted to Rumanian

⁹¹ For transcript of discussion at joint meeting of senior Soviet, British and U.S. representatives on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania, held August 23, see p. 589.

authorities in clarification of the position of these Govts as a result of the tripartite conference in Berlin.⁹²

Sent to London; rptd to Bucharest and Moscow.⁹²

BYRNES

871.00/9-545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1945—7 p. m.

476. Your telegrams 626 and 628, Aug. 31.⁹³ Since we feel that any advice to the King in the matter of the advisability of his signing or refraining from signing Groza Government decrees would constitute the kind of direct interference on our part in the Rumanian political crisis that we wish to avoid at this time, we do not therefore propose at this time to authorize you to express any observations to the King on this subject. You have received a copy of our proposed telegram to Moscow⁹⁴ and will be informed of the British views as soon as received. When the message is communicated to the Soviet Government you may of course use it in any conversations you have with Rumanian authorities. In the meanwhile Dept sees no reason for you to avoid contact with the King, his advisers, members of the Government and officials (reurtel 641, Sept. 4) whose attention should be drawn to the Secretary's statement to the press of Sept. 4. In answer to a question concerning consultation on Rumania the Secretary said "There has not been an agreement. The Soviet Government has not agreed but I have requested the Soviet Government to authorize Foreign Minister Molotov to consult on that subject while we are in London".

ACHESON

871.00/9-545 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, September 5, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received 9:35 p. m.]

646. Mr. Molotov's reply⁹⁵ to the note addressed by Ambassador Harriman to him on August 23 on the situation in Rumania justified

⁹² As telegrams 473 and 1948, respectively.

⁹³ Latter not printed, but see footnote 82, p. 600.

⁹⁴ Reference is to telegram 7566, September 4, to London, repeated to Moscow as 1948 and to Bucharest as 473, *supra*.

⁹⁵ See telegram 3149, September 3, 1 p. m., from Moscow, p. 603.

the fears Rumanians have felt and I have expressed to the Department in recent telegrams, for the note gives further indication of the desire of the Soviet Government to retard a discussion and circumvent an honest settlement of the Rumanian problem.

Whereas, the Western Democracies have worked through word and deed toward preparing for the establishment of democratic institutions in Rumania, there are persistent indications that the Soviet Government is working toward a different goal.

The 3 numbered points in Mr. Molotov's letter are such patent falsifications of the facts that answering them in the customary diplomatic language admittedly is a problem. The third point, when applied to the English and American representatives in Rumania, is such a colossal distortion that even Mr. Vishinski must have chuckled over it.

As seen from this level our course is clear. We must, if we are going to made good our commitments in Rumania, reply immediately to Mr. Molotov's letter and in our reply, state in firm and clear language that we do not accept the Soviet analysis of the Rumanian situation. We should proceed to reiterate our request for immediate consultation, which shall be preceded by the resignation of the Groza government and that government of course, continuing to serve as an interim government pending a solution of the Rumanian problem by the three principal Allies. This seems to me to be a minimum of what we can accept from the Soviets.

Repeated London as 15 and Moscow as 202.

BERRY

740.00119 Council/9-1045 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, September 10, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 11 : 25 p. m.]

663. There follow detailed answers to points 1 through 5 listed in Deptel No. 485, Sept 8, 5 p. m.⁹⁶ The information received from General Schuyler under each point is set forth between quotes :

1. General Schuyler states: "Status of US representative on Control Commission is governed by statutes promulgated by General Susaikov

⁹⁶ Not printed ; it requested detailed answers to the following points concerning the status and operations of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria : (1) current position of American representatives on the Control Commissions and of the American political representatives ; (2) the degree of American participation in the formation of directives to the local governments ; (3) the difficulties in the circulation of American officials and the admission of and reporting by press correspondents ; (4) the limitations on access to local information and officials ; (5) the obstacles to the protection of American nations and interests (740.00119 Council/9-845).

17 August 1945. These statutes establish rights and privileges of US representatives exactly paralleling rights and privileges of the US representatives in the Hungarian ACC. The US representative has his own staff of 17 officers and 32 enlisted men established in a building several blocks from the Russian ACC headquarters. No American officer is expected to visit Russian ACC headquarters unless accompanied by the Russian liaison officer who is assigned to the US representation. Chief US and British representatives meet with the Deputy Chairman ACC three or four times each month at which times questions presented in advance by British and US representatives are answered by the Deputy Chairman. In addition at certain of these meetings representatives of the Rumanian Govt are present and present reports covering certain Rumanian governmental activities. Senior officers on the staff of the Chief US representative meet occasionally with Russian officers who are chiefs of various sections of the ACC (military, naval, economic, and air sections). The procedure at these meetings follows the procedure at meetings of chief representatives.

In addition to the scheduled joint meetings a number of important matters have been brought to the attention of the Deputy Chairman by letters addressed to him by the chief US representative. In the course of the past 7 months approximately 90 such letters have been written covering a large range of subjects; as for example, protection of American property, questionable activities of the Rumanian Govt, deportation of German nationals to Russia, size and composition of the Rumanian Army, personal safety of important Rumanian political leaders, freedom of the press, and details of working procedures for the ACC Rumania. Of these 90 letters less than 20 per cent have been answered either verbally or in writing. In a few other cases it has been evident that action on the matters presented actually was taken by the ACC Deputy Chairman. In the majority of cases however there has been no indication of any sort that the matters raised were ever given consideration."

The United States Mission in Bucharest was set up independently of the US representation on the Allied Control Commission and so from its inception did not consider itself bound by the statutes of the Control Commission. As it existed prior to the arrival of the American representative on the Control Commission, its status and activities were explained directly to the local Soviet authorities. It was accepted by them in accordance with this explanation. Its activities within Rumania have never been questioned or interfered with by the Soviet authorities. However when clearances are required for members of its staff to enter or leave Rumania it is obliged to fall in with the practices established by the Control Commission. In all

matters concerning the Control Commission this Mission operates through General Schuyler's office.

Upon its arrival the Mission was welcomed by the Rumanian Govt then in power. The same cordial relations continued with the succeeding Govt but with the present gov't of Dr. Groza the Mission had no social or protocolar relations. Nevertheless the Mission continues to maintain close contact with the Govt upon the administrative level. Informal letters addressed by the Mission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have normally received prompt and courteous replies.

2. General Schuyler states: "At no time since our arrival here last November has any US representative participated in the formulation of any important directive to the Rumanian Govt. The ACC procedures of 17 August, 1945, prescribe that the Deputy Chairman shall discuss questions of principle with US and British representatives before issuance to Rumanian Govt of directives covering these questions. However no such discussions have as yet taken place. At no time since last November has any United States representative been permitted by Russians to inspect any document of any nature delivered to Rumanian Govt by ACC. Certain instructions of a minor nature have been reported to US representatives subsequent to their delivery, and one or two minor matters such as the calling up of additional recruits for Rumanian Army, were discussed at ACC meetings prior to issuance of instructions."

3. General Schuyler states: "(a) United States officials are authorized complete freedom of circulation throughout Rumania except for that portion of the Danube River between Braila and the Black Sea (Sulina). The chief US ACC representative recently was specifically denied access to this portion of the Danube by the Deputy Chairman ACC who stated that such portion was under control of Soviet High Command and not of ACC Rumania. (b) Great difficulty has been experienced in securing clearance for entry into Rumania of US press representatives. Although over one month has now passed since the Potsdam Conference,⁹⁷ only one press representative has been authorized by ACC to enter Rumania and his clearance was not received until 7 September. The names of 14 press correspondents have been officially submitted to the ACC for clearance some of these as long as 6 months ago. We have had frequent promises that clearances would be arranged but thus far only one such clearance has come

⁹⁷ Part X of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, August 2, 1945, stated, *inter alia*, that the United States, British, and Soviet Governments expressed the conviction that the Allied press would enjoy freedom to report developments in Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. See bracketed note, p. 561.

through. In matter of difficulties in securing release of press reports I believe the United States Mission has full information."

(a) From the time of the arrival of the officers of the Mission no restriction has been placed upon their movement within the country. There was little occasion to move around during winter months but in the month of May in preparation of my trip home for consultations I traveled by motor car more than 3,000 miles over Rumanian roads. Although one passes Soviet control points in entering and leaving each city, I was permitted to pass freely upon the display of my documents.

(b) In [*On?*] March 1, I complained to Mr. Vyshinski, who was then in Bucharest, that ACC had failed to act upon applications of many journalists who desired to come to Rumania. He took note of my complaint.⁹⁸ Two weeks later four American journalists were flown in from Moscow, permitted free circulation in Rumania, and then flown back to Moscow. Such stories as they tried to send out from Bucharest were badly cut by the censor. As a result no one attempted to send out a true story and no important story from that group of journalists reached America until Leigh White arrived in Rome 2 months later. Since the departure of that group at the end of March, only two American journalists have visited Rumania. They arrived on August 30 without the approval of the ACC but left with its approval on September 8. A single American journalist was cleared this week with the ACC. Thus between the end of March and the present time only one American journalist has been authorized to come to Rumania although the applications of at least 14 have been pending, some of them since last November.

The Rumanian censorship is such that the last two journalists that came here said that they would not return and would advise against any of their colleagues coming here until American journalists were able to send out their stories without having them garbled by the Rumanian censor to the point where their context is changed.

4. General Schuyler states: "Under the terms of the 17 August, 1945 procedures,⁹⁹ members of the United States Representation can contact Rumanian officials only through the Chairman or Deputy Chairman ACC. No direct official contacts between US representatives and Rumanian Govt officials are authorized. Of course considerable local information is obtained by members of the US representation from Rumanian individuals through personal and unofficial contacts, many of which are social in nature. However any information received offi-

⁹⁸ With regard to the exchange of remarks between Berry and Vyshinsky on the subject of freedom of the press in Rumania, see telegram 151, March 1, from Bucharest, p. 489.

⁹⁹ The new procedures proposed for the Allied Control Commission for Rumania by the Soviet authorities were set forth in telegram M-1446, August 18, from Schuyler to the War Department, p. 571.

cially from Rumanian Govt must pass through the Deputy Chairman ACC for his vussiae red [*sic*]. On many occasions, in conformance with this procedure, we have requested Russian assistance in securing information from the Rumanians. In every case, the information was received after delays of from 2 weeks to several months and was couched in such general and nonspecific terms as to be almost useless for our purposes."

As this Mission is not restricted by the rules of the ACC it has received promptly from official Rumanian sources copies of ACC directives to the Rumanian Govt and copies of replies to Rumanian Govt to these directives. Occasionally the Mission has received latter before they were received by the Soviet authorities. Thus on an informal and personal basis, Mission has had through local Rumanian officials access to a full measure of local information.

5. General Schuyler states "chief difficulties in this regard have been as follows:

(a) Russian seizure of machinery supplies and other items belonging to US owned oil companies. In cases of this type the chief US Representative has protested to the Deputy Chairman Allied Control Commission and has requested that either the property be returned or that seizures be suspended pending consultations by US and Russian Governments. In one such case involving 4 American owned tank cars assurances were given that cars would be returned but to date this has not been accomplished. In the other and more important cases the requests were disregarded and seizures continued as originally scheduled by the Russians.

(b) In certain other cases individuals claiming US citizenship have been seized by the Russians as Saxons and deported to Russia in disregard of certificates and other documentary evidence tending to indicate US citizenship. Letters addressed by the US representative to the Deputy Chairman protesting these seizures and calling for the return of the individuals concerned have brought no results.

(c) In two cases commercial organizations in which the majority stock interests are American have been treated by the Rumanian Government as enemy property and have had Rumanian administrators appointed to control their operations. Protests by the US Allied Control Commission Representative to the Allied Control Commission Deputy Chairman have thus far elicited no reply.

(d) Serious delays and difficulties have been encountered in securing clearance for entry into Rumania by American business men and philanthropists closely associated with legitimate American interests in this country. Certain of these individuals have actually been refused entry, a few have been cleared after delays of several months' duration and in at least two cases clearance applications which

were submitted over 6 months ago are still pending, no answer having been received even after repeated reminders.

(e) Administrative delays and obstacles in every day operation of US Missions Bucharest are continually being encountered. Many of these must be considered prejudicial to the interests and prestige of the US. For example a regularly scheduled and properly cleared administrative airplane flight to Bucharest from Italy recently could not be made on the date specified because of bad weather. Our application to have the plane come in on the following day was rejected with a statement that an entire new clearance would have to be arranged necessitating a delay of at least 5 days."

As this Mission has no means of exerting direct pressure upon the Groza government for the protection of American citizens and their property, and it is doubtful if that government would have the authority to protect such property even if it desired to do so, it has been necessary where citizens or their property have been jeopardized to work for their protection through General Schuyler's office. His office issues certificates to cover property that is American owned. When such property is taken or damaged he asks redress according to circumstances through the Allied Control Commission or directly of Rumanian authorities. Thus the difficulties that the General has set forth above accurately describe the situation both for the American Representative on the Allied Control Commission and for the US mission in Rumania.

Sent to London as 24 and Dept as 663.

[BERRY]

871.00/9-1045: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 10, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

3227. Following reply received from Vyshinsky this afternoon to note¹ which I addressed to him on September 7 on situation in Rumania.

"In connection with your remarks in letter dated September 7 on Rumania, I must say the following. The position of the Soviet Govt with respect to the present Govt of Rumania headed by Peter Groza was set forth in detail in a note addressed to you dated September 1²

¹ Telegram 1967, September 6, to Moscow, instructed Ambassador Harriman to deliver a note set forth in telegram 7566, September 4, to London (repeated to Moscow as 1948), p. 606. The note, in paraphrase, was delivered on September 7.

² Molotov's note, dated September 1, was transmitted to the Department in telegram 3149, September 3, from Moscow, p. 603.

and I see no need to dwell again on this question. This letter also makes clear the inadmissibility to the Soviet Union of your proposal regarding the resignation of the govt of Peter Groza which was formed by no means at the insistence of the Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, as you write, but as the result of the union of the democratic forces of the country, and this has been demonstrated by the half year of the existence of the present Rumanian Govt, which enjoys the full support of the majority of the Rumanian people. There should be added to this the fact that the King of Rumania himself, after sending to the Govts of the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union the letter of which you are cognizant regarding a reorganization of the present Rumanian Govt, officially declared to the powers that he had no grievances whatsoever against the Groza govt and raised the question concerning the resignation of this govt as a result of those statements which were made to him by the representatives of the US and Great Britain.

With respect to your remark that the future existence of an impasse in the relations between the King and the govt of Peter Groza is intolerable, there cannot be two opinions on this question. One should indeed find a way out of this impasse. Therefore the Soviet Govt agreed as you already know to consult with the Govts of the US and Great Britain on the situation which has been created in Rumania and advocated the carrying on of such consultations in the period after the termination of the work of the September session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. You find, however, that this is incompatible with the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference on the preparation of a peace treaty for Rumania maintaining that the discussion of this question at the Council of Foreign Ministers should be connected with the discussion of the question concerning the Rumanian Govt. But such a statement does not follow from the decisions of the Berlin Conference.

You dispute the statements contained in the letter of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov of September 1 regarding the incorrectness of the actions of the American and British representatives on the Allied Control Commission who endeavored to bring about the resignation of the present Rumanian Govt without preliminary discussion of this question on the Allied Control Commission. But the information at the disposal of the Soviet Govt shows irrefutably that the American and British representatives on the Allied Control Commission placed before the King of Rumania the question of the resignation of the Govt of Peter Groza without any attempt to submit this question to preliminary discussion on the Commission.

Accept, Mr. Ambassador, etc."

Sent to Dept repeated to London for Secretary Byrnes 441 and Bucharest 134.

HARRIMAN

[The Council of Foreign Ministers held its first session in London, September 11–October 2, 1945. The American delegation was headed by Secretary of State Byrnes. In the course of the session, procedures

for the preparation of a peace treaty with Rumania, the recognition of the Rumanian Government, and the broadening of the Rumanian regime were discussed, especially at the 14th meeting, September 20, and the 15th and 16th meetings, September 21. For the records of these meetings and other documentation regarding the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see volume II, pages 99 ff.]

740.00119 Council/9-1145: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London*³

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1945—8 p. m.

7836. Secdel 27. AmRep, Rumania has received signed statement from Titel Petrescu, Social Democratic Party leader (Bucharest 647, Sep 6⁴) presented simultaneously to BritMis and King advising of Govt censorship prohibition to publish declaration (Bucharest 596, Aug 24⁵) adopted by Political Bureau of his party (Bucharest 592, Aug 24). Petrescu took this action as a challenge to Groza gov't communiqué (Bucharest 639, Sep 4⁴) published as "unanimous" conclusion by Council of Ministers that the Groza gov't enjoys the confidence of the masses and should remain in power despite the intrigues of anti-democratic forces.

With more than a hundred of his party members arrested and receiving open threats against his life (Bucharest 645, Sep. 5), Petrescu backed by great majority of party, which holds key place in current crisis, is adhering firmly to declared position. This affirms necessity of adopting Gov't formula acceptable to US and Brit so as to secure, in accord with Potsdam agreement, restoration of diplomatic relations and conclusion of peace treaties. Declared position also expresses conviction that Rumanian Gov't should call upon three great powers to find solution.

Petrescu authorized for publication abroad text of party declaration

³ Repeated to Bucharest as telegram 489.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Not printed; it transmitted the text of the Social Democratic Party declaration which read as follows: "The Social Democratic Party declares that it cannot approve any government formula which does not have the agreement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Social Democratic Party considers it necessary to adopt a government formula which would have also the agreement of the United States and Great Britain, so as to be able to secure, in accordance with the decisions taken at Potsdam, the reestablishing of diplomatic relations with the United States of America and at the same time to obtain the signature of peace treaties and Rumania's admittance among the United Nations. The Social Democratic Party is of the opinion that the government should call upon the three great powers to find a solution of a nature to satisfy the points of view expressed above." (871.00/8-2445) Bucharest's telegram 596 was retransmitted by the Department of State to the Secretary of State in telegram 7837, (Secdel 28), September 11, to London.

(which is being telegraphed separately)⁶ and presumably would welcome publicity not only of it but also of circumstances surrounding its issuance and particularly of refusal by Govt to allow its publication in Rumania. However, we are not giving this information to the press until authorized by you. OWI broadcast has used text of party declaration and is anxious to use additional material with your approval.⁷

ACHESON

[A memorandum of September 11, 1945, from the British Embassy to the Department of State dealt with the question of the economic agreements concluded between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary on the other; for text of this memorandum, see volume II, page 123.]

871.00/9-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 12, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received September 12—12:45 p. m.]

3251. Embassy's 3227, September 10, 7 p. m.; repeated London 441. In the course of conversation with Vyshinski this afternoon, I took occasion to reproach him in friendly manner for writing us notes such as the last we have received on the Rumanian question which practically impute [*impugn?*] the truthfulness of our Government.

Vyshinski then asked my opinion of how the Rumanian question could be solved, adding that some way would have to be found, in his opinion, to create conditions on which the King could work with the Groza government. I replied that I was not sufficiently familiar with conditions in Rumania to answer but that certainly we expected freedom in political expression to all democratic parties. Vyshinski said that our two Governments had solved harder questions than this in the past and that he was hopeful that a way could be found to solve this one as well. He referred to the Polish settlement. In conclusion, he said he was sure this question would be talked over at the London conference.

Sent London for the Secretary 447; repeated Department as 3251, Bucharest as 138.

HARRIMAN

⁶ See footnote 5, p. 616.

⁷ A memorandum by Samuel Reber, of the Division of Southern European Affairs, dated September 17, 1945, states that teletype conversations with the American delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London had taken place during the preceding weekend, and it was decided that there was no need to issue the Petrescu statement (871.00/9-1745).

740.00119 Council/9-1245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London*⁹

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1945—8 p. m.

7889. Secdel 41. For the Secretary. You will have seen Moscow's tel of Sept 10¹⁰ repeated to London as no. 441 that Vyshinski has replied to our note of Sept 7 in regard to Rumania. His answer is drafted in such terms as to make it entirely unacceptable. Rather than continue a correspondence of this nature however it is thought that you may wish to discuss the subject direct with Molotov in London. Should the occasion arise it might be well to point out the following misstatements of fact which appear in Vyshinski's letter.

The Soviet Govt maintains that the Groza govt was not formed at the instance of the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Information at the disposal of this Govt shows irrefutably that the Soviet Rep first informed the King that the existing Govt of Rumania was unsatisfactory to the USSR and subsequently, when political consultations with regard to the formation of a new govt were under way in accordance with constitutional procedure, Mr. Vyshinski had nominated Groza in the name of the Soviet Govt. The Asst Commissar later stated that cancellation of the Groza mandate would be considered by the Soviet Govt as a hostile act. Furthermore it cannot be denied that the Groza govt was brought to power without consultation with either the US or Brit Govts as had previously been requested. The views of this Govt in regard to the method of formation of the Groza govt were communicated at the time to the USSR and since the Soviet Govt gave no substantial reassurance this Govt therefore proposed consultation and joint action under the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe. This proposal was rejected by the USSR.

Mr. Vyshinski further insists that the American and Brit Reps on the ACC placed the matter of Groza's resignation before the King without consultation with the Soviet member of the Commission. This statement is also unfounded on fact. The US Political Representative who is not a member of the ACC replied to questions of Rumanian leaders regarding the attitude of his Govt in respect of the Potsdam communiqué by stating that his Govt did not consider the Groza govt sufficiently representative of democratic opinion in Rumania to warrant the conclusion of a peace treaty with it at this time. The US Govt still maintains this view. Any subsequent Rumanian action was taken entirely on Rumanian initiative.

Insofar as this Govt is aware the King has never "officially declared to the Powers that he had no grievances whatsoever against the Groza

⁹ Repeated to Moscow and Bucharest.

¹⁰ Same as telegram 3227, September 10, from Moscow, p. 614.

govt". We understand he may however have informed the Soviet Ambassador that he had no personal grievances against Groza himself. The decision of the majority of the party leaders to form a new govt has however demonstrated that the Groza govt does not enjoy the support of all democratic elements in Rumania and the continuance of the present deadlock is contrary to the constitutional procedure of the country.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/9-1645 : Telegram

The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Hulick) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, September 16, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received September 16—11:30 a. m.]

688. From General Schuyler. There follow additional comments contained in letter dated September 13 upon subject matter Department's telegram 485, September 8, 5 p. m.¹¹ and Mission telegram 633 [663], September 10, 1 p. m.

"In paragraph 3b of my outline, I referred to the difficulty experienced in securing clearance for newspaper correspondents to enter Rumania and stated that of the 14 names of correspondents submitted to the ACC (Allied Control Commission) for clearance, only one had as yet been cleared. I think it only just to point out to you that shortly after the preparation of this outline, a number of additional correspondents were cleared. At the present time, 11 of the 14 names officially submitted have received clearance.

"In paragraph 5e I mentioned that we had protested to the ACC the appointment of Rumanian administrators for 2 commercial firms in which majority stock interests are American, and stated further that thus far these protests had elicited no reply. I now wish to add that a reply was received this morning from the Deputy Chairman, ACC. The reply calls for further proof of American ownership of these firms and demands data to permit of a full investigation of their trade liabilities. Thus while no positive action has been taken on our protests as yet, it is now apparent that the matter is under consideration.

"Again, under paragraph 5e of my outline, I quoted as an example of unnecessary obstacles to our administrative activities the fact that a regularly scheduled plane flight from Italy, cancelled on account of weather, had to be cleared all over again, involving a delay of at least 5 days. I should now like to point out that this matter has been taken up officially with General Vinogradov and he has promised to take immediate steps so that in the future any properly cleared airplane flights which cannot take place due to bad weather may be automatically arranged for the following day. It is of course entirely possible that when Vinogradov considers further all the details of this

¹¹ See footnote 96, p. 609.

new arrangement, it may turn out to be impracticable of application. We have not as yet had an example of its operation, and judging from past experiences, we may well expect further difficulties."

This is 688 from Hulick, repeated to London for Berry¹² as 38. [Schuyler.]

HULICK

871.00/9-1045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1945—8 p. m.

2055. Urtel 3227, Sept 10. Secretary has informed Dept¹³ that Vyshinski note is not being discussed in London. He does not, however, wish it on the record without rejoinder and asks that you reply along lines of Deptel 7889, Sept 12 to London, rptd to Moscow as 1922.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/10-445 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, October 4, 1945—midnight.

[Received October 5—4:04 p. m.]

763. The termination of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London has set in motion in Bucharest two currents of opinion. The more prominent is loaded with disappointment and apprehension. The people who follow this line feel that Rumania will be one of the first countries to experience unpleasant consequences as a result of the absence of a general agreement in London. They believe that the Soviet Union will now proceed more rapidly with a policy of communization in Rumania.

The second current carries the opinion of a section of the more experienced but less numerous Bucharest public. These people reason like Mr. Maniu. He said that although nothing may have been gained, nothing certainly was lost nor will be lost as long as America

¹² Mr. Berry had gone to London to join the American delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

¹³ In a telecommunication conference between the Department of State and the American delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, September 21, 1945, 7:30 p. m. (871.00/9-2145).

and England maintain firmly their point of view. Mr. Maniu, of course, like all Rumanians, would have liked to have seen an agreement reached in London for the setting-up of a democratic govt in Rumania and King Michael informed by a reply to the letter he addressed the three principal Allies. But barring such a solution Mr. Maniu feels that the conclusion reached is the best that could be expected.

The Bucharest press, with the exception of a single newspaper, carried the Tass¹⁴ report of the Molotov statement upon the London Conference.¹⁵ Several sentences from Secretary Byrnes' statement,¹⁶ most favorable to the Russian interpretation, were appended to the Molotov statement. The single exception was *Momentul* which gave Secretary Byrnes statement in full.

The members of the Govt publicly are making political capital point of the fact that the London Conference adjourned without taking action against the Groza govt. The press in reporting today a speech given on Sunday by Premier Groza adds the statement: "Dr. Petru Groza formed the Govt because such was the wish of the people, and he will remain by the helm of the Govt until such time as the people demand his resignation".

At the same time Cabinet members are privately maneuvering so as to maintain their personal position in the Govt that follows the Groza govt. Communist Minister of Justice Patrascanu has recently sent two messages to the King claiming the backing of the Russians and suggesting that he be asked to form a new government in which several key ministries will be held by "neutral" personalities and in which all parties will be represented. Dissident Liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs Tatarescu has sent a confidential messenger to the King to say that he has the confidence of the Russians for forming a new govt and that he can bring into being a govt that will truly represent the country.

Dr. Lupu of the National Peasants has given out that he has the backing of the King and of the Russians. Socialist Democratic leader Petrescu, while keeping his party's position in the present Govt, is talking daily with other political leaders about the next Govt.

¹⁴ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union.

¹⁵ The Tass report of the Molotov statement of October 2, 1945, regarding the termination of the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London appeared in *Izvestia*, October 3, 1945.

¹⁶ For text of statement by the Secretary of State on the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, released to the press October 3, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 7, 1945, p. 513.

Above all this the King continues to display great resolve and patience while waiting a reply to his letter. He has indicated that he will maintain this attitude until the reply is forthcoming. But his position may become increasingly difficult if the Groza govt indulges in provocative acts or if Soviet Govt increases its pressure.

This is No. 763; rptd to London as 67 and Moscow as 236.

BERRY

871.00/10-1145 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, October 11, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received October 11—10:40 p. m.]

789. I am delighted with the Secretary's announcement,¹⁷ as reported in the Radio Bulletin, that he is sending shortly to Rumania and Bulgaria a representative with an entirely new approach for the purpose of reappraising the situation. I am happy too that the man chosen is one who has behind him a long and impressive record of fact-finding and reporting.

The Government press has also reacted enthusiastically to this announcement although for quite other reasons as it reads into the announcement a recognition of the need to reevaluate the supposed opinions and recommendations of the American Government's representatives in Rumania.

Parties in opposition to the Government are depressed by announcement as they believe Groza government will use it as a pretext for maintaining itself in power until additional American representative has made his report and American Government has confirmed or altered stand taken by Secretary Byrnes. They know that delay means a further loss of prestige for King and further opportunities for Communists to entrench themselves in power.

BERRY

¹⁷ At his press conference of October 10, the Secretary of State announced the appointment of Mark Ethridge of the Louisville *Courier Journal* as his special representative to investigate conditions in the Balkans preparatory to the recognition of the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. For a summary of the Secretary's statement, see telegram 336, October 12, to Sofia, vol. iv, p. 346.

871.00/10-1745 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania
(Berry)*

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1945—7 p. m.

555. Retel 802 Oct 17.¹⁸ You may in your discretion provide Rumanian Government accurate text of my announcement of Ethridge mission, indicating orally the hope of this Govt that the Rumanian authorities may wish to give the correct text sufficient publicity to correct any possible misunderstanding of purpose of Ethridge visit on part of Rumanian people.

Voice of America will endeavor in future broadcasts to counteract effect of inaccurate versions circulated by Groza cabinet members and Communist leaders.

BYRNES

871.00/11-845 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary
of State*

BUCHAREST, November 8, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received November 8—6:30 p. m.]

863. This morning church services were held for the King in many places throughout the capital and early in the morning strong detachments of police and soldiers patrolled the palace square and its approaches. At about 10 o'clock numerous trucks laden with workers circulated in the square shouting for Groza and disrupting groups of citizens beginning to congregate there. Police and soldier detachments disappeared upon the arrival of these trucks. However, the crowds of citizens increased with fresh influxes waving banners until it is estimated the people shouting "King and Country" formed as large a demonstration as any in Bucharest during the past year.

About noon gendarmes in the Interior Ministry building began shooting into the ground and in the air and ricocheting bullets wounded several. These shootings occurred after the cordon of police had cut off approximately 150 persons and taken them into the Interior Ministry under arrest. Intermittent shooting continued during the next few hours near the Interior Ministry while a large crowd filled the square and surrounding streets. Soldiers at one point fired upon demonstrators and killed two and wounded three others. By mid-

¹⁸ Not printed; it reported that members of the Groza Cabinet and Rumanian Communist leaders had deliberately misquoted the Secretary of State's announcement and statements broadcast by the Voice of America regarding the impending Ethridge Mission as signifying the eventual recognition of the Groza regime (871.00/10-1745).

afternoon the crowd had gradually dispersed and cordons of soldiers across the square prevented any further demonstrations before the palace. However, groups carrying banners were later seen parading through main streets of the city.

A crowd of demonstrators appeared before this Mission, the Military Mission as well as British Headquarters, cheering the King, the US and requesting aid in releasing those arrested today.

A report received this evening shows that 7 persons were killed and 61 hospitalized as a result of the day's activities.¹⁹

This is 863 from Berry; repeated to London as 880; and Moscow as 257. BERRY

871.00/11-1045 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, November 10, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received November 11—8:36 a. m.]

872. The Government is trying to place the onus for the casualties in Thursday's demonstration on the members of the opposition groups, namely, the National Peasant, National Liberal and to a lesser extent the Social Democratic parties.²⁰

Therefore General Schuyler and I have had conversations in the last 24 hours with Mr. Maniu, Mr. Bratianu and Mr. Titel Petrescu for the purpose of informing ourselves of the facts not available from witnesses at Thursday's demonstration.

Messrs. Maniu and Bratianu said that the secretaries-general of their respective parties had informed the Ministry of Interior of their plans on November 6. These plans included orderly demonstrations of loyalty to the King in the Palace square on his name day November 8. At this demonstration there were to be no political speeches, no banners except the national flag and no placards except the King's picture. There was no premeditated plan of march. The people would assemble, shout for the King, sign the Palace register and depart. The Minister suggested using halls but Mr. Maniu refused bearing in mind the experience of General Radescu and more recently that of Titel Petrescu with Communist packed halls (remy 860, No-

¹⁹ Telegram 865, November 9, from Bucharest, reported that the number of dead had reached 13 (871.00/11-945).

²⁰ Telegram 875, November 12, 7 p. m., from Bucharest, reported on the holding of a large-scale popular demonstration, organized by the Communists, on the occasion of the burying of workers killed during the November 8 demonstrations. Extraordinary measures were adopted by Government officials to secure a large turnout, and members of the Government stood at the gravesides. The demonstration included signs placing the responsibility for the deaths upon Maniu and Bratianu. (871.00/11-1245)

vember 7²¹). He insisted that the demonstration have a popular rather than a political character. In the end the Minister gave his consent, a consent that he withdrew by telephone the morning of the demonstration as the crowds were assembling.

All political leaders felt that the Groza gov't had shown an excess of zeal in obliging factories to close the 7th so that attendance would be large at a Gov't demonstration for Soviet Rumanian solidarity at which there were political speeches and a mixture of Rumanian and Soviet flags and placards. The leaders considered that the Groza gov't was culpable in declaring contrary to tradition that the King's name day was a working day thus prohibiting workers and school children from demonstrating their loyalty to the King. In spite of this the leaders believed that the demonstration would have passed in an orderly and calm manner had not the Gov't provoked the feelings of the people by sending trucks through the crowd loaded with men who shouted in favor of the Groza gov't. Even then there would likely have been no fatality had not the Gov't withdrawn regular troops who showed themselves to the demonstrators and substituted units from the Tudor Vladimirescu Division which fired into the crowd.

The three leaders said that the Soviet authorities had abstained from intervening with Soviet troops. Moreover, these authorities had ordered the Rumanian troops to cease firing into the crowd. The leaders said that they felt the demonstration had served a useful purpose as by it the people had unmasked the Groza gov't that the world might see its true features.

This is 872 from Berry; repeated Moscow as 261 and London as 92.

BERRY

871.00/11-1645: Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, November 16, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received November 19—8:25 a. m.]

892. Mytel 865, November 9²² and 873, November 10.²³ General Schuyler's urgent request on the 8th for a special meeting of the

²¹ Not printed; it reported Communist efforts to break up Rumanian Social Democratic Party meetings (871.00/11-745).

²² Not printed; it reported, *inter alia*, that General Schuyler had twice written to General Susaikov asking that a special meeting of the Allied Control Commission be convoked to consider an inquiry into the November 8 demonstration (871.00/11-945).

²³ Not printed; it reported that General Susaikov had called an Allied Control Commission meeting on November 10 to hear the reports of Admiral Stevenson and General Schuyler on the November 8 demonstration. After General Susaikov, who appeared to be open-minded, had heard the reports, he said he had not made up his own mind but would call a Commission meeting on November 12 in order to inform the other Commission members of his opinion. (871.00/1045) Actually this meeting was not held.

ACC being unanswered the questions which he raised were considered at yesterday's regular meeting.

General Susaikov said that he would not agree to the appointment of a Tripartite Board to establish the facts surrounding the events of the 8th as (1) that would be an infringement of Rumanian sovereignty area and (2) the Russian High Command not the ACC was responsible for order within the country. General Susaikov was equally unable to agree to General Schuyler's request that a Board of Inquiry be appointed to investigate the third degree methods used by the Secret Police of [on?] children, women and men brought to the Interior Ministry. Please see General Schuyler's cable M-2207²⁴ for a full report of this meeting.

In reviewing objectively all the facts I have been able to assemble upon the demonstration of the 8th I wish now to supplement the sentence in my telegram 863 of November 8 reading "These shootings occurred after a cordon of the police had cut off approximately 150 persons and taken them into the Interior Ministry under arrest".

Appears that one group of the crowd as reported was cut off and taken into the Ministry, that another group provoked by this action of the Rumanian authorities made a rush towards the Ministry and that soldiers replied to this rush with shots. Not being able to reach the Ministry building the crowd showed its anger by tearing from the wooden fence before the Ministry which was covered with government-printed posters, all printed matter. As the local Communists may make a point of this "attack" against a public building I submit this supplementary information with the explanation of the provocation for the "attack". The Soviet authorities have already used the incident, as some of the posters boasted of Soviet-Rumanian friendship to label the demonstration "anti-Soviet". The next move which is already hinted would be to say the demonstration was created and sustained by the Anglo-Americans.

This is 892, repeated Moscow as 2691, London as 100.

BERRY

871.00/11-2145 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, November 21, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received November 21—8: 15 p. m.]

906. Mr. Maniu asked urgently to meet General Schuyler and me. He stated that in view that the fury of the reign of terrorism of the Groza govt had not abated; that investigation had not been [under-

²⁴ Not printed.

taken?] by the ACC in connection with the events of November 8; that the investigations made by the Govt were directed exclusively against the National Peasant Party; and that the leaders of the Peasant Party no longer have any security of domicile or of person, he asked, (1) that the political situation in Rumania be immediately examined, (2) that the ACC immediately investigate the events of November 8 and (3) that sanctuary be provided Dr. Ilie Lazar and his minor daughter. Dr. Lazar is head of the Peasant Party organization of the working men. He and his daughter have been threatened with death by their political opponents.

Bearing in mind the instructions sent this Mission on asylum (re-Deptel 86 of February 23 and 110 of March 7²⁵) and that if this Mission were authorized to extend asylum under the same instructions as issued Ambassador Patterson (Depcirtel of November 13, 9 a. m.²⁶), it would be unable to offer asylum because of the fourth condition.

General Schuyler and I limited ourselves to a statement that we would forward to our Government a report of Mr. Maniu's request.

BERRY

871.00/11-2645 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, November 26, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 27—3:39 a. m.]

917. From Ethridge. Although I leave here Thursday,²⁷ on the way home, I am sending this telegram at the end of a busy week in Bucharest because of the urgency of the situation. The position of the Western Democracies is disintegrating fast, the Russian position becoming stronger all the time, and unless we can take firm and effective action in Rumania it will soon be too late. We are jeopardizing the confidence of the Rumanian people in our intent and ability to carry out commitments we have made to the world.

²⁵ Latter not printed; but see footnote 17, p. 507.

²⁶ Not printed; it stated that Ambassador Richard Patterson in Yugoslavia had been instructed as follows on the question of granting asylum to opposition leaders: "We are in general opposed to having our Missions grant asylum under normal circumstances. In view of unsettled conditions in Europe now however cases may arise where rigid adherence to policy of withholding asylum might give grounds for criticism that we are unmindful of risks being taken by patriotic leaders of democratic opinion. Patterson therefore authorized to provide protection when it is requested provided he is satisfied (1) that the individual is in immediate danger for his life (2) that no other reasonable avenue of safety is open to him (3) that his life is endangered only as a result of political activities that are consistent with democratic processes and (4) that lives or safety of Embassy personnel will not be jeopardized by granting asylum. Privilege to be exercised only on individual merit of each case." (800.00 Summaries/11-1435).

²⁷ November 29. Mr. Ethridge had arrived in Bucharest on October 19.

During the past week I have talked to almost all the major political figures, including the British and Soviet representatives, the King, leading members of the parties in the Groza coalition govt, leaders of the opposition and numerous persons representing labor and industrial groups. Before leaving today for the provinces for 2 days, I should like to summarize briefly and tentatively for your information my impressions of the Rumanian situation.

Although the pattern of seizure of power is much the same as that I found in Bulgaria there are significant differences. In the first place, there is no political grouping here, such as the Fatherland Front regime of a year ago in Bulgaria, which the Yalta signatories could accept as a common denominator. Secondly, the refusal of Groza last August to resign at the King's demand has created a constitutional deadlock which is an important contributing factor in the present situation. Both sides profess to be anxious to solve it but in the meantime the governmental situation is approaching the chaotic and some decision must be made. In the third place the question of parliamentary elections is in the discussion stage because the present Govt contends that further preparations are necessary. My own conviction is that the Govt will not go to the people yet because it is not willing to risk itself in a free election and wants more time to consolidate its power.

I am entirely convinced that the Groza govt is in no sense representative under the Yalta formula because the two political groups which have the support of the vast majority of the Rumanian people are not only out of the Govt, but their leaders are being harrassed by the Govt, their political clubs largely taken over, their newspapers entirely suppressed and all public meetings of the opposition barred. The Peasant and Liberal Parties are represented in the Govt by only a few dissident leaders under Soviet control. The Social Democratic Party which participates in the coalition is greatly discontented with the policies of the Govt and claims to be seeking an appropriate time to leave the coalition.

Of the parties composing the Groza coalition only the Socialist Party can be considered substantially independent of direct Russian domination. The Communist Party is almost wholly a Russian creation in contrast with the party in Bulgaria. It is led by persons of non-Rumanian origin, and in [*is*] pursuing a policy which has no basis in Rumanian traditions, policies which are daily increasing tension and resistance here. The Plowmans Front and Patriotic Union are new groups created by the Communists to win adherents among peasant and artisan classes. Tatarescu, who seems to be the broker who is selling Rumania out to the Russians, has been so discredited by his

past conduct that he is now wholly dependent upon the Russians for protection.

The Socialist Party alone has its roots in Rumanian history and apparently has been gaining popularity during the past years although its leaders admit that constant efforts are made by the Communists to split and weaken it.

The policy pursued by the Groza govt, under close and [apparent omission] direction is calculated only to further Soviet exploitation of the country without regard to the armistice terms and has resulted in a degree of Soviet control beyond anything I found in Bulgaria. That is natural, of course, because Rumania is presently wealthy but the armistice agreement to which Allies subscribed has been circumvented by a series of conventions implementing its terms. Russia already has claimed 700 factories taken over from the Germans, it has a major interest even in banking institutions, it has joint ownership of Rumanian-owned oil, steamship and airline companies and it has so priced the goods which Rumania has to deliver in reparations that Rumania is paying approximately three times what she anticipated when signing the armistice. In addition the presence of more than 600,000 Russian troops who must be fed, clothed and paid largely at Rumania's expense, constitutes a drain that the country cannot long stand. Five-sevenths of all of current armistice expenditures go to the upkeep of the Russian Army. Outside companies, including those Americans have an interest in, are being squeezed to the point where they will have to get out of the country unless the trend is changed. Given another few months, Russia will have complete economic domination of Rumania and the sort of Govt the country has will make little difference. Groza and Tatarescu are the complete servants of Russia in the delivery of Rumania into the hands of a dictatorship army [*which?*] certainly is worse by universal agreement than the German occupation.

As for the two major position groups, both barred from public speaking or writing, while anyone may criticize the conservative policies of the Bratianu Liberal Party in the past and the negative maneuvering of Maniu, they personally undoubtedly represent very important elements, if not the absolute majority of democratic Rumanian opinion. Maniu particularly remains the unquestioned symbol of Rumanian democracy and of traditionally Rumanian and democratic feeling and in free elections his party would certainly win the biggest block of seats. Nevertheless, 27 of Maniu's district leaders have been jailed. Two of Bratianu's district leaders in Bucharest are in jail and the other two are in hiding. The personal security of the major leaders has not, however, been threatened as yet. There is no terror here in the Bulgarian sense of blood baths, but there is nevertheless great fear,

great repression of political opponents, midnight arrests, secret police beatings, disappearances and all of the accoutrements of making people behave your way.

A consequence of the King's demand that Groza resign last August and his refusal to sign any decree since then or receive any Minister of the Govt has been a further rise in his personal prestige and popularity. He has become the symbol of resistance to the Communists and of Russia. Even Communists have admitted that his great popularity and six of them have said that they hope the Americans would be able to find a solution to the constitutional impasse between the King and the Govt. Of course, they want him to go eventually but they would not dare now to try to dissolve the monarchy. All the Communists who urged me to try to find a settlement to the constitutional impasse intimated strongly that the Russians also desire a settlement. Whether Russia wants a settlement or not Rumanians certainly do. In view of the great prestige of the King, however, it is possible that the Soviet Govt may be willing to make concessions in the political field if it can do so in such a way as to avoid giving the appearance of having acted under Anglo-American pressure. I am seeing Susaikov Wednesday night and he may raise the question. If so, I shall, of course, report it. Communists denied settlement because, even though directed by Russians, many of them are Rumanian in feeling and are getting alarmed at what is happening. Inflation is rising rapidly, transport is breaking down, factories are not able to get raw materials, shut off as they are from outside trade and Russians making such drafts of food that people fear a shortage of major proportions by February.

It is obvious to me that little can be done here except to keep the pressure on to salvage as much as can be saved of Rumanian political and economic independence. The real answer lies, as with Bulgaria, in Russia's intent and in the American Govt's efforts to work out all its problems with Russia. Much could be done if we would insist that the Allied Control Commission become a truly tripartite body rather than a Soviet authority as at present with our only role one of constantly futile protest.

I am not recommending a course at this time. Perhaps the conversation with Susaikov will suggest one.

I am only trying now to indicate the urgency of the Rumanian situation and the fact that the country is just being swallowed up economically, that its people are becoming more and more disillusioned, their morale sinking all the time and that continued failure on our part to insist upon the application of our announced principles can only result in their being driven to communism, which is repulsive to them. [Ethridge.]

This is 917. Mr. Ethridge suggests that the Secretary may wish to repeat to Moscow for Harriman.

BERRY

871.00/11-2145 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1945—8 p. m.

621. ReMistel 906 Nov 21. You and Gen Schuyler may answer first two points of Maniu's request, if you believe further reply necessary, in whatever way you deem appropriate under present circumstances, making such use as you wish of following two paragraphs.

Dept has Rumanian political situation under continuing scrutiny with view to exploring all paths which might lead out of present impasse. No positive "immediate" steps are contemplated, however, until Ethridge's investigation and report have been completed.

On subject of Nov 8 disturbances Dept commends Gen Schuyler's initiative in promptly requesting tripartite ACC investigation. We regard Susaikov's refusal to agree to this reasonable proposal as particularly unfortunate since proposal provided only real possibility of reaching agreement on facts. In default of such tripartite investigation US Govt's views on Nov 8 events will continue to be based on full and factual reports made by US Reps in Bucharest.

On third point you should inform Maniu that you and Gen Schuyler are not authorized to extend asylum to Dr. Lazar. Instructions in Deptels 86 Feb 23, 110 Mar. 7,²⁸ 114 Mar 9, 164 Mar 29 final Para, 180 Apr 9, 190 Apr 19,^{28a} and Depcirtel Nov 13, 9 a. m.,^{28b} should continue to be basis for any decisions with which you may be faced as result of requests for asylum. Dept considers offer of sanctuary to Lazar or other opposition leaders not justified unless situation should arise in which there is threat of immediate violence and death and other conditions set forth in Depcirtel and previous instructions are clearly met.

BYRNES

871.00/11-2845 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, November 28, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received November 29—8:55 p. m.]

928. From Ethridge. Since returning from a brief trip into Transylvania I have seen two key Rumanian political figures whom I had

²⁸ Telegram 110, March 7, not printed, but see footnote 17, p. 507.

^{28a} See footnote 64, p. 533.

^{28b} See footnote 26, p. 627.

been unable to contact earlier; Titel Petrescu, President of the Social Democrat Party, and Iosif Szraer, Communist Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior, who in separate interviews fully confirmed the impressions reported in my 917 of November 26.

Both Petrescu and Szraer agreed that the Govt was completely dominated by the Communists who receive their orders from Moscow and that the other parties within the Govt enjoy no independence whatsoever. Whereas the Socialists had originally been promised full freedom within the coalition Petrescu reported that, below the top level, no such cooperation exists. He predicted that a definite split between the Socialists and the National Democratic Front was inevitable although it might be several months before it materialized.

Petrescu added that the Communists would in the next several months make a vigorous effort to split the Socialist Party but expressed his confidence that his party would be able to withstand these attacks. From another source I have further been informed that in the near future the gov't will probably prefer official charge of treason against the leaders of the Peasant and Liberal Parties accusing them of having organized the "Fascist" demonstration of November 8.

Petrescu and Szraer were also in agreement that the prestige of the King was at the present time higher than it had ever been before and that he has in fact become the symbol of Rumanian sovereignty and independence. Their views likewise coincided that, given the facts of Soviet occupation and Communist discipline, there was no possibility of finding a solution to the Rumanian problem on a local basis.

I therefore remain all the firmer in my belief that if the US desires to live up to the obligations which it assumed at Yalta and Potsdam, it must do so by bringing direct pressure on the Soviet Govt and while at the same time preserving its attitude of absolute inflexibility in Rumania. I believe we have the possibility of achieving this through the instrument of the Allied Control Commission if we can make that Commission a truly tripartite organization. Upon my return to Washington next week I shall undertake to develop in my report to you this approach to a solution.

I have notified Barnes²⁹ that I am not coming to Sofia. [Ethridge.]
[BERRY]

²⁹ Maynard B. Barnes, American Representative in Bulgaria.

871.00/1-1146

*Memorandum by Mr. Mark Ethridge, Special Representative of the Secretary of State*³⁰

SUMMARY REPORT ON SOVIET POLICY IN RUMANIA AND BULGARIA

The contradictions between the public commitments of the Soviet Government with regard to Rumania and Bulgaria since August 1944 and the policy which it has actually followed have resulted in serious differences of opinion between it and the United States. Whereas the Soviet Government is publicly committed by the statements issued by Mr. Molotov on April 3 and August 25, 1944³¹ to non-interference in Rumania's internal affairs, by the Yalta Declaration to the establishment of a government broadly representative of all democratic elements, and by the Potsdam Agreement to broader consultation of the American and British delegations on the Allied Control Commissions in these two countries, it has in fact pursued a policy of prolonging military occupation, indirect political domination of Rumania and Bulgaria through the Communist Party and extensive economic penetration, both direct and indirect. The objections of the United States Government to this trend of affairs have been expressed in its notes of August 18 and November 16, 1944 [1945?] to the Bulgarian Government with regard to electoral procedure³² and in its notes of March 14 and August 23 regarding the formation of the Groza Government and the development of the constitutional crisis in Rumania.³³

The Soviet interpretation of the democratic governments called for in the Yalta Declaration may be judged by the regimes which it now

³⁰ A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to President Truman under cover of a memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State dated January 11, 1946.

³¹ For text of the Soviet statement regarding Rumania, issued to the press at Moscow on April 2, 1944, as transmitted earlier to the Department of State by the Soviet Embassy, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 165. For text of the statement by the Soviet People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs regarding Rumanian affairs, released to the press in Moscow on August 25, 1944, see telegram 3148, August 25, from Moscow, *ibid.*, p. 193; see also, in this connection, telegram 3147, August 25, from Moscow, *ibid.*

³² See the American note of August 13, 1945, to the Bulgarian Government regarding the undemocratic election procedures in Bulgaria, contained in telegram 437, August 14, from Sofia, volume iv, p. 284; see also telegram 436, August 13, from Sofia, *ibid.* Subsequent to this note, the Secretary of State issued a public statement regarding the undemocratic election procedures in Bulgaria, the text of which was contained in telegram 260, August 18, to Sofia, *ibid.*, p. 294. For text of the note to the Bulgarian Government, dated November 16, 1945, regarding Bulgarian elections, see telegram 373, November 14, to Sofia, *ibid.*, p. 376; see also telegram 695, November 16, from Sofia, *ibid.*, p. 384, regarding the delivery of this note.

³³ For Ambassador Harriman's note of March 14, 1945, to Foreign Commissar Molotov regarding the situation in Rumania, see p. 512. For text of the note delivered to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat on August 23, 1945, see telegram 7108, August 21, to London (sent, *mutatis mutandis*, to Moscow as telegram 1882), p. 581.

supports in Rumania and Bulgaria. In both countries it has fostered the establishment of "front" governments which on the surface appear to represent all democratic groups in the two countries with the exception of those "bourgeois" parties which, while they have in general favored Western constitutional procedures, have in the past been identified with anti-Soviet policies. Upon closer examination, however, the Fatherland Front ³⁴ in Bulgaria and the National Democratic Front in Rumania are revealed not as coalition governments in the true sense of the term but as regimes dominated to a very large extent by the Communist Party despite the fact that it is in a minority in both countries. The Peasant and Socialist Parties, which in free elections would together undoubtedly win a majority in both countries and give every appearance of being democratic in the Western sense of the term, are nominally members of these "front" governments. In both cases, however, they are represented not by their recognized leaders but by "dissidents", their role is in no way commensurate with their probable popular strength, and they are moreover under constant attack by the Communists. The former "bourgeois" parties are represented in a lesser degree and enjoy relatively limited popular support within the two countries. In the case of Rumania, a number of important elements which formerly played an important role in supporting the pro-Fascist policies of King Carol or of Marshal Antonescu, such as the Tatarescu Liberals and certain remnants of the Iron Guard Legionnaires, today occupy posts within the government.

In both Rumania and Bulgaria there are noteworthy similarities in the use which the Soviet Government has made of the local Communist parties. In both cases it has relied on the Communist organizations developed before the recent World War, headed by Ana Pauker in Rumania and by Georgi Dimitrov in Bulgaria. In both countries the Communists restricted themselves to seizing certain key posts through which they have succeeded in dominating the whole government. Of these the most important are the Ministry of Interior, which controls the police, and the Ministry of Justice. In other ministries, and in particular the Ministry of War, they have found it possible to exert influence by the appointment of key officers on the second level who are either Communists or are at least amenable to their point of view. In both Rumania and Bulgaria the activities of the Communist Party are directed from Moscow and all the Communist Ministers have at one time or another during the past year visited the Russian capital for conferences with the Soviet authorities. It is also believed on good evidence that direct telephone communication with Moscow is maintained by these governments at all times.

³⁴ Political organization including certain agrarian elements, the Social Democrats, the Zveno, and dominated by the Communist Party; the ruling political organization in Bulgaria at this time.

The influence of the local Communist parties is, in fact, such that they serve as a check on official Soviet military and diplomatic representatives in Rumania and Bulgaria and have thus far succeeded in forestalling any efforts which the latter may have made to further Soviet policy by dealing with persons not under Communist control. While the Soviet Government has thus succeeded in exercising a very direct and constant influence in the internal affairs of the two countries, its policy of exerting its authority through a minority party has led to a rapid decline in Soviet prestige and has alienated the majority parties which at the start were quite willing to cooperate with the Russians.

Parallel to its political domination of Rumania and Bulgaria, the Soviet Government has been active in extending economic controls over these two countries. In part, this economic activity has been carried on within the framework of the Armistice Agreements with the two countries, although in the case of Rumania, the Soviet authorities have given a broader interpretation to their rights under the Armistice than the United States and Great Britain would have accepted had they been consulted. Outside the framework of the Armistice terms, the Soviet Government has concluded trade agreements which, initially at least, have absorbed almost the entire exportable surpluses of the two countries, and have included many products which the Soviet Government does not necessarily need for itself but apparently intends to reexport to other countries. In addition to this, in Rumania, under the pretext of regulating economic enterprises formerly in the hands of German firms, the Soviet Government has assumed a controlling interest in important sectors of the Rumanian economy, such as transportation and the petroleum industry, through the operation of joint Soviet-Rumanian companies.

Parallel to this program of political domination and economic penetration, the Soviet authorities systematically neglected to give adequate recognition to American and British interests. It must be admitted that the terms of the Armistice agreements and the atmosphere created by the Soviet-British discussions in Moscow of October 1944 gave the Russians considerable reason to believe that Rumania and Bulgaria were being abandoned to their exclusive domination. With the Yalta Conference, however, the United States and Great Britain launched a new policy which reasserted their interest in these countries and since that time they have repeatedly tried to restore the balance upset during the previous autumn. Despite considerable efforts, however, the positions of the American and British delegations on the Allied Control Commissions have not changed substantially, and the attempts of the American and British missions to make effective the views of their Governments and to protect the interests of their nationals has met with only moderate success. Apart from ques-

tions of broad policy and general prestige, the principal American interests in these countries are investments in local industry, which are important only in Rumania, commercial relations, freedom to express the point of view of the United States through the medium of newspapers and films and the conduct of educational institutions.

It is significant to note certain marked contrasts in the policies of the Soviet Government in Rumania and Bulgaria. As the Bulgarian Communist Party represents a native growth of considerable vigor, representing perhaps as much as twenty per cent of the electorate, the Soviet authorities were able to leave them to a considerable extent to their own devices and merely accorded them general support. In Bulgaria the Soviet troops of occupation exercise a very minor influence on the government's position and almost all democratic groups were, at least at the start, quite willing to adjust themselves to Soviet policy. It was the excesses committed by the Bulgarian Communists, rather than any overt act on the part of Soviet authorities, which led to the disintegration of the Fatherland Front coalition after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe. In Rumania, on the other hand, the Communist Party never represented more than three or four per cent of the population, and even today the only Communist leaders in which the Russians have complete trust are persons such as Ana Pauker, Emil Bodnaras and Vasile Luca who, while Rumanian citizens, belong to minority groups by national extraction. Since they had to place their reliance on so small a group, the Soviet authorities were neither able to create a real coalition government nor were they able to guide Rumanian affairs without very extensive and direct interference on the part of Soviet civil and military authorities. It should also be noted that Bulgaria has gained from a territorial point of view by its intimate relations with the Soviet Union and sees the possibility in the future of improving its position vis-à-vis Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. Rumania, on the other hand, with the exception of Northern Transylvania which it expected to regain in any case, has suffered only losses at the hands of the Russians. Another point of difference is the monarchy. While it is a factor of no consequence in Bulgaria, it has been recognized as a major issue in Rumania, where the Soviet authorities have made every effort to win over the monarch to their point of view. There are likewise significant contrasts in the degree of success which Soviet policy has achieved. Whereas in Bulgaria most democratic groups are entirely reconciled to the necessity of adjusting themselves to the new position of the Soviet Union and blame most of their troubles on Bulgarian Communist extremists, in Rumania there is a far greater reaction on the part of most democratic elements to direct Soviet interference in their affairs, a feeling which extends even to certain leading native-born Rumanian Communists.

Judging Soviet policy from its reflection in Rumania and Bulgaria alone it appears probable that the Soviet Government is sincere in believing that only those governments are democratic and friendly to the Soviet Union which are headed by Communist-dominated "front" regimes. In view of Russia's domestic political system it is perhaps not surprising that its government should entertain such views. Russian protestations of non-interference in these two countries, however, are almost certainly insincere, for their constant and vigorous intrusions into the internal affairs of those countries is so obvious to an impartial observer that Soviet denial of its existence can only be regarded as the reflection of a party line dictated from above. As regards ultimate Soviet intentions in this area, there is as yet no reason to believe that Soviet policy aims at anything more than the establishment of a security zone pivoted on Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. It should be emphasized, however, that the strong position which the Soviet Government is establishing in Bulgaria and Rumania will doubtless be used as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Greece, Turkey and the Straits, and could be converted without great effort into a springboard for aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Confronted with this Soviet attitude in Rumania and Bulgaria, the United States is faced with the alternatives of continuing its policy of adherence to the position taken at Yalta and Potsdam or of conceding this area as a Soviet sphere of influence. Its present policy is presumably founded on two principles: namely, that the peace will be secure only if based on truly representative governments in all countries with western political traditions, and that to concede a limited Soviet sphere of influence at the present time would be to invite its extension in the future. Unless the United States is prepared to abandon these two principles it must take the necessary steps to ensure their eventual application. While certain local and temporary advantages may be gained by direct American intervention in Rumania and Bulgaria, it should be recognized that no significant improvement can be expected in these two countries without a change in Soviet policy. It should further be recognized that the only sound criteria of a change in the Soviet attitude would be the holding of free elections under conditions similar to those obtaining in the recent elections in Finland, Hungary and Austria. From past experience it is clear that measures short of free elections, such as broadening the base of the present governments through cabinet reconstructions, the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops, et cetera, would provide no sound guarantee that Soviet policy had been altered.

MARK ETHRIDGE

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1945.

871.00/1-1146

*Mr. Mark Ethridge to the Secretary of State*³⁵

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: When you asked me to go to Rumania and Bulgaria you instructed me to ascertain whether the interim governments of those countries were broadly representative in the sense of the Yalta Declaration, which expressed the conviction of the Big Three that a lasting peace could be based only on fully representative and democratic governments, and whether the peoples of those countries would have an opportunity to vote in elections free from coercion and fear. Under your instructions, our concern was not with the political complexion of the two governments, but with their representative character.

I must report to you that, having had conversations in the two countries with considerably more than three hundred persons, representing all elements and shades of public opinion, I do not consider that the government of either Rumania or Bulgaria is broadly representative of all democratic elements in the Yalta sense. Furthermore, I must say in all honesty that both governments are authoritarian and are dominated by one party, and that large democratic segments of the populations in both Rumania and in Bulgaria have been forcibly excluded from representation in the government, while in Rumania particularly, former pro-Fascist collaborators and even some Iron Guardists³⁶ occupy key positions in the government.

In both countries "front" governments are in power. In Bulgaria the Fatherland Front, organized in 1942 as a combination political and partisan resistance movement operating against the Nazis and the dictatorship of King Boris, came to power with the overthrow of the Muraviev³⁷ cabinet in September 1944. At its inception, the Fatherland Front movement could indeed have been considered broadly representative and its announced program progressive; it has become much less representative in the fifteen months of its life. Of the original parties which constituted the Fatherland Front, only the Communist and Zveno have retained any semblance of unity within their own ranks. The prime minister, a member of the Zveno party, was criticized in his own party congress for not putting a stop to excesses and for allowing the government to be dominated by one party. The leader of the Socialist party in Bulgaria is not in the gov-

³⁵ A penciled notation reads: "Ethridge letter intended for publication but not published." Initials to the notation not decipherable.

³⁶ Pre-war Rumanian fascist movement.

³⁷ Kosta Muraviev, Bulgarian agrarian leader and Prime Minister, September 2-8, 1944; subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment by the Communist-dominated Bulgarian Government.

ernment at all, and the dissident Socialist leader who is in the cabinet cannot be considered representative of any large element of his own party. Although the Agrarian party is by common consent the largest party in Bulgaria its first leader after the war, Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, found it necessary to leave the country after taking refuge temporarily in the United States Political Mission³⁸ and its second leader, Nikola Petkov, resigned from the cabinet when he became convinced that he could remain in it only if his own party accepted domination of a single group. Altogether, six members out of the original cabinet have resigned. With each resignation the government became less representative of the other democratic elements in Bulgaria and more representative of the Communists who, by the highest estimate I received, have about thirty per cent of voting strength in Bulgaria, by the lowest, about ten per cent. The Zveno party was not a party at all until after the *coup d'état*; it was a conspiratorial league of military men and independent intellectuals who had great faith in government by an elite and in their own ability to outwit the leaders of the traditional parties.

There was no pretense on the part of anybody before the elections on November 18, except the Communists, that the government was representative in the Yalta sense. All that was contended was that the government would have a majority. There was no way for the government not to have a majority; as a matter of fact, I was told a month before the elections how they would come out. They signify nothing. Under a thin veneer of "civil liberties", they were characterized by coercion and fear and they were rigged in advance so that they could not possibly have expressed the will of the people. Seats in the Sobranye, the national parliament, were allotted before the election, not on any basis of popular support, but by arbitrary agreement between the parties in the Fatherland Front. A single list was used so that, with the opposition groups abstaining, the voter could only vote yes or deposit a blank ballot, which theoretically would be a vote against the government. It was not possible to vote by parties as in Hungary and Austria. Feeling that the whole basis of such elections was fraudulent, the Agrarian and Socialist parties, which represented a very important element of democratic opinion, refused to participate in them. The only surprise of the election was that so many people apparently had the courage to deposit blank ballots; every form of threat and coercion had been used to prevent them from doing so. The Communist party has control not only of the election machinery but also, through the Ministries of Interior and Justice,

³⁸ Regarding the granting of asylum in the United States Mission in Sofia to Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov, leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party, and his eventual flight from the country in August 1945, see vol. IV, pp. 220-251 *passim*, 261, 269-270, 280, and 313-314.

of all the machinery of government, down to the mayoralty of the smallest village, the militia, the urban police and the courts.

The pattern of the seizure of power in Rumania is much the same, but with significant differences. The Antonescu regime was overthrown by the *coup d'état* of August 23, 1944. The government which emerged was composed of the three traditional parties, the National Peasants, the National Liberals and the Social Democrats, and the Communists. The latter had been an illegal organization until that time, suffering great persecutions and repressions. Three cabinets fell within seven months and with each cabinet crisis the Communists strengthened their position. On March 6 of this year, at the insistence of Mr. Vyshinski, the Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the present government headed by Petru Groza was installed. In Moscow Mr. Vyshinski insisted to me that his action did not constitute interference in the affairs of Rumania, but only interference in the affairs of the Allied Control Commission. Nevertheless the government was changed and the Communists, whose strength, according to the highest estimate I received, and that from a high official of the present government, is about ten per cent, occupy the Ministries of Interior and Justice, and thus control the courts, the police, the *gendarmerie*, the secret police and the election machinery. They control, in addition, several other cabinet posts, including that of prime minister, either directly or through representatives of the Plowmen's Front and the Patriotic Union, parties which they have organized to appeal to the peasants and to the artisans and professional men. These groups have a working agreement at the top level with the Socialists, which is probably the largest party in the coalition, but there is great friction underneath and the coalition may not survive.

The National Peasant and National Liberal parties, which participated in the government until March 6 in the coalition cabinets of General Sanatescu and General Radescu, are out altogether now and have suddenly become "Fascist beasts", although for years they were the leading representatives of parliamentary democracy in Rumania and actively resisted King Carol's pro-Fascist policy. A great many of their ward and district leaders have been arrested and the parties faced the prospect, when I left Rumania, of being outlawed altogether. Their newspapers have been suppressed, their clubhouses have been taken over in a great many instances, and their attempts at political meetings are broken up. The regrettable and largely spontaneous street rioting which occurred in Bucharest on November 8 has been blown up by the government into a great "fascist plot". In the Groza Government the Rumanian people now have a new dictatorship in place of the one which they overthrew in August 1944.

The new dictatorship has not yet attempted to legalize its position by holding elections.

The Soviet Government has recognized these two governments and has consistently maintained the position that they are representative, which has had the effect of keeping them in power. It has also taken advantage of this opportunity to conclude trade agreements with both countries and to get extensive economic concessions in Rumania—such sweeping concessions as to constitute an economic blackout for other countries. We, on the other hand, have adhered to a strict interpretation of the Yalta pledge “to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of the three governments in assisting the peoples . . . to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems”. On several occasions we have formally protested the authoritarian character of the two governments. While I fully sympathize with the need of the Red Army to protect its southern flank while it was actively engaged in Central Europe, the irritation which the Soviet Government may have felt with regard to the events of the past year in Greece and its concern over the question of the Straits,³⁹ as well as the bitterness of the Russian people over the terrible ravages of the Rumanian Army in the Ukraine, I feel that these considerations should now have much less weight and I trust that it will eventually be possible for the Russians and us to reach an agreement concerning these countries along the lines of those already reached with regard to the other former enemy countries in Eastern Europe. Particularly with regard to elections, I hope that the precedents of separate lists and civil liberties established in Austria and Hungary, agreed to by all three Yalta Powers, may be applied in Bulgaria and Rumania.

Sincerely yours,

MARK ETHRIDGE

871.001 Carol II/12-1045 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, December 10, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received December 15—1:02 a. m.]

967. Re AmEmb Paris tel 6871 of November 29.⁴⁰ I hope that the Department will do everything possible to support the British in their stand that Carol should not return to Europe as Carol on this side

³⁹ For documentation regarding American interest in Soviet-Turkish negotiations and the Straits question, see vol. VIII, first section under Turkey.

⁴⁰ Not printed; it reported that King Carol held an unlimited diplomatic visa for France but had been definitely informed that a visit to France at the time would be inopportune (871.001 Carol II/11-2945).

of the Atlantic will be an added threat to all democratic institutions in Rumania.⁴¹

This is 967, repeated Paris as 21 and London as 111.

BERRY

871.00/12-1145 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, December 11, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 2: 50 p. m.]

972. A backdown from the principles which were enumerated at Yalta and upon which we have stood since, such as is suggested by British Under Secretary Sargent,⁴² would net us little in Rumania except the contempt of a vast majority of the Rumanian people. Certainly we could expect no more from the Russians after accepting their interpretation of Yalta than we are now getting and the Rumanians in their bitterest hour would accuse us of having held out false hopes to them through many months.

From my conversations with the British Political Representative in Rumania I am convinced that he would support me in this point. I may add the observation that if the thinking of Mr. Sargent is generally shared by the British policy making group and if they expect to secure in the Balkans the recognition of the British point of view as well respect the British interests by "jagging" the occupying power, the fundamental issue has already been lost (London's 12850 to the Dept).

I believe that we will come out of this stalemate in Rumania with colors flying if we match Russian firmness with firmness and if we add to firmness frankness and friendliness.

This is 972, repeated London as 113, and Sofia as 41.

BERRY

⁴¹ Telegram 1931, December 20, to Lisbon, repeated to Bucharest as 657, reported that the Department had received formal assurances that the French Government would not permit Carol to enter France or Monaco (871.001 Carol II/12-2045). Telegram 2401, December 27, from Lisbon, reported that the Portuguese Government would inform Carol that his Portuguese visa, which had been suspended but not canceled because of the full validity of Carol's French visa, would not be recognized as valid until Carol could show proof that the French would permit him residence (871.001 Carol II/12-2745).

⁴² The views of the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Orme Sargent, regarding the steps that might be taken to resolve the "stalemate" in Bulgaria and Rumania, were reported in telegram 12850, December 7, from London, vol. IV, p. 405.

871.00/12-845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania
(Berry)*

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1945—9 p. m.

645. For your confidential info Ethridge report submitted and with Departmental policy memoranda will form basis of proposals to be made at forthcoming Moscow conference.⁴³ Ethridge's general conclusion on Rumania is, briefly, that Groza govt is not representative in Yalta sense and should not be recognized by US Govt, and that latter should seek solution to present impasse by direct approach to other Yalta powers setting forth specific steps which might be taken as means of bringing about US recognition and early conclusion of peace treaty. No publicity will be given to Ethridge report prior to Moscow meeting.

Dept appreciates difficult position of King (reurtels 960, 961, 962 Dec 8⁴⁴), who must be aware that absence of US reply to his letter of Aug 21 results from Soviet Govt's unwillingness hitherto to consult with US and British Govts, under terms of Yalta Declaration, on problem raised by his appeal. Without informing him that I intended to take up matter again at Moscow, you may in your discretion indicate that he can expect US Govt's reply to his letter within a few weeks and that it is hoped no action will be taken meanwhile by Rumanians which would prejudice possibilities of favorable solution.

Repeated to Moscow.⁴⁵

BYRNES

871.00/12-1345 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary
of State*

BUCHAREST, December 13, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 23—8: 27 p. m.]

979. Because of garbled transmission only yesterday did I see the Committee text of London's No. 12441 of November 28.⁴⁶

⁴³ Reference is to the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, held in Moscow, December 16-26, 1945.

⁴⁴ None printed. Telegram 960, December 8, from Bucharest, reported the delivery to the King by Princess Elizabeth of two letters. The first letter was from General Vasiliu Rascanu, the Minister of War, who asked that the King receive him at once in order that he might explain the disintegrating morale of the army which he attributed to the fact that no promotions had been possible since contact was broken between the King and the government on August 23. The second letter was in the form of an unsigned memorandum from Foreign Minister Tatarescu which placed upon the King the responsibility for the economic, political and constitutional crisis and which hinted that the King might be dethroned unless he altered his policies. (871.00/12-845)

⁴⁵ As telegram 2502.

⁴⁶ Not printed; it reported that a British Foreign Office official had commented upon the Rumanian political opposition to the effect that Maniu was principally responsible for the crystalization of the Rumanian opposition (871.00/11-2845).

There are some indications that the British Government is in a mood to consider changing its past firm policy on the Rumanian situation. Perhaps that policy is determined by much larger interests than the Brit position in Rumania. If so, the matter is one upon which this Mission has no right to pass judgment. It does, however, feel an obligation to point out that the British Government's zeal for a solution seems to be warping its view of facts that must be available. For example the discouraging perspective with which the FonOff views the position of the political opposition in Rumania does not conform to facts.

The Liberal Party strength in the country is probably not great but there is a great deal of vigor in its leadership. Mr. Bratianu has often said that when Mr. Vyshinski installed the Groza government that he took from the hands of the Rumanian political leaders the possibility of finding any real solution of the Rumanian crisis. We cannot quarrel with this analysis.

In spite of a constant effort by the Communists to split and weaken the Socialist Party, it is a fact that it has roots in Rumanian victory [*history?*] and that it has shown considerable gains of popularity in the past year.

Whether the British, or we, like Mr. Maniu's dilatory and often negative maneuvering, it is a fact that he remains the unquestioned symbol of Rumanian democracy and in a free election his party will certainly win the largest block of votes. Moreover, from my observations I cannot concur with the British that Mr. Maniu is useless in the Rumanian political scene or that he has only "yes men" in his entourage. When I last saw him, on December 6, he appeared vigorous and alert. With his party newspapers suppressed, and without the right to hold public meetings, he has done a first rate job in maintaining party discipline, and this in spite of continued Communist endeavors to entice away some of his lieutenants and divide his strength. He, Mihalache and others around him agree that the fundamental question for Rumania is the continued independence and integrity of the country.

Repeated to London as 116 and to Moscow as 287.

BERRY

871.00/12-1345 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, December 13, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received December 24—6: 58 p. m.]

981. ReDeptel 645 of December 11. Through the channel I use in getting messages to and from the King I sent him word this morning

that he might expect the US Govt's reply to his letter within a few weeks and that it is hoped that no action will be taken by him in the meantime which would prejudice the possibility of a favorable solution of the Rumanian crisis.

My contact told me that Genl Susaikov has now followed Mr. Tatarescu's exploratory talks concerning the formation of a Regency Council in discussing this subject with Rumanians. My informant believes that the question will become critical if the King maintains his present attitude until the end of the month when plans must be discussed for the traditional New Year's reception. If the King lets it be known that on that occasion he will not receive the Govt my contact believes the Govt with full Russian support will set up a Regency Council which will receive them.

Repeated Moscow as 288.

BERRY

[Secretary of State Byrnes, British Foreign Secretary Bevin, and Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov, with their advisers, met in conference at Moscow, December 16-26, 1945. Generalissimo Stalin also participated in the conference. In the course of the conference, consideration was given the questions of the procedures for the preparation of a peace treaty with Rumania, the recognition of Rumanian Government by the United States and the United Kingdom, and the request by King Michael for advice from the Three Powers regarding the broadening of the Rumanian Government. The agreements reached on these subjects were recorded in the communiqué on the Moscow Conference released to the press December 27, 1945. For text, see volume II, page 815. For documentation regarding the consideration given Rumanian subjects during the conference, see the records of the conference, *ibid.*, pages 560 ff., especially the records of the meetings of December 18, 12:15 p. m., December 20, 3 p. m., December 22, noon, December 23, 5 p. m., December 24, 3:15 p. m., and December 25, 5:15 p. m., pages 643, 692, 727, 750, 761, and 781, respectively.]

871.00/12-3145 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, December 31, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received December 31—11:50 a. m.]

1031. Remy 981, December 13. The Moscow communiqué has quieted the voices of those who until yesterday urged that a regency

replace King Michael. It has as well ended the talk that Messrs. Bratianu and Maniu soon will be prosecuted and that the political parties that they lead will be suppressed. (Remy 1005, December 21.)⁵⁰

All people are pleased that an outlet has been discovered to the political impasse in which the representatives of the three Great Powers when at London had found themselves. The people are delighted that a solution has been found for the Rumanian constitutional crisis. With this, unanimity of feeling ends.

The Communists initially were disappointed and confused by the communiqué, even hesitating in authorizing its full publication. The fellow travellers with the Communists reacted as the Communists. The opposition leaders' first reaction was of relief. They interpreted the communiqué as absolving their parties of the charge of being anti-Democratic.

Non-party people generally have indicated a considerable degree of skepticism toward Soviet good intentions. Drawing on their experience on living in Rumania during 16 months of Soviet occupation and bearing in mind that during this time the Armistice terms were warped under Soviet pressure to meet Soviet demands, they doubt that all people will be permitted to express themselves freely at elections particularly as the Soviet authorities insist on maintaining the Groza govt in office while the electorate had indicated its overwhelming distaste for the parties that support that govt (remy 956, of December 7⁵¹). The most experienced of this group point out that under the terms of the communiqué the Communist Party in Rumania will continue to run the country behind the familiar façade of the Groza govt.

This is 1031; repeated Moscow as 295 and London as 124.

BERRY

⁵⁰ Not printed; it reported that the Mission in Rumania had been reliably informed that the Council of Ministers had decided not to prosecute Maniu as a result of the findings of a commission set up to investigate the public demonstrations of November 8 (871.00/12-2145).

⁵¹ Not printed; it reported that Maniu had informed Representative Berry on the evening of December 6 that the Groza regime was continuing its reign of terror against the leaders and members of the opposition parties. Maniu's home had been thoroughly searched two days before and several of his papers had been confiscated. Maniu had been reliably informed that the Groza regime was planning to dissolve the opposition parties. (871.00/12-745)

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE REMOVAL BY
THE SOVIET UNION OF AMERICAN-OWNED OIL EQUIPMENT IN
RUMANIA

871.6363/1-545 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, January 5, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received January 6—11:40 a. m.]

55. ReEmb's 4979, December 24, 6 p. m.⁵² I have received today a letter from Vyshinski,⁵³ dated January 4, on the subject of the removal of Rumanian oil equipment in answer to the letter which I addressed to him on December 24. The reply states that since the Germans delivered pipe and other oil equipment to Rumanian oil enterprises in order to supply their own military and para military units with oil products thereby obtained, such property obviously falls within the terms of paragraph 2 of the armistice agreement⁵⁴ and the Soviet Government sees no grounds for changing its view on this point. The Soviet Government has in mind, however, the interests and needs of the Rumanian oil industry and is prepared to meet our wishes in this respect. Vinogradov⁵⁵ has accordingly given orders to cease further removal of such equipment from Rumania to the USSR.

The information at the disposal of this Embassy with respect to what has actually taken place in Rumania along these lines is so fragmentary and out of date that I am unable to comment on this reply. The last information I have with respect to loadings and removal of this equipment is to the effect that loading of tubing and casing was resumed on November 26. I have no knowledge of what has happened since that date.

I am also hesitant in these circumstances to address any further communication to Vyshinski with respect to our proposal for a tripartite commission, which he ignores in his reply. I would be glad to be informed whether this proposal has in the meantime been the subject of any further discussions in Rumania.

Repeated to Amrep Bucharest⁵⁶ as 3, January 5, 8 p. m.

HARRIMAN

⁵² For text of this telegram, which reported the delivery to the Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissariat of a letter dated December 24, 1944, setting forth American proposals regarding the question of the removal of Rumanian oil equipment to the USSR, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, p. 288.

⁵³ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁵⁴ For text of the Allied armistice with Rumania, signed at Moscow, 5 a. m., September 13 (as of September 12), 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1712; for documentation regarding the negotiation of the armistice, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 133 ff.

⁵⁵ Lt. Gen. Vladimir Petrovich Vinogradov, Deputy Chairman (Soviet) of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania.

⁵⁶ Burton Y. Berry, American Representative in Rumania, stationed at Bucharest.

871.6363/1-1345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1945—8 p. m.

261. ReEmbs 55 January 5. The Department would like you to reply to Vyshinsky's letter of January 4 at an early date expressing this Government's gratification that the Soviet Government agrees with us over the need for rapid rehabilitation of the Rumanian oil industry and has accordingly ordered the cessation of removals. You should then reaffirm this Government's unwillingness to accept the Soviet contention that the removed equipment can be properly described as "war material" under Article VII of the Armistice and paragraph 2 of the protocol (reEmbs 122 January 13⁵⁷) and re-state the Department's position as set forth in its 2629 November 8 and 2848 December 18,⁵⁸ emphasizing the following points: (a) Since the rehabilitation of the Rumanian oil industry is a matter directly affecting the Allied war effort in several theatres, measures concerning the provision and disposition of equipment essential thereto should be taken not unilaterally but only after agreement among the three principal Allied Governments; (b) it should be determined by agreement what equipment already taken should be returned, as essential to the maintenance of production, and what equipment should remain in the Soviet Union; (c) in the case of equipment taken from American-owned companies which is not returned, such companies should receive compensation, either from the Rumanian Government, in the event that the property is credited as reparations payments under Article XI of the Armistice, or from the Soviet Government.

Berry's telegram of January 24 (Bucharest's 60 to Department repeated to you as 9)⁵⁹ states in reply to the Department's inquiry of January 13 (Department's 22 to Bucharest repeated to you as 84)⁶⁰ that in his opinion a tripartite commission of experts should be able to perform a valuable service. In your letter to the Soviet Government

⁵⁷ Not printed; in it Ambassador Harriman recommended that he be instructed to inform the Soviet Government that the United States could not accept Vyshinsky's interpretation contained in his letter of January 4 that pipes and other oil equipment which the Germans supplied to the oil enterprises in Rumania were included in the meaning of war material as defined in the protocol to the armistice agreement with Rumania (871.6363/1-1345).

⁵⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 256 and 283, respectively.

⁵⁹ Not printed; it expressed the view that a tripartite commission of experts to study the situation and to make suggestions could perform a valuable service (871.6363/1-2445).

⁶⁰ Not printed; it stated that the Department desired further factual information from the Mission in Bucharest regarding the removal of oil equipment from Rumania before sending fresh instructions to Ambassador Harriman on the subject (871.6363/1-545).

you should renew the proposal for such a commission, which seems to have been ignored in the Soviet reply of January 4. The Department is anxious to secure Soviet agreement to this proposal as a means of implementing its position set forth in the preceding paragraph as well as for the reasons given in Berry's number 60. We feel that this would afford the best means of reaching agreed conclusions on the entire question. Only then will there be an agreed factual basis for discussion on the possible return of some of the equipment and on the question of compensation to the companies for that which is not returned (reurtel 242 January 26⁶¹).

The factual data sent to you by Berry (Bucharest's 11, January 27 to Moscow repeated to Department as 69⁶²) may be of use to you in drafting your reply to Vyshinsky. If this report has not arrived in Moscow, you may delay your communication to Vyshinsky for a reasonable period while awaiting its arrival.⁶³

A paraphrase of this telegram is being given to the British Embassy. Sent to Moscow; repeated to Bucharest.⁶⁴

GREW

871.6363/2-2145: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 21, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received 3:06 p. m.]

489. Department is undoubtedly aware of the fact that the Soviet Government is asking for substantial increase in the shipments of petroleum products under Lend Lease to the Soviet Union for the balance of the protocol year.⁶⁵ If it is considered that we should be permitted to participate in Rumanian oil production matters to assure maximum production through the establishment of a tripartite commission of experts (re Department's 2848 December 18, 9 [8] p. m.,⁶⁶ and 261 February 7, 8 p. m.) is it not opportune to suggest to the Soviet Government that its request for additional petroleum

⁶¹ Not printed; it reported that the Embassy in Moscow still lacked adequate information regarding the removal of oil equipment from Rumania (871.6363/1-2645).

⁶² Not printed.

⁶³ Telegram 439, February 16, from Moscow, reported that the factual data had been received from Berry, but because of its tabular nature, had not been used in the letter sent to Vyshinsky on February 16 along the lines indicated by the Department (871.6363/2-1645).

⁶⁴ Repeated to Bucharest as telegram 56.

⁶⁵ For documentation regarding the conclusion of wartime assistance from the United States to the Soviet Union, see pp. 937 ff.

⁶⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 283.

products will be viewed simultaneously with satisfactory reply to our demands in connection with the above?

HARRIMAN

871.6363/2-2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1945—9 p. m.

484. The suggestion contained in your 489, February 21 was referred to the President's Soviet Protocol Committee which has commented to the following effect:

1. Messages from Moscow have approved increased petroleum shipments to the Soviet Union as a military requirement. The Soviet Government was informed in the Depts note of February 2, 1945⁶⁷ that every effort would be made to meet its needs for these products. It may be presumed that military plans may be seriously delayed by failure to deliver.

2. For nearly 4 years the Committee has followed a policy laid down by the President and Mr. Hopkins⁶⁸ which precludes a barter basis with respect to Lend-Lease for the achievement of political or diplomatic ends.

3. As only 4 months remain to complete the Fourth Protocol, it would be desirable to postpone a major policy decision of this nature until the policies to be established in connection with the Fifth Protocol are promulgated at which time major military and political objectives could be related to over-all policies with respect to the supply of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union.⁶⁹

GREW

871.6363/2-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1945—8 p. m.

143. Petroleum Administration for War says that great difficulties are being encountered in producing sufficient oil-field equipment to

⁶⁷ For text of note from the Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union, February 2, 1945, see p. 971.

⁶⁸ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President.

⁶⁹ In his telegram 976, March 30, from Moscow, Ambassador Harriman responded in part as follows: "The Rumanian oil question is a war production matter. Our proposal that there be established in Rumania a tri-partite commission of experts is primarily to insure maximum production of petroleum products for the war. It does not seem logical that we should go to great sacrifices in supplying the Russians with petroleum products when it appears to be the opinion of American Representatives in Rumania that the Soviets are not taking full advantage of the potentialities of the Rumanian production for the combined war effort." (871.6363/3-3045)

supply the requirements of production programs in the United States, South America and Middle East, and that it may be impossible to obtain here materials needed for Rumanian operations this year or to replace those removed from Rumania to the U.S.S.R. (reurtel 120 February 17⁷⁰). PAW is being requested to supply considerable quantities of equipment direct to the U.S.S.R., and this is being accomplished only with difficulty because of shortages.

Ambassador Harriman has not yet received a reply to his last representation in Moscow on the subject of the removal of oil-field equipment from Rumania by the Soviet authorities, which was based on Department's telegram of February 7 to Moscow repeated to you as 56.⁷¹ Meanwhile, although it is not likely that the Soviet Government will agree to return any of the removed equipment, American representatives in Rumania should take every appropriate opportunity to impress upon the Soviet authorities there (1) the need for the return to Rumania of such removed equipment as is essential for meeting the production schedules for 1945, (2) the difficulties involved in importing necessary equipment from the United States in view of war requirements, and (3) the desirability of close and continuous contact in Rumania between Soviet oil representatives and those of the United States and Great Britain. General Schuyler's⁷² message number M-480 of February 27⁷³ concerning the meeting on February 27 between Soviet and American oil representatives indicates that the exchange of views and information on the expert level has at least begun.

The Department of course does not desire American representatives in Rumania to take part in controversies between the Rumanian Government and the Soviet authorities. In any discussions concerning the oil production program in which American representatives may participate (your telegrams 120 February 17 and 133 February 23⁷⁴), however, the Department hopes that the views of American experts may be brought clearly before the Russians whenever occasion arises. With particular reference to the reply of February 6 from the ACC⁷⁵ to the Rumanian Commission for the Application of the Armistice, the text of which is enclosed with your despatch no. 128

⁷⁰ Not printed; it reported that the Allied Control Commission for Rumania had rejected a memorandum from the Rumanian Commission for the Application of the Armistice which had pointed out the difficult position of the Rumanian oil companies as a result of Soviet seizures of equipment (871.6363/2-1745).

⁷¹ See footnote 64, p. 649.

⁷² Brig. Gen. Cortland T. Van R. Schuyler, Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania.

⁷³ Not printed.

⁷⁴ Telegram 133, February 23, from Bucharest, summarized the efforts by American experts since their arrival on January 25 in gathering information on the status of the Rumanian oil industry (871.6363/2-2345).

⁷⁵ Allied Control Commission (for Rumania).

of February 22,⁷⁶ if it is the considered view of your mission and of that of General Schuyler that the arguments used in that reply were not justified by the facts, General Schuyler should inform the Soviet Vice-Chairman of the ACC accordingly and should state that his Government did not and cannot associate itself with the reply in question. At the same time Schuyler may state that the importance which all three Allies attach to the maintenance of a high level of production and the apparent divergence of views as to the facts of the situation emphasize the need for a tripartite commission of experts such as this Government has already proposed and that, pending the Soviet Government's reply to our representations in Moscow on that subject, it would be desirable for petroleum experts representing the three Allied Governments to meet together informally at frequent intervals.

Sent to Bucharest, repeated to Moscow.⁷⁷

ACHESON

871.6363/3-645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1945—7 p. m.

281. Department has received several communications from Standard Oil New Jersey relating to Romano-Americana⁷⁸ and other Standard subsidiaries and affiliates in Rumania which raise certain questions connected with execution of the armistice, namely: (1) liftings of Romano-Americana equipment by Russians; (2) transfer of part of current petroleum output of Romano-Americana to USSR under Article 11 of armistice; (3) installations of Standard subsidiaries in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina; (4) compensation due to Romano for war damage under terms of Article 11; (5) restoration of legal rights and properties to American-owned companies under Article 13.

1. Standard values at 800,000 dollars casing and other equipment taken by Russians from Teleajen refinery (your despatch 149, March 8⁷⁹). Please check this figure against estimates which have been given to you by Romano-Americana or by other sources. Department has already informed Soviet Government that, according to our view, if equipment removed from premises of American-owned oil companies is not returned, companies are entitled to full compensation from the

⁷⁶ Neither printed.

⁷⁷ Repeated to Moscow as telegram 632.

⁷⁸ Oil refinery in the Ploesti area owned by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.

⁷⁹ Not printed; it transmitted statistical information on tubular goods taken by Soviet authorities from the stocks of Romano-Americana (871.6363/3-645).

Rumanian Government if the equipment should be charged to Rumania's reparations account, or from the Soviet Government if it should not be so charged (reDeptel 56, February 7⁸⁰).

Unconfirmed report indicates Russians have returned some equipment previously removed. Please verify.

2. Department realizes that American-owned companies, like other oil companies in Rumania, will be required to contribute part of current output for payment of Rumania's reparation obligation to USSR under Article 11. It is Dept's view that this must be done on a non-discriminatory basis and that arrangements must be made for payment of adequate and effective compensation to American-owned companies. Please report in what way Rumanian Government has compensated American-owned companies for products taken.

3. Department would like to have description and statement of pre-war value of Standard-owned installations, if any, located in territory which Rumania ceded to USSR under Article 4 of the armistice.

4. Has Rumanian Government established any procedure whereby reparation payments may be made to American citizens and companies under Article 11? Ministry of National Economy's letter of February 14 (your despatch 157, March 14, Enclosure 1)⁸¹ refers to loans for reconstruction but not to compensation for war damage.

5. What measures has Rumanian Government taken toward fulfillment of obligation under Article 13 to restore pre-war legal rights of United Nations nationals and to restore their property in complete good order?

Repeated to Moscow⁸² for its information.

GREW

871.6363/S-345

*The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne)
to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

No. 454

BUCHAREST, August 3, 1945.

Subject: Armistice Questions with Regard to Romano-Americana.

SIR: I have the honor to furnish certain information in reply to the questions raised in the Department's telegram No. 281 of June 2 regarding Romano-Americana and other Standard Oil Company affiliates and subsidiaries in Rumania.

⁸⁰ Same as telegram 261, February 7, to Moscow, p. 648.

⁸¹ Neither printed; the letter had been directed to the Romano-Americana Oil Company and requested certain data of the company so that it could qualify for reconstruction loans from the Rumanian Government (871.6363/3-1445).

⁸² Repeated to Moscow as telegram 1210.

The contents of the telegram were communicated to Romano-Americana and a reply was received from them on June 27, a copy of which is enclosed.⁸³ . . . On August 3, further information was received from Romano-Americana, a copy of which is enclosed.

Under point 1 of the Department's telegram, this Mission is requested to check with Romano-Americana and others the estimate made by the Standard Oil Company of the value of the casing and other equipment taken by the Soviets from Romano-Americana. The Standard Oil estimate as given in the telegram under reference is \$800,000. Under paragraph 2 of Enclosure 1, Romano-Americana shows the book value of this equipment as \$1,971,896 and the replacement value at \$2,542,159. [Here follows the Mission's estimate of \$1,873,339 as the replacement value.]

The second point in the Department's telegram states that it is realized that American-owned companies will have to contribute their share of products in payment of reparations but that this should be done on a non-discriminatory basis. Romano-Americana does not feel that any discrimination has been shown in demanding that products be furnished by them in the payment of reparations. Their reply is covered under the first paragraph of point 5) in Enclosure No. 1.

Under point 3, a statement giving description and value of the pre-war evaluation of installations owned by the Standard Oil Company in territory ceded to Russia under Article IV of the Armistice was requested. Under Annex 2 of Enclosure No. 1, Romano-Americana shows the value of investments after allowing for depreciation at \$133,639.60 and of products taken at \$150,233.49. . . .

Under item 4, the Department asks whether the Rumanian Government has set up any procedure for making reparation payments to Americans under Article XI. To my knowledge, the Rumanian Government has taken no steps in this direction. In Enclosure No. 1, under 1) Romano-Americana gives information on the steps which have been taken by them to protect their rights in this connection.

Information on loans granted by the Minister of Finance to assist in reconstruction is also given. It had been stated that, in the granting of these loans, the local company, Creditul Minier, had been favored. In Enclosure No. 3, Romano-Americana points out that they have no complaints to make regarding their treatment by the Rumanian Government in the distribution of these loans.

Under point 5 of the telegram, the Department asks what measures have been taken by the Rumanian Government toward the fulfillment of the obligation taken under Article XIII of the Armistice to restore

⁸³ Enclosures to this despatch not printed.

to nationals of the United Nations, their property. General Schuyler was asked for a statement regarding this point, which statement is given as Enclosure No. 4. General Schuyler points out that the right to dispose freely of goods and properties appears to have been restored to nationals of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia by Law No. 313 published in the *Monitorul Oficial* of March 1. General Schuyler then points out that although there have been no official acts which would restrict the free exercise by American companies of their rights and powers, restrictions have been imposed by the action of the Workers' Syndicate. . . .

Respectfully yours,

ROY M. MELBOURNE

871.6363/8-1045 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne)

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1945—9 p. m.

412. The following arrangements were made at Potsdam⁸⁴ for dealing with problem presented by removal of oil field equipment from Rumania :

"The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of UK and Soviet members, and one to be composed of US and Soviet members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment in Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days on the spot."⁸⁵

Walters⁸⁶ on return from Budapest and Col. Willcox⁸⁷ should serve as US Reps on American-Soviet Commission. They are authorized to begin immediately preparatory work for the discussions. Other members may be added to the Commission subsequently. We hope to hasten arrival of oil company men recently admitted to Rumania some of whom will act as consultants to the US members of the Commission.

⁸⁴ President Truman, British Prime Minister Churchill (later Prime Minister Attlee), and Soviet Premier Stalin, with their advisers, met in conference at Berlin (Potsdam), July 17–August 2, 1945.

⁸⁵ The quotation is from section XIV (XIII) of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, August 1 (2), 1945, *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. II, p. 1496. For additional documentation regarding the removal by the Soviet Union of American-owned oil equipment from Rumania, see *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 420–432, *passim*, and *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 737–746, *passim*. For the record of discussions during the Conference regarding such removals, see *ibid.*, entries in Index under "Rumania: Soviet removal of British and American property (oil equipment): Discussions concerning," p. 1636.

⁸⁶ Ray Pierce Walters, Petroleum Attaché, American Mission in Bucharest.

⁸⁷ Petroleum Adviser to General Schuyler.

British Embassy here has given us exchange of telegrams between London and Bucharest dealing with agenda and procedure of Anglo-Soviet Commission. Dept has communicated to Brit Embassy its agreement with Brit proposal for consultation in Bucharest between Brit and US experts before decisions are taken regarding terms of reference and procedure of the two commissions.

Meanwhile suggestions on procedure made by British are being studied by Dept and PAW.⁸⁸

Walters should return from Budapest as soon as possible after completion of urgent work requiring his presence there (reurtel 527 Aug 7⁸⁹).

Sent to Bucharest; repeated to Budapest for Walters.⁹⁰

BYRNES

661.7131/8-1445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 14, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 1:11 p. m.]

2896. Embassy's 2692, July 27.⁹¹ Answering Kennan's letter of July 19 regarding exclusive character Soviet-Rumanian trade agreement Vyshinski stated in letter dated August 12, that pact in question does not limit commercial opportunities nor discriminate against other states. USSR has primary interest in development trade with Rumania, an immediate neighbor. Scarcely necessary to point out that Soviet-Rumanian trade relations cannot be regarded as hindrance to development trade relations between Rumania and other nations.

On Rumanian oil, agreement does not provide for special Soviet rights prejudicial to American interests. Kennan's mention of American supplies of oil equipment to USSR (final sentence third paragraph Department's 1621, July 16, 5 p. m.⁹²) has no bearing on Rumanian oil problem. Obviously these supplies were produced for

⁸⁸ Petroleum Administration for War.

⁸⁹ Not printed; it reported that Walters was making a brief trip to Budapest (123 Walters, Ray Pierce).

⁹⁰ Repeated to Budapest as telegram 288.

⁹¹ Not printed; it reported Soviet acknowledgement of receipt of a letter from the American Embassy delivered in accordance with Department's instructions to make a strong presentation of U.S. views regarding the Soviet-Rumanian Cooperation Agreement of May 8, 1945, and also concerning possible Soviet-Rumanian oil arrangements (871.6363/7-1945). The Department's instructions were given to Chargé Kennan in telegram 1621, July 16, to Moscow, printed in *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 737; delivery of the letter was reported in Kennan's telegram 2634, July 19, *ibid.*, p. 741.

⁹² See footnote 91, above.

mutual advantage of Allies so as to create all conditions necessary to defeat Germany of Hitler.

To Dept as 2896, rptd. Bucharest as 108 and London 404.

HARRIMAN

871.6363/8-2845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania
(Berry)*

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1945—7 p. m.

462. Objective of U.S.-Soviet Commission⁹³ of experts should be to determine damages sustained by American interests from seizure of materials, equipment and supplies. Accordingly, Commission should ascertain (a) replacement value of everything seized, and (b) damages to normal operations resulting from shortages. In addition to establishing and agreeing upon the facts it is hoped that the Commission will be able to prepare agreed recommendations for settlement to be referred to the two Governments. (Deptel 412, Aug 10 and urtels 570, Aug 21⁹⁴ and 589 [587], Aug 23⁹⁵).

It is suggested that the following facts should be established:

1. Inventory of materials and equipment in stock at date seizure by Soviets commenced, by country of origin, and segregated as to receipt prior to and after June 22, 1941. To this should be added materials received during the period seizures were continued and also materials seized directly from suppliers which were owned by American interests. This category would include all inventory items such as oil field materials, automotive equipment, tank cars and all other movable assets.

2. A similar inventory of refined products in bulk and in packages.

3. Corresponding inventories and lists of all items taken by the Soviets during the period seizures were in progress.

4. Corresponding inventory of materials used by the companies during the same period.

5. Closing inventory of materials on hand at some agreed date after the seizures ceased.

6. List of capital assets dismantled and removed, including such items as compressors, gasoline plants, motors and refinery equipment

⁹³ i.e., the Oil Commission.

⁹⁴ Telegram 570, not printed; it reported that the first meeting of the American-Soviet Oil Commission was held on August 20 and was primarily concerned with the establishment of an agenda for discussion (871.6363/8-2145).

⁹⁵ Not printed; it reported that American-British discussions had preceded the first meeting of the British-Soviet Petroleum Commission on August 18: the Americans and British had agreed among themselves that Commission discussions should be confined to factual data concerning the amount of oil equipment available in Rumania prior to the beginning of Soviet removals and the amount of such removals by the Soviet authorities. It was further reported, however, that at the second meeting of the British-Soviet Commission, August 22, the Soviets had requested detailed information on oil equipment stocks for the entire 1939-1944 period. (871.6363/8-2345)

showing location from which items were taken, date of removal, book value, and estimated replacement value.

In estimating value of materials seized, consideration should be given to normal sources of replacement. Supplies of tubular goods from US can probably not be expected before next winter, and from Germany and Czechoslovakia before opening of Danube next spring.

In estimating damages to operations resulting from shortages, basis should be the development, production and rehabilitation programs operators would have normally carried out had removed materials been available. Specific items are:

1. Higher costs of transportation due to loss of automobiles and trucks.
2. Delays and losses in drilling due to lack of proper casing, use of over-age drill pipe, etc.
3. Delays and losses in refinery operation and rehabilitation due to lack of equipment.

Equitable settlement requires either return of equipment taken in equal condition or replacement with material of equal quality. Compensation for material not replaced and for other damages sustained should be paid in dollars.

BYRNES

871.6363/9-445 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)*⁹⁹

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1945—6 p. m.

474. Dept has received from French Emb here note¹ requesting urgent intervention of US in ACC to obtain modification of Rumanian Govt's decree no. 573, July 18, involving transfer to Soviet organizations of shares in petroleum and banking concerns owned by French citizens. Request made on ground that France is not represented on

⁹⁹ Repeated to Moscow as 1951, to Paris as 4168, and to London as 7579. Repeated to Brussels as 792 with the addition of the following paragraph: "Suggest appropriate Belgium authorities be notified of foregoing in view of their interests in Rumania inviting expression of their position." Note D 5057/No. 5876, September 7, from the Belgian Embassy to the Department of State, requested United States intervention of the Rumanian decree law of July 18, 1945, as it affected Belgian interests in Rumania (871.6363/9-745). In a note of September 28, 1945, to the Belgian Ambassador, the Acting Secretary of State replied that the United States Representative on the Allied Control Commission in Rumania had been instructed to recommend modification of the Rumanian decree law along lines set forth in this telegram (871.6363/9-745).

¹ Note 554, August 8, not printed (871.6363/8-945). In a note to the French Ambassador dated September 4, the Secretary replied that the United States Representative on the Allied Control Commission in Rumania had been instructed to recommend modification of the Rumanian decree law along the lines set forth in this telegram (871.6363/8-945).

ACC Rumania. Note specifically refers to Concordia, Colombia, and Rumanian Commercial Bank. (Urtels 456 July 8, 485 July 20²).

Dept's views as stated in Dept's Terminal 56 to SecState at Potsdam, repeated to Bucharest as 372, and to Moscow as 1680, July 25,³ remain unaltered with respect to properties acquired by Germans through duress. Article IV, paragraph 9 of Berlin Protocol of Aug 1, 1945⁴ does not apply to these. Validity of ownership in any particular instance is question of fact. Dept bases its position on declaration of United Nations of January 5, 1943⁵ and on Article 13 of Rumanian armistice agreement.

Gen Schuyler's two notes of protest to Gen Susaikov (Schuyler's tels M-1249 July 16, M-1264 July 18, M-1306 July 26⁶) apparently dealt with general question of transfer of German shares to USSR which was later settled at Potsdam (Section IV, paragraph 9 of communiqué) and not with specific question of transfer to USSR of United Nations property which Germans acquired by duress during war. Please request him to bring up latter question in ACC stating US view as set forth in preceding paragraphs. He should recommend modification of Rumanian decree to provide that no transfer should be made of alleged German property to which a member of the United Nations on its own behalf or on behalf of its nationals, makes a claim pending settlement of questions of fact regarding ownership and whether such property was acquired by the Germans through duress and is subject to restitution. He should also recommend, in cases where transfers of such shares have been previously

² Neither printed; telegram 456, July 8, reported that a Soviet economic delegation had arrived in Bucharest at the end of June 1945, purportedly to discuss the whole problem of Rumanian-Soviet economic collaboration, particularly the establishment of a joint Rumanian-Soviet oil company. Acting Representative Melbourne further reported that he had received a copy of the draft agreement setting up such a joint Rumanian-Soviet oil company. According to this copy, Soviet shares in the proposed company would consist of those shares of Rumanian oil companies which formerly belonged to the Germans (840.6363/7-845). Telegram 465, July 12, from Bucharest (*Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 561) transmitted the text of a note from Rumanian Prime Minister Groza to Colonel General Susaikov, enumerating the allegedly German-owned oil companies which had been transferred to the Soviet Union as reparations payments. Telegram 485, July 20, from Bucharest, transmitted the text of Rumanian decree law 573 (871.6363/7-2045). The convention between the Soviet Union and Rumania regarding the creation of a Soviet-Rumanian company for the exploration, exploitation, refining, and marketing of crude oil and oil products was signed in Bucharest on July 17, 1945.

³ *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 951.

⁴ While the reference here is to the Berlin Protocol, the article and paragraph cited are in the Communiqué, *ibid.*, p. 1506.

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 443.

⁶ None of these military messages printed. Copies of General Schuyler's letters of July 16 and July 18 to Colonel General Susaikov protesting the transfer of German-held shares of oil companies and banks to the Soviet Union were transmitted to the Department in despatch 435, July 27, from Bucharest (not printed).

made, that no steps be taken by Soviet or Rumanian authorities which in effect would jeopardize return of the shares to the rightful owner.⁸

This telegram has been cleared with War Dept.

BYRNES

871.6363/9-745 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, September 7, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received September 9—6:15 p. m.]

650. Third meeting Soviet-American Oil Commission September 6
Soviets requested details on Romano-American equipment.

(a) Inventory of oil equipment January 1, 1942 Note: All following refer to period January 1, 1942 to October 1, 1944

(b) Additions to stock

(c) Contracts for deliveries of equipment concluded with which companies

(d) Point of origin and place at which received

(e) Conditions as to payment on contracts

(f) Who completed necessary formalities in connection with receiving equipment and where. Actual contracts should be presented if possible

(g) Value of equipment received and to what extent equipment had been paid for

(h) List of equipment consumed

Americans asked why above material was wanted since it appeared irrelevant to problem in hand. After much discussion on this point, Russians stated that the material had been seized because it was considered German material and they will consider it so. They stated that when America entered war, Romano-Americana status changed. The information was requested in order to establish question of ownership. This question they consider fundamental. Discussion on this point ended by Americans saying they could not agree to furnish information requested but would submit same to their Government for approval, pointing out that they might offer counterproposals which should serve just as well as a basis for determining question of ownership. Russians replied that they would be pleased to consider any counterproposals providing questions asked were answered.

⁸ In a letter of September 18, 1945, to Colonel General Susaikov, General Schuyler called attention to Law No. 573 of the Rumanian Government containing regulations governing the transfer to the USSR of shares of oil and banking companies belonging to persons of German nationality, and recommended that the law be modified to prevent the transfer to the USSR of German property to which a member of the United Nations, on its own behalf or on behalf of its nationals, makes a claim, pending settlement of all questions of fact regarding ownership. In the course of a meeting on October 18, 1945, of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania, Susaikov stated that Schuyler's requests had been forwarded to Moscow where the matter was under discussion.

When asked about furnishing their list of materials seized the Soviets said question of material seized is secondary. Real question is that of ownership. From questions asked and discussion it appears that Soviets consider all equipment purchased by Romano-Americana during period in question as of doubtful ownership.

The Americans gained the impression that this would apply not only to equipment purchased in Germany but to all equipment purchased, possibly less stocks January 1, 1942.

At third meeting held by British September 5 similar discussions took place. British concluded that Russians were trying to prove that all material purchased in Germany during period Great Britain was at war should be classed as war booty. British finally agreed to furnish information requested but stated it would be done from June 22, 1941 rather than September 1, 1939. British intend to present preliminary data when ready with hope it will not be necessary to complete task.

Members of American Commission feel that question of ownership which has been raised by Soviets is not really part of assignment given Commission. Preparation of data requested would require much time and useless work.

Commission members therefore suggest they be empowered to inform Russians (a) that question of ownership is not for Commission to decide; (b) that American Government willing to discuss question of ownership and to furnish any factual data which may have bearing on same; (c) that in order to tackle this problem properly, Soviets should define under what conditions they would or would not consider property purchased by Romano-Americana as of German ownership; (d) when two Governments agree in principle on questions of ownership, preparation of pertinent factual information proceed.

No date set for fourth meeting.

Repeated to Moscow as 2045, London as 18.

BERRY

871.6363/9-745 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)*⁹

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1945—1 p. m.

548. Dept agrees with American position regarding Soviet requests outlined 650 Sept 7 except as hereafter indicated.

Dept desires that American members be requested to inform Soviet members of Soviet-American Oil Commission that settlement of

⁹ Repeated to Moscow and London as telegrams 2177 and 9188, respectively.

questions arising from the Soviet removal of oil equipment in Rumania (Deptel 412 Aug 10) hinges on (1) Soviet-American agreement as to materials removed by Soviets, (2) Question of ownership regarding material removed, and (3) Restoration of American owned equipment or replacement in kind.

Point (1) should be resolved on basis of comparing list prepared by oil company with Soviet list of equipment removed and of agreeing on quantity and value involved. Point (2) should be resolved on basis of oil company furnishing factual data pertinent to establishment of American ownership of removed material, and for the purpose of this inquiry the Commission should confine itself to the question of whether title to the equipment discussion vested clearly in Romano-Americana under the applicable provisions of existing Rumanian law (such determination being considered by the Department sufficient to establish American ownership). Point (3) provides for restoration of equipment removed or replacement of equipment in kind by Soviets after oil company establishes ownership.

It should be emphasized that Commission is not empowered to discuss issues beyond the scope outlined herein.

BYRNES

871.6363/11-145 : Telegram

The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State

BUCHAREST, November 1, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 3—3 a. m.]

843. On receipt Deptel 548 of October 17 we requested fourth meeting American-Soviet Oil Equipment Commission be held soon possible. Owing illness Colonel S. M. Blank, Chief Soviet member, meeting delayed until October 30. Americans represented by Reagen¹⁰ with assistance Walters and Willcox and interpreter Greydberg. Following is Reagen's report of fourth meeting:

Americans handed Soviets memorandum incorporated in minutes which presented *inter alia* (1) American position as set forth urtel 548 regarding Soviets' requests of Sept 6; (2) photostatic copies seven procès-verbaux covering all but minor items lifted; (3) repetition American reply to Soviets' proposal regarding release information (urtel 487 of September 10¹¹) (copy is memo being forwarded

¹⁰ Daniel J. Reagen, Counselor for Economic Affairs at the Legation in Bern, on temporary assignment as United States member on the U.S.-Soviet Oil Commission.

¹¹ Not printed; it instructed that information regarding meetings of the Commission investigating removal of oil equipment from Rumania should be released only by American and Soviet Governments and preferably when the Commission had concluded its work (871.6363/8-3045).

under despatch with minutes as soon as transcribed ¹²).

Soviets first adverted to (3) and stated their Govt considered no information regarding Commission's work should be released by either Govt until work completed. We agreed that in principle our Govt takes same position. Soviets then stated their Govt maintains its position that neither Government should give out information without other's approval and said they considered our statement that "each Govt should be free to release etc." as nullifying the principle enunciated with regard to timing of any releases. We reiterated that our Govt like Soviet Govt would, of course, prefer no information be released until conclusion of Commission's work but that should, for example, there be undue delay in its conclusion, either Govt might be constrained to release information but that its release should not be dependent upon approval of other Govt. After further discussion on latter point, Soviet members stated they could not agree to this and submitted a prepared memo for minutes to this effect. (Text is being submitted by despatch.) ¹³

Soviets reiterated their previous position that question ownership is basic factor whereas quantities materials removed secondary. Latter could be settled short order on basis of lists materials available both parties. Soviets stated that question ownership of material removed was raised by Americans; therefore, Americans should furnish proof American ownership. Americans refused accept principle that burden of proof as to ownership rested on American Govt and stated this was matter of reciprocal responsibility. Blank in what appeared to be prepared statement complained American position (1) above merely represented counter proposal for procedure and that Americans have delayed Commission's work by refusing give detailed information with regard stocks, purchases, etc., requested on September 6 (mytel 650 of September 7) which would permit determination ownership, that Soviets do not deny lifting material from Romano-Americana but that their Govt has documents showing such materials to be German and that Americans' failure present this information requested by Soviets has placed responsibility for lack of progress in work entirely upon Americans. He stated that "restoration American owned materials and equipment" (urtel 548) was outside competence

¹²The preliminary notes of the fourth meeting of the Soviet-American Commission for the Study of Facts and Documents Connected with the Removal of Oil Equipment, October 30, 1945, were transmitted to the Department in despatch D-590, November 2, 1945, from Bucharest, neither printed. Annexed to these notes was the memorandum cited here, also not printed. (781.6363/11-245)

¹³The Soviet memorandum was embodied in the notes of the fourth meeting of the Commission, cited in footnote 12, above.

of Commission and merely "took note" our statement we considered Commission competent to make recommendations as to basis for and manner in which restoration should be made. He agreed in principle (although later negated by Spilman¹⁴) with our basis for determination of ownership (as outlined under 3 of urtel 548) but only if considered in conjunction with all information requested by Soviets September 6. Soviets asserted that if ownership could be determined on basis of Rumanian law only, then Commission would not have been necessary; the fact that Commission was appointed proves seriousness of questions involved. Colonel Spilman, Soviet legal adviser, stated he considered that view wartime position of Rumania, certain features international law might override "existing Rumanian law" (some he said made by reactionary Govt) but did not specify more exactly and added he did not care go further into that legal phase this question at this time. Spilman in support of Blank's contention argued that in order identify the "part" i.e., items lifted and ownership thereof full information on the "whole" i.e., all information asked by Soviets on September 6 must be presented. By "whole" Spilman means all goods acquired by the companies in 1942 through 1944 while Rumania was under German domination. Blank stated that naturally it was the purpose of Soviet members of this Commission to use the information on the "whole" merely in order to determine the ownership of the "part".

American representative stated he was glad to note Blank's acceptance as basis for discussion of Dept's prescription for determination of ownership (under 3 urtel 548) but could not, under his Govt's instructions, accept Blank's reservation that with this basis the procedure demanded by Soviets September 6 must be employed. Reagen stated that he must emphatically reject Soviet member's assertion that delay has been caused by failure of Americans to give proof of ownership on basis requested by Soviets, that primary details as to acquisition by Romano-Americana of materials lifted by Soviets had been presented at third meeting; that the procès-verbals relating thereto and requested by Soviets at third meeting had now been submitted at this fourth meeting; that the interim delay between third and fourth meeting had been caused by the demands of Soviets at third meeting and which demands, as he had just informed the Soviet members, were considered by the American Govt as irrelevant to the Commission's objective, namely, agreement as to the material lifted and determination of ownership. In reply to Spilman's argument that all information on "whole" is required to ascertain facts on "part" Reagen recalled terms of Potsdam protocol and pointed out that no considera-

¹⁴ Colonel Spilman (sometimes spelled Spielman in minutes of the Commission meetings), Legal Adviser to the Soviet members of the Commission.

tion was envisaged therein re equipment which had not been removed and that, therefore, investigation of facts regarding latter and presentation of information and documents relating these concerned issue in his opinion outside competence of the Commission (last paragraph urtel 548). He pointed out that on basis our interpretation Potsdam protocol it appears logical continue procedure on points begun first and second meetings and in conformity with restatement our position as outlined our memo just presented, namely to seek agreement on items lifted and then conduct simultaneous efforts (a) to check further on unagreed lifted items and (b) to establish ownership on agreed items. To these ends he felt sure Soviets would consider that only frank and reciprocal presentation of all relevant information by both sides would fulfill spirit as well as letter of Potsdam protocol; he then repeated requests made by Walters previous meetings for Soviet lists of lifted materials and asked for submission of documents Blank has said his Govt possessed showing German ownership.

Blank reiterated his Govt's instructions called for procedure on lines requested September 6, evaded replying directly to our request for list cigtel [*lifted?*] materials by reiterating that question ownership, primary question be settled; in reply to our request for documents Soviets had said they possessed showing German ownership material lifted, Blank in effect withdrew his previous statement in this respect and stated that it was obvious that in removing this property as war booty his Govt considered that this material was German property. Blank said since Americans had presented "counter-proposals" today he must refer these to Moscow for decision. Soviets did not indicate when Moscow's reply could be expected.

In view of this envisaged delay Reagen asked whether work as previously undertaken might not be continued meanwhile and inquired whether Soviets would indicate example items from our list for which companies might immediately prepare full documentation on basis our instructions presented Soviets today. Soviets refused. Reagen then suggested that to save time Americans were prepared submit documentation on random items as examples for consideration by Soviets. Soviets replied that since documentation only of items lifted did not fulfill Sept 6 requirements they could not undertake accept such submission for consideration.

Summarizing the chief points of Soviets position follow: (1) they insisted the question of ownership was basic factor and question of quantities secondary; (2) question of ownership was raised by Americans and therefore Americans should furnish proof of American ownership; (3) Americans have not presented such proof although Commission has been meeting for 3 months; therefore Soviets cannot accept responsibility for delay; (4) they refused American offer as test of method to supply information re ownership for part of material stating this might prejudice question of ownership on the "whole";

(5) their reaction to proposal to base ownership on Rumanian law was unfavorable; (6) they have no authority to discuss question of restoration; (7) Americans instead of supplying answers to their questions had made new proposals embodying a complete new approach to problem; the question will therefore be referred to their Govt.

The Americans position is summarized as follows: (1) Americans refuse to accept principle that burden of proof as to ownership rests on Americans and stated this was matter of reciprocal responsibility. (2) The Soviets had asked for information on ownership of all materials whereas Commission's assignment referred to materials lifted only. (3) Americans raised question of Soviets supplying list of materials lifted but evasive answer received.

This is 843 from Berry; rptd Moscow as 252; Bern as 23 and London as 83. BERRY

871.6363/12-1445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 14, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 2:18 p. m.]

4160. On December 12 British Embassy addressed note to FonOff referring appointment on October 13 of Soviet delegation to Anglo-Soviet Commission experts to examine removal oil installations from Rumania stating that British delegation had been unable to contact Soviet delegation since last October¹⁵ and British Govt wish to learn when Soviet representatives propose resume work. Note further states that British representatives have regularly communicated fully documented evidence to Soviet representatives in support British claims answering every question put by Soviet representatives and establishing beyond doubt that all materials in question ordered, despatched, delivered and paid for on direct account British owned companies and cannot be regarded as in German ownership. On other hand Soviet representatives have failed produce any documents or arguments which could be held to refute British contentions despite fact that since material in question removed by Soviet authorities onus of proving removal justified clearly must rest on Soviet representatives. Under circumstances British Govt trusts very early proposals will be made by Soviet Govt for settlement of issue in manner satisfactory to British Govt.

Sent Dept as 4160, repeated Bucharest as 176.

HARRIMAN

¹⁵ The last previous meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Commission was apparently held on October 23.

SPAIN

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE FRANCO REGIME IN SPAIN FOLLOWING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

711.52/3-2845

*President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour)*¹

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. ARMOUR: In connection with your new assignment as Ambassador to Madrid I want you to have a frank statement of my views with regard to our relations with Spain.

Having been helped to power by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and having patterned itself along totalitarian lines the present regime in Spain is naturally the subject of distrust by a great many American citizens who find it difficult to see the justification for this country to continue to maintain relations with such a regime. Most certainly we do not forget Spain's official position with and assistance to our Axis enemies at a time when the fortunes of war were less favorable to us, nor can we disregard the activities, aims, organizations, and public utterances of the Falange, both past and present. These memories cannot be wiped out by actions more favorable to us now that we are about to achieve our goal of complete victory over those enemies of ours with whom the present Spanish regime identified itself in the past spiritually and by its public expressions and acts.

The fact that our Government maintains formal diplomatic relations with the present Spanish regime should not be interpreted by anyone to imply approval of that regime and its sole party, the Falange, which has been openly hostile to the United States and which has tried to spread its fascist party ideas in the Western Hemisphere. Our victory over Germany will carry with it the extermination of Nazi and similar ideologies.

As you know, it is not our practice in normal circumstances to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries unless there exists a threat to international peace. The form of government in Spain and the policies pursued by that Government are quite properly the concern of the Spanish people. I should be lacking in candor, however, if I did not tell you that I can see no place in the community of nations for governments founded on fascist principles.

¹ This letter was released to the press on September 26, 1945.

We all have the most friendly feelings for the Spanish people and we are anxious to see a development of cordial relations with them. There are many things which we could and normally would be glad to do in economic and other fields to demonstrate that friendship. The initiation of such measures is out of the question at this time, however, when American sentiment is so profoundly opposed to the present regime in power in Spain.

Therefore, we earnestly hope that the time may soon come when Spain may assume the role and the responsibility which we feel it should assume in the field of international cooperation and understanding.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

123 Armour, Norman H./3-2445: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 24, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received March 26—11:30 a. m.]

629. I presented my letters to General Franco ² at 1 p. m. today. The ceremony, which was much simplified even as compared with that of the Italian Ambassador who was received about a month ago when the throne room was used, took place in one of the smaller rooms of the palace. Only the ceremonial officers and members of Franco's civil and military households were present. There were no speeches and after presenting my letters and introducing the staff, Franco took me and the Foreign Minister ³ into an adjoining room for an interview which lasted three-quarters of an hour.

I opened the conversation with a reference to Mr. Hayes,⁴ whom I had seen before my departure and who had, I said, asked me to convey his greetings. Franco expressed warm appreciation of the very able and tactful way in which the Ambassador had accomplished his mission during a particularly difficult period initiated at a time when the war was in its most critical stage.

Franco then passed on to a somewhat philosophical dissertation on the war. He attempted to make the point, as I note he had done in several of his conversations with Mr. Hayes, that there were really two wars in progress: in Europe and in the Pacific. So far as the European war was concerned, of course, Nazism was doomed—the Germans were on the verge of defeat—but Spain could not remain indifferent to the dangers presented by communism in postwar Europe.

² Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spanish Head of State.

³ José Felix Lequerica.

⁴ Carlton J. H. Hayes resigned as United States Ambassador to Spain on February 20, 1945.

As to the war in the Pacific, there were no two ways of looking at the matter. . . . He referred bitterly to the atrocities committed against Spanish citizens in the Philippines adding that a strong note of protest had already been sent to the Japanese Government and that Spain would no longer be willing to represent Japanese interests. In this connection he said that some time ago when his Government had learned of the barbarous treatment accorded our prisoners by the Japanese his Government had warned the Japanese Government that if this continued they would have to withdraw further representation of Japanese interests. He did not however give any indication to confirm the current reports that his Government was planning to break relations and I deliberately refrained from questioning him on this point having in mind the Department's instructions.

Taking up the point Franco had tried to make in distinguishing between the European and Pacific conflicts, I told him that he must understand that so far as we were concerned it was one war: That as he had truly said the battle in Europe was approaching its victorious conclusion and that once unconditional surrender of the Germans was an accomplished fact the full power of Allied arms would be concentrated on the Pacific. In the meantime, we were entirely satisfied with the progress made in that area. I could well understand the feelings of Spain and the Spanish people over Japanese atrocities committed against their citizens but I had been glad to note that he realized that acts of similar barbarity had from the initiation of hostilities been committed by the Japanese against those unfortunate enough to fall into their hands. As regarded his reference to the dangers presented by communism following the defeat of the Nazis, I had noted that he distinguished between Russia, our Ally in the war, and communism per se, the distinction clearly brought out by Mr. Hayes in his letters to the late Count Jordana more than a year ago.⁵ I felt, with Mr. Hayes, that communism was an essentially internal problem and a menace that could best be met by not permitting to exist in a country conditions conducive to its growth. So far as the United States was concerned, the question would never arise.

As to the fears he had expressed of Russia dominating Europe and spreading communism in its wake, I felt that Russia had changed greatly during the last years and we were confident that the same cooperation we were receiving in the war would carry over into the peace. Russia would require a good deal from us in the way of materials and cooperation in the postwar period and I felt that we would be able to exert considerable influence and this would doubtless be exercised particularly in behalf of those countries which had put their

⁵ Ambassador Hayes' letters to Count Jordana, dated October 29 and December 27, 1943, not printed.

own houses in order and were attempting to live in peace with their neighbors.

I then told General Franco that I had had a talk with the Foreign Minister (see later) last evening and had explained to him that while I realized that in this first interview it might not be customary to take up more fundamental aspects of our relations, in order to avoid any possibility of later misunderstanding and in compliance with the President's wishes as expressed in a talk I had with him just prior to my departure, I felt it was important that I make my Government's position entirely clear in this our first talk. Franco nodded agreement, indicating that Lequerica had taken the matter up with him. I then stated our case along the lines set forth in the President's letter of March 10. I said that while I had come to Madrid with every desire to see our relations improved and would do whatever I could towards that end, my presence must not be interpreted as meaning that my Government was satisfied with the existing situation or approved the structure of the present regime in Spain. While this was, of course, an internal question and while I need not assure him that it was against the policies of our Government to interfere in the internal affairs of other governments, nevertheless, as he must know there were elements in the United States covering a wide range of public opinion who were opposed to the continuance of official relations with his Government. My Government had not deferred to the wishes of these groups as my presence here indicated but, in all frankness, I must make it clear to him that so long as the present type of government was maintained with the Falange, a government within a government and along totalitarian lines, it would not be possible for my Government to enjoy the relations of complete confidence and understanding that we would like to have and that our friendship for Spain and for the Spanish people would normally indicate. He must realize that the Falange represented for our people the symbol of the collaboration with our enemies during the days when the war was not going so well for us. We realized that Spain had gone through difficult days. No one wished to see the country again plunged into civil war or civil strife. But we had hoped to see an evolution in the government take place that would be in line with the trend of events and the new spirit abroad in the world; an evolution that would enable Spain to occupy the role that properly belonged to it in the postwar world. I mentioned the Foreign Minister's recent speech in which he discussed Spain's role in the Americas as an example of one of the many contributions that Spain might make to the cause of world peace if and when she made it possible for us to welcome her participation in the family of nations. Franco listened attentively and apparently took my remarks in good part (the Foreign Minister offered no comment, in fact throughout the

interview took no part in the discussion). He then entered into a long dissertation on the very evident misunderstanding abroad of the present regime in Spain. The Falange was, he insisted, not a political party but rather a grouping together of all those having a common interest, an objective—the welfare of Spain, the maintenance of order, the development of the country along sound religious, cultural, and economic lines et cetera. It was open to anyone to join and included representatives from all walks of life. He referred to the accomplishments of his regime in rebuilding the devastation caused by the civil war and in healing the wounds arising out of the bitterness the conflict had engendered and pointed out that many administrative posts under the Government were now held by those who had been on the other side during the civil war. I asked Franco if it was not true, however, that many thousand political prisoners were still held, adding that as he must know, knowledge of this and reports that executions were still continuing had produced a very painful impression in our country. He replied with some warmth that these reports were greatly exaggerated; that only those who had been proven guilty of gross crimes and assassinations were still in prison and that the number did not exceed 26,000. He remarked that he had heard that some press reports had put the figure at 225,000 which was fantastic. As a matter of fact there were not prisons enough in Spain to hold a fraction of that number nor did any concentration camp exist, but this showed the type of propaganda to which his Government was subjected abroad.

The interview terminated with Franco's saying that he hoped we might soon have an opportunity for another talk when we could go more into detail on certain of the points brought out in the conversation. In the meantime he wished to assure me that I could count on his full support and cooperation in all matters. In thanking him I told him that the President had asked me to convey his greetings. General Franco said that he had the highest admiration for the President, and he hoped that I would convey to him the assurances of his highest respect and esteem.

Last night after Butterworth⁹ and I had decided that it would be advisable not to permit this first interview with Franco to pass without getting down to certain fundamentals, I arranged to see the Foreign Minister and outline to him the main points that I proposed to make. Lequerica was well disposed and agreed that it was important that the circumstances of my appointment should be made entirely clear from the start, adding however that he felt I should not attempt to go into too much detail.

ARMOUR

⁹ W. Walton Butterworth, Counselor of Embassy in Spain.

741.52/3-1345

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department has given careful consideration to the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy dated March 13, 1945,¹¹ setting forth the general lines of British policy toward Spain.

This Government is in substantial agreement with the British Government's statement of policy toward the present Spanish regime and the Falange Party. It considers that while the present regime remains in power it will be difficult for Spain to assume its proper role and responsibilities in the field of international cooperation and understanding. While this Government and the American people entertain the most friendly feelings toward the Spanish people and desire a development of genuinely cordial relations between the United States and Spain, public sentiment in this country is profoundly opposed to the present Spanish Government, both because of its policies and acts, which until recently have been distinctly unfriendly to the interests of the United States, and because that Government and the Falange Party were founded on undemocratic principles.

This Government considers that the form of government in Spain and the policies pursued by that Government are the concern of the Spanish people, and it is not the policy of this Government in normal circumstances to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. It shares the hope of the British Government however, that any successor regime in Spain will be based on democratic principles, moderate in tendency, stable, and not indebted for its existence to any outside influences.

A tranquil Spain is desirable, from the standpoint of international cooperation, and a recurrence of civil strife in Spain could only militate against the general postwar objectives of reestablishing peace and order in Europe and of rehabilitating devastated areas. In the general interest therefore, and in the particular interest of the Spanish people, any tendencies toward renewed disorder in Spain would be regretted.

This Government fully agrees that there should be a close coordination of policy between it and the British Government respecting Spain. The policy of the United States Government toward the Franco regime, described in the foregoing paragraphs, has been followed by this Government without deviation for a long time. There have been no acts of this Government or public utterances of its officials on the subject at variance with that policy. It is not thought possible that General Franco or his Government can be under any

¹¹ Not printed.

misapprehension respecting the views of this Government or of the American people toward the Spanish Government and the Falange Party. These views have been expressed to General Franco and to his Foreign Ministers repeatedly and with clarity over a considerable period of time.

In the circumstances, the Department of State is at a loss to understand why the United Kingdom Government would take seriously enough to include in its memorandum the reported allegations of the Spanish Government that United States feelings toward it are less hostile than those of the United Kingdom Government.

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1945.

852.00/4-1245

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Spain
(Armour)¹²*

[MADRID,] April 12, 1945.

I called on the Foreign Minister by appointment this morning. Although I had seen him on various occasions at social functions, it was the first time that I had had an opportunity for a formal talk with him since the presentation of my letters.

The Minister opened the conversation by referring to the decision to break relations with Japan. He said that there had been absolute unanimity regarding this decision at the Cabinet meeting which is still in progress (these meetings, he said, occur only once a month and last several days. One must not be misled by the length of the meetings into thinking that only important things are discussed, as Franco insists in entering into great detail with all the Ministers on relatively small matters).

I then asked the Minister how the "evolution" was progressing. He said that several important decisions are about to be reached.

1. Franco is planning the establishment of a "Monarchical form of government". The idea apparently is to have a Council of the Kingdom (*Consejo del Reino*) created to determine the succession. Franco will continue as head of the State (under the Monarchical form of government) and it will be the function of the Council of the Kingdom to designate the King, who would, however, not assume the power until Franco either dies or abandons office. I asked Lequerica how there could be a Monarchy without a King and whether this meant that Franco would act as Regent. He said that the situation would be somewhat similar to that which had existed in Hungary but that

¹² Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 78, April 12, 1945, from Madrid; received April 26.

Franco would not assume the title of Regent but would merely be known as the Head of the State. Apparently the Council of the Kingdom would look into the qualifications of those eligible and decide which of them possessed the best qualifications. The Council would also establish the general condition for the succession, that is, revise the old Monarchical rules of succession regarding the age at which the King could assume power, etc. I asked Lequerica how soon this would be finally decided and what form the announcement would take but he was vague on this point except to say that he thought it would be shortly.

2. The Bill of Rights which has been under study for some time by Franco's legal advisers is now in definite form and is to be presented to the Consejo Nacional. This, he hopes, will be acted upon shortly and will have the effect of stabilizing conditions through definition of individual rights and privileges. Municipal elections are also contemplated.

3. It has been decided to grant complete freedom from censorship to the foreign press correspondents. Lequerica asked me to consider this as confidential, as he wishes to call in the correspondents and himself give them this notification. It is also planned to remove the control of the Spanish press from the present Falange Vice Secretariat of Education and put it under the ordinary Ministry of Education.

4. The death penalty for offenses committed during the civil war is to be abolished and I understood him to say this will apply to all those at present under sentence. Furthermore, all sentences for civil war crimes for terms of twenty years or under have been annulled. This already holds to those in the country and will now be applied to those abroad who will be invited to return to Spain. In fact, all Spaniards now abroad will be invited to return and public notification will be made that those who are in any doubt as to whether they can safely return have only to apply to the Consuls who will receive instructions to telegraph to the Government for specific confirmation in individual cases. Incidentally, he said that the latest figures given him by the Minister of Justice show that only 17,000 political prisoners are now held in the prisons of the country.

5. The present special courts for judging political offenses arising out of the civil war are to be abolished. In other words, in the future only the regular tribunals will have jurisdiction. I understood him to say that announcement on these last points would be made on the termination of the present meeting of the Cabinet, probably within the next two or three days.

I told the Minister that I had been very much interested in what he had to tell me. I asked him how the Falange would be affected by

this evolution. He was somewhat vague in his reply, falling back on his previous arguments that the real functions of the Falange had been misunderstood abroad, that it was not a party but a movement, etc. He said that Franco was very much interested in the social welfare work which the Falange had been conducting and wished this to go on in one form or another, but Lequerica felt that with the evolution that he had described in the internal field, as well as the very marked evolution in the international field, many of the bad features of the Falange would automatically be disposed of. I said that I had told him in our first talk and as I knew he himself realized, the existence of the Falange was perhaps the greatest obstacle to an improvement in our relations and that, while implementation of certain of the measures he had described would undoubtedly be well received abroad, so long as the totalitarian aspect of the regime continued and the Falange had its place in the structure of the Spanish State, it was more than unlikely that public opinion in my country, and I felt sure in the other democracies, would be satisfied. I said that I had been somewhat concerned that the Spanish press was conveying the impression that our relations with Spain were on an entirely satisfactory basis and I had also seen a tendency to draw a distinction between our attitude and that of the British towards the present Spanish regime. Lequerica said that this was, of course, absurd, that the Government entirely understood our position and if the press were assuming this attitude it was certainly not with any encouragement from the Government. So far as a distinction between our policy and that of the British, he realized that there were certain elements, largely in the Monarchist group here, who had tried to give this impression, adding that the Duke of Alba¹⁴ had come to see him shortly before I presented my letters to say that he had heard that demonstrations, flags, etc. were being planned as a mark of special consideration for the American Ambassador, with the implication of drawing a distinction between the United States and Britain. He had told Alba that any such reports were without foundation. I said that I felt it would be most unfortunate if this situation were to develop to a point where my Government or even the President, might find it necessary to make a public statement defining the exact situation. I said that, while I felt I had already stated clearly to him and to General Franco our Government's position, perhaps the best way to sum it up would be to read him a letter which the President had written me on the eve of my departure. I then read him the President's letter,¹⁵ stressing particularly the last four paragraphs.

¹⁴ Jacobo Fitz-James Stuart, Spanish Ambassador in the United Kingdom. He had offered his resignation in March 1945 but it was refused by Franco and it did not take effect until October.

¹⁵ Letter of March 10, p. 667.

Lequerica listened with keenest interest but vouchsafed no comment except to say that he hoped very much that the evolution which he had described to me would contribute towards an eventual solution of the situation and enable us to establish our relations on the basis which we all desired. I told the Minister that we would await with interest the announcement of the various measures he had outlined and perhaps when this had taken place we would be in a position to pursue these matters further.

N[ORMAN] A[RMOUR]

852.00/5-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 1, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received May 2—3 : 43 p. m.]

913. There is increasing evidence that the Spanish Government is greatly concerned over the situation that will confront Spain on the German surrender and in particular that the Soviet Government may shortly thereafter seek to induce the American and British Governments to bring pressure to bear on it in one form or another. From questions put to me recently by various high Spanish officials it is clear that the Spanish Government would like to secure assurances from us in advance that if such changes in the government structure now contemplated are put into effect Spain may be able to count on the American Government at any rate to pursue its own independent policy vis-à-vis Spain. They profess to believe that the steps this Government is planning to take in its evolution will at least temporarily weaken the central authority and be seized upon by the opposition elements in the country, already encouraged by dissident Spanish groups across the border in France, to attempt a test of strength. If at this juncture, they say, we and the British were to accede to Soviet pressure and take a position openly opposed to the present Spanish Government the consequences might well be another civil war.

This was the line of reasoning the War Minister General Asensio used with me in a recent talk I had with him and Lequerica. He stated that he felt sure that the Russians in their plan to dominate Europe would attempt to make use of the not inconsiderable elements in Spain favorable to them in order to bring about a violent upheaval. He then asked me what I thought would be our Government's position and that of the British in the event that the Russians either at San Francisco¹⁶ or later should insist upon a break in relations by

¹⁶ United Nations Conference on International Organization held at San Francisco, April 25-June 26, 1945. For documentation regarding the Conference, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

our Government with Spain. I told him that I could not answer a hypothetical question of this sort. So far as I knew political questions of any such nature were not on the agenda of the San Francisco Conference. I must frankly inform him, however, that Russia was not alone in its feeling about the character of the present regime in Spain and, while it was not our policy to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and while the reorganization of the government structure was a matter for Spain and the Spanish people, he must understand that until they had taken steps to effect these changes and make it abundantly clear that a real evolution was under way they could expect little sympathy or support from us or, I believed, from any of the democratic nations.

Our position as it had been clearly set forth to the Foreign Minister and to General Franco himself was that while we maintained formal diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government, these relations would have to remain on a purely formal basis so long as the present structure with the Falange constituting a government within a government remained unchanged. On the other hand, the United States Government, of course, had no wish to see a renewal of civil war in Spain. I suggested that instead of speculating on what would be our Government's position in the event certain steps were taken it would be better for Spain to proceed to take requisite steps without further delay. I pointed out that valuable time had already been lost and they now found themselves on the eve of Germany's collapse with virtually nothing to point to in changes effected to bring their regime into line with new conditions in the world.

General Asensio said that he did not question the high desirability or necessity of evolutionary change in the character of the Spanish regime; on the other hand, it must be recognized by us that it was not easy to take such steps and at the same time avoid civil strife in a country whose people were by nature violent and who had but a few years ago engaged in the bloodiest of civil wars. He said the problem in his mind which he wanted to make clear was that if in undertaking the necessarily painful steps of discard and change in the character of the regime whereby at least temporarily the executive power of the government was weakened at a critical and dramatic moment in European affairs and if at the same time the Soviet Government pressed for action on the part of the United States in pursuance and furtherance of the Soviet policy of European domination, the United States Government must not regard Spain as a minor issue, such as that of the presidency of the San Francisco Conference, but as an issue as important as Spain's key strategic geographical position justified and, therefore, should be prepared to resist extreme Soviet demands as in the case of Poland.

Incidentally, in the course of my conversation with Lequerica today (my 912 of May 1, 7 p. m.¹⁷) he reverted to this same matter as did the Minister of Commerce and Industry¹⁸ some days ago.

In order to exploit to the full Spanish preoccupation and fears, I have merely met this query by pointing out its hypothetical nature and emphasizing our firm desire that rapid evolution and not civil strife take place in Spain. I shall continue to press for beneficial and peaceful change in the character of the regime, towards which some beginning has been made. In the meantime, I should appreciate any information which may have reached the Department arising out of formal or informal conversations at the San Francisco Conference relating to the above.

ARMOUR

S52.00/5-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 25, 1945—11 p. m.
[Received May 26—11:29 a. m.]

1145. In a conversation with the Foreign Minister yesterday, I drew his attention to a despatch from New York dated May 22, from the EFE¹⁹ correspondent, published in the papers here, which stated in effect that Franco's speech last Sunday²⁰ at Valladolid had been interpreted in the US as a reaffirmation of Gen Franco's support of Falange and as indicating that no immediate change in the existing political regime here was envisaged. I said I could not but feel after reading the speech that this interpretation was a natural and logical one to place upon it. Furthermore, the fact that the local press authorities had permitted the publication of the despatch would, I felt, be taken as confirmation that the Govt approved this interpretation.

Lequerica vigorously denied that this was the interpretation to be given the speech. Today he called me up to say that he had brought the EFE despatch to Gen Franco's attention and the latter had emphatically confirmed what the Minister had told me.

ARMOUR

¹⁷ Not printed.

¹⁸ Demetrio Carceller Segura.

¹⁹ Spanish Foreign News Agency, Pedro Gómez Aparicio, Director.

²⁰ May 20.

852.00/6-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 2, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received June 3—12:10 a. m.]

1202. General Franco gave a dinner for us at the Pardo last night. It was the first opportunity I had had to see him since presenting my credentials on March 24, and I took advantage in a short conversation to stress again our Govt's viewpoint.

I expressed my disappointment at what I felt to be the lack of any real progress in the evolution of the regime in the 2 months since our last talk. Franco pointed to certain steps taken, freedom from censorship of Foreign press correspondents, the bill of rights now before the Cortes, proposed municipal elections, etc. as evidence of a gradual change. I said that while the two latter matters cited might have some significance internally—although I felt that their importance depended in large measure on how they were applied—so long as the Falange continued to occupy its present position in the structure of the Govt and the totalitarian aspect of the regime remained unchanged, he could not expect any improvement in our relations. I said that I felt the important thing was that they should get started as soon as possible along the right road even though attainment of the ultimate goal might not be immediately realized. Time was passing, the San Francisco Conference was nearing its end and where would Spain be in the new world organization that would emerge? Franco fell back on his usual arguments stressing the Communist menace to Europe including Spain. He admitted that the danger of a clash between the Western Allies and Russia might have been exaggerated, particularly in their own press (plans for relaxation in the press control are now he said under way). He thought it not unlikely that we would be able to work out many of our pending problems with the Russians although he was pessimistic of a favorable solution on the Polish question. But he emphasized that Spain was the particular target for Communist propaganda and that France was playing Russia's game. The combined Soviet French attacks, he said, made it necessary for them in accomplishing their evolution not unduly to weaken the central authority.

Franco said that he sincerely desired the closest relations with the United States and Great Brit and he could not believe that with the many grave problems that confronted us in Europe we would not be disposed to show a sympathetic understanding of Spain's difficulties, having in mind the nearness of their own civil war and therefore give them time to work out their problems in their own way, which he felt sure they would be able to do.

I said we considered this to be an internal problem for Spain: That as he knew it was not our policy to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries but he must realize that until they at least made a real start in bringing this regime more into line with the new world currents he could not expect relations on the basis that we would like to have them.

The FonMin who was present at the dinner did not take part in the conversation which was entirely informal as the party was breaking up.

ARMOUR

852.00/7-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 7, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received July 8—4:25 p. m.]

1468. From recent talks with the Foreign Min and other Spanish officials it now seems reasonably certain that Franco shortly is to make a pronouncement on the steps he proposes to take toward an evolution of the regime and that this will probably be in the form of a speech to be made on July 18, anniversary of the beginning of the Span Civil War. A plenary session of the Cortes has been called for July 13-14 when the bill of rights, possibly the municipal election law, and certain other measures will be voted. At least two Ministers have told me that there will be Cabinet changes, including the elimination of all or some of the Falange Ministers and their replacement probably by members of the Acción Católica; that Arrese will go out and the Ministry of Movement be suppressed. Carceller states quite openly that he is slated for the Ministry of Finance.

There is a report given me by certain of my colleagues that Lequerica will leave the Foreign Office. Those who are inclined to give some credence to this last report claim that Franco for some time has been irritated by Lequerica's independent attitude and furthermore is not satisfied with his handling of Spanish French relations. It is rumored that he wishes to give the post to Mateu, former Mayor of Barcelona and at present Span representative in Paris, who reputedly enjoys his confidence. I believe all this is highly speculative.

While Franco's recent interview with Bradford of the United Press set forth the general lines of the evolution he has been developing over a period of months, there seems little doubt that recent events, notably the attack on the Span regime at UNCIO,²¹ coupled with

²¹ United Nations Conference on International Organization held at San Francisco, April 25-June 26, 1945. Reference is apparently to objections to membership of Spain in the United Nations voiced at the Third Meeting of Commission I on June 19, 1945. For text of minutes on this subject, see *Documents on International Organization*, vol. 6, pp. 124-136.

thought that the action first by Guatemala and then by Panama may be infectious, have brought home to him the urgency for action. He probably hopes by combining these various steps in a single pronouncement, probably coupled with a reference to the constitution of a Regency Council and an announcement of some lessening of the press control, to curb local criticism and to divert attacks from abroad.

I am not sanguine that any real evolution is to be expected or that fundamental changes, notably complete disestablishment of the Falange, will be forthcoming. Even Franco's own Ministers, however, admit that they do not pretend to know what he has in mind and appear to be completely in the dark as to how far he proposes to go in his announcement on July 18 or the date chosen. Lequerica still professes to be optimistic that things are moving in the right direction. I have advised him that if Franco hopes to change public opinion abroad, notably in the United States, a real and fundamental change in the structure of the present regime will be necessary. The real test of the adequacy of the reform measures, however, would lie with Span public opinion itself. Although I believe Lequerica is sincere when he assures me that he thoroughly agrees with this and has so informed Franco, I am not certain how strongly Lequerica has dared to express himself to Franco or how much weight his opinions carry.

ARMOUR

852.00/7-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 18, 1945—noon.

[Received 8:14 p. m.]

1547. Franco yesterday delivered 45-minute address to the National Council of Falange being accompanied on arrival and departure by Arrese, Minister-Secretary of Movement. Speech was in general aggressive, confident and highly nationalistic. It gave no indication whatever of imminence of any real change either in principles or personnel of the regime, being on the contrary largely devoted to glorification of what has been achieved. Toward end of address Franco said: "The best laws would be of little importance if the spirit of our Falange were to fail, if we were to fall asleep on easy laurels or if we were to lose heart before the difficulties of the road which we must yet cover."

Franco presented the establishment of the traditional Spanish Monarchy as the next step in the progress of national movement to be achieved through a law to be presented to Cortes in order that the succession to the high office now held by Franco himself may be as-

sured. Translation of his remarks on subject is being cabled *en clair*.²²

Other topics dealt with generally along familiar lines were as follows:

Peace and progress of Spain contrasted with conditions elsewhere in Europe.

Great merit of Spanish neutrality. Reference made in this connection to assurances received from Roosevelt and British Government at time of North African landings.²³ Pact with Portugal of July 1940²⁴ also referred to.

Difficulty of Spain's relations with other countries since this is hour of passion not hour of reason and fact of Spanish crusade involving 1,200,000 Spanish soldiers not appreciated. When full story of Spain's international conduct can be made known, relations will be restored to normal. Spain has shown desire to cooperate but must now maintain attitude of reserve about what may be decided behind her back on matters affecting her.

Revolutionary characteristics of national movement with emphasis on social justice, Catholic religion and national unity. Paradox that this is misunderstood abroad precisely by sectors who should be most interested. Peculiarly Spanish quality of movement stressed. Spain does not need and should not import political ideas from abroad.

Necessity for anti-communism of Spain and of foreign propagandists about true nature of communism. Stress here is on Spanish experience.

Solidity and stability of regime and error of those abroad who speculate about it. Experiences and accomplishments of national movement already being studied abroad.

Review of work of Cortes with emphasis on bill of rights and local aviation law. Statement that proposed elections will give to institutions the spontaneous and efficacious popular integration proclaimed by doctrine of the movement. Popular participation to be through family, syndicate and municipality.

Campaign against unemployment and establishment of unemployment insurance designated immediate specific task.

ARMOUR

²² Telegram 1549, July 18, 1945, not printed.

²³ For text of President Roosevelt's letter of assurance to General Franco, dated November 12, 1942, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, p. 906.

²⁴ Protocol between Spain and Portugal signed at Lisbon, July 29, 1940; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, p. 520. The protocol was made as an annex to the treaty of friendship and non-aggression of 1939, *ibid.*, vol. CXLIII, p. 673.

852.00/8-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

SAN SEBASTIAN, August 5, 1945.
 [Received August 5—4: 46 p. m.]

SS 9. I have today received from the Foreign Affairs Office a *note verbale* translated below.

"The Ministry Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to inform it that the Spanish Government has decided to make public the following note:

In the face of the extraordinary reference to Spain which is contained in the communiqué of 'The Three' at Potsdam²⁵ the Spanish State rejects as arbitrary and unjust those concepts which refer to it and considers them the result of the false atmosphere created by the slanderous campaigns of the expatriated Reds and their like abroad.

Spain, following the policy of discretion and goodwill which she had fixed for herself in the face of the errors of others which would not directly affect her, did not wish to set forth her reserves in respect to the agreements at the Conference of San Francisco, reached in the absence of almost all the European countries; but on being today so unjustly referred to, she finds herself obliged to declare that she neither begs for a place at international conferences nor would she accept one which was not in relation to her history, her population and her services to peace and culture.

Similar reasons one day led her to abandon under the Monarchical regime the former League of Nations.

Spain once again proclaims her peaceful spirit, her goodwill toward all peoples and is confident that once those passions are quieted which the war and propaganda exacerbated, the excess of this hour will be revised and from within or without she will continue to collaborate in the work of peace for which the fact of her having remained neutral, free and independent in the two greatest and most terrible wars recorded by history constitutes an outstanding credential. San Sebastian, August 4."

Repeated to London, Paris and Madrid by courier.

ARMOUR

²⁵ For communiqué of August 2, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. II, p. 1499. The statement referred to here is the last paragraph of section X, "Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to the United Nations Organization", p. 1509. This paragraph reads:

"The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership."

852.00/8-1645

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Spain
(Armour)*²⁶

MADRID, August 10, 1945.

The Foreign Office had advised me that Sr. Martín Artajo^{26a} would receive me at 4:30 this afternoon, and I called at that hour.

The Minister opened the conversation by extending his congratulations and expressing his satisfaction over the news they had just received of the Japanese Government's offer of surrender.

He then passed on to immediate problems. The Foreign Minister told me that he had spent Saturday afternoon, August 4, and most of Sunday with General Franco, during which time he had had an opportunity to discuss matters very fully with him. I asked the Minister how he viewed the situation. He said he felt the Spanish Government's position had been misrepresented in the press and radio abroad, including the United States. However, before giving me his views he would like to have my own.

I began by saying that I presumed he was aware of my Government's position as I had set forth very frankly in discussions with his predecessor, Sr. Lequerica, and in the two conversations with General Franco. However, I then reviewed for him our position along the usual lines, concluding by saying that so long as the present regime continued unchanged I felt there was no possibility of improved relations between our two governments.

Referring to the Potsdam Declaration, I said that I could not believe this had come as a surprise to his Government, in view of the position my Government had consistently taken. Furthermore, it was a reaffirmation of the position taken by the fifty nations represented at the San Francisco Conference more than a month earlier. He must know the strong feeling of opposition that existed in the United States towards the present regime in Spain, a sentiment which, far from becoming less, was, I felt, steadily on the increase. In this connection, I mentioned recent radio broadcasts by two prominent United States senators, advocating a break in relations with the Franco regime (the Minister indicated that he had heard of this). In view of all this and similar feelings in other democratic nations of which he must be aware—I mentioned specifically the recent action of the Peruvian Congress in recommending the suspension of relations with the present regime in Spain—I hoped that his Government realized the seriousness of the situation and was prepared to take a realistic attitude. Unfortunately, I could see no evidence thus far of this. General

²⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 753, August 16, 1945, from Madrid; received August 27.

^{26a} Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, succeeding Lequerica on July 19, 1945.

Franco's speech of July 17 had stressed that any evolution that took place must be within the framework of the Movement (*Movimiento*) and inspired by the spirit of the Falange. There had, to be sure, been changes in the cabinet but, while the Ministry of the Movement had been suppressed, Sr. Arrese had been appointed a member of the Junta Política, while Sr. Girón, a well-known Falangist, remained in the cabinet and Fernandez Cuesta, one of the original Falangists, had been appointed to succeed Sr. Aunos as Minister of Justice. One of the factors in the present situation in Spain which had caused the most painful impression in my country was the continued holding in prison of so many political prisoners. According to reliable reports executions were also still being carried out. Admitting the bitterness the struggle had engendered, it seemed to many of us that General Franco could have done far more than he has done to heal the breach. Referring again to the Potsdam Communiqué, I pointed out that the Spanish press had not been allowed to publish the text of that portion referring to Spain while, on the other hand, all of the Spanish papers had been required to publish the note of the Spanish Government and, subsequently, evidently inspired and provocative editorials had come out, setting forth the Government's attitude. All of this, I felt, had created an increasingly unfavorable public opinion in my own country and I believed in the other countries. In this connection, I referred to the references in these inspired articles to the Non-Intervention Committee. Calling attention to this episode could only have the result of recalling painful memories and be used against our Government by those elements in our country favoring strong measures against the present regime here.

Finally, I could not see that the evolution proposed by Franco, even if carried out immediately, would essentially change or modify the opposition in our country to the present regime. Unless and until a substantial proportion of the Spanish people were given an opportunity freely to decide on the form of regime they desired, there could, I believed, be no final solution to the problem. We all, of course, realized their difficulties and no one wished to see Spain plunged again into civil war. It might be said that all of this was an internal matter, but as I saw it the time had come for them to decide how much an improvement in relations with the United States, Great Britain, and other democratic countries meant to them. This, I believed, was one of the questions on which they must make up their minds without delay.

The Minister listened attentively and, when I had finished, expressed his appreciation for the frankness with which I had spoken. He insisted that he had accepted the post only because he believed that Franco intended to carry out a real evolution and that it was his plan

eventually to restore the monarchy. In the meantime there would be liberalization of the press, although here they would have to proceed carefully since the public had been so accustomed to believing that everything the papers said was inspired by the Government that too sudden liberty of expression might give rise to misunderstandings. Furthermore, General Franco intended to call municipal elections along the lines set forth in his program and, while these would not be on as broad a basis as he himself might have wished in view of his own liberal leanings, nevertheless he thought that it would be a good start. Furthermore, he hoped that, as a result of these elections, a new Cortes might later be formed with a broader basis of popular support. The important point was that these steps should be carried out without impairing the central authority, since anything that would run the risk of bringing about disorders or lead even to civil war must be avoided. He had himself been a prisoner of the "Reds" during the first six months of the civil war and he knew from personal experience from what a real catastrophe the country had been saved by the victory of the elements fighting for decency and order. Nothing, he repeated, must be done, in effecting the evolution, to weaken the central authority to a point where it might plunge the country again into civil strife and bloodshed. The Minister said he believed General Franco had in mind the analogy of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.²⁷ Once the strong hold was relaxed disintegration set in. The monarchy fell shortly thereafter, then came the Republic and the gradual chaos that finally resulted in the civil war. The Minister then entered on a long dissertation on the character of the Spanish people which made it impossible to have here anything such as had occurred in England during the recent elections when, overnight, the Conservative Government was turned out and a strong Labor majority brought in, without disorders or trouble of any kind.

They desired, he said, nothing more than to have the best possible relations with the United States, Great Britain and the other democratic countries. Here the Minister referred to the position General Franco's government had taken during the war, giving the usual explanation as to why it had been necessary for Franco to do certain of the things that were now being held up against him. The Minister insisted that the regime was not Fascist in character and that even the Falange had represented in its ranks many of the so-called working classes. However, so far as the Falange was concerned, he could assure me that it was now "out" and that Franco had every intention of separating it completely from all participation in the Government. It was also his conviction that both the Junta Política and the Consejo

²⁷ Miguel Primo de Rivera established himself as military dictator of Spain on September 13, 1923; his dictatorship lasted about two years.

Nacional would be suppressed. As to the appointment of Sr. Fernandez Cuesta to the Ministry of Justice, Cuesta was no longer an ardent Falangist. He personally had always found him to be a man of moderate views, and he felt sure he would do his utmost to remedy certain of the features I had referred to, although he, the Minister, himself believed that the figures of the number of political prisoners still held in custody had been greatly exaggerated.

When the Minister finished, I said that I could only reach the conclusion from what he told me that it was evidently the intention of General Franco to continue along the lines set forth in his July 17 speech and that, if this were true, I could see little hope of any real improvement in the present status of our relations: in fact, given the increasing feeling of opposition in my country, I had serious misgivings as to whether it would be possible to maintain even the *status quo* unless something far more radical than what he had outlined were done to change the present character of the regime.

852.00/8-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State.

SAN SEBASTIÁN, August 28, 1945—midnight.

[Received August 28—6:35 p. m.]

SS 28. I saw Foreign Minister for 2 hours last evening at his residence and during course of informal conversation endeavored once more to impress upon him importance of early and far reaching changes in present Spanish regime. He insisted that evolution is progressing as rapidly as could be expected and said that even greater changes may be expected in near future. It was readily apparent from conversation that situation continues to revolve in direction of restoration of monarchy.

He informed me that he planned to leave today for Galicia in order to see Franco prior to next meeting of Council of Ministers and promised to acquaint Caudillo²⁸ with strong views which both British Ambassador and I have expressed on this subject.

I had short talk with Minister again today shortly before his departure for Galicia at which time he stated that Council of Ministers will probably be held in Madrid on or about September 7. I took advantage of occasion to refer to last night's conversation and to ask if recent developments particularly Potsdam Declaration had not convinced him that there could be no solution to Spain's problem until Franco handed over the reins of government. He replied that not only he but he believed Franco himself now realized this and that

²⁸ The Spanish Head of State, Generalissimo Franco.

it was only a question of when and by what means this could be accomplished without rise of disorder.

By courier to Madrid.

ARMOUR

852.00/8-3045

The Acting Secretary of State to the Spanish Ambassador (Cárdenas)

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Just before leaving for London the Secretary turned over to me your personal letter to him of August 30.²⁹

I have noted the protest which you were instructed to make.³⁰ Since the United States Government took no part in the activities complained of, it is assumed that this Government was informed of this protest for information purposes.

I have also noted the review set forth in your letter of the Spanish situation. The attitude of the United States Government has, I think, been made clear at San Francisco and Potsdam. In these circumstances I do not believe that any further comment by me on matters dealt with in your letter would serve a useful purpose.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

711.52/9-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, September 30, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 1—5:15 p. m.]

2029. I have not yet had any direct official reaction to publication of Acting Secy's statement on Spain.^{30a} It has not, of course, been published here nor has any reference direct or indirect to it appeared in any paper. Emb's confidential bulletin sent to high Spanish officials and certain Spaniards outside of Govt contained full statement including text of Pres. Roosevelt's letter as well as comment on it in US and British official circles. British Ambassador who saw FonMin day following publication tells me Artajo made no reference to it or what surprised Mallet to publication of Churchill^{30b}—Franco exchange.

I learned from American correspondent that one or two high officials in FonOff expressed indignation over publication which they considered unethical. While admitting that our Govt's position as

²⁹ Not printed.

³⁰ The Ambassador stated that the Spanish Government had instructed him to ask the Department of State to note its protest to the Mexican Government for recognizing a Spanish Government in Exile formed in Mexico (852.00/8-3045).

^{30a} This statement was printed in the weekly publication of the American Embassy, *Semanario Gráfico*, dated October 3, 1945.

^{30b} British Prime Minister until July 26, 1945.

stated in letter had been fully presented to Govt and therefore came as no surprise, they argued that it was unprecedented to make public confidential instructions of this nature. In other words it is clear that Govt here had hoped to be able to keep Spanish public including their own supporters in ignorance of the true attitude of our Govt towards Franco regime and probably realize that in spite of strict censorship contents of letter are bound to become known to some extent thru clandestine channels. What apparently worries Govt most is that statement is a unilateral one by our Govt, as Churchill letter was of British Govt, in contrast with San Francisco and Potsdam declarations which were participated in by Soviet and other govts.

Judging from past instructions to OWI³¹ outpost we take it for granted Dept would desire to secure full publicity on pronouncement of this nature and despite fact that British Embassy has decided to publish Churchill-Franco correspondence in their corresponding bulletin we are arranging to carry translation full text including President's letter in next number of Emb's *Semanario Gráfico* scheduled to appear Oct. 3. This has circulation of 90,000 copies that probably reach more than a million people. Since this action will undoubtedly be resented by Govt as tending to defeat their censorship and **may even call for strong protest possibly coupled with sanctions against *Semanario***, I feel Dept should be informed of procedure we propose to follow. As publication will follow closely upon action British Ambassador and I are taking in not attending Te Deum and official reception tomorrow to celebrate Ninth Anniversary of Franco's assumption of power to which all Chiefs of Missions are invited and majority apparently attending, the challenge will inevitably be clear and provocative.

While in agreement with what I believe to be the Depts policy that no suitable opportunity should be overlooked to make clear our attitude toward present Spanish regime, I feel we must, however, not lose sight of fact that so long as regime remains in power it is the one we have to deal with and on whose cooperation we must rely in such matters as repatriation of Germans, SAFEHAVEN, aviation and other questions. While Franco would probably hesitate to retaliate openly he can always find ways in which to make things difficult for us. Furthermore, I believe we must take into consideration that peaceful evolution can only be achieved thru those who now hold power and influence in the present Spanish State, notably the Army, the Church and to a lesser extent industry, and we should weigh our acts so as not, through offending Spanish pride and patriotism, strengthen Franco and Falange by drawing to their support those who now favor peaceful evolution.

³¹ Office of War Information.

I feel, therefore, that before proceeding finally with proposed publication all preparations for which have been made, I should bring these considerations to Dept's attention. Unless hearing from the Dept we propose to send out bulletin on the morning of Wed, Oct 3.

ARMOUR

711.52/10-145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour)

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1945—9 a. m.

1654. Urtels 2029 and 2030.³² One of the reasons behind release of President Roosevelt's letter was to let the Spanish people know our attitude toward Franco and the Falange. We feel therefore that you should proceed with publication in Embassy bulletin. We can probably meet any difficulties Franco might make for the Embassy.

ACHESON

711.52/10-2645

*The Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in Spain*³³

[Translation]

NOTE VERBALE

No. 835

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to state the following.

The Madrid correspondent of the United Press, Mr. Forte, has sent to his headquarters a telegraphic report framed in the following terms: "While General Franco today convoked his Government, thousands of Madrid people read for the first time the text of the letter sent by President Roosevelt to the present North American Ambassador in Spain, Norman Armour. This has been possible through the insertion of the text of the letter denouncing the Falange into the *Graphic Weekly* published twice a month which is edited in Spanish. 90,000 copies of this publication are issued which are distributed in Madrid and the provinces by the Consulates of the United States, and in Madrid it has a wider circulation than any of the local newspapers."

Elsewhere, the same correspondent reports: "Scarcely were Spaniards aware that the Embassy had published in its News Bulletin,

³² Telegram 2030, dated October 1, 1945, not printed.

³³ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 1072, October 26, 1945; received November 7.

Semanario Gráfico, the text of the letter sent by President Roosevelt to the present Ambassador, Norman Armour, which had never been made public in Spain, than they congregated by the hundreds in front of the Embassy, forming lines to obtain a copy of the Bulletin. It is estimated that each of those distributed has been read by a minimum of ten persons. It seems that the Embassy of the United States is determined to give publicity to all documents, speeches, and news which are not announced through other methods in this country, for which reason a large part of opinion does not know the true position of Spain in the world."

On their side, the press and radios of the United States have given wide diffusion to the news that the Bulletin of the North American Embassy in Madrid has published integrally the text of the letter under reference, in which the deceased President accused the Franco regime. "This document," the report adds, "was not picked up by the Spanish press, being treated in the same way as the Potsdam declaration and President Truman's rebuke, but public opinion of the country has been sufficiently informed because the Bulletin of the North American Embassy is run off in 90,000 copies, more than any large Madrid daily, and reaches all social classes." The report moreover permits itself to point out that "no protest from the Spanish Government is expected for this act of the Embassy of the United States."

This Ministry of Foreign Affairs can do no less than express its surprise at the transcribed reports. Knowing the correct manner with which the Embassy of the United States has always conducted itself, it naturally resists giving credit to the report relative to the exorbitant distribution of the *Graphic Weekly of the Embassy of the United States of America*. The Spanish Government believes on the contrary that that diplomatic representation adheres strictly to the standards which, with a spirit of ample tolerance, the Spanish authorities issued on the publication and distribution of news bulletins by foreign representations accredited in Spain—standards which establish that the cited bulletins are edited *exclusively for destination to the authorities*. If, on the contrary, the above transcribed cables reflect the truth of what has happened, the Spanish Government would find itself, much to its regret, forced to prohibit the circulation of a publication which could be considered illegal in not adhering to the dispositions in force in Spain on the subject.

As a consequence, this Ministry of Foreign Affairs trusts that the Embassy of the United States will consider it convenient, in reciprocation of the correct attitude observed by the Spanish authorities and press with regard to everything concerning its country, to order its press section not only to adhere to the norms established on publication of news bulletins but also to abstain from reproducing documents or

declarations which refer to Spanish policy, the publication of which is not expressly authorized by the Spanish Government.

MADRID, October 10, 1945.

711.52/10-2645

*The American Embassy in Spain to the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs*³⁴

NOTE VERBALE

No. 1073

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ministry's *Note Verbale* No. 835 dated October 10, 1945 and received at this Embassy on October 18, which refers to the distribution of the *Semanario Gráfico*, a publication of the Press Section of this Embassy. The *Note Verbale* in question deals particularly with the issue of the *Semanario Gráfico* which contained the letter addressed by the late President Roosevelt to the American Ambassador in Spain, the text of which was recently made public by the Department of State in Washington.

The *Semanario Gráfico* has been distributed in Spain since June, 1943. The issue to which reference is made above is No. 113 and was circulated in a manner wholly similar to the previous issues. This publication, insofar as distribution and circulation are concerned, is similar to the publications of other Embassies, including those of the late Axis, which have been circulated in Spain in recent years.

The *Note Verbale* of the Foreign Ministry raises the question of whether the distribution and circulation of the *Semanario Gráfico* after being in force for over two years and having been matters of general knowledge, should now be altered. There can, of course, be no discussion as to the right of the Spanish Government to order such alteration or of this Embassy to decide in view of the attitude assumed by the Spanish Government whether it desires to continue publication.

The *Note Verbale* also raises a further important question. The issue of the *Semanario Gráfico* cited therein published a letter from the President of the United States to his Ambassador in Spain. Is it consistent with the relations prevailing between the two Governments for the Spanish Government to prevent either in the Spanish press or in the official bulletin of this Embassy the publication of statements by the President or other high officials of the Government of the United

³⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 1072, October 26, 1945; received November 7.

States? No such restrictions exist in the United States on the publication of statements of the Spanish Chief of State or of other Spanish officials.

In view of the importance of the above questions, this Embassy will defer any action in the premises pending receipt of further word from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

MADRID, October 22, 1945.

852.00/11-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 9, 1945.

[Received November 10—11:36 a. m.]

2306. The following is a translation of a *note verbale* dated November 6 just received from the Spanish Foreign Office:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and with the object of correcting tendentious and inexact news reports recently circulated abroad with the intention of injuring the prestige of Spain and its Government is pleased to inform (the American Embassy) that there having been revealed to all persons of good faith the falseness of the defamatory campaign which international communism has directed against Spain during the past summer putting into play the press, radio and every kind of propaganda because of the arrest in Madrid of the Communist agitators Alvarez and Zapirain. There is now being unleashed anew another equally calumnious accusation because of the arrest in the province of Cádiz of the members of certain clandestine cells of Communist agitation it being now alleged that there is involved a group of peaceful citizens who have been condemned to death because of their political ideas.

On the contrary the truth is that there having reappeared in Spain certain crimes of terroristic nature, kidnappings, holdups, et cetera, which are being perpetrated in rural districts by some individuals who have infiltrated clandestinely across our frontiers, the state organs of security have succeeded in detaining in the south of Spain the members of those cells of agitation (who have been) in contact with the outlaws and have delivered them to the tribunals of justice which are commencing the appropriate processes of law, up to the present no sentence whatever having been pronounced against them, inasmuch as the case is (still) in the process of indictment.

In denying the new accusation and putting things in their proper places, once again it is necessary to caution Governments, diplomatic representatives and the press so that they will be able to discern in their noise-making campaigns the peculiar methods of agitation and propaganda which international communism uses when it proposes to attack a given country. Once again, also, the Spanish Government gives assurance that there reigns in Spain a regime of law in accordance with which the Government, respectful of the law and of the autonomy of the judicial power incharged with applying it, leaves

exclusively to the courts the judgment and the punishment of any criminal deeds whatever, subject always to the prior judicial process. Finally the policy of generosity and clemency which the Spanish Government follows in progressively pardoning those responsible for the past Communist revolution must have as a fundamental premise the unshakable affirmation of the principle of order and authority which is required for an inflexible application of justice."

ARMOUR

852.00/11-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 30, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received December 2—6 : 39 a. m.]

2430. I called yesterday on General Franco to say goodbye. In the course of a 2-hour conversation, his characteristic volubility was such as to justify description as a filibuster by a man not desiring to discuss certain unwelcome topics upon which his mind was made up. However, I was able to get across very definitely certain points.

1. I emphasized disappointment at slowness of political evolution during my stay here.

2. Although recognizing that foreign correspondents in Spain have now freedom from censorship, I pointed out with concrete examples that there has been no liberalization of local press control.

3. I referred to the question of political prisoners and urged greater publicity and clearer definition of govt policy.

4. I said that the Falange, the symbol of cooperation with our enemies, seemed as influential as ever.

5. I said to him that in all frankness I must state that I considered the situation serious and I knew that my British colleague shared my opinion: that opposition to his regime in the US, far from lessening, had increased during the past months, and that our Govt, as he must know, was being submitted to ever-increasing pressure to break relations, not to mention the South American Republics where, as he knew, certain govts had already broken and others were showing a disposition in the same direction.

To all this General Franco replied with a great flow of familiar generalities and digressions. He said that opposition abroad to his regime is artificially stimulated by Communist elements and is based upon widespread ignorance of conditions here. He was particularly eloquent regarding the Communist threat to Europe and South America.

In closing I asked General Franco what I could tell the President and Secretary regarding Spain's political evolution. He replied that I might say he is working honestly and loyally for evolution on liberal lines, that the problems confronting him and his collaborators

particularly those arising from the Spanish Civil War and the World War counsel patience on our part. He emphasized the need for avoiding further fratricidal strife in Spain. He closed by regretting that I could not stay on for another year since he believed that at the end of that time I would be convinced of the truth of his words.

I wish to stress that General Franco's attitude throughout our talk was one of complete confidence and self-righteousness.

ARMOUR

852.00/12-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 1, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received December 2—6:39 a. m.]

2438. After a farewell luncheon yesterday at the Foreign Minister's I had an opportunity for a further talk with him.

I expressed disappointment in my talk with General Franco (see my 2430, November 30, 7 p. m.) indicating that I nevertheless hoped Franco had realized from what I had said what a serious view I took of things. The Minister said that he had been in touch with Franco and that the latter had been left in no doubt as to my views which had given him pause for thought.

I took occasion to reiterate to Martín Artajo that the standing of Spain had steadily deteriorated in recent months, mentioning the resolution against Spain at San Francisco, the Potsdam Declaration, and the clear statements by high officials of the British and American Govts and the breaking of relations by various American Republics with the probability that others might soon follow. I said I was personally convinced that there could be no real amelioration in the situation so long as Franco remained as head of the Govt. The Minister indicated that he himself had been aware of the seriousness of the situation and that both Ambassador Cárdenas and Manuel Aznar³⁵ had confirmed to him much of what I had said. On the other hand, he felt that, much as Franco and many of his supporters would regret a worsening or a break in relations with other govts, they would prefer this rather than to compromise themselves or take premature action here which might result in grave disorders or civil war.

I told the Minister that, while it was a purely internal problem, I could not believe that the Spaniards would be willing to admit that Franco was the one and only man in the country who could handle the situation; that I could not see why, if Franco could be induced to hand back the power to the generals from whom he had originally received it, and if those in turn were to call in some outstanding civil-

³⁵ Spanish Minister in the United States.

ians and together work out a form of constitution, to be submitted to plebiscite, this might not prove to be a way out of the present impasse. The Minister agreed that such an arrangement seemed practical and logical but interposed that unfortunately the military could not be given a free rein the danger being, and he felt sure Franco knew this, that once they had been given the power, they would not willingly relinquish it. Franco, he said, being a military man himself, knows the weaknesses of his own military.

He said Franco always had in mind what happened to Alfonso XIII in 1931.³⁶ He said that the King had abandoned the power in the mistaken idea that the country was against him which as a matter of fact events subsequently proved was not the case and with the result that disaster ultimately followed. Franco feared that if he were to transfer the power when he is not convinced that the time has come, a similar situation might [now?] result. For this reason Franco had gone back on [to?] his original idea of creating shortly a Council of the Realm (in this connection the Minister stated that the very frank discussions the British Ambassador and I had with him in the summer in San Sebastián had been useful in bringing Franco around to his original plan) composed of six to eight leading figures. This council would be submitted to the new Cortes formed after the March municipal elections. Once approved by the Cortes, it would be submitted by referendum to the people. Franco would then turn over the power to the Council thus formed with the full approval of the people, which in turn would decide upon the form of govt to be established, presumably a monarchy. The Foreign Minister said that he was satisfied that the British Govt would accept a monarchy but had some doubts as to what our Govt's position would be. I told him that in my opinion it was a question for the Spaniards themselves to decide what form of govt they desired, but that I did not believe there would be any difficulty if the govt decided upon appeared clearly to have the approval of the majority of the reasonable elements of the country, adding however that time was of the essence. As the municipal elections would not be held until March and the Minister himself stated that such a plan could not be put [apparent omission] as to whether they would weather the storm until then.

The Minister said that Franco was a man who did not respond to pressure or rough treatment, and that he thought it might be useful if some form of statement or message could be received from the Secretary of State or from Mr. Bevin³⁷ or both. I asked him what type of statement he had in mind, but he replied vaguely that he thought we

³⁶ For documentation regarding the recognition of the Provisional Government in Spain in 1931, see *Foreign Relations*, 1931, vol. II, pp. 985 ff.

³⁷ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

would be the best judges. I then said that I did not see how our Govt could send any such statement to Franco under existing circumstances.

I suggested that General Franco put his plan in writing, with definite details and dates, and that this statement be given Ambassador Cárdenas to carry back to Washington. My British colleague who joined us at this point and who expressed in the strongest terms the serious view he takes of the situation mentioning the strong criticism already evidenced on the Govt side of the House of Commons against Bevin's policy towards Spain appeared to agree that this could be a constructive procedure.

The Minister not only agreed with this suggestion, but added significantly that this would likewise have the effect of committing General Franco to a definite schedule. I then pointed out that while such an arrangement might be helpful it still did not meet the question of public opinion abroad which would be in ignorance of Franco's plans and would see the situation as unchanged. For this reason I suggested that they might also wish to have the plan perhaps in less detail made public. Here again the Minister expressed concurrence adding that Cárdenas had brought back an invitation from the NBC³⁸ for Franco to broadcast to the US at the end of the year which might offer an excellent opportunity for some such declaration.

My British colleague and I agree that the above is interesting but it remains to be seen whether or not Franco is prepared to commit himself which is after all the crux of the situation.

In the meantime both Cárdenas and Aznar have assured me that they intend to present in realistic colors the situation as they know it to be.

ARMOUR

711.52/12-1545

*The Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in Spain*³⁹

[Translation]

NOTE VERBALE

No. 1007

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the American Embassy and regrets to have to call again its attention to the attitude of the Press Section of the Embassy concerning the publication of the so-called *Semanario gráfico de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos*.

³⁸ National Broadcasting Company.

³⁹ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 1319, December 15, 1945; received January 2, 1946.

Indeed, in its November 29 issue the Bulletin transcribes an article of the *New York Herald Tribune* of November 26 in connection with the secret correspondence between Franco, Hitler and Mussolini which was found in Germany and sent from there to the Department of State.⁴⁰

This Ministry would have nothing to object against the transcription of that article in the *Semanario* if it would not be a specially tendentious and offensive comment against the Chief of the Spanish State, and, as this Ministry cannot believe that one of the purposes of the aforesaid Bulletin of information is to attack the Chief of the State to whom your Embassy is accredited, it has no doubts that that diplomatic Mission will be good enough to repeat the necessary instructions to the cited Press Section in order to avoid that acts of serious discourtesy—as those which on two occasions the Ministry has had to point out—are repeated in the future.

MADRID, December 4, 1945.

852.01/12-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 12, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 9:11 p. m.]

7133. In accord with what he told me on December 8 Bidault handed me this morning a note reading in translation as follows:

“The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to invite the attention of the Embassy of the United States of America to the very sharp reaction of public opinion in the democratic countries, caused by the recent publication of the correspondence exchanged, during the last few years between Hitler, Mussolini and General Franco.

“In the light of this publication, the attitude of the present Chief of the Spanish Government appears to be such that it can be denounced as treason with respect to the democracies at war. This can only accentuate the hostile attitude which public opinion has adopted toward the political tendencies of General Franco and toward the absence of a sincere effort to prepare the way for guarantees of political and personal freedom of thought in Spain.

“France, as a neighbor of Spain, is particularly sensitive to the political evolution of that country, and feels a special responsibility in everything concerning it. As matters stand, the French Government considers that the disclosures outlined above make it difficult to continue to give to the Franco regime the support which is, in fact,

⁴⁰ Selections from this correspondence were published by the Department of State in a booklet entitled *The Spanish Government and the Axis*, European Series No. 8 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946). Additional papers through 1941 appear in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. XI (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960).

afforded to it by the maintenance of relations, even when reduced, as in the case of France, to the exchange of official representatives.

"The French Government considers, however, that the breaking off of these relations would assume its full significance in the eyes of the Spanish people only if it formed the subject of a joint decision on the part of the American, British and French Governments. The French Government considers, in particular, that common action on the part of the Three Powers would alone be capable of bringing about a change of regime in Spain.

"The Ministry for Foreign Affairs would be obliged to the Embassy of the United States of America if it would be good enough to convey to its Government the above information. The Ministry would, moreover, appreciate greatly knowing the attitude of the Department of State concerning the possibility, at present, of concerted action with respect to the Franco government. The Ministry would also like to be informed of the position which the American Government in case of rupture (of relations) with Madrid, would propose taking with reference to the Giral government,⁴¹ considered as legally representing Republican Spain. A similar communication has been made to the Brit Emb."

Sent Department 7133, repeated to Madrid 410, London 859 and Moscow 437.

CAFFERY

711.52/12-1545

*The American Embassy in Spain to the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs*⁴²

NOTE VERBALE

No. 1050

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ministry's *Note Verbale* No. 1007 regarding an alleged publication in the *Semanario Gráfico* of the Press Section of this Embassy. The aforesaid *Note Verbale*, although dated December 4, was received in this Embassy on December 10.

The *Note Verbale* states that the aforesaid publication in its number dated November 29, last, contained an article from the *New York Herald Tribune* of the 26th of the same month regarding "secret correspondence between Franco, Hitler and Mussolini found in Germany" and now in the Department of State. The *Note Verbale* goes on to say that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have no objection to the publication in the *Semanario* of the aforesaid article if

⁴¹ An *émigré* government in Mexico City, under the premiership of Señor José Giral.

⁴² Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 1319, December 15, 1945; received January 2, 1946.

there were not involved an especially tendentious commentary and one offensive for the Chief of the Spanish State. It adds that since the Ministry cannot believe that among the purposes which the aforesaid publication may pursue there is that of attacking the Chief of the State to which the Embassy is accredited, the Ministry does not doubt that the Embassy will reiterate the necessary instructions to the aforesaid Press Section in order to avoid the repetition in the future of actions of serious discourtesy as are those which the Ministry has had to point out on two occasions.

The Embassy desires to state categorically that the *Note Verbale* in question is based upon a complete error as to facts and furthermore this Embassy regrets and rejects the tone which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has seen fit to employ in the aforesaid *Note Verbale*.

There was no issue of the *Semanario Gráfico* of this Embassy dated November 29. A copy is attached⁴³ of the issue of November 28. It does not contain any quotation whatever from the *New York Herald Tribune*.

In the November 29 English language, "Department of State Radio Bulletin", a copy of which is attached,⁴³ there did appear an editorial comment from the *New York Herald Tribune*, the text of which was as follows:

New York Herald Tribune November 26th:—

"Unearthed in Germany, the secret correspondence between Franco, Hitler and Mussolini is now in the possession of the State Department in Washington. The news may well provide much food for thought to the Generalissimo in Madrid. The anomaly of Franco poses a difficult problem for the State Department as it studies the confidential correspondence. While it endeavors to make up its mind, the publication of that correspondence would be of assistance to the general public in making up its own mind."

This "Bulletin" incorporates material which is sent daily by the Department of State to the diplomatic missions of this Government all over the world in order to keep the officials of this Government informed as to news developments and public opinion in the United States. The following note, which daily appears at the head of the "Bulletin" explains this plainly:

"This Bulletin is prepared by the Department of State for the use of the officials of the United States Government abroad. It has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion."

A feature of this "Bulletin" is the so-called editorial comment section, the purpose of which is explained as follows in the section itself:

"The following is an attempt to present an objective, factual and unbiased daily picture of the editorial opinion appearing in repre-

⁴³ Not attached to file copy of this *note verbale*.

sentative American newspapers. In an effort to indicate opinion in different parts of the country, the newspapers selected will be varied from time to time. No effort has been made to select editorials or to give either favorable or unfavorable emphasis."

The above-quoted editorial from the *New York Herald Tribune* was one of thirteen editorial selections published in the issue of the "Bulletin" of that day. It is desired to repeat that these selections are made by the Department of State and are sent in identical form to all of the diplomatic missions of the United States abroad.

This "Bulletin" then is not a publication of the Press Section of this Embassy but rather of the Department of State in Washington for the benefit of the missions of the Government of the United States throughout the world. A sufficient number of copies is prepared in the English language only for distribution in Spain to official American personnel, to the diplomatic representatives accredited to Spain or certain foreign countries, to certain American and British citizens resident here, to certain foreign press correspondents and finally to certain officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to whom the Embassy is pleased as a courtesy to send copies. The latter category together with a small number of miscellaneous cases involves fourteen copies daily.

Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raises the issue of a previous occasion on which a *Note Verbale* was forwarded by the Ministry with regard to the *Semanario*, this Embassy desires in closing to reiterate the serious concern with which it views the fact that official utterances by the President of the United States or by the Secretary of State or other high American officials regarding the relations between the United States and Spain are denied publication in the Spanish press because of official Spanish censorship. This situation is indeed inconsistent with that prevailing in the American press in regard to statements of Spanish officials, regardless of the circumstances or the nature of those statements, and is a serious obstacle to mutual understanding.

MADRID, December 14, 1945.

751.52/12-1945

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1945.

The Spanish Ambassador came in by appointment at his request this afternoon at 3:30. I had not seen him for about ten months.

The Ambassador asked whether the question of Spain would be

raised in Moscow at the present meeting of the Foreign Ministers there.⁴⁴ I said that I did not know, but that, as he may have read in the press, the matter of relations with Spain had been brought up by the French Government with the Governments of the United States and Great Britain.⁴⁵ He said that he had seen reports of the French approach on the subject and wished to give me some information on the background of this *démarche*. He said his information was that the French Government had been under tremendous pressure by some of the extremist groups in France, particularly the Communists, to consider breaking off diplomatic relations with Spain, but that although Mr. Bidault, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had taken this matter up with the British and United States Governments, Mr. Bidault had no intention of actually coming to the point of breaking off diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government. I told the Ambassador that our information with regard to the background of the French approach was entirely contrary to his statement; that, as it had come to us, the three major parties in France were all very strongly opposed to the Franco regime and had taken the position that the time had come to press for rupture of diplomatic relations with the Franco Government.

The Ambassador asked what the attitude of the United States would be with regard to this question. I said that there was a tremendous feeling of resentment in this country over the activities of Franco as disclosed in the correspondence and documentation of Hitler and the Nazi Government, and that this Government would certainly not be disposed to raise any objection to the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Franco Government provided the French and British Governments were inclined to adopt that course. I went on to say that it would be perhaps just as well if I spoke in an entirely frank and straightforward manner to the Ambassador and to tell him just what the attitude of this Government was. I said that it had been made entirely clear by public declarations of this Government at San Francisco during the United Nations Conference there, at Potsdam during the meetings of the three Heads of States there last summer, and by public statements of high officials of this Government that we did not like the Franco regime nor the policies and activities pursued by that regime and the Falange organization with which it was connected. I said there was no use in reviewing all of the various activities of the Franco regime which were inimical to the policies and attitudes of this and the other Allied Governments, as the record was plain for everyone to see in that regard.

⁴⁴ For documentation pertaining to the Foreign Ministers Conference at Moscow December 16-26, 1945, see vol. II, pp. 560 ff.

⁴⁵ See telegram 7133, December 12, 5 p. m., from Paris, p. 698.

The Ambassador then asked whether I thought the Government of the United States would declare a rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain. I replied that as the present official relations between the two Governments were bad, and as they were becoming increasingly worse and were not even remaining in the same state but deteriorating progressively, I saw no other outcome of such a progressive deterioration than the final rupture of diplomatic relations, and I thought it was incumbent upon us to be frank and straightforward with respect to our attitude in this regard.

The Ambassador said that he appreciated this frankness and regretted only that we seemed to be forcing this action in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of finding some solution to the problem of Franco in Spain, as many Spaniards were applying themselves to some solution of the Franco problem, and it looked as if they would not have the time to work out a remedy which would avoid civil war and general devastation in that country. I asked him what prospects there were for substituting for the Franco rule a representative and democratic form of Government. He said that while he was in Spain he learned of a plan which, he had been informed, also was acceptable to Franco himself, for the turning over of the Government by Franco to a form of council which would hold a plebiscite or referendum in the country in order to determine the type of government the Spaniards wanted themselves. He said this plan was to have been put into effect sometime next March or April in conjunction with the holding of municipal and provincial elections and elections for national representation in a constituent assembly. He said it was to be regretted if the plan for putting into effect such a program of transition were to be interfered with by precipitate action on the part of the United States, Great Britain, and France. I asked the Ambassador whether any public announcement had been made of the program he spoke of, and he said that he himself had endeavored to have this program announced before Christmas but had been unable to achieve this purpose while he was in Spain; that he was still hoping that these arrangements would be made public, and that the program would proceed early next spring. I said that, in my opinion, the publication by the Spanish Government of any program which would provide for the removal of Franco and the substitution for him of a representative democratic government would be welcomed by all those who were real friends of the Spanish people.

Upon leaving, the Ambassador said that he would appreciate very much being informed of anything he could do in the situation, and particularly if he could be informed of any important move this Government decided to undertake. I said that, of course, I could not tell where the consultations on this subject might take place, and it might

be difficult for me to assume to inform him as the matter developed in consultation with the other Governments. Señor Cárdenas, referring to the retirement of Mr. Norman Armour, the present Ambassador to Madrid,⁴⁶ asked whether this Government intended to name his replacement soon. I said to the Ambassador that as far as I knew, there was no present intention of naming any replacement for Mr. Armour, and that it did not seem to me to be appropriate to name an ambassador to a country with the Government of which we were in such bad relations at present. I said further that I did not see any prospect of these relations improving as long as General Franco and his regime remained in control of the Spanish Government.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

711.52/12-2045

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 20, 1945.

Señor de los Ríos, who was formerly Ambassador from the Spanish Republican Government to the United States and now occupies the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in the group which have set themselves up as the Spanish *émigré* government in Mexico City under the premiership of Señor Giral, came in to see me this morning at his request. He said that he was leaving on December 27 for a visit to London and Paris, and as he had seen some conflicting reports in the papers recently of the attitude of the United States Government toward the Spanish problem, he had thought, in view of our past association during his time here as Ambassador, that it would be well to come to see me and ask me frankly what our attitude is at present toward the whole Spanish question. He then took considerable time in describing to me the composition of the Giral group and in stating the program he thought should be followed by the United States toward Spain. According to this plan, the United States should break off diplomatic relations with the Franco regime and should immediately recognize the Giral ministry as the Government of Spain. He said that, if the United States did not come to the assistance of the Giral cabinet by recognizing and supporting them, it would be necessary for them to make some arrangement by which the Communists were brought into their group. Up to the present time they had representation of all the Spanish elements except the Communists, but, if support were not forthcoming from the western democratic powers, the Giral ministry would find itself forced to enter into negotiations with the Communists in order that it might receive the support of

⁴⁶ Mr. Armour retired December 31, 1945.

Soviet Russia for its activities. Señor de los Ríos said that he had just seen a report in the press to the effect that the United States would require certain changes or readjustments in the Giral group before they would afford [*accord?*] recognition to it. He asked if I could inform him as to what changes or adjustments would be required, as they were most anxious to conform to anything we should consider desirable.

With regard to the latter point, I said that I did not know of any position which had been taken by the State Department or this Government to the effect that they would have to undertake certain changes before they would be granted recognition. I said that this Government was not making any stipulations or stating any requirements along those lines, and that, although I had only just returned from a rather extended absence on conference work, I had not heard of any plan of the kind he said he had seen in the press.

I told Señor de los Ríos that, of course, the attitude of this Government toward the Franco regime was clearly known and of public record, and there was no need to further elaborate on that for his benefit. I said that, as he probably had seen reported, we had just received from the French Government a suggestion⁴⁷ that an exchange of views take place between the French, British, and United States Governments on the possibility of terminating diplomatic relations with the Franco regime. I could tell him that, far from raising any objection to the discussion of this subject, we would notify the French Government that we would be prepared to discuss every aspect of this question. I told Señor de los Ríos that I could also tell him that as the relationship between this country and the Spanish Government was deteriorating progressively, it was inevitable that the final outcome of such progressive deterioration would be a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. I said that it was very hard to predict within what time such a result might eventuate, but that it was certainly moving toward that end, and it was possible and even likely that as a result of these conversations suggested by the French, a decision on the breaking of relations would be accelerated.

Señor de los Ríos went on then to press the advisability and necessity of the United States recognizing the Giral government, at which point I asked him whether he thought it would be possible for the Giral government to go into Spain in the event of General Franco's leaving the power. He said that it would be necessary for some arrangement to be made which would guarantee the peaceful holding of free elections, and that in his opinion the result of such free elections would unquestionably be a government exactly similarly composed as the present Giral group. He then continued with a very exhaustive description of the objectives and composition of the different representative groups contained in the Giral government.

⁴⁷ See telegram 7133, December 12, 5 p. m., from Paris, p. 698.

I asked Señor de los Ríos if he thought it would be possible for Franco to turn the power over to some kind of provisional council for the purpose of holding elections with a view to setting up a really representative democratic government in Spain. He said he did not think this was possible, and that the only procedure which could be followed would be to call in the Giral government to take over the power and make certain that the people were guaranteed a free expression of their choice, and that this would have to be supported by the insistent demand of the European democracies and of the United States.

I told Señor de los Ríos that it was rather difficult to discuss future developments with respect to Spain, but that I was very happy to inform him of the present attitude toward the Franco regime and also our attitude toward the suggestion of the French Government with respect to discussing a rupture of relations with that regime.

Señor de los Ríos said that he appreciated very much indeed the time I had given him, and that he felt that his information was very much clearer on the attitude of this Government. He hoped to see me either in London, if I went over for the United Nations meeting,⁴⁸ or back in Washington upon his return, when we would have a further discussion and report the situation as we found it.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

751.52/12-2245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1945—3 p. m.

5992. Embtel 7133 Dec. 12. Following is literal text of note which you should with any minor changes you think necessary, deliver to FonOff.

“The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on instructions from its Government, has the honor to refer to the Ministry’s Note of December 12, 1945, on the subject of relations with Spain and to make the following reply.

The United States Government agrees that consultation between the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, as the countries most directly interested, is of great advantage and welcomes the opportunity afforded by the Ministry’s Note.

There should be no doubt, either generally or on the part of the Spanish Government and the people of Spain, as to what the position of this Government has been, namely, that, because of the origins and nature of the present regime in Spain, and because of its close associations with the enemies of the United States, there is entirely lacking

⁴⁸ The General Assembly of United Nations convened for the first time at London in January 1946.

a basis for that confidence which must be the foundation of satisfactory relations between two countries. The reasons for this position were stated in a letter addressed by the late President Roosevelt on March 10, 1945 to the Honorable Norman Armour, then the newly appointed Ambassador to Spain. That letter was made public on September 16 [26], 1945, and the United States Government intended thus to confirm the policy stated therein.

As the Ministry knows, the United States supported the Resolution with respect to Spain passed on June 19, 1945, by Commission I of the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco.⁴⁹ This position was reiterated in the Declaration made by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Potsdam on August 2, 1945.

The American Ambassador at Madrid recently applied for permission to retire and was granted that permission. He has now left Madrid and it is not the intention of the United States Government to appoint an Ambassador to Spain at this time.

The United States Government is therefore prepared to take part in an informal exchange of views with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom at any time agreeable to these Governments to discuss frankly and realistically all aspects of this question. Such an oral and informal exchange of views could take place in Paris, Washington or London."

Sent Paris as 5992, rptd. London 11037, Madrid 2068.

ACHESON

852.00/12-1945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling)

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1945—9 p. m.

363. Legtel 417, Dec. 19.⁵⁰ Following for your information only. US reply to French Note suggesting consultation requesting our views on possible joint break of relations with Spain recited record of official public statements on Spain and indicated our willingness to have informal talks with French and Brit to discuss frankly and realistically all aspects of the problem.

Brit reply reaffirmed their desire to see Franco replaced by representative and stable regime acceptable to majority of Spaniards. Brit conclude however that breaking relations now would be premature and unwise since they did not believe such action would lead speedily to desired result, that renewed civil war might ensue and that there might even be rallying to support of Franco. Certain practical

⁴⁹ See vol. I, p. 1358.

⁵⁰ Not printed.

considerations militating against rupture now were also to be mentioned orally by Brit Amb Paris in delivering reply to French For Min.

ACHESON

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SPANISH DISPOSITION OF PIERRE LAVAL AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN SPAIN ON HIS ESCAPE FROM FRANCE

851.00/5-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 2, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 7:20 p. m.]

918. Shortly after 1 p.m. the Consulate General in Barcelona received information from one of its informants at the Barcelona airport that a German Junker-88 plane containing five men and one woman had just landed there. It was ascertained that Laval⁵¹ and Abel Bonnard⁵² were among the passengers and that it seemed quite possible that Marcel Déat⁵³ was also a passenger. The Consulate General immediately got in touch with both the Civil Governor and the Embassy. In turn, I have had several talks with the Foreign Minister⁵⁴ on the telephone and have just returned from seeing him at the Foreign Office. He confirmed to me that Laval and Bonnard were on board the plane but did not have the names of the other passengers. He said that when informed of this, General Franco⁵⁵ had agreed that the plane must leave Spanish territory at once with all on board except the woman.⁵⁶ Having in mind the position set forth in the Department's telegram 2701, October 3 [4], 5 p. m.,⁵⁷ I told the Minister I felt this solution would be satisfactory to us. However, I suggested to the Minister that a Spanish plane accompany them to make sure that the plane left Spanish territory and not return to metropolitan Spain or to the islands. In my presence he telephoned this request to the Air Minister.⁵⁸ The Air Minister apparently asked Lequerica what they should do if Laval and the others refused to board the plane or the pilot to take off. Lequerica replied that under Franco's orders he should tell them that if they refused to leave they would be "held here at the disposition of the Allied Governments".

⁵¹ Pierre Laval, formerly French Chief of Government at Vichy.

⁵² Formerly French Minister of National Education at Vichy.

⁵³ Formerly editor of newspaper *L'Oeuvre* in Vichy.

⁵⁴ José Felix Lequerica.

⁵⁵ Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spanish Head of State.

⁵⁶ Madame Laval.

⁵⁷ Not printed. The position set forth by the Department was that Spain had the prerogative to expel at once any political refugee from another country (740.00116 E.W./9-2944).

⁵⁸ Gen. Vigón Suerodíaz.

Shortly after the arrival of this plane I notified the French delegate⁵⁹ and the British Chargé d'Affaires.⁶⁰

Repeated to Lisbon as 86, Tangier as 41 and Paris as 178.

ARMOUR

851.00/5-245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 2, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

919. The Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs⁶¹ has telephoned me that Laval and his associates refuse to leave. Castillo spoke to Laval personally by telephone and the latter said that he also refused to give himself up to a French Tribunal where he would not get a fair trial, but was disposed to submit himself for trial to an American or International Tribunal. On these conditions he proposed to come to Madrid and give himself up to the American Embassy. I told Castillo that I would, of course, refuse to see him or have anything to do with him, and reminded him that the Foreign Minister had told me that, in the event that Laval and the others did refuse to leave, they would be held here in Spain at the disposition of the Allied Governments. I said that, of course, I presumed they would not be permitted the liberty of a hotel but would be confined.

Castillo called me back later to say that he had again spoken to Barcelona and that Laval and all the others on the plane except Madame Laval would be imprisoned in the military fortress of Monjuich at Barcelona, to be held at the disposition of the Allied Governments as a whole. He said that the Spanish Government would, therefore, await word from the Allied Governments as to their desires. I said that I presumed that all documents in their possession would also be held at our disposition. He said that Laval had expressed a desire to retain certain of his documents in order to prepare his defense while in prison but indicated that the Spanish Government would not permit this. I have brought the above to the attention of my British and French colleagues and shall await instructions from the Department.

The Foreign Office has given me the following as the list of those who arrived in the plane: Pierre Laval, Madame Laval, Abel Bonnard, Eugene Bonnard, Maurice Gabol, Paul Neraud. Also three members of the crew (apparently German) Gerhard, Helmuth, and Funk.

Repeated to Tangier as 42, Lisbon as 87 and Paris as 180.

ARMOUR

⁵⁹ Jacques Truelle.

⁶⁰ Reginald J. Bowker.

⁶¹ Cristóbal del Castillo y Campos.

851.00/5-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 2, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received 9:50 p. m.]

920. Following the conversation with the Under Secretary reported in my telegram No. 918 the Foreign Minister telephoned me to confirm that all those aboard plane, with the exception of Madame Laval, are being confined in the fortress of Monjuich and will be held "as prisoners" at the disposition of the Allied Governments. He expressed the hope that an early decision might be reached by our Governments as to what we wished to have done with them.

I suggested to Lequerica that in their own interest I thought it would be advisable for the Spanish Government to issue a clear statement to the press stating the position they had taken in this matter, as rumors were already circulating and I thought that it was important that the facts be authoritatively stated.

Repeated to Lisbon as 88, Tangier as 43 and Paris as 181.

ARMOUR

851.00/5-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 3, 1945—noon.

[Received 3:40 p. m.]

924. The Foreign Minister has just made to me the suggestion that Laval and his entire party be turned over to the British authorities at Gibraltar. He said that their presence here is becoming increasingly embarrassing to the Spanish Government and he feels that this would be the best solution.

I asked him whether this would include the German crew of the plane. While he was not entirely specific he indicated that they were not interested in the crew, and I judge that satisfactory arrangements with regard to them could be made. The idea apparently would be to have the party sent to Gibraltar by car or by any means that the British might suggest.

I immediately consulted my British colleague who is telegraphing London. He said he assumed the delivery would be made to the British on the understanding that they would receive them on behalf of the United Nations.

I am also notifying my French colleague.

The prompt handing over of Laval to the Allied authorities will no doubt deter other war criminals from seeking refuge in Spain.

I believe that the proposed method would be the most expeditious manner of handling the matter since the Spanish will obviously be reluctant to hand Laval and his party over directly to the French, particularly since the French have thus far been unwilling to enter formal diplomatic relations with Spain.

Repeated to London as 263, Paris as 185 and Lisbon as 89. By courier to Tangier.

ARMOUR

851.00/5-245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour)

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1945—7 p. m.

728. We have discussed with the British and the French Embassies here the subject matter reurtel 920, May 2, 9 p. m. and previous telegrams and both Embassies have undertaken to wire their respective Foreign Offices. We suggested that the problem of Laval being brought to justice for his crimes against France is essentially a French problem. We feel therefore that the French should seek to have Laval and his party taken to the French border and there turned over to the appropriate French authorities. We told the French Embassy here that we would fully support such a request of the Spanish Government and we have suggested to the British Embassy that its Government instruct the British Embassy in Madrid to take similar action. Please consult with your British and French colleagues and take such action as you deem most appropriate to the end that the Spanish authorities deliver Laval and his party to the French border.

Are the people mentioned in urtel 911, May 1,⁶² the same as those mentioned in your 919, May 2? If not please report what action the Spanish authorities have taken with regard to those people.

GREW

851.00/5-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 4, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received May 4—11:37 a. m.]

938. The Foreign Minister telephoned me again this morning to ask whether I had any reply on the Laval matter and to urge a rapid decision on our part. He said that the situation was becoming increasingly embarrassing for the Spanish Government as it was developing into an international incident. He said that he still felt that the

⁶² Not printed.

Gibraltar solution was the best one and that his Government would be prepared to hand Laval and his entire group over to the British authorities without any attached conditions. If, however, a decision was not reached shortly, he proposed again to insist with Laval that he and his party leave Spanish territory on the same plane in which they had arrived. For obvious reasons, he said he did not feel that this would be a satisfactory solution, nor did he seem hopeful that Laval would be more responsive now to this suggestion than he was 2 days ago, but he insisted again that a decision must be reached as soon as possible.

In the given circumstances the Spanish Government obviously does not wish to hand Laval over directly to the French authorities, although they probably assume that eventually Laval will have to stand trial in France. If the direct transfer is insisted on for its own sake, I fear that it will only serve to cause delay, all of which I must emphasize may result in encouraging others to make similar attempts to impose upon Spain for refuge. Please instruct.

ARMOUR

851.00/5-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 4, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received May 4—2:05 p. m.]

4520. We were told at Foreign Office this afternoon that when word was received here of Laval's arrival in Spain, British Embassy in Paris was asked to tell French Foreign Office that question of what to do with Laval was in the British view a matter to be decided between the French and Spaniards. Foreign Office says it was very pleased to learn through British Embassy at Washington that that was also Department's view. British Embassy in Madrid has been instructed to impress British view on Spanish Foreign Office. Foreign Office adds that no information on French reaction to leaving this matter in Spanish and French hands has as yet been received here.

Sent Department as 4520 repeated Madrid as 120.

WINANT

851.00/5-445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour)

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1945—7 p. m.

733. Your 938 May 4. Although we would much prefer the procedure suggested in Department's 728, May 3, we would be willing, if

this proves impracticable, to accept procedure outlined in your 924, May 3, under which Laval and party would be turned over to the British at Gibraltar for eventual handing over to the French.

For your information we think it desirable to play down the United Nations aspect of the matters since the question of whether nationals of Allied countries should be listed as war criminals to be tried by the United Nations has never been clarified. As indicated in Department's previous telegram Laval is apparently not now listed as a war criminal by the United Nations War Crimes Commission for the reason that up to the present these lists have been confined to nationals of enemy countries. The French would almost certainly prefer to deal with their own nationals in accordance with French law rather than have them dealt with by an international tribunal, and in view of Laval's trial and conviction *in absentia* by a French court his early delivery to French justice would appear the best solution from every angle.

We appreciate, however, that the important thing is to obtain his removal from Spain at the earliest possible moment and if it is impossible to obtain his direct delivery to the French, we are prepared to support any proposal along the lines you suggest which will accomplish the purpose of placing him under French or British control and which has the approval of your French and British colleagues.

Sent to Madrid as 733, repeated to Paris as 1866, and London as 3513.

GREW

851.00/5-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)

MADRID, May 4, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received 11:08 p. m.]

947. Personal for the Under Secretary. My British colleague has shown me a telegram sent last night by the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office London and repeated to him in Madrid indicating that I am to receive instructions from the Department to make representations to the Spanish Government jointly with him to the end that Laval be turned over to the French. My French colleague has received no instructions from Paris and my British colleague has not received any instructions from London to take any action. In its first telegram to Madrid the Foreign Office appeared to take the position that although the Spanish Government was probably entitled to put these undesirable aliens across the frontier into France, they were under no obligation to do so.

There is no doubt that the quickest means of ending this matter is for Laval and party to be sent to Gibraltar where with British consent they could be immediately handed over to the French and placed on a French vessel. For obvious reasons the Spanish Government would be most reluctant to hand Laval directly over to the French and the relations between Spain and France are such that, if left to their own devices, this matter may well drag on.

I bring this matter to your attention because if Laval is not considered a war criminal by the American and British Governments the two Embassies have really no local stand in the case and if the French are unable to get Laval extradited, will it not be difficult to explain why as alleged in British telegram, Laval is not on the United Nations' list of war criminals.

Repeated London as 270 and Paris as 193 to Lisbon by courier.

ARMOUR

851.00/5-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 5, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received May 6—10:05 a. m.]

969. On instructions from his Government, the French representative called on the Foreign Minister at noon today and formally requested that Laval and his party be delivered to the French authorities at the Franco-Spanish frontier. The Foreign Minister asked that the request be submitted in writing and apparently did not at the time commit himself although Truelle lately appeared to be somewhat optimistic.

This afternoon my British colleague and I called together on the Minister and supported the French request. We state that our Governments considered this to be primarily a French question but we hoped that the Spanish Government would accede to it.

The Foreign Minister was most emphatic in stating that the Spanish Government could not consider for a moment acceding to this extraordinary suggestion of the French Government: that it ran counter to the traditional relations between Spain and France; not to mention international law and to accept it would submit the Spanish Government to the most justifiable criticism. The Minister pointed out that a large number of political refugees from the Spanish Civil War charged with serious crimes were in France, the Spanish Government had never attempted to secure their extradition. He pointed out that the Spanish Government's position had been clear from the beginning; they wanted to rid themselves of Laval at the earliest possible moment. When he had refused to leave by plane, he had been in-

turned in a fortress and the Spanish Government continued ready to hand him over to the United Nations representatives at any time. They would, for example, be entirely agreeable to placing Laval and his party on a British or American warship or merchant ship with French officers on board either in the Bay of Barcelona or any other suitable point. Or they would be glad to put Laval across the border at Gibraltar where within ten minutes he could be made to board a French ship. Lequerica made it clear that once they were rid of Laval through one of the procedures described the Spanish Government was not interested in his ultimate destination. But it was out of the question, he insisted and it would create break [in?] a long tradition which was founded on realistic humanitarian consideration for France and Spain gratuitously to extradite people for purely political offences. My British colleague and I told the Minister that we would communicate this [apparent omission] the French representative would be notified.

Truelle was later called to the Foreign Office and informed by the Under Secretary of the Spanish Government's position along the same general lines set forth above. I have acquainted both my British and French colleagues with the purport of the Department's 733, May 4 for which I wish to express my appreciation. It now remains to be seen whether the British and French Governments are prepared to take accommodating action.

Repeated to London as 277, Paris as 195 and Lisbon as 95 and by pouch to Tangiers.

ARMOUR

851.00/5-1045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 10, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received May 13—2: 48 a. m.]

1012. My French colleague informs me his Government is now ready to accept Gibraltar solution for Laval and British Chargé is so informing his Government. I have authorized him to say that our Government is also prepared to accept this solution (Department's 733, May 4, 7 p. m.). If British Government accepts, Bowker will make arrangements with British authorities at Gibraltar.

To Paris as 216, repeated to Lisbon as 107, to London as 298, to Tangier by courier.

ARMOUR

851.00/5-1245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour)

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1945—9 a. m.

781. For your information only. Department has informally discussed with War Department possibility of requesting Spanish Government to deliver Laval to SHAEF.⁶⁴ However, Department definitely prefers solutions already proposed, namely, direct delivery to French or delivery to Gibraltar, and we do not wish to suggest this procedure unless those proposals fail. So far British have shown no inclination to go further than to support French request for direct delivery of Laval to French. Of course, their cooperation is essential for any other solution.

Sent to Madrid as 781, repeated to Paris as 2025 and London as 3720.

GREW

851.00/5-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 19, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received May 21—10:50 a. m.]

1090. British Embassy has now received instructions regarding Laval in a telegram from the British Foreign Office number 392, May 18 and repeated to the British Embassy, Washington, directing the Chargé d'Affaires to inform the Spanish Foreign Office that they cannot accede to the French request that Gibraltar proposal be accepted. They made clear they will not interfere in what they consider to be a purely French-Spanish question and repeat the line taken in former British telegrams that they can see no reason to help Franco out of his present embarrassment.

It seems obvious from what the British Chargé said that the British do not want to be associated in any way with the type of trial or treatment which Laval might receive on his return to France. Although he has been instructed to take this up with the Spanish Foreign Office, Bowker takes the line that the Spanish Government when informed of the British position will revive suggestion that Allied (other than British or French) warships come to Barcelona and interprets his instructions to mean that British Govt would refuse to participate in any such action. He states he is telegraphing British Foreign Office to ascertain from Washington whether our Govt would

⁶⁴ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

be willing to have a US vessel go to Barcelona for the purpose since it then would follow—if we did not agree—that our position and the British position were the same.

It is most unlikely that the Spanish Govt will agree to hand over Laval directly to the French for the reasons stated in my previous telegrams as well as those implicit in the British refusal to participate. The British, I believe, overestimate the embarrassment accruing to Franco from this unwelcomed guest if it is brought out later that Laval is not considered by Great Britain and the US or the United Nations as a war criminal and his presence here is merely a question between France and Spain.

In any case, such are the relations between France and Spain at the present time that no speedy acceptance of a French demand could be expected from the Spanish Govt. Meanwhile the longer Laval remains in Spain the more chance there is of his escaping justice. Although this Embassy is not in a position to comment on the British reference to the creation of an undesirable precedent in the use of Gibraltar, the continuation of the present situation in regard to Laval hardly creates the impression of effective action on the part of the United Nations. There is no evidence that the Spanish Govt desires to protect Laval or to delay his departure. It is prepared to hand him over to the United States or Great Britain as a war criminal for trial in France in accordance with a policy which the Spaniards have acknowledged, but to hand him over directly to the French runs counter to treaty and traditional Franco-Spanish practice.

Please instruct.

ARMOUR

851.00/5-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 26, 1945—9 a. m.
[Received May 27—6:34 a. m.]

1146. My 1090, May 19, 6 p. m. Pursuant to instructions from London the Brit[ish] Chargé d'Affaires called on the Foreign Minister yesterday to reassert the attitude of his Govt to the effect that the Laval affair is a matter to be settled between the French and Spanish Govts and one in which the Brit Govt does not choose to permit itself to become involved and that Laval should therefore be turned over directly to the French authorities without further delay as an undesirable alien being deported to the country of his origin. Invoking the familiar arguments with which he has on previous occasions countered similar proposals Lequerica reiterated the view of the Spanish Govt that such a solution is completely unacceptable and out of the question.

The ForMin speaking personally and informally then advanced the suggestion that arrangements might be made to return Laval to the point of his original departure (understood to have been Bolzano) to be turned over to whatever Allied authorities might be in control at that point in reply to which Bowker expressed the opinion that if such a course were to be followed he should be returned in a Spanish plane or if in his own plane at least with a Spanish crew. (A suggestion to this effect had in fact been advanced by the French Govt in its telegram of May 22 to the French Minister in Madrid and, according to the latter, mentioned by the BBC⁶⁵ and Bowker had planned to propose it of his own accord as an alternative solution.) After a brief discussion the Foreign Minister stated that he would give this suggestion his continuing consideration.

The French Minister states that he does not wish to call on Lequerica until he has received from his Govt a denial of certain damaging statements recently made by the BBC concerning assurances alleged to have been given Spanish republican leaders in the United States by Bidault but that he hopes to be able to see him early next week at which time he will, in consonance with instructions contained in his Govt's tel of May 22, pursue the suggestion that Laval be returned by the Spanish to the point from which he originally departed for Spain.

Pending the receipt of instructions requested in my reference telegram, I plan to make no further mention of the Laval affair in my conversations with the Foreign Minister.

Repeated to Paris as 259, London as 336, and Rome.

ARMOUR

851.00/7-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

SAN SEBASTIÁN, July 29, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received July 30—11:41 a. m.]

Niact SS5. Chief of Protocol called this morning with message from FonMin who is still in Madrid, to effect that Spanish Govt has decided to send Laval back to point from which he came in same plane in which he arrived. They wished to have this done as soon as possible and proposed to get him off tomorrow, Monday. He described plane as Junker 88 with no special design on wings and speed of 472 kilometers per hour.

Later in the day the British Ambassador⁶⁶ and I discussed matter with French representative Hardion who had been given above in-

⁶⁵ British Broadcasting Corporation.

⁶⁶ Sir Victor A. L. Mallet became British Ambassador to Spain on July 25, 1945.

formation yesterday by Spanish Under Secretary and had immediately telegraphed it to Paris. Hardion is telephoning his Govt this evening to see that Allied military authorities are advised and that proper measures are agreed upon to receive plane.

Plane is supposed to be flown to Bolzano its point of origin but Spanish official has expressed to Hardion view that German pilots who will fly plane may endeavor make clandestine landing in Bavaria, abandon Laval and wife, burn plane and rejoin families.

My British colleague and I have agreed, and have so informed Hardion, that to avoid confusion, Hardion should handle all details with French Govt leaving to latter coordination and clearing with Allied authorities.

British Embassy here states Foreign Office some time ago approved in principle return of Laval in manner now contemplated.

Repeated to Paris and London. To Madrid by courier.

ARMOUR

851.00/7-3145 : Telegram

The United States Political Adviser on Austrian Affairs, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (Erhardt), to the Secretary of State

VERONA, July 31, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received July 31—2:09 p. m.]

129. Premier Laval landed today at Linz in American zone in Austria in a JU 88 with markings painted out. Laval was immediately taken into custody by US forces in Austria and will be turned over at once possibly today to French commander at Innsbruck.

Repeated Paris as 16.

ERHARDT

851.00/7-3145 : Telegram

The United States Political Adviser on Austrian Affairs, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (Erhardt), to the Secretary of State

VERONA, July 31, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received July 31—2:30 p. m.]

132. Re my 129, July 31, 3 p. m. Army authorities will deliver Pierre Laval to French Commander at Innsbruck at 2000 hours tonight. Laval had intended to land in Salzburg. Mrs. Laval is accompanying her husband. German pilot and co-pilot former members of Luftwaffe, the only other occupants of plane are being de-

tained. Among Laval's possessions was 10,000 American dollars in cash in 500 notes.

Repeated Paris as 17.

ERHARDT

[On October 9, 1945, Laval was sentenced to death for plotting against the State and collaborating with the enemy. He was executed October 16, 1945.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND COMPAÑÍA TELEFÓNICA NACIONAL DE ESPAÑA ASSURING PROTECTION OF INTERESTS OF AMERICAN SHAREHOLDERS⁶⁸

852.75 National Telephone Company/1-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 13, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received January 15—12:06 p. m.]

87. In the course of my formal farewell interview with General Franco⁶⁹ I took occasion to say that I was glad that the negotiations between the appointed representative of the Spanish Government and the representatives of the IT and T⁷⁰ were making progress and I expressed the hope that the Spanish Government would do its part to bring them to a successful and speedy conclusion. Franco said that he too was aware that progress was being made in the negotiations which he hoped would terminate successfully for both parties because he was most anxious that American capital and technical facilities would be made available to Spain to help in its reconstruction and that he realized that the successful termination of these negotiations were not unconnected with such a development.

HAYES

852.75 National Telephone Co./2-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 22, 1945—10 p. m.
[Received February 22—1:05 p. m.]

388. Carceller⁷¹ informed Caldwell⁷² that in the Cabinet meeting held last Friday⁷³ it was decided the Spanish Government should

⁶⁸ For previous documentation regarding representations by the United States to Spain for the protection of American interests in the Spanish National Telephone Company, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 423 ff.

⁶⁹ Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spanish Head of State.

⁷⁰ International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

⁷¹ Demetrio Carceller Segura, Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce.

⁷² F. T. Caldwell, Vice President of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

⁷³ February 16.

exercise the right provided for in the telephone concession contract to purchase all of the American owned shares in the CTNE.⁷⁴ This decision is motivated primarily by the fear that if shares are sold to bankers there is danger of speculation and manipulation which would open the way for serious criticism of the Government and secondarily to avoid lengthy delays in the negotiations which may occur from demands of bankers for adjustment by the Government of tariffs and other CTNE problems as prior condition to agreement to purchase. Carceller stated the autonomous position of the CTNE will not be changed, that the Government is merely substituted in the erstwhile position of the ITT and that it is the present intention of the Government to resell to the public when convenient all or the major part of its holdings. He also stated that authority to purchase will be conveyed by a simple decree law which will then pass directly to the plenary session of the Cortes for approval.

Carceller also reaffirmed the intention of the Government to pay the purchase price figured at 2000 pesetas per share with dollar bonds and to liquidate the \$25 million outstanding indebtedness to ITT by payment of \$15 million immediately upon the issue of the enabling decree law and the balance by short term non-interest bearing notes in dollars or sterling.

CTNE would enter into a service contract with ITT for a minimum period of 10 years and would pay therefor three-fourths of one percent of gross annual income but payment for these services may not exceed 3 million pesetas in any one year. CTNE would also enter into an arrangement with Standard Eléctrica for purchase of materials under terms and conditions to be determined at a later meeting. The Government would approve an increase in capitalization in Standard Eléctrica provided at least 25 percent of its voting shares would be sold to CTNE.

Last night Caldwell informed Carceller that ITT is not disposed to accept the above proposal. ITT however would sell to the Government at 2000 pesetas the 280,941 shares previously agreed upon and the balance of its holdings or 38,000 shares at 3000 pesetas; payment to be made in dollar bonds based on present exchange rates, and the 286 million pesetas outstanding arrears liquidated by transfer of \$15 million upon reaching agreement and balance accepted in notes payable half June 1, half September 1, 1945. Inasmuch as ITT would thereafter have no capital investment in the company, its representation on the CTNE board, if any, would not have adequate powers to insure that the company would follow its recommendations and under these circumstances, and the reduced compensation, ITT would not

⁷⁴ *Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España.*

be willing to enter into a service contract. Nevertheless it would be disposed to offer its services at such time as the control of the company reverts to private ownership and under conditions which would insure that its recommendations would be followed by CTNE.

In view of CTNE's urgent need for a large amount of automatic equipment ITT would accept confirmation of orders authorized by the board of CTNE last May. As a major part of this equipment would be manufactured by Standard Eléctrica SA, its capital would have to be increased by 7 million pesetas and ITT would require that it be granted full preemptive rights to subscription of this capital.

Carceller stated he wished to discuss these proposals with Franco and would give an answer within a few days.

BUTTERWORTH

852.75 National Telephone Co./3-245: Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 2, 1945—midnight.

[Received March 4—8:51 p. m.]

455. During the course of negotiations developing from the two proposals reported in Embassy's 388, February 22, 10 p. m., it became apparent that the Spanish Government is very anxious to have assurances from the ITT that it will enter into a service and technical contract with the CTNE. These conversations led to an agreement between Carceller and Caldwell along the following lines:

1. The Government will purchase all ITT shares at 2,000 pesetas per share to be paid (a) \$98,752 in cash with surrender of shares; (b) \$50,000,000 in 4% bonds to be completely amortized in 16 years. Minimum annual amortization will be \$2,000,000 payable semiannually. If in any year 20% of the total dollar value of Spanish exports to the United States exceeds this minimum plus interest charges amortization will be increased by the sum of the difference. Furthermore, annual amortization will be increased by (1) the application of 75% of the dollar value of exports of Standard Eléctrica to ITT New York, and its subsidiaries and (2) at the option of the ITT by the return to the Spanish Government of bonds equivalent to 75% of exports of Standard Eléctrica to subsidiaries of the ITT in countries other than the United States (3) \$6,700,00 in 4% Government notes due December 1, 1945.

2. The Government will authorize the transfer of dollars \$15,263,000 against ITT/CTNE credits as soon as the Government and ITT lawyers reach an agreement on the exact phraseology of the sales contract. (Carceller assured Caldwell this payment would be made before March 15, 1945.)

3. The balance of \$11,000,000 of these credits will be covered by two notes without interest, one of \$6,000,000 due July 1, 1945 and one of \$5,000,000 due September 1, 1945.

4. Contract for sale of shares and notes and bonds issued in payment thereof will be exempt from taxes.

5. During the month of March the Government will authorize an increase in the capital of Standard Eléctrica Madrid of 5,000,000 pesetas in ordinary shares and 2,000,000 pesetas in preferred shares with full preemptive rights to International Standard Eléctrica Corp.

6. After above capital increase has been carried out and the Standard surplus account has been liquidated the ISEC will sell to the CTNE 17% of the ordinary shares of Standard at par.

7. At the request of the Government the ITT will allow up to 3 of its representatives to remain on the board of directors of CTNE without compensation other than their fees as board members during the period of reorganization but not to exceed 3 months. These representatives of the ITT will act as special advisors to the Government appointee as president of the CTNE during this transition period.

8. The ITT gives an oral undertaking to the Minister expressing its willingness, once assured the Spanish national telephone service would be operated under a private company with satisfactory distribution of shares board of directors concession contract, et cetera, that the ITT would enter into a service and technical contract with the CTNE and repurchase 38,000 shares by the surrender of the \$6,700,000 4% Government notes due December 1, 1945 plus the necessary additional cash to make the price correspond to that paid by the Government to the ITT. This service contract would be based on 1½ of gross revenue for a minimum period of 5 years continuing thereafter from year to year until cancelled on one year's advance notice by either party.

Subsequently Carceller informed Caldwell that General Franco has approved the above and that it is probable Cabinet approval will be given within the next few days.

BUTTERWORTH

852.75 National Telephone Co./3-1345: Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 13, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received March 14—11:45 a. m.]

534. Embassy's 472, March 6, 10 p. m.⁷⁶ Government and Company lawyers today signed memorandum to the effect that both parties are

⁷⁶ Not printed.

in agreement on conditions for the purchase/sale of ITT shares in CTNE and also in agreement on the English and Spanish text of bonds to be issued. The substance of the conditions of sale, in abbreviated form, will be incorporated in a bill to be presented to the Cortes, probably for action on March 15, which would authorize the Government to purchase the shares under the terms outlined. Subsequently the contract will be submitted to the Consejo del Estado which will determine whether it complies with the law.⁷⁷

Upon approval by the Consejo del Estado the Government and ITT will formally sign the contract and at that time the Government will deliver provisional bonds to the company in exchange for the company's shares.

CTNE is now arranging to deposit with the Instituto de Moneda funds sufficient to pay for the indebtedness owed to ITT and it is anticipated that before the end of the present week the first payment of \$1,500,000 will be transferred to the United States.

BUTTERWORTH

**PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AIR TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN** ⁷⁸

811.248/1-1345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945—10 p. m.

88. The War Department desires to obtain the permission of the Spanish Government to make landings in Madrid of planes of the Air Transport Command on regularly scheduled flights from the United States to Paris and Rome. As Mr. George⁷⁹ is thoroughly familiar with this project he is being sent to Madrid, accompanied by Colonel Payne,⁸⁰ to assist you. They expect to leave Washington the morning of the 16th by transport plane and to proceed via Casablanca. Depending on connections, they probably will travel to Lisbon by air from Casablanca.

GREW

⁷⁷ The Decree Law of April 13, 1945, authorizing the Spanish Government to acquire 318,641 holding shares in the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España owned by the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation of New York was ratified May 14. For text, see *Boletín Oficial Del Estado*, No. 138, May 18, 1945, p. 4053.

⁷⁸ The protocol effected by an exchange of notes signed at Madrid February 19, 1945, is an addition to the Air Transportation Agreement signed at Madrid, December 2, 1944. For text of the agreement of December 2, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 432, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1473.

⁷⁹ William Perry George, Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.

⁸⁰ Lt. Col. Robert G. Payne of the Air Transport Command.

811.248/2-645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 6, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received February 7—11 : 02 a. m.]

276. For Hickerson⁸¹ and Culbertson.⁸² After several meetings attended by George, Payne, Haering and Bond with the Spanish delegation the following definite proposal was finally obtained from the Spanish Government. As translated it reads:

[Here follows text as in protocol effected by exchange of notes, February 19, printed on pages 727-730, except that in final text article V was added and articles V to XI of this draft were accordingly re-numbered.]

Pertinent comment will follow.

George and Payne left for Lisbon tonight.

BUTTERWORTH

811.248/2-745 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 7, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received February 8—1 : 59 a. m.]

278. For Culbertson and Hickerson. In making the proposal contained in my 276 February 6, 9 p. m. the Spaniards stated they fully understood that ATC operation in question would have military aspects and that they had no objections to collaborating but could not make an outright written commitment which would in the first place put them on record as allowing an ostensible subrogation of sovereignty and secondly of openly participating in breaches of neutrality. A third factor involved was the necessity of providing authority for a unique operation which would cut across numerous internal laws and regulations and the jurisdictions of several Ministries.

The proposal they have now presented constitutes a formula which they feel will in effect enable ATC to satisfy its requirements and will at the same time cover the above mentioned factors. The Spaniards pointed out that although the wording of their proposal is somewhat obscure on some points, the full collaborating intent is not affected and that the device of a regulating committee of special delegates stipulated in article IX constitutes the core of the proposal since this Commission will be able to issue orders overriding the procedure and limitations of individual Ministries. Moreover, the Spaniards intend to have these proposals (if accepted by us) incorporated in a protocol to

⁸¹ John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs.

⁸² Paul T. Culbertson, Chief, Division of Western European Affairs.

our existing air agreement to give the matter some outward semblance of plausible legitimacy. The protocol will not be published. To increase the veneer of legal respectability Spanish article I refers to the operation within this country as being "ATCCS" with the implication that the two last letters of this anagram signify "civil services".

A further fiction for seeming alignment of the protocol with existing legal procedure is that of article VIII providing for special visa procedure in case of American officials (including military personnel) in transit. The procedure would consist of furnishing some rough form of manifest of such passengers under Embassy or other American Governmental seal with the understanding that aliases could be used if necessary and that there will be no inspection. Cargo in transit need not be manifested or inspected under this article. Foreigners and American commercial passengers in transit as well as all passengers stopping at Madrid would have to comply with regular Spanish visa regulations.

Article 6 would be interpreted liberally in that civilian coats or jackets could be used to cover uniforms during the stop at Madrid and a supply of these could be kept on hand for that purpose.

Under article 3 the installations required by ATC would be constructed or erected in collaboration with and for account of Spanish Air Ministry and would be under its general jurisdiction though set aside for ATC and, so far as confidential matter is concerned, restricted to handling entirely by ATC personnel within this face-saving structure. Similarly under article 4 a Confidential Section would be created within the Meteorological and Communications Services to cover American personnel and its operations.

Presumably most of the basic arrangements could be established by the Commission mentioned in article 9 within 60 days and thereafter Commission would probably have only minor matters to deal with. The Commission would settle payment terms on which installations would be set up for Air Ministry. It would appear that Americans appointed to Commission (the Spaniards have suggested three delegates from each side) in beginning should be of especially high calibre who would gain confidence of Spaniards and we particularly recommend Stanton of CAA as a member during opening stage.

The Spanish proposal is unusually liberal according to all local standards and certainly in advance of any concessions made during this war to other nationalities including Axis. Spaniards were undoubtedly moved to make such a liberal proposal at least partially under the influence of George's references to the opportunity afforded them to collaborate with us in the rehabilitation of Europe, and of having Madrid airport improved as well as of becoming closely associated with us in international aviation matters.

The Sub-Secretary of Foreign Affairs⁸³ who has been in direct charge of negotiations has indicated he would appreciate being informed of Washington's reaction by February 10 in order that he may decide upon vacation he intended to take. Since George and Payne emphasized the importance of speed in pressing negotiations with Spaniards while here I hope Department will send Embassy some reply by 10th to convey to Sub-Secretary.

Repeated to Lisbon as 17.

BUTTERWORTH

811.248/2-845 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 8, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received February 9—1:58 a. m.]

291. I called on the Foreign Minister today at his request. Lequerica said that he hoped that we were satisfied with the arrangements worked out about the Air Transport Command and the rapidity with which they were concluded and that he wanted the United States Government to understand that they would be implemented with a ready disposition on the part of the Spanish Government. Lequerica further stated that since it was a most unusual procedure to permit an army air transport command to operate through a neutral country, it had to be clothed in a certain manner but the Spanish Government wished to be most helpful to the United States and to contribute to the rehabilitation of Europe and European stability and the ATC would find that when its operations began the Spanish authorities concerned would in practice interpret liberally and he felt sure to our satisfaction the terms of the proposed arrangement.

Repeated to Lisbon as 18.

BUTTERWORTH

811.248/2-2045

*The American Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Lequerica)*⁸⁴

No. 3801

MADRID, February 19, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to negotiations which have recently taken place between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Spain for the conclusion of a Protocol⁸⁵ to the Air Agreement of December 2, 1944.

⁸³ Cristóbal del Castillo y Campos.

⁸⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 4070, February 20, 1945; received March 6.

⁸⁵ Authorization by the Department of State, the ATC, and the War Department to effect this agreement was given in telegram 301, February 18, 1945, 2 p. m. to Madrid, not printed (811.248/2-2045).

It is my understanding that it has been agreed in the course of the negotiations now concluded that this Protocol shall be as follows:

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND SPAIN RELATING TO THE OPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

As a provisional measure and in conformity with the provisions of the Agreement of December 2, 1944, the Spanish Government and that of the United States of America agree to amplify its stipulations with the following conditions:

I. A.T.C., which for internal purposes of Spain shall be designated A.T.C.C.S., shall be considered as one of the air transport enterprises of the United States to which Articles I and II of the Agreement of December 2, 1944 refer, for the purposes of realizing exclusively in transit the air traffic to which Article II of this protocol pertains.

II. All the routes defined in No. I(*a*) of Article I of the cited Agreement may be used by A.T.C. independently of the stops which are stipulated thereon, stops which shall be limited for the purposes of this Protocol to the air connection between the United States of America or other points on the itineraries covered by A.T.C. and Madrid, and beyond.

The Spanish Government will authorize moreover the non-stop flight over Spain on the direct Lisbon-Paris route, as an exceptional privilege and within the special conditions established in this protocol.

III. To this end the airport of Barajas shall be duly enlarged to the extent which the new service may require, the enlarged zone being destined to A.T.C., even though it form a part of the cited airport and be subject to the authority of the Chief thereof. The new installations and services shall be constructed by the Ministry of Air in accordance with the needs planned for by the North American technicians.

IV. The meteorological and communications services shall be the corresponding national services, which may contract North American technical personnel with respect to the needs of A.T.C., the confidential nature thereof being guaranteed.

V. The equipment and material which are to be imported for the A.T.C.C.S. will be purchased on reasonable terms by the Spanish Government with the exception of those which, for reasons of military protection, should be reserved by the Government of the United States and which will be also sold to the Spanish Government on reasonable terms when the named reasons disappear.

VI. A.T.C. shall be authorized to employ the minimum number of ground personnel necessary for its operation, under the general discipline of the airport.

VII. The aircraft employed in this service shall fly completely unarmed, and their crews shall make no ostentatious display of military character.

VIII. The Spanish Government shall authorize the necessary supplies for the proper functioning of the aircraft of A.T.C.

IX. The legislation in force on transit traffic shall be applied to the air traffic provided for in this Protocol, with the exception of

passengers of North American nationality who may be traveling on official duty at expense of the State, the visas of whom shall be adjusted to special procedures.

X. All political, financial and technical modalities relative to the execution of this Protocol shall be resolved by common agreement between both Parties, special delegates charged with proposing or deciding the opportune measures in each case being named for the purpose.

XI. This Protocol enters into effect on February 19, 1945, remaining in force for fourteen natural months counting from the cited date. Either of the Parties may after that date communicate in writing to the other Party its desire to terminate the present Protocol. Said notification may be effected only after a consultation celebrated between both Parties for a period of not less than ninety days. Once the Protocol is denounced in the manner indicated, it will cease to be in force ninety days counting from the date on which notification is given by one of the Parties to the other.

XII. Both Parties agree that the present Protocol shall not constitute a precedent applicable to their relations in the aeronautical field and that whatever is not expressly provided for in its text or may arise from the attributes granted the delegates to whom Article X refers, shall be adjusted to the general provisions agreed to between the Spanish and North American Governments in the Agreement relative to the operation of international air transport services signed in Madrid December 2, 1944.

I shall be glad to have you inform me whether it is the understanding of your Government that the terms of the Protocol reached as a result of the negotiations are as above set forth. If so, it is suggested that the Protocol become effective on February 19, 1945; if your Government concurs in this proposal the Government of the United States will regard it as becoming effective on that date.

I avail myself [etc.]

W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH

811.248/2-2045

*The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Lequerica) to the American Chargé in Spain (Butterworth)*⁶⁵

[Translation]

MADRID, February 19, 1945.

MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of today's date, in which you communicate to me the terms of a Protocol additional to the Air Transportation Agreement between the Spanish Government and the Government of the United

⁶⁵ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 4070, February 20, 1945; received March 6.

States of America signed in Madrid on December 2, 1944, a Protocol which has been agreed to in the negotiations now concluded between both governments.

The terms of the said Protocol which Your Honor has communicated to me are the following:

[Here follow the terms of the Protocol as given in note No. 3801, printed *supra*.]

I have instructions to inform Your Honor that my Government accepts the terms of the Protocol in the form in which they have been communicated to me, and likewise that it agrees with Your Honor's proposal that the said Protocol enter into effect on February 19, 1945, considering it therefore as being in force from the indicated date.

I avail myself [etc.]

LEQUERICA

SWEDEN

NEGOTIATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH SWEDEN FOR THE CESSATION OF SWEDISH EXPORTS TO GERMAN-OCCUPIED EUROPE¹

740.00112 European War 1939/12-2044 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1945—3 p. m.

2. Department understands that *Saturnus* has just arrived at Göteborg. It therefore assumes that in accordance with its agreement,² the Swedish Government will immediately terminate all exports to Germany and German controlled territory. In this connection, a review of incoming telegrams from Stockholm and London indicates that the Swedish Government has not made a categorical reply to our contention that Denmark and Norway fall within the definition of German controlled territory and, hence, the prohibition on exports applies to all shipments to these countries except those authorized by the Stockholm JSC³ after clearance with the American and British Governments (Department's 2536, December 16, midnight, sent to London as its 10496, December 16⁴). You are requested immediately to obtain an assurance from the Swedish Government that it concurs in our definition of German controlled territory.

Repeated to London as Department's 3.

STETTINIUS

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 456-682.

² Interim War Trade Agreement; for text of the memorandum serving as this agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, see telegram 11032, December 12, 1944, 7 p. m., from London, *ibid.*, p. 670, as modified by telegram 11088, December 14, 1944, 9 p. m., from London, *ibid.*, p. 673, and telegram 10495, December 16, 1944, midnight, to London, *ibid.*, p. 677.

³ Joint Standing Commission consisting of United States, United Kingdom, and Swedish representatives was established in Stockholm to assure the Allied Governments that Swedish policy was in accordance with various wartime trade agreements.

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 678.

103.9169/1-145: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 1, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received January 1—4:42 p. m.]

18. For Department and FEA.⁵ MEW⁶ was informed by Swedish Legation here December 30 that Swedes have agreed to consider Interim Agreement in force as of January 1, 1945.

WINANT

740.0012 European War 1939/1-245: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 2, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 5:35 p. m.]

6. Department's 2, January 1, 3 p. m.; 3 to London. All exports of Swedish goods to Germany were terminated January first. No notice of this will be given to the press and newspaper correspondents have been requested not to refer to situation since publicity would inevitably lead to stoppage of Göteborg safe conduct traffic. Foot⁷ and Stone⁸ according to Sohlman⁹ agreed to no publicity in meeting with Gisle¹⁰ and De Besche¹¹ December 22. Allies are understood to be interested in maintaining Göteborg safe conduct traffic open as long as possible in view of desire to get 100 octane aviation fuel and relief supplies et cetera to Sweden. (MEW's telegram to British Embassy, Washington dated December 15.) It is accordingly expected by Swedish Foreign Office that we will take every precaution to prevent any publicity leak.

The only Swedish goods which may still leave Swedish jurisdiction for Germany are those which had already cleared through the Swedish customs and were aboard German vessels or in railroad cars aboard ferry boats and therefore, had been exported prior to midnight, December 31.

Swedish interpretation of Germany as confirmed by Sohlman includes all German-controlled Europe except Norway and Denmark

⁵ Foreign Economic Administration.⁶ British Ministry of Economic Warfare.⁷ Dingle M. Foot, Member of Parliament and Parliamentary Secretary, British Ministry of Economic Warfare.⁸ William T. Stone, Director of the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in London and Special Adviser to Ambassador Winant.⁹ Rolf Sohlman, Chief of the Commercial Section of the Swedish Foreign Ministry.¹⁰ Carl O. Gisle, Counselor of the Swedish Legation in London.¹¹ Hubert Waltier August de Besche, First Secretary of the Swedish Legation in London.

(London's 11088, December 14, 9 p. m. to the Department; 837 to Stockholm¹²). Outstanding licenses for exports to Norway and Denmark have not been invalidated and presumably (Sohlman was not certain of this and will not be able to check with Boheman¹³ until the latter's return from the country tomorrow) new licenses will continue to be issued under terms of barter transactions entered into second half 1944. Questions of extent and nature of JSC "supervision" over Swedish exports to Norway and Denmark and when such supervision will become operative were, according to Sohlman, by agreement between Swedes and Foot and Stone left on the agenda for consideration and settlement when Boheman returns to London this month.

My 1, January 2, 4 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/1-145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Trimble)

[WASHINGTON,] January 2, 1945.

Mr. Dent¹⁴ telephoned me on January 2, 1945 regarding the suggestion recently made by representatives of the Swedish Government to the effect that we authorize a continuance of token shipments from Sweden to Germany in order that the Göteborg safe conduct traffic may remain open. He said that he thought we should approve this suggestion because of the value of the traffic to the British and the Americans. I informed Mr. Dent that this Government had decided not to accept this suggestion, but would insist upon complete termination of all Swedish trade with Germany. He then said that he thought it might be advisable for the Swedish Government to appeal our decision. I replied that I failed to understand the reason since the Swedish Government had formally agreed to terminate the trade. Mr. Dent then mentioned that the matter might still be referred to "higher authority". I reiterated that, in so far as this Government is concerned, we desired that all Swedish exports to Germany cease upon the arrival of the *Saturnus* and that we would hold the Swedish Government to its commitment.

Mr. Dent then stated that he could not understand why we were opposed to Sweden's exporting goods to Norway and Denmark. I pointed out that we would be agreeable to the exportation of relief supplies et cetera on an *ad hoc* basis and after reference to London and Washington. Further exports, however, might be of indirect value

¹² *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, p. 673.

¹³ Erik C. Boheman, Under Secretary of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁴ John Dent, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

to the German war effort and hence, we were opposed to them and were insisting that Sweden terminate them in accordance with its commitments to us. Mr. Dent thereupon asserted that our attitude would cause serious hardships to the Norwegians and the Danes and that he was thinking of "the Norwegians' feelings in the matter rather than those of you or ourselves".

I informed Mr. Dent that our minds had been made up and hence had nothing more to say regarding the subject.

WILLIAM C. TRIMBLE

740.00112 European War 1939/12-2044: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1945—2 p. m.

10. Department has made it clear in its 10495 and 10496 to London¹⁵ (which were repeated to Stockholm as 2535 and 2536, December 16 respectively) and in its 2201 and 2347¹⁶ to Stockholm (which were repeated to London as 9170 and 9804, November 2 and November 21, respectively) that provision of the *Saturnus* rubber cargo was contingent upon our understanding that the Swedes would terminate all exports to Germany and German-controlled territories. Furthermore, the word Germany has always been taken, in our war trade conversations with Sweden, to be synonymous with Axis Europe and to include Norway and Denmark and, as a matter of fact, is so specifically stated in the existing War Trade Agreement.¹⁷ We fail to understand therefore how the Swedes could have been under any misapprehension on this point nor how Foot and Stone (Stockholm's 6, January 2) could have agreed without prior authority from this Government to have reserved for future discussion with the Swedes the question of Swedish exports to Norway and Denmark. If this Government had appreciated that there was any remaining misunderstanding whatsoever on the question of Swedish exports to Norway and Denmark we would have been constrained to request the British authorities to detain the *Saturnus* at the Faroes until the question had been settled. Nor do we see how there could be any area of misunderstanding with respect to the "extent and nature of JSC supervision over Swedish exports to Norway and Denmark" as our position on this point is clearly set forth in the fourth paragraph of Department's 10495, December 16 to London.

This Government is not willing to await Boheman's return to London for further discussions on the above points but desires that its

¹⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 677 and 678, respectively.

¹⁶ Telegram 2201 not printed; for telegram 2347, see *ibid.*, p. 668.

¹⁷ For texts of the documents comprising the 1943 War Trade Agreement, see enclosures to despatch 11348, September 24, 1943, from London, *ibid.*, 1943, vol. II, p. 805.

views be strongly presented to the Swedish Foreign Office at once. To summarize, these views are as follows: that certain rubber and buna supplies would be made available to the Swedish Government and that immediately upon the arrival of such supplies in a Swedish port the Swedish Government would terminate all exports to Germany including German-controlled territories such as Norway and Denmark; that subsequent exports to Norway and Denmark could only be considered by the JSC on an *ad hoc* basis implying of course reference to Washington and London in each case.

In view of the position now taken by the Swedish Government with respect to exports to Norway and Denmark it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it was with deliberate intent that the Swedes did not bring up the question of such exports until after the *Saturnus* and its cargo had left American waters.

Failing prompt and satisfactory settlement of this question, Department is prepared to recommend to the appropriate American authorities the withholding of certain items now loading or about to be loaded on the *Falsterbohus*.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department's No. 49.

STETTINIUS

103.9169/1-345 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 3, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received January 3—4: 24 p. m.]

28. Official definition of Germany according to Sohlman is Germany proper including Bohemia and Moravia. Sohlman's comment yesterday (Legation's 6, January 2, 4 p. m., 1 to London) as to what constituted Swedish interpretation (London's 11088, December 14, 9 p. m., to Department, 837 to Stockholm¹⁸) was misunderstood. What Sohlman actually meant was stoppage of exports to Germany means that in [apparent garble] Europe excepting Norway and Denmark since Sweden has not for some time been exporting to Hungary, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Poland and German-occupied Balkan areas. The exports to Norway and Denmark pending conclusion of the Anglo-American-Swedish negotiations in London which contemplate reaching agreement as to extent and nature of JSC "supervision" and effective date thereof will consist only of carryovers from barter transactions entered into second half 1944. Swedes fully believe that such exports are permissible within interim understanding reached with Foot and Stone.

My 11, January 3, 5 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

¹⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 673.

103.9169/1-345 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 3, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

33. Legation's 6, January 2, 4 p. m., 1 to London. Further discussion of the precautions taken to prevent a publicity leak regarding stoppage of trade which in Swedish opinion inevitably would result in the closing of the Göteborg safe conduct traffic has produced the information from the Swedish Foreign Office that the Norwegian Government has approached the British and American Governments (MEW's telegram to British Embassy Washington dated December 15) for approval of token shipments from Sweden to Germany sufficient to keep the Göteborg safe conduct traffic open. (London's 838, December 14, 9 p. m. to Stockholm, number to Department unknown.¹⁹) The alleged reason for this Norwegian approach is Norwegian interest in the building up of stockpiles of relief supplies in Sweden which would be readily available for distribution in Norway upon Norway's liberation (Legation's 1653 December 14, 2 p. m., to London, 5112 to the Department.²⁰ The same problem was raised in Department's 1428, July 17, 9 p. m.,²¹ and commented on in my 720 July 20, 5 p. m., to London²¹ for SHAEF²²). It has allegedly been made clear to the Norwegians that if the war in Europe should be prolonged until August the Swedish supply situation (London's 10507, November 28, 8 p. m. to the Department, 771 to Stockholm²⁰) will have so deteriorated that Sweden will be unable to meet its promises to provide food and clothing.

Thus far according to Sohlman the Germans have not been informed that Swedish exports to Germany have been stopped. The Germans have simply been informed that the situation is not sufficiently clear to enable the Swedes to enter negotiations for the renewal of the German Swedish trade agreement²³ which expired at the end of 1944 and that they are not ready to enter negotiations for other types of trade such as the barter transactions with Norway and Denmark. However, Swedish Foreign Office officials fear that if the Germans are not invited before the middle of January (Legation's 5134, December 15, 6 p. m., 1661 to London²⁴) to discuss trade the Germans will

¹⁹ Telegram 11089, December 14, 1944, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv., p. 675.

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ Not found in Department files.

²² Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

²³ The Swedish-German Trade Agreement for 1964, which was concluded on January 10, 1944.

²⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 676.

"smell a rat". Those officials also fear that it would be much more difficult to get the Göteborg safe conduct traffic reopened than to keep it open.

In discussing these factors the Swedes have stressed that they are anxious that the record shall show that they have warned us about the importance of the Göteborg safe conduct traffic to the Allies and what in their considered judgment is the minimum the Swedes would have to offer the Germans in order to keep that traffic open. They also would like it shown that if the Allies in the interest of the Norwegians and other peoples in distress should authorize the Swedes to attempt within certain limitations to make an arrangement with the Germans, closing of the traffic and the resultant consequences to distressed people would clearly be on the heads of the Germans.

The Swedes have reiterated in advancing these considerations that they do not in any way intend to suggest that they are not willing and prepared to carry through with their undertaking to stop all Swedish exports to Germany. They have stopped these exports and the exports will not be resumed unless the Allies request that they be resumed. The Swedes merely wish us to be warned of the possible consequences. The Legation, of course, has maintained and maintains that all exports to German-controlled Europe must be terminated. Mr. Boheman in private conversation with me has expressed personal gratification over this position.

My 15 January 3, 7 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 BW/1-445: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1945—10 p. m.

100. Department's 10, January 3 to Stockholm which was repeated to London as Department's 49. Unfortunately *Falsterbohus* sailed at noon, January 3 before any action could be taken with respect to her cargo.

Vessel carries certain items of cargo which were supplied the Swedes in connection with the Swedish undertaking to terminate all exports to Germany and German-controlled territory upon the arrival of the *Saturnus*. The Swedes have not observed this undertaking either in spirit or in letter. Please inform the British authorities that unless the Swedes have terminated all exports to Germany and German-controlled territory including Norway and Denmark by the time *Falsterbohus* arrives at the Faroes the United States Government desires that the vessel be detained and that certain items of her cargo be

removed. Any consent given by this Government to the transit of these items through the blockade to Sweden may now be considered as withdrawn and voided.

Items are as follows: 287 tons carbon black and 38 tons tire cord fabric. This Government also withdraws its consent to the shipment of and desires to have removed from the *Falsterbohus* 50 tons of miscellaneous chemicals; 87 tons of tire accessories including 10 tons of bead wire; and 500 tons of copper wire and ingots. While these latter items (with the exception of the tire accessories and bead wire) were supplied under basic rations this Government feels that shipment of basic ration items must be contingent upon full satisfaction by Sweden of its obligations under the War Trade Agreement including the Interim Agreement which is provisionally in effect.

Stockholm Legation should inform Swedish authorities of foregoing.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm as Department's no. 23.

STETTINIUS

740.00112 E.W./1-245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1945—11 p. m.

24. Your 6, January 2. This Government's dissatisfaction over failure of Swedes to observe their commitment to terminate exports to Norway and Denmark is such that no guarantee can be given that matter can be withheld from the press.

STETTINIUS

740.00112 E.W./1-545 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 5, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received January 6—3:38 a. m.]

65. Department's 10, January 3, 2 p. m., 49 to London. Present situation is due to an understandable misunderstanding and not to any deliberate attempt on the part of the Swedes to mislead us. This misunderstanding arises from the use of the word "Germany" in the proposal that was made to the Swedes (Department's 2347, November 21, 8 p. m., 9804 to London,²⁷ 2352, November 22, 6 p. m., 9830 to London²⁸). The 1943 war trade agreement by implication defines Germany as meaning Germany proper including Bohemia and Moravia (Legation's 28, January 3, 5 p. m., 11 to London) since article

²⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 668.

²⁸ Not printed.

21 (1) of the Swedish declaration specifically sets forth the words "Germany and associated countries and occupied territories" to be used with reference to German-controlled Europe. Further, at the time when the Swedish Government gave the *Saturnus* undertaking (Legation's 4799, November 22, 7 p. m., 1540 to London²⁹), there was, in fact, no Swedish trade with satellite Axis countries and German-controlled territories excepting Norway and Denmark. As to the latter, Sweden has always made reservations. Thus the Swedes under the 1943 war trade agreement reserved the right to deal with these countries on a different basis than with other countries should the circumstances warrant. Anglo-American memorandum of September 20 [23?], 1943³⁰ noting general reservation as to Sweden's right of freedom of action to protect joint Scandinavian interests set forth in paragraph 3 of Swedish note of September 1, 1943³¹). Consistent with this policy Mr. Sohlman, in advising the British Minister³² and me last July that the Swedish Government would not make any new trade commitment with Axis Europe without first informing the London JSC, made exception in the cases of Norway and Denmark pointing out that trade with those countries would continue on a barter basis (Legation's 2718, July 21, 7 p. m., 728 to London³³). Also in stopping Swedish shipping to "German" ports exception was made of shipping to Danish ports which continues with what is understood by Swedes to be Allied approval. (Legation's 3163, August 18, 5 p. m., 911 to London, and related correspondence particularly Legation's 3997, October 2, 7 p. m., 1191 to London; 3998, October 2, 8 p. m., 1192 to London; and London's 8203, September 30, 7 p. m., 515 to Stockholm³⁴). Mr. Boheman, on December 14, 14 days before the arrival of the *Saturnus* at the [apparent omission], similarly advised Messrs. Foot and Stone of the Swedish plan to continue barter trade with Norway and Denmark (London's 11032, December 12, 7 p. m., 826 to Stockholm and 11088 December 14, 9 p. m., 837 to Stockholm³⁵). The Swedes understood that this was accepted by Foot and Stone and that passing final agreement as to exact mechanism to be employed by us to review each case they could continue their shipments pursuant to the 1944 barter deals.

The instructions of the Swedish Foreign Office of December 29 to the Swedish Legation at London (Department's 12, January 3, midnight, 68 to London³⁶ were to the effect that the Swedish Government

²⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 669.

³⁰ See paragraph quoted in telegram 6379, September 23, 1943, from London, *ibid.*, 1943, vol. II, p. 804.

³¹ See telegram 5771, September 1, 1943, 8 p. m., from London, *ibid.*, p. 801.

³² Sir Victor A. L. Mallet.

³³ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 585.

³⁴ None printed.

³⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 670 and 673, respectively.

³⁶ Not printed.

provisionally approves the draft agreement under the conditions presented by Foot and Stone (London's 11399, December 22, 8 p. m., 868 to Stockholm³⁷ it being understood (a) that putting the agreement into force would not prejudice the right of any party to propose modifications during the negotiations prior to formal signature, (b) that the provisional approval would not prejudice the question of final approval, (c) that the provisional approval signified that the provisions of the 1939³⁸ and 1943 war trade agreements with later modifications thereof would continue in force as from January 1, and (d) that the Swedish Government would stop exports to "Germany" pursuant to its *Saturnus* promise.

Relying either on the technical arguments or on the realistic factors of the situation, the Swedes believe they are in position to establish that they did not mislead us. I am convinced that they had no intention of doing so.

Concerning the course of action which may be suggested at this time it is noted that the only goods which may come in question for export during the interim period prior to the conclusion of the London negotiations are those not yet exported under the terms of the Swedish-Norwegian and Swedish-Danish barter transactions (Legation's 3041, August 10, 9 p. m., 869 to London, and 3651, September 14, 1 p. m., 1066 to London³⁹) entered into for the last half of 1944. These balances though their exact extent is unknown due to the time lag in Swedish export statistics are said to be small. (London's 11178, December 16, 8 p. m., 849 to Stockholm⁴⁰ and 11088 December 14, 9 p. m., 837 to Stockholm⁴¹). The Swedes understand that the approval in principle of the Swedish-Norwegian and Swedish-Danish barter trade permits them to fulfill the 1944 barter deals and to continue the trade pending determination of the applicable controls (Department's 2535, December 16, midnight, 10495 to London,⁴² London's 11196, December 18, noon, 850 to Stockholm,⁴⁰ London's 40, January 2, 8 p. m., 3 to Stockholm;⁴⁰ and Department's 13, January 3, midnight to Stockholm,⁴⁰ number to London unknown).

Accordingly the attitude towards publicity (Department's 24, January 4, 11 p. m., not repeated to London) and the proposed removal of certain goods from the *Falsterbohus* (Department's 23, January 4, 10 p. m., number to London unknown) would seem to be directed at stop-

³⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 681.

³⁸ The Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of 1939 was signed on December 7, 1939; the substance is printed in W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, vol. i, in the British civil series *History of the Second World War* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), pp. 150-152.

³⁹ Neither printed.

⁴⁰ Not printed.

⁴¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 673.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 677.

ping the export of carryovers from the 1944 barter deals since further exports beyond these are understood by the Swedes to have been agreed to in principle leaving only questions of details of nature and controls still to be negotiated.

I shall inform the Swedish Government pursuant to the Department's 13, January 3, midnight, number to London unknown, and consistent with London's 8, January 4, 7 p. m. to Stockholm, number to the Department unknown,⁴³ that our policy will be in general not to agree to any new barter exports to Norway and Denmark save those for humanitarian purposes. However, I shall appreciate receiving further instructions whether the threats of publicity and removal of goods from the *Falsterbohus* apply to carryovers from 1944 or on the other hand are designed to produce agreement from the Swedes as to the extent and nature of JSC supervision and the effective date thereof with reference to any 1945 barter deals between Sweden and Norway and Sweden and Denmark.

The Department of course fully appreciates that having *Falsterbohus* taken into an Allied control port (Department's 23, January 4, 10 p. m. number to London unknown) and having cargo removed therefrom would automatically invalidate the vessel's German safe conduct and results in ATC's⁴⁴ loss of the hundred octane fuel it requires for American military purposes in Sweden.

My 23, January 5, 6 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 EW/1-545: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 5, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received January 5—4: 35 p. m.]

161. MEW has confirmed that there is no basis for misunderstanding of the terms of the interim agreement now in force as pointed out in Embassy's 117 of January 4.⁴⁵

MEW has cabled Stockholm to the effect that the Swedes should be told that it is the understanding of the British Government that no trade shall take place after the first of January with Germany, occupied territories and satellite nations except for particular transactions which can only be permitted after specific approval by the

⁴³ Telegram 117, January 4, 1945, 7 p. m., from London, not printed.

⁴⁴ Air Transport Command.

⁴⁵ Not printed; it asserted that the tripartite interim trade agreement reached at London in December 1944 left no room for misunderstanding regarding the possible continuation of Swedish trade with Norway and Denmark (740.00112-European War/1-445).

JSC and that this applies to any barter arrangements made in 1944 as well as to commitments made in 1945.

Sent to Department repeated to Stockholm.

WINANT

740.00112 EW/1-445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 6, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received January 6—2: 52 p. m.]

193. For Department and Fleming⁴⁷ FEA, from Strong.⁴⁸ Re-Depts 69, January 3,⁴⁹ and reEmbs 161, January 5, repeated to Stockholm as our 14. At our request MEW is considering urgently the procedure for approval of particular transactions which Sweden desires to export to Norway and Denmark. British agree completely with us that en bloc approval for Norway and Denmark trade was not promised to Swedes and has never been contemplated. The only question at issue is whether reference of each export license to London and Washington is necessary. British will desire to scrutinize these transactions carefully, but they believe that reference of every small item will cause unnecessary delay. We are requesting MEW for prompt decision on this point. American intelligence and economic warfare experts here, including you, have examined Swedish lists which in their judgment are of no use to enemy war effort.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/1-545: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1945—midnight.

41. The Department concurs in your view that there is possible room for honest misunderstanding on the part of Sweden concerning the extent to which it was committed by the *Saturnus* agreement (your 65, January 5, 6 p. m.). However, this is all now academic in view of the provisional entry into force of the Interim War Trade Agreement by which Sweden is specifically bound to eliminate trade with Germany, occupied territories and satellite countries except as regards particular transactions specifically approved by the American and British Governments through the Stockholm JSC. MEW confirms

⁴⁷ John R. Fleming, Acting Director of the Special Areas Branch of the Foreign Economic Administration.

⁴⁸ Probable reference to William T. Stone.

⁴⁹ Not printed.

our feeling that there is no basis for misunderstanding of the terms of this Agreement (London's 161, January 5, 7 p. m. to the Department, repeated to Stockholm, number unknown). We would therefore be satisfied if Sweden, in conformity with the provisions of the Agreement, stops all exports to Denmark and Norway except those approved through the Stockholm JSC.

Repeated to London as Department's 154.

STETTINIUS

740.00112 EW/1-945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 9, 1945—noon.

[Received January 9—9:37 a. m.]

276. For Department, Crowley⁵⁰ and Fleming FEA from Stone. ReDepts 154 January 6 to London, number to Stockholm unknown.⁵¹

British are cabling their Minister in Stockholm today requesting immediate assurance from Sweden that no exports will be sent to Norway and Denmark before specific approval is given by JSC. In addition, British are requesting Swedes to submit a complete list of commodities carried over from 1944 barter deals and any other commodities they desire to export in next 2 months. For your information, MEW is considering a procedure under which London and Washington would scrutinize lists of proposed exports in advance, and if we were satisfied as to end use, Stockholm JSC would be given authority to approve individual export permits on the spot, referring any substantial alterations to us. Under this procedure, (which is not being discussed with Swedes in Stockholm), we would reserve the right to veto any category or item of trade which we found to be of value to the enemy. We would also be free to withhold approval should there be any radical change in our policy.

We assume that detention of *Falsterbohus* at Faroes (reDept's 100 January 4 to London, 23 to Stockholm), will not be necessary if the Swedes satisfy us that all exports to Norway and Denmark have stopped in accordance with final sentence in Department's 154, January 6.

This message repeated to Stockholm as our 29, January 9 noon. [Stone.]

WINANT

⁵⁰ Leo T. Crowley, Foreign Economic Administrator.

⁵¹ Telegram 41 to Stockholm, *supra*.

740.0112 European War 1939/1-1045: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 10, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 9:25 p. m.]

333. For Department and Fleming, FEA, from Stone. At a meeting with Foot today the Counsellor of Swedish Legation, Gisle, mentioned for the first time the four points reported in paragraph 2 of Stockholm's 65, January 5 to the Department (23 to London) setting forth the "conditions" under which the Swedish Government provisionally approved the Interim Agreement. Gisle explained that apparently a sentence in the original telegram from his Government had not been included in the version which reached him on December 30. (For your information, Gisle attached no conditions to Swedish acceptance when he informed MEW on December 30 as reported in Embassy's 18 on January 1.⁵³) Foot replied that this misunderstanding had created an awkward situation as the British and American Governments had undertaken to continue basic rations, et cetera, on the understanding that the Swedes would fully observe the Tripartite Agreement as drafted. He added that if the misunderstanding has not been cleared up in Stockholm, the Swedes should at once agree to a standstill arrangement under which no deliveries would be made to Norway and Denmark and no trade would be permitted with Japan until the final agreement is concluded when Boheman returns to London.

I pointed out to Foot (who is cabling Stockholm) the importance attached by my Government to securing the adherence of the Swedish Government to the Tripartite Agreement without reservation to include the immediate stoppage of exports to Norway and Denmark.

Sent Department as 333; repeated Stockholm as 34. [Stone.]

WINANT

740.00i12 European War 1939/1-1245: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 12, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 1:54 p. m.]

136. Legation's 130, January 12, 10 a. m., 42 to London.⁵³ Discussions with officials of the Swedish Foreign Office in the light of the Department's 41, January 6, midnight, 154 to London, and London's

⁵³ Not printed.

29, January 9, noon, 276 to the Department, have produced agreement on the part of the Swedish Government (a) to refer to Stockholm JSC lists of exports outstanding under the 1944 barter deals with Norway and Denmark and (b) not to export goods except those specifically approved by the American and British Governments through the Stockholm JSC.

JSC will approve as *faits accomplis* the exports contemplated by the licenses issued prior to December 31 for which renewals were granted in the period of misunderstanding from January 1 to date (Legation's 132, January 12, 11 a. m., 44 to London⁵⁴). The Swedish Government stresses that it is necessary to keep this trade going since (1) if this is not done it would lead to the closing down of factories in both Norway and Denmark in which event the Germans would deport the workmen to Germany and the Swedes could be blamed which might have political consequences and (2) if the trade is stopped it would be difficult to resume it since the Germans would do all they could to prevent its resumption and to place the blame on Sweden in the eyes of the Norwegians and the Danes.

Swedish Foreign Office advises that no 1945 barter transaction has yet been entered into with either Norway or Denmark and that we shall be advised of proposals in due course in order that any commitments will have our approval before they are made.

My 46, January 12, 1 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/1-1245: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Osborne)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 12, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received January 13—noon.]

Noweg⁵⁵ 6. Ranking officers of the Economic Department of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have shown this Embassy a list of proposed Swedish exports to occupied Norway during the first half of 1945 now under discussion in connection with tripartite agreement between United States, United Kingdom and the Swedish Governments. They state that elimination of this trade would seriously affect the civilian population of Norway and that they are satisfied that controls exercised by Swedes and Norwegians effectively prevent any benefit to the German authorities in Norway. They further state that they received recent assurances from reliable sources

⁵⁴ Not printed.

⁵⁵ Norwegian Series.

in Norway in this respect. For example, applications for Swedish funds to be used for payment of imports from Sweden are refused if the import is taking place at the request, direct or indirect, of German civil, military or police authorities. Applications are also refused if there is a German interest of any importance in the Norwegian consignee. They also state that no goods of Swedish origin have been reexported from Norway to Germany.

The Norwegians say that continuance of this trade is of paramount importance to them and they wish it maintained as long as it does not benefit the enemy. They state that cessation of trade with Sweden might result in a German demand that certain goods exported from Norway to Sweden under the Norwegian-Swedish trade agreement should be exported to Germany. Representations similar to the above have been made to the British through MEW.

I assume that full consideration will be given in Washington to the importance to the Norwegian civil population in relation to the resistance movement of continuation of this trade. This matter has been discussed with Stone of London Embassy's Economic Warfare Division who suggests that substance of this telegram be communicated to FEA's Blockade Division.

This has been repeated to Stockholm.

[OSBORNE]

740.00112 EW/1-445: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945—midnight.

305. The agreement proposed by the Swedish Government regarding exports to Denmark and Norway which is outlined in Stockholm's 136, January 12 (repeated to London as its 46) is acceptable to this Government. If the British likewise approve, it is proposed that the British and American Ministers at Stockholm be requested so to inform the Swedes.

In view of the above, this Government desires that you withdraw the request contained in the Department's 100, January 4, 10 p. m. (Department's 23 to Stockholm) relative to the detention of the *Falsterbohus* and the removal of part of her cargo.

Repeated to Stockholm as Department's 71.

GREW

740.00112 EW/1-1445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 14, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received January 14—4:47 p. m.]

486. For Department and Fleming FEA from Stone. In accordance with instructions (reDepts 305 January 13, midnight, repeated to Stockholm as Department's 71) we have informed MEW that agreement proposed by Swedish Government as outlined in Stockholm's 136 January 12 (repeated to London as its 46) is acceptable to the US Government. British concur and are cabling their Minister in Stockholm to join his American colleague in so informing the Swedes. In view of above, we have withdrawn request for detention of *Falsterbohus*.

Repeated Stockholm as 48. [Stone.]

WINANT

MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES DATED MARCH 12, 1945⁵⁶

811.79658/1-1745

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)

WASHINGTON, [January 27, 1945.]

SIR: In accordance with travel orders already issued to you, you are directed immediately to proceed to Stockholm to assist the American Minister, the Honorable Herschel Johnson, in the negotiation of an agreement with the Swedish Government for the establishment of Air Transport Command services to, through, and away from Sweden. You will journey to Stockholm by air, accompanied by representatives of the United States Army Air Forces who will be appointed by the War Department to act as technical advisers.

The nature of the proposals which the War Department desires to have made to the Swedish Government and which are approved by the Department are as follows:

[Here follow the specific proposals which, with certain modifications and additions, are contained in the note of March 12 from the

⁵⁶ For previous documentation regarding negotiations for a military air transport agreement between the United States and Sweden, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 683 ff.

American Minister in Sweden to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, printed on page 753.]

You will arrange with Mr. Johnson to keep the Department and the War Department fully informed regarding the progress of the negotiations. No final agreement should be signed without specific approval of the Department and the War Department.

The War Department considers that the pseudo-civilian air service, known as the AATS,⁵⁷ which the Air Transport Command now operates between the United Kingdom and Sweden, to be unsatisfactory from an operational standpoint. The aircraft must have civilian markings and be registered with the Civil Aeronautics Administration. This destroys the flexibility of the fleet of aircraft operated by the Air Transport Command since only planes having civilian markings may be flown on the AATS route between the United Kingdom and Sweden. It also leads to a disruption of the flying schedules, for an Air Transport Command aircraft with regular United States Army Air Forces insignia cannot be substituted for an AATS plane when it requires repairs. The AATS aircraft do not have type and prototype certificates, thereby making it necessary for them to be based outside of the United States and preventing them from returning to this country for extensive repairs and overhauling. Although members of the United States Armed Forces, the crews operating the AATS aircraft wear civilian clothes. They therefore run the risk of being executed as spies by the Germans, should a plane be shot down over enemy-occupied territory. Finally, it is obviously advantageous to the Air Transport Command to operate its own meteorological stations rather than be dependent upon the British and Swedish authorities for weather data as must be done at the present time. The aforementioned handicaps to efficient flying operation would not exist if the Swedish Government would agree to the establishment of regular Air Transport Command services to, through, and away from Sweden.

Should the Swedish authorities inquire during the course of the negotiations as to reasons why the Air Transport Command proposes to charge for certain transportation services, thereby likening it to a commercial air transportation entity, you should inform them that this Government does not consider that the charging of rates for the services offered in any way makes the present AATS operation or the proposed Air Transport Command services commercial in character, and that it has no intention of engaging in the general business of air transportation for hire. The Secretary of War ⁵⁸ has officially informed the Secretary of State that the Executive Order authorizing

⁵⁷ Army Air Transport Service.

⁵⁸ Henry L. Stimson.

the Air Transport Command to charge for the transportation of non-military passengers and freight is of an emergency and temporary nature. He has furthermore stated that the air transportation requirements of the Armed Forces greatly exceed the capacity of the Air Transport Command and that the Executive Order merely authorized it to use, for official and civilian travel on missions of importance to the over-all war effort, in relief and rehabilitation activities and in expediting a return to peace-time conditions, such small amounts of space as may from time to time be available and when such use does not interfere with the needs of the Armed Forces. You should furthermore impress upon the Swedish authorities that neither the AAT service nor the proposed Air Transport Command services should be considered as operating in competition with the ABA⁵⁹ or any other commercial airline.

The foregoing instruction has been approved by the War Department.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:
JAMES C. DUNN

811.79658/2-2745: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, February 27, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received February 28—1:28 a. m.]

746. From Cumming.

1. Following is text of draft ATC⁶⁰ agreement and annex thereto which is the outcome of conversations with Foreign Office and Swedish technical experts during past 2 weeks:

“DRAFT AGREEMENT

a. The Swedish Government agrees to the operation by the Air Transport Command of unarmed military transport aircraft into, through, and away from Sweden.

b. The administrative and operational control of United States Aircraft utilizing the Bromma air base,⁶¹ or such other air bases as may be agreed upon, shall be vested in the Air Transport Command insofar as such control does not violate established Swedish civil air regulations applicable to air traffic and air drome control (and subject further to the provisions of Annex “A”).

c. Air Transport Command aircraft may operate into, through, and away from Sweden with military crews and passengers in uniform. Air crews and passengers in uniform will, if required by the Swedish authorities, change to civilian clothes before leaving the limits of the

⁵⁹ AB Aereotransport, Swedish air line.

⁶⁰ Air Transport Command.

⁶¹ Located at Riksby, a Stockholm suburb.

Bromma base and such other Swedish air bases as may later be agreed upon for use by the Air Transport Command.

d. The Air Transport Command will determine and provide the minimum number of ground personnel necessary for the conduct of its operations. Such personnel, while permanently stationed in Sweden, will wear civilian clothes if required by the Swedish authorities.

e. The Air Transport Command will take all action necessary to assure procurement and delivery of all supplies necessary for its operations.

f. If requested by the Swedish Government, the Air Transport Command will arrange for the construction of weather observing stations required in Sweden for its operations and will operate such stations for the mutual benefit of the United States and Sweden, under the supervision of competent Swedish authority.

g. The Air Transport Command will arrange for the establishment of all communications facilities necessary to safe and efficient control of United States aircraft and will provide instruction in the installation, operation and maintenance of these facilities and a mutually agreed upon number of Swedish technicians. It is agreed that radio transmitting facilities installed for the Air Transport Command may be operated by Swedish technicians. It is also agreed that the Swedish Government will give priority to the operational requirements of the Air Transport Command in the use and operation of air and ground communications equipment, installed by or for the Air Transport Command. It is further agreed that the Swedish Government will not originate for transmission, by such equipment, messages pertaining to Air Transport Command operations outside of Swedish territory except with the prior consent of competent United States authority.

h. Cryptographing and decryptographing of administrative, operational and weather communications will be accomplished in an American Legation annex situated at Riksby (Bromma airport).

i. The communications equipment, navigational aids, weather stations and equipment installed by or for the Air Transport Command will not be removed as long as the Air Transport Command is operating in Sweden. Upon such equipment becoming surplus the United States authorities will discuss the transfer to Sweden of title to such equipment, subject to the pertinent provisions of pertinent American law.

j. It should be understood that when American civil air carriers operate into Sweden all facilities and equipment provided by the government of the United States, and which may later become the property of the Swedish Government, will be made available for use by American carriers on terms as favorable as those enjoyed by any national air carrier.

k. Subject to the obtaining by the Swedish Government of the necessary authorization from the Icelandic Government for the operation of Swedish aircraft into Iceland, the United States will permit Swedish use of the United States air base facilities at Meeks Field, Iceland including landing rights and access to weather and operational information insofar as this will not interfere with United States security or military requirements.

l. The Swedish Government will furnish appropriate guarantees that any classified information, technique or equipment which it may

acquire as a result of any action taken under this agreement will not be transmitted or made known to any other country, Allied, Axis or neutral, without the prior consent of the United States Government.

m. This agreement shall remain in force for 12 months and will automatically continue in force for successive 12 months periods subject to termination by either Government upon 90 days notice prior to the end of any 12 months period other than the first.

ANNEX A

1. Local (flight) control shall be managed by Swedish officers. The Air Transport Command shall have an American control officer or pilot in the control towers, at such airports as may be agreed upon for Air Transport Command operations, as soon as an Air Transport Command aircraft crosses the Swedish frontier. He will advise the Swedish control officer concerning Air Transport Command traffic in the air and should be a Swedish (Norwegian or Danish) speaking officer, if possible. When radio telephony is used he shall convey orders and messages from the Swedish control officer to the ATC aircraft.

2. Radio communications between ATC aircraft and the ground shall preferably take place by radio telegraphy according to the Q code or other agreed upon codes, when the aircraft is flying outside of the airport traffic control.

3. Existing Swedish regulations regarding the circumstances under which takeoffs and landings may be prohibited shall be also applicable to aircraft operated by the ATC. The Swedish civil aviation authority shall, however, give sympathetic consideration to requests for the promulgation of special regulations regarding the operation of aircraft operated by the ATC.

4. Other regulations which are generally applicable to traffic over Swedish territory shall be observed by aircraft operated by the ATC.

5. All navigational aids which the ATC may place at Swedish disposal shall be put under Swedish control but aircraft operated by the ATC shall be given priority in the use of such navigational aids.

6. It is agreed that the volume of radio traffic handled in the American Legation annex at Riksbys will be kept to the minimum necessary for the conduct of ATC operations in order that Swedish communication facilities will not be overburdened."

2. We preferred paragraph B of draft agreement without annex, leaving operational details to be worked out vocally on basis of experience. Swedes, however, wished the paragraph amplified which we believe has been accomplished without compromising principles of operational control originally desired. In fact there are some advantages in spelling out in a written document operational principles which might otherwise later be the cause of disagreement between American and Swedish operational offices.

3. Draft agreement and annex are approved by the Minister, General Kessler,⁶² Colonel Gutru⁶³ and Major Wilder.

⁶² Brig. Gen. Alfred A. Kessler, Jr., United States Military Attaché and Attaché for Air in Sweden.

⁶³ Col. George Henry Gutru, chief of European Theater Section, European Branch, Operations Plans Division A/C Plans, Headquarters AAF.

4. Text of agreement and annex will today or tomorrow be further discussed by the Foreign Office with Swedish technicians and will be laid before the Government for final decision Friday or Saturday morning, March 2 or 3. Accordingly I would appreciate receiving approval comments urgently.

5. Please pass to War Department and Army Air Forces. [Cumming.]

JOHNSON

811.79658/3-245: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 2, 1945—noon.

[Received March 2—noon.]

808. Personal for Matthews⁶⁴ from Cumming.

(1) Despite strong support for our ATC proposals which we have good reason to believe MA⁶⁵ are receiving in many influential Swedish circles including the Air Force, civil aviation interest and especially the Foreign Office there are some indications that opposition in principle may have developed in other quarters including the defense staff. In part this opposition is based on narrow concepts of Sweden's position as a neutral and in part arises out of irritation over various aspects of our policies with respect to Sweden. The latter may be an important factor in the case of politicians who are personally irritated by attacks on them in the press and in the Riksdag because of our Black List and economic warfare policies. We also do not overlook the possibility which cannot however be verified that British circles by now have at least some knowledge of our aims and one way or another are trying to throw sand in the machinery.

(2) If a substantially satisfactory reply is received from the Swedish Government today or tomorrow Gutru, Wilder and I will leave Sunday evening.⁶⁶ If however no reply or an unsatisfactory reply is received we will, on the strong advice of the Minister and in the absence of contrary instructions from you, remain over for a week to try to accomplish something.

Please pass to OPD⁶⁷ and Colonel Gates in ATC. [Cumming.]

JOHNSON

⁶⁴ H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

⁶⁵ Military Attachés.

⁶⁶ March 4.

⁶⁷ Operations Division, War Department General Staff.

811.79658/3-1345

*The American Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Günther)*⁶⁸

No. 666

STOCKHOLM, March 12, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the conversation I had with Your Excellency on February 16, 1945 in which it was recalled that on December 15, 1944 the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while advising me⁶⁹ that the Swedish Government could not at that time grant the request for an aviation service between the United States and Sweden as set forth in my Note No. 567 of October 30, 1944,⁷⁰ had stated that it would be prepared to examine a new proposal on the subject at a later date when the need of a direct air service communication between the two countries should prove more imminent.

As Your Excellency suggested, Swedish and American representatives have since discussed in detail the new proposals which I had the honor to advance on February 16.⁷¹ These, as thus modified, are as follows:

a. The Swedish Government agrees to the operation by the Air Transport Command of unarmed military aircraft into, through, and away from Sweden.

b. The administrative and operational control of United States aircraft utilizing the Bromma airbase, or such other airbases as may be agreed upon, shall be vested in the Air Transport Command insofar as such control does not violate established Swedish Civil Air regulations applicable to air traffic and airrome control (and subject further to the provisions of Annex "A"^{71a}).

c. Air Transport Command aircraft may operate into, through, and away from Sweden with military crews and passengers in uniform. Air crews and passengers in uniform will, if required by the Swedish authorities, change to civilian clothes before leaving the limits of the Bromma base and such other Swedish airbases as may later be agreed upon for use by the Air Transport Command.

d. The Air Transport Command will determine and provide the minimum number of ground personnel necessary for the conduct of its operations. Such personnel, while permanently stationed in Sweden, will wear civilian clothes, if required by the Swedish authorities.

⁶⁸ A note of the same date (not printed) from the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Minister in Sweden confirmed the understanding set forth in this note. Although both notes are dated March 12, telegram 982, March 13, from Stockholm stated that the formal exchange of notes took place on March 13, in the afternoon. (811.79658/3-1345)

This agreement was terminated by an exchange of letters between the American Legation and the Swedish Foreign Office dated September 30, 1946 (811.79658/12-346).

⁶⁹ See telegram 5151, December 17, 1944, 9 a. m., from Stockholm, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 685.

⁷⁰ Not printed.

⁷¹ See telegram 746, February 27, 7 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 749.

^{71a} For annex A, see p. 755.

e. The Air Transport Command will take all action necessary to assure procurement and delivery of all supplies necessary for its operations.

f. If requested by the Swedish Government, the Air Transport Command will arrange for the construction of weather observing stations required in Sweden for its operations and will operate such stations for the mutual benefit of the United States and Sweden, under the supervision of competent Swedish authority.

g. The Air Transport Command will arrange for the establishment of all communications facilities necessary to safe and efficient control of United States aircraft and will provide instruction in the installation, operation and maintenance of these facilities for a mutually agreed upon number of Swedish technicians. It is agreed that radio transmitting facilities installed for the Air Transport Command may be operated by Swedish technicians. It is also agreed that the Swedish Government will operate the facilities according to established international regulations accepted by the Governments of the United States and Sweden governing radio telegraphy procedures and will within the limits of these regulations give priority to the operational requirements of the Air Transport Command in the use and operation of air and ground communications equipment, installed by or for the Air Transport Command. It is further agreed that the Swedish Government will not originate for transmission by such equipment, messages pertaining to Air Transport Command operations outside of Swedish territory except with the prior consent of competent United States authority.

h. Cryptographing and decryptographing of administrative, operational and weather communications will be accomplished in an American Legation annex situated at Riksby (Bromma airport). It is agreed that the Swedish Government is entitled to knowledge of the substance of messages dispatched under the provisions of this paragraph, provided that cryptographic security is maintained. It is also agreed that recognition of this principle involves no more than examination from time to time of paraphrased sample messages. It is further agreed that Swedish requests for such examination will be made within one week of the date of dispatch of the message concerned.

i. The communications equipment, navigational aids, and weather stations and equipment installed by or for the Air Transport Command will not be removed as long as the Air Transport Command is operating in Sweden. Upon such equipment becoming surplus the United States authorities will discuss the transfer to Sweden of title to such equipment, subject to the pertinent provisions of American law.

j. It should be understood that when American civil air carriers operate into Sweden all facilities and equipment provided by the Government of the United States, and which may later become the property of the Swedish Government, will be made available for use by American carriers on terms as favorable as those enjoyed by any national air carrier.

k. Subject to the obtaining by the Swedish Government of the necessary authorization from the Icelandic Government for the operation of Swedish aircraft into Iceland, the United States will permit Swedish use of the United States airbase facilities at Meeks Field,

Iceland, including landing rights and access to weather and operational information insofar as this will not interfere with United States security or military requirements.

l. The Swedish Government will furnish appropriate guarantees that any classified information, technique or equipment which it may acquire as a result of any action taken under this agreement will not be transmitted or made known to any other country, Allied, Axis or Neutral, without the prior consent of the United States Government.

m. It is understood that the Swedish Civil Aviation Authority (Luftfartsmyndigheten) will grant a concession to the Air Transport Command for the service agreed upon, effective April 1, 1945.

n. These understandings shall remain in force for 12 months and will automatically continue in force for successive 12 months periods subject to termination by either Government upon ninety days notice prior to the end of any 12 months period other than the first.

As for the questions raised by representatives of the Swedish Government during the course of the negotiations regarding (*a*) flights of Swedish planes into and away from the United States, (*b*) the supply of spare parts required by AB Aerotransport for flying fortresses now on loan to the Swedish Government for air transport use, (*c*) the delivery of Douglas DC-3 aircraft to AB Aerotransport, (*d*) the supply of weather observations from the west to the State Meteorological and Hydrographic Board, (*e*) the training of certain Swedish personnel in flying the northern route to the United States via Iceland and (*f*) the circumstances under which Swedish aircraft might be permitted, after the establishment of an Allied Control Commission in Germany, to resume their pre-war scheduled flights into and over Germany, the replies to these questions are given in separate communications from this Legation.

I would greatly appreciate Your Excellency's confirmation of the understandings which have now been reached between our respective representatives, as set forth above.

Please accept [etc.]

HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON

ANNEX A

1. Local (flight) control shall be managed by Swedish officers. The Air Transport Command shall have an American control officer or pilot in the control towers, at such airports as may be agreed upon for Air Transport Command operations, as soon as an Air Transport Command aircraft crosses the Swedish frontier. He will advise the Swedish control officer concerning Air Transport Command traffic in the air and should if possible be a Swedish (Norwegian or Danish) speaking officer. When radio-telephony is used he shall convey orders and messages from the Swedish control officer to the Air Transport Command aircraft.

2. Radio communications between Air Transport Command aircraft and the ground shall preferably take place by radio telegraphy according to the Q code or other agreed upon codes, when the aircraft are flying outside of the airport traffic control.

3. Existing Swedish regulations regarding the circumstances under which take-offs and landings may be prohibited shall be also applicable to aircraft operated by the Air Transport Command. The Swedish Civil Aviation Authority shall, however, give sympathetic consideration to requests for the promulgation of special regulations regarding the operation of aircraft operated by the Air Transport Command.

4. Other regulations which are generally applicable to traffic over Swedish territory shall be observed by aircraft operated by the Air Transport Command.

5. All navigational aids which the Air Transport Command may place at Swedish disposal shall be put under Swedish control, but aircraft operated by the Air Transport Command shall be given priority in the use of such navigational aids under the same conditions as are set forth in paragraph "g" of the note to which this is an Annex concerning communication facilities.

6. It is agreed that the volume of radio traffic handled in the American Legation Annex at Riksbys will be kept to the minimum necessary for the conduct of Air Transport Command operations in order that Swedish communication facilities will not be overburdened.

RELEASE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY AIRCRAFT INTERNED IN SWEDEN

858.79661/1-2645

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

No. 897

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1945.

SIR: The War Department has informed the Department that a review of the requirements for heavy bomber aircraft indicates that by June 1945 the Army Air Forces will be confronted with a shortage of this type of aircraft in combat theaters. The War Department therefore intends to explore every available source to alleviate this situation.

According to records of the United States Army Air Forces, 131 American Army aircraft were interned in Sweden as of January 1, 1945. Of this number, nine have been loaned to the Swedish Government and are being used by AB Aereotransport.⁷² Your former Military Attaché for Air, Lt. Colonel Hardison, has informed the War Department that, including airplanes which have been loaned to the

⁷² Swedish national air line.

Swedish Government, there are from 85 to 86 serviceable United States military aircraft in Sweden. The majority of these interned aircraft are of the heavy bomber type. Further information available to the War Department indicates that more of the interned aircraft will become serviceable as a result of the work being accomplished by interned American airmen with assistance from the Royal Swedish Air Force and engineering personnel from AB Aereotransport.

In view of the above factors, the War Department has requested the Department to instruct you to initiate negotiations with the Swedish Government to obtain the release of all serviceable United States military aircraft except those currently on loan to the Swedish Government. Disposition of aircraft, salvaged spare parts and parts of aircraft that are not repairable will be made by the Foreign Economic Administration.

You are requested to discuss the aforementioned matter with your Military Attaché⁷³ and Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.,⁷⁴ of the Department, who is proceeding to Stockholm to assist you in the negotiation of an agreement with the Swedish Government regarding the establishment of Air Transport Command services,⁷⁵ and to present the proposal for the repair and release of the interned aircraft in such a manner and at such a time as you consider to be desirable. In this latter connection you are informed that the War Department considers the release of the interned aircraft to be of extreme importance and hence the matter should not be minimized by the Air Transport Command negotiations.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
JAMES C. DUNN

811.79658/3-245 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 2, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 6:43 p. m.]

817. Department's 373, February 28, 7 p. m.⁷⁶ Obtaining the release of interned bombers is one of the most delicate matters which could be taken up with the Swedish Government; and in my considered judgment our only chance of achieving our objective in this connection is through careful preparation of the ground in interested quarters prior to making formal request. Accordingly in the absence of the

⁷³ Brig. Gen. Alfred A. Kessler, United States Military Attaché and Attaché for Air.

⁷⁴ Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs.

⁷⁵ For documentation regarding the Military Air Transport Agreement between the United States and Sweden effected by exchange of notes dated March 12, 1945, see pp. 747 ff.

⁷⁶ Not printed.

Foreign Minister ⁷⁷ and Mr. Boheman,⁷⁸ I arranged to broach the question informally to Messrs. Assarsson ⁷⁹ and Hägglöf ⁸⁰ on February 26. The latter happened to be in Stockholm that day and I felt it would be helpful to have him present at the meeting, since his good offices had already been requested by General Anderson, Deputy Commander Operations United States Strategic Air Forces in the course of conversations regarding the matter in London last January. I found both Assarsson and Hägglöf sympathetic but pessimistic and strongly of the opinion that formal request for the release of our interned bombers should not be made until as many as possible of the interested individuals and agencies of the Government had been apprised of the advantages that would accrue to Sweden from meeting the request. I pointed out to them that the Swedish Government had already established a precedent which might well serve as a spring board for the desired action. This was the Swedish Government's decision to release interned Allied airmen "on account" (Legation's 3895, September 26, 10 p. m., 1944 ⁸¹ and related correspondence). I also stressed the obvious political advantages to Sweden from meeting our wishes in this matter and urged that under existing conditions no action should be regarded as impossible, that responsible officials should pursue a "can do", not a "can't do" policy. They agreed to help insofar as practicable and in this connection they undertook at my request to endeavor to keep the minds of responsible officials open, so that a negative attitude on the part of the Government would not develop while high officials with whom decision will rest were being informally prepared.

I had this first informal approach followed up by Cumming and Ravndal ⁸² who discussed the subject informally with Grafström; ⁸³ and I am having General Kessler prepare the military particularly General Nordenskiöld.⁸⁴

General Kessler has authority to give the Swedes up to 20 aircraft in exchange for the release of our flyable interned bombers and he will attempt to arouse support for our request by letting it be known that we would be prepared to let the Swedes have free of charge the bombers we have loaned them for civil aviation purposes as well as the five

⁷⁷ Christian E. Günther.

⁷⁸ Erik C. Boheman, Under Secretary of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁷⁹ Per Vilhelm Assarsson, Assistant Under Secretary of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁰ Gunnar Richardson Hägglöf, Swedish Minister to Belgium and the Netherlands, and former Chief of the Commercial Section of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁸¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 691.

⁸² Christian M. Ravndal, Counselor of Legation.

⁸³ Sven Grafström, Deputy Director of the Department of Political Affairs of the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

⁸⁴ Gen. Bengt Nordenskiöld, Commander in Chief, Royal Swedish Air Force.

fighters now interned here. He hopes that the opportunity of acquiring those bombers free will interest those concerned with ABA and SILA⁸⁵ and that the chance of getting five fighters immediately and free will gain support for our request from the Swedish Air Forces which badly needs them.

Grafström who has informally been apprised of what General Kessler is prepared to offer expressed the opinion following discussion with Assarsson and Hägglöf and presumably other high officials of the Government that an offer of a gift of the nature indicated would not have the supposed appeal. He said that our request would be regarded by some members of the Government as tantamount to a request that the Swedish Government take the status of a nonbelligerent and in consequence would require something far-reaching to get the Government's acquiescence. He suggested that we should be prepared to offer to undertake parallel conversations relating to some of Sweden's postwar interests. Asked what he had in mind in this connection, he replied that he would let us know after he had explored the matter with officials of the government. Mr. Cumming at this point expressed to Grafström as his personal view that the higher the questions went into the stratosphere of policy the more two considerations would be pointed up: (a) Sweden's pursuit of a policy of neutrality during the time we have been fighting the war at such a terrific cost in lives and material and (b) the relatively few matters which can be treated as purely of Swedish-American concern.

A further progress report will be submitted following General Kessler's conversation with General Nordenskiöld which will occur as soon as practicable, the latter's return from maneuvers, possibly tonight. See my immediately following telegram.

JOHNSON

811.79658/3-1245 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 12, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received March 13—2:36 a. m.]

972. Legation's 817, March 2, 5 [6] p. m. General Kessler has informally discussed with General Nordenskiöld, head of Swedish Air Force and General Kellgren of the Office of the Swedish Defense Ministry the question of the release of our interned bombers and in his opinion we can now expect the full support of the Swedish military authorities. In each case the Swedish officer mentioned that we had shown our interest in Swedish security by releasing 50 Mustangs to

⁸⁵ Svensk Interkontinental Lufttrafik AB (Swedish Intercontinental Air Traffic, Inc.).

them and that they might make return gesture by releasing the interned aircraft. General Kessler made it clear that it is not our desire to capitalize on the recent release of Mustangs but that we would consider the release of our interned aircraft as direct evidence of Swedish friendship.

General Kellgren suggested that a very plausible argument for release of the aircraft would be that upon release these aircraft would be used in the liberation of Norway and Denmark. Both officers expressed the opinion that approval of our request would have been impossible 3 years ago but that conditions have changed materially since then and that from a Swedish military viewpoint it should now be feasible subject to political considerations.

General Nordenskiöld called on me personally Saturday afternoon⁸⁶ to say that he had just come from a conference at the Foreign Office with Acting Secretary General Assarsson and Mr. Grafström and that he had supported our request from the Swedish Air Force point of view strongly and with all the persuasiveness he could.

JOHNSON

811.79658/3-1945 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 19, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received March 19—6:30 p. m.]

1067. My 972, March 12, 8 p. m. I mentioned to Foreign Minister Günther when I had occasion to see him recently our desires regarding release of interned bombers. I made no request of him but merely stated what we desired and our point of view and referred to my conversations on the subject with Acting Secretary General and other officials of Foreign Office. Mr. Günther had been informed of these talks and was sympathetic but did not commit himself and I avoided trying to get a definite opinion from him.

I have mentioned the matter again today both to Assarsson and Graftström. These very helpful officials have confirmed my opinion that it would be a mistake for us to press for too early a decision. Under such pressure answer might be negative. Both are fairly optimistic of some result if we allow Foreign Office to prepare the ground in political quarters. Assarsson told me that obstacle he must [most?] feared was the very conservative Minister of Defense.⁸⁷ Favorable factor in this situation is that we have the full support of

⁸⁶ March 10.

⁸⁷ Per Edvin Sköld.

General Nordenskiöld and General Kellgren. The decision however will be made on a political and not a military level.

JOHNSON

811.2358/4-745 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 7, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 10:28 p. m.]

1311. Reference my 1067, March 19, 8 p. m., and previous telegrams based on Department's secret instruction No. 897, January 29, 1945 regarding release by Sweden of interned American Air Force bombers.

Foreign Minister Günther informed me this afternoon that the Government has consented to release of all force-landed bombers which arrived in Sweden prior to January 1945. This will in fact be practically all of them. Mr. Günther said that he had been discussing this matter with the Prime Minister⁸⁸ and other members of the Cabinet for some time and that he was glad to tell me that there were no conditions whatever attached to the release of these aircraft. They do not include the machines which have already been loaned to Sweden and those which have been offered by the Military Attaché under authorization of the War Department. Mr. Günther said that it had not been an easy matter to push this through the Cabinet but that favorable action had recently been facilitated by the arrival of three or four German fighter planes which gave him an opportunity to establish a technical *quid pro quo* for release of four planes.

I subsequently saw Mr. Assarsson who informed me that present action refers only to the release of American craft but that Mr. Günther hoped there will be no objection on our part to Swedish release of any British craft which may be here and to the release of the three or four German fighter planes which have landed in Sweden. Mr. Günther's argument on this point has validity in my opinion. There are a certain number of members of the Cabinet in positions of influence who are neutrally minded to an extreme degree in a technical sense. Release of the three or four German craft which in comparison with our bombers are only a token, serves apparently to calm their conscience at the breach of technical neutrality.

I have on several occasions since receipt of Department's instruction on February 15 mentioned our desires in regard to these bombers to Mr. Günther without making of him a formal request. Legation has

⁸⁸ Per Albin Hansson.

also kept matter constantly before other officials of the Foreign Office. I have the impression that Mr. Günther and his Foreign Office associates were sympathetic and have been working for our ends. Mr. Günther evidenced pleasure when he gave me the information this afternoon.

In a later telegram I will inform Department of exactly what is involved in this Swedish action in terms of machines and how many are physically capable of being moved out.⁸⁹

Please inform War Department.

JOHNSON

811.79658/5-2645

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

No. 5635

STOCKHOLM, May 26, 1945.

[Received June 4.]

SIR: Referring to the Department's Top Secret instruction No. 1065, May 11, 1945,⁹⁰ I have the honor to inform the Department that the Swedish Government has accepted as a gift from the United States Army Air Forces the nine Flying Fortresses (Boeing 17s) which it previously held on a loan basis. Accordingly, the question of a contract to govern this loan raised in the Legation's despatch No. 4976, January 29, 1945,⁹¹ entitled "Contract Covering Loan of Flying Fortresses to Swedish Government" is no longer pertinent.

On behalf of the Legation's Military Air Attaché, General Kessler, who in a letter from General Anderson, dated January 15, 1945⁹² and in a MilID⁹³ telegram, dated February 22, 1945,⁹⁴ from General Giles⁹⁵ signed by General Bissel,⁹⁶ had been authorized to give to the Swedish Government up to twenty of the American interned aircraft in

⁸⁹ The War History Report of the Legation in Stockholm, which was transmitted to the Department in despatch 6694, February 20, 1946, stated that the United States aircraft began to be flown from Sweden immediately after the German surrender (124.586/2-2046).

⁹⁰ Not printed; it transmitted copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, dated May 4, 1945, suggesting that action regarding formalizing the terms under which B-17 aircraft had been loaned to the Swedish authorities be suspended until the manner of the final disposition of American aircraft in Sweden was clarified (811.79658/5-445).

⁹¹ Not printed; it proposed that a contract be concluded with the Swedish authorities for the purpose of formalizing the terms under which nine B-17 aircraft had been loaned to Sweden (811.79658/1-2945).

⁹² Not found in Department files.

⁹³ Military Intelligence Division.

⁹⁴ Not printed.

⁹⁵ Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles, Deputy Commander of the Army Air Forces and Chief of Air Staff.

⁹⁶ Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissel, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Military Intelligence) of the War Department General Staff.

Sweden, I offered in a letter to the Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Günther, the nine aircraft mentioned above as a gift to the Swedish Government. A copy of this letter, dated April 24, 1945 is enclosed herewith, as well as paraphrases of General Kessler's telegram to the United States Military Intelligence Division in Washington, dated February 21, and of the reply thereto, dated February 22, referred to above.⁹⁷ It will be noted that in this reply it was stated that the offer to the Swedish Government of the aircraft had been concurred in by the Department of State.

Replying on behalf of the Foreign Minister, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Assarsson, requested that there be conveyed to the competent military authorities of the United States, an expression "of the sincere gratitude of the Swedish Government for this generous gift", which it accepted with the greatest satisfaction. He added that the United States Government would be relieved of all responsibility for the payment of any Swedish customs duties or any other possible charges that might be levied on the aircraft concerned. He also expressed the belief that these aircraft would prove to be of very great importance for the future development of Swedish civil aviation. A copy of his letter, dated April 27, 1945, is enclosed.⁹⁸

General Kessler, as stated above, was originally authorized to offer up to twenty of the American bomber aircraft interned in Sweden in return for the release of the remainder. Since, however, it was thought undesirable to place the release of the interned aircraft on a barter basis, it was decided that if and after the Swedish Government did consent to the release, the nine Fortresses lent to the Swedish Government for use as civilian carriers could then be offered the latter as a gift without reference, however, to the internment question. This release was subsequently effected, and it was therefore considered that the appropriate moment for making the offer in question had arrived.

Respectfully yours,

HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON

⁹⁷ None printed.

⁹⁸ Not printed.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN AMENDING THE AGREEMENT OF DECEMBER 16, 1944, RESPECTING AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES, EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED AT STOCKHOLM DECEMBER 4, 1945

[For text of agreement, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1550, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1859. For text of agreement of December 16, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 431, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1466.]

SWITZERLAND

NEGOTIATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE WITH SWITZERLAND FOR THE CESSATION OF EX- PORTS TO GERMANY¹

740.00112 European War 1939/11138 1/2

*The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Secretary
of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1944.

DEAR ED: The Foreign Economic Administration is greatly disturbed about the lack of progress in economic warfare negotiations with Switzerland which have been conducted by our Legation in Bern upon instructions from the Department and FEA. These discussions have now been under way for more than three months, although when minimum demands were presented in September the Allied representatives insisted on their acceptance within five days as a condition for our making the supply concessions offered in return. Although the Swiss acquiesced in part, their replies on certain aspects of our *démarche*, especially the transit traffic question, have been entirely inadequate. The possibility that the campaigns in Italy and at the German border may continue for a considerable time makes it more and more essential that effective action be taken by the Swiss to terminate at once their aid to our enemies.

The Swiss contend, of course, that only by continuing trade with Germany and the transit traffic through Switzerland can they obtain supplies essential to the Swiss economy. While that argument may have been valid a year or even six months ago, I believe that present conditions make it untenable. The Swiss have built up substantial stocks of coal (amounting, according to the last report, to ten months average consumption) and of other supplies. They have stored in Spain and Portugal substantial quantities of food, fodder, and related commodities, and some textile raw materials, which are now awaiting transportation into Switzerland as soon as SHAEF² permits it. However, the fact that they have been able to forego receiving them for several months without any real hardship strongly indicates that they had stockpiled considerable quantities, and that the onshipment of their supplies in Spain and Portugal would simply replenish these

¹ For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 706 ff.

² Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

stockpiles. From an economic standpoint, therefore, there appears to be no reason why Switzerland cannot follow, to a very large extent at least, the example now being set by Sweden.³

The possibility of military retaliation by the Germans for any withdrawal of Swiss assistance now appears so remote as not to deserve consideration.

Despite these circumstances, which appear to make possible a far-reaching reorientation of the economic policy followed by Switzerland for the past five years, all available evidence indicates that the Swiss expect to continue their assistance to the enemy's war economy to the bitter end, making any reductions only very haltingly and under the strongest Allied pressure. Their collaboration with Germany on financial matters—the cloaking of enemy funds, the purchase of Axis gold, the Swiss banks' assistance to the enemy, etc.—is also continuing, a fact which does not promise extensive voluntary cooperation in our financial objectives, especially on the problem of enemy assets. Moreover, even where concessions have been made in principle, in both the economic warfare and financial spheres, there have been serious derogations in practice.

The Foreign Economic Administration believes, therefore, that the time has come when, for the sake of both present and future objectives, we must take immediate measures to convince the Swiss not only that we mean business, but also that to continue their present economic policy vis-à-vis the Germans would be disastrous to their own interests. On the basis of past experience, it appears unlikely that a reorientation of their policy can be obtained simply by presenting another note to the Swiss Government. Some new initiative must be taken to convince the Swiss that they can no longer count on our tolerating their assistance to the Germans. At the same time, if we were satisfied that the Swiss were doing everything possible to meet us on these objectives, we would be prepared to give them every possible assistance on supply matters consistent with overriding military requirements and our commitments to our Allies. We are not willing, however, to make any further economic concessions to the Swiss in advance of value received.

The Foreign Economic Administration recommends, therefore, that the following measures be taken at once, unless there are the strongest overriding political objections:

1. An immediate withdrawal of the offer of supplies made in September. To hold this offer open any longer, after having originally emphasized that it was valid only for a few days, would disastrously weaken our position in dealing with the Swiss.

³For documentation regarding negotiations of the United States and the United Kingdom with Sweden for the cessation of Swedish exports to German-occupied Europe, see pp. 731 ff.

2. A demand for immediate renegotiation of the export ceilings in Annex I of the existing War Trade Agreement⁴ for the period following December 31, as provided in the Agreement, for nil ceilings on all Annex I commodities, and for a drastic reduction of other Swiss exports to Germany.

3. A concurrent demand for stoppage of all southbound transit of coal; and of all transit of other commodities in either direction except where they are demonstrated to be directly for civilian consumption and excluding any loot.

4. Immediate and strong notice to the Swiss that if our demands on points 2 and 3 above are not met, we will consider our obligations under the War Trade Agreement to be at an end, and will reconsider entirely our policy of permitting Switzerland to receive supplies from overseas. Moreover, they should be put definitely on notice that transit facilities across France cannot be made available, at the expense of Allied transportation needs, for a country which continues to work with our enemy.

I hope that you will inform me of the views of the Department of State on this important question at your earliest convenience.

I understand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now considering the problem of the transit traffic through Switzerland. In view of their interest in this question, I am sending copies of this letter to the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of War.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

740.00112 EW/1-945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1945—8 p. m.

135. With reference to impending Swiss-German trade negotiations reported in British Legation Bern's 4174, December 29, Department believes Swiss should be advised not to make any commitments which would preclude favorable agreement with us for 1945 trade matters. You are therefore requested, at your discretion, informally to indicate to the Swiss that any important commitments to Germans would create unfavorable atmosphere for future negotiations with us and render conclusion of satisfactory agreement most difficult, particularly as regards Swiss desiderata. Perhaps the Swiss might arrange for an "escape clause"⁵ such as was included in the Swiss-German agreement in September.

It is hoped that your British colleague will join you in this informal approach to the Swiss. If arrangements have been or are made shortly

⁴The Anglo-American-Swiss War Trade Agreement effected by exchange of letters December 19, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 888-892.

⁵Term relates to provision in some trade agreements for a party to agreement to withdraw certain concessions when unforeseen developments occur that threaten serious injury to the producers of certain articles covered by the agreement.

for resumption of French participation on Mixed Commission (Department's 105, January 6,⁶ repeated to London as 138 and Paris as 63), we believe it would be helpful if French also associated themselves with the approach.

Sent to Bern repeated to Paris as 95 and to London as 193.

STETTINIUS

740.00112 EW/1-1145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 11, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received 11:12 p. m.]

207. Department's 135, January 9. British Legation having received instructions similar to those contained in Department's telegram under reference Secretary Altaffer and British Commercial Secretary called on Doctor Hotz⁷ of Swiss Commerce Division today and conveyed sense of Department's message.

1. Hotz freely discussed with them aims of present Swiss negotiations with Germans and he expressed rather urgent interest in learning items of undesirable exports which Americans and British wished to have reduced. He stated that they were exacting hard terms of the Germans and they anticipated no important commitments to Germany. Swiss need for raw materials such as coal and iron was great and naturally if Germans could guarantee to supply these they were prepared to give them Swiss goods. He pointed out that any agreement made with Germany would stipulate delivery of goods to Switzerland before export licenses would be issued against them. Swiss expect to confine exports to Germany to goods paid for in clearing and export licenses will not be issued for merchandise purchased out of free francs.

2. Hotz indicated that Swiss imports from Germany were as follows: October, 26 million francs, November, 31 million francs, December, 20 million francs. New transfer guarantees for exports to Germany, on the other hand, were as follows: October, nil, November 5.5 million francs, December, 2 to 3 million francs.

3. The Swiss intend to negotiate an agreement nominally for a period of 6 months but they do not propose to be bound for longer than 1 month. They will stipulate an escape clause similar to the one included in last September's Swiss German agreement. Prolongation of existing agreement after January 15 will probably be formal and

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ J. Hotz, Director of the Division of Commerce, Swiss Department of Public Economy.

bilateral although Swiss may unilaterally require payments into national bank until new agreement signed.

4. Referring to approaching negotiations with United States for extension of agreement of August 14, 1944,⁸ Hotz stated that naturally the 3 new items for which they had established nil quotas as of January 1, 1945, i.e. diesel engines and parts position M 5, steam locomotives position 883 A, and motor vehicles tractors and parts position 914 A/G, would automatically be included among nil quotas in new agreement.

5. Instruction urgently requested as to items of exports to Germany and other Axis which Department is most interested in having reduced so that this may be communicated to the Swiss in time to receive consideration in their negotiations with Germans.

See British Legation's Arfar 25, of this date repeated to British Embassy Washington as number 1.

Repeated to London as 76.

HUDDLE

740.00112 EW/1-1145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945—11 p. m.

202. We are endeavoring to draw up list of items of exports to Germany to be submitted to Swiss (paragraph 5 reurtel 207, January 11th repeated to London as 76) and have requested information from London (Department's 255, January 12 to London⁹ repeated to you as 170) and from SHAEF at Paris.

Any information you may be able to obtain from your contacts in Swiss Government and Swiss business circles as to importance Germans attach to particular Swiss exports will be appreciated.

Please keep us informed as to when list of items should be submitted to Swiss in order to prevent commitments to Germans. If list needs to be submitted in few days and before further information can reach you the following are the Swiss exports to Germany which we believe, on the basis of general information, should either be reduced or have a nil quota:

753/756—precision instruments and M6—machine tools of all kinds, both of which we believe are of considerable importance to the Germans; 931—watch parts (reports from intercepts and intelligence sources indicate possibility parts used in direction finders, bearing parts, etc.); 862-867—aluminum and products; ex 971—vegetable alkaloids; M4—steam machines; and electrical machinery, equipment,

⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 758-760.

⁹ Not printed.

and parts, which are included under several items under Annex I. If time should require that you present these items to the Swiss now you should indicate to the Swiss that the aforementioned items represent only our present and minimum desires and that we will undoubtedly wish to demand reduction or elimination of additional items in the future. You may also indicate to the Swiss that we will probably desire a reduction in net exports of electric power to Germany.

British Embassy here has received MEW's Arfar 64, January 12 and we will inform you shortly of our views on the subject.

Sent to Bern repeated to London as 303.

GREW

740.00112 European War 1939/12-2944 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Foreign Economic Administrator
(Crowley)*

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. CROWLEY: I refer to your letter of December 29, 1944, in which you set forth certain views with regard to the economic warfare policy which should be adopted in connection with our relations with Switzerland. This whole question has received the Department's serious consideration and as a result of the studies made the decision has been reached to adopt the following policy:

1. For political reasons and for reasons arising out of the benefits to us of Switzerland's neutral position and future potential usefulness in the economy of Europe it is inadvisable to place too great pressure upon the Swiss government at this time in order to attain pure economic warfare objectives.

2. The change in tactics suggested by the Legation at Bern and fully supported by the British government should be adopted as offering the best practical means of achieving our economic warfare objectives.

3. The Swiss should be told that as the military situation changed, our economic warfare objectives likewise would change and increase; that they had not fully met our September demands¹⁰ and that in the January negotiations we would have further requests to make, particularly with respect to North/South transit traffic; that in supply and other economic matters the Swiss demands would receive sympathetic consideration in the light of Swiss willingness and ability to meet Allied demands.

The policy set forth above was not adopted for political reasons alone. Both our Legation at Bern and the Economic Warfare Division of our Embassy at London who have had long experience in dealing with the Swiss in economic warfare matters have strongly urged

¹⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, pp. 766-769.

a change of tactics in the above sense as the most practical means of achieving our ends. This policy likewise has been adopted by the British government, and we shall have the advantage of the latter's full support.

As you are aware, the Swiss have suggested that a joint Anglo-American delegation proceed to Bern to consider all economic warfare questions now in dispute between the Swiss government on the one side and the British and American governments on the other. The Department is in favor of sending such a delegation in the very near future and will suggest to the military authorities that a representative of SHAEF be included. The delegation should be empowered to treat with the Swiss government on the basis of the above policy. What may be described as the "minimum demands phase" of our negotiations with the Swiss, which, while productive of certain concrete results seems now to have outlived its usefulness and resulted in the present impasse, will be closed out by the release of a substantial portion of the supplies of our September offer. The negotiators should be empowered to proceed on the basis of the semi-annual revision of the War Trade Agreement and to offer, subject to supply considerations and military necessity, both raw materials and transit rights across France in return for export reductions in Annex I of the War Trade Agreement and in inter-Axis transit traffic with particular reference to southbound coal shipments. Conversations are already in progress between representatives of your Administration and members of the Department's staff with respect to the relative importance to the German War effort of current Swiss exports to our enemy, and the views of SHAEF and of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare also have been requested.

I shall be glad to hear from you the names of the persons whom you wish to represent your Administration on the delegation. I count, of course, on your continuing cooperation in the forthcoming negotiations.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

740.00112 EW/1-1645

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Grew)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 16, 1945.

The British Ambassador called on me today at his request.

He reviewed the problem of our economic relations with Switzerland and reiterated the British position that since stern tactics had failed to achieve results, it would be the better part of wisdom now to allow a reasonable amount of commodities to move into Switzerland

over the French frontier in the belief that this would cause the Swiss still further to meet our wishes in cutting off their supplies to Germany. The Ambassador said he understood that there were differences of opinion between ourselves, FEA and the War and Navy Departments, and he asked me whether a decision for our future policy had yet been reached. He said that his Government attached great importance to Swiss services in connection with our prisoners of war and felt that in return for these services Switzerland deserved considerate treatment.

I said to Lord Halifax that we were studying this problem daily, but that I was not yet in a position to say that a change in policy had been determined. I said I understood that negotiations would take place in Switzerland, and it was questionable whether we could let down the bars on commodities moving into Switzerland until the Swiss should agree to accord a *quid pro quo* in a reduction of exports to Germany. I assumed that this whole problem would be the basis for such negotiations as might take place.

Lord Halifax urged that we proceed with the matter as soon as possible, to which I replied that we were living with the problem daily.

JOSEPH C. GREW

740.00112 EW/1-1745

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1945.

The Swiss Minister¹¹ came in to see me this morning and took up the matter of Swiss trade with Germany, which has been the subject of several calls by the Swiss Minister upon officials of this Department and other departments recently. His presentation of the Swiss case was very much along the lines of pointing out the necessity for Switzerland maintaining her neutral position in the war and the benefits the Allies received from her neutral position by reason of Switzerland being able to assist in the inspection and care of the Allied war prisoners held by Germany and Japan.

Mr. Bruggmann further stressed the fact that Switzerland was a party to an international treaty which prevented the Swiss Government from stopping the transit rail traffic entirely, if such traffic had not the character of war implements or war material or war munitions. He said that coal had never been classified as a war material and it was therefore impossible to stop the north to south shipments of coal from Germany to Italy entirely.

¹¹ Charles Bruggmann.

I said that we fully recognized the neutrality of Switzerland and respected the Swiss decision to continue her neutral position but that what we were asking did not in any way involve the question of Swiss neutrality; that we were asking and would continue to ask reductions in the shipment of goods to Germany and the transit shipment of coal to Italy and that the Swiss might just as well understand that as the war changed our demands would change; that we were fully determined to insist on the reduction of shipments from Switzerland to Germany to the lowest possible level and on drastic reduction of coal shipments from Germany to Italy.

Mr. Bruggmann entered into a long discussion of the technicalities of the Swiss position, but I maintained the Swiss could expect nothing less from the United States than insistence on the reductions I had described above.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

740.00112 E.W./1-1545: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1945—midnight.

346. Reurtel 294, January 15 repeated to London as 128.¹² 1. We are immediately suggesting to the British that an Anglo-American delegation proceed to Bern as soon as possible to negotiate with the Swiss and therefore we prefer not to settle in advance on definite ceilings of Annex I items but rather warn the Swiss to avoid commitments to the Germans on items in which we are especially interested.

2. While ceilings suggested in your paragraph 1 are in the right direction we hope something better can be obtained if we are successful in reaching an over-all agreement with the Swiss. If the Swiss meet us fairly we intend to be most liberal with respect to imports into Switzerland and most cooperative in arranging for transit across France for Swiss trade. We hope to reduce group 1 items to the vanishing point. With respect to precision instruments, the 1936-1938 average exports to Germany were only 485,000 francs, 1938 total was 569,000 francs. Quota of 9 percent will permit the Swiss to export to the extent of over a million francs. Your proposal does not cover transit traffic or exports of electric power. These topics must be included in any agreement with the Swiss.

3. We agree with your proposals on vegetable alkaloids and concur that aluminum is probably now of minor importance. We prefer not to release goods covered by last September offer in advance of arrival

¹² Not printed.

of delegation. Every effort should be made to keep the situation as flexible as possible pending the arrival of the delegation.

Sent to Bern repeated to London as 475.¹³

STETTINIUS

740.00112 E.W./1-1745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1945—4 p. m.

506. Department is inclined to view with favor suggestion of the Embassy at Paris (made in its 224 January 17 to Department¹⁴ being repeated to you) regarding French participation in forthcoming economic warfare negotiations with the Swiss. While France is not a party to the War Trade Agreement and so not technically involved in its renegotiation, we believe that her support would be advantageous to obtain the maximum concessions from the Swiss, her cooperation indispensable because of her geographic position and her participation politically desirable.

Please approach foreign office along these lines and cable British views.

Reurtel 498 January 15¹⁴ matter of French representative on mixed commission in Bern should, we feel, also be settled simultaneously with that of French participation in negotiations. Please take this up again with MEW.

Sent London repeated Paris as Department's 258 and Bern as Department's 377.

GREW

740.00112 E.W./1-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1945—midnight.

562. Your 816 January 23 repeated to Bern as 29.¹⁴

(a) We are prepared to send delegation as soon as transportation can be arranged. Delegation will be headed by Lauchlin Currie, Assistant to the President, and will include John V. Lovitt of the State

¹³ Repeated to London with the following final sentences: "Please concert with the British with respect to proposal to send delegation to Bern for negotiations. We plan to send two representatives from the Department and two from FEA and/or EWD. We will wire you further details shortly and in the meantime please let us know whether the British agree to send delegation and if possible names of British representatives."

¹⁴ Not printed.

Department and David Gordon of FEA and possibly one other. Delegation will stop in London to confer with you and the British, then it is hoped British negotiators will join the delegation to proceed to Bern via Paris. In Paris, delegation will confer with the French and join French representatives if so agreed.

(b) American delegation will be given wide authority to conclude an agreement with the Swiss.

(c) Delegation will have authority to release Swiss stocks held at Lisbon as well as authority to offer Swiss quotas for industrial raw materials including the release of commodities contained in the offer of September 18th. We would prefer, however, not to release the September list in advance of the arrival of the delegation. The delegation will discuss this with you and the British upon arrival in London.

We hope this meets British approval and that there are now no obstacles to British participation.

Through applications for visas, et cetera, Swiss here already know that representatives of this Government are planning to visit Bern. We therefore favor the suggestion made in Bern's 486, January 23 to Department, repeated to you as 230,¹⁵ to the effect that Legation advise Swiss informally that we are sending delegation. Bern is hereby authorized to proceed to advise Swiss accordingly in concert with British colleague if MEW agrees. Please ascertain if MEW will send parallel instructions to Bern and notify our Legation in Bern if MEW concurs.

Sent to London repeated to Bern as 401.

GREW

740.00112 EW/1-264b

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1945—midnight.

352. London's 935, January 26 to Department repeated to Paris.¹⁵ After consultation with British Embassy, which presumably has similar instructions please invite appropriate French authorities to participate in forthcoming negotiations with the Swiss with particular reference to aspects thereof in which France has direct interest. It is planned that negotiations will include both economic warfare and SAFEHAVEN¹⁶ considerations, and presentation will, of course, depend on conversations which Delegation will have in London and Paris

¹⁵ Not printed.

¹⁶ Code name for sending and concealing Axis assets abroad, and project by United States and British Governments to locate and gain control of these assets. For documentation on this subject, see vol. II, pp. 852 ff.

(it is on the point of leaving) and on the military situation at the time of arrival at Bern.

Sent Paris repeated London and Bern.¹⁸

GREW

740.00112 E.W./2-545: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, FEBRUARY 5, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received February 5—8:35 p. m.]

1267. For the Department and FEA from Currie. Quite satisfactory conferences with British have been concluded. It was agreed that we give first priority to cessation of transit traffic through Switzerland. Foot¹⁹ proposed in view of Italian Government protest that we ask for suspension of transit traffic while matter is referred to arbitration in line with procedure provided for in St. Gothard convention²⁰ and I concurred provided we use as well argument that coal is a war material. Agreement reached on Swiss exports we wish stopped and reduced. Only serious difference arose over my suggestion we ask initially for complete cessation of Swiss exports. After consulting Foreign Office Foot proposed only that we ask for cessation if German coal deliveries stop. At my request we took the matter up jointly with Law.²¹ I explained that we wished to avoid any German-Swiss diplomatic rupture, and that therefore I did not propose making complete cessation of exports a *sine qua non*. I wished to advance demand merely as bargaining tactic. On this basis, Law concurred. I further suggested to him that it would assist the Mission and remove certain misunderstandings if he would see the Swiss Minister here and seek to dispel any thoughts that the British Government did not feel as strongly as the American Government about the importance of a successful outcome of the negotiations. This he agreed to do. British delegation will be Foot, Bliss and Seeböhm. I plan to leave for Paris February 6. British will follow on 7th. Final discussions on SAFEHAVEN proceeding with British Treasury today. I will advise outcome tomorrow. [Currie.]

WINANT

¹⁸ Repeated to London as No. 711 and Bern as No. 499.

¹⁹ Dingle M. Foot, Parliamentary Secretary, British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

²⁰ Convention between Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, signed at Bern October 13, 1909; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cv, p. 639.

²¹ Richard K. Law, British Minister of State.

740.00112 European War 1939/12-1644

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The United States Government has given careful consideration to the recommendations of the British Government, as contained in the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy of December 16, 1944,²² regarding the steps to be taken by the American and British Governments in the attainment of Allied economic warfare objectives in Switzerland.

The United States Government shares, of course, the appreciation of the British Government for the services rendered to the United Nations by Switzerland during the war, particularly those services rendered in connection with the protection of prisoners of war, and concurs that appropriate consideration should be given in Allied economic warfare policy vis-à-vis Switzerland to the interest of UNRRA²³ and the military authorities in obtaining goods and facilities from Switzerland. While it is recognized that Switzerland has now substantially met the demands of the American and British Governments of last September as regards exports to Germany and that reductions in Axis transit traffic across Switzerland have gone far toward meeting the Allied desires, it is the view of the United States Government that continued efforts should be made to obtain further reductions in those exports and in that traffic without prejudicing important benefits which are derived by the United Nations from Swiss neutrality.

It is believed that the best means at this time of attaining the desired reductions in Swiss exports to Germany and in transit traffic is by discussions by American and British representatives, familiar with the problems involved, with the appropriate Swiss officials at Bern. An American delegation, headed by Mr. Lauchlin C. Currie, has now proceeded to London to confer with the appropriate British authorities and to join such representatives as the British Government may appoint for the discussions at Bern. It is contemplated that the American delegation will discuss in London matters relating to supplies for Switzerland, including the question as to whether supplies should be made available to the Swiss before negotiations actually begin in Bern or whether such supplies should be part of a general *quid pro quo* for Swiss concessions to Allied demands. The American delegation has been given wide authority to settle this and similar questions of tactics with the British authorities in London.

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1945.

²² Not printed.

²³ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

740.00112 E.W./2-1345: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 13, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received February 13—8: 20 p. m.]

984. For Department and FEA from Currie Mission. Delegation arrived in Bern on first through train from Paris since German occupation of France. Swiss are extremely interested in delegation and our arrival caused considerable excitement. Crowd of several thousand Swiss greeted us at the station. Press summaries will be sent by separate cable.

Yesterday Currie delivered the President's letter²⁴ to Von Steiger, President of Swiss Confederation. Then followed large press conference. Prepared statement is being sent you.

This morning we met in plenary session with Swiss delegation. Currie stated joint position subject under discussion. Foot and Vergier [*Vergé*], French Chargé d'Affaires, added comments. We delivered to Swiss preliminary draft of agreement which we hope to reach. This draft provided for complete cessation of transit and exports to Germany including any net export of electricity, implementation of Bretton Woods Resolution No. VI²⁵ and general clauses relating to coordination of Swiss purchases and provision of supplies for relief of France and other liberated countries. In return we would agree to continue the food and fodder quotas and to open quotas covering Swiss raw material requirements and to make the best arrangements possible for transit across France. We also offered to permit Swiss to import at once a list of commodities which is being sent you under separate cable. Swiss restated their request for raw materials which we took under consideration and will forward shortly by pouch. Subcommittees were appointed to consider in detail the various items on the agenda and these subcommittees are scheduled to meet tomorrow. [Currie Mission.]

HARRISON

740.00112 E.W./2-1545: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 15, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received February 15—2: 48 p. m.]

1005. For Department and FEA from Currie Mission. At plenary session February 13 we developed generally practical and legal argu-

²⁴ Not found in Department files.

²⁵ For text of resolution, see circular airgram of August 19, 1944, 2 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 218, or *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), vol. I, p. 939. For documentation pertaining to the Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 106 ff.

ments for complete stoppage of transit between Germany and Italy in either direction. At subcommittee on transit yesterday these arguments were elaborated. Canvassed our position on article II of Hague Convention²⁶ claiming that in present circumstances it was unneutral for Switzerland to permit her railroads to be used for what is in effect military transport between different portions of German Army. In this connection we referred to Great Britain's protest in World War I to transport from Germany to occupied Belgium across neutral Holland²⁷ pointing out that Holland admitted validity of contention. We then referred to article III of St. Gothard Convention which gives Switzerland right to interrupt transit over St. Gothard line if Switzerland's neutrality is in jeopardy. At this meeting we concentrated on north-south transit of coal reserving of course our position as to all transit but stressing the urgency for immediate and preliminary answer on coal. Swiss did not give a final answer to our contentions but gave the following information :

(a) Coal shipments in January were 53000 tons.

(b) From February 1 to February 10 total shipments were 6000 tons.

(c) Since February 10 all shipments have been suspended by Swiss.

(d) Swiss have informed Germans that shipments will not be resumed until they deliver to Switzerland arrears for January which Swiss estimate at 15000 tons and thereafter for every ton which Switzerland transports to Italy Germans must supply a ton for Switzerland. We made it clear that we were not satisfied with this answer to our contentions. Swiss replied they would consider the matter further and hoped to be in a position more closely to meet our demands in a few days. We expressed opinion that negotiations could not possibly be successful unless Swiss met us on transit. Swiss then promised that in any case coal traffic would not be resumed without first informing us.

This morning Italian Government as one of the three parties to St. Gothard Convention protested to Swiss Government concerning transit traffic on St. Gothard line claiming that all shipments from Germany to northern Italy are in support of a rebel government and at expense of the *de jure* Italian Government which Swiss have recognized. Italians also claimed that all shipments from Italy represent a spoliation of Italian people. Protest requested transit be stopped immediately. If Swiss reply to Italian note is unsatisfactory Italians intend to request arbitration under article XIII of St. Gothard Con-

²⁶ Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, signed at The Hague October 18, 1907, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1216.

²⁷ For an account of the question of transit of German war materials across the Netherlands in World War I, see Green Haywood Hackworth, *Digest of International Law* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. VII, pp. 595-602.

vention and demand that pending arbitration traffic be suspended in order to preserve the *status quo*.

We are given to understand from Rappard that Swiss do not expect Germans to agree to offer in (d) above but if they do the Swiss would feel free to raise further difficulties in light of new developments. Therefore we believe that chances are excellent that transit traffic in coal will not be resumed.

On imports and exports we are informed that imports of coal from Germany totalled 12000 tons in January and 4000 tons the first week of February. Because of this small value Swiss permitted exports in January of only 5,000,000 francs with no machinery and virtually no electrical equipment. Believed exports running at about same rate in February. Federal Council is considering our SAFEHAVEN proposals at its meeting on Friday.

Repeated London 502. [Currie Mission.]

HARRISON

[In telegram 1083, February 18, 1945, the Minister in Switzerland transmitted the translation of a decree of the Swiss Federal Council, enacted February 16, governing the freezing of German assets in Switzerland (740.00112 E.W./2-1845).]

740.00112 E.W./2-1945: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 19, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 10:18 a. m.]

1087. For Department and FEA from Currie Mission. In draft agreement presented to Swiss at preliminary meeting provision was included for complete termination of exports from Switzerland to Germany. No subcommittee was appointed for this question since we wished to obtain principle by complete cessation rather than discuss individual exports; however in meeting of committee on Swiss requirements Swiss representatives put forward counter proposals. They indicated that since February 1944 all payments in German Swiss clearing have been balanced including invisible items; proportion of latter has steadily increased, now amount to about 8 million francs monthly. Since October 1944 Swiss have required Germans to complete deliveries to cover invisibles before granting new transfer guarantees and have approved guarantees only to extent of German deliveries in excess of invisibles. December imports from Germany amounted to 19 million francs, export guarantees only 1 million francs. In January export guarantees were 4 million francs. Total exports approved are distributed proportionately among different industrial

associations and by them among individual firms. Swiss contend this insures adequate spread of exports.

Swiss counter proposal involved maintenance and possible extension of a list agreed in London in 1944; new reductions in ceilings for Annex I; and agreement to spread remainder among all remaining tariff items. Major reductions in Annex I proposed by Swiss were as follows: (read in three columns tariff item, quota for Germany, quota for other Axis in thousand francs) 753/756 1250 15; M 6 4000 200; ex M 6 (wood working) 300 nil; ex 954A (radio sets for civilian use) 80 5; 747 100 5; 935 D and 937 300 30; 937 402 30; 947 74 10; M 4 400 625; M 9 2248 (not more than 500 machine parts and 500 material testing and foundry machines) 210; MDY 2026 600; 956A/-F1896 200; total Annex I 19212 3410.

We indicated we considered it impossible to discuss less than complete cessation since changing German needs at present stage of war made individual priorities and ceilings irrelevant. Swiss emphasized importance of supplies still received from Germany and admitted this was sole consideration; however we feel these supplies are of such small value and so unreliable as to be of negligible importance. Moreover fact that Germans continue to export to Switzerland despite necessity of covering invisible items before receiving any Swiss supplies indicates continuing importance of latter. Question to be discussed further at high level with Swiss after examination of latest import and export statistics.

Repeated London 542. [Currie Mission.]

HARRISON

740.00112 E.W./2-2245: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 22, 1945—noon.

[Received February 22—10:35 a. m.]

1164. For Department, Treasury and FEA from Currie. Contrary to impression I received from Stucki and reported in my 1093, February 19,²⁸ Swiss Government does not interpret absence of trade agreement with Germans as meaning end of all trade. Even our best friend[s] in government appear unyielding on subject of total stoppage. We have therefore indicated that we would discuss token delay under very limited and restricted conditions.

Northbound transit traffic in January fell to 7067 tons. We continue to press for complete cessation. We are also requesting that March 1 ban on electricity be extended to north Italy. My proposal that Japanese assets be frozen outside National Bank met with initial

²⁸ Not printed.

favorable hearing. We have also requested that freezing decree be extended to Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria and their nationals in Switzerland. In view of limited transit facilities we have suggested that Swiss subcharter some of their ships for time being to bring in civilian supplies to France. We pointed out probable adverse reaction throughout liberated Europe should Swiss stockpile raw materials in Spain. I have indicated that if response is satisfactory on these various points we would be prepared to make available up to 30,000 tons of coal per month. Please confirm. [Currie.]

HARRISON

740.00112 E.W./3-345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1945—midnight.

933. For Currie. Because of extreme tightness of domestic coal supply situation, it does not appear possible to make any allocation of coal for Switzerland from this country at the present time. If the domestic situation improves consideration will be immediately given to Swiss needs.

GREW

740.00112 EW/3-545 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 5, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 12:29 p. m.]

1397. For State, Treasury and FEA from Currie. After 3 weeks of continuous negotiation with our exerting the strongest pressure against strong resistance and a stalemate yesterday, the Swiss delegation capitulated today and is now prepared to recommend to the Federal Council at an extraordinary session on Monday that in addition to the decree issued February 16 blocking Germany, which is being reinforced by additional regulations, and the decree issued March 2 prohibiting the importation, exportation and dealing in foreign currencies, they will:

(1) Issue a decree blocking Bulgaria, Rumania, and possibly Finland. The step will mean that all European occupied countries and all Axis countries (other than Japan) will be blocked. This will be done at our request after the attitude of Russia has been ascertained. We have not pressed for the blocking of Japan in view of considerations already raised with you. We have been given to understand that Japanese assets will be blocked upon our request.

(2) Tighten the hitherto existing controls over assets which were transferred to Switzerland by such countries and their nationals since the date of blocking (in most cases 1940) which assets have hitherto not been subject to Swiss blocking decrees;

(3) Take a complete census of all assets held in or through Switzerland not only by Germany but by all countries now or hereafter covered by Swiss blocking decrees (this includes all European countries except the neutrals);

(4) Reinforce measures to prevent the importation into Switzerland of assets which could have been the subject of acts of dispossession and facilitate return to dispossessed owners of any such assets found here;

(5) Refuse to purchase any more gold from Germany except to provide funds needed to pay for prisoners of war, Red Cross, and German Legation expenses (it is expected that this will bring about the immediate cessation of standstill and other German payments to Switzerland) and;

(6) Consult with the governments of each blocked country before the relative blocking controls are removed and be ready at any time to discuss with the USA, British, and French Governments with respect to financial questions discussed during the present negotiations.

Having presented our case individually to several members of the Council I am sanguine this will be accepted. All this has been accomplished without jeopardizing trade or transit negotiations and without any concession on our part except the general promise of more favorable consideration of Swiss requests. If this is approved by Council, bringing Sweden, Spain, and Portugal in line should prove easy and the second battle of SAFEHAVEN (Resolution VI³⁰ being the first) will have been won.

In view of the fact that (1) the United States had initiated and approved Resolution VI, (2) there was general agreement I should try to get blocking and a census if this could be done without jeopardizing trade and transit objectives, (3) I reported February 18 (telegram 1084)³¹ after the blocking decree that I would try to get other implementing measures and (4) we are giving nothing in exchange over and above what we had been prepared to give for economic warfare considerations, I find your 919 March 3³² incomprehensible. You will appreciate the impossible position in which the delegation would be placed if after presumably speaking for the Government I had to inform the Swiss that I would have to await the approval of Washington to the unilateral action the Swiss have taken and are preparing to take. I shall therefore assume the responsibility of concluding the nego-

³⁰ For text of Bretton Woods Resolution VI on enemy flight capital, as well as looted gold and other property, see circular airgram of August 19, 1944, 2 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, p. 218.

³¹ Not printed.

³² Not printed; it instructed Bern not to conclude agreement until SAFEHAVEN provisions had been referred to Washington for evaluation (800.515/3-345).

tiations Monday or Tuesday if the Council approves the Swiss delegation's recommendations. In that event we shall have achieved far more than had been hoped or expected. I note your last sentence.³³

On the other points the Swiss delegation is recommending as follows:

(1) Virtually complete cessation of northbound transit traffic by placing a very broad construction on looted property. We agreed to refrain from insisting on complete stoppage under the Italian protest formula as we may shortly wish to use Swiss transit facilities ourselves.

(2) Southbound transit will be confined to the quantities and commodities transported in February with complete stoppage of coal and iron. Remaining items which were sent you appear insignificant.

(3) On exports Swiss have agreed to cut outstanding commitments under previous trade agreements from an estimated 30 or 40 million francs to 3 million francs to be spread over 2 months with insignificant or nil quantities of goods in which we have interest from military point of view. In addition they wish to accept new commitments up to one million francs a month in order to preserve appearance of neutrality and to get a few things like seed potatoes they need.

(4) Stop all exports of electricity to Germany and offer 500,000 kwh a day to France if the French want and can take it.

(5) Grant clearing payment facilities up to 250 million francs to the French.

The Swiss are pleased with the commodities and transit facilities we are offering. However, your decision to allocate no coal even for transit purposes is a great blow to them. I have explained the situation as best I could to Stucki and suggested that he accept our assurance that we will furnish some coal as soon as we are able. If this is agreeable to the Swiss Government, I shall discuss the matter with you upon my return.

Repeated to London as 713 and to Paris as 218. [Currie.]

HARRISON

740.00112 E.W./3-745: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 7, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received March 7—6:25 p. m.]

1457. For Department, Treasury and FEA from Currie. Letters with Swiss delegation will be exchanged tomorrow and will be cabled you then. Letters incorporate all points mentioned in my 1397, March 5. We have secured virtually everything we hoped for and Swiss appear well satisfied. Stucki said that the strongest argument Federal

³³ Last sentence reads: "Freezing decree alone, of course, does not meet SAFEHAVEN requirements."

Council was hope and expectation that suspicions abroad would be dispelled and Switzerland would gain in esteem and good will. Therefore, he hopes reaction will be favorable in America. Official joint communiqué here will be in generalities because of neutrality considerations. De Steiger ³⁴ has given me letter and special commemorative coin for the President.

Please inform Patterson ³⁵ of results and tell him that Charquéraud has given me letter undertaking on behalf of his Government to enforce all security measures requested by SHAEF in connection with transit traffic across France.

Will leave tomorrow for Paris and London. Expect to spend a week with Hawkins ³⁶ and then will go direct to Washington.

Repeated London 755, Paris 26. [Currie.]

HARRISON

Treaty Affairs Files

The Head of the Swiss Delegation (Rappard) to the Heads of the American, French, and British Trade Delegations (Currie, Charquéraud, and Foot)

BERNE, March 8, 1945.

GENTLEMEN: On behalf of the Swiss Government, I have the honour to advise you as follows with respect to the financial matters discussed during the present negotiations:

The Swiss Government on its behalf and that of the Principality of Liechtenstein, affirms its decision to prevent the territory of Switzerland and that of the Principality from being used for the disposal, concealment, or reception of assets which may have been taken illegally or under duress during the war. It declares furthermore that, in the framework of the Swiss legislation as it stands today or as it will be completed in the future, every facility will be given to the dispossessed owners to claim in Switzerland and Liechtenstein their assets found there.

It also declares that it will prevent the concealing, disposing of or dissipation of assets of persons falling under the various blocking decrees issued by the Swiss Government in the past or which it will enact in the future, or the execution of transactions for or on behalf of such persons designed to elude or evade such controls as are now in effect in Switzerland or hereafter established.

The Swiss Government further agrees to consult with the Governments of each blocked country before abolishing or relaxing the con-

³⁴ Apparently the reference is to Edward von Steiger, President of the Swiss Confederation.

³⁵ Presumably Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War.

³⁶ Harry C. Hawkins, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom.

trol measures applied to such country. It will also be ready to consult at any time with the American, British and French Governments with regard to the financial questions which have been discussed in the course of the present negotiations.

In this connection, I also wish to bring to your attention the measures recently taken by the Federal authorities, as well as some of those in contemplation, for the purpose of implementing the foregoing decisions.

I. On February 16, 1945, the Federal Council decreed the blocking of all German assets in Switzerland. As you know, this decree freezes not only the assets of persons or entities domiciled in Germany—whatever their nationality may be—but also the assets of German nationals domiciled in Switzerland itself.

Moreover the executive measures taken in connection with similar freezing decrees in the past have been strongly reinforced, notably to the effect of blocking the assets of blocked countries transferred to Switzerland after the date of the respective freezing decrees. It is further agreed that the terms "*directement et indirectement*" as they are used in article I and the dispositions of article 2 of the decree of February 16, 1945, are to be understood as applying to the assets of entities, the control of which goes back to Germany, regardless of the country in which they are domiciled or operating.

Furthermore, the Federal Government on March 2, 1945, issued a decree prohibiting the import, export and all traffic in foreign bank-notes in Switzerland. This decree is applicable to all foreign currency notes.

II. In addition to the measures already taken as indicated above, the Federal Government is prepared to take the following steps:

a) to make for their own purposes a complete census of all German assets situated in or held through Switzerland, whether they be administered by the German owners themselves or by others on their behalf irrespective of nationality;

b) to make for their own purposes a complete census of all assets of persons falling under the various other blocking decrees issued by the Swiss Government in the past or which it will enact in the future. The executive measures applying to these censuses will be studied without delay;

c) to take such measures, in addition to those already taken, as are considered necessary to prevent the import into Switzerland of assets which could have been the subject of acts of dispossession.

III. Furthermore the Federal Government, in concert with the Swiss National Bank, agrees to restrict gold purchases from German or German controlled sources to the amounts in Swiss francs required for the diplomatic services of Germany or countries controlled by the latter. Under diplomatic services are to be understood:

- a) the expenses of legation and consulates in Switzerland;
- b) the amounts needed for prisoners of war and internees and generally all expenses in relation to the role of Switzerland as protecting power;
- c) payments to the International Red Cross.

The Swiss Government wishes to point out that these restrictions impose heavy sacrifices on Swiss interests in general as Swiss francs will no longer be made available for Germany for the execution of their contractual obligations towards Swiss persons and entities.

Yours sincerely,

RAPPARD

Treaty Affairs Files

The Heads of the American, French, and British Trade Delegations (Currie, Charquéraud, and Foot) to the Head of the Swiss Delegation (Rappard)

BERNE, March 8, 1945.

DEAR PROFESSOR RAPPARD: As a result of our recent negotiations we understand that the Swiss Government has taken the following decisions which will remain effective until the end of hostilities in Europe.

(1) The Swiss-German Trade Agreement which lapsed on 15th February 1945 will not be renewed.

(2) Swiss exports to Germany and German-controlled territory will not in any case exceed the limits set out in Annex I to this letter.

(3) The restrictions on transit between Germany and the German-occupied part of Italy already decided on by the Swiss Government will be maintained. These restrictions apply to coal, iron, scrap-iron and steel which will not be allowed to pass through Switzerland either by rail or otherwise between Germany and the German-occupied part of Italy.

(4) In order to prevent the transit of looted property no goods will be allowed to pass through Switzerland by rail or otherwise from the German-occupied part of Italy to Germany until the Swiss authorities are satisfied that such goods have been legitimately acquired and are not property of which the Italian people have been deprived by any act of dispossession. It is understood that in each case the onus of proving that the goods in question have been legitimately acquired will rest upon the person who applies for transit facilities. In cases of doubt the Swiss Government will be prepared to consult with the Mixed Commission and will take into account any information which the Commission may be able to supply.

(5) Transit in either direction between Germany and the German-occupied part of Italy will not be permitted to exceed the level of February 1945 either in total volume or to any significant degree in respect of any particular item, save insofar as variations may be agreed by the Mixed Commission.

(6) All practical measures have been taken and will continue to be taken to stop the export of Swiss electric power to Germany or to any territory under German control.

We also take note of your letter of today's date concerning the financial measures discussed between us and the measures to be taken regarding property held in Switzerland by nationals of other countries.

The Swiss Government has obtained or will immediately obtain the concurrence of the Government of Liechtenstein as far as such consent is necessary in order to make these measures effective.

We understand that it is the intention of the Swiss Government to co-operate with the United Nations in the general economic tasks involved in the reconstruction and relief of Europe and the orderly distribution of supplies throughout the world.

We also understand that the Swiss Government, when making purchases of any of the commodities now or subsequently appearing in Annex II of this letter will upon request of the appropriate Allied authorities make such purchases through Allied procurement agencies or in other manner requested; also that the Swiss Government will keep the Allied authorities informed regarding stocks of these commodities which Switzerland holds abroad and will not make purchases in amounts greater than those required for orderly shipment in the quantities indicated in Annex II.

The purpose of this arrangement is solely to avoid the disruption of markets which might result from excessive and disorganized buying of goods of which there is a scarcity. Our Governments do not intend to request co-ordination of purchases in this manner except in those instances where shortage of world supply clearly makes it necessary.

Our three Governments will immediately open import quotas to the amounts and under the conditions specified in Annex II of this letter.

Our three Governments are also prepared immediately to make available facilities for the transit of goods across France to Switzerland to the fullest extent compatible with the requirements of the Allied military forces in Western Europe and the civilian needs of France and other liberated countries. The conditions which will govern this traffic for the immediate future are set out in Annex III of this letter.

Except as modified by the present exchange of letters the Agreement of December 19, 1943, as subsequently modified remains effective.

On learning that this letter and its Annexes accurately sets forth the actions and intentions of the Swiss Government, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be ready to regard this letter and your reply as constituting a formal and binding agreement between the four Governments.

This letter has been written in English and French, both texts having the same validity.

Yours sincerely,

LAUHLIN CURRIE
CHARQUÉRAUD
DINGLE FOOT

ANNEX I

1. The export to Germany of goods for which transfer guarantees were granted before March 1, 1945, will be limited to 3 million Swiss francs and will not exceed 1½ million Swiss francs in the month ending April 8, 1945. With the exception of the following special quotas there will be no exports of commodities which appear on the attached list ³⁷ referred to in paragraph 5 below:—

M 6	200'000 francs
753/6	30'000 “
956a/f	50'000 “
Mdy	200'000 “

2. The export to Germany of goods for which transfer guarantees may be granted on or after March 1, 1945, will be limited to 50% by value of the imports from Germany of the following:—Foodstuffs and fodder; fertilizer; leather; seeds; staple fibre; artificial silk and staple fibre yarn; clay for pottery; electrodes; coal, coke and briquettes; iron and steel and semi-manufactures thereof; zinc; machinery and apparatus; raw materials for chemicals (including tar, pitch and resin); petroleum products.

3. The exports referred to in paragraph 2 above will be spread over the various tariff groupings and will not exceed one million Swiss francs in any one month. The Mixed Commission will be kept informed of the placing of any German orders for unusual quantities of goods.

4. There shall be no exports to Norway while that country remains occupied by Germany, and there shall be no exports to Denmark of goods listed in Annex I to the Agreement of December 19, 1943, without the prior concurrence of the Mixed Commission.

5. List A of the War Trade Agreement of April 1940 ³⁸ is cancelled and replaced by the attached list of goods, the export of which to Germany and German-occupied territories is prohibited.

6. There shall be no increase in exports to Germany or other Axis territories as a result of the granting of import facilities for industrial materials.

BERNE, March 8, 1945.

³⁷ Not printed.

³⁸ Presumably reference is to the Anglo-French-Swiss (later Anglo-Swiss) War Trade Agreement, April 25, 1940.

ANNEX II

Attached is a list of "reserved" commodities,³⁹ showing the quantities which will be available to Switzerland from all sources on a pro rata basis until the end of hostilities in Europe and three months thereafter, when the position will be reviewed. Generally speaking, the balances from the 1944 allocations and quotas that remained unshipped or unauthorised by the 10th January 1945 will be counted against the amounts shown on the list. Special cases, however, when this causes hardship, will be examined on request of the Swiss Government. The list will be under continuous review by the Allied supply authorities and subject to alteration both as to quantities and as to the actual commodities appearing on the list, but everything possible will be done to see that a fair share of these supplies is available. Further if the supply situation in regard to scarce commodities should materially improve, the Allied supply authorities will be ready to examine whether any increase or addition to the allocations will be possible. Furthermore the Allied Delegations will immediately take up with the Allied supply authorities the requests listed in column 3 (additional or new requirements) and in particular do their utmost to make available the goods mentioned as having first priority. The Swiss Government will be informed as soon as possible of these additional quotas. Shipments will not necessarily be restricted to quarterly or six-monthly amounts but decision in this respect will depend on supply considerations. Shipments of commodities not appearing on the Reserved Commodity List will not be restricted by quotas or allocations.

BERNE, March 8, 1945.

ANNEX III

Under the conditions existing at present it is anticipated that the following rail facilities will be available:

(1) Three trains a day in each direction, of approximately 600 tons each, from Cerbère to Switzerland by the line on the right (west) bank of the Rhône,

(2) Two trains a day in each direction, of approximately 200 tons each, from Toulon to Switzerland by the Alpine route. The S.N.C.F.⁴⁰ may at any time direct all or part of this tonnage to the line on the left (east) bank of the Rhône.

It is understood that these facilities will be used primarily for the transportation of goods of prime necessity for Switzerland or for

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français.

raw materials required by Swiss export industries. It is also understood that these trains may be used for the export of Swiss goods.

These transit facilities will be increased as rapidly as conditions permit.

Necessary facilities in the port of Toulon will be made available for use by Swiss vessels.

It is understood that the Swiss Federal Railways will make available to the S.N.C.F. an appropriate number of steam locomotives for this transit. A specific agreement to this end, including the dates at which the locomotives will become available, will be made between the two railway administrations. The Swiss Federal Railways will also furnish the necessary rolling stock. The fuel required for this traffic will be deposited by the Swiss Government at one or more locations to be agreed.

The traffic will be subject to such control measures as may be deemed necessary by the Provisional Government of the French Republic. As a means of reducing the number of control measures that need be applied in France, the Swiss Government agrees to the presence in Switzerland of an Allied official to lend his assistance to the competent Swiss authorities for the control of this traffic.

BERNE, March 8, 1945.

Treaty Affairs Files

The Head of the Swiss Delegation (Rappard) to the Heads of the American, French, and British Trade Delegations (Currie, Charquéraud, and Foot)

BERNE, March 8, 1945.

GENTLEMEN: I thank you for your letter of today and wish to confirm that your communication accurately sets forth the intentions of the Swiss Government and the undertakings which they agree to give. I further confirm that your letter together with the present acknowledgement will be regarded by the Swiss Government as constituting a formal and binding agreement between our four Governments.

Yours sincerely,

RAPPARD

Treaty Affairs Files

The Head of the Swiss Delegation (Rappard) to the Heads of the American, French, and British Trade Delegations (Currie, Charquéraud, and Foot)

BERNE, March 8, 1945.

GENTLEMEN: Reference is made to the exchange of letters resulting from negotiations just concluded between the American, British and

French Government[s] and the Government of Switzerland, and in particular to the letters relating to the financial problems discussed.

During the discussions consideration was given to the desirability of immediately extending the Swiss blocking measures to the assets of Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania and Japan. However, it was felt by all parties concerned, that the decisions to take such action depended upon certain considerations of which you are aware. This is to affirm Switzerland's decisions to extend the blocking and census provisions to the aforementioned countries at the appropriate time.

Yours sincerely,

RAPPARD

Treaty Affairs Files

The Heads of the American, French, and British Trade Delegations (Currie, Charquéraud, and Foot) to the Head of the Swiss Delegation (Rappard)

BERNE, March 8, 1945.

DEAR PROFESSOR RAPPARD: In view of the continued occupation of Northern Italy by German forces, the three Allied Delegations have not thought it appropriate during the course of these negotiations to raise the question of Swiss trade relations with Italy. It is to be hoped, however, that the time is now drawing very near when the whole of Italy will have been liberated and when Swiss-Italian commercial exchanges will once more be possible. We should like your Government to know that the reconstruction of Italian industry and a speedy return to a reasonable standard of life for the Italian people are matters in which our three Governments are greatly interested. We hope, therefore, that Switzerland will be able to make a contribution to these ends.

Sincerely yours,

LAUHLIN CURRIE
CHARQUÉRAUD
DINGLE FOOT

740.00112 EW/3-1945

The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There have been numerous references in the foreign press lately to an economic agreement concluded by the United States with Switzerland. The text of this agreement has not been made public.

The Soviet Government has directed me to inform you that it would deem it desirable to obtain information as to the substance of the nego-

tiations which took place, and as to the content of the agreement concluded with Switzerland. At the same time the Soviet Government would like to know whether there is an assurance, that the goods furnished to Switzerland in consequence of the agreement will not fall into German hands.

I should be very grateful to you, Mr. Secretary, for the bringing of the aforesaid to the attention of the Government of the United States, and for the communication to me of its answer regarding that question.⁴¹

Sincerely yours,

A. GROMYKO

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SWISS GOVERNMENT OF PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE IMPORT OF SWISS WATCHES INTO THE UNITED STATES AND SWISS RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORT OF WATCH-MAKING MACHINERY

811.20 Defense (M) Swiss Jewels/6-845

The Department of State to the Swiss Legation

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

As the Swiss Government is aware, the watch industry of the United States has been devoted almost exclusively to the production of items indispensable to the prosecution of the war during the last three years. During this time, the American market for civilian watches has been supplied by Swiss watches and watch movements, since American watches have been practically unavailable.

As the period of reconversion of the American watch industry to civilian production approaches, the Government of the United States is concerned at possible injury that might be caused to the American industry, especially during its reconversion period, in the event that excessive quantities of watches should be imported into the United States.

It would be appreciated, therefore, if the Swiss Government could provide in the near future an indication of the anticipated volume of exports of watches and watch movements to this country during the coming twelve months. Such an indication would provide this Government with a sound basis on which to judge whether there is a possibility that the American industry may suffer injury.

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1945.

⁴¹ In a letter dated April 7, 1945, the Secretary of State supplied Ambassador Gromyko with the substance of the negotiations and stated that the United States Government was satisfied that none of the goods to be made available to Switzerland under the agreements would fall into German hands (740.00112 EW/3-1945).

811.20 Defense (M) Swiss Jewels/7-245: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1945—7 p. m.

2212. As you are aware Dept has asked Swiss Minister ⁴² for estimate of volume of watches and watch movements expected to be exported to US during next 12 months. This request arose from great concern of domestic industry over possibility of injury to it, particularly during period of its reconversion. Industry and Dept also concerned over apparent intention of Swiss to compete for large share of American market while at same time purposely refusing to permit exportation of watch-making machinery, to American watch manufacturers. In view of numerous instances of such refusals in recent years, for example experience of Pierre Dumaïne of Waltham Watch Company in recent visit to Switzerland, and our exchanges of telegrams over last 6 months, you are fully cognizant of this situation. WPB ⁴³ has requested all possible consideration and cooperation be extended to assist Waltham, Elgin, Hamilton and Bulova in obtaining Swiss machinery.

Dept has now presented an *aide-mémoire* ⁴⁴ regarding this matter to Swiss Minister and requests you to make representations to appropriate Swiss authorities in following sense:

1. The continued refusal by Swiss Federal Department of Public Economy to permit exportation of Swiss machine tools and equipment described List VII of Swiss Watch Chamber to American watch manufacturing companies has caused considerable concern.

2. These types machines essential to continued operation of American companies because of urgent need for replacements resulting from abnormal use in wartime production. They are therefore essential to our national defense. WPB recently has requested assistance of the State Dept in obtaining Swiss machinery or equipment necessary for continued operation of American companies.

3. We have evidence that Department of Public Economy will permit exportation with exemption from export duty only on certification that machinery will not be used in making products for horological industry. Even more serious, however, is the circumstance that export is apparently prohibited even if American Company is willing to pay the duty. Apparent reason is desire of Swiss watch industry to restrict future American watch production by means of arbitrary trade controls. Swiss watch industry is doubtless aware that Swiss manufacturers of horological machinery themselves use certain American-made machine-tools.

4. Concern recently expressed to Swiss Minister in Washington regarding future of American watch industry is based on possibility

⁴² Charles Bruggmann.

⁴³ War Production Board.

⁴⁴ *Supra*.

that injury might result from excessive Swiss exports to this country, particularly during period of American industry's reconversion. Similarly concern over refusal of exportation of Swiss horological machinery and equipment is based on possibility of injury to American industry resulting therefrom. The American Govt finds it inconsistent that Swiss industry should expect to compete freely for large share of American market at a time disadvantageous to American producers while at same time arbitrarily refusing to allow exports of machinery to American watch manufacturers.

5. In view of the above considerations it is hoped that equipment needed by American watch companies will be permitted exportation as soon as practicable.

For your information Mr. Ira Guilden, President and Treasurer of Waltham Watch Company expects arrive Switzerland in July to endeavor obtain export permits for equipment items on order concerning which Legation is familiar. Details follow by air pouch.⁴⁵ In accordance with above views, please extend every appropriate assistance to Mr. Guilden who will have letter of introduction.

GREW

811.20 Defense (M) Swiss Jewels/7-445

The Department of State to the Swiss Legation

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to its memorandum of June 8, 1945, asking the Swiss government for an estimate of the amount of watches and watch materials which might be exported from Switzerland in the next twelve months. This request grew out of the concern of the American industry over the possibility of injury to it during its period of reconversion from the war time production in which it has been almost exclusively engaged.

The attention of the Department of State has now been drawn to the fact that the Swiss Department of Federal Economy continues in numerous instances to refuse to permit exportation to American Watch manufacturers of Swiss machine tools and equipment described in a certain List VII prepared by the Swiss Watch Chamber. This has caused the domestic industry and this Department considerable concern. The American government finds it inconsistent that the Swiss industry should expect to compete freely for a large share of the American market, at the moment when American producers are handicapped by their war effort, while at the same time the export of machinery to American watch manufacturers is refused.

Because of the urgent need for replacement of equipment worn out by abnormal use in the war effort, the American companies re-

⁴⁵ Instruction 3086, July 28, 1945, to Bern, not printed.

quire this machinery to remain in operation. The machinery is, therefore, necessary to the national defense. The United States War Production Board has recently requested the aid of this Department in obtaining the Swiss machinery which the American companies require.

This Department has evidence that the Swiss Department of Public Economy will permit exportation with exemption from export duty only on certification that the machinery will not be used in making products for the watch industry. Even more serious, however is the circumstance that export is apparently prohibited even if the American company is willing to pay the duty. By these measures of arbitrary trade control the Swiss watch industry apparently seeks to restrict future watch production in this country.

It is sincerely hoped that the Swiss government will modify these regulations in order to permit exportation of the equipment required by the American companies as soon as practicable.

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945.

811.20 Defense (M) Swiss Jewels/9-1445

*The Swiss Federal Political Department to the American Legation in Switzerland*⁴⁸

[Translation]

The Legation of the United States of America, on July 16, 1945, delivered an *aide-mémoire* to the Federal Political Department concerning the estimate of the volume of watches and watch movements which Switzerland expects to export to the United States during the next 12 months and the refusal of the Swiss authorities to permit the exportation of machine tools and equipment, described in List VII of the Swiss Watch Chamber, to American Watch manufacturing companies:

The Political Department has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of this *aide-mémoire* and, after having approached the competent authorities who gave it their best attention, is able to communicate the following to the Legation of the United States:

The commercial treaty which governs commercial relations between the United States and Switzerland guarantees complete freedom for the importation of watches into the United States. Furthermore, according to declarations made by the State Department to the Swiss Legation at Washington, it is not the intention of the American authorities to withdraw from this liberal policy. The Federal authori-

⁴⁸ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Switzerland in his despatch 12546, September 14, 1945; received September 26.

ties, for their part, have endeavored to take into consideration, within the limits of possibility, the desire expressed by the State Department. The Political Department takes pleasure in hoping that the following indications will be satisfactory to the Legation of the United States:

1. The exportation of watches to dollar countries is limited because of the payment problems (that is, conversion of the export products into Swiss francs). Exporters, however, have complete liberty to utilize the quota assigned to them for any country whatsoever. The division of the monthly quota of Fr. 25,000,000 to dollar countries cannot therefore be foreseen for each country.

2. According to Swiss trade statistics, exports to the United States for the first six months of 1945, amounted to 4,859,407 watches and watch movements as compared to 2,069,121 during the same period of 1944. These figures, however, are misleading and require comment. It must be observed, that as a result of transportation difficulties, the watches produced for export for October, November and December 1944 could not be delivered last year and they are therefore included in the statistics for the first 6 months of 1945. The foregoing figures for the first semester of 1945 also include important deliveries to the American Army in Europe. The Purchasing Commission of the American Government, which is entrusted with purchases in Switzerland, has, up to date, purchased 544,360 watches. This Mission has the intention to undertake, up to the end of the year, additional purchases of 255,640 pieces for the American Army in Europe and 500,000 for the Army in the Far East. Although these watches do not reach the American market, they are registered as exports to that country.

3. Watches delivered to the United States are not only destined for civilian use. In fact, an important part thereof has to be handed over by the importers for American Army supplies.

4. This increase in exports has not a speculative character. This is noted also from the fact that there is a considerable shortage of watches in the United States and the market requirements will not be covered. American production, after reconversion to peacetime production, should not therefore sustain any injury which might be imputable to Swiss imports.

5. The above-mentioned points and certain information permit one to suppose that the export of watches will be fully as large during the last 6 months of this year as it was during the first. There may even be a slight increase. Such a development, however, should cause no anxiety to the American watch industry. In effect, a sudden increase of Swiss importations to the United States should not be expected on the one hand in view of restrictions due to the quota system, and on the other hand, because Swiss factories are not in a position to increase rapidly their production.

In the second part of its *aide-mémoire*, the Legation of the United States expressed the desire that the exportation of the equipment needed by American watch companies be permitted in the near future.

The Federal Department, after having thoroughly studied this question with the competent authorities, has the honor to inform the Legation of the United States of America of the following:

The watch industry has developed in certain regions in Switzerland

the population of which have no other means of livelihood other than that derived from this industry. A reduction in this industry would cause an irreparable catastrophe with unforeseeable social repercussions. Again, the watch industry is the cornerstone of Swiss industry. Even a partial diminution of work in this sector would have decisive consequences for the entire Swiss economy. Under these circumstances, the Government cannot fail in its duty to take and enact the necessary measures for the defense and the preservation of this industry. It takes pleasure in taking into consideration the desires of other countries insofar that they do not impede the execution of its duty which is to maintain the economic structure and the means of livelihood of an entire segment of the country.

The Political Department avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Legation of the United States of America the assurance of its high consideration.

BERN, September 5, 1945.

811.20 Defense (M) Swiss Jewels/9-1445: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1945—noon.

2849. Urtel 4144, Sept. 14.⁴⁷ Dept greatly disturbed by evasive reply re watch machinery as well as by absence of reference to subject of Swiss exports to US of watches and movements re Dept's instruction 3010, June 13.⁴⁷

Please request Swiss Government to provide at very early date (within one week if possible) indication of anticipated volume of exports of watches and watch movements to US during balance of 1945 and during first half of 1946.

You should orally inform Swiss Govt, if you perceive no objection, that this Govt is concerned lest American watch industry be injured substantially by excessive imports of watches and watch movements, and that during recent weeks, and particularly since termination hostilities against Japan, American watch industry representatives have continued to urge strongly that quantitative limitation be imposed upon imports into US of watches and movements. Consequently, you should state that unless aforementioned info is received in very near future Dept is unable to foretell what future action this Govt may find itself compelled to take re future imports of watches and movements from Switzerland.

Also you should state that, although importance of watch industry to Switzerland is recognized, it is view of this Govt that continued

⁴⁷ Not printed.

Swiss refusal (reurtel 4144, Sept. 14) will be detrimental generally to commercial and other relations between US and Switzerland and particularly to Swiss watch industry. In this connection such continued export prohibition will doubtless lead to manufacture of this machinery in US. Should production cost in US be greater than cost of importing similar Swiss machinery competitive position of American watch industry as compared with Swiss watch industry might be affected adversely. Such situation would inevitably cause representatives of American watch industry to press even more strongly for quantitative limitation on future imports into US of Swiss watches and movements.

As you know, Article VI of our Trade Agreement prohibits imposition of import or customs quotas, import licenses, or any other form of quantitative regulation. For your background information, we of course would be very reluctant to give notice of termination of the Trade Agreement in order to obtain freedom of action to impose quotas in the event that mutually satisfactory solution of imports into US of watches and movements is not reached at early date. However, if it appears that imports are becoming excessive we might be compelled as a last resort to give such notice. If quantitative limitation should prove necessary during reconversion period, we would prefer Swiss Govt agree to limit exports from Switzerland to import quotas by US.

For your info only Swiss Legation here intimated that perhaps delay in reply to our request stems from Swiss Govt's desire to use matter of watch machinery and watch exports as a bargaining power re other economic matters now being discussed. Should you be unable to secure reply to our request, Dept would appreciate your ascertaining, if possible, reasons behind Swiss non-compliance.

ACHESON

611.5431/10-845

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Woodruff Wallner of the
Division of Commercial Policy*

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Bruggmann, Swiss Minister
Mr. Acheson, Under Secretary of State
Mr. Wallner, Division of Western European Affairs

The Swiss Minister opened the conversation by saying that his call was chiefly one of courtesy on the occasion of his return from a summer in Switzerland.

Mr. Acheson said he was very glad to see the Minister and to have the opportunity to talk with him again concerning the heavy imports of Swiss watches. He was expecting the visit this week of a delegation

of labor people, who were presumably going to ask for a restriction on Swiss watch imports during the reconversion period.

Mr. Bruggmann said that Mr. Culbertson⁴⁸ had taken this question up with him the other day, and that he could only repeat what he had told Mr. Culbertson, namely that the watch industry in Switzerland refused to believe that the United States really intended serious action on this question. The Industry was unwilling under the circumstances to accept further Government intervention. In order to put the Swiss Government in a position to impress upon the Industry the serious view which is being taken of this problem in Washington, the Minister suggested that we make a concrete proposal, setting a reasonable figure for future imports which could serve as a basis for discussion between the two Governments.

Mr. Acheson said that this seemed like an excellent suggestion and requested Mr. Wallner to get in touch with the Division of Commercial Policy with a view to making such a proposal. He told the Minister that some sort of action is necessary at once, that the Department is under considerable pressure from the watch Industry, Labor and Congress. He added that the President had made certain pledges to Congress when he requested the renewal of authority to conclude trade agreements, and that the Department must avoid being accused of allowing these pledges to go unfulfilled.

Mr. Bruggmann said that the Swiss watch industry was the hardest for the Government to deal with and that the present case was particularly complicated since, unlike pre-war days, the United States was the principal market for Swiss watches, other countries being prevented from buying them because of the war. Consequently, any restrictions on exports to the United States would have a serious effect on employment. This would lead again to political complications.

Mr. Bruggmann seemed impressed at last with the seriousness of this question.

The rest of the conversation was general.

611.5431/11-3045

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1945.

The Swiss Minister called at my request. I read to him the principal paragraphs of the *Aide-Mémoire* of November 30, and handed him the paper.⁴⁹ We then discussed the situation for some time. The Minister made the following points.

⁴⁸ Paul T. Culbertson, Chief, Division of Western European Affairs.

⁴⁹ *Infra.*

1. The Minister stated that he had hoped that the situation could be worked out by direct talks between the Swiss Watch Industry and the American Watch Industry, but that he had been informed that any such discussions would be regarded by the Department of Justice as in violation of the Anti-Trust Act.⁵⁰ I said that I was not informed about this, but that I could well see that the Department of Justice might properly take this position.

2. The Minister said that the Swiss Government had gotten the impression from statements made by American representatives of the Watch Industry in Switzerland that the request for a limitation of imports was connected with the request for the release of certain Swiss watch-making machinery and that, if the release were granted, the request for the limitation of imports would be dropped.

I said that this was not the case and that, while the matters were quite separate, we felt that the Swiss had not been cooperative in regard to the machinery.

3. The Minister claimed that, without any limitation of imports, the American Industry could make and sell watches up to the full capacity of its plants.

I told him that we did not share this view—for one reason, because I understood that the capacity of the watch-case makers had been fully taken up by importers of Swiss watch movements.

I explained to the Minister that, in connection with the passage of the Trade Agreements Act,⁵¹ the President had assured American industry that it was not his intention that any industry or portion of an industry should suffer injury through the administration of the Act. The American Watch Industry had been diverted to war production during the war and was experiencing difficulty in returning to its peace-time production by reason of the very great volume of Swiss imports. It seemed to me that the long-run interests of both countries would be furthered if a reasonable attitude were taken so that the American industry might get back to producing the comparatively small portion of the American consumption of which it was capable. Any other attitude would produce bitterness and resentment and might well cause the Congress to take action which would not be carefully adjusted to the situation.

The Minister agreed to report to his Government and to discuss the matter further.

DEAN ACHESON

⁵⁰ Enacted July 2, 1890; 26 Stat. 209.

⁵¹ Enacted June 12, 1934; 48 Stat. 943.

611.5431/11-3045

The Department of State to the Swiss Legation

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In discussing the matter of future imports of Swiss watches and watch movements with the Swiss Minister on June 8, 1945, officers of the Department of State referred to the recent large imports of watches and watch movements into the United States from Switzerland and pointed out that representatives of the domestic watch manufacturing industry had expressed concern with respect to the possibility of excessive imports of watches and watch movements during the coming months when it would be reconverting to civilian production. It is recalled further that the Swiss Government was asked to provide an indication of the anticipated volume of exports of watches and watch movements to this country during the coming twelve months.

In an *aide-mémoire* dated September 5, 1945, presented to the United States Minister in Bern, the Swiss Government stated that 4,059,407 watches and watch movements had been exported from Switzerland to the United States during the first six months of 1945. Furthermore, it was indicated that a similar volume, or perhaps even an increased volume, was anticipated for the last half of 1945. No estimate was given for the first half of 1946. United States imports of watches and watch movements during the first ten months of 1945 indicate that the volume estimated by the Swiss Government is likely to be exceeded.

A vigorous domestic watch manufacturing industry is vital to the national security and defense of the United States. The Government of the United States, therefore, is deeply concerned lest the domestic watch manufacturing industry be injured substantially by excessive imports of watches and watch movements, particularly during the period of its reconversion to civilian production.

It is the opinion of the Government of the United States that the importation of watches and watch movements in recent months has been excessive. Because of certain reconversion problems facing the domestic watch manufacturing industry and the importance of this industry to national security and defense, it is believed that the importation of more than 3,000,000 watches and watch movements into the United States during the calendar year 1946 would be excessive and would be injurious to the domestic industry.

As the Government of Switzerland is aware, Article VI of the trade agreement between the United States and Switzerland, signed January 9, 1936, prohibits the imposition of import quotas, licenses, or any other form of quantitative regulation upon imports of watches

and watch movements into the United States. In view of the volume of such imports in recent months the Government of the United States believes it of the utmost importance that some form of limitation be imposed.

As a first step in such a limitation, the Swiss Government is requested to indicate whether it would be willing and able to restrict the export of watches and watch movements so that not more than 3,000,000 units would reach the United States in the calendar year 1946. As the United States Government would desire a limitation to become effective retroactively to December 1, 1945, however, an adjustment for the extra month would produce a total of 3,250,000 units for the thirteen-month period ending December 31, 1946. The Government of the United States would also like to avail itself of this opportunity to propose, by means of a supplementary agreement, an amendment of the existing trade agreement between the two countries so as to include therein an article conforming in substance to Article XI of the trade agreement between the United States of America and Mexico, signed December 23, 1942, a copy of which is attached.⁵²

Should the Swiss Government state that it is unable to limit direct exports of watches and watch movements to the United States and to administer such a limitation of exports in a manner so as to minimize shipments by way of third countries, and is unable to agree to an amendment of the trade agreement as outlined above, the United States Government proposes as an alternative that a supplementary agreement be concluded at once for the specific purpose of so amending the trade agreement of January 9, 1936 to permit the Government of the United States to establish a quota limitation upon the importation of watches and watch movements for the period and in the amount set forth above.

The United States Government considers this matter to be one of extreme urgency and would appreciate receiving a reply from the Swiss Government by December 15. In case the Swiss Government finds itself unable to agree to either of the foregoing proposals, the Department of State believes that it will be necessary, shortly after that date, to give formal notice of intention to terminate the trade agreement between the United States of America and Switzerland, in accordance with Article XVIII thereof, in order to obtain liberty of action in regard to the importation of watches and watch movements into the United States.

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1945.

⁵² For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 311, or 57 Stat. 833. For documentation regarding the negotiation of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. vi, pp. 489 ff.

611.5431/12-345

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Brown)

[WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1945.

I called Mr. Bruggmann at 10:30 a. m. to inform him that the Department was issuing a press release at noon⁵³ stating that a note had been handed to him concerning the increasing volume of imports of Swiss watches. I told the Minister that I would be glad to furnish him with copies of the release as soon as it was handed to the press.

The Minister said that he considered the issuance of the release "a terrible blow" and that he would have preferred that nothing be made public about the matter. He said that he had hoped the situation could be discussed in a friendly way and agreement reached, but that no specific proposals had ever been made to him and it had not been made clear to him exactly what it was we wanted the Swiss Government to do. He added that he was "amazed" when Mr. Acheson handed him the note on Friday, November 30.

I assured the Minister that these steps had been decided upon only after the most careful consideration, and in view of the extreme urgency of the matter, and that it had been decided on a very high level.

Copies of the press release were given to a messenger from the Swiss Legation immediately after it had been handed to the press.

611.5431/12-645

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Brown)

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Charles Bruggmann, Minister of Switzerland
Mr. Wilcox, ITP⁵⁴
Mr. Brown, CP

Mr. Bruggmann called at his request to express his very great concern at the note which Mr. Acheson had handed him on Friday, November 30, suggesting restriction of Swiss exports of watches to the United States to 3,250,000 for the 13 months beginning December 1, 1945. He said that this came as a great shock, in as much as no such proposal had been made before and, in fact, assurances had been given him by officials, even in the Department, that no consideration

⁵³ Department of State *Bulletin*, December 9, 1945, p. 942.

⁵⁴ Office of International Trade Policy.

was being given to the possibility of denouncing the trade agreement. He stated that he had talked to officials in other Departments of the Government who indicated that they were unaware of this proposal and he pointed out that no real warning had been given that we had such a proposal in mind; we had merely asked his Government for indication of the amount of anticipated exports for the balance of 1945 and 1946, which had been furnished. Mr. Bruggmann said that during the war, and particularly last year, both the United States Army and United States Treasury Department had insisted that the Swiss provide the maximum amount possible of watches for the United States, and that Treasury had objected when his Government proposed some limitation of the amount of dollars received from watches which could be converted into francs, which limitation might have acted as some brake upon the volume of exports to the United States. He said that he had received assurances from Senators that no quota would be considered, and pointed out that any quantitative restriction was wholly inconsistent with the spirit of the Trade Agreements Act and the commercial policy of the United States. He said that Switzerland was in a desperate situation, that the rest of Europe provided no market for watches, at least not on satisfactory terms, and that the livelihood of many thousands of people in Switzerland depended on the watch industry. He said that our suggestion was wholly incomprehensible to him at a time when we were probably headed for a boom and when all that he had been able to ascertain, plus statements even by the American watch makers themselves, indicated that they would have a market for everything that they could produce.

Mr. Bruggmann also said that the inclusion of the Mexican-type escape clause in the trade agreement would render it useless by taking away all the permanency and assurance of stability which the present agreement contained.

Mr. Wilcox explained that our proposal had been decided upon after very mature and serious consideration by all interested agencies, that the United States watch industry had been almost wholly converted to military production during the war, and it was now engaged in the process of reconversion faced by the fact that civilian demand for watches during the war period had been met from imports. Watches were a durable good, not items that one bought every day. Mr. Wilcox pointed out that the special skills of the watch making industry were something essential to the security of the United States and which we could not afford to lose.

Mr. Bruggmann said he could not understand why we could not have discussed this matter with him quietly in terms of specific proposals rather than presenting a note which would in all likelihood

result in a break. Mr. Bruggmann was reminded that the matter of the volume of imports from Switzerland had been discussed on frequent occasions with Swiss representatives both here and in Berne, and that there had been long delays in receiving any replies to our inquiries. Moreover, there had been similar difficulties in connection with our request for licenses for export of watch making machinery. Mr. Bruggmann said that he could not agree to "suicidal" export of watch making machinery to a competitor, when there was a possibility that thereafter proposals for limitation of watch exports would be made.

Mr. Bruggmann asked if there was anything that could be done to get out of the present situation and was advised that we had made our proposals to the Swiss Government and would have to wait for its reply.

Mr. Bruggmann said that the United States watch importers had often stated that they would prefer no trade agreement to a trade agreement with quotas, and that he thought that their view would be influential with his Government.

611.5431/12-1545

The Swiss Legation to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Swiss Government is willing to confer immediately with the American Government with a view to controlling, in the year 1946, the importation of Swiss watches and movements by measures which would minimize the indirect importation.

In order to examine the ways and means to this end, certain data would be desirable, namely:

- a) A list of the countries from which indirect delivery of watches to the United States is being made;
- b) the names of the firms, in the transit countries as well as in the United States, which handle these indirect deliveries;
- c) specification of the watches thus imported, with exact technical description, including make and number;
- d) information on the quantity of, for example, the indirectly imported watches since the beginning of this year.

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1945.

611.5431/12-2145

The Department of State to the Swiss Legation

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Government of the United States greatly appreciates the willingness of the Swiss Government to discuss the problem of the ex-

portation of watches and watch movements from Switzerland to the United States for the year 1946 and its readiness to consider the ways and means of limiting such exportations to the United States by way of third countries. The Department of State is giving careful consideration to the suggestions set forth to this end in the *aide-mémoire* of December 15, 1945 from the Legation of Switzerland.

It is the opinion of the Government of the United States, however, that the general problem which has arisen at this time can be alleviated only to a minor extent by curtailing indirect exports. Readily obtainable information indicates that, for the years 1943 and 1944, approximately fifty percent of the United States imports of watches and watch movements from Switzerland did come by way of third countries, but more recent data tend to indicate that this percentage has materially decreased in 1945, probably because of the end of abnormal wartime practices and conditions. Parallel with the decrease in the volume of indirect shipments, there has been an exceptionally large increase in the number of watches and watch movements imported into the United States directly from Switzerland. In this instance, the Government of Switzerland in an *aide-mémoire* of September 5, 1945 to the United States Minister in Bern estimated that watch and watch movement exports from Switzerland directly to the United States for the year 1945 in all probability would be in excess of 8,000,000 units.

Therefore, in view of the decreasing significance of indirect shipments, the Government of the United States is convinced that, in addition to any reduction of indirect shipments, it is necessary that direct exports from Switzerland to the United States be also limited. Since it is intimated in the Legation's *aide-mémoire* of December 5 [15?], 1945 that the Swiss Government believes that feasible means can be found to limit indirect exports to the United States, it would appear that direct exports of watches and watch movements from Switzerland to the United States could also be readily controlled.

The Government of the United States will be glad to confer immediately with the Swiss Government but is convinced that the discussions should be on the entire problem of the export, direct as well as indirect, of watches and watch movements from Switzerland to the United States, and on the general basis of the proposals outlined in this Department's *aide-mémoire* of November 30, 1945.

These proposals are: 1) a quantitative limitation on the exports of watches and watch movements from Switzerland to the United States for the thirteen-month period ending December 31, 1946; 2) a supplemental agreement conforming in substance to Article XI of the Trade Agreement between the United States and Mexico; and 3) failing the ability of the Swiss Government to accept the proposals suggested in 1) and 2) above, a supplemental agreement to permit

the Government of the United States to establish a quantitative limitation upon the importation of watches and watch movements for the thirteen-month period ending December 31, 1946.

The Government of the United States has upon several occasions within recent months brought to the attention of the Swiss Government the difficulties which certain United States nationals and companies have been experiencing in obtaining watch-making machinery from Switzerland. A similar circumstance with respect to jewel bearings has now arisen. It appears that the various firms in Switzerland are unable to secure permits for the export of these items to the respective American firms. Recent action of the Swiss Government indicates that this problem of the export of watch-making machinery and jewel bearings is closely associated with the general problem of the export of watches and watch movements from Switzerland to the United States. The Government of the United States also regards these matters as closely associated and desires that these problems be discussed simultaneously.

It is believed, therefore, that immediate discussions should take place to determine the manner and extent of control over shipments from Switzerland and the intentions of the Government of Switzerland with respect to the other proposals and matters set forth above.

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1945.

[In a memorandum directed by the Swiss Legation in Washington to the Department of State on April 22, 1946, the Legation declared that it was the intention of the Swiss Government to take certain steps designed to contribute materially to a solution of the problems of the American watch industry during the period of conversion to civilian production. For texts of the exchange of memoranda of April 22, 1946, between the two Governments concerning the exportation to the United States by the Swiss of watches, watch movements, watch-making machinery, and jewel bearings, during the period January 1, 1946, to March 31, 1947, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 5, 1946, pages 763-764.]

RECIPROCAL INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND RELATING TO AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

[For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Bern, August 3, 1945, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1576*, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1935.]

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

REPORTS ON DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE CONCERNING SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES¹

811.3361/1-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 15, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received January 16-7 a. m.]

132. ReEmbs 4392, November 16, 4 p. m.² I have received a letter from Dekanosov³ dated January 10 in reply to Kennan's letter to him of November 16 proposing a reciprocal agreement for the prompt issuance of visas. Dekanosov says he has ascertained that certain delays in acting on visa applications did in fact occur at one time on both sides, but he is informed that these delays have now been eliminated and the Soviet Government consequently sees no necessity of concluding a special agreement on this subject.

We find this answer singularly unconvincing. Even if it were true that there were at present a momentary lull in our perennial difficulties in this score, this would give us no adequate assurances that such difficulties would not soon recur. Actually it is hard to find substantiation for Dekanosov's statement that the delays have been eliminated. As recently as January 4 the chief of the consular section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs called Kennan in and complained to him about long delays on our side in the issuance of visas. He handed Kennan a list of 30 cases in which the Soviet authorities considered that action had been unduly delayed. These were all cases of Soviet Naval personnel or officials wishing to proceed to Alaska. (See my 22 January 3, 4 p. m.⁴) While our information is not complete, we on our side have record of applications by Commander C. E. Allen of the Dental Corps entered September 18, by Francis E. Flavin, civilian employee of the military mission entered about August 10, and by Sergeant Wilfrey W. Towsey entered at

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 801-939.

² Not printed; but see *ibid.*, p. 932, footnote 80. The Counselor of Embassy, George F. Kennan, was then Chargé in the absence of the Ambassador, W. Averell Harriman.

³ Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁴ Not printed.

Cairo about December 10, all of which have, to our knowledge, not yet been acted on.

No matter how unsubstantial Dekanosov's reasoning, the fact remains that the Soviets do not now wish to enter into an agreement such as we have proposed. The interest we have shown by making this proposal will probably suffice to cause them to pull up their socks and treat our applications with reasonable promptitude for a certain length of time. If and when they again begin to lag behind, I think it will be up to us to find tangible means to make it evident that this practice has unfavorable effects on Soviet interests.

HARRIMAN

124.616/2-245

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

No. 1442

Moscow, February 2, 1945.

[Received February 17.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's confidential circular instruction of November 21, 1944, (File No. 124.06/11-21/44, Foreign Service Serial No. 279),⁵ concerning the submission of confidential biographical data by foreign service missions.

Before describing the arrangements which exist at this post at present for the handling of biographical material and the plans for handling such material in the future, I should like to make some general comments on the factors which affect the conduct of this work in Moscow.

There are certain conditions governing the work and life of Soviet civil servants which render the question of assembling and utilizing biographic data on them quite different than in the case of any western country. Among these, the following may be mentioned.

1. *The Soviet official must remain impervious to the personal qualities of any foreigner with whom he deals.*

Any Soviet official dealing with foreigners who would admit that his actions or his opinions had been in any way influenced by personal liking or gratitude for any individual foreigner would receive severe disciplinary punishment without delay. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government go on the theory that every foreign representative is acting solely in the interests of his own government, and that whatever he does may be explained by this factor. If he does a kind or obliging act, it is because he finds it in the interests of his government to do so. From this it follows that in theory no foreign representative or official can be considered objectively capable of an

⁵ Not printed.

act of kindness or generosity, and no Soviet official accordingly need feel himself under obligation to a foreigner. To do anything or say anything in deference to a personal relationship which one would not have done or said in straight performance of official duties would be considered equivalent to acting in the interests of a foreign state. This is particularly true if the act or the statement is one favorable to the foreigner. If it is one unfavorable to him it can, unfortunately, be more easily defended.

2. *The Soviet official must not endeavor to please or to stand out by virtue of his own individual personality.*

It is not part of the job of a Soviet official to "sell" himself. His own individuality is not to be stressed, and should have as little as possible to do with the performance of his duties. These duties are laid down for him with the greatest exactitude by the Party and the Government. His job is to perform these duties, nothing more. He is instructed to be civil in his contacts with foreigners. He is not to offend them unnecessarily. But it is not part of his job to make himself personally liked. If he goes too far in this direction, he creates among his colleagues an impression of seeking personal ends, and brings discredit upon himself. It is for his country and its leader that he is supposed to win respect, not for himself.

3. *The personal views of a Soviet official have little or no influence on his behavior.*

The views of a Soviet official are manufactured for him, in considerable detail, by the All-Union Communist Party, to which—if he is an official dealing with the outside world—he almost surely belongs. Even if he does not belong to the Party, it is incumbent upon him, as a Soviet citizen, to stick closely to what the Party has told him, in his conversations with foreigners. In Party meetings, questions may be discussed by Party members as long as no decision has been taken with respect to them in that body or a higher one. Once such a decision has been taken, the subject is no longer open for discussion. What the Party has decided is true, and final. To voice any other views, particularly to a foreigner, would be a serious breach of discipline. In general, any unnecessary discussion with an outsider, and anything that smacks of personal speculation or ad-libbing, is frowned on. Soviet circles are often contemptuous of foreign diplomats in Moscow for their readiness to blurt out ideas of their own which do not represent the considered policy of their governments and which are therefore, in the Soviet view, "interesting to nobody".

4. *The Soviet official is to keep his private life as distant as possible from his work.*

The passion for conspiracy in the Soviet structure is so great that considerable efforts are made to conceal as far as possible even the actual identity of Soviet officials who deal with the outside world.

Officials in Soviet offices abroad are changed frequently. When they return to the Soviet Union, every contact between them and persons they may have known in their work abroad ceases at once, and entirely. They disappear back into the great mass of the Soviet people. Inquiries about them are in vain. If foreigners who knew them abroad encounter them by chance in the public places of Moscow, the Soviet officials are obviously upset and embarrassed, and make their get-away as fast as possible. There is reason to believe that on occasions they use false names in their work abroad, in order to help to hide their real identities. Their biographies are often revealed, if at all, only in their obituaries. As a rule, only married people with children are now permitted to serve abroad for any length of time and they go abroad accompanied by their families. The purpose of this is to eliminate any possible dependence on personal company or intimacy outside of their own circle. In foreign capitals they build their own life, as far as possible. They have their own schools, and their own amusements. This again reflects the determination of the regime that no relationship shall grow up between them and foreigners which might affect the performance of their work.

5. *The basis of Soviet Government and administration is collective and not individual.*

It is safe to say that practically all decisions in the Soviet Union which have any importance of principle are taken by collective bodies and not by individuals. If these collective bodies are not pure Party bodies, they always contain dominating Party elements, one of whose tasks is to see that the deliberations reflect the interests of the Party itself and not of any individual. It is true that in certain executive posts, such as those of the party chiefs of large provincial territories, a great deal of personal executive power is given to individuals. But in the central administration, and particularly in all matters affecting foreigners, the collective principle is rigidly adhered to. I think it safe to say that no important request of a foreign government is ever considered in Moscow except by a collective body. Individual relations could therefore not possibly have—except possibly in the case of Stalin⁶ himself—much effect on such decisions.

From the above, two factors flow which affect biographical reporting from this Mission.

The first of these is the fact that individual personality as such plays a far smaller role in the public affairs of the Soviet Union than in the case of other countries. It is obviously a matter of policy

⁶ Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

with the Soviet Government to rule out the personal element as far as this can possibly be done in all official relations between Soviet citizens and foreigners. This has been accomplished with what I should say was at least 95 percent efficiency. It is therefore idle to hope that much can be gained in relationships with Soviet officials by a knowledge of their personal background and predilections as distinct from those of any other Soviet citizen. Their behavior is not influenced by games of golf or invitations to dinner. Their egos have usually taken a pretty thorough subduing before the individuals themselves ever appear on the international scene. Persons abroad who have to deal with them will do better to study carefully the ideological conceptions in which they have been trained rather than to bother about their individual propensities. There has been no more common nor more fateful mistake in the judging of Russian matters by our people, and particularly by our personality-conscious press, than the effort to explain all Soviet phenomena in the light of reactions to the personality of individuals. The Soviet Government is a collective effort of the most baffling and unprecedented character; and whoever deals with a Soviet official or a Soviet citizen should never think of him outside of the collective framework into which he has been carefully and firmly fitted.

In the second place, it being official Soviet policy to obscure the background and identity of those Soviet officials who deal with the outside world, it is probably more difficult to assemble personal data on individual officials here than any other place in the world. There are perhaps 20 to 25 officials, at the most, with whom this Mission comes into contact in its work. There are practically none who are permitted to have sufficiently close social contact with foreign representatives in the Soviet Union so that it would be possible to know anything much of their personal lives or characters. It should never be forgotten that it cannot be ascertained even in the case of some of the most important and prominent men in the country whether they are married, or even where they live. All this is a state secret and no Russian dares mention it to a foreigner even if he knows it. As a rule, the best this Mission can do is to give the announced names (we are never sure that they are the real ones) of the incumbents of high positions in the country. In certain cases, we are able to trace them through from one position to another by careful collecting of official press announcements in which their names appear, but their real biographies usually appear only in their obituaries when, as the regime is well aware, they can no longer be of use to the foreign world.

[The final five paragraphs, which are concerned with the method and difficulties of collecting biographical details, are here omitted.]

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE F. KENNAN

761.00/2-345

Memorandum by Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs (Dunn) ⁷

[WASHINGTON,] February 3, 1945.

MR. DUNN: This Division heartily agrees with Mr. Armstrong's observations.⁸ It has been noted by almost all of our people who have dealt with the Russians that the high Soviet officials who are responsible for the formulation of policy do not appreciate the importance of public opinion in a democracy nor the importance of the press in the formation of public opinion.

Kennan, in a conversation with Lozovski,⁹ the Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who is a Foreign Office official responsible for press and propaganda matters, endeavored to impress upon him the importance of having the case of an American broadcaster who had been excluded from broadcasting from the Soviet Union handled in such a way as to cause as little disturbance to public opinion as possible. Lozovski replied to the effect that the Soviet Union was a great power and did not have to concern itself with sensibilities of the press.

The Russians appear to believe that our press is largely controlled by big business and that it can to a large extent be ignored. In conversations with Soviet officials, they have frequently pointed to the fact that President Roosevelt continues to be reelected despite the strong opposition of the greater part of the American press, and they tend to draw the inference from this that the press is not important. There are some indications that the Russians are now following a policy of seeing how far they can go politically without breaking down collaboration with the United States and Great Britain. There is great danger that before they reach the point where our Governments will react strongly enough to cause the Russians to realize that they cannot go further, they will have already gone beyond the point where public opinion in the United States and Great Britain will allow further wholehearted collaboration with the Soviet Union.

L[LEWELLYN] E. T[HOMPSON, JR.]

⁷ Seen by the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew.

⁸ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, was under instruction to make reports from time to time.

⁹ Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

811.3361/1-2045

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) to the Director of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department (Thebaud)

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1945.

Subject: Telegram 132, January 15, from Moscow and telegram 194, January 20, from Moscow to Secretary of State¹⁰ (paraphrases of which have been handed to Major Wylie).

It will be noted that the Embassy in Moscow regards the backlog of visas requested for United States naval and military personnel as having been cleared up and asks authority to issue visas in all outstanding cases of Soviet naval personnel. This authorization was given and there is now only one case outstanding, that of Lieutenant Captain Lulakov whose case was referred to the Navy January 26 (memorandum 38¹¹).

The Embassy feels that the action which has been taken to date has had considerable effect and has resulted in the Soviets bringing up to date their consideration of requests for visas for United States naval personnel. The Embassy recommends, consequently, that no further action be taken on the proposed visa agreement, stating that the British agreement along similar lines has not proved in practice to be of any real value.

The Department is inclined to agree with the Embassy's recommendation and suggests that no further action be taken in this connection unless new delays occur in Soviet consideration of applications for naval personnel visas.¹²

ELBRIDGE DURBROW

861.415/2-2445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 24, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received February 24—5: 50 p. m.]

543. Moscow press for February 24 published prominently in quotation most of Morgenthau's Red Army day speech,¹³ omitting, how-

¹⁰ Telegram 194 not printed.

¹¹ Memorandum 38, January 22, 1945, not printed.

¹² In a letter of March 19, 1945, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, H. Struve Hensel, replied that the Navy Department concurred in this recommendation but requested the Department of State to continue to refer to the Navy Department individual applications for visas for Soviet naval personnel in order that comment might be made on each case on the basis of its merits. At the same time, the Navy Department withdrew its objections to issuing a visa to Lieutenant Captain Lulakov. (811.3361/3-1945)

¹³ For report on the speech of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., on February 22 before the American-Soviet Friendship Council, see the *New York Times*, February 23, 1945, p. 9, col. 1. For the greetings sent by President Roose-

(Footnote 13 continued on p. 816.)

ever, his reference to British heroism at Dunkirk and Britain's role in Lend-Lease. Coverage also omitted Morgenthau's statement regarding use of American vehicles in Red Army operations, but quoted in full his paragraph regarding new understanding between American and Russian peoples.¹⁴

HARRIMAN

740.0011 EW/4-245: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 2, 1945—midnight.

[Received April 3—11:38 a. m.]

1020. In an earlier *en clair* message namely 1007 of April 2,¹⁵ the Embassy wired the complete text of an article by General Galaktionov on the Allied military operations in the west which appeared in today's *Pravda*.

I wish to invite special attention to this article and recommend that it be given careful study. It not only explains the extreme reserve with which news of our recent military advances has been released to the Soviet public, as described in my 979, March 30, 6 p. m.,¹⁵ but it reveals an attitude with respect to the background of our operations which might well find its reflection in other fields.

It is clear from this article that Russian suspicions, never hard to arouse in the best of circumstances, have now been fanned by reports in our press and radio of lack of German resistance in the west. The Russians evidently conclude from this that the Germans are putting up only token resistance to our advance, and suspect that they may be acting this way either in pursuance to some tacit understanding with our military authorities or in the hope of obtaining some sort of assurance of mild treatment from our side. These suspicions are undoubtedly aggravated by the unpleasant consciousness that the pros-

(Footnote 13 continued from p. 815.)

vult to Marshal Stalin on the occasion of Red Army Day, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1945, p. 304. They were acknowledged by Stalin on February 27. For documentation for the previous year, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 833-834.

¹⁴ In telegram 394, February 23, 1945, to Moscow, transmitting the text of Morgenthau's speech, this paragraph read: "Both Russians and Americans, I am certain, will emerge from the war with a new understanding and appreciation of one another. The achievements of the Red Army and the heroic devotion of all Soviet citizens have commanded the admiration of the entire world. Misconceptions about Russian life and character are being cleared away. In the same manner, I am sure, there is growing among the Russian people a new esteem for the greatness of America. They have seen us throw off our lethargy, flex our muscles and devote ourselves and all that we possess to the defense of human freedom. They have seen the valor of their own soldiers matched by that of Englishmen and Americans who stormed the beaches of Normandy, and then swept the Nazi Armies back to their own borders." (861.415/2-2345)

¹⁵ Not printed.

pects of occupation by Soviet forces are a source of particular dread and horror to many of the peoples of central Europe, by the suspicion that this accounts for what they take to be a greater German will to resist in the east than in the west, and by the thought that in consequence of this the Red Army may be deprived of the glory of being the first to reach the vital centers of Germany, at a time when the forces of the western Allies are winning sensational and—in the Russian view—cheap victories.¹⁶

HARRIMAN

840.50/4-445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 4, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received 10:22 p. m.]

1038. I fully agree with the Department's views expressed in 768, April 1, 11 p. m. [*a. m.*],¹⁷ regarding the British proposal for tripartite conversations in Moscow on relief supplies for Europe. Aside from the practical reasons given in the Department's cable indicating that these tripartite conversations would overlap other established commissions I feel that we have now ample proof that the Soviet Government would use such conversations to promote only their own welfare and political objectives. As we would approach the conversations from the humanitarian aspect we would start at an insuperable disadvantage. Should our own study of these problems together with British develop specific matters on which we wished to obtain Soviet cooperation I believe we should then approach the Soviet Government through one of the established commissions or through diplomatic channels in order to attempt to persuade or induce the Soviets to cooperate. I refer to such things as the general problem of feeding Germany, since I understand that the Russians will occupy the food surplus areas of Germany whereas the British and we will occupy some food deficit areas. Another case might be the stimulation of production and the direction of the distribution of oil in Rumania. In this case I still believe that we should insist upon the establish-

¹⁶ In telegram 1040, April 4, 1945, 11 p. m., from Moscow, Ambassador Harriman reported that the Soviet press, following publication of the Galaktionov article, began for the first time to give extensive treatment to material on the subject. "This change in treatment presumably reflects a sense of the necessity of preparing the Soviet reader for possible further important developments in Germany which would otherwise have taken him quite by surprise." (740.0011-EW/4-445)

¹⁷ Vol. II, p. 1082. For documentation on negotiations relating to provision of civilian supplies for liberated areas in the military and post-military periods, see *ibid.*, pp. 1059 ff.

ment now of the tripartite committee of experts in Rumania as has been suggested by the Department¹⁸ and also in Hungary. I can see no reason why we should not inform the Soviet Government that until they show willingness to cooperate along these lines we will be forced to give less attention to Soviet protocol requests for petroleum products.¹⁹ Pressure of this kind is the only way we can hope to obtain even partial Soviet cooperation.

Turning to the matter of policy, we now have ample proof that the Soviet Government views all matters from the standpoint of their own selfish interests. They have publicized to their own political advantage the difficult food situation in areas liberated by our troops such as in France, Belgium and Italy, comparing it with the allegedly satisfactory conditions in areas which the Red Army has liberated. They have kept our newspaper correspondents under strict censorship to prevent the facts becoming known. They have sent token shipments to Poland of Lend-Lease items or those similar thereto in order to give the appearance of generosity on the part of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party or its associates everywhere are using economic difficulties in areas under our responsibilities to promote Soviet concepts and policies and to undermine the influence of the western Allies.

In my War Department message of March 31 to the Protocol Committee²⁰ in answer to the War Department message the Department refers to, which evidently crossed the Department's cable to which I am now replying, I suggested in the first paragraph "that minimum requirements of our western Allies be given first consideration". I feel I should expand the reasons for this suggestion and if the Soviet Government had shown any willingness to deal with economic questions on their merits without political considerations, as we approach them, I would feel that we should make every effort to concert our plans with those of the Soviet Government. On the other hand our hopes in this direction have proved to be futile. Unless we and the British now adopt an independent line the people of the areas under our responsibility will suffer and the chances of Soviet domination in Europe will be enhanced. I thus regretfully come to the conclusion that we should be guided as a matter of principle by the policy of taking care of our western Allies and other areas under our responsibility first, allocating to Russia what may be left. I am in no sense suggesting that this policy should have as its objective the development of a political bloc or a sphere of influence by the British or ourselves, but that we should, through such economic aid as we can

¹⁸ See telegram 143, March 17, 8 p. m., to Bucharest, p. 650.

¹⁹ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 647 ff.

²⁰ Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser and Assistant to President Roosevelt, was Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee; for documentation on wartime assistance by the United States to the Soviet Union, partly through this Committee, see pp. 937 ff.

give to our western Allies, including Greece as well as Italy, reestablish a reasonable life for the people of these countries who have the same general outlook as we have on life and the development of the world. The Soviet Union and the minority governments that the Soviets are forcing on the people of eastern Europe have an entirely different objective. We must clearly recognize that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy as we know and respect it. In addition the Soviet Government is attempting to penetrate through the Communist parties supported by it the countries of western Europe with the hope of expanding Soviet influence in the internal and external affairs of these countries.

Since we under no circumstances are prepared to involve ourselves in the internal political affairs of other countries by such methods, our only hope of supporting the peoples of these countries who resent totalitarian minority dictatorships is to assist them to attain economic stability as soon as possible. Lack of sufficient food and employment are fertile grounds for the subtle false promises of Communist agents.

The Soviet Government will end this war with the largest gold reserve of any country except the United States, will have large quantities of Lend-Lease material and equipment not used or worn out in the war with which to assist their reconstruction, will ruthlessly strip the enemy countries they have occupied of everything they can move, will control the foreign trade of countries under their domination as far as practicable to the benefit of the Soviet Union, will use political and economic pressure on other countries including South America to force trade arrangements to their own advantage and at the same time they will demand from us every form of aid and assistance which they think they can get from us while using our assistance to promote their political aims to our disadvantage in other parts of the world.

I recognize that it may be thought that much of this has no relationship to the question raised by the Department's message. On the other hand, I am stating it in order to justify my final recommendation, namely that the Soviet Government's selfish attitude must, in my opinion, force us if we are to protect American vital interests to adopt a more positive policy of using our economic influence to further our broad political ideals. Unless we are ready to live in a world dominated largely by Soviet influence, we must use our economic power to assist those countries that are naturally friendly to our concepts in so far as we can possibly do so. The only hope of stopping Soviet penetration is the development of sound economic conditions in these countries. I therefore recommend that we face the realities of the situation and orient our foreign economic policy

accordingly. Our policy toward the Soviet Union should, of course, continue to be based on our earnest desire for the development of friendly relations and cooperation both political and economic, but always on a *quid pro quo* basis. This means tying our economic assistance directly into our political problems with the Soviet Union. This should be faced squarely in our consideration of the fifth protocol.

HARRIMAN

761.9411/4-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 5, 1945.

[Received April 6—6:20 a. m.]

1054. Following is the text, as received from press section of Foreign Office, of item under today's date which has been broadcast over Soviet radio and will appear in tomorrow's press:

"Today at 3 p. m. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov received the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. N. Sato, and made the following statement to him in the name of the Soviet Government:

"The neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was concluded on April 13, 1941,²¹ that is, before the attack of Germany on the USSR and before the outbreak of war between Japan on the one hand and England and the United States on the other. Since that time the situation has been basically altered. Germany has attacked the USSR, and Japan, the ally of Germany, is aiding the latter in its war against the USSR. Furthermore Japan is waging war with the USA and England, which are the allies of the Soviet Union.

In these circumstances the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR has lost its sense, and the prolongation of that pact has become impossible.

On the strength of the above and in accordance with Article 3 of the above mentioned pact, which envisaged the right of denunciation one year before the lapse of the 5-year period of operation of the pact, the Soviet Government hereby makes known to the Government of Japan its wish to denounce the pact of April 13, 1941."

The Japanese Ambassador, Mr. N. Sato, promised to inform the Japanese Government of the statement of the Soviet Government."²²

HARRIMAN

²¹ For documentation regarding the negotiation of this neutrality pact, see *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. iv, pp. 905 ff.; for text of the pact, see *ibid.*, p. 944; and for a statement on April 14, 1941, by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, see *ibid.*, p. 948. See also *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 153-186.

²² For the eventual declaration of war by the Soviet Union on Japan, see memorandum by Acting Secretary of State Grew of his conversation with the Chargé of the Soviet Union (Novikov) on August 8, vol. vi, section under Japan entitled "Surrender of Japan . . .", Part I; see also *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, vol. II, p. 1474, footnote 1.

711.61/4-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 6, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received April 7—3:23 a. m.]

1061. You request a report on our relations with the Soviet Government in your personal cable No. 777, April 3, 5 p. m.²³ You will recall that on September 18 in Department's No. 2234, 10 p. m.²⁴ a similar request was made to which I replied in cable No. 3572, September 19, 1 p. m.²⁵ and No. 3600, September 20, 8 p. m.²⁶ At that time I pointed out that a telegraphic message was a difficult medium in which to report on as complicated a situation as then existed and suggested that a satisfactory report could only be given if I were directed to return to Washington. The situation today is even more difficult to analyze and explain in a message. It is for this reason that I urgently request that I be permitted to return at once to Washington. However, in the meantime, for such a limited value as it may be, I will attempt to outline the situation as it appears from Moscow.

We have recognized for many months that the Soviets have three lines of foreign policy. (1.) Overall collaboration with us and the British in a World Security Organization; (2.) The creation of a unilateral security ring through domination of their border states; and (3.) The penetration of other countries through exploitation of democratic processes on the part of Communist controlled parties with strong Soviet backing to create political atmosphere favorable to Soviet policies.

We have been hopeful that the Soviets would, as we have, place number 1 as their primary policy and would modify their plans for 2 if they were satisfied with the efficacy of plan 1. It now seems evident that regardless of what they may expect from the World Security Organization they intend to go forward with unilateral action in the domination of their bordering states. It may well be that during and since the Moscow Conference they feel they have made this quite plain to us. You will recall that at the Moscow Conference Molotov indicated that although he would inform us of Soviet action in Eastern Europe he declined to be bound by consultation with us. It may be difficult for us to believe, but it still may be true that Stalin and Molotov

²³ This telegram read: "In view of recent developments it would be helpful for the President and myself to receive an overall survey of our relations with the Soviet Union with any comments and views you may care to submit." (711.61/4-345)

²⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 991.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 826.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. iv, p. 992.

considered at Yalta²⁸ that by our willingness to accept a general wording of the declarations on Poland and liberated Europe, by our recognition of the need of the Red Army for security behind its lines, and of the predominant interest of Russia in Poland as a friendly neighbor and as a corridor to Germany, we understand and were ready to accept Soviet policies already known to us.

We must recognize that the words "independent but friendly neighbor" and in fact "democracy" itself have entirely different meanings to the Soviets than to us. Although they know of the meaning of these terms to us they undoubtedly feel that we should be aware of the meaning to them. We have been hopeful that the Soviets would accept our concepts whereas they on their side may have expected us to accept their own concepts, particularly in areas where their interests predominate. In any event, whatever may have been in their minds at Yalta, it now seems that they feel they can force us to acquiesce in their policies. Since we are resisting, they are using the usual Soviet tactics of retaliating in ways that they think will have the most effect, one of which is the decision not to send Molotov to the San Francisco Conference.²⁹ They are fully aware of the importance we place on this Conference.

I have evidence which satisfies me that the Soviets have considered as a sign of weakness on our part our continued generous and considerate attitude towards them in spite of their disregard of our requests for cooperation in matters of interest to us.

I am further satisfied that the time has come when we must by our actions in each individual case make it plain to the Soviet Government that they cannot expect our continued cooperation on terms laid down by them. We have recognized that the Soviets have deep seated suspicions of all foreigners including ourselves. Our natural method of dealing with suspicion in others is to show our goodwill by generosity and consideration. We have earnestly attempted this policy and it has not been successful. This policy seems to have increased rather than diminished their suspicions as they evidently have misconstrued our motives. I feel that our relations would be on a much sounder basis if on the one hand we were firm and completely frank with them as to our position and motives and on the other hand they are made to understand specifically how lack of cooperation with our legitimate demands will adversely affect their interests.

I hope that I will not be misunderstood when I say that our relations with the Soviet Government will be on firmer ground as soon

²⁸ For documentation on the Yalta Conference, February 4-11, 1945, attended by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945.

²⁹ For documentation on the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco, April 25-June 26, 1945, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

as we have adopted a policy which includes on the one hand at all times a full place for cooperation with the Soviet Union but on the other a readiness to go along without them if we can't obtain their cooperation. Up to recently the issues we have had with the Soviets have been relatively small compared to their contribution to the war but now we should begin to establish a new relationship. As you know I am a most earnest advocate of the closest possible understanding with the Soviet Union so that what I am saying only relates to how such understanding may be best attained.

Turning now to practical suggestions, they fall into two general categories. The first relates to policies toward other nations. I feel that we should further cement our relations with our other Allies and other friendly nations, settle our relatively minor differences with them and assist them economically as described in my 1038, April 4, 8 p. m., which I suggest be read in connection with this message. I am in no sense suggesting that in settling our political differences with them we should compromise our principles, but that we should make it our business with energy and understanding to make these countries feel that they are secure in dealing with us, that we will be understanding of their problems and needs.

If such an atmosphere is developed, the people of these countries will feel less dependent politically and economically on Soviet Russia and, as their concepts are much the same as ours, they will be inclined to orient their policies along lines similar to ours. A policy of this kind in itself will have an influence on our relations with the Soviet Union as I believe they fear more than anything else a close understanding among the western nations and I believe they will be more ready to deviate from their unilateral policies if they find that they cannot play one against the other and that they are not indispensable to us.

China is a subject by itself and I will not attempt to deal with it in this telegram.

My suggestions in the second general category relate to our current dealings with the Soviet Union. Although we should continue to approach all matters with an attitude of friendliness we should be firm and as far as practicable indicate our displeasure in ways that will definitely affect their interest in each case in which they fail to take our legitimate interests into consideration by their actions.

In the compass of this message I cannot list the almost daily affronts and total disregard which the Soviets evince in matters of interest to us. Whenever the United States does anything to which the Soviet take exception they do not hesitate to take retaliatory measures. I must with regret recommend that we begin in the near future with one or two cases where their actions are intolerable and make them realize

that they cannot continue their present attitude except at great cost to themselves. We should recognize that if we adopt this policy we may have some adverse repercussions in the beginning. On the other hand we have evidence that in cases where they have been made to feel that their interests were being adversely affected we have obtained quick and favorable action. In any event I see no alternative as our present relations are clearly unsatisfactory.

Leaning to the military, General Deane on his return to Washington will present recommendations for a line of policy in which I concur. We both are satisfied that whatever the Soviets do in the Far East will be because of their own interests and not because of any conciliatory policy on our part.

I recognize that I am attempting to discuss in this message most fundamental questions. I feel that regardless of other considerations, serious as they are, I should be ordered home immediately for a very brief stay in order that I may report more fully on developments here and their implications. In spite of recent developments, I am still satisfied that if we deal with the Soviets on a realistic basis, we can in time attain a workable basis for our relations. There is ample evidence that the Soviets desire our help and collaboration but they now think they can have them on their own terms which in many cases are completely unacceptable to us. They do not understand that their present actions seriously jeopardize the attainment of satisfactory relations with us and unless they are made to understand this now, they will become increasingly difficult to deal with.

HARRIMAN

711.61/4-645 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1945—11 p. m.

817. Personal for the Ambassador. We find most helpful and are carefully studying the review of our relations with the Soviet as given in your 1061, April 6, 1 p. m. I am cognizant that a cable is a difficult medium to use in giving us the true picture; however, I believe we should await Stalin's replies to the President's last two important messages²¹ before deciding on a date for your return here.

STETTINIUS

²¹ On April 7, Stalin sent two replies to President Roosevelt. One was to the President's message No. 218, April 1, concerning Polish problems; for texts of message No. 218 and reply, see *ante*, pp. 194 and 201, respectively. The other was to the President's message No. 222, April 4, concerning the discussion of surrender terms for Germany which had taken place at Bern; for texts of message No. 222 and reply, see vol. III, pp. 745 and 749, respectively.

124.611/4-1245

Memorandum by Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] April 12, 1945.

One of the most practical items which this Government might attempt to obtain from the Soviet Union in the form of reverse Lend-Lease is a building for our mission in Moscow.³² Plans have already been drawn up by the Foreign Buildings Office which include a chancery, embassy and living quarters for officers and clerical personnel.

It is believed that such a plan is particularly appropriate in Moscow as the housing situation is probably more acute there than at any other post and will probably remain so for many years to come. Moreover, the question of labor and materials in the Soviet Union is so great as virtually to preclude our ever being able to build there on the basis of a Congressional appropriation. An added reason is that the Russians have never been willing to give us a sufficiently long lease on a site to justify our building, and they will not sell land outright.

It is not believed that we should attempt at this stage to obtain buildings for our consulate at Vladivostok under reverse Lend-Lease.

The question of reverse Lend-Lease with the Soviet Union is tied in with the question of the possible extension of a postwar credit with the USSR. The Soviet Union will have raw materials which would be useful to us for stockpiling, but the furnishing of such materials on this basis would seriously prejudice the prospects of the USSR being able to repay any credit that may be extended.

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.

811.001 Roosevelt—Condolences/4-1345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 13, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received April 13—6:47 a. m.]

1151. Late last night I telephoned to Molotov the news of President Roosevelt's death.³³ He came immediately to the Embassy

³² For earlier documentation on the inability to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Soviet Union for the construction of an Embassy building in Moscow, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, index entries under American Embassy in Moscow, p. 1017. For documentation on lend-lease and reverse lend-lease, see *post*, pp. 937 ff.

³³ Messages of condolence were received from Moscow on April 13. For Mr. Molotov's telegram to the Secretary of State, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1945, p. 665. For Marshal Stalin's telegram to President Truman, see *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 1: *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1955), p. 20; for President Truman's acknowledgment, see *ibid.*, p. 21.

at 3 o'clock Moscow time to express the deep sympathy of his Government and of himself personally. He said that all Russia would mourn his death and that the world had lost a great leader to guide the way in peace. He seemed deeply moved and disturbed. He stayed for some time talking about the part President Roosevelt had played in the war and in the plans for peace, of the respect Marshal Stalin and all the Russian people had had for him and how much Marshal Stalin had valued his visit to Yalta. I encouraged him to ask questions about President Truman and assured him that President Truman would carry on President Roosevelt's policies.

Molotov in leaving said that the Soviet Government would have confidence in President Truman because he had been selected by President Roosevelt. I have never heard Molotov talk so earnestly. I asked him to arrange for me to call on Marshal Stalin today.³⁴ It is my purpose to reassure Stalin as to the continuation of our policies and make every effort to get us back as far as possible to the spirit and atmosphere of the Crimea Conference.

It is my intention to leave Moscow Monday morning³⁵ for Washington for a brief visit to talk with you and the President unless you instruct me otherwise.³⁶ If I have luck with weather I should reach Washington Wednesday morning.³⁷

HARRIMAN

Moscow Embassy Files: 59A543, Part 6, Box 357, Folder 39

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*³⁸

[Moscow,] April 13, 1945—8 p. m.

Participants: Marshal Stalin
 V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
 [V. N.] Pavlov, Interpreter
 W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
 Edward Page

When I entered Marshal Stalin's office I noticed that he was obviously deeply distressed at the news of the death of President Roosevelt. He greeted me in silence and stood holding my hand for about 30 seconds before asking me to sit down.

³⁴ See memorandum of conversation, *infra*. For report of Ambassador Harriman's meeting with Marshal Stalin, see telegram 1161, April 13, 11 p. m., from Moscow, vol. I, p. 289.

³⁵ April 16.

³⁶ For the Secretary's reply, see telegram 867, April 14, 3 p. m., to Moscow, p. 212.

³⁷ In telegram 911, April 19, 5 p. m., the Department informed the Embassy at Moscow of the arrival of Ambassador Harriman and his party late on the evening of April 18 (123 Harriman, W. Averell/4-1945).

³⁸ Memorandum prepared by Edward Page, Second Secretary of Embassy.

He then asked me many questions about the President and the circumstances which brought about his death. I explained that the President had heart trouble during the last year; that Dr. MacIntyre had informed me that he might live for years or die suddenly. From the information I had received it appeared that the President had gone to Warm Springs for a rest. He was in excellent health and intended to return to Washington forthwith. He had evidently had a stroke and had passed away very suddenly. I commented that Marshal Stalin had probably received the President's last message,³⁹ that is, the message that I had received last night at 12:30 and transmitted to Marshal Stalin. The President at that time was already dead but when I had sent the message I was not aware of this fact.

I stated that I had come to see Marshal Stalin with the thought that he might wish to ask some questions as to the situation in the United States as a result of the death of President Roosevelt. The Marshal stated that he did not believe that there would be any change in policy. I said that I was convinced that this would be true in so far as the war, foreign policy, and all those other policies where the President had made his plans clear. I continued that I had explained to Mr. Molotov last night why the President had selected Mr. Truman as Vice President. Mr. Truman had always followed the President's program and had heartily supported all his views. Mr. Truman was a man Marshal Stalin would like—he was a man of action and not of words. Mr. Molotov had noted that he had not made many speeches. This was quite true—he was not an individual who sought publicity. He had been in the United States Senate since 1936 and had gained the highest respect from both political parties. The President knew that he would need Senate approval of his peace plans, of Dumbarton Oaks,⁴⁰ and of other important internal and foreign policies. This was one of the main reasons he had chosen Senator Truman for his running mate. I said that I was satisfied that President Truman would carry out President Roosevelt's plans precisely as he understood them. Marshal Stalin was pleased to hear this. I continued that President Truman would not try to interject his own personality into future policies but would have the courage to develop them. From the domestic standpoint, he was a New Dealer—but perhaps in the center.

On the other hand, I said that President Truman naturally could not have the great prestige that President Roosevelt enjoyed at the time of his death. Until he had become Vice President he was not especially well known in the United States because he had never

³⁹ See telegram 229, April 12, from President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin, vol. III, p. 756.

⁴⁰ For the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, August 21–October 7, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 713 ff.

sought publicity. The same was true abroad. This, in my opinion, could not help but cause a certain period of uncertainty, both internally and externally, not necessarily about the conduct of the war but on all foreign and domestic policy questions. The San Francisco Conference, for example, might well cause more difficulties. The American people did not know whether President Truman could carry through President Roosevelt's program as the late President would have done. However, it was my belief that President Truman would gain the complete confidence of the American people.

I said that I believed that Marshal Stalin could assist President Truman at this time: this would facilitate in stabilizing the situation in the United States and in solidifying him with the American people. The American people knew that President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin had close personal relations and that this relationship had a great effect on United States-Soviet relations. Marshal Stalin interjected, "President Roosevelt has died but his cause must live on. We shall support President Truman with all our forces and all our will." The Marshall then requested me to inform President Truman accordingly.

I stated that I was going to make a suggestion which might be impossible to realize. I was thinking of what Marshal Stalin might do to help President Truman, to stabilize the situation in America and to reduce the disturbances which had been caused by the death of President Roosevelt. I said that I believed that the most effective way to assure the American public and the world at large of the desire of the Soviet Government to continue collaboration with us and the other United Nations would be for Mr. Molotov to go to the United States at this time. I suggested that he might stop in Washington to see the President and then proceed to San Francisco even though he might remain there only for a few days. I said that if it would assist, I felt sure that we would be pleased to place a plane comparable to the plane in which President Roosevelt had gone to the Crimea at the disposal of Mr. Molotov. The plane could make the trip to Washington in 36 hours. If Marshal Stalin so desired, I remarked jokingly, we could paint a red star on the plane and man it with a mixed Soviet-American crew. Marshal Stalin remarked that he would prefer a green star. I continued that these planes could make the trip with great comfort and speed. If Marshal Stalin desired, we would paint the entire aircraft green. During these exchanges of remarks, Mr. Molotov kept muttering, "Time, time, time."

I continued that these were details connected with the trip. I could not find words to express too strongly what it would mean to the American people and to President Truman, what it would mean to our overall relations, especially at this time in our great tragedy

if Mr. Molotov could come to the United States. The entire world would regard his visit as a great stabilizing influence.

After a brief discussion between Mr. Molotov and Marshal Stalin as to the dates of the San Francisco Conference and the convening of the Supreme Soviet, Marshal Stalin inquired whether I was expressing my personal views. I made it clear that I was but added that I felt completely confident that I was expressing the views of the President and the Secretary of State and that I felt sure that they would be ready to confirm what I had said. Marshal Stalin then stated categorically that Mr. Molotov's trip to the United States, although difficult at this time, would be arranged. He made it clear, however, that this decision was based upon my assurances that the President and the Secretary would renew the hope that it would be possible for Mr. Molotov to come to Washington and San Francisco as they considered his presence there at this time of real importance.

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser and Assistant to the President, to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) ⁴¹

ROCHESTER, MINNESOTA, April 13, 1945.

Personal and secret to Premier Stalin from Harry Hopkins.

I heard your message broadcast to the American people today ⁴² but I want you to know that I feel that Russia has lost her greatest friend in America. The President was ever deeply impressed by your determination and confidence that the Nazi tyrants of the world will be driven from power forever.

HARRY HOPKINS

740.0011 EW/4-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 14, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received 11:20 p. m.]

1169. This morning's *Pravda* carries an article of high importance for current Soviet attitude toward military events in Germany and the treatment of the German population in the coming period. The article is written by G. Alexandrov, who is head of the Propaganda

⁴¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. On this day Mr. Hopkins was a patient at St. Mary's Hospital in Rochester, Minnesota.

⁴² For Marshal Stalin's message to Mrs. Roosevelt, broadcast by Moscow radio on April 13, see the *New York Times*, April 13, 1945, p. 10, col. 7.

Committee of All Union Communist Party and as such is responsible for the official line. The article thus bears a highly authoritative character. It consists of an attack on Ilya Ehrenburg⁴³ for an article the latter recently wrote about Germany. Ehrenburg is attacked on the following two counts:

1. For treating all elements of the German population alike, for maintaining that they are all equally guilty and deserve punishment in equal measure, and for implying that the Red Army should destroy the entire population except the children. These are sharply rebutted and it is stated that the Red Army has never made it its objective—and does not now do so—to destroy the German people.

2. For explaining the relatively greater German resistance on the Eastern Front, as compared with the Western Front, by the fear of the German people for the revenge of the Russians as compared with their reliance on the softness of the Western Allies. On this point Alexandrov states that fear, of course, plays its part but that it is not the only or even the main reason for the German determination to hold in the east while yielding in the west. Through these tactics, Alexandrov says, the Hitlerites merely are continuing their old game of trying to sow dissension among the Allies with a view to delaying the final mortal blow of the Allied armies and to retaining by a military-political trick what they were not able to retain by armed force. Ehrenburg's thesis that their action is governed exclusively by fear is not helpful, in Alexandrov's view, to the proper explanation of this provocative German policy aimed at dissension among the Allies.

An open attack of this sort by someone of Alexandrov's standing on a publicist as prominent and authoritative as Ehrenburg, in connection to questions or [of] such vital current significance, must be taken as a major expression of Soviet policy. It is impossible to say with certainty what motives lie beyond it. In the Embassy's view the most likely explanation is the following: the unexpectedly rapid advance of the armies of the Western Allies at a moment when the Red Army has been substantially immobilized on the Oder Line and the consequent conquest by Allied forces of large sections of central and even eastern Germany, has presented the Soviet propaganda machine with a new and pressing problem, namely: to explain to the Soviet public and to the world why Germany was finally toppled over by the Allies in the west and not by the Red Army who were the first to penetrate into substantial expanses of German territory. Ehrenburg, through his vehement and bloodthirsty articles, has done his utmost to provide substance to the wildest fears of the German population and he is now voicing these very fears as the reason why Germany was willing to

⁴³ Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg, prominent Soviet writer.

yield to the west and not to the east. It is plain that the Kremlin does not wish to have to tell the Russian people that the Germans held desperately in the east while opening the front in the west because they feared something like a new barbarian invasion. It is offensive to the Russian sense of prestige, and no longer necessary or desirable for tactical considerations, that it should be officially held that all elements of the German people feared Russia more than the west. The time is coming when the Russians will have to share responsibility for the German civil population and will have to deal in one way or another, in the last analysis, with the political sentiments and reactions of the German people. They do not wish to inaugurate this period with the official thesis that they constituted so deadly a menace to all elements of the German population that the German people as a whole preferred death to Russian occupation.

As is their frequent practice, the Russians throughout the war have been advancing two conflicting theses toward Germany. One is that which has now been put forward by Alexandrov and which envisages the necessity of enlisting the confidence and hopes of large sections of the German population. This view, it will be recalled, was put forward by Stalin himself in the early months of war, and Alexandrov quotes Stalin in support of his views. The second line is that which was taken by Ehrenburg and is one of unadulterated and bloodthirsty hatred for the entire German population.

The Kremlin has permitted the impetuous and eloquent Ehrenburg to carry forward the second of these two lines during the last months of the war when it was felt necessary, for reasons of military and civilian morale, to whip up to a maximum the feelings of hatred and revenge among the Russian army and population. It has probably done this deliberately, fully conscious that the usefulness of this line would be of limited duration; and it is significant that none of the other prominent Soviet publicists and no responsible political figure in Russia has endorsed the extremist line that Ehrenburg has taken. Events in Germany have now forced the Kremlin to take early measure to clarify to the Russian people the German attitude toward the Red Army and to the German people the Russian attitude toward Germany. In these circumstances the unsoundness of Ehrenburg's line has become clear and his ideas can no longer be tolerated.

Alexandrov's article contains no rebuke to Ehrenburg for his incessant and highly unfair criticisms of our methods of military government in Germany.

HARRIMAN

711.61/4-1945

Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State for White House Liaison, to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1945.

The following is a list of questions which Mr. Molotov may raise or which you might wish to raise depending upon the course which the discussions take: ⁴⁴

1. Implementation of the Crimea Agreement on liberated areas in Rumania.⁴⁵
2. Implementation of the Crimea Agreement on liberated areas in Bulgaria.⁴⁶
3. Need for improvement of the American position on Allied Control Commissions in satellite states.
4. Failure of the Soviet Government to provide facilities for the entry of UNRRA and Red Cross personnel into Poland and the Balkans.
5. Failure of the Soviet Government to satisfy our requirements for full advance information concerning transfers to third countries of supplies furnished to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease or supplies of Soviet origin similar to Lend-Lease materials.⁴⁷
6. The implementation of the Crimea Agreement regarding the exchange of liberated prisoners of war and civilians.⁴⁸
7. The Kravchenko case.⁴⁹
8. The Soviet request for a six billion dollar loan.⁵⁰
9. Forthcoming meeting of the Reparations Commission in Moscow.⁵¹

1. *Implementation of the Crimea Agreement on Liberated Areas in Rumania.*

Basic Facts.

At the end of February a political crisis developed in Rumania, largely as a result of a campaign by the Left-wing parties under Communist leadership, aided by measures taken by the Soviet military au-

⁴⁴ For discussions between President Truman and Foreign Commissar Molotov on April 22 at 8:30 p. m., and on April 23 at 5:30 p. m., see the memoranda of conversations on these days by Charles E. Bohlen, pp. 235 and 256, respectively. For the President's own account, see *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 1: *Year of Decisions*, pp. 75-82.

⁴⁵ For the Declaration on Liberated Europe, see the Communiqué issued at the end of the Crimea Conference, signed on February 11, 1945, by Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin. *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 971-973. For documentation on Rumania, see *ante*, pp. 464 ff.

⁴⁶ For documentation on Bulgaria, see vol. iv, pp. 135 ff.

⁴⁷ For documentation, see pp. 937 ff.

⁴⁸ For text of this agreement, signed at Yalta on February 11, 1945, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 985. Concerning the carrying out of this agreement, see *post*, pp. 1067 ff.

⁴⁹ For documentation, see pp. 1131 ff.

⁵⁰ See telegram 29, January 4, 2 p. m., from Moscow, p. 942.

⁵¹ For documentation, see vol. III, pp. 1169 ff. For the Protocol on Reparations signed at Yalta on February 11, 1945, by Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 1945, p. 982.

thorities and encouraged by Soviet radio and press propaganda. After some disorders took place in Rumanian cities Vyshinski⁵² arrived in Bucharest and forced the King⁵³ to dismiss Premier Radescu and to accept a government headed by Groza⁵⁴ and including only representatives of the left-wing parties together with a few opportunist politicians formerly associated with the historic parties, which were now excluded from the government. Vyshinsky's direct intervention took place without consultation with American and British representatives. The Groza Government has been in office since March 6. Developments since that date have not changed our view that it is an unrepresentative minority government and that the political situation should be stabilized.

Exchange of Views Between the United States and Soviet Governments.

During the crisis we made known our views to the Soviet Government on several occasions. Ambassador Harriman presented three notes referring to the Declaration on Liberated Europe, requesting the Soviet views, and suggesting consultation. In its replies the Soviet Government stated that the action taken was made necessary by the Radescu Government's failure to fulfil the armistice terms⁵⁵ and by the intolerable situation existing in the rear of the Red Army. On March 14 we formally proposed tripartite consultation under the provision of the Yalta Declaration calling for concerted Allied policies to assure in the former Axis satellites interim governments broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population. The British Government agreed to the proposal. Mr. Molotov rejected it, however, saying that no consultation was necessary since the Groza Government represented the democratic forces in the country and had restored order. His note also implied that no action in the former satellite states on the part of the three Governments was required under the Yalta Declaration because Allied Control Commissions were operating there.

The Present American Position.

The Department has made clear to the Soviet Government that we take seriously our responsibilities under the Yalta Declaration, and that these responsibilities call for genuinely tripartite consultation and action on broad political matters, whereas the functions of the Control Commissions are limited to enforcement of the respective armistice agreements. Our specific reply to Mr. Molotov's refusal of the pro-

⁵² Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁵³ Michael I.

⁵⁴ Petru Groza, leader of the Plowman's Front.

⁵⁵ For armistice with Rumania signed at Moscow, 5 a. m., September 13 (as of September 12), 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1712.

posal for consultation has not yet been communicated to the Soviet Government, since its timing depends on the course of the discussions on Poland. We maintain the position that the three Governments are obliged to concert their policies, and we feel that the Soviet Government, having intervened unilaterally to install a government which we do not consider representative of all democratic elements and having refused to consult with us, is hardly fulfilling its obligations. We are, however, more interested in getting Soviet agreement to apply in the future the principles of the Yalta Declaration than in insisting on a review of the Soviet action of last February or on a drastic reorganization of the Rumanian Government. We shall continue to press for an agreed Allied policy on Rumania and we may find it necessary to make public the fact that the Soviet Government has rejected our proposals.

2. *Implementation of the Crimea Agreement on Liberated Areas in Bulgaria.*

On March 29 our Embassy at Moscow was instructed⁵⁷ to inform the Soviet Government that our information clearly indicated that Bulgarian electoral plans would make it impossible for the Bulgarians to hold free elections without assistance. We suggested that a tripartite Allied committee be constituted in Bulgaria to insure that all democratic political groups in the country would have full freedom to bring their separate platforms and lists of candidates to the voters' attention and that the rights of the electorate in the pre-election period and in the polling would be protected. This message was communicated to Molotov on April 5.

On April 11 Molotov replied⁵⁸ in brusque terms, questioning our motives in making the proposal and stating that the Soviet Government's information indicated that there was no intention of holding elections in Bulgaria in the near future. Molotov went on to say that, in view of the Finnish precedent, the Soviet public would be "dumbfounded" if there were foreign interference in Bulgarian elections and he stated that the Bulgarians did not deserve our "mistrust."

We suggest that Mr. Molotov be informed that we are glad to learn that there is no intention of holding elections in Bulgaria in the near future and are gratified by the implication in his message that the Finnish precedent will be followed in Bulgaria. Information has reached us nevertheless to the effect that it is planned to have a single "Fatherland Front" electoral list, with no opportunity for the several parties within the "Front" to have their separate lists or present their separate platforms to the electorate. Should this be the case, and we assume that the Soviet Government is keeping itself informed in the

⁵⁷ Telegram 735, March 29, 8 p. m., to Moscow, vol. iv, p. 179.

⁵⁸ See telegram 1182, April 15, midnight, from Moscow, *ibid.*, p. 186.

matter, we feel that we should again press our request for consultation. Since such action is not only permissible but becomes an obligation under the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, we are unable to comprehend why the invocation of the Declaration should be cause for misunderstanding. The American people fully expect that the Declaration will be given reality in the treatment of liberated and ex-enemy peoples.

3. *American Representation on the Allied Control Commissions in the Former Satellite States.*

Present Status of American Representatives. Allied Control Commissions, on which the three principal Allied Governments are represented, were established in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to supervise the execution of the armistice agreements. The executive authority is, of course, in the hands of the Soviet High Command since these states are in the Soviet theater of military operations. The role of the American and British representatives has been more or less limited to "observation," even though, in the Bulgarian and Hungarian armistice agreements,⁵⁹ provision is made for their "participation." The Department has not been satisfied with the status of the American representatives, partly because of the many minor difficulties created by the Soviet authorities with respect to travel and other matters, but more fundamentally because the Soviet authorities have issued directives in the name of the Commissions without informing our representatives and often on the basis of interpretations of the armistice terms with which this Government was not in agreement but with which we became involuntarily associated by virtue of the presence of American representatives on the Commissions. We have attempted to secure Soviet recognition of the right of our representatives to be informed of directives prior to their issuance to the local governments. In Rumania we have had informal agreements to this effect, but they have not worked out in practice. In Bulgaria we have had no satisfaction at all. Provision was made in the statutes of the Hungarian Control Commission for such a procedure, but the Soviet authorities, after a good beginning, are not now strictly adhering to it. The result has been that in all three countries ultimate authority rests with the Soviet Government which is at liberty to act either directly, as in the recent Rumanian crisis, or through the Control Commissions. Neither the presence of American representatives on the Commissions nor the Crimea agreement to concert Allied policies has provided any check on dynamic Soviet policy in this area.

⁵⁹ For text of armistice agreement with Bulgaria, signed at Moscow, October 28, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 437, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1498; with Hungary, signed at Moscow, January 20, 1945, see Executive Agreement Series No. 456, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1321.

Future Status of American Representatives. In the Bulgarian and Hungarian armistice agreements it is stated that until the end of hostilities against Germany the Control Commissions shall operate under the general direction of the Soviet High Command. The Department failed to secure Soviet agreement to the inclusion of reference to the "second period" (from the end of hostilities against Germany to the conclusion of peace), during which the three Allied Governments would have equal participation in and responsibility for the work of the Commissions, but reserved the right to re-open this question later. It might now be appropriate to raise it with Mr. Molotov. With the termination of hostilities the Soviet case for retaining its present dominating position will lose much of its force; most of the clauses of the armistice agreements will no longer be operative. We have a right to expect that the Soviet Government will withdraw its armed forces from these countries, in accordance with Article VI of the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943.⁶⁰ If the Soviet Government shows no inclination to agree to such a change in the character of the Commissions, it would be desirable for the United States to work for an early end to the armistice period and liquidation of the control machinery through the conclusion of peace and normalization of relations with the satellite states.

4. *The Failure of the Soviet Government to Provide Facilities for the Entry of UNRRA and Red Cross Personnel into Poland and the Balkans.*

UNRRA has been attempting for several months to arrange for the entry of UNRRA personnel into Poland in connection with the carrying out of its functions there. Despite the fact that the Provisional authorities in Poland indicated their agreement, it has not been possible to obtain the necessary visas. Similar difficulties have been encountered by the Red Cross in getting its representatives into Poland. Late in February, however, two Red Cross representatives did finally get into Poland and one is still there. It has been impossible so far for them to carry out any effective work since the sixty tons of medical supplies sent from Moscow in February had not arrived in Lublin by April 16.

Mr. Molotov may take the position that this is a matter for the Polish Provisional Government. You may wish to point out that these areas are under Soviet military control and that UNRRA is an international organization in which the Soviet Union is a prominent member. We cannot believe that these difficulties could not be overcome if the Soviet Government desired to do so. You may also

⁶⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 755.

wish to stress the humanitarian aspects of this matter and to point out that our sole interest is to help the people in these areas who have suffered so much from the effects of the war.

5. *Failure of the Soviet Government to Satisfy Our Request for Full Advance Information Concerning Transfers to Third Countries of Supplies Furnished to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease or Supplies of Soviet Origin Similar to Lend-Lease Materials.*

The Lend-Lease Act ⁶¹ requires prior approval by this Government of such transfers and in the case of other countries we have insisted upon this advance notice. We have also insisted that we be informed in advance of transfers of materials similar to Lend-Lease supplies.

With respect to the transfer of actual Lend-Lease materials, you may wish to state that this is a matter of law and that we have no discretion about the requirement for the advance notification. We have no intention of prohibiting reasonable transfers, but if the Soviet Government is not willing to consult us in advance we will be obliged to consider such transfers as an indication that these materials are no longer needed by the Soviet Union.

6. *The Implementation of the Crimea Agreement Regarding the Exchange of Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians.*

You are familiar with the fact that despite the intervention of the President the Soviet Government would not allow our contact teams to proceed to Poland to assist our liberated prisoners of war in accordance with the terms of the Crimea Agreement on this matter.

Mr. Molotov may raise the question of our refusal to return to Soviet control Soviet nationals captured in German uniform who claim the protection of the Geneva Convention ⁶² as German prisoners of war.

You may wish to explain that we have been concerned that the Germans might retaliate on American prisoners of war in their hands if we did not comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention on this matter. We have insisted with the Germans that prisoners of war captured in American uniform be treated as American prisoners of war regardless of their nationality. Moreover, German measures of retaliation might not be confined to this particular question. You might assure Mr. Molotov, however, that we have no intention of holding Soviet citizens after the collapse of Germany regardless of whether they desire to return to the Soviet Union or not.

⁶¹ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. Amended March 11, 1943 (57 Stat. 20), May 17, 1944 (58 Stat. 222), and April 16, 1945 (59 Stat. 52).

⁶² For text of convention signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929, see *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336.

7. *The Kravchenko Case.*

Should Mr. Molotov raise this matter you might explain that we have done all we could to meet the desires of the Soviet Government but that under our law Kravchenko entered this country as a civilian, and should we try to deport him he would be allowed a trial and would undoubtedly be deported but with the right to depart for any foreign destination provided he would do so within a certain length of time.

8. *The Soviet Request for a Six Billion Dollar Loan.*

You may wish to state that the Soviet memorandum⁶⁸ on this subject is receiving the careful consideration of this Government, but compliance with the Soviet requestion [*sic*] would require prior legislation by Congress.

Depending on the general tenor of the conversations you may consider it advisable to point out to Mr. Molotov that in considering this matter the Congress will doubtless be influenced by the prospect for full collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union in the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability.

You might further desire to remind Mr. Molotov that Congress reflects public opinion and that public opinion in this country has been greatly concerned over developments in Eastern Europe since the Crimea Conference. You will doubtless wish to assure Molotov, however, that this Government sincerely desires this collaboration, and we are anxious to do all we can to assist the Soviet Union in reconstruction and in the further development of its prosperity.

9. *Forthcoming Meeting of the Reparations Commission in Moscow.*

You will recall that in reply to our inquiry as to whether the Soviet Government would agree to the participation of France in the Reparations Commission the Soviet Government replied that it agreed but that it also felt that Poland and Yugoslavia should be represented. We replied that we felt that original membership should be limited to the countries represented on the European Advisory Commission which is concerned with related matters, particularly as the members of this Commission are those responsible for the occupation of Germany. We feel that if any additional countries are invited, all countries concerned should be invited. If the Soviet Government desires the Commission to be enlarged to this extent, we would be prepared to agree, although such a large body would probably be very unwieldy.

⁶⁸ See telegram 29, January 4, 2 p. m., from Moscow, p. 942.

Secretariat Files : Lot 122 (Rev.), Box 13147

*Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee, Friday
Morning, April 20, 1945*⁶⁴

[Extract]

[Here follows list of members of the Staff Committee, including absentees.]

The Committee met at 9:30 a. m.

URGENT BUSINESS

Relations with the Soviet Union

The United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. Harriman, reported on relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Harriman said Mr. Molotov had come to see him immediately following President Roosevelt's death. Mr. Molotov was greatly concerned, and questioned Mr. Harriman particularly about President Truman's attitude. The Russians had respected Mr. Wallace,⁶⁵ Mr. Harriman said, and had not understood his being dropped out. Mr. Harriman explained to Molotov that Truman was President Roosevelt's choice.

On the next evening Mr. Harriman saw Stalin, who was very sober and like Molotov asked many questions. It was on this occasion that Stalin (somewhat against Molotov's desires) agreed to Mr. Harriman's proposal that Molotov come to the United States to call on President Truman and then go to San Francisco as an indication to the world of Stalin's stated determination to deal with President Truman as he had with President Roosevelt.

Subsequently Mr. Harriman talked to Stalin about the Polish situation.⁶⁶ Mr. Harriman said it was fair to say that since the Crimea Conference the Russians have been greatly disturbed by the fact that for the first time they realized that we were determined to carry through what we said (i.e. in regard to Poland and the Liberated Areas Declaration). We always have dealt directly and fairly and with full candor. This the Russians, accustomed to an atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue, do not understand. Furthermore, they have undoubtedly viewed our attitude as a sign of weakness. For example, they so interpreted our willingness to grant Soviet requests

⁶⁴ This meeting was presided over by the Under Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, in the absence of the Secretary of State.

See also a memorandum of April 20 by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, p. 231.

⁶⁵ Henry A. Wallace, Vice President of the United States, January 20, 1941-January 20, 1945.

⁶⁶ Presumably reference here is to Ambassador Harriman's conversation with Stalin on the evening of April 15; see telegram 1189, April 16, 4 p. m., from Moscow, p. 223.

for increased lend-lease in the face of several developments which would have justified refusing their requests.

Mr. Harriman said it was also obvious the Russians after talking with Bierut⁶⁷ and Company do not like the agreement with respect to Poland as well as they did at Yalta. This attitude is based principally on their belief that the Lublin Government⁶⁸ could be kept effectively under Soviet domination, but that this would be difficult if any of the old Polish leaders had to be reckoned with. It seemed evident that Mikolajczyk⁶⁹ and the other old leaders would be welcomed by the majority of Poles, and thus the Lublin group would be weakened. The Russians seem to be making every effort to make any reorganization of the Polish Government as much of a "white-wash" as possible.

Mr. Harriman said he felt the time had come to eliminate fear in our dealings with the Soviet Union and to show we are determined to maintain our position. He agreed with Mr. Grew that we have great leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union. He said one point worth remembering was that the Soviet Union wants very much to be a respected member of world society. The Russians are more afraid of facing a united west than anything else. In this connection Mr. Harriman thought our relations with the Soviet would be vastly improved if we could settle our differences with Great Britain and France.

Mr. Grew asked to what extent the Soviet leaders are afraid of isolationism. Mr. Harriman said their main problem is keeping internal control. The people were most anxious to have friendly relations with the outside world, particularly the United States. While they have liquidated all opposition, they are still sensitive to public demands and Mr. Harriman doubted they would be willing to face a break with the United States. He said that there were fears that the Russian people might become too internationally minded, and this fear had been responsible for a number of efforts made from time

⁶⁷ Bolesław Bierut, President of the Polish National Council (National Council of the Homeland), the Communist-dominated legislative body in Soviet-liberated Poland.

⁶⁸ By a decree dated July 21, 1944, of the Polish National Council, a Polish Committee of National Liberation was formed. Shortly afterwards, this Committee was established in Lublin and became known as the "Lublin Committee". For an account of the establishment of this Committee, see telegram 2736, July 24, 1944, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 1425. On December 31, 1944, the Polish National Council decreed the transformation of the "Lublin Committee" into the Provisional Polish Government. After the capture of Warsaw by the Red Army on January 17, 1945, the Polish Provisional Government moved from Lublin to Warsaw.

⁶⁹ Stanisław Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, July 14, 1943–November 24, 1944; leader of the Polish Peasant Party.

to time to create doubts about the position of the Allies, for example the Cairo separate peace rumors.⁷⁰

Mr. Harriman also discussed Soviet information policy. He said it was perfectly clear that the Soviet Government has no intention of loosening its control of the press.

The basic and irreconcilable difference of objective between the Soviet Union and the United States, Mr. Harriman said, was its urge for its own security to see Soviet concepts extend to as large an area of the world as possible. This now arises in connection with their plans to establish friendly governments in bordering countries (e.g. Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland, with Finland temporarily the exception). Such governments are set up with Soviet assistance by leftist groups using secret police and other terroristic and undemocratic methods.

Mr. Harriman expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union, once it had control of bordering areas, would attempt to penetrate the next adjacent countries, and he thought the issue ought to be fought out in so far as we could with the Soviet Union in the present bordering areas.

Asked by Mr. Grew what course of action he would recommend, Mr. Harriman said he would first point out that we would have to face the realities of certain situations. For instance, if we joined the British in backing the present reactionary government in Iran, we would lose out. Each case would have to be studied individually. But, Mr. Harriman said, we must reestablish our respect in Moscow, and we must not tolerate Russian mistreatment of our people and disregard of our interests. He mentioned in this connection the case of an American seaman still being held in a Murmansk jail after his arrest on charges of drunkenness; he also mentioned the holding of a number of American airmen as hostages because the Russians suspected our air force of aiding the Polish Underground, and the closing down of American operations at Poltava. Mr. Harriman said he had recommended, in the case of the Poltava incident, that Soviet planes at Fairbanks be grounded at once, but the U.S. Army had vetoed this.

With regard to air communications routes, Mr. Harriman said there was no reason to accept the Soviet insistence on routing all flights via Tehran. He said that if the British would agree we could stop all outside air traffic with the Soviet Union. He said we ought now to inform the Russians that as of a certain date Tehran air travel would

⁷⁰ The newspaper *Pravda* on January 17, 1944, had published a report from its own correspondent in Cairo based upon assertedly reliable information about a recent meeting in one of the coastal cities of the Iberian Peninsula between two responsible British officials and the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. The purpose of the meeting was to find out the conditions of a separate peace with Germany. It was presumed that the meeting had not remained without results. Two days later *Pravda* printed a Tass despatch from London reporting that the Reuters Agency had stated that the British Foreign Office had denied the rumors from Cairo.

cease, and that we wished to operate two lines to Russia, one connecting with the Russians at Stockholm and one at Bucharest.

Mr. Harriman emphasized that we ought to take, at the present time, strong stands on minor points at first, to avoid giving the Russians the idea we had made a major change in policy.

With regard to the international security organization, Mr. Harriman said that if we had any basic differences with the Soviet Government, we should make it clear that, while we would be disappointed if the Soviet Union did not go along, we intend to go ahead with those nations which do see the problem as we do. At the same time we would always be ready to welcome full cooperation.

On Poland, Mr. Harriman said we should not recede from our position.

Referring to lend-lease assistance, Mr. Harriman said there had been a perfect case for action in Rumania. At the same time the Russians were stripping Rumanian oil installations and not taking the full advantage of Rumanian potentialities of production, they were asking us to double our lend-lease of petroleum.⁷¹ We had agreed to do this, even though our proposal for a tripartite commission in Rumania had been turned down by the Russians. If we had made an issue of it, we would doubtless have had our way.

At the conclusion of Mr. Harriman's remarks, Mr. Rockefeller⁷² referred to what Mr. Harriman had said about the Soviet Union's interpreting our attitude as a sign of weakness and Mr. Rockefeller said he had found this attitude mirrored in many Latin American countries, where governments were losing their respect for the United States for giving in to the Russians so frequently.

Mr. Grew asked Mr. Harriman to attend the next meeting of the Committee.

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Secretariat Files: Lot 122 (Rev.), Box 13147

*Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee, Saturday
Morning, April 21, 1945*⁷³

[Extract]

[Here follows list of members of the Staff Committee, including absentees.]

The Committee met at 9:30 a. m.

⁷¹ For documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the removal of American-owned oil equipment from Rumania to the Soviet Union, see pp. 647 ff.

⁷² Nelson A. Rockefeller, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs.

⁷³ This meeting was presided over by the Under Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, in the absence of the Secretary of State.

URGENT BUSINESS

Relations with the Soviet Union

The United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. Harriman, continued his discussion of relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Grew read a telegram from Ambassador Caffery in Paris⁷⁴ in which it was indicated the French Government is becoming increasingly worried about Russian expansion in Europe. Mr. Harriman said this represented a change which has developed gradually in the French attitude since General de Gaulle's visit to Moscow.⁷⁵ He said it pointed up the desirability (as he had suggested yesterday) of settling our differences with France, as well as any with Great Britain. (In this connection, Mr. Dunn informed Mr. Harriman that the Department is making every effort to improve relations with France, and that we are convincing the French Government we are working on a basis of friendly relations and support.⁷⁶ He said the main point of difficulty is Indo-China, a problem now being studied⁷⁷.)

Mr. Harriman went on to say that Russian plans for establishing satellite states are a threat to the world and to us. The excuse offered that they must guard against a future German menace is only a cover for other plans.

Mr. Grew asked if Soviet Government were not establishing more than spheres of influence and if it were not taking complete charge in satellite countries. Mr. Harriman said that this was true.

Some of the areas in which Mr. Harriman suggested Soviet policies might cause further trouble were Macedonia, Turkey, and especially China. If Chiang⁷⁸ does not make a deal with the Communists before the Russians occupy Manchuria and North China, they are certainly going to establish a Soviet-dominated Communist regime in these areas and then there will be a completely divided China, much more difficult of uniting. The extent to which the Soviet will go in all directions will depend on the extent of our pressure.

Mr. Grew raised the question of our leverage. He said the Soviet Union appeared to need our money and our supplies, and he asked Mr. Harriman to what extent the Soviet Union was in fact dependent

⁷⁴ Presumably reference here is to telegram 1983, April 20, 1945, from Paris, not printed.

⁷⁵ Concerning the visit of General Charles de Gaulle, Head of the French Provisional Government, to Moscow on the occasion of the signature of the French-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance on December 10, 1944, see telegram 4770, December 11, 1944, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 937.

⁷⁶ For documentation regarding the efforts of the United States to maintain good relations with France, see vol. iv, pp. 661 ff. James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs, was a member of the Secretary's Staff Committee.

⁷⁷ For documentation on this subject, see vol. vi, section on French Indochina.

⁷⁸ Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

on us; in other words, just how much leverage did we possess? Mr. Harriman said the Soviet Union particularly needed our heavy machinery and machine tools, and our "know-how" in many fields, for example chemical industry, coal mining mechanization, power development, and railroad equipment. In the war, we have been supplying all Russian deficits in essential materials.

Mr. Harriman said it was important not to overestimate Soviet strength. The Army is an extraordinarily effective but disorganized mass of human beings. Almost all of the Army's transport equipment and much of its food is supplied by us. The country is still fantastically backward. There is no road system, railroad mileage is very inadequate, and ninety percent of the people of Moscow live in a condition comparable with our worst slum areas. Mr. Harriman said he was therefore not much worried about the Soviet Union's taking the offensive in the near future. But they will take control of everything they can by bluffing, he added.

Mr. Harriman said one very unfortunate development was the appointment of a Russian as head of the UNRRA Mission to Poland.⁷⁹ Thus UNRRA supplies would be used against our policies. He emphasized again the importance of taking a firm stand on the Polish issue.

Mr. Harriman said it was also important for the Department to get control of all the activities of agencies dealing with the Soviet Union so that pressure can be put on or taken off, as required.

Mr. Clayton⁸⁰ raised the question of lend-lease assistance. He said that in the discussions now in progress on supplies for liberated areas it had been indicated that if we give the liberated areas the fats, oils, and sugar they need, shipments of these products to the Soviet Union will have to be stopped. Meat shipments will have to be reduced also. Harriman said this should be done—the liberated areas of western Europe should be supplied first.

Mr. Harriman thought there should not be a fifth lend-lease protocol (the fourth, covering the twelve months ending June 30, 1945, was signed April 17, 1945).⁸¹ After the expiration of the fourth protocol,

⁷⁹ In March 1945, Mikhail Alekseyevich Menshikov, Deputy Director General, Headquarters Bureau of Areas, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, was chosen to head a temporary UNRRA delegation which was to negotiate a relief and rehabilitation agreement with the Polish Provisional Government at Warsaw. For an expression of the Department's position with regard to the Menshikov appointment, see the memorandum of conversation by the Acting Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, March 24, 1945, vol. II, p. 973.

⁸⁰ William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

⁸¹ The Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol, covering the period from July 1, 1944, to June 30, 1945, was signed on April 17, 1945, by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Soviet Union. The text is in Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols* (Washington, Government Printing Office), pp. 89-156. The announcement of the signature made in Ottawa on April 20, 1945, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 22, 1945, p. 723. For documentation on the conclusion of wartime assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see *post*, pp. 937 ff.

Mr. Harriman said, Russian requests should be dealt with on a supply basis, and we should supply the absolute minimum requirements. He said he was satisfied that up to now the Russians had needed the supplies they had obtained, because of the limitations of available shipping. When the war in Europe ends, however, the Soviet Union should have ample production to meet essential needs in many fields, and our shipments should be reduced accordingly. We should continue to supply legitimate requirements, especially for use in the Far East.

With regard to an agreement under section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act, Mr. Harriman said the Russians had the impression we are interested in such an agreement merely to stabilize our own position. Mr. Clayton asked if Mr. Harriman did not think it would be better to avoid opening 3(c) negotiations and to handle the problem in connection with discussions regarding post-war credits.

Mr. Harriman said this procedure conformed to the Soviet view—the only disadvantage would appear to be that a post-war credit agreement might not be worked out in time to cover certain necessary war supplies, and that it would be difficult to honor certain legitimate Soviet requests without a 3(c) agreement.

Mr. Clayton mentioned that post-war credit arrangements would require legislation—for example, repeal of the Johnson Act⁸² and extension of the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank.⁸³ Mr. Acheson⁸⁴ asked whether there was any reason why any such legislative program could not be deferred until mid-July, in order to avoid complicating the current program (Bretton Woods,⁸⁵ trade agreements, etc.). Mr. Harriman said it would be quite satisfactory to have negotiations on the question of post-war credits drag along, but that we should begin promptly. He agreed with Mr. Clayton that this was the greatest element in our leverage.

Mr. Harriman also said he hoped that any credits opened would not be for a period of several years (the Russians are asking approval of credits under which they would buy over a several-year period), and he thought that the best method would be to make a one-year arrangement and see how that worked out before expanding it. He also thought we should not renew the offer to negotiate a 3(c) agreement, but explain the disadvantage to them without it. We should then let the Soviet Union take the initiative in this connection.

⁸² Approved April 13, 1934; 48 Stat. 574.

⁸³ An act further increasing the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank, and for other purposes, was approved on July 31, 1945; 59 Stat. 526.

⁸⁴ Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and International Conferences.

⁸⁵ The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944. For documentation regarding this Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 106 ff.

Mr. Acheson raised the question of the decentralization of the Army throughout the sixteen Soviet republics.⁸⁶ Mr. Harriman said he thought that from the standpoint of United States relations with the Soviet Union decentralization of the U.S.S.R., though "phony", was useful to us. It would enable us to have sixteen observation posts in the Soviet Union and it would also increase Soviet knowledge and understanding of the United States if there were sixteen missions in the United States from the various Soviet republics. Mr. Harriman said the Kremlin pays considerable attention to the opinions of Party leaders in the local areas.

Mr. Phillips⁸⁷ asked about Soviet-British relations. Mr. Harriman said that in October 1944 Churchill went to Moscow and obtained Soviet agreement to a free hand for Great Britain in Greece in return for his recognition of the importance of Rumania as a supply line for the Red Army.⁸⁸ Churchill had assumed, however, that the Allies would be treated at least as well in Rumania as the Russians were in Italy, whereas the Russians had later shown that they had no such intention. Regarding Yugoslavia it had been agreed that Great Britain and the Soviet Union had completely equal interests, but Tito⁸⁹ was now one hundred percent Stalin's man. On Poland Mr. Harriman said the British felt even more strongly than the United States about the need for insisting on the Yalta Agreements. He said that without our support in Europe, however, the British would be forced to work for spheres of influence.

Mr. Harriman concluded by reemphasizing that if this Government is resourceful and firm, it will be possible to check the Soviet Union to a degree.

800.00B International Red Day/5-345: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kenman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 3, 1945.

[Received May 3—12: 45 p. m.]

1433. Front page of newspapers for May 1 was occupied by Stalin's Order of the Day and large full length portrait of Stalin with Lenin

⁸⁶ By laws of February 1, 1944, amending the constitution of December 5, 1936, relating to the reorganization of the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Defense, certain plenipotentiary powers were granted to each of the 16 constituent republics of the Soviet Union in these fields. For documentation regarding these laws, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 809-813.

⁸⁷ William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

⁸⁸ Documentation concerning the meetings of Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin in Moscow between October 9 and 18, 1944, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 1002-1024, *passim*.

⁸⁹ Marshal Josip Broz Tito, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.

in background to right and map of eastern and central Europe on left. Summary of Order follows:⁹⁰

Fatherland greets first of May this year in circumstances of victorious conclusion of patriotic war. (Order here summarizes Red Army campaigns of recent months and states that in 3 or 4 months Germans lost over 800,000 soldiers and officers taken prisoner and about 1,000,000 killed as well as about 6,000 planes, 12,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and over 23,000 field guns.)

Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Rumanian divisions fought side by side with Red Army.

Red Army's crushing blows forced German command to transfer dozens of divisions to Soviet front, leaving bare whole sectors on other fronts. This helped Allies to carry on successful offensive in west and Allies and Red Army troops cut German forces into two parts.

There can be no doubt that this means the end of Hitlerite Germany. "Germany is completely isolated if one does not consider her Ally, Japan."

Seeking way out of hopeless situation Hitlerites resort to every sort of trick, attempting to create discord among Allies. These new Hitlerite tricks are doomed to complete failure and can only hasten collapse of German troops.

Fascist propaganda frightens Germans with stories that United Nations want to destroy German people. United Nations will destroy Fascism and German militarism, sternly punish war criminals and force Germans to repair damage done by them to other countries but they will loyally fulfill demands of Allied military authorities.

Brilliant victories of Soviet troops have shown legendary might of Red Army and its great military skill. Army successfully defended great Socialist achievements of Soviet people and state interests of Soviet Union. Despite 4 years of war on unparalleled scale Socialist economy is growing stronger and is flourishing, and the economic life of liberated areas is successfully and rapidly reviving. World war unleashed by German Imperialism is ending. Collapse of Hitlerite Germany is matter of nearest future. Task now is to finish mortally wounded Fascist beast. Order concludes with exhortations to armed forces and workers to fight enemy skillfully and tirelessly, to aid front in every way, to heal wounds of war and still further increase might of Soviet state. Stalin extends greetings of government and Bolshevik party, orders salutes in capitals of Union Republics and hails fatherland, armed forces, dead heroes.

[KENNAN]¹

⁹⁰ For comparison with the Order of the Day for 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 864.

740.00119 EW/5-845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 8, 1945—noon.

[Received May 8—6:35 a. m.]

1492. Up to 11 o'clock this morning Moscow time, more than 30 hours after signature of the act of surrender, there had still been no recognition in Moscow of the fact that the end of the war was at hand. While rumors are widely spread, no public announcement had been made; the street scene was as usual; no flags were out; and the morning papers were devoted to such things as the Oswiecim death camp, the fall of Breslau and a celebration at the Great Theater in commemoration of the discovery of radio by the Russian scientist Popov.⁹¹ The Russian public was given no inkling that there had been a total German surrender which might have had something to do with the surrender of Breslau garrison. The papers contained no mention at all of military affairs in the west.

The official justification for this state of affairs would doubtless be that there was still resistance here and there against Soviet forces in Eastern Europe but I think the true explanation lies deeper. For Russia peace, like everything else, can come only by ukase and the end of hostilities must be determined not by the true course of events but by decision of the Kremlin. Among the lesser injuries for which the Germans may have to answer to Russia, when the smoke has cleared away, perhaps not the least may be their willfulness in capitulating at a time and place which the Kremlin had not selected.

Sent Department; repeated to Caserta as 90; and to Paris for Reber⁹² as 102.

KENNAN

740.0011 E.W./5-845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 8, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received May 8—7:50 a. m.]

1496. Role of Allied armies in final stages of war continues to receive most inconspicuous treatment in Moscow press whereas role of Red Army is prominently featured. For the past week there has been no more than passing editorial reference to military achievements of Allied armies in the flood of articles concerning fall of Berlin and other Red Army triumphs.

KENNAN

⁹¹ Alexander Stepanovich Popov, 1859-1905.

⁹² Samuel Reber, Counselor of Mission, Staff of the U.S. Political Adviser, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEPF), with rank of Minister.

740.00119 E.W./5-845: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 8, 1945—6 p. m.
 [Received May 8—11:20 a. m.]

1508. No announcement concerning German surrender was forthcoming at 4 p. m. when the official announcements were made in London and Washington and no information is available yet as to the time at which the Soviet Government proposes to make the surrender known to the Soviet public or as to the form in which this step will be taken.⁹⁸

As far as the Russians are concerned this is an ordinary working day and there has been nothing in the life or aspect of this city to mark the German surrender.

Sent to Department as 1508, repeated to Paris for Reber as 105.

KENNAN

740.00119 EW/5-945: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 9, 1945.
 [Received May 9—7:45 a. m.]

1520. For over an hour now the Embassy building has been besieged by a large and enthusiastic crowd of demonstrators shouting hurrahs and greetings to the American Allies. We estimate that there are at least two or three thousand people in the crowd, which shows no signs of dispersing. There are unceasing demonstrations of enthusiasm, the greatest of which was invoked when a Russian officer climbed onto a ledge of the building where an American noncommissioned officer was standing, pumped the American's hand and kissed him in real Russian fashion. The demonstrators have no banners referring to United States, and the demonstration seems to have been entirely spontaneous.

American and British military personnel who have ventured out among the crowd, including one British general, have been mercilessly tossed in the air. All in all, there can be no question of the sentiments of the Russian man in the street today toward the western Allies.

KENNAN

⁹⁸ See Marshal Stalin's telegram of May 7 to President Truman, received by him at 1 a. m. on May 8, vol. III, p. 779. In this telegram Marshal Stalin explained the reason for postponement of the announcement by his Government until May 9, 7 p. m., Moscow time.

811.54261/5-1245 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kenman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 12, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 9:25 p. m.]

1554. Weekly newsletter No. 178 of USSR branch of FEA⁹⁴ dated April 21, 1945, paragraph IV, deals with request of Soviet engineers for permission to ship descriptions and sketches of 9300 patents on plastics to USSR and notes that since USSR provides no protection to patent not registered in USSR, matter has been brought to attention of State Department which is stated to be taking steps toward arriving at an equitable arrangement with USSR regarding use of patents in the country.

We would appreciate being informed of any steps taken by Department in this matter.

As Department is aware, the Soviet Union has been engaged for years in copying machinery, articles and processes patented in US and other countries. In USSR it is not illegal to copy foreign patents which are not patented in USSR. Soviet policies make it difficult for foreign inventors or owners of patents to take out patent in USSR. Even if patent is taken out, it is unlikely that foreign patentee will receive any particular remuneration, due to nature of Soviet patent laws.

In addition, the Embassy has found by experience that it is extremely difficult and frequently impossible for US officials to obtain details from agencies of Soviet Government on Soviet patents. On the whole Soviet patents are regarded as State secrets.

It is, of course, desirable that agreement be reached with USSR so that US patents are protected here and practical systems worked out whereby US patents are regarded as valid in USSR and US patentees can receive remuneration when their patents are made use of here. However, existing situation is, of course, definitely to advantage of USSR. Presumably Soviet agents can obtain descriptions and sketches of US patents without difficulty and send them to Soviet Union for study by diplomatic pouch or other means. When necessary or desirable machinery or device can be purchased for copying purposes and sent to USSR. There is absolutely no protection of either property interest of patentees or of US national interest in this connection.

It is doubtful that USSR would be interested in any agreement with US on patents so long as it is possible to have access to and copy US patents on a wholesale scale with complete impunity. It therefore appears to me that the solution must be found in Washington; and it would seem desirable that a study be undertaken by the Government

⁹⁴ Foreign Economic Administration.

agencies concerned with a view to imposing the maximum possible legislative and administrative barriers against utilization of our patent information by agents of governments which do not give us patent protection. This is unquestionably a prerequisite to any satisfactory patent agreement with USSR.

Meanwhile, it need hardly be added, Russians should not be encouraged in wholesale shipment of US patent descriptions and sketches.

KENNAN

711.61/5-1845: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 18, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received May 18—6:30 p. m.]

1655. Recent publication here of two press reports from the United States indicating alarm at the prospects for early internal economic difficulties and a return of unemployment in our country is a development which, in my opinion, deserves special note. If the impression is gained in Moscow that without some special effort to influence American public opinion, postwar credits for the Soviet Union might possibly not be forthcoming in the amount or under the conditions desired here, we may well soon be witness to a concerted Soviet attempt to influence American public opinion through establishing the thesis that the country is faced with the choice of keeping the wheels moving by producing goods for the Soviet Union and other eastern European countries on credit or of suffering partial economic collapse.

It is not always possible to spot Soviet propaganda efforts in advance and to observe their progress. Careful attention to the ways and channels through which the thesis referred to above is now put forward in the United States might throw a revealing light on the machinery used by the Soviet Union to influence American public opinion.

KENNAN

093.613/5-1945: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 19, 1945.

[Received May 19—12:22 p. m.]

1666. Today's press published on front page Ukase of USSR Supreme Soviet awarding Order of Lenin to former US Ambassador to Soviet Union Joseph E. Davies⁹⁵ "for successful activity contribut-

⁹⁵ Mr. Davies was Ambassador to the Soviet Union during parts of the years 1937 and 1938.

ing to strengthening of friendly Soviet-American relations and fostering growth of mutual understanding and confidence among peoples of both countries".

[KENNAN]

[Certain documentation on the Mission of Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser and Assistant to President Truman, to Moscow between May 26 and June 7, 1945, is printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, volume I, pages 21-62. Additional material, particularly concerned with Polish problems, is printed *ante*, pages 299-335, *passim*.]

870.50/5-3045

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) ⁹⁶

[WASHINGTON,] May 30, 1945.

Subject: Soviet Policy of Tying Up Economic Activities in the Balkans.

In view of the United States Government's announced policy of liberalizing trade in the post-war world and the efforts now being made to obtain from Congress authorization to reduce tariffs by an additional fifty percent in connection with the trade agreement policy, it is believed that careful thought and consideration must immediately be given to the restrictive trade policies the Soviet Government is putting into effect in eastern and southeastern Europe.

We have just received, through unofficial channels, what we believe to be the full texts of the recently-concluded Soviet-Bulgarian and Soviet-Rumanian Trade Agreements. As far as I am aware, we have not as yet received a copy of the recently-concluded Soviet-Finnish Trade Agreement.⁹⁷ The general tenor of these agreements is very restrictive and are [*sic*] apparently aimed at excluding free trade in these areas by other powers. The agreements are in effect barter agreements and the prices for the goods delivered by the smaller countries are apparently very low. Moreover, provision is made in the

⁹⁶ In transmitting this memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William L. Clayton, on May 31, Mr. Matthews wrote that it "merely points out conditions that are developing on the economic side in the Balkans. What can be done about it at the present stage, it is difficult to say."

⁹⁷ A general description of these trade agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria on March 14, 1945, the Soviet Union and Finland on May 8, 1945, and the Soviet Union and Rumania on May 8, 1945, all signed in Moscow, is given in an article by Raymond H. Fisher, "Agreements and Treaties Concluded by the U.S.S.R. in 1945," Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1946, pp. 392, 393, and 396-398, respectively.

Rumanian agreement, for instance, for the creation of jointly-owned Rumanian-Soviet concerns to exploit the oil, mineral and other resources of the country and provision is made for the creation of a joint Rumanian-Soviet bank which apparently might be used to control the entire financial structure of Rumania.

I believe it is fair to assume that the Soviet Government will make similar agreements with all other countries in the areas under its control and that by this method they will create an almost airtight economic blackout in the entire area east of the Stettin-Trieste line. This blackout, coupled with the effective news blackout in this area, presents a very serious problem which we must give immediate consideration to.

E[LBRIDGE] D[URBROW]

*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*⁹⁸

[Extracts]

[Moscow, undated.]

RUSSIA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION AT THE CLOSE OF THE WAR WITH
GERMANY

The greatest change which the war has brought to Russia's world position has come not from any development of Russia herself but from the disintegration of the power of neighboring peoples.

Russia's own overall potential has probably undergone little alteration since 1940. Losses in man-power and in physical property have been substantially balanced off by new compulsory labor forces available from German prisoners and the civil population of conquered areas, by the stricter regimentation of Russian society, by the greater exploitation of woman's labor, and by the development of new industrial districts.

But there has been an extensive decline in the rival power which confronts Russia across her land frontiers. By the time the war in the Far East is over Russia will find herself, for the first time in her history, without a single great power rival on the Eurasian land-mass. She will also find herself in physical control of vast new areas of this land-mass: some of them areas to which Russian power had never before been extended. These new areas (although their exact frontiers are deliberately kept vague) will probably contain well over one hundred million souls—most of them in the European sector. These

⁹⁸ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

are developments of enormous import in the development of the Russian state.

Plainly, such a relative increase in Russia's power will bring with it a similar increase in her responsibilities. It is now Russia which must be at least morally responsible to the world for the happiness and prosperity of the newly-acquired people, for the development of their resources, the ordering of their industrial and social relationship, the securing of their military defense. But this is not the greatest of the new responsibilities. Russian Government now has a heavy responsibility to itself: namely, to hold the conquered provinces in submission. For there can be little doubt that many of the peoples concerned will be impatient and resentful of Russian rule. And successful revolts on their part against Moscow's authority might shake the entire structure of Soviet power.

The great question of Russia's new world position, as seen from Moscow, is whether the Soviet state will be able to carry successfully these new responsibilities, to consolidate its hold over the new peoples, to reconcile this with the traditional political structure of the Russian people, to make of its conquests a source of strength rather than weakness. This is the real question of Russia's future, as seen from the Kremlin.

Behind Russia's stubborn expansion lies only the age-old sense of insecurity of a sedentary people reared on an exposed plain in the neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. Will this urge, now become a permanent feature of Russian psychology, provide the basis for a successful expansion of Russia into new areas of east and west? And if initially successful, will it know where to stop? Will it not be inexorably carried forward, by its very nature, in a struggle to reach the whole—to attain complete mastery of the shores of the Atlantic and the Pacific?

Yet for all this, the Russian machine in eastern and central Europe is not without its weaknesses.

In the first place, it bears the inevitable drawbacks of foreign rule. The peoples of this area are familiar with the devices of puppet government. After their experiences with the Germans it is not easy to fool them in this respect. Moscow would wish that those who accept its authority and convey its will to the peoples in question might pose as independent patriotic leaders of the peoples to which they belong. This is a fond hope. Europe has not spent five years smelling out quislings and collaborationists for nothing; and it is a hard thing today for any man in these areas to conceal or disguise his efforts in the service of a foreign state.

There is every reason to believe that in the newly-acquired areas the Russians will continue to put politics before economics, cost what it may. They will not hesitate to ruin the productivity of entire branches of economic life, if by doing so they can reduce to helplessness and dependence elements which might otherwise oppose their power. The resulting decline in living standards will appear to them, in many cases, a well deserved corrective to the smug Philistinism of the peoples involved; and they will be astonished and disgusted at the unwillingness of these peoples to accept a standard of living as low as that of the Soviet peoples.

But, on the other hand, they will also strive—from motives of prestige and military security—to develop to the maximum certain branches of production particularly useful to the state; and they will seek various outward economic effects which can be exploited for propaganda purposes at home and abroad to prove that Soviet rule has been an economic blessing. The development of all industry that relates to the defense of the state will be forced. This will be done with more energy than discrimination, and with a crude concentration of effort which may well lead to depreciation of subsidiary facilities and to a decline in real working conditions. The latter phenomena, on the other hand, will be combatted with pretentious workers' clubs, with lottery awards, with prizes to individual workers, and with similar showy benefits which can be easily publicized. Similarly, in the countryside, such devices as the conversion of erstwhile manor houses into rest homes and museums, the building up of individual model collective farms, the creation of individual machine tractor stations, and spectacular mass deliveries of grain during the harvest season will all be used to build up the impression of thriving country life to mask over what will probably be a real decline in agricultural production and in rural living standards. In all of this, outside of branches of production vital to the internal and external security of the state, emphasis will be placed not on the real economic content but on the external political effect. The Russians are a nation of stage managers; and the deepest of their convictions is that things are not what they are, but only what they seem.

There remains to mention perhaps the greatest difficulty which the Russians will have to face in controlling the newly won areas; a difficulty inextricably entwined with all those that have been mentioned above. This is the question of personnel and manpower. In the west, the countries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany up to the Oder and Neisse, Ruthenia and Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have a total population of roughly ninety-five million people. This does not take into ac-

count Bohemia and Moravia or Austria, where the Russians also obviously intend to exercise considerable influence. None of these peoples are Russian-speaking and only about sixty percent of them use Slavic languages. To administer them and to hold them in submission as reluctant members of a Russian security sphere will take probably a greater administrative and police force than was necessary even in normal times; and this last must have numbered in the millions.

Here the Russians are faced with a dilemma. If they rely extensively on local officials they run the risk of eventual disaffection, intrigue and loss of control as soon as they remove their military forces. If they try to use Russians in their places a number of difficulties arise. In the first place they have not got enough of them who know the languages and customs of the other peoples. If they try to maintain large numbers of them for long periods abroad, to learn these customs and languages and to obtain really valuable experience, they run a strong risk of their becoming corrupted by the amenities and temptations of a more comfortable existence and more tolerant atmosphere. They can attempt to combat this, as they do at present in the case of their diplomats abroad, by concentrating them in closely controlled Soviet communities and forbidding them to have unsupervised close personal contact with the local population. Or they can send them abroad for brief periods only. But in neither case is it easy for the individuals concerned to obtain the thorough experience of a foreign tongue and a foreign system of thought which they require if they are to be useful as administrators.

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All in all, therefore, it can be seen that Russia will not have an easy time in maintaining the power which it has seized over other peoples in eastern and central Europe unless it receives both moral and material assistance from the West. It must therefore be Russian policy in the coming period to persuade the western nations, and particularly the United States (1) to give its blessing to Russian domination of these areas by recognizing Russian puppet states as independent countries and dealing with them as such, thus collaborating with the Soviet Government in maintaining the fiction by which these countries are ruled; and (2) to grant to Russia the extensive material support which would enable the Soviet Government to make good the economic damages caused by its costly and uncompromising political program and to claim credit for bringing economic as well as political progress to the peoples in question.

If it seems at first sight remarkable that the Kremlin should hope to win the support of democratic peoples for purposes so contrary to

western democratic ideals, it should be remembered that the Russian views all currents of public sentiment as the sailor views the winds. He is convinced that even if he cannot sail directly against them he can at least use their power to tack in general directions contrary to that in which they blow. It would not appear to him impossible to exploit western enthusiasm for democracy and national independence in order to further the interests of authoritarianism and international oppression. He knows, to use a classical expression, that "mankind is governed by names"; and he has no compunction in adopting to his own use any slogan which he finds appealing to those whom he wishes to influence.

Furthermore, in the particular case of the United States, the Kremlin is counting on certain psychological factors which it knows will work strongly in Russia's favor. It knows that the American public has been taught to believe:

(a) That collaboration with Russia, as we envisage it, is entirely possible;

(b) That it depends only on the establishment of the proper personal relationships of cordiality and confidence with Russian leaders; and

(c) That if the United States does not find means to assure this collaboration (again, as we envisage it), then the past war has been fought in vain, another war is inevitable, and civilization is faced with complete catastrophe.

The Kremlin knows that none of these proposals is sound. It knows that the Soviet Government, due to the peculiar structure of its authority, is technically incapable of collaborating with other governments in the manner which Americans have in mind when they speak of collaboration. It knows that the Soviet secret police have no intention of permitting anything like the number of personal contacts between the two peoples that would be required to lead to a broad basis of personal confidence and collaboration. It knows that throughout eleven years of diplomatic relations between the two countries it has been the United States Government in at least 99 cases out of 100 which has taken the initiative to try to establish relationships of confidence and cordiality; that these efforts have met almost invariably with suspicion, discourtesy and rebuff; and that this will not, and cannot, be otherwise in the future. Finally, it knows that the type of intimate collaboration for which Americans yearn is by no means necessary for the future of world peace. It knows, as a body thoroughly versed in the realities of power, that all that is really required to assure stability among the present great powers for decades to come is the preservation of a reasonable balance of strength between them and a realistic understanding as to the mutual zones of vital interest.

But it is no concern of the Soviet Government to disabuse the American public of prejudices highly favorable to Soviet interests. It is entirely agreeable to Moscow that Americans should be indulged in a series of illusions which lead them to put pressure on their government to accomplish the impossible and to go always one step further in pursuit of the illusive favor of the Soviet Government. They observe with gratification that in this way a great people can be led, like an ever-hopeful suitor, to perform one act of ingratiating after the other without ever reaching the goal which would satisfy its ardor and allay its generosity. As long as these prejudices can be kept alive among large sections of the American public, the Kremlin will not give up the hope that the western democracies may, for the time being, be used as the greatest and most powerful auxiliary instrument in the establishment of Russian power in eastern and central Europe.

It is this hope which lies behind all Russian action in the question of international security. Russia expects from an international security organization that it will effectively protect Russian dominion in this belt of puppet states. It expects the organization to enlist automatically the support of the western democracies against any forces which might undertake the liberation of the peoples in question. In addition to this, it expects to be repaid immediately in the form of credits and economic assistance for its generosity in consenting to join an organization of this nature at all.

There are undoubtedly thoughtful people in the higher councils of the Soviet Government who see the preposterousness of this program and the possibilities for its failure. But they apparently still represent the weaker voice in the councils of state. And why should it be otherwise? Others can always talk them down by pointing to the extraordinary record of patience and meekness which the western allies have thus far exhibited. They can point out that there has been no act of Russian power, however arbitrary, which has not evoked an approving echo and at least some attempt at defense on the part of a considerable portion of the American and British press. They can point to the unshakable confidence of Anglo-Saxons in meetings between individuals, and can argue that Russia has nothing to lose by trying out these policies, since if things at any time get hot all they have to do is to allow another personal meeting with western leaders and thus make a fresh start, with all forgotten. Finally, they can point again to the fact that "getting along with the Russians" is political capital of prime importance in both of the Anglo-Saxon countries and that no English or American politician can pass up any half-way adequate opportunity for claiming that he has been successful in gaining Russian confidence and committing the Russians to a more moderate course of action. In other words, they consider that Anglo-Saxon opinion can always be easily appeased in a pinch by a

single generous gesture, or even in all probability by a few promising words, and that western statesmen can always be depended upon to collaborate enthusiastically in this appeasement.

As long as a number of Stalin's leading advisors are able to use these arguments and to point to an unbroken record of success in reliance upon this line of thought, the Soviet Government will continue to proceed on the theory that with the western countries anything is possible, and that there is no reason to fear that serious difficulty will be encountered either in reconciling the western world to Russia's program of political expansion in Europe or even in obtaining western assistance for the completion of that program.

It should always be borne in mind in this connection that before its own people the Soviet Government is committed to nothing with respect to the western allies. In its own unceasing press campaign against reactionary elements and "vestiges of fascism" abroad, it has carefully kept a door open through which it can retire at any moment into a position of defiant isolation. Through the puppet government system which it has employed for the domination of eastern and central Europe, it can always withdraw the battle lines of its political power without damage to its own prestige. In such extremity, it would be principally Moscow's stooges that would take the rap before world opinion; this is what stooges are for.

Should the western world, contrary to all normal expectations, muster up the political manliness to deny to Russia either moral and material support for the consolidation of Russian power throughout eastern and central Europe, Russia would probably not be able to maintain its hold successfully for any length of time over all the territory over which it has today staked out a claim. In this case, the lines would have to be withdrawn somewhat. But if this occurred, the nuisance value of Soviet power in the western countries and in the world at large would be exploited to the full. The agents of Soviet power might have to abandon certain districts where they now hold sway; but they would, to use Trotski's vivid phrase, "slam the door so that all Europe would shake". Every difficulty that could conceivably be created for the western democracies by communist parties and communist cliques would be used in this baring of the fangs; and the world would have cause to remember Molotov's warning at San Francisco that if the conference did not give Russia peace and security on her own terms, she would seek it and find it elsewhere.

Should the western world stand firm through such a show of ill temper and should democracies prove able to take in their stride the worst efforts of the disciplined and unscrupulous minorities pledged to the service of the political interests of the Soviet Union in foreign countries, Moscow would have played its last real card. It would

have no further means with which to assail the western world. Further military advances in the west could only increase responsibilities already beyond the Russian capacity to meet. Moscow has no naval or air forces capable of challenging the sea lanes of the world.

But no one in Moscow believes that the western world, once confronted with the life-size wolf of Soviet displeasure standing at the door and threatening to blow the house in, would be able to stand firm. And it is on this disbelief that Soviet global policy is based.

711.61/6-145: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1945—6 p. m.

1193. Late press ticker report states that in talking to four Congressmen yesterday I had told them that the State Department was "leaning over backwards" to avoid offending Russia. Needless to say, I did not make this statement but I did say to the Congressmen that we had been meticulous in keeping Moscow informed of every step which was of interest to the Soviet Government. The rest of the story given out by the Congressmen seems to be fairly accurate and will probably be helpful.¹

GREW

[For a study entitled "Possible Resurrection of Communist International, Resumption of Extreme Leftist Activities, Possible Effect on United States" by the Special Assistant, Raymond E. Murphy, to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), see annexes to memorandum of June 27 by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, volume I, pages 267-280.]

740.0011 EW/6-545

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*²

[Translation]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On May 9, 1945, on the day of victory it was decided to put up in the city of Murmansk aerial defense balloons with flags of the Allied

¹ See the *New York Times*, June 1, 1945, p. 11, col. 7, and June 2, 1945, p. 9, col. 2.

² Handed by the Chargé of the Soviet Union, Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov, on June 5 to the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew.

powers. At the time when a number of the balloons were already raised a heavy snowfall started due to which the other balloons were not raised and the ones that had already been put up were lowered. At that time the descending balloons were shelled by anti-aircraft artillery and machine-gunned from foreign vessels. According to declarations of the appointed commission of experts and through interrogations of a series of witnesses questioned it was ascertained that the balloons were fired at from American transports *Stevenson Taylor*, *Albert C. Ritchie* and *Benjamin Hill* and from the English crane vessel *Lapland*. The fire continued until the balloons were lowered and, while the balloons were touching the ground, shells and bullets were falling to the ground.

As a result of the bombardment of the said balloons several persons were wounded and one of them—Sergeant Shkolny—died as a result of a serious wound. The artillery fire burned down three balloons, three balloons were badly damaged and one burning balloon fell on the building of the club belonging to the repair shops of the Northern Fleet and caused fire in the club.

The Soviet Government in bringing this occurrence which has caused such serious consequences to the attention of the Government of the United States is expressing firm belief that the American authorities will take urgent measures and investigate the circumstances of this matter, hold the guilty responsible and reimburse the damage caused by these unlawful actions of the commands of the American transports; the size and nature of the damage is being ascertained and will be submitted additionally.

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1945.

033.1161/6-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 15, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received June 15—6:15 p. m.]

2105. ReDept's 1307 and 1308, June 14, 7 p. m.³ Today I had a chance to talk informally to Molotov about the question of Congressmen making unofficial visits to Moscow. He said the Soviet Govt had no objection to such visits providing sufficient notice was given and that accommodations were then available. It was suggested that the Congressmen should apply to the Soviet Amb in whatever capital they might be. Molotov also assumes that there

³ Neither printed.

is no obligation on his part or the Soviet Govt's to entertain them officially, although Voks⁴ or some other agency would arrange for them to see what was of interest to them. Molotov said also that some Congressmen had applied in Paris and that visas had been authorized.

I hope that I will be personally informed of any prospective visitors and the time of arrival so that I can have them met at the airport and entertain and assist them while in Moscow.⁵

I then asked whether an official visit of Congressional delegation similar to the Brit Parliamentary delegation would be welcome. Molotov said that of course they would be welcome but again requested that if such a visit were contemplated sufficient advance notice should be given and a date selected that would be convenient to the Soviet Govt. Such a delegation would of course be officially received and entertained by the Soviet Govt.

To Dept as No. 2105, rptd for info to Paris as No. 193, London as No. 287, and Rome as No. 45.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 EW/6-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1945—9 p. m.

1440. For Harriman from Harry L. Hopkins:

"I talked with President Truman about Eisenhower's⁶ visit to Moscow. He was quite enthusiastic about it. Eisenhower is taking a rest and I doubt very much if it could be worked out prior to the Berlin conference⁷ but it might well be done immediately thereafter. The President told me he would like to ask Zhukov⁸ to come to the United States at about the same time. I am taking this up with General Marshall.⁹

⁴ All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

⁵ During the summer of 1945, particularly while the 79th Congress, 1st session, was in recess (the House of Representatives from July 21 and the Senate from August 1, until September 5), several delegations of Congressmen planned visits to the Soviet Union, mainly in August or September.

⁶ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe.

⁷ For documentation on the Conference, held July 16–August 2, 1945, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, 2 vols.

⁸ Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany, and Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany.

⁹ General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

I want to send you my warmest congratulations on the negotiations in Moscow.¹⁰ Apart from the Hearst and McCormick papers they have received a warm welcome from the American people.

Louie arrived this morning from France.¹¹

GREW

762.61114/6-3045: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1945—2 p. m.

1471. Important German secret records now being examined in Germany by joint FonOff-State Dept. team include following relative to shooting of son of Stalin while allegedly attempting escape from prison camp: (1) letter dated April 1 [22], 1943 from Himmler¹¹ to Ribbentrop¹² re incident; (2) photographs; (3) several pages of documentary evidence.¹³

FonOff suggested that British and American Governments present originals of above documents to Stalin and wished to instruct Clark Kerr¹⁴ to inform Molotov that these documents had been found in Germany and to request Molotov's advice as to proper manner of making them available to Stalin. Clark Kerr was to state that they were a joint UK/US find and were to be presented by FonOff and US Embassy. Winant informed FonOff that in our opinion that presentation, if made, should be in name not of FonOff and Embassy but FonOff and State Dept.

Dept. will appreciate views of Embassy on appropriate manner of making these documents available to Stalin. If you think it advisable, you might request Molotov's advice on this matter, proceeding jointly with Clark Kerr in case he has been similarly instructed.^{14a}

GREW

¹⁰ The negotiations referred to were those of the Polish Commission for the formation of a Provisional Polish Government of National Unity; for documentation, see pp. 110 ff.

¹¹ Heinrich Himmler, Chief of the German Police and leader of the Nazi Elite Guard.

¹² Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1938-45.

¹³ The United States Political Adviser for Germany, Robert D. Murphy, forwarded to the Department of State in despatch 558, July 5, 1945, from Frankfurt (840.414/7-545) a roll of microfilm containing 19 frames regarding the shooting of Stalin's son, Lt. Yakov Dzhugashvili, on April 14, 1943, while he was attempting as a prisoner of war to escape through electrified wire surrounding the Special Camp A in Sachsenhausen near Oranienburg.

¹⁴ Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

^{14a} For a time, consideration was given by the United States and British Governments to finding an appropriate way to present these documents and photographs to Stalin. After more careful study of the incident and its background, the Foreign Office proposed to drop the original idea of presenting the evidence to Stalin, because the unpleasant and unsavory revelations of the documents could not have been of any comfort to Stalin. Since nothing had been revealed to any Soviet official about the discovery of these documents, the Department informed Ambassador Harriman in telegram 1895, August 23 (840.414/8-945), that it had agreed that the documents should not be given to Stalin.

861.00/7-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 3, 1945.

[Received July 3—8:58 a. m.]

2387. Stalin's appointment as Generalissimo of Soviet Union¹⁵ was featured in June 28th Moscow newspapers which published tremendous photographs of leader, gave most prominent place to decree of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet naming Stalin to highest military post and carried editorials attributing victory in war over Germany to genius of Stalin. *Pravda* editorial was entitled "Creator of Victory of Soviet People". It depicted Stalin as greatest military genius in history and stated that his strategy founded on scientific laws of development of society on Marxist-Leninist theory foresaw enemy attack and made and executed plans which assured victory. Among other things editorial stated that Stalin was founder of modern military science.

All papers also published from one-half to full page accounts of meetings in industrial enterprises, military units et cetera characterizing award to Stalin of Order of Victory¹⁶ as expression of unanimous will of the people and declaring that gratitude of people to Stalin was boundless. Item from Riga was headed "Latvian people will be eternally grateful to Comrade Stalin" while Kiev despatch was headed "Burning gratitude of Ukrainian people". Academician Baikov¹⁷ contributed piece stating that Soviet learned men had responded to award with feelings of tremendous satisfaction and joy.

[HARRIMAN]

¹⁵ The press had published on June 27 the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union creating the rank of Generalissimo of the Soviet Union. The decree stated that this highest military title was to be conferred for especially outstanding service in the leadership of all the armed forces of the state in time of war.

¹⁶ The Embassy in Moscow had reported that decrees had been published on June 27 awarding to Stalin his second Order of Victory, as well as the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

¹⁷ Professor Alexander Alexandrovich Baikov, a metallurgist and chemist in Leningrad.

761.00/7-1145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

Moscow, July 11, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received July 12—10:15 p. m.]

2507. Herewith my fourteenth interpretable report on developments in Soviet policy based on the press for the period from V-Day in Europe to July 1:

The first weeks of the post hostilities period were characterized by a marked reserve, if not uncertainty, in the tone of the Soviet press. It seemed as though the policy makers in Moscow, while clear enough on certain immediate objectives, such as Poland and the world security statute, still felt themselves unable to see clearly into the more distant future and were hesitant to commit the Soviet Union on overall, long term issues. The Soviet press accordingly abounded in hiatuses and was not devoid of contradictions. The general line remained that of the last months of hostilities, namely: That the world was divided into the partisans of peace, progress and democracy on the one hand and of Fascism and reaction on the other; that the Soviet Union was the spiritual and militant center for the first of these categories; that conversely all those who opposed the aims of the Soviet Union or showed lack of confidence in them automatically placed themselves in the camp of Fascism and reaction. In Soviet eyes the outside world could be neatly divided into black and white on the sole issue of attitude toward Russia, and all the principles of ethics with which humanity had occupied itself for centuries were now subordinated in Moscow to the single question of whether men, individually or collectively, were willing to accept all the policies of the Kremlin and to applaud consistently even those Soviet actions in which accepted principles were difficult to discern. Inevitably as the result of such intolerance, the forces of evil loomed large and menacing. It should be borne in mind that Soviet propaganda technique to unify the people of Russia has always been to point out dangers from real or imaginary common enemies.

1. Russian-American relations.

The question of Russian-American relations became a major topic in Soviet press during this period. Concern over prospects for political collaboration between the two great powers was expressed through publicizing of statements by various prominent Americans condemning current anti-Soviet propaganda campaign in America and affirming that Russian-American friendship is necessary condition of world peace. These materials tended to suggest that criticism of Russia emanated from malicious reactionaries who were taking advantage of

Roosevelt's death to attack his policies but that these elements were being repudiated in responsible circles. There was no suggestion that Soviet policies in Eastern Europe might have had any connection with these developments. On economic side threat of postwar business crisis and mass unemployment in America was emphasized at every opportunity, mainly on basis of materials lifted from American press. Connection between this press line and Soviet desire for American economic assistance was made explicit by Manuil[1]sky¹⁸ in his speech in San Francisco urging trade with Soviet Union as solution to America's unemployment problem.

Sent Dept as 2507, repeated London as 353, Paris as 227, Stockholm as 38, Rome as 52, Cairo as 73, Ankara as 39, Chungking as 58, and paraphrase by mail to Murphy at Berlin. HARRIMAN

800.00B/7-1545 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 15, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received July 15—12:46 p. m.]

2571. In his 3918 to Dept Ambassador Caffery¹⁹ has called attention to fact that Paris is again becoming great center of operations for international Communist agents.

I think it should be understood that this is part of general Russian effort to disguise source of inspiration and channels of authority for international Communist movement. Abolition of Comintern²⁰ was only first step in this process. It has been followed by outward decentralization of movement. Remembering that principal foreign reproaches about Comintern were that it functioned "on Soviet territory", Soviet leaders have recently made every effort to place operational centers in other countries where either general democratic liberties or extent of Soviet influence make it easy for them to function. Thus Oriental Comintern agents formerly in Moscow are now understood to be in Yenan, Iberian Communist affairs have been run in part at least from Cuba. Latin American parties are presumably run through Mexico or some other local center. Paris has apparently become center of authority for western democracies;

¹⁸ Dmitry Zakhharovich Manuilsky, chief Ukrainian delegate to the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, April 25-June 26, 1945.

¹⁹ Jefferson Caffery, Ambassador in France; telegram not printed.

²⁰ The dissolution of the Third (Communist) International, from the resolution adopted by the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on May 15, 1943 (published on May 22) recommending this action, to the communiqué of June 10 of the Presidium considering this organization abolished, is described in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 531-543, *passim*.

and recent issuance there of public rebuke to American Communist leaders²¹ shows clearly that there was no desire that this be concealed from world opinion.

It would be contrary to all existing evidence to assume that this meant an abandonment or weakening of Moscow control. The unfailing hundred percent solidarity of foreign Communists with all the aims and maneuvers of Russian foreign policy, even in instances where it plainly runs counter to interests of countries to which they profess alliance [*allegiance?*], would make this amply clear even if other indications were lacking.

This policy of obscuring source of authority for international Communist movement is directly in line with prevalent Soviet internal policy of attempting to mask dominant role of Communist Party in domestic political life. Current Soviet theses of "democratic" quality of Soviet institutions, of independent role of Soviet labor unions, of spontaneous vigor of Soviet public opinion and its influence on govt: All these hold water only if role of Communist Party in Russia is ignored. For this reason every effort has been made in recent years to obscure real nature and channels of Party control and members are not allowed to forget the Party, although it has held official monopoly of state power for over quarter of a century, is still a "conspiratorial" organization.

In essence all these efforts at disguise of authority reflect basic Russian conviction that power is safest and most desirable when divorced from responsibility. Hence Russian predilection for seeking maximum of power and minimum of responsibility: For puppet states, front organizations and individual stooges. Kremlin desires that its power should be felt but not seen and that it acquire in this way something of the awesome quality of the supernatural.

Among Russian population this policy of mystification has been not unsuccessful. As a weapon in foreign affairs it should not be lightly dismissed; for it has never before been applied on present scale and western countries in particular, with their greater tolerance and with the variegated patterns of their public life, are ill-prepared to recognize or to cope with its numerous and confusing manifestations. It is greatly facilitated at this juncture by increased general prestige and authority of Moscow in world affairs. By virtue this factor many foreign supporters who once had to be kept in hand by highly centralized system of discipline and authority can now be relied upon, like well-trained pets, to heel without being on the leash. But this flexible policy also carries with it increased risks of sudden

²¹ A letter written by Jacques Duclos, French Communist leader, rebuking American Communists and undermining the leadership of Earl Russell Browder, had appeared in the April issue of the *Cahiers du Communisme*.

loss of control at individual points; and its safe administration requires at all times a nice estimate of the fine and almost imperceptible line which divides fancied independence of political action from the real thing.

Sent Dept 2571; rptd Paris as 235; London as 361; Frankfurt for Murphy as 15; Rome as 53; Chungking 59.

KENNAN

811.3361/7-1745: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 17, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received July 18—1:27 a. m.]

2596. Serious difficulties have recently been experienced by our Assistant Naval Attaché²² and officers and crews of American vessels in Murmansk. Three separate incidents have occurred in last 3 months. In all of these incidents the conduct of Soviet authorities has been highhanded and in some cases even offensive and has contrasted markedly with treatment received by our personnel at other ports. Incidents in question are as follows:

1. Alleged firing on balloons by US vessels on May 9. Dept has been apprised of this incident by Soviet Embassy at Washington²³ and will also have noted Dept's 1248 June 7 and our 2314, June 28 and 2332, June 29.²⁴ Dept will recall that charges advanced by Russians were of slim plausibility and that Soviet authorities were completely noncooperative in assisting our officials to conduct investigation.

2. Incident involving Chief Mate Kenneth Worrell.

As far as Embassy is aware Dept has not yet been informed of this incident. On June 17, Worrell threw a small stock [*stick?*] of wood at a Soviet worker who in spite of repeated orders to desist was misusing some of the ship's loading gear. Worker received slight cut on forehead, refused offer of medical assistance on board ship and went ashore at once. Worrell was later induced to come ashore by false pretenses and was detained incommunicado more than 48 hours for questioning. In handling this matter Soviet authorities acted in such a way as to give cause for complaint on our part in a number of respects. Some of these are as follows:

(a) Our Assistant Naval Attaché was badly misinformed by Soviet diplomatic agent concerning seriousness of injury and resulting condition of Soviet worker and misinformation was of a character tending to magnify incident out of all reasonable proportions.

²² Lt. Col. John M. Maury, naval member of U. S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

²³ *Aide-mémoire* of June 5, p. 860.

²⁴ None printed; the contents of telegrams 2314 and 2332 are summarized in Department's *aide-mémoire* of August 1, p. 873.

(b) Diplomatic agent insisted that Soviet police authorities had right to board American Govt vessels and to arrest an officer of the ship for an act committed in the course of his official duties.

(c) Worrell was asked to come ashore and visit the militia office "to answer a few questions". He had no warning that he was to be incarcerated and held incommunicado.

(d) Our Assistant Naval Attaché was not permitted to be present at any of the questioning of Worrell or to visit him in prison.

(e) Our Assistant Naval Attaché was flatly denied access to the police authorities handling the case.

(f) Although diplomatic agent justified police action on theory that court was now operating on peacetime basis, Worrell was brought before a military tribunal.

(g) Diplomatic agent attempted to advance against the vessel charges of "sabotage" which he later admitted were based on ignorant and unsubstantiated rumors.

(h) Our Assistant Naval Attaché was treated by Soviet authorities with unmistakable discourtesy. On June 20 when he requested permission to be present at questioning of Worrell, he was told that he could be received "in a few minutes" by officer in charge of militia. After waiting 1½ hours in outer office he was informed that he could be received neither by that officer nor by any other responsible officer there.

(Some of these points, taken individually, may seem of small importance; but in their aggregate they indicate a provocative and contemptuous attitude on part of Soviet authorities, and in a country as sensitive as this to matters of "face" officers of our Govt stationed in remote cities of Soviet Union need the full support of our Govt for maintenance of their official dignity and prestige if their services are to be effective.)

3. Detaining of vessel *Daniel Willard* 4 days after she was ready to sail. Under date of June 29 Assistant Naval Attaché telegraphed Naval Attaché²⁵ that Murmansk local militia were threatening to board US vessel to arrest a Navy sentry charged with pointing an unloaded pistol at stevedores who were obviously pilfering cargo. (Witnesses have sworn they saw stevedores putting on new shoes from broken case.) Naval Attaché instructed Assistant Naval Attaché to refuse militia permission to board vessel and arrest sentry but to protest only, without offering physical resistance, if militia forced its way aboard. Assistant Naval Attaché offered to allow sentry to appear at militia headquarters for questioning if assured his return to ship same day. Such assurance was refused by local representatives Soviet Govt. On July 2 Assistant Naval Attaché ordered vessel to sail in accordance with instructions and to pick up cargo in Archangel. Port refused clearance alleging various reasons, all of which proved groundless. Ship finally sailed July 6.

Question now arises what action if any should be taken by Embassy on diplomatic level with respect to these incidents. I understand little if any further shipping is scheduled through port of Murmansk and there is good reason to suspect that much of trouble was due to effort

²⁵ Rear Adm. Houston L. Maples, naval member of the U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

of officious and anti-American diplomatic agent and NKVD officials in background to create conditions which would hasten expected departure of American Naval representatives from Murmansk. However this may be, I think it undesirable from general standpoint of prestige of our officials in Soviet ports that such behaviour on part of Soviet officials should go unquestioned by our Govt. Unless these trouble-makers are made to suffer for trouble they have caused we cannot expect to remain immune from similar difficulties in other ports.

I recommend Embassy be authorized to lodge vigorous protest with Foreign Office over conduct of Murmansk officials in these three cases and to tell Foreign Office that pressure of our wartime responsibilities is such that we cannot afford to have our ships held up and time of our officials taken with annoyances of this sort and that if further difficulties along these lines are experienced in Soviet ports by vessels bringing Lend-Lease supplies to Soviet Union it may be necessary for our representatives in individual cases to suspend automatically further unloading of vessels involved and require them to depart at once in which case unloaded supplies might have to be allocated elsewhere. In particular I think we should voice expectation that Govt vessels will not be boarded by Soviet police authorities on matter involving acts by American personnel committed on board ship, unless possibly in important instances clearly affecting peace of port and then by agreement with American representatives; that no personnel of US armed forces serving on our vessels visiting Soviet ports will be detained by Soviet authorities except by agreement both our representatives; that no US personnel of any sort will be detained incommunicado; and that local official US representatives be permitted to be present at all questioning of US personnel by police authorities.

I see no reason for us to attempt to justify these requirements by reference to principles of international law and usage. It seems to me we are entitled to take position, if pressed, that these are minimum conditions under which we can afford to despatch American Lend-Lease vessels to Soviet ports and that if Soviet authorities are not prepared to cooperate in individual instances in making observance of these conditions possible we will be obliged to go on assumption that their need for the particular supplies in question cannot be urgent.

The above views are my own and have not been passed on by the Ambassador or General Deane neither of whom is at present in Moscow.²⁶ Naval section of Military Mission has seen this message and has itself been in communication with Navy Dept (Office of Naval Operations) on these cases.

KENNAN

²⁶ Ambassador Harriman and Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union, were attending the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference. In telegram 166, July 31, to the Secretary of State at Potsdam, the Department informed Mr. Harriman that "Department [is] taking no action pending your return to Moscow" (811.3361/7-1745).

861.918/7-2145: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 21, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received July 22—12:05 a. m.]

2654. According to AP (Associated Press) report received by Embassy press office, Wilbur Forrest²⁷ stated in public address to Chicago Rotary Club that Russia was going to relax its strict press regulations, that this did not mean it would completely abolish censorship in our time but there was distinct possibility Russia would allow foreign correspondents to travel freely in Russia and to report what they might see and learn.

Am not aware of anything Forrest saw or learned on his recent visit here which would justify this optimism. It would, of course, be surprising if facilities for travel were not to improve with the final overcoming of war conditions in Russia but ability to travel freely in Russia can be, and always has been, subject to many restrictions other than direct Government prohibitions. Similarly there are many means besides direct censorship whereby Government can influence not only what foreign correspondents learn and see but also what they choose to write about it. To suppose that Russian officials will essentially alter their general views and policies on extent to which Soviet reality should be revealed to outside world is something for which no one in this Mission has seen any substantiation. Present Russian foreign press policies, which are only slightly stricter today than they were before war, have justified themselves from Soviet standpoint. They have generally succeeded in concealing from broad mass of foreign public many Russian conditions which could hardly fail to arouse distaste and criticism abroad and in giving foreign public, in our country at least, a relatively favorable and reassuring picture of Russian reality. Mr. Forrest's own words (which are exactly those which Moscow would have wished him to utter) are a good proof of ultimate efficacy of Moscow's methods, in which assiduous cultivation of distinguished visitors is balanced by consistent undercutting of regularly assigned correspondents and diplomats. Few Russians will see any reason to abandon a policy which is producing such results.

KENNAN

²⁷ Assistant editor, *New York Herald Tribune*.

800.00B/7-1545 : Airgram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)* ²⁸

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1945.

A-313. This is with reference to Moscow's 2571 of July 15 repeated by Moscow to Paris as 235, to London as 361, to Frankfurt for Murphy as 15, to Rome as 53, and to Chungking as 59. Information in telegram under reference is greatly appreciated as helping to clarify recent developments in international communist movement.

Evidence has been accumulating for some time that Communist International is being reactivated on a regional basis with interlocking characteristics on the top level. World-wide distribution of Moscow *War and the Working Class* now the *New Times* in five languages plus press service to all countries, plus demonstrated integration and correlation of programs of various communist parties now functioning, plus international communist machine organized to take advantage of vacuum created by Nazi defeat and difficulties of post-war readjustment in other parts of world leave little room for doubt that this machine is coordinated to extent never previously attained by Communist International and is ready to take advantage of opportunities. The ostensible lack of a direct tie-up with Moscow formerly evidenced by headquarters there of outmoded Executive Committee of Communist International and its world congresses removes open irritant to other countries but the new covert machinery appears far more efficient and practical.

Active participation in national conventions of one Communist Party of representatives of Communist Parties of other countries, parallelism of attitude of all Communist Parties on foreign policy including colonial problems, emphasis on militant program internally by each Communist Party, extension of press facilities by one Communist Party to print important documents of Party of another country for dissemination of material in former's country and support by one Communist Party of internal policies of all other Communist Parties are further indications of close cooperation and high degree of efficiency now obtaining in international communist movement.

The rebuke in April 1945 by French Communist Party of Communist Political Association of America and its leader, Earl Browder, for deviation from Marxian program *even though the French Communist Party in May 1944 had approved* unreservedly Browder's position which it now condemns shows that:

1. The French Party is a vehicle for orders for transition by western parties to a militant line in contrast to diluted Marxian version

²⁸ Copies sent to Paris, London, Frankfurt (for Murphy), Rome, and Chungking.

adopted during prosecution of war and liberation of Western European countries.

2. There may be possible use of French Party in future as focal point for official international pronouncements to international communist movement.

3. The immediate acceptance by Communist Political Association of America of French rebuke, reversal of its former position and repudiation of Browder and his program indicates resumption of active militant line and attempt to capture control of working-class movement.

4. For the proper execution of militant line, drastic reorganizational changes and purges of functionaries throughout the international movement may be expected.

5. The purpose of change may be for use of the communist movement in sovereign democratic countries during period of communist-anticipated economic and social post-war difficulties as internal pressure medium in behalf of Soviet interests.

GREW

740.0011 EW/6-545

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*²⁹

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Reference is made to the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of June 5, 1945 which contained the charge that anti-aircraft and machine gun fire from the American transports *Stevenson Taylor*, *Albert C. Ritchie*, *Benjamin Hill*, and the English vessel *Lapland*, set fire to several aerial defense balloons in the harbor of Murmansk on May 9, 1945; wounded several persons, one of them fatally; and caused damage to nearby property. It is noted that this charge was based on the declarations of a commission of experts and the interrogation of a series of witnesses.

The contents of the *aide-mémoire* under reference were transmitted to the Navy Department and the War Shipping Administration, both of which promptly initiated an appropriate investigation. The findings of these investigations fail to substantiate the allegations made in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*. It appears that the American vessels named were expressly requested by Captain Dushin of the Soviet Port authorities to participate in the extensive celebration of V-E Day being carried out that day by Russian ships and shore batteries in the Murmansk area, and that they did so in a carefully controlled manner for a period of approximately twenty minutes (between 12:30 and 12:50 p. m.). Two of the balloons were observed to fall in flames before the firing by American vessels commenced. The *Albert C. Ritchie* fired no guns at all and limited its contribution to blowing a V-E signal on the ship's whistle, Captain Dushin himself being on

²⁹ Text of this *aide-mémoire* was sent to the American Embassy in Moscow in telegram 1908, August 24, 1945, 6 p. m.

board at the time. The other two American vessels fired anti-aircraft guns and machine guns on carefully selected, safe bearings over the water of Kola Inlet for a period of twenty minutes. It is entirely clear that no damage was caused by American fire.

With regard to the commission of experts and the interrogation of witnesses mentioned in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, the Department of State has been informed that, although the three American vessels remained in Murmansk for several days following May 9, no request was made by the Soviet Port authorities to question any persons aboard the American vessels referred to: and that these authorities were completely non-cooperative with respect to the efforts of the United States Naval Attaché there to ascertain the facts in the matter.

It is noted that the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* expresses the belief that the American authorities will hold the guilty responsible and reimburse the damage caused, the size of which is to be submitted later. On the basis of the investigations outlined above, and particularly in view of the heavy volume of fire from Soviet ships and shore batteries throughout the entire day, the United States Government finds no evidence to substantiate the charge that the American vessels named above caused the alleged damage and personal injury, and can accept no responsibility whatever therefor.

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1945.

[For the declaration of war by the Soviet Union on Japan, see memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, August 8, volume VI, section under Japan entitled "Surrender of Japan . . .", Part I; see also *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, volume II, page 1474, footnote 1.]

811.3361/7-1745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1945—1 p. m.

1857. ReEmbs 2596, July 17, 3 p. m. The Dept agrees that a protest should be made to the Soviet Govt over the incidents and lack of cooperation at Murmansk, but felt it undesirable to make such a protest until the meeting at Potsdam had been completed and you had returned to Moscow.

If you concur that protest should be made you are authorized to take such action along the lines suggested in the Embassy's telegram under reference.

BYRNES

811.3361/8-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 21, 1945—noon.

[Received 7:45 p. m.]

2987. Re Dept's 1857, August 18, 1 p. m. I have discussed with General Deane and Admiral Maples Embassy's 2596, July 17, 3 p. m., and we all feel that it would be unprofitable to lodge protest at this time. The Soviets have been particularly cooperative with our naval officers who have recently been stationed in Odessa and Novorossik [*Novorossiysk*] and we have had no recent difficulties at Archangel. The trouble at Murmansk seems to have been caused by one man named Timoshenko representing foreign trade. Our ships are no longer going to Murmansk in any numbers and I dislike making a protest unless we have some way to back it up with action which would be of concrete disadvantage to the Soviet interests. Otherwise the only result would be a discourteous reply from the Foreign Office particularly as the exact facts on this case are hard to prove. In spite of the difficulties in the cases referred to the men involved departed with their ships.

Therefore, unless instructed otherwise I will take no further action.

HARRIMAN

860M.01/8-2245

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the Division of Eastern European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1945.

At Mr. Dunn's request I received a delegation from the Lithuanian American Council which had been holding a two-day conference in Washington. The delegation consisted of Mr. Leonard Simutis, Mr. William F. Daukaitis, Dr. Pius Grigaitis, Mr. Michael Vaidyla and Mr. Constantine R. Jurgela.

The delegation claimed that the Lithuanian American Council represents 98 percent of the persons of Lithuanian extraction in the United States, the number approximating one million. All members of the delegation are American citizens. They expressed their concern for the independence and sovereignty of Lithuania and the hope that the policy of the United States Government had not changed since the Department's statement of July 23, 1940³⁰ and President Roosevelt's statement of October 15, 1940. . . .

³⁰ Statement regarding the independence and territorial integrity of the Baltic Republics, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 401.

[Here follow paragraphs summarizing matters of concern to the delegation and also summarizing three memoranda (not printed) left by the delegation.]

After listening to statements by each of the members of the delegation, I informed them that the policy of the American Government toward Lithuania as set forth in the statements to which they referred was unchanged and that this Government continues to recognize the Lithuanian Minister in Washington³¹ as the representative of Lithuania. I pointed out, however, that the Soviet Union was in effective occupation of Lithuania and considered that Lithuania had been formally incorporated into the Soviet Union as one of the sixteen constituent republics. I assured the delegation that the considerations which they had raised would be brought to the attention of the appropriate officials in the Department and expressed on behalf of Mr. Dunn his regret that he had been unable to receive them personally.

841.796/8-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 26, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received August 26—7:15 p. m.]

3066. Reference Department's telegram 1904, August 24, 2 p. m.³² Watson-Watt's statement is first we have heard of any reconsideration of Russian position on aviation. As far as we can see, Russian attitude is still governed principally by determination that aircraft of other great powers shall not fly over Soviet territory. It is not impossible, in my opinion, that Soviets might consent to permit airlines of Russian satellite countries or even of smaller neighbors, such as Sweden, to enter Soviet Union on strictly reciprocal basis; but we have been given no encouragement to hope they will consent to entry of American airlines. On the other hand, it is possible they may expect to have participation in international aviation through lines of satellite countries which would be in reality Russian controlled and it is impossible to find in Moscow anyone who would discuss questions of policy on matters of civil aviation while these questions are still in preliminary stage and while no major directives from high policy making authorities are yet available. Soviet reticence is particularly marked in mat-

³¹ Povilas Žadeikis.

³² Not printed; it reported that Sir Robert Alexander Watson-Watt, the British chairman of the London Conference of Commonwealth and Empire Radio for Civil Aviation, understood that four Soviet observers at the Conference were giving full reconsideration to the position on international aviation organization for their Government (841.796/8-2445).

ters of civil aviation, probably because they involve a wide circle of separate Soviet authorities with varying, and sometimes conflicting, interests.

HARRIMAN

861.20 Missions/8-2645: Telegram

*The Chief of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union
(Deane) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Moscow, 26 August 1945.

[Received August 27.]

M 25421. When all hostilities have ceased and military control of enemy and enemy occupied territory has been established, it is believed that the United States Military Mission to the USSR should be discontinued as soon as practicable and its activities transferred to those agencies which normally carry them out under peacetime conditions. The Soviet authorities have always regarded the presence of both the United States and British Military Missions as wartime measures. In the case of the British, the Soviets have already indicated their expectation that the British Military Mission will soon be discontinued.

I believe that if we take the initiative in recalling the Military Mission and reverting to a peacetime status our peacetime agencies will get off to a better start in the Soviet Union. However, current negotiations with the Red Army General Staff regarding military control of Japan should be completed by the Military Mission.

I recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff give immediate approval to the following program:

1—For planning purposes, the date of discontinuance of the US Military Mission to the USSR is set at 31 October 1945 (with the understanding that this date may have to be extended, depending upon developments in the Far East).³³

2—The US Naval Attaché's office in the USSR, which has remained in existence throughout the war under the Military Mission, will revert to its independent status when the Mission is disbanded.

3—The Navy Department will conclude arrangements with the WSA³⁴ in Washington with regard to the maintenance of US Naval personnel as WSA representatives at Soviet ports.

4—The activities of the Supply Division of the United States Military Mission will be transferred to the United States Embassy in Moscow as soon as practicable with its records and part of its personnel.

³³ In his book, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation With Russia* (New York, The Viking Press, 1947), General Deane states: ". . . I recommended that ours should depart from the Soviet Union before it was invited to do so. Accordingly we closed our offices on October 31, 1945, and American representation in Moscow was restored to our Military and Naval Attachés" (p. 285). Regarding establishment of the Military Mission, see telegram 934, October 1, 1943, to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 704.

³⁴ War Shipping Administration.

5—The United States Military Attaché's office will open simultaneously with the discontinuance of the United States Military Mission. This is in consonance with a recommendation already made to the State Department by the Ambassador.^{34a}

6—A final report covering the activities of the United States Military Mission will be rendered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with copies to the War and Navy Department.

7—The United States Military Mission will deal direct with the War and Navy Departments in carrying out the details of this program.

The Ambassador concurs in the above.

[DEANE]

861.60/8-3045 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Officers*³⁵

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1945—8 a. m.

Analysis of Soviet industry by Emb Moscow reached conclusion that there is no evidence of any widespread reconversion at present or planned for near future. Production of military goods appears to be only slightly below wartime peak levels. Up to first week in Aug production of capital goods in USSR plainly limited in first instance by priorities given to war production. Emb feels that with reconversion of but 50% of machinery plants USSR could without any large-scale assistance from abroad produce capital goods in sufficient quantities to provide for rapid reestablishment of production of basic raw materials and consumers goods at pre-war levels. Survey concludes that question of Soviet need for assistance from abroad is inextricably bound up with contd maintenance of war-time arms production and with political-military aims which that production is intended to further.

BYRNES

800.00B/8-3045

The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State

No. 26,044

MEXICO, August 30, 1945.

[Received September 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's mimeographed memorandum instruction of August 7, entitled "Methods of Communist Infiltration",³⁶ in which is quoted the sub-

^{34a} In telegram M 25424, August 27, from Moscow, General Deane advised that this final sentence should be shifted to recommendation 4.

³⁵ At Ankara, Berlin, Bern, Brussels, Caserta, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Paris, Stockholm, and Warsaw.

³⁶ Circular instruction sent to Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay, not printed.

stance of a telegram received by the Department from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i. at Moscow, Mr. Kennan,³⁷ and in which attention is brought to the fact that Paris is again becoming a center of operations for international Communist agents and in which respect Mr. Kennan makes some very pertinent remarks.

I am very appreciative of the Department's having brought this memorandum instruction to the attention of this Embassy to which it will be helpful for guidance and background. Mr. Kennan is obviously in a better position to know than others of us what the objectives and procedures of the Soviet Government are as planned in Moscow. We in other parts of the field can see the working out of this policy.

I am sending this brief despatch to the Department to indicate that so far as our observation and knowledge in Mexico is concerned, there is no doubt that Mr. Kennan's remarks are pertinent and that the Soviet Government is following definitely the policy and procedure indicated in his telegram to the Department under reference. Ever since last December when Lombardo Toledano³⁸ was in London for a labor meeting there it has been obvious that he is completely an agent of the Soviet Government and that he has been chosen by it or by elements in that Government as their agent. The attitudes of Lombardo are well known to the Department prior to his visit to London in December of last year. He was always unfriendly to the United States; always friendly to Soviet Russia and while he stated that he was not a Communist, he was in fact a Communist. Since December of last year, however, Lombardo has almost completely thrown off the mask to the degree that it is understood in Mexico that he is more interested in representing a Soviet point of view than any Mexican point of view although he is a Mexican citizen.

This Embassy is continuously reporting upon the activities of Lombardo Toledano and this is not the place to refer in any detail to them. I merely wish to mention here that in spite of the fact that Lombardo's complete sellout to the Soviet Government is well understood in Mexico, his power in the internal Mexican situation for the present is certainly greater. This is due not to any general adherence to the ideas which he represents but is due to the circumstances surrounding a Presidential election campaign in Mexico and in which Lombardo is playing so far a very real role.

It is interesting in connection with Ambassador Caffery's telegram from Paris,³⁹ referred to in the memorandum instruction under reference, and in connection with Mr. Kennan's telegram from Moscow,

³⁷ Telegram 2571, July 15, from Moscow, p. 866.

³⁸ Vincente Lombardo Toledano, prominent labor leader, head of the Communist-dominated union, the Confederation of Latin American Workers.

³⁹ No. 3918, not printed.

to note that Lombardo left Mexico a few days ago for a trip which will take him to London and to Paris. Before leaving here he made it clear that his stay in London would be relatively short but he seemed to lay a great deal of stress in his conversation with his friends on the importance of his stay in Paris.

May I take the liberty of adding that I think it is most helpful for the Department to send to its Chiefs of Mission material of the kind covered in the instruction of August 7, for background and guidance.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH

103.9166/9-345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 3, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received September 4—5:30 a. m.]

3156. With the announcement that the foreign program of Office of War Information is to pass to Dept's control in near future,⁴⁰ I feel I should express my opinion about importance of the work in Soviet Union which OWI has been performing.

With my arrival in Moscow 2 years ago OWI has had a small staff attached to the Embassy. This is the first time Soviet Government has permitted an American organization to present the picture of America directly to the Russian people and to supply information to Soviet publications. I am impressed with the fact that the tremendous interest of Russian people in our country is a powerful asset in our future relations with Soviet Government.

OWI section of my Embassy has been exploring virgin territory with increasingly gratifying results. Contacts with different Soviet organizations are expanding with increasing opportunities to exchange books and technical information and to organize exhibitions of American material of special interest in Moscow and other cities. If handled with understanding, these opportunities for disseminating information about the US can be expanded. OWI magazine *America* is only American magazine other than technical publications permitted distribution in Soviet Union⁴¹ and, therefore, does not compete

⁴⁰ President Truman's statement, August 31, and Executive Order 9608, of the same date, are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 2, 1945, pp. 306-307.

⁴¹ Ambassador Harriman had made strenuous efforts to obtain consent for publication in the Soviet Union of a magazine to be called *America (Amerika)*, and on March 25, 1944, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, had written Mr. Harriman agreeing to a bimonthly illustrated magazine. By October 1945 the first two issues were distributed in the Soviet Union on an irregular basis and undated.

with private publications. I feel it important that there be no break in carrying on the present program. It is difficult to get high level Soviet approval of programs of this character but when once approved, we find those involved on an operational level are much interested to cooperate in the work.

In the Soviet Union more than any other country there is a minimum of opportunity for the people to get information about America unless such a program is organized and stimulated through government channels and our private organizations are given assistance. I feel it would be useful if Colonel Phillips,⁴² OWI representative here, should return to Washington for consultation with the Dept when Dept is formulating its information program for Soviet Union and adjusting it from wartime to peacetime needs. Meantime I hope it may be possible to continue present program without interruption.

At this time I wish to express my appreciation of the competent cooperation and work of the OWI staff in Washington and New York.⁴³

[HARRIMAN]

033.1100/9-1545 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 15, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

3277. For the Under Secretary,⁴⁴ Colmer group and Senator Pepper were received by Stalin yesterday evening.⁴⁵ Interviews were separate, that of the Senator following immediately on that of the Congressmen. I was present at both interviews, made presentations and translated for Americans. Stalin had his own translator for his own statements. Vyshinski was present throughout.

Colmer conducted discussion on behalf of Congressional group. He began by referring to interest of committee in question of credits to Russia and in Russian foreign trade plans. Stalin recounted in detail 6 billion dollar proposal made to our Govt last winter and stated that no answer to this had yet been received. Somewhat illogically he added that our differences had so far been over interest rates. He himself thought that prices would be a greater difficulty and that if we

⁴² Col. Joseph B. Phillips, on military leave from *Newsweek Magazine*, was a special assistant to Ambassador Harriman.

⁴³ The Department replied in telegram 1981, September 8, 1945, 1 p. m., that it would give the recommendations every consideration in its plans for an information program on a continuing basis (103.9166/9-345).

⁴⁴ Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State. Secretary Byrnes was attending the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in London, September 11–October 2.

⁴⁵ Memoranda of several conversations by this group and by Senator Pepper with officials of the Soviet Government are filed under 861.50/9-2645 and 033.1100/10-245.

could eventually agree on prices question of interest rates could be easily solved. He proceeded to recount items which were needed for reconstruction, mentioning 5 million tons of rails, 100,000 [10,000]⁴⁶ locomotives, 100,000 to 150,000 railway cars, 40,000 to 50,000 machine tools, equipment for metallurgical plants, blast furnaces, etc. They could take about one million tons of grains and meat, he said, particularly for Far East. They might also be able to take large amounts of cotton. Finally there were surplus military materials in Europe, particularly transportation equipment, which they could use. If 6 billion figure was not sufficient to satisfy these needs it might be increased. As to form of repayment he mentioned various raw materials and gold. Colmer inquired as to proportion which each of these items, i.e. gold and raw materials, might assume. Stalin replied that it was premature to talk of this, that a decision in principle must first be reached about the loan, then experts could sit down and decide these other questions.

Colmer asked what assurances we could have that if Soviet Union eventually became economically self-sufficient, it would still be interested in conducting trade with other countries. Stalin replied that the greater the economic development of a country the greater its foreign trade potential. To import, a country had to be economically strong. Russia, for example, could import and absorb three times as much as China, despite China's greater population because Russia was more developed. Russian internal market was boundless. Russia had work[ed] for 50 years to build up domestic economy. In answer to a question as to plans for development of Soviet export trade to China, Stalin said possibilities were not great. Russia had all it could do to develop its own Far Eastern districts. Soviet Far East was administratively connected with European Russia, but economically it still led its own existence. There were 50 cities to be built out there and 3,000 kilometers of railroads to be laid down. In these circumstances how could Russia spare much of anything for China?

Colmer referred to large demands of Soviet Union for export surpluses of eastern European countries and asked how in view of this factor we could expect to get paid for exports to those countries. Stalin said that actually Russia could not take much from these countries and had relatively little to give them. Demands made on them up to this time had been dictated by circumstances of military occupation. Troops would soon be removed. Then things would be different. They had found, for example, in case of Rumania that possibilities were not great. They did not object to participation of other countries in trade with those nations. In support of this he

⁴⁶ Correction based on telegram 3614, October 20, 1945, 10 p. m., from Moscow. not printed.

cited recent Soviet assent to proposed erection of new Dodge automobile plant in Rumania. (After Congressmen had completed their interview and left Stalin took me aside and said: "Tell your fellows not to worry about those eastern European countries. Our troops are going to get out of there and things will be all right.")

Stalin declined to be drawn out on subject of Russia's future participation in development of international civil aviation. They would do their part, he said, but he could not state at this time what form this would take.

Colmer asked what their plans were for utilization of labor of POWs,⁴⁷ pointing out that we had common problem in this respect. Stalin said that as long as no peace treaty existed Russians would presumably go on using them as they were now being used: in mines, forests, construction work, etc. At the moment Soviet transportation system was terribly over-taxed with repatriation of 5 million civilian deportees, 2 million Soviet POWs and 3 million men being demobilized out of armed services, not to mention needs of forces in Far East. Until these people could be brought back Soviet labor force would remain disrupted. As soon as it was possible, however, to get Soviet citizens back into jobs now performed by German prisoners, labor of latter would be dispensed with. It was not very productive anyway.

To a question about publication of economic data, Stalin stated such publication would soon be resumed as before the war. To Colmer's remark that some people at home feared that Russia intended to maintain large war economy Stalin said it would be suicidal for them not to reconvert.

With Senator Pepper, Stalin went over some of the same ground about Russia's reconstruction needs. He said that Russia's pig iron output, over 20 million tons before the war, was now only 8 to 9 million. Oil output had been over 30 million tons, was now about 18 million. They were now in process of demobilizing over 3 million men, close to 4 million. They would have as many again to demobilize. Eventually Red Army would be reduced to one-third its wartime strength.

Senator asked what to tell people at home who thought Russia had aggressive intentions with respect to border countries. Stalin scoffed at this suggestion. "Our people are tired", he said, "they couldn't be induced to make war on anybody any more."

On the question of the foreign policies of Labor Government in England, Stalin said he had impression at Potsdam that Laborites were anxious nobody should think they were less zealous for protection of British imperial interests than Conservatives. He agreed with

⁴⁷ Prisoners of war.

Senator that their policies would probably show some change as soon as they felt able to risk such a development.

Stalin spoke soberly and without either optimism or pessimism of difficulties in path of maintenance of big power collaboration in peacetime conditions. He acknowledged prime importance of American-Russian relations.⁴⁸ As for England, there was not really much England could do for them or they could do for England. Asked if he was satisfied with American efforts to achieve postwar collaboration, he would only admit that the Americans are "seeking" means for such collaboration. To Senator's statement that he was known affectionately among American public as "Uncle Joe", Stalin replied that he did not know what he had done to deserve this. Senator concluded by asking whether there were any advice or suggestions Generalissimo could give him. In reply Stalin urged him to attempt to view Russia objectively, neither to praise it nor to scold it, and to make his judgements only on basis of facts and not of rumors.

Sent to Dept, repeated to London for the Secretary, and for Ambassador Harriman upon arrival, No. 454 to London.

KENNAN

811.2423/9-3045

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*⁴⁹

No. 2151

Moscow, September 30, 1945.

[Received October 6.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum prepared by Mr. Whitney,⁵⁰ at present head of the Embassy's Economic Research sec-

⁴⁸ In the report written by Senator Pepper of his interview with Stalin, included as an enclosure in despatch 2162, October 2, 1945, from Moscow, this subject was more fully elaborated: "I said did the Generalissimo feel that the United States was collaborating with the Soviet Union in a satisfactory way in international collaboration. He said that the common interest of the United States and the Soviet Union in the war had brought the two nations very close together and the Soviet Union was very greatly indebted to the United States for the help which the Soviet Union had received from the United States. However, he said that tie which has held us together no longer exists and we shall have to find a new basis for our close relations in the future. That will not always be easy he said. He continued, 'Christ said seek and ye shall find.'" (033.1100/10-245)

⁴⁹ In a covering letter to Ambassador Harriman on September 30, Mr. Kennan wrote: "It is my feeling that not only would it be a tragic folly for us to hand over the secrets of atomic energy production to the Russians but that our Government has a serious responsibility to see that everything possible is done to obtain information on Russian progress along these lines. This Embassy should, I think, do everything within its power to stimulate such action. This is the only thing I can think of to do." A notation in pencil on this letter states that the despatch was "Taken to USA by Gen'l Deane". (124.616/1-1149)

⁵⁰ Thomas P. Whitney, Attaché of the Embassy in the Soviet Union. The memorandum is not printed.

tion, with respect to Soviet research organization and its potential ability to develop the utilization of atomic energy.⁵¹

This memorandum is merely a brief and superficial survey of the situation as far as it is known today. I am sure, however, that the conclusions drawn therein are sound and I feel that they warrant the very careful attention of interested circles in our Government.

The Department will note from the memorandum the following points:

a. The Soviet Government will undoubtedly endeavor with every means at its disposal to learn the secrets of atomic energy.

b. The natural resources, the research facilities and the production machinery of the Soviet Union are such as to lead us to assume that it may be possible for the Soviet Government to accomplish this purpose.

c. It is vital to United States security that our Government should be adequately and currently informed on this subject.

d. The completeness of Soviet security makes it out of the question that adequate information can be obtained through the normal channels and facilities now available to us.

e. Large scale special efforts on various lines in this direction are therefore justified.

I earnestly recommend these conclusions to the most careful attention of our Government.

I have no hesitation in saying quite categorically, in the light of some eleven years experience with Russian matters, that it would be highly dangerous to our security if the Russians were to develop the use of atomic energy, or any other radical and far-reaching means of destruction, along lines of which we were unaware and against which we might be defenseless if taken by surprise. There is nothing—I repeat nothing—in the history of the Soviet regime which could justify us in assuming that the men who are now in power in Russia, or even those who have chances of assuming power within the foreseeable future, would hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us if by doing so they thought that they might materially improve their own power position in the world. This holds true regardless of the process by which the Soviet Government might obtain the knowledge of the use of such forces; i.e., whether by its own scientific and inventive efforts, by espionage, or by such knowledge being imparted to them as a gesture of good-will and confidence. To assume that Soviet leaders would be restrained by scruples of gratitude or humanitarianism would be to fly in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence on a matter vital to the future of our country.

It is thus my profound conviction that to reveal to the Soviet Government any knowledge which might be vital to the defense of the

⁵¹ For further documentation on the interest of the United States in the development of atomic energy and in the international control of it, see vol. II, pp. 1 ff.

United States, without adequate guaranties for the control of its use in the Soviet Union, would constitute a frivolous neglect of the vital interests of our people. I hope the Department will make this view a matter of record, and will see that it is given consideration—for whatever it is worth—in connection with any discussions of this subject which may take place in responsible circles of our Government.

At the same time, I wish to say that I consider it the clear duty of the various interested agencies of our Government to determine at once in Washington the measures which our Government should take to obtain information with respect to Soviet progress in atomic research. There are a number of points which occur to me in this connection, but I think this perhaps not the proper time or vehicle for mentioning them. If the Department so desires I would be glad to submit detailed recommendations on this point at an early date.⁵²

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE F. KENNAN

051.61/10-145: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 1, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received October 1—6:38 a. m.]

3413. Forty-seven sealed pouches for this Embassy were recently forwarded by American Legation Stockholm by steamer to Leningrad, where Embassy officer was sent to receive them. Leningrad customs refused delivery to him, saying they would have to be forwarded to Moscow customs. Pouches were, therefore, forwarded to Moscow. Moscow customs have now likewise refused release unless pouches be opened for inspection, stating that they were despatched as freight unaccompanied by diplomatic courier, *laissez passer* or appropriate invoice. Despite Embassy's repeated requests to Foreign Office to facilitate delivery, latter has supported Moscow customs in its stand. I have no knowledge of contents of these pouches and do not feel at liberty to submit them to inspection without instructions. If Russians refuse to release them we might propose sending them to Berlin to be reintroduced into Soviet Union by courier.

Department's instructions would be appreciated.

Sent to Dept as 3413, repeated to Stockholm as 79 and to Paris as 357.

KENNAN

⁵² Notation by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson): "This should be asked for. D. A." No such request found in Department files.

860M.01/10-145

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1945.

This afternoon I received Mr. P. Zadeikis, Minister of Lithuania, who left with me the attached note⁵³ in which he expressed the hope that "the American Government will continue its benevolent attitude in regard to the aspirations of the Lithuanian nation for the restoration of Lithuania's independence and will use its powerful influence in bringing about the realization of democratic principles as expressed in the Four Freedoms⁵⁴ and in the Atlantic Charter⁵⁵ so that the processes of economic ruin and the depopulation of Lithuania under the present foreign military occupational regime of the Soviets may be brought to an end and the country returned to its rightful master, the Lithuanian people."

I have assured Mr. Zadeikis that the Note would be brought to the attention of all the officers of the Department concerned but gave him no encouragement that this Government would be in a position to effect any change in the present situation.⁵⁶

ELBRIDGE DURBROW

⁵³ Note 1441, October 1, 1945, addressed to the Acting Secretary of State, not printed.

⁵⁴ See President Roosevelt's State of the Union message to Congress, January 6, 1941, *Congressional Record*, vol. 87, pt. 1, p. 44, or Department of State, *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 608.

⁵⁵ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

⁵⁶ President Truman received on November 16, 1945, a telegram from Paris sent by former leading Lithuanian officials on November 14 in which they appealed to him "to save the Lithuanian nation from starvation and complete annihilation." The telegram charged that Soviet occupation authorities were carrying out the "systematic extermination" of the people and the "ruthless spoliation" of national resources. About 50,000 patriots, most active in the resistance against Nazi occupation, had been encircled by Soviet troops and were being exterminated. "Mass arrests and deportations of Lithuanians to Siberia and the Altai are in progress while thousands of Russian colonists are being settled in Lithuania." (860M.01/11-1645)

Secretary of State Byrnes requested the Embassy in Paris by airgram A-1509, November 30, 1945, to acknowledge the telegram in behalf of President Truman and to state that the President had referred the telegram to the Department of State for the consideration of the appropriate officials of the Department. (860M.01/11-3045)

861.2311/10-445 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 4, 1945—5 p. m.
 [Received October 4—11 : 04 a. m.]

3451. In connection with announcement that Zhukov visit to USA has been postponed on account of illness,⁵⁷ it is encouraging to note that the Marshal is at least not bedridden. He was seen at theater evening of October 2 apparently in good health by member of this Embassy staff.

To Department 3451, repeated Berlin 98.

KENNAN

740.00119 Council/10-445 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*⁵⁸

Moscow, October 4, 1945—7 p. m.
 [Received October 5—1 : 40 a. m.]

3454. Outcome of London Conference⁵⁹ raises several interesting questions with respect to Soviet reaction.

1. First is question of adaptation of general party line and official ideology to new situations. Importance of this to Soviet leaders should never be underrated, for a regime which forbids individuals to formulate their own political thought must itself always have an answer for everything, and entire structure of Soviet power and influence among Communist and Left Wing groups abroad is cemented together principally, and in some cases only, by clarity, consistency and vigor of ideological appeal. Soviet press initially presented results of Conference to Russian public boldly and bluntly, without a single hopeful note, and evidently with a view to creating impression that most of Russia's reasonable and constructive proposals along lines of international collaboration had met with cold and unfeeling rebuff

⁵⁷ In pursuance of instructions Ambassador Harriman had informed Foreign Commissar Molotov on August 2, 1945, that President Truman extended through Generalissimo Stalin an invitation for Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov to visit the United States. Assistant People's Commissar Vyshinsky in a letter of September 17 to the Chargé, George F. Kennan, replied that the invitation was accepted and that the beginning of October would be the best time for Marshal Zhukov to come. General Eisenhower had made a visit to Moscow and Leningrad August 11-15.

⁵⁸ Secretary of State James F. Byrnes wrote in a personal letter of October 8, 1945, to Mr. Kennan that he had read this telegram with great interest and declared that the "analysis contained therein of Soviet reaction to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the probable effect thereof on future Soviet foreign policy and internal evolution is highly illuminating and contains much food for thought."

⁵⁹ For documentation on the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in London, September 11-October 2, 1945, see vol. II, pp. 99 ff.

in London at hands of Western Powers. Molotov's press interview,⁶⁰ as published here, contained only one hopeful phrase, and served generally to underline to Soviet public that this must be regarded as serious matter, with far-reaching implications. To Soviet man in the street this must come as distinct shock; for prospect of successful collaboration with Western Allies in post-war era has been held out to him ever since Moscow Conference, 2 years ago, as one of main achievements of Soviet leadership, and on these prospects he has been taught to state his hopes for peace and better times. To be sure, he has been warned on many occasions by state propaganda machine that there were dangerous reactionary elements in both England and America lowering background and awaiting opportunity to incite western world to new crusade against Russia. But these were invariably portrayed as minority elements in opposition to majority opinion and to political regimes in power in Western countries. Anglo-American masses and their respective governments were pictured to Soviet citizen as impressed with Soviet achievements and as yearning for benefits of collaboration with USSR. It must now be explained why official representatives of Western Powers should suddenly have dealt rebuff to Soviet aspirations which, as far as Soviet public has been informed, were the essence of reasonableness and progressive idealism. For this, mere personal attacks on Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin⁶¹ will not be enough and it is cardinal Communist dogma that individuals are only agents of social forces, and that their personalities do not determine course of events. It will also not be easy to portray either of these statesmen as the agent of conservative-reactionary elements such as, in this case, the Hearst-McCormick press. Yet it will be impossible to admit that in their attitudes and actions at the London Conference they could have represented majority opinion in their respective countries. Moscow will therefore probably be forced to take position that both the Democratic and the Labor parties contain reactionary wings, to whose intrigues these statesmen have fallen victim. This thesis will suffice for immediate future; and foreign critics of handling of Conference on part of American and British Governments will now no doubt be cited profusely to demonstrate to Soviet reader discontent to [of] the masses in England and America with policies of their Governments. But such tactics must at long last create widespread impression among Soviet public that American and British Governments are no longer representative. This leads directly to general denial of democratic character of Western political life and to re-spousal of original Leninist thesis of spuriousness and viciousness of "capitalist

⁶⁰ Molotov gave his press interview in London on October 3, 1945. A translation was sent as enclosure 1 in despatch 2168, October 4, from Moscow, not printed.

⁶¹ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

democracy". And this, in turn, is perilously close to a reversion to entire ideology of "capitalist encirclement" which preceded Russia's recent gestures toward collaboration with Western Powers and which, if again adopted at this time, would involve a fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy and in entire pattern of Russia's role in future international society.

2. Second question is that of effect of outcome of London Conference on actual Soviet policy. Some fear a general tightening up in treatment of western countries: a sharpening of tone and curtailing of amenities. For this the Soviet Government—perhaps unfortunately for themselves at such a moment—have not left themselves a very large margin; and Moscow diplomats, at least, may take solace from fact that it would require considerable inventiveness to make them much more uncomfortable, officially and personally, than heretofore. More interesting are possibilities for major moves in Soviet policy; and question is being asked, for example, whether negative outcome of Conference will not lead to early unilateral Soviet action against Turkey⁶² or elsewhere. Although it is early to judge, I think this quite unlikely. For the moment Soviet reaction will probably take form of creating maximum trouble for Western governments through groups within their own countries or within countries over which they have control. Sudden flood of complaints at Paris Trade Union Conference about "colonial imperialism" of Western Powers and cracks in Paris *Humanité* about our fighting together with Japs against natives of Indochina and China itself are only opening guns in this tactical offensive. Such attacks have thus far been concentrated on policies of Western Powers in Asia; but our actions in Europe will not be forgotten. We must expect concerted efforts to discredit policies of American and British Government at home and abroad, to mobilize public opinion against recent actions of our statesmen and to create situation in which fear of public opinion will cause these statesmen in near future to become more pliable to Soviet purposes. But it is my own belief that Kremlin will think more than once before deciding on any actions or policies which could mean a final break with Western World.

3. This brings us to third question which is possible effect of course and outcome of Conference on inner political situation in Moscow. Kremlin must face fact that if it has not been thrown for a loss, it has at least been stopped without a gain. Its downs are numbered; and such an outcome is equivalent to a reversal: the first serious one suffered by Russians since Moscow Conference inaugurated high level

⁶² For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the demands of the Soviet Union for revision of the regime of the Turkish Straits and other matters affecting Turkish-Soviet relations, see vol. VIII, first section under Turkey.

intercourse with Western statesmen. Whether this can pass off without recriminations and a test of strength within Soviet ruling group remains to be seen. This group has now remained in power, practically without alteration in composition or even in incumbency of official position, much longer than the govt of any other great country. It has become dangerously ingrown and remote not only from mass of people but even from [mass of] Communist Party members. Atmosphere of Kremlin today has a definite staleness about it. Meanwhile there are signs of fairly wide popular discontent: Among intelligentsia, who chafe at cultural isolation; among student youth, who suspect that there is a great deal they are not being told; and above all among returning veterans whose horizons have been broadened and appetites whetted by experiences in foreign countries.

This [dis]content is nothing which a well run totalitarian machine (which this one is) should not normally be able to take in its stride, but present issue cuts deep. Soviet failure to come to terms with West would not only be direct source of deep disappointment and concern to Soviet public, in which natural liking for US has attained legitimacy for first time in recent wartime associations, but would complicate, insofar as it might affect foreign credits, the formidable economic problems with which regime [is faced.] If anything could test unity of Kremlin, this would be it.

Should ruling group be severely torn at this juncture over broad issues of Soviet foreign policy, much would depend on whether lines of cleavage within Kremlin might happen to coincide with broad lines of popular discontent throughout the country itself. If so, Russian political life could again be shaken to its foundation, as it was during the purges of 1936-37.⁶³ If not, then the most that can be looked for would be change in composition of Political Bureau and a redistribution of Govt posts. A certain shift in Govt jobs is presaged in any case by possibility that elderly Kalinin will be replaced as chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet,⁶⁴ and that Stalin may soon wish to relinquish post of Chairman of Soviet of People's Commissars which he has held since May 1941. This would, of course, have no bearing on Stalin's position in party Political Bureau, which is real source and channel of his authority. Whether Molotov's position will be affected by London Conference remains to be seen. In either case, answer to this last question will be indicative.

Sent to Department as 3454, repeated to London as 493 and Paris as 363.

KENNAN

⁶³ For reports concerning the arrests and trials of this period, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, index entries under Purges, p. 1030.

⁶⁴ Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin did resign because of ill health on March 19, 1946; he died on June 3.

051.61/10-145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1945—8 p. m.

2102. Five Soviet pouches which have arrived in Washington under circumstances roughly comparable to those of 47 pouches which were subject to your 3413, October 1, are being held in Washington and Dept does not propose to turn them over to SovEmb, which has already requested delivery of them, until you advise that pouches in Moscow have been released to you. You may make such use of this information in your negotiations with Soviet authorities as you deem desirable.⁶⁵

ACHESON

051.61/10-145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1945.

2103. Position of Soviet customs authorities in connection with entry of 47 pouches containing American diplomatic correspondence is not understood. There can be no question in this case of the authenticity of source of pouches or correctness of address. Dept knows of no nation into which its sealed diplomatic correspondence, properly identified, is denied entry, regardless of whether or not it is accompanied by courier. Dept is aware of no precedent requiring unsealing of pouches containing such correspondence for customs inspection. It is common practice for representatives of foreign embassies and legations in Washington to proceed to ports of entry such as New York or Philadelphia to receive incoming diplomatic correspondence and effect dispatch of outgoing pouches, which have been properly identified.

You should continue to decline to permit opening of pouches for customs inspection. It should be possible by communicating with Stockholm by mail or telegraph to correct any specific deficiencies in documentation of the 47 pouches in such manner as to meet Soviet requirements. This is merely a routine consignment of pouches containing material which under former procedures would have been despatched via Tehran.

⁶⁵ In telegram 2219, October 24, 1945, 8 p. m., to Moscow, the Department reported that the Soviet Embassy had again inquired regarding release of the five pouches and the Department requested information as to results of representations at Moscow for release of the 47 pouches held there (051.61/10-2445).

No reason is seen for calling upon this Government to pay duplicate transportation charges on material which has already arrived at city of destination.

Keep Department informed.

ACHESON

811.42761/10-545

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

No. 840

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1945.

SIR: In relation to its program of cultural exchange between the United States and other nations the Department considers it of importance to stimulate cultural interchanges between this country and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.⁶⁶ Various art, music, and theater groups have approached the Department since the cessation of hostilities asking its advice as to the best method and the most appropriate time for a resumption of exchange in the art and music fields, with particular reference to the possible appearance in the United States of various ballet groups, theater groups, choruses and art exhibitions from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In this connection it is pointed out that the Office of War Information has sent to that country on various occasions certain United States musical and artistic materials which have been well received.

It is realized that transportation across the Atlantic is still a serious problem and may remain so for some time to come. The Army points out that it may need more of the available shipping space till the summer of 1946. However, the Department would like to know the attitude of responsible officials in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics toward an increased exchange of persons and materials in the art and music fields for its general guidance in giving advice to United States organizations interested in the possibility of sending United States orchestras, choruses, ballet groups, art exhibits, and art and music material to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in exchange for similar materials and groups.

Following is a list of specific topics upon which the Department would like information at the earliest opportunity:

1. The earliest practical date by which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics might consider sending the Red Army Chorus or some similar group to this country, perhaps in exchange for a similar group from the United States.

⁶⁶ For attitude of the Soviet Union in regard to international cultural cooperation prior to establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), see telegram 3838, November 13, 5 p. m., from Moscow, vol. I, p. 1521. See also telegram 10571, October 10, 7 p. m., from London, *ibid.*, p. 1515.

2. The earliest practical date by which Soviet organizations could plan to send ballet groups or theater groups or orchestras to the United States in exchange for similar groups.

3. The earliest practical date by which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider sending exhibits of Soviet art, architecture, or handcraft to the United States in exchange for similar initiatives on the part of United States organizations.

4. The earliest practical date by which international conferences or conferences in the arts and sciences might be convened in the United States in order to have responsible Soviet representatives in attendance, together with materials or devices illustrative of the latest advances in Soviet arts and sciences.

The Department wishes to issue a statement on the importance of resuming active cultural interchanges between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is felt however that such a statement would be more effective if it were made in the light of the fullest possible knowledge of the attitude of the Soviet Government in regard to the questions raised in this instruction.⁶⁷

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:
WILLIAM BENTON⁶⁸

861.00/10-645 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 6, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received October 6—2:55 p. m.]

3469. By way of background to today's announcement of forthcoming election of new Supreme Soviet⁶⁹ following may be worth noting:

1. Present Supreme Soviet is first and only one ever elected under new Soviet constitution of 1936. It was elected on December 12, 1937, and will therefore have been in existence more than 8 years by time it is replaced. There was no provision in constitution for this long tenure. Constitution provides flatly for 4-year term. New elections have been postponed from year to year by executive decree since expiration of original 4-year term, on grounds of special wartime conditions.

⁶⁷ In telegram 4146, December 12, 1945. Ambassador Harriman reported that the "head of American Section in FonOff writes on Dec. 11 that opinion of appropriate Soviet organizations has been sought and upon receipt of conclusions of these organizations he will communicate reply in substance to our proposals." (811.42761/12-1245)

⁶⁸ Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations.

⁶⁹ The Moscow press published a ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union calling for elections to the Supreme Council. Now that the war was ended and the powers of the first Supreme Council had expired, on the basis of article 72 of the constitution elections for a new Supreme Council were set for the non-working day of Sunday, February 10, 1946.

2. Present deputies were elected from single lists ostensibly setting forth candidates of an electoral bloc made up of Communist Party and non-party people. This propaganda device, adopted to obviate criticism that candidates were advanced solely by Communist Party, was purest eyewash. Non-party people had no organization of any kind among themselves through which they could have influenced selection of candidates.

3. Actual election in 1937 proceeded as follows: Voters found themselves confronted with a piece of paper containing a single list of candidates. If they marked this in any way, mutilated it or destroyed it their ballot was considered invalidated. If they handed it in or even left it in the booth unmarked or unutilized, it counted as a ballot for list in question. Many were completely bewildered, and never understood, either before or after, what it was all about.

4. There must, particularly in view of wartime vicissitudes, have been considerable mortality in a body so long in office. In local Soviets this is reckoned as high as 30-40%. It must have been nearly as high, one would think, in Supreme Soviet. We are not aware that any by-elections have ever been held. Nevertheless, at recent sessions the hall seems to have been no less full than 8 years ago. This has occasioned some questioning [by?] foreign observers as to manner of selection of many of delegates, particularly since it is known that in case of local Soviets new deputies have been freely "co-opted", presumably by Communist Party's authorities to take places of those who had dropped out.

5. Constitution provided voters had right to recall their deputies if latter should swerve from correct path. Stalin himself sternly admonished public, at time elections were held, to remember this right and to exercise it where called for. Evidently no deputies have ever swerved from path. I am personally not aware, in any case, that right of recall has ever been exercised, even in cases of those who, like the notorious Yezhov,⁷⁰ have since been most ruthlessly purged by secret police authorities. For this reason present Supreme Soviet, in its personal composition, is by no means ridiculous body. But its influence as a body on major Soviet policy during 8 years of its existence has been exactly nil: And it should be thought of rather as an honorary panel of docile distinguished citizens than as a legislative body in the Anglo-Saxon sense.

Sent to Department as 3469, repeated to Paris as 372, to London as 499, to Rome as 70.

KENNAN

⁷⁰ Nikolay Ivanovich Yezhov, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1936-38, conducted the purges during this time.

861.751/10-945: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1945—4 p. m.

2114. As you know, all censorship in the US on incoming and outgoing telecommunication messages, whether by telegraph or telephone, has ended. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. advises Dept informally that Soviet authorities continue to restrict use of direct radio-telephone circuit between US and USSR to official calls. It is believed that removal of this restriction would be mutually advantageous, for example, in permitting use by American citizens for business and personal calls in USSR. It is of course recognized that Soviet restrictions on use by Soviet nationals of radiotelephone circuit is a matter on which it would not be appropriate to make representations.

Within your discretion please ascertain whether Soviet authorities would agree to appropriate relaxation of restrictions on radiotelephone circuit. Please telegraph.

BYRNES

861.751/10-1645: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, October 16, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received October 16—3 p. m.]

3563. ReDeptel 2114, October 9. Embassy addressed note to Foreign Office October 15 asking whether Soviet authorities might not relax present restrictions on radio telephone circuit between US and USSR to permit business and personal calls.

Embassy made same request in note to Foreign Office on June 9 though at that time calls were to be subject to censorship both in US and USSR. No answer was ever received to this note.

Embassy made informal approach direct to Commissariat for Communications on July 13 and received written reply on July 20 stating under Article 8(c) of existing radio telephone agreement⁷¹ private conversations are as a rule temporarily disallowed. Exceptions may be made only in special cases and only with permission of competent organs of both parties. However, employees of Embassy in cases of urgent necessity may be authorized by Commissariat for Communications to make personal calls provided calls are made from Embassy telephones.

⁷¹ See paragraph 1, article 8, of revised radio regulations signed at Cairo, April 8, 1938; 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 1417, 1473.

Under this arrangement employees of Embassy and Military Mission have succeeded in placing private telephone calls.

It may be that some time will elapse before Soviets will relax restrictions generally.

HARRIMAN

761.00/10-1845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 18, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 9:50 p. m.]

10910. FonOff officials dealing with Russian affairs to [*do*] not consider that current Soviet propaganda lines being followed in Moscow, France and the Balkans of fulmination against a western bloc and denunciation of British and American leadership as reactionary can at present, at least, be taken as indicating any change in policy either responsible for or arising from difficulties in Council of Foreign Ministers. They attribute the harping on a western bloc to Soviet displeasure at effect which Socialist victory in Great Britain is having in strengthening Socialist and other moderate labor parties on continent against Communists. They attach somewhat more importance to hardening of Communist ideological line with its stress on divergence and antagonism between USSR and capitalistic countries.

These officials still feel that Soviet Government has not fully adjusted itself to rebuff in Council to its efforts to split Britain, France and US in apparent hope of forcing some measure of last minute compromise on Balkans. They do not anticipate any early change in Soviet policy of "cooperation" with Western Powers which they emphasize is never followed for sake of cooperation but merely as means of facilitating attainment of Soviet objectives.

Current British policy they state is directed toward *ad hoc* settlement of problems with Russia as they arise and to avoid as far as possible intensification of spheres of influence. FonOff is acutely conscious of continuing development of Soviet sphere but fears that competitive action would be losing game for Great Britain. All that Great Britain, restrained by parliamentary and public opinion, can do in Eastern Europe is to encourage moderate and center parties whereas Soviet Government has more effective and less scrupulous means at its disposal for exerting influence in West. They deplore widening split down the center of Europe but as yet see no answer.

As an illustration of this policy FonOff has been considering frank talks with Russians on Iran stating what British Government considers its basic interest in Iran to be and asking what Soviet Government

considers as its basic interests there. It has so far not done so and may well not do so at all for fear Russians will counter with proposal for outright division of Iran into spheres of influence, Tehran to be in Soviet sphere.

Sent Dept as 10910, repeated to Moscow as 359 and Paris as 674.

GALLMAN

811.79600/10-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 19, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 2:05 p. m.]

3601. ReDeptel 2164, October 15.⁷² 1. Dept is aware of intransigent policy of Soviet Govt not to permit foreign aircraft to enter Soviet Union except under unusual circumstances and to limit as greatly as possible foreign air traffic into or over Soviet controlled countries or areas. With respect to Finland I feel it is therefore likely that Soviet authorities will endeavor to block United States air service thereto. I believe that Soviet Govt will endeavor to establish purely Soviet or Soviet controlled airline from Helsinki to Stockholm connecting with Soviet airline Moscow to Helsinki. Nonetheless it is my opinion we should endeavor to obtain clearance for entry into Finland for United States air service from Finnish authorities particularly as Soviet Govt has been more "correct" in Finland than in other controlled countries and that we should approach the Russians on this question only if negotiations should break down and if it becomes clear that Russian pressure has brought about Finnish refusal to permit United States entry.

2. I favor Dept's proposal to link up question of commercial air rights in Soviet territory as well as unsettled economic questions with Export-Import Bank credits provided Dept is prepared to take a strong stand on this question. Soviets will maintain that question of airlines and at least some of other unsettled economic matters are unrelated to credits and will bring all possible pressure at their disposal, public and otherwise, to bear in order to break down Dept's position.

I feel Dept should in any event raise questions of airlines and other unsettled economic matters in any discussions it might have with Russians on Article VII of 1942 Lend-Lease agreement⁷³ relative to final

⁷² Not printed.

⁷³ For master lend-lease agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed at Washington, June 11, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500.

determination of benefits provided United States by Soviet Govt in return for Lend-Lease assistance.

3. In view of attitude Soviet Govt has taken re entry of United States planes into Soviet Union, I recommend that we cease permitting Soviet planes to enter Alaska without obtaining prior authorization. I recommend further that I be instructed to advise Soviet Foreign Office at my discretion in connecting service at Berlin that Soviet planes which were permitted freely to fly into Alaska in connection with Lend-Lease will no longer be permitted to land at Fairbanks without obtaining prior clearance from appropriate American authorities.

HARRIMAN

811.79661/10-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 20, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received October 20—11 : 20 a. m.]

3609. On reconsideration I wish to withdraw one recommendation made in second paragraph of Embassy's 3601, October 19, 1 p. m., in which I state that I favor Dept's proposal to link commercial air rights in Soviet territory with Eximbank credits. I feel that my second suggestion in this cable is more appropriate, namely, that the question of United States airline privileges should be raised in connection with final Lend-Lease settlement under Article VII. It seems to me that other unsettled economic questions are more appropriate to raise in connection with Eximbank credits.

HARRIMAN

811.79661/10-2245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1945—1 p. m.

2200. Following information has been obtained from the War Dept. in response to questions raised in your 3461 October 5, 8 p. m.⁷⁴ regarding present use by Soviet planes of Alsib ⁷⁵ route :

Use of route for non-military purposes such as transportation of civilians, freight, couriers and mail terminated with end of lend-lease. Bulk of Soviet Mission in Fairbanks is scheduled to leave by October

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ Alaska-Siberia.

15. Prior to end of lend-lease Soviet planes entered Alaska on previously submitted flight schedule without prior notification of individual flights. Soviet radio station in Siberia simply informed Fairbanks when planes took off for Alaska.

Soviet Purchasing Commission ⁷⁶ has asked for permission for its employees to continue to proceed to U. S. via Alaska. Dept proposes to attempt to extract some concessions for American travelers before granting this request and would be grateful for your views.

BYRNES

811.79661/10-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 23, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received October 23—12:30 p. m.]

3639. Deptel 2200, October 22, 1 p. m. We are still negotiating with the Soviet FonOff and Civil Aviation authorities for an airline connection, Moscow-Washington, at Berlin. Service at present not formalized. Soviets are, however, carrying our passengers to and from Berlin. Soviet FonOff has recently proposed a definite connection once a week which we assume to be in addition to current service, but this has not been confirmed. I am despatching airgram ⁷⁷ giving details of negotiations.

I believe it is desirable to grant Soviets permission to continue to proceed to the United States via Alaska for the present at least while our air service is filled westbound with returning soldiers. I suggest that this permission, however, should be on a month to month basis as we may have to put pressure on the Soviets to give us adequate service to Berlin. I recommend also that we insist that a certain number of American travellers be permitted to go in both directions over this route. It will be particularly useful for Americans returning from Moscow during the present emergency period. In addition it is an interesting and useful experience.

It is still my hope that in connection with the Lend-Lease termination agreement we can obtain permission for American planes to enter Moscow on a regular service.

No long term concession should be made to the Russians until this question is settled.

HARRIMAN

⁷⁶ The Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U. S. A. had been established on February 27, 1942. Lt. Gen. Leonid Georgiyevich Rudenko was its Chairman at this time. See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 696.

⁷⁷ A-313, October 29, not printed.

761.00/10-2345

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*⁷⁸

No. 2215

Moscow, October 23, 1945.

[Received November 6.]

SIR: I have the honor to review below current trends of Soviet policy with respect to the Near and Middle East.

General

Soviet aims in this area are primarily strategic: security and aggrandizement. These aims are not defined in hard and fast terms. They are accommodated to time and circumstances. The endless, fluid pursuit of power is a habit of Russian statesmanship, ingrained not only in the traditions of the Russian State but also in the ideology of the Communist Party, which views all other advanced nations as Russia's ultimate enemies and all backward nations as pawns in the struggle for power.

Particularly is this true in the kaleidoscopic Near and Middle East where a realistic policy must take into account not only national factors but also such extra-national forces as the Orthodox Church, the Armenian and Jewish communities, the Kurds and the Arab League.

Turkey

Turkey represents the principal westerly gap in the Soviet system of defense in depth along its borders. Until Turkey is under Soviet domination and the Black Sea a Soviet lake, the USSR will feel itself strategically vulnerable from the southwest. Furthermore, Turkey lies athwart any Soviet ambitions for expansion into the Mediterranean.

More for reasons of security than of expansion it may be assumed that the Soviet program for Turkey is a matter of relative urgency. Yet thus far, aside from an irritable press campaign against a Turkish editor, which has now subsided, and Mr. Molotov's heavy-handed overtures regarding cession of territory and bases,⁷⁹ the U.S.S.R. has remained remarkably inactive with regard to Turkey. The only recent manifestations of interest are the domestic intimations of Communist Party political agitators that certain issues with Turkey are to be joined and that this may lead to war.

But although the U.S.S.R. will probably use its full stock of political stratagems, it is scarcely likely to resort to outright military at-

⁷⁸ This despatch was drafted by George F. Kennan, Counselor of Embassy, and John P. Davies, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy at Moscow.

⁷⁹ For documentation on the Straits question, see vol. VIII, first section under Turkey.

tack because of the far-reaching international repercussions that such action would have.

Through negotiation, the Soviet Union will presumably seek a favored position with regard to the Straits. But because the Straits are internationally the most explosive of Turkish issues and because the relative strategic importance of the Straits is greatly diminished in an age of airpower, the Soviet Union's ambitions regarding the Straits may well, in final analysis, play a secondary role. The U.S.S.R. may approach a fundamental revision of the status of the Straits from the Turkish flanks rather than frontally.

The absence of any significant leftist opposition in Turkey means that the Soviet Union must rely principally on other discontented elements—real and artificially created. They are the Kurds and the Armenians. Both overlap national borders and so possess a wide utility. Although practically no Armenians remain in eastern Turkey, an Armenian irredenta movement based on Soviet Armenia has already made its implausible presence known. If vigorously developed, it may help to detach the eastern provinces from Turkey by various peaceful pressures or to provoke fatal Turkish exasperation.

While the principal impetus for Armenian separation must originate from outside Turkey, the Kurds are sufficiently strong within Turkey to constitute, if given direction and arms, a considerable disruptive force. This Embassy has seen nothing to indicate that the Kurds of Turkey are being organized and armed by the Soviet Union. But when the time comes, their natural potential utility is not likely to be overlooked by the U.S.S.R.

The Kurds

The utility of the Kurds as an extra-national force extends into Iraq and Iran. This means that if the Soviet Union wishes to exploit the Kurdish potential, there might be developed a regional separatism splitting off contiguous corners of three nations.

The Armenians

With the Armenian SSR constituting an Armenian homeland, the Soviet Union possesses a politically magnetic force tending to draw Armenian communities in the Levant and the western world in the direction of support of Soviet policy. Despite the anti-Soviet sentiments of some Armenian groups outside of the U.S.S.R., it may be assumed that a full-fledged crusade for Armenian SSR recovery of historical Armenian territory would draw popular Armenian support abroad.

Syria and the Lebanon

Soviet strategic objectives in Asia Minor logically extend from Turkey and Iraq to Syria and the Lebanon. Oil pipelines, access to the

Mediterranean and propinquity to the Suez Canal are obvious long-range objectives in the Levant States.

The principal obstacle to the realization of these aims is French influence and continued British interest in this area. Soviet policy in the Levant States is therefore directed at the undermining of what remains of the French position in those states, both through local elements friendly to the U.S.S.R. and through French Communists. At the same time the U.S.S.R. is engaged in cautious exploration for and encouragement of indigenous groups amenable to Soviet guidance.

In opposing French influence in Syria and the Lebanon, Moscow is inhibited by the danger that it may inadvertently give aid to elements friendly to the British. For this reason, it must tread a particularly wary path. The U.S.S.R. appears, nevertheless, already to have assumed something of the role of protector of the rights of the Aleppo Armenians and the Orthodox Church, notwithstanding the stubborn attitude of the Patriarch of Antioch. Furthermore, Syrian grievances against Turkey over Alexandretta would seem to tempt Soviet exploitation.

The Orthodox Church

With communities in Turkey, Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt, the Orthodox Church is an important extra-national force in the Near East.⁸¹ At present, it offers an opportunity for apparently innocent cultural penetration and propaganda, which opportunity the U.S.S.R. is assiduously cultivating. Having traditionally entertained a keen appreciation of temporal as well as spiritual powers, the Orthodox Church in the Levant does not view the courtship of the Soviet State with excessive distaste. Eventually the Church in the Near East may, despite factional jealousies, serve as a ponderable political force operating in response to Soviet direction.

The Jews and Zionism

In seeking to enlist Jewish support of Soviet policy in the Near and Middle East, Moscow is confronted with complicated and far-reaching issues. For the Jewish problem is not only an international phenomenon; it is also an important domestic issue in the U.S.S.R. A false Soviet step with regard to the Jews in the Near and Middle East would cause repercussions inside the U.S.S.R., as well as among world Jewry from Wall Street to the Dead Sea. Therefore Moscow is treading softly among Levantine Jews.

⁸¹ For indication of the rise of Soviet political influence in the Near East through the church, see telegram 1800, May 30, from Moscow, p. 1127, and telegram 2455, July 7, from Moscow, p. 1129.

In seeking to assess Soviet tactics toward the Jews, it may first confidently be said that the U.S.S.R. does not encourage nationalist sentiments among the Jews as it does among the Armenians. As evidence of this, one need only point to the melancholy position of the Jewish Autonomous Province.⁸² Bounded by the Amur on one side, by Siberian desolation on the other, and far from Jewish population and historical centers, the Jewish Province can hardly serve either as a focus of world Jewry's longing for a homeland or as a base for "Jewish national" expansion.

Secondly, it seems clear that the U.S.S.R. does not look with approval on Zionism. The reasons for this attitude are: Moscow does not wish to offend the Arabs, and the Zionist movement is not now amenable to Soviet direction. Soviet opposition to Zionism is, however, cautiously expressed. That is to say, it is revealed openly in certain Arab communities, and inferentially in the Soviet press. But it is not manifested so broadly as to provoke the united antagonism of Zionist sympathizers. The U.S.S.R. may be expected to continue this generally noncommittal course until such time as developing events bring Soviet policy into sharp open conflict with Zionism, or—what is far less likely—Moscow is able to capture the Zionist movement.

Having rejected nationalism as a basis for rallying Jewish support in the Levant, Moscow appears to be concentrating on class and ideological appeal. The Soviet program for Jews in the Near and Middle East seeks to enlist the support of laborers and intelligentsia.

Palestine

Soviet policy in Palestine is directed at the elimination of British influence and, however discouraging the task may now appear, the building up of pro-Soviet Arab and Jewish elements to a point where they can eventually be reconciled with each other and united in making a bid for power in that area. The Russians cannot now afford to take sides outright either with the Arabs or the Jews. Their aim is therefore to split both.

Accordingly, they oppose Jewish "reactionaries" in Palestine without opposing the Jews as a body. As has been noted, leftist Jewish intelligentsia labor groups serve Soviet purposes in this enterprise. With the Arabs the U.S.S.R. has been more careful, but the beginnings of a similar distinction are visible there. Landless Arabs and Arab members of the Orthodox Church are elements which the Soviet Union may turn to its use.

⁸² The Jewish Autonomous Oblast in the Khabarovsk Kray, on the Amur River in a corner jutting into Manchuria, was established in 1934 with its administrative center at Birobidzhan, after an original settlement of about 19,000 Jews in 1927. Conditions were so uncongenial that the project was not a success.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union is not averse to allowing the Arab world to draw from official Soviet reticence on the problem of Palestine the deduction that the U.S.S.R. alone, of all the great powers, has no interest in Jewish immigration into Palestine and is therefore the friend of the Arabs.

The Arab League

The Soviet Government made no reply to the official notification which was given to it of the establishment of the Arab League.⁸³ The Soviet press has subsequently criticized it somewhat obliquely on the general grounds that it was supported by the British. In so far as the League may outgrow British tutelage and support, it might look for favor in Moscow; and the possibility of such a development may have been one of the reasons for Soviet caution in openly opposing it. But the recent expression of the League's opposition to a Soviet trusteeship in Tripolitania will not go unforgotten, and such merit as the Soviet Union may be able to acquire in Arab eyes by its relative reticence on the Palestine question will probably be exploited toward the disruption rather than the support of the present League leadership.

Egypt

Soviet interest in Egypt is presumably focussed in long range terms on the Suez Canal. That interest is less economic than strategic; less in shipping and other economic benefits which would flow from influence or control over the Canal than in the strategic advantage of being able to compromise or sever the vital British Empire communications line through Suez. Soviet attempts to acquire influence or control over the Canal must, because of extreme British sensitivity regarding Suez, proceed cautiously and slowly—probably through negotiations for financial participation in the Suez Company and through bids to outflank the Canal, as have already been made in the proposals for Soviet trusteeship over Eritrea and Tripolitania.

In the domestic Egyptian scene the Soviet Government is feeling its way. It is trying to build up Soviet prestige through cultural propaganda and a display of interest in Mohammedanism and at the same time is endeavoring to find internal elements sufficiently reliable to be used as effective vehicles of Soviet influence in Egyptian domestic politics. This last has apparently not been easy. The anti-British elements in Egypt are for the most part even more hostile to the U.S.S.R. than to Great Britain. The Soviet Union has a long way to go before it can hope to play an influential role in Egypt.

Iraq

Oil and access to the Persian Gulf and to the Arabian peninsula constitute motivations for Soviet expansion into Iraq.

⁸³ For documentation on formation of the Arab League, see vol. VIII, section entitled "Attitude of the United States toward the question of Arab Unity."

The Russians are probably fairly well convinced by this time that they cannot do business with the Arab elements which are now in control in Iraq. They have only recently succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with the Iraqi Government, and they are still hesitant about attacking it openly for fear of involving themselves in trouble with the Arab world in general. They are therefore treating the Iraqi Government with great caution.

This does not hinder them, however, from exploiting the deficiencies of the Iraqi minority policy with respect to the Kurds, who, it is important to note, are strongest in the vicinity of the northern oil fields. It must be expected that Kurdish grievances will be nurtured by Moscow and will some day be exploited by the Russians as a means of pressure on the Iraqi central government. For the moment Soviet policy is to aggravate to the utmost the conflict between the Kurds and the Arabs. At the same time a vigorous effort is being made to obtain influence in Baghdad among the Arab intelligentsia. It must be expected that if this effort is successful, a day will come when dissident pro-Soviet Arab elements will also begin to make trouble for the government and to bid, as in Iran, for political power.

Iran

Security, oil and access to the Persian Gulf are to the Soviet Union three incentives for encroachment on Iran. Domination of northwestern Iran is a minimum requirement for the security of the Caucasus area. Acquisition of control over northern Iranian oil is a goal for the near future. A bid for control over southern oil must wait because such a move at this time would provoke violent British reaction. Eventually, however, the U.S.S.R. may be expected to attempt to obtain control over southern Iranian Oil, not so much because of Soviet need for that oil, but more because the denial of it to the Anglo-Americans would be a strategic coup. Access to the Persian Gulf, the third incentive for Soviet encroachment on Iran, would open a corridor to Arabia and India and a direct trade route between the Ural industrial area and southeast Asian raw material sources.

In Iran the Soviet Union depends on four instruments for attaining its end. One is the Red Army in occupation. It obstructs the functioning of the Iranian Government and protects, if by no other way than through its presence, the native agents and agencies of the U.S.S.R. A second is the Tudeh Party. The U.S.S.R. seeks to utilize it for the discrediting, and eventually the overthrow, of the existing government and its replacement by a regime amenable to the Soviet Union. Thirdly, the Azerbaijan Party is the instrument by which the U.S.S.R. is attempting, as a preliminary move, to separate northwest-

ern Iran from the rest of the country⁸⁴ and so insure early Soviet predominance in that particular region. Finally, under Soviet direction, the Kurds are likewise a fissionist force in northwestern Iran. There have been hints that the Kurdish "independence" movement is already fairly well developed—and that certain Iraqi Kurds have made contact with it.

Afghanistan

Security and a gateway to India constitute primary motives for the Soviet Union's seeking dominant influence in Afghanistan. Security is a primary concern because of the close proximity of Afghanistan's present border to the richest portion of Soviet Central Asia. And Afghanistan is the nearest gateway into India, in which the U.S.S.R. has always had a latent but strong interest.

Soviet policy toward Afghanistan is at present one of comparative quiescence. Although evidently now working quietly, as a preparatory measure, toward the penetration of certain border areas of Afghanistan, the U.S.S.R. is not yet ready to act in a big way. When the time comes, it will probably seek with characteristic flexibility to exploit the open issue of the Oxus boundary and to utilize fully tribal ties across the Afghan-Soviet border and tribal and dynastic conflicts within Afghanistan. Meanwhile it will of course oppose with determination any association of Afghanistan with other Moslem states in which the U.S.S.R. does not itself play the leading and controlling role.

Summary of Soviet Political Tactics in Near and Middle East

One of the outstanding characteristics of Soviet foreign policy is its flexible multiformity. Nowhere, perhaps, is this quality more clearly demonstrated than in the Near and Middle East. It may therefore be useful, in conclusion, to summarize the various lines of Soviet policy in that area.

Nationalism and irredentist sentiments are encouraged among the Armenians. Tribal revolt and autonomy is incited among the Kurds. The export brand of Stalinist ideology is sold to the Jews. The doctrine of Church unity under the patronage of the Soviet State is propagated in Orthodox communities.

In dealing with states, still other techniques are employed as instruments of policy. Tactics of cultural and religious ingratiation are used in Egypt. In contrast, against Turkey the U.S.S.R. has employed diplomatic negotiation, a war of nerves (including a whispering campaign regarding impending military action) and propaganda

⁸⁴ For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward fostering by the Soviet Union of dissident movements in northern Iran, see vol. VIII, first section under Iran.

by foreign agencies (such as the demand of Armenians in the United States for the "return" of eastern Turkish provinces to the Armenian SSR). Finally, toward Iran the U.S.S.R. has resorted to active and passive military intervention and internal political intrigue.

Respectfully yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

051.61/10-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 24, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received October 24—2:05 p. m.]

3650. ReDepts 2102 and 2103, Oct 6 [5]. Foreign Office informed Embassy that in this instance our 47 pouches would be released by Moscow customs as exception to customs regulation to effect that diplomatic mail is subject to release only if accompanied by diplomatic courier or authorized person possessing courier-letter visaed by Soviet diplomatic agent abroad.

Accordingly Embassy has today taken custody of pouches.

Dept's action in holding five Soviet pouches, for which Embassy is highly appreciative, proved most helpful in negotiating release of our pouches. Recommend they be immediately released.

Sent Dept 3650, repeated Stockholm 86.

HARRIMAN

[For reports on two conversations between Ambassador Harriman and Stalin on October 24 and 25, 1945, at Gagry (near Sochi), concerned with the situation in Japan, see the memoranda of conversations by Edward Page, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy at Moscow, dated October 24 and 25, volume VI, section under Japan entitled "Surrender of Japan . . .", Part II. For other portions of these memoranda concerned with procedures for the preparation of the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Finland, see volume II, pages 567 and 575.]

611.6131/10-2645

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

No. 866

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1945.

The Secretary of State transmits for the information of the Officer in Charge a memorandum which outlines the economic and commercial program now being considered in the Department of State as it relates to the U.S.S.R.

This memorandum was prepared in response to an informal request made by Brigadier General Frank N. Roberts⁸⁵ for a brief statement regarding the economic and commercial program being considered in the Department as it relates to the U.S.S.R. The original copy of this memorandum was informally handed to General Roberts before his departure for Moscow.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1945.

The following is a brief outline of the commercial and economic program now being considered in the Department of State as it relates to the USSR. This outline is for background information only. Some of these programs are only in a tentative stage of development, but an outline of them may be helpful in indicating some of the thoughts which have been expressed concerning economic and commercial relations between the United States and the USSR and some of the steps which have been taken in their implementation.

(A) The Proposed International Conference on Trade and Employment.

The proposal for an International conference on trade and employment is based upon Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreements which have been concluded with over thirty countries constituting most of the United Nations. Although specific agreements have not been signed with the British dominions, adherence to the principles of Article VII of these agreements has been indicated by them. The Lend-Lease agreement with the USSR, which was signed on June 11, 1942, is almost identical with the Lend-Lease agreement signed with Britain⁸⁶ and other countries.

Article VII of that agreement provides for "agreed action by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the

⁸⁵ Military Attaché in the Soviet Union since October 4.

⁸⁶ For text of preliminary agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression, signed at Washington February 23, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

economic objectives set forth" in the Atlantic Charter.⁸⁷ Article VII also provides for conversations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a view to determining the best means of attaining these objectives.

Pursuant to Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreement with the United Kingdom, informal exploratory conversations at the expert level were held with the British in September and October of 1943.⁸⁸

In September 1943, prior to the discussions with the British, an invitation to hold similar discussions was extended to the Government of the USSR. Additional information was given to the Soviet Government in a memorandum entitled "Basis of Our Program for International Cooperation" submitted as Agenda no. 15(c) by Secretary Hull on October 22, 1943 to the conference of ministers in Moscow.⁸⁹ However, no discussions with the Soviet representatives in regard to these subjects have been held.

Since the original conversations held in Washington, informal discussions between the American and British technical representatives have been taking place in London. All of these discussions have consisted of an exchange of views regarding a variety of commercial and economic problems.

In the economic and financial discussions which are taking place here in Washington at the present time, an effort is being made to obtain general agreement on a variety of trade problems with the representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom. The discussions with the British representatives and the views exchanged with representatives of other governments have been designed to lay a basis for international agreement on the matters outlined in the document entitled "Proposal to Establish an International Trade Organization, July 21, 1945."⁹⁰

It is anticipated that this document will be published by the Secretary of State of the United States, as a statement of American experts, not later than November 15.⁹¹ It is hoped that discussion of the proposal will develop enough agreement so that a general conference on trade and employment may be called about June 1946.

The document entitled "Proposals to Establish an International Trade Organization" (the title of which may later be changed to "Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on

⁸⁷ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

⁸⁸ See *ibid.*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 48 ff.

⁸⁹ For text of memorandum, see annex 9, "Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation", attached to Secret Protocol signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943, *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 763.

⁹⁰ Not printed, but for summary sent to President Truman, September 7, see vol. VI, first section under United Kingdom.

⁹¹ With regard to published Proposals, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 9, 1945, p. 912-929.

Trade and Employment") briefly outlines the purposes and membership of such an organization and indicates the commercial policy to which member nations would adhere in the conduct of their trade relations with other member countries. The Soviet Union, having a complete state monopoly of foreign trade, might not be primarily affected by provisions dealing with such matters as quantitative trade restrictions, tariffs, subsidies, and exchange control; therefore, provisions dealing with state trading have been included in the general commercial policy statement. These provisions are designed to establish a nondiscriminatory basis for trade relations between state-trading economies and free-market economies. In free-market economies, the principles of most-favored-nation treatment with regard to legislative acts and administrative procedures is generally sufficient to assure fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory treatment, but in the case of a state monopoly of foreign trade, the matter of assuring most-favored-nation treatment raises special problems.

The principle of "commercial considerations" which has been developed for application to state trading (and which has been incorporated in many of our trade agreements) provides that members engaging in state trading in any form should undertake to make all foreign purchases and sales solely on the basis of commercial considerations such as price, quality, marketability, transportation and terms of purchase or sale. Acceptance of this principle on the part of the Soviet Union would be equivalent to the acceptance by other countries of the most-favored-nation principle with regard to tariffs and other matters influencing international trade.

The proposed international trade program also contemplates the substantial reduction of tariffs and the relaxation of other trade barriers, on the part of private-enterprise countries. As a counterpart of this it is proposed that members having a complete state monopoly of foreign trade should undertake to purchase annually from other members, on the basis of equality of treatment and commercial considerations, products valued at not less than an aggregate amount to be agreed upon. This global purchase arrangement would be subject to periodic adjustment in consultation with the international trade organization. A precedent for this kind of arrangement exists in the present commercial agreement between the United States and USSR.⁹²

It is proposed that the Soviet Union and certain other important trading nations will be invited, prior to the proposed general conference, to participate in multilateral negotiations for the purpose of reaching agreement on concrete measures for the reduction of trade

⁹² For the latest renewal and indefinite extension of the commercial agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union by an exchange of notes signed on July 31, 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 763.

barriers and to prepare in general for the proposed conference. It is anticipated that the Soviet Union will find it to its interests to participate in such negotiations and will benefit by the tariff reductions on the part of other countries and the most-favored-nation treatment which will be accorded to its commerce. Other countries will benefit from the pledge of the Soviet Union that its state monopoly of foreign trade will be influenced solely by commercial considerations and will accord equality of treatment to other members. Other countries will also benefit from the pledge of the Soviet Government to purchase on a global basis products of a designated minimum value.

(B) *Draft Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.*

At the present time the contractual basis for the conduct of commercial and economic relations between the United States and the USSR is inadequate, consisting merely of (1) notes exchanged at the time of recognition,⁹³ and (2) an executive commercial agreement, in the form of an exchange of notes, whereby the United States agrees to grant unconditional most-favored-nation treatment, and the USSR, on its part, undertakes to "increase substantially the amount of purchases in the United States."⁹⁴ Considerable study has been given in the Division of Commercial Policy to the preparation of a draft of a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation which might be acceptable from the point of view of the United States and the USSR. As a result of this study, it is hoped that a preliminary draft of such a treaty will be available for study by the Department of State and other Departments of the Government concerned. Many changes have been made in the language of some provisions which would normally be included by the United States in drafts of such treaties designed for conclusion with governments whose economic system is based primarily on the principles of private enterprise. Some changes have been made to obtain for Americans in the Soviet Union rights and privileges which are considered to be of primary importance in the development of better relations between the two countries. One of these provisions gives American students broad rights as to entering, traveling and residing in the Soviet Union in order to engage in professional or academic study or research.

Some of the matters which are expected to be the subject of provisions in the draft treaty are the following: entry and activities of foreign nationals; status and activities of foreign corporations; participation in and operations of domestic corporations; pro-

⁹³ For the notes exchanged between President Roosevelt and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, on November 16, 1933, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 27 ff.

⁹⁴ These subjects were discussed in the negotiation of the commercial agreement effected by exchange of notes signed on August 4, 1937. For documentation on this negotiation, see *ibid.*, pp. 405 ff.; for text of exchange of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 105, or 50 Stat. (pt. 2) 1619.

tection, access to courts and commercial arbitration; visit and research [*search?*] of premises; real and personal property; industrial and literary property; taxation of persons and corporations; commercial travelers; religious, intellectual and mortuary activities; civil liability for injury or death; military service; commercial objectives; import and export duties and restrictions; customs administration; treatment of imported articles; exchange control; government monopolies and contracts; entry of foreign vessels, imports and exports in foreign vessels; loading and unloading of vessels; coasting trade and inland navigation; transit.

(C) *Commercial relations between private American firms and the USSR.*

The Department of State and the Department of Commerce are interested in the problem of developing commercial relations between American business firms and commercial organizations of the USSR. Since most private American businessmen are not well informed about the problems involved in commercial and other economic relations with the Soviet Union, an effort is now being made to coordinate the activities of the Departments of State and Commerce in advising American businessmen about these problems. It is hoped that as a result of this coordination this Government will, among other things, be able to obtain from American businessmen information about the commercial policies and procedures which the Soviet economic organs may be following. One aspect of this problem is the technical aid contracts which are now being concluded between American business firms and Soviet economic organs.

861.00/11-145 : Airgram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 1, 1945.

[Received December 7—9 : 06 a. m.]

A-316. The slogans of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party for the 28th Anniversary of the October Revolution were published on the front pages of the Moscow newspapers for October 28.⁹⁵

The content of the slogans and the order of their publication were substantially similar to those appearing during the war, with the

⁹⁵ To compare with the slogans for the XXVII anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution of October 25/November 7, 1917, see telegram 4197, November 2, 1944, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 926.

For text of President Truman's telegram of November 6, sent at 9:45 a. m., to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, on the occasion of the XXVIII anniversary of the October (Bolshevik) revolution, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 11, 1945, p. 768.

exception of appeals to front line troops, which were omitted. As usual, slogans given priority and emphasis were those to the Soviet armed forces and to "the great Soviet people, which has won victory over the German-fascist and Japanese imperialists".

The major differences between the October and May slogans are the omission of any mention of the "Anglo-Soviet-American Alliance", which was greeted in May Day slogan No. 6, and the substitution of the theme of success in socialist construction in the final slogan for that of increasing the "military-economic might" of the country. The "people" of the Allied countries are greeted in slogans 6 and 7, as allies of the USSR in defeating the German and Japanese "aggressors", respectively. The total number of slogans lauding foreign countries or peoples was reduced from nine (No. 6-14, inclusive) to three (No. 6-8, inclusive). One of the groups of foreign countries applauded in the slogans for the October Revolution Anniversary consists of Italy and other former German satellites. These countries are praised for having broken with the Hitlerites.

Emphasis upon vigilance in guarding the security of the Soviet Union from external attack is marked by slogans 5 and 12, addressed respectively to Red Army and Navy forces abroad and by slogans 9 and 10, expressing determination to prevent unnamed "aggressive countries" from disturbing peace and urging vigilance in preserving the peace which has been achieved.

The themes of reconstruction and consumers goods receive only slightly more emphasis than in the May Day slogans.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 Council/11-545: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 5, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 4:40 p. m.]

11577. Warner⁹⁶ indicates British official thought is divided on extent to which atomic energy question influences Soviet policy. One school, noting Communist line and recent Moscow radio broadcasts, believes Soviet leaders seriously concerned lest Anglo-Saxons use present monopoly as implied threat behind active policy in eastern Europe. This school believes maintenance of monopoly tends to increase Soviet suspicions of anti-Soviet trend in western countries. Other school, including Warner, holds controversy has little influence on Soviet policy, Soviet leaders knowing Anglo-Saxons have no aggressive intentions and being confident Soviet science can catch up in

⁹⁶ Christopher Frederick Ashton Warner, Counselor and Superintending Under-Secretary of the Southern Department, British Foreign Office.

reasonable time. This does not discount possibility of Soviet feelings that their prestige suffers from exclusion from the secret and consequent anxiety to avoid any sign of weakness in face of it.

No matter how much Communist agitation there may be for sharing secret, Warner does not believe sharing it would have any material influence on Soviet policy. He believes Soviet leaders much more concerned at Anglo-American pressure in eastern Europe, at American unilateral control of Japan and at Anglo-American insistence on broad, rather than Big Three, cooperation. He says he has become increasingly convinced Soviet obstructiveness at Council of Foreign Ministers was not due to any deep change in policy but was tactical and sprang from Molotov's or Moscow's surprise at Anglo-American insistence on these points. Reassurance on Anglo-American intentions in eastern Europe, solution of controversy over control of Japan, and reaffirmation of continuing Anglo-American interest in close Big Three as well as broader international cooperation would, he feels, be more effective in promoting Soviet desire to end deadlock.

Reassurance in regard to eastern Europe need not mean relaxation of pressure, which is having effect. Soviet Govt naturally prefers to achieve its ends within sugar coating of eastern and democratic appearances. Attainment of Soviet ends in eastern Europe has lately encountered some difficulties, including decline of prestige in various areas due to gleaning by and conduct of Red troops. In Poland, for example, Soviet Govt is approaching dilemma between using force and yielding ground. Soviets would be most reluctant to resort to force and Warner believes continuation of quiet but firm pressure may well produce effective results.

Sent Dept; repeated to Moscow as 379.

WINANT

862.01/11-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 5, 1945.

[Received November 5—7:20 p. m.]

3764. *Izvestiya* November 4 published inconspicuous item announcing dissolution of "Free Germany Committee" and "League of German Officers".⁹⁷ Announcement read as follows:

⁹⁷ For documentation on the founding of the "Free Germany" National Committee in Moscow under Soviet auspices on July 12, 1943, and of the Union of German Officers at a meeting near Moscow on September 11-12, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 552-605, *passim*. Erich Weinert, a Communist German writer, had been president of the former organization, and General of Artillery Walther von Seydlitz, commander of the 51st Army Corps, had been president of the latter.

On November 2, 1945 near Moscow, session was held of National "Free Germany" Committee, together with "Union of German Officers" forming part of its membership. At this session following reports by President of National "Free Germany" Committee, Erich Weinert, and President of "Union of German Officers," Von Seydlitz, following decision was unanimously taken:

"National Free Germany Committee, and Union of German Officers adhering to it, having set as their goal unification of German anti-Fascists with USSR for struggle against Hitlerite regime and for democratic Germany, consider that under conditions of complete defeat of Hitlerite State and development in Germany of activity of democratic bloc of anti-Fascist parties, further existence of National 'Free Germany' Committee and 'Union of German Officers' is superfluous and resolve to dissolve National Free Germany Committee and Union of German Officers and to terminate publication of newspaper *Free Germany*." ["]

Sent Dept 3764, repeated USPolAd Berlin 116.

[HARRIMAN]

861.00/11-1545

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

No. 2259

Moscow, November 15, 1945.

[Received December 11.]

SIR: I have the honor to comment below on certain manifestations of internal discontent which have been evident in the Soviet Union since the conclusion of the war.

In general, it may be said that this discontent is the product of (a) the economic deterioration and social maladjustments which in any country result from war and invasion and (b) the nature of Soviet bureaucracy.

The enclosures⁹⁸ to this despatch suggest that the discontent is fairly widespread. For reasons to be discussed at the end of this despatch, it would be an error to deduce from the enclosures that it is also of such general intensity as to jeopardize the stability of the Soviet system. The current dissatisfaction does, nevertheless, probably result in impairment of the morale, efficiency and, consequently, strength of the Soviet Union.

The evidence of discontent may be divided into three categories: (1) that involving demobilized soldiers and sailors and troops transferred back to the Soviet Union from East and Central Europe; (2) that arising in trades union organizations; and (3) that prevailing among the general public.

⁹⁸ None printed.

[Here follow details of report.]

Conclusions.

Having viewed in some detail the evidence of discontent in the Soviet Union, an attempt should be made to evaluate this dissatisfaction in broad perspective. Such an evaluation raises and answers the question why Soviet discontent finds expression in resignation rather than revolt.

A number of factors in the Soviet Union nullify whatever impulse there may be to revolt. One is the ubiquitous strength of the Soviet control and repression mechanisms. The group now in power in the Kremlin got there through conspiracy and revolt; they know better than anyone else in the U.S.S.R. the symptoms and course of revolutionary conspiracy. In these circumstances, there is slight chance of serious organized opposition making an appearance, much less surviving. Another factor is the capacity of the Russian masses for long-suffering submission to authority. A third factor is that the people of the U.S.S.R. are now in the Soviet groove. They have lived for 28 years in the Soviet system. They undoubtedly desire modifications within the Soviet system, but few of them can now construct in their thinking a practical alternative philosophy of government. Finally, Soviet propaganda is an omnipresent and powerful pressure in the direction of conformity to and acceptance of the Soviet system.

Realizing all of this, the shrewd, inexorable and pitiless men who rule the Soviet Union can, if they wish, afford to overlook much of the popular discontent. They undoubtedly recognize that discontent means a lowering of morale and, consequently, efficiency. But discontent is not likely to jeopardize the stability of the system unless it becomes so general and intense as to disaffect the personnel of the state control and repression mechanisms.

The rulers of the U.S.S.R. are therefore able to handle (and have generally had to handle, since their advent to power) a wide margin of discontent—perhaps the widest known in any contemporary state. In the vital sphere of state planning—blue-printing the portentous future of the Soviet Union—the breadth of this margin enables the men who rule the U.S.S.R. drastically to limit production of consumer's goods and in direct ratio, to augment capital and military production and construction. All indications are that this is exactly what is being done—individual wants are being sacrificed to the aggrandizement of the economic-military might of the Soviet Union.

Discontent will therefore probably continue. If it approaches the boiling point of serious disaffection or if efficiency is dangerously impaired, concessions can be made in the form of a slight increase in

consumers' goods. Otherwise, discontent will be allowed to exist as a necessary evil attendant to the realization of towering ambition.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

EDWARD PAGE, JR.

First Secretary of Embassy

811.79661/11-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 19, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 19—4:20 p. m.]

3897. Disturbed by last sentence of your message 2356, November 16, 8 p. m., repeating Dept's 895 to Berlin⁹⁹ in which it is stated that in view of Murphy's¹ recommendations contained in his 993 to Department November 11, repeated to Moscow as 66,⁹⁹ discussions with Soviet authorities regarding transfer point at Berlin for Moscow-Washington service "may be further postponed".

Murphy's recommendations appear to be based on his statement that "it appears to be fairly obvious that the Russians do not want foreign airplanes over Russian territory". I wish to call Department's attention to the fact that this is not beginning to be fairly obvious but is a fact confirmed in writing by Soviet officials on many occasions during the past 2 years. The negotiations regarding American service to Moscow commenced at the Moscow Conference in October 1943² and have been the subject of continuing negotiations on the part of the Embassy with the Foreign Office and Military Mission with the Civil Air Fleet. At no time have the Soviets ever deviated from their position that no scheduled American service to Moscow will be permitted.

The present discussions regarding Berlin as a connecting point result from a request made in writing by President Truman to Generalissimus Stalin at the Potsdam Conference.³ In this communication he proposed that the connection which had previously been functioning at Tehran should be transferred to Berlin. This proposal has been accepted by the Soviet Govt in principle and traffic has been interchanged at Berlin during the past 3 months. The Soviet Govt now wishes to formalize the service that has been informally established. I see no value in postponing these discussions.

⁹⁹ Not printed.

¹ Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser for Germany with rank of Ambassador.

² For documentation on the tripartite conference in Moscow, October 18-November 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

³ Dated July 20; for text, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1167.

Such arrangements would not relate to American traffic from Berlin to Warsaw any more than they would relate to Soviet traffic from Berlin to Paris. If the Soviets refuse to permit flights across Soviet occupied Germany to Warsaw, we can refuse a similar privilege to the Soviets in their flights to Paris. This would of course only be effective if the British cooperated.

I have not as yet received reply to my protest to Foreign Office reported in my 3756, November 3, in connection with embargo of U.S. flights between Berlin and Warsaw.⁴

To Department 3897; repeated to Berlin as 155 and Warsaw as 60.

HARRIMAN

811.7661/11-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 21, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 7 : 30 p. m.]

3924. For Benton. Phillips is en route Washington under doctor's orders but will be available on his arrival to give our views here on information program generally and specifically regarding broadcasting in Russia.

The following are my preliminary comments:⁵

1. A transmitting station in Europe is almost essential on account of the poor reception in Russia. It is only possible occasionally to hear the Moscow programs broadcast from the US. I am glad therefore to learn that you are contemplating establishment of transmitter in Germany which presumably would cover eastern Europe as well as Russia in native languages. I wish also to emphasize the importance of having this station powerful. People in Moscow generally listen to the BBC⁶ rather than the US Army Forces station because it is stronger and more regularly understandable.

2. Since the Russians are broadcasting to the West in English they cannot object to our broadcasting in Russian. On other hand it's essential that our broadcasts be well edited or they will create more ill will than benefit. If it is definitely decided to establish a station which I strongly recommend be done I will gladly give detailed recommendations. In general, however, the program should be solid as well

⁴Telegram 3756 not printed. Telegram 918, November 2, 1945, 4 p. m., from Berlin, reported that the embargo, although it had been imposed, had been lifted (740.00119 (Germany)/11-245).

⁵Assistant Secretary of State Benton replied in the Department's telegram 2417, November 29, 1945, 6 p. m., expressing appreciation for "the constructive suggestions" in telegram 3924, and added: "We will canvass this field with Phillips immediately on his arrival." (811.7661/11-2145)

⁶British Broadcasting Corporation.

as interesting. All speeches of President, Secretary Byrnes and prominent American statesmen should be quoted in detail insofar as they affect Russia. This information is important to get to the Russian people as the Russian press selects sentences out of texts which give completely false meanings. In addition I believe that if the people got by radio a fair summary of these speeches the Soviet Government would be forced to report them more accurately. Soviet press should be watched carefully and information should be given to offset inaccurate impressions created. For example, the strikes in US have been strongly played up by Soviet press. From this a Russian would judge that American industry is almost at a standstill. Our broadcasts might state the number of men on strike in relation to total employed. In same way unemployment in US is exaggerated by Soviet press and one would think that men were walking the streets starving. Accurate information could be given of the unemployment benefits and the way we take care of our unemployed. In addition the Russians are intensely interested in everything to do with American life and all kinds of color stories, American music, et cetera, should be given. This is intended only as a rough outline.

3. Skillful editing of program is essential. This would require a competent staff in US and at the station well coordinated with your staff in Moscow.

4. Russian people have only a vague understanding of US, its life and objectives. Opinion is easily swayed by Soviet propaganda line. At the present time they are much concerned over what has been depicted as American aggression in attempting to block Soviet policy in eastern Europe and threat of atomic bomb. I believe it is of vital importance in our long term relations with Soviet Union that we use every means to correct false impressions and to attempt to block Soviet propaganda lines which build up fears and antagonisms to US. A broadcast in Russian is one of our best media for accomplishing this purpose. I should emphasize however that we should not of course criticize the Soviet Government or Soviet institutions. We should attempt to obtain our objectives by positive statements of facts about America and its policy.

5. Since the development of our relations with Soviet Union is unquestionably the most important problem ahead of us in international affairs and since the normal channels of information which exist to other countries are almost nonexistent to Soviet Union I urge that information program to Russia be given first priority in retention of staff and in budget.

HARRIMAN

711.61/11-2245: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 22, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received November 22—2:36 p. m.]

3930. At the theatre last night I had a most disquieting few sentence conversation with Litvinov.⁷ He told me that he was disturbed by the international situation, that neither side knew how to behave towards the other and that this was the underlying reason for the London Conference breakdown and subsequent difficulties. I suggested that time might cool the strong feelings that had been aroused. He replied that in the meantime however issues were developing. I again suggested that if we came to an understanding about Japan, it might clear the atmosphere. He replied that we would then be confronted with other issues.

I asked him what we, for our part, could do about it. He replied "Nothing". I then asked "What can you do about it". He interpreted this to mean himself personally and replied, "Nothing. I believe I know what should be done but I am powerless". He made it clear that he was speaking about the situation within the counsels of the Soviet Govt. I then said "You are extremely pessimistic" to which he replied "Frankly, between us, yes".

In evaluating this conversation it must be realized that Litvinov has been consistently during the past 2 years extremely disgruntled with his personal position, has been obviously antagonistic to Molotov, and the Soviet Govt has evidently been disregarding his advice.

In this connection all the reports I have recently received of conversations of Americans, including my own, with Soviet writers and other intellectuals, follow the same pattern "Why has America become so aggressive; why is she interfering with Soviet attempts to bring 'democracy' into the Balkans? She made no objection to the previous Fascist regimes. Why is she refusing to admit the Soviet Union into Japan? Why is she threatening the Soviet Union with the atomic bomb, etc?". From the Soviet press and the party line which has been promulgated through the agitators, the Russian people are much disturbed by what they have been led to believe is the United States policy of aggression against the Soviet Union.

Adding up the above, together with Stalin's comment that the Soviet Union may have to pursue an isolationist policy, it seems clear that since Molotov could not get what he wanted at London Conference

⁷ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov had been an Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union since 1943. Just before this he had been the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States from December 1941 until September 1943.

the Soviet Govt under leadership of his group has been pursuing to the fullest extent possible a policy of unilateral action to achieve their concept of security in depth. Vyshinski and other Soviets have attempted to stiffen the lines in Bulgaria and Rumania. Tito has broken with Subasic.⁸ The Chinese National Govt has been double-crossed and Manchuria has been turned over to the Chinese Communists and revolt has been fostered under Red Army protection in Iranian Azerbaijan, renewed pressure has been brought on Norway and Turkey for bases.

On the other hand Molotov has still indicated that he wants to come to an agreement over Japan if he feels he has got all the traffic will bear. Stalin has indicated that the Foreign Ministers should meet again. Soviet reports on UNO appear to be cooperating in establishment of this organization.

It would appear that Molotov's policy following the London breakdown has been to seize the immediate situation to strengthen the Soviet position as much as possible through unilateral action and then probably to agree to another meeting of the Foreign Ministers. We would at that time be faced with a number of *faits accomplis* and also entrenched Soviet positions.

I hope the above will be accepted only as our tentative interpretation of recent developments as they look from Moscow.⁹

HARRIMAN

761.00/11-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 27, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 5:20 p. m.]

3973. I have been attempting to obtain some understanding of the real effect of the atomic bomb on Soviet attitude and have come to the following tentative general interpretations.

It must be borne in mind that high Soviet Governmental and party leaders have lived throughout their lives in almost constant state of fear or tension beginning with the days when they were conspirators in a revolutionary movement. They attained their objectives through determination and aggressive tactics as well as intrigue and bluff. As they have never felt fully secure either for themselves personally

⁸ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1208 ff. Dr. Ivan Subasic, former Yugoslav Prime Minister, had been a member of the provisional government representing the former Royal Government.

⁹ In telegram 4040, December 3, 1945, 11 p. m., from Moscow, Ambassador Harriman reported that Litvinov showed himself as feeling "almost jubilant" since the Foreign Ministers were going to meet again at Moscow (711.61/12-345).

or for the revolution they have been constantly on the alert and suspicious of all opposition. This atmosphere continued throughout the period when they seized control of the Government and faced internal and external forces attempting to expel them. They feared capitalistic encirclement and dissension within the ranks of the party, leading to two ruthless purges: and later when Hitler came to power¹⁰ they faced the menace of German aggression. The invasion came¹¹ and all but destroyed them. When the tide of the war turned, there must have been a feeling of tremendous relief. With victory came confidence in the power of the Red Army and in their control at home, giving them for the first time a sense of security for themselves personally and for the revolution that they have never had before.

It will be recalled that in September 1941, Stalin told me¹² that he was under no illusions, the Russian people were fighting as they always had "for their homeland, not for us", meaning the Communist Party. He would never make such a statement today. The war has assisted in the consolidation of the revolution in Russia. They determined the Red Army should be kept strong and industry developed to support it so that no power on earth could threaten the Soviet Union again. Political steps were taken to obtain defense in depth, disregarding the interests and desires of other peoples. The strength of the Red Army would ensure that these policies could be carried out regardless of opposition.

Suddenly the atomic bomb appeared and they recognized that it was an offset to the power of the Red Army. This must have revived their old feeling of insecurity. They could no longer be absolutely sure that they could obtain their objectives without interference. As a result it would seem that they have returned to their tactics of obtaining their objectives through aggressiveness and intrigue. It is revealing that in early September in the Bulgarian elections campaign the Communist Party used posters to the effect that "we are not afraid of the atomic bomb". This attitude partially explains Motolov's aggressiveness in London. I have confirmation of this from a former member of the Communist Party. It is not without significance that Molotov, in his November 7th [6th] speech bragged about bigger and better weapons. The Russian people have been aroused to feel that they must face again an antagonistic world. American imperialism is included as a threat to the Soviet Union.

¹⁰ Adolf Hitler became German Chancellor on January 30, 1933, and Chief of State on August 2, 1934.

¹¹ June 22, 1941.

¹² Ambassador Harriman then was President Roosevelt's special representative to facilitate material aid to the British Empire and was on a mission to the Soviet Union. For documentation on this mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 825-851, *passim*.

This message is in no sense intended to suggest any course of action but only as a partial explanation of the strange psychological effect of the atomic bomb on the behavior of the Soviet leaders.¹³

HARRIMAN

711.61/11-2245

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)*¹⁴

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1945.

[Subject:] Suggested Frank Discussion with Stalin over American-Soviet Political and Economic Problems.

In view of the continued unilateral actions being taken by the Soviet Government in various areas of the world (Iran, China, Korea, Balkans, etc.) which add to the public misgivings in the United States and elsewhere as to the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Government, and in view of the fact that these actions tend to drive our respective countries in opposite directions, it is believed that it would be most helpful to take the opportunity of Ambassador Harriman's impending departure to have him discuss these disquieting developments with Stalin. Mr. Harriman could explain that before returning to the United States¹⁵ he felt that he would like to review in a most frank manner the favorable developments and differences which have taken place during his tour in the Soviet Union in an effort to clarify our respective positions. Such a step is further indicated on the basis of Mr. Harriman's recent conversation with Litvinov who expressed anxiety over the deterioration in our relations (Moscow's 3930, November 22).

Ambassador Harriman should be instructed to reiterate our wholehearted desire to cooperate with the Soviet Government. He should

¹³ The Consul General at Vladivostok, O. Edmund Clubb, advised the Department in telegram 104, November 14, 1945, that the local diplomatic representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Dmitry Mikhailovich Ryzhkov, had inquired whether he could be supplied with any pictures treating the subject of the atomic bomb. The Consul General was of the opinion that this request was so direct that it "would seem to indicate that Soviet representatives and agents everywhere may have been instructed somewhat urgently to obtain from every source possible all available information which would be sifted for clue to desired secret by Soviet scientists." (811.2423/11-1445)

¹⁴ Addressed to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, John D. Hickerson, and to the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. Mr. Hickerson wrote a notation as follows: "I agree that it would be advisable for Harriman to have a talk along these general lines with Stalin unless our position on these matters reaches the Russians on a higher level. Harriman is in a good position to be used for this purpose. J. D. H."

¹⁵ Ambassador Harriman left Moscow by train for Bucharest at 11 p. m., December 28, en route home; his resignation was accepted by President Truman on February 14, 1946, and his nomination as Ambassador to the United Kingdom was confirmed by the Senate on March 27, 1946.

frankly explain, however, that since the Yalta conference the Soviet Government has taken several unilateral steps which have been contrary to the letter and spirit of most of the agreements reached for the handling of the many political and economic problems arising in the post-war period. The Ambassador should point out that while the Soviet Government professes to desire to cooperate with the United States Government in all matters, it has not, in all frankness, given any important concrete evidence to confirm this desire. On the contrary, it has taken steps which make it difficult, if not impossible, for the United States Government to convince the American people that it is in fact the desire of the Soviet Government to reach mutually satisfactory agreements in the political and economic fields.

In this connection, the Ambassador should be instructed to point out the many specific examples of Soviet unilateral action, such as the establishment of the Groza Government, the refusal to assist in assuring the holding of democratic elections in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the unilateral trade arrangements made with Eastern European countries, the situation developing in Manchuria and Korea, the failure to reach a uniform policy regarding Germany, etc. It might be well for the Ambassador to tell Stalin quite frankly that we are fully aware of the continued activities of the Comintern, despite the fact that technically it has been dissolved, and explain to him that these continued activities make it almost impossible for us to cooperate wholeheartedly with the Soviet Government.

The Ambassador should also be instructed to tell Stalin that he would appreciate receiving from him his most frank opinion as to what actions he feels the United States Government has taken which the Soviet Government feels have made it difficult to reach mutually satisfactory agreements and understandings.

In such a discussion the Ambassador should be instructed to point out in a most frank manner that it is difficult to see how, if the Soviet Government persists in taking unilateral action in many areas in the world, it will be possible to interpret these actions other than as concrete indications of a policy of non-cooperation which can only lead to further distrust on all sides and might bring about most unfortunate and undesired results. In explaining this, the Ambassador should point out that if this is the policy the Soviet Government is intent on following, despite our desires to the contrary, we of course must take cognizance of it and act accordingly.

The Soviet Government is fully aware of our point of view in regard to the many differences which have arisen between our two governments since we have in almost every case expressed our point of view in regard to developments as they arose. Ambassador Harri- man has presented the American point of view to the Soviet Govern-

ment in the last two years and therefore it is felt that it would be most appropriate and opportune for him just prior to his departure to have such a talk with Stalin and make an earnest effort to get to the heart of the problem in the hope that he can convince the Soviet Government of our sincerity and explain to Stalin that if the Soviet Government continues on its present path, there is little possibility of our reaching a sound, lasting and fundamental basis in our relations. It is felt we would lose nothing by making this effort. On the contrary, the fact that Mr. Harriman has enjoyed a somewhat unique position in having dealt directly with Stalin more than most other foreigners, offers an excellent opportunity for him to speak most frankly with Stalin on these subjects.

E[LBRIDGE] D[URBROW]

811.79661/11-1945 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1945—3 p. m.

2408. Reurtel 3897, Nov 19, repeated to Berlin as 155 and Warsaw as 60.

First. Dept appreciates receiving detailed info re interchange traffic at Berlin contained in your airgram A-313 Oct 29.¹⁶ Advice previously furnished had indicated that problem was being discussed at Berlin and that effective interchange had not been achieved due to failure secure Soviet participation in discussions. Dept concurs in proposed course whereby General Ritchie¹⁷ will not press for meeting with Astakhov¹⁸ as long as present service between Moscow and Berlin continues to work on satisfactory basis. This presumes that no further communication from Soviets re interchange has been received.¹⁹

Second. The routes over which the US desires to have its commercial air transport enterprises operate services are clearly stated

¹⁶ Not printed, but see telegram 3639, October 23, 5 p. m., p. 900.

¹⁷ Brig. Gen. William L. Ritchie, Army Air Forces member of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

¹⁸ Marshal of the Soviet Union Fedor Alexeyevich Astakhov, Chief, Civil Air Fleet of the Soviet Union.

¹⁹ In despatch 2375, January 17, 1946, the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) reported that a formal meeting was held between American and Soviet representatives on December 1, 1945, at which a draft agreement was submitted by the Americans. Although another meeting was scheduled for December 4, the Soviet representatives had it postponed and did not arrange to meet again in 1945.

In the same despatch Mr. Kennan summarized the existing situation in these words: "The route via Berlin continues to be used by American and Soviet travellers on the same informal basis upon which it started—there being no agreement on the number of passengers and weight of mail and cargo which

in the opinion of CAB²⁰ transmitted with Depts circular instruction July 12, 1945.²¹ Dept is endeavoring to conclude bilateral air transport agreements to permit the operation of these services with the Govts of countries involved (reurtel 3897). Negotiations are currently in progress with Govts of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Instructions have been issued to US members ACC²² for Germany and Austria to seek operating rights for US civil aircraft in those countries. Before regular operations by US carriers may be undertaken US law requires survey flights to be made and technical questions of operation settled. We have sought permission for such survey flights to be made even though negotiations for agreements have not been concluded. Pending the initiation of regular commercial air service the ATC^{22a} has been directed to operate services in addition to those required for occupation purposes where necessary to maintain communication with US Govt missions. For this reason, this Govt has sought to obtain authorization for ATC flights Berlin to Warsaw and from Vienna to Budapest, Belgrade and Bucharest as well as authorization for PanAm²³ survey flights thru the Balkans to Turkey.

Third: Dept understands Soviet Govt opposed to operation US aircraft over Soviet territory but would appreciate receiving a detailed statement of the efforts made by the Embassy in this connection including copies of correspondence exchanged for use if necessary in answering Congressional or other inquiries.²⁴ (Re para 2 urtel 3897). It also appreciates interest of Soviet Govt in flights over territory in which Soviet troops are stationed. It has assumed that in ex-enemy states permission for operations of civil US aircraft should be obtained thru Allied Control Councils temporarily pending signing of peace treaties. It has no record of official Soviet opposition to flights of US planes over such territory but has been advised that Soviet members of Councils deny authority to grant permission without approval from Moscow. Dept does not understand to whom Vyshinski refers as "appropriate authorities" (reurtel 3887).²⁵

will be carried during a given period by either party on its sector of the route. Service remains in general barely satisfactory—a little better than on the old Tehran route—though one completely unsatisfactory aspect is the charge to American travellers from Berlin to Moscow which is based on an exchange rate between the ruble and dollar of approximately five rubles to one dollar making this air travel very expensive. It does not take into account the official status of many travellers who in Moscow would be entitled to the diplomatic rate of twelve rubles to the dollar." (S11.79661/1-1746)

²⁰ Civil Aeronautics Board.

²¹ Not printed.

²² Allied Control Councils.

^{22a} Air Transport Command.

²³ Pan American Airways, Inc.

²⁴ Such a report was submitted in despatch 2375, January 17, 1946, from Moscow (not printed); received March 26, 1946.

²⁵ November 17, 1945, 6 p. m., not printed.

Fourth. It is apparent that no progress can be made until matter can be resolved with sufficiently high Soviet authority. Dept therefore desires you to reopen matter with Vyshinski vigorously. We desire reinstatement of a reasonable procedure for the clearance of ATC flights between Warsaw and Berlin and a similar procedure for ATC Balkan flights. (ReDeptels 2358 Nov 17 and 2387 Nov 23.)²⁶ We desire a definite statement of Soviet position as to where authority lies to grant permission for flights of civil aircraft to Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria and with respect to Soviet agreement or opposition to these operations.

Repeated to USPOLAD Berlin as Depts 952 to AmEmbassy Warsaw as Depts 301 to AmMission Bucharest as Depts 625 to AmMission Budapest as Depts 739.

BYRNES

861.646/12-445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 4, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received December 4—12:56 a. m.]

4048. Regarding atomic energy Soviet press has consistently held position that discovery of atomic bomb was hailed by Anglo-American reactionaries who desired to use bomb's monopoly by Anglo-Saxons to exert pressure diplomatically on USSR, while progressives in Allied countries urged sharing knowledge of atomic energy technology with USSR. Following significant examples of this line appeared in press past few days.

1. Trud survey on Trade Unions abroad November 30 quoted UAW President Thomas²⁷ in letter to President Truman as opposing belief that force alone could be best defense for US and reported that Thomas advocated international control over use of atomic energy and urged strengthening unity of Three Great Powers. Survey emphasized that progressive US workers were especially worried by policy adopted by US in connection with atomic energy.

2. All papers December 1 carried despatch telephoned by Tass²⁸ correspondent at Paris anti-Fascist Women's Congress reporting that US delegate Pinchot and British delegate Pratt-Clark had hotly protested against keeping secret discovery [and] utilization of atomic energy and insisted that discovery should be shared with Allied Nations for peaceful purposes, and that Congress supported this demand.

²⁶ Neither printed.

²⁷ Rolland Jay Thomas, President, United Automobile Workers since 1938.

²⁸ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union.

3. *Red Fleet* article December 1 "Struggle for Peace and Intrigues of Reaction" asserted that reactionaries wished to make disclosure of secret of bomb or participation in control over it dependent upon "fulfillment by USSR of certain conditions".²⁹

Sent Dept 4048, repeated London 617, Paris 434.

HARRIMAN

861.2423/12-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

WARSAW, December 4, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received December 5—8:08 p. m.]

630. Jakob Berman, Under Secretary of State of Council of Ministers and Polish Workers Party member in speech at recent meeting of Warsaw PPR (Polish Workers Party), declared that atomic bomb is not monopoly of one country. "Soviet Russia, leading in science, technical and social progress, is also in possession of atomic power."

Mieczyslaw Wolfke (see *International Who's Who 1944-45*) called at the Embassy recently and informed officer in strictest confidence that from conversations with Polish colleagues who had worked in an elaborate Russian laboratory near Moscow he had come to conclusion that Russians had been able to manufacture two or three atomic bombs. He said that Russian laboratory was magnificently equipped and that only factor which might limit success of experiments there was the quality of the personnel.

Sent to Dept as 630, repeated to Moscow as 97.

LANE

861.918/12-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 10, 1945—9 a. m.
[Received December 10—6:24 a. m.]

4112. American correspondents here inform me that without warning their stories are again being subjected to the same scrutiny and censorship which has prevailed during the war. Deletions are again being made in their copy and stories are being held up without explanation.

²⁹ The Military Attaché in Moscow, Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, believed that an editorial in the magazine of political opinion, *New Times*, for December 18, 1945, might be of significance because of the timing of its publication with the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow. He reported that the editorial said in part: "Responsibility for peace in coming atomic century is larger than ever before and peace loving nations should prove now they can collaborate on lasting basis. Will of Soviet Union for close international collaboration in interest of a firm peace and security of peoples is unshaken."

Zinchenko³¹ has been brought back as head of the Press Section and the same arbitrary attitude of the censors which previously pervaded has returned.

The only possible explanation which correspondents have given me in [*is*] that the Reuters representative had intentionally been "trying out" the freedom from censorship to see how far he would be permitted to go and had been filing stories which, though accurate, he knew would cause displeasure for example, on the activities of the NKVD³² (Soviet secret police) in restricting personal liberties within the Soviet Union and on the crime wave in Moscow.

During the month of freedom the stories of Randolph Churchill³³ who was in Moscow on a short visit were the only ones that had been censored and explanation had been given that he was not a resident correspondent.

It will be of interest to note whether this reversal of policy in Moscow will have any influence on the censorship of foreign correspondents in countries where the governments are dominated by Communist Party.

Sent Dept as 4112, repeated to London 625; Berlin 182; Sofia 143; Bucharest 172; Budapest 60; Paris 439; Warsaw 67 and Vienna 31.

HARRIMAN

811.20200 (D)/12-2145: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 21, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received December 21—1:35 p. m.]

4247. Dept's Dec 12 circular³⁴—Radio broadcasts to USSR. Suggest Department see my 3924, Nov 21 for Benton in which I discussed problem of broadcasts to USSR.

1. *Transcriptions.* Soviet radio and cultural authorities have evinced interest in receiving American transcriptions for use by Soviet radio stations. They desire only music not commentary. Therefore, loan or donation of such transcriptions can be considered as only limited "medium of information from the US to the people of our area".

2. *Receivers and outlets in USSR.* Statistics, if they exist, regarding various channels through which Soviet radio public receive

³¹ Konstantin Emelyanovich Zinchenko, Chief of the Press Section, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

³² Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.

³³ Journalist son of the former British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill.

³⁴ Not printed; it requested comment on the value of proposed radio broadcasting as a medium of information from the United States to the people of the Soviet Union (811.20200 (D)/12-2145).

broadcasts are not available to us. Our observation leads us to believe that most of the Soviet radio public receives broadcasts through amplifiers plugged into lines carrying Soviet broadcasts. It is most unlikely that Soviet radio authorities would put foreign broadcasts into these lines, particularly such as might have any propaganda value from standpoint of a foreign [government?] for practical purposes. It may be assumed that this system will not provide a channel for American informational activity.

Before war both long-wave and short-wave receiving sets were manufactured in USSR. We understand that while most short-wave sets were called up by Red Army during war, sets have now been returned to owners. Soviet press states that "several hundred thousand" radio sets are to be manufactured in 1946. There was no indication whether they are to be short or long wave. We surmise they will be both.

In addition, short-wave sets taken from Soviet occupied Europe are now being brought into USSR. These sets are in possession of army officers and upper and some of middle stratum of Soviet society.

As a generalization it may therefore be said that influential classes in USSR possess Soviet or foreign short-wave sets and that masses are dependent upon wired-in Soviet programs. It follows that foreign broadcasts reach Soviet officer class, intelligentsia and higher bureaucrats, but not masses.

3. *Broadcasts from USA.* Our Army Signal Corps officer here³⁵ states direct short-wave broadcast from USA would be unsatisfactory as reception would be poor. He suggests short-wave relay by stations in Central Europe and Far East of programs originating from USA. He states relays should be beamed to specific areas in USSR if they are not to be blocked by powerful transmitters in USSR.

4. *Programs.* Programming of American broadcasts to USSR should, of course, receive most expert and intelligent treatment. Soviet radio provides varied and high quality programs. As a result Soviet audience is a critical one. Therefore, American broadcasts to USSR must be well conceived and executed. Russians dislike too much levity and feel themselves cheated if spoken programs do not have a solid intellectual content. Programs should, of course, be in Russian language.

a. *Music.* In considering broadcast of classical music to USSR it should be remembered that music of this type provided by Soviet radio is first class. If classical music is included in American programs to USSR, it should be of top quality. But there is other music which we can broadcast with which Soviet radio cannot or will not compete successfully.

³⁵ Maj. Lawrence B. Roy.

American dance music (but not esoteric jive) and folk music is very popular with Russians. So far as we have been able to determine, Soviet citizens who have short-wave radios listen avidly to American swing programs. Two best selling records in Moscow now are American-style dance music by Soviet band. And such songs as "Tavern in the Town", "K-K-Katie" and "Polly Wolly Doodle" are rendered in Russian and are well known to all Soviet radio listeners.

A third form of musical program with peculiar appeal to emotionally-starved Soviet people is represented by songs of former Russian *émigré* Vertinsky, now in Moscow. His extraordinary popularity suggests possibility that if a Russian *émigré* can be found who can broadcast in song with real ability and distinction the poignant sentiments evoked by champagne, sables, and melancholy love, he will command an enthusiastic Soviet audience. As Vertinsky is probably regarded officially as debilitating influence, he performs only to theater and concert audiences, not over radio. We therefore have that particular field open to us. And because Soviet people in their austere Spartan existence yearn for escape and vicarious luxury, such programs would fill a psychological void. For reasons of policy, Soviet Government is reluctant to recognize or gratify its people's longing for plush obvious sophistication. Although Soviet Government would not welcome programs of this character, it cannot very well enter objection to them. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that, if such programs are undertaken, they should be most carefully thought out. Indifferent renderings of hackneyed Russian gypsy music, such as are common in New York Russian restaurants and Hollywood films, are worse than useless and would only invite ridicule. Also Russian classical music customarily on Soviet radio should be avoided.

b. Commentary. As Dept knows, Soviet radio does not hesitate to carry commentaries critical of various phases of American life and American policy. It is not suggested that an American program beamed to USSR should give equal reason for offense to Soviet official susceptibilities. It is suggested, however, that American news and commentaries should not be squeamish in approach to Soviet listeners. It is felt that American news and comment will command more attention and respect if it is straightforward and vigorous rather than delicate and noncommittal. Reasonable care should, of course, be exercised to make sure that such material is keyed to Soviet psychology. In view of tardy and taciturn dissemination of news by Soviet press and radio, any normally alert American news broadcast may expect to scoop Soviet information releases and for that reason if, for no other, will be listened to.

c. Cultural spoken material. Readings in translation of selections from American literature would be popular, as would translations of

suitable radio plays, particularly detective thrillers. As there is a growing interest in study of English language, English lessons by radio would probably have an audience.

HARRIMAN

861.50/12-2445

*Report Prepared by Mr. Thomas P. Whitney, Attaché of the Embassy in the Soviet Union*³⁶

[Extract]

THE SOVIET UNION IN 1945—AN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Military Expenditures and Capital Investment. The present Soviet policy of maintaining large standing armed forces, of maintaining a good sized war industry and production of war equipment, and of building a large navy, if continued as a permanent policy, will act as a brake on capital investment since manpower, raw materials and productive facilities which are assigned to the armed forces and their support, could otherwise be used in capital investment. In this respect Soviet leaders are compromising between currently available military potential represented by the armed forces and war industry, and future military potential represented by capital investment in heavy industry.

Size of Armed Forces. The eventual Soviet policy on the size of the armed forces and war production is not completely clear, but at the present time almost all physically fit men from 18 to 30 years in age in the armed forces and large sectors of war industry have not yet been reconverted for peacetime lines of production. It is clear that both considerable further demobilization, and much wider reconversion than heretofore completed must be undertaken in the near future if the rate of capital investment is to be accelerated as desired. But even when these further demobilizations and reconversion have taken place, Soviet armed forces and war production will probably be very large as compared with peacetime establishments of other nations, and a [*in?*] competition with the capital goods and construction industries for men, materials, and equipment.

Living Standards and Capital Investment. Another brake on capital investment and competition with it for manpower, materials and equipment is standard of living. Raising the standard of living in

³⁶ In transmitting this report on December 24, 1945, to the Secretary of State, then attending the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers, Ambassador Harriman stated that the report had been prepared at the suggestion of the Counselor of Embassy, George F. Kennan. Mr. Harriman added that Mr. Whitney was "an extremely competent economist with an excellent command of the Russian language."

the Soviet Union is not a primary current aim of the Soviet leaders. While they are not opposed in principle to a rise in the standard of living, economic-military potential must come first, in their opinion, and the standard of living of the Soviet people can always be raised later. However, standard of living in the U.S.S.R. was low before the war and has been much lowered as a result of the war. It has a very close connection with labor morale and labor productivity as well as with the general health and morale of the nation, all of which are also elements in military-economic potential.

Because of these considerations standard of living must be improved, but housing and the consumers' goods industries will, all evidence indicates, have a relatively low priority in Soviet economic plans and standard of living will certainly not rise as rapidly as gross industrial and agricultural production.

Atomic Energy and Capital Investment. Thus, summing up, Soviet economic plans must provide for capital investments in rehabilitation and reconstruction plus large new capital investments and also for a certain rise in the standard of living, at the same time that large armed forces and a respectable war industry are maintained. This is a very large task in itself and demands the continued mobilization of all resources, but it would be by no means so big if the U.S.S.R. were not facing another extremely urgent problem.

The U.S.S.R. is out to get the atomic bomb. This has been officially stated. The meager evidence available indicates that great efforts are being made and that super-priority will be given to the enterprise.

Capital Outlay for Atomic Energy. The manufacture of the atomic bomb will demand a tremendous capital investment. The manufacture of the capital equipment for the Soviet equivalent of "Manhattan Project" will absorb a very large part of Soviet manufacturing capacity particularly for electrical equipment and precision instruments of all sorts. The manufacture of the atomic bomb when added to the other ambitious features of Soviet plans will strain Soviet economy to the utmost.

External Economic Policy: Foreign Trade. These are the main features of the internal aspects of the Soviet economic plan. As for external economic policy the principal goal of the U.S.S.R. in the coming years is the consolidation of the Soviet bloc of nations of Eastern Europe and Asia. States in Eastern Europe now occupied by the Red Army or controlled by the U.S.S.R. in one degree or another include Bulgaria, Albania, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, the Soviet Zone in Austria, the Soviet Zone in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Finland, while in Asia, Manchuria, part of Korea, and the remainder of Sakhalin have fallen under Soviet influence. Regardless of political developments in these areas, it is evident that Moscow hopes to retain dominant economic influence.

Present Policy in Satellite Areas. At present, the U.S.S.R. is endeavoring by all means at its disposal to bind the economies of these nations to that of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, everything is being done to ensure a Soviet monopoly of the foreign trade of each of these countries. The devices being used include reparations payments, military requisitions, seizure of plants and equipment as war booty, and bilateral barter agreements, and special agreements on particular commodities. By these various means the U.S.S.R. has succeeded in taking over almost the entire export surplus of each of these nations. The latter are thus left without the possibility of exporting to western nations, and therefore cannot obtain foreign exchange with which to make purchases from western nations. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is influencing the internal economies of these countries. Programs of nationalization and government control of industry and transport are being inspired and supported by Moscow. The Soviet Government is also using its influence on these governments to secure a permanent interest for the U.S.S.R. in the economies of these nations and to deprive western nations of their investments there. This is done by means of expropriation measures, by seizures as war booty, and by discrimination directed with particular vehemence at firms and enterprises owned by western nations.

Effect on Soviet Military-Economic Potential. If the Russians succeed in this program of economic integration of these controlled areas with the Soviet economy, the perspective for the development of Soviet economic-military potential in the long run are immensely increased. Over a hundred million peoples are added to the two hundred millions of the Soviet Union itself for peace or for war, and tremendous additional natural resources will be at the command of the U.S.S.R.

Time Limits. Enough has been said to make clear that in both its domestic and foreign aspects, the economic program of the Soviet Union is very ambitious.

To execute it the Russians need time. The proposed Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-1950) will be only the first stage in the program and will in the main provide for the reconstruction of the devastated areas and of railway transport. If before the war the Russians estimated that it would require 15 years for the Soviet Union to catch up with present U. S. development, they must now reckon with an even longer period. And there is no reason to assume, as some Russians do, that in that period the United States will stand still.

Effect of Foreign Assistance. The economic program of the U.S.S.R. can be greatly speeded up by assistance from abroad. The Soviet leaders are as keenly conscious of this as anyone else and are greatly desirous of obtaining large credits from the United States with which to purchase machinery for their industry, and transport. The amount of equipment desired from the United States by the

U.S.S.R. (six billion dollars worth) would speed up the Soviet economic development by at least two years, and probably more. By means of this credit, the entire resources of the industrial and transport equipment industries of the United States would be at the service of the U.S.S.R. in order to break the many bottlenecks of the Soviet economy. In addition technical aid would be obtained which would suddenly advance some sectors of industry and transport by whole decades. This is an appealing prospect and it is no wonder that such a loan is desired. There is no advantage to be gained from belittling the significance to the U.S.S.R. of United States credits.

Absence of Foreign Assistance. There is also, however, no advantage to be gained from belittling the ultimate ability of the U.S.S.R. to carry out the economic tasks which it has set for itself even without foreign help. The Soviet Government is able to mobilize all the resources of the Soviet Union in peace as well as in war for the fulfillment of economic plans. If the primary problem at the present time is the manufacture of the atomic bomb everything else will be sacrificed for that end. If because of the ambitious character of capital investment plans it proves impossible to raise the standard of living while they are being carried out, the standard of living will be sacrificed to capital investment. The Soviet citizen cannot object to this program. He cannot even express dissatisfaction by emigrating. If he undertakes a slowdown, the piecework system will catch up with him and his pay and rations will be reduced. If even during the worst days of the war the Soviet Government was able to carry out a large program of industrial development, now in peace with much of the manpower, raw materials and industrial resources formerly assigned to the needs of the front available for the service of industry, agriculture and transport, the Soviet Union will be able to make considerable progress towards putting into effect its ambitious economic program. But without foreign assistance it will take longer. The longer it takes, the greater the comparative economic advances of other nations, and the greater the chances that it may be interfered with before completion by unforeseen factors, political, economic, or military. And who can say, in the Russian world, that he can foresee all the factors?

811.3361/12-3045 : Telegram

The Consul General at Vladivostok (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

VLADIVOSTOK, December 30, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 5 : 39 p. m.]

139. The following telegram has been sent to Moscow as 272 :

Upon arrival here last night of weather group from Khabarovsk comprising US Naval personnel on official mission, Soviet representa-

tives NKVD insisted on inspection their baggage despite protests Assistant Naval Attaché Roullard.³⁷

Embassy may consider that this exercise of local jurisdiction over an organized American military unit to be a breach of recognized international procedure meriting protest at Moscow. American position made the stronger by failure Soviet agents discover more than Russian books obtainable any bookstore and a few ruble notes.³⁸

Roullard is reporting matter separately.

CLUBB

CONCLUSION OF WARTIME ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE SOVIET UNION; THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 15, 1945; CONSIDERATION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT FOR EXTENSION OF AID FOR POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION AND CREDITS³⁹

861.51/1-145

*The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to President Roosevelt*⁴⁰

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During the last year I have discussed several times with Ambassador Harriman⁴¹ a plan which we in the Treasury have been formulating for comprehensive aid to Russia during her reconstruction period. We are not thinking of more Lend-Lease or any form of relief but rather of an arrangement that will have definite and long range benefits for the United States as well as for Russia.

Ambassador Harriman has expressed great interest and would like to see the plan advanced. I understand from him that the Russians are reluctant to take the initiative, but would welcome our presenting a constructive program.

³⁷ Comdr. George D. Roullard, at Vladivostok. The naval vessel, U. S. S. *Starr*, had arrived in the port of Vladivostok on December 27, 1945, for the purpose of evacuating the personnel of the United States Navy Weather Central of Khabarovsk.

³⁸ In telegram 67, January 8, 1946, 3 p. m., from Moscow, Chargé Kennan reported that he had addressed a letter to the Chief of Protocol of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Fedor Fedorovich Molochkov, and added: "In this letter I have stated that I could not find this action consistent with ordinary requirements of international courtesy either with respect to personnel of weather group involved or to US Assistant Naval Attaché and that I was informing my Government in that sense." (811.3361/1-846)

³⁹ For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1032 ff.

⁴⁰ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., sent on the same date a note to the Secretary of State enclosing a copy of his letter to President Roosevelt. Secretary of State Stettinius on January 2 asked the Assistant Secretary of State, William L. Clayton, to "recommend to me the position which I should take on behalf of the Department on this matter" (861.50/1-245).

⁴¹ W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

You will recall that at Quebec⁴² Mr. Churchill showed every evidence that his greatest worry was the period immediately following V-E Day. We have now worked out a Phase 2 Lend-Lease program with the British after two months of very hard work.⁴³

I am convinced that if we were to come forward now and present to the Russians a concrete plan to aid them in the reconstruction period it would contribute a great deal towards ironing out many of the difficulties we have been having with respect to their problems and policies.

If a financial plan of this nature interests you at this time, I would appreciate an early opportunity to discuss it with you and Mr. Stettinius.

I am sending Mr. Stettinius a copy of this letter.

Sincerely,

H. MORGENTHAU, JR.

861.51/1-445

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Collado)*⁴⁴

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1945.

Subject: Treasury Proposal Regarding Reconstruction Aid to the Soviet Union

1. The Secretary of the Treasury has written the President stating that he has a comprehensive plan for aid to Russia during her reconstruction period that does not involve Lend-Lease or relief but rather "an arrangement that will have definite and long range benefits for the United States as well as for Russia." He is "convinced that if we were to come forward now and present to the Russians a concrete plan to aid them in the reconstruction period it would contribute a great deal towards ironing out many of the difficulties we have been having with respect to their problems and policies."

2. Although the Treasury does not indicate the nature of its plan, I believe from talks I have had previously with Mr. White⁴⁵ that

⁴² The records of the second conference at Quebec between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, September 11-16, 1944, are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

⁴³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 31 ff.

⁴⁴ Addressed to the Director of the Office of Economic Affairs (Haley), the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton), and the Secretary of State. Mr. Haley made a notation on January 4: "I agree. B. F. H." Mr. Clayton on January 6 asked Mr. Haley to prepare a letter for the Secretary to Mr. Morgenthau and wrote: "I agree that the Secretary should ask the Secretary of the Treasury for details of his plan of financial aid to Russia and should say that he will be very glad to have representatives of the Department of State meet with representatives of the Treasury Department to carefully consider every aspect of this important subject" (861.51/1-645). For letter to Mr. Morgenthau on January 15 from the Acting Secretary of State, see p. 953.

⁴⁵ Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of Monetary Research.

the Treasury proposes to ask the Congress for a specific loan authorization of several billion dollars at 1 or 2 percent interest and amortizable over 40 to 60 years.

3. We have discussed credits to the U.S.S.R. a number of times with Ambassador Harriman and last spring, with the President's approval, instructed him to begin negotiations for a Lend-Lease 3-C agreement⁴⁶ covering certain types of capital goods necessary for war production. These negotiations have languished (see attached memorandum prepared for the proposed Big-3 meeting⁴⁷ background material.)

We also informed Ambassador Harriman⁴⁸ that the question of long-term reconstruction and development credits would depend on Congressional action with respect to the Bretton Woods Bank,⁴⁹ the Export-Import Bank, and the Johnson Act,⁵⁰ although our general policy would be, if so authorized, to extend such credits to the U.S.S.R. and other nations.

4. Legislative action has of course not yet been taken. A program of financial legislation is ready for discussion and clearance at the highest levels.

5. There is attached a memorandum⁵¹ analyzing Russia's interest in foreign credits which highlights the following points:

(a) Russia's war loss is estimated at \$16 billion of fixed capital or about one-quarter of the pre-war total. Inventory losses may total an additional \$4 billion.

(b) It is estimated that Russia with no foreign loans and only limited use of its gold reserves (estimated at \$2-2½ billion) and production (\$200 million a year), plus reparations deliveries, could reattain by 1948 the pre-war level of capital investment.

(c) Thus the U.S.S.R. will be in a position to take a highly independent position in negotiations regarding foreign credits, especially since \$2 billion in credits would only speed up reconstruction by some 3 or 4 months.

(d) Pre-war exports from the U.S.S.R. to the U.S. averaged only \$26 million annually, enough to pay for only limited amounts of capital goods, special machines, and know how.

⁴⁶ For text of proposed agreement, see telegrams 625-627, March 18, 1944, noon, to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1065. For text of Lend-Lease Act approved March 11, 1941, see 55 Stat. 31; as amended on March 11, 1943, 57 Stat. 20; on May 17, 1944, 58 Stat. 222; and on April 16, 1945, 59 Stat. 52.

⁴⁷ President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met at Yalta with Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, February 4-11, 1945. For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. Briefing memorandum not attached to file copy of this document.

⁴⁸ See telegram 1965, August 17, 1944, 10 p. m., to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1115.

⁴⁹ For setting up of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, see documentation on the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944, *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 106 ff.

⁵⁰ Approved April 13, 1934; 48 Stat. 574.

⁵¹ Not attached to file copy.

(e) The annual gold production could service about \$3 billion of credits at 4 percent and 20 years; or \$6 billion at 2 percent and 40 years.

(f) Russia may be expected to borrow only up to the amount which she is sure she can service; only if the terms appear satisfactory to her (she has demanded exceptional terms in the 3-C negotiations); and she will repay unless she feels it politically desirable not to do so.

6. Ambassador Harriman and the Department have been thinking in terms of completing the 3-C agreement, which might involve during one year of continued war \$500-800 million in capital equipment on a long-term credit basis, and discussing an Export-Import Bank credit of perhaps \$500 million at once and as much as \$1 billion eventually. Additional credit needs of the U.S.S.R. might properly be handled by the Bretton Woods Bank. This program could be handled within the authority envisaged in our legislative program.

7. We do not view with great favor Mr. White's suggestion of requesting special legislation for credits on special terms for the U.S.S.R. or Britain. The Congress is not likely to be willing to take the full responsibility for specific loans and their terms. (It fought shy of a loan to Finland in 1939-40 and we made it through the general powers of the Export-Import Bank.⁵² The special Chinese case of January 1942⁵³—right after Pearl Harbor—does not appear to be a satisfactory precedent.) Moreover, if we ask special consideration and terms for some countries we will be in an untenable situation with respect to others. It is to avoid all of these difficulties that the administrative mechanisms of the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank have been conceived.

8. It is recommended that the Secretary should of course ask the Secretary of the Treasury for details of his plan and indicate a willingness for the two Departments to sit down and consider this important subject.

861.24/1-845

The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]⁵⁴

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In confirming the receipt of your note of November 28, 1944⁵⁵ I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Gov-

⁵² See telegram 436, December 14, 1939, from Helsinki, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 1029; telegram 142, March 12, 1940, from Helsinki, *ibid.*, 1940, vol. I, p. 313; and telegram 85, April 2, 1941, from Helsinki, *ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, p. 17.

⁵³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, China, pp. 419 ff.

⁵⁴ The Russian original note is filed under 861.24/1-445.

⁵⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 1154.

ernment accepts the proposals of the Government of the USA outlined in your note concerning the signature of the Fourth Protocol.⁵⁶

The Soviet Government, taking note of the statement of the Government of the USA to the effect that at the present time it cannot bind itself to supply to the Soviet Government the coal mining and oil well equipment requested, hopes that during the implementation of the Fourth Protocol the Government of the USA will take all possible measures to satisfy the requests of the Soviet Union for the delivery of the coal mining and oil well equipment in question, having in mind the importance of these branches of industry for the conduct of the war against the common enemy.

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction that thanks to the measures taken by the Government of the USA the program of deliveries of aviation gasoline and alcohol to the USSR under the Fourth Protocol is near to fulfillment and the Soviet Government requests the Government of the USA to continue the delivery of aviation gasoline and alcohol during the second half of the Protocol period on the level of the actual deliveries during the first half of the Fourth Protocol.

In this connection the Soviet Government, having in mind the statement that the Government of the USA is willing, if conditions permit, to reexamine from time to time the list of deliveries for the purpose of increasing them expresses the wish that the appropriate authorities of the USA should regularly consider additional requests from the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission for the delivery of materials essential for the conduct of the war against the common enemy in particular certain types of non-ferrous and ferrous metals.

The Soviet Government expresses the wish that the Government of the USA without waiting for the signature of the agreement concerning long-term credit will issue the necessary instructions for the acceptance now of Soviet orders including those for that portion of industrial equipment which the Government of the USA does not wish to deliver under Lend-Lease on the basis of the agreement between the USSR and the USA of June 11, 1942⁵⁷ and for which the Soviet Government agrees to pay on the basis of a long-term credit.

The Soviet Government takes note of the statement in Your note of November 28, 1944 to the effect that the Government of the USA considers it entirely probable that additional tonnage will be available for an increase in the program of deliveries from the USA to

⁵⁶ The Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol, covering the period from July 1, 1944, to June 30, 1945, was signed only on April 17, 1945, by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Soviet Union. The text is in Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, pp. 89-156. The announcement of the signature made in Ottawa on April 20, 1945, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 22, 1945, p. 723.

⁵⁷ Signed at Washington; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500.

the USSR over and above the 6,900,000 short tons envisaged by the Third Protocol ⁵⁸ which includes 6,544,000 short tons for the transport of supplies from the USA in accordance with the program of the Fourth Protocol (in this figure is included the 1,200,000 short tons for the transport of equipment and materials on the basis of the special request made to the Ambassador of the USA on October 17, 1944 ⁵⁹) and 356,000 short tons for the transport of supplies to the Soviet Union from Canada.

I can inform you also that the Soviet Government accepts the proposal of the Government of Canada to have the signature of the agreement on the Fourth Protocol in Ottawa. The Soviet Government authorizes the Ambassador of the USSR in Canada, Mr. Zarubin, to sign the agreement on the Fourth Protocol.

Accept [etc.]

A. GROMYKO

861.24/1-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 4, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 9: 15 p. m.]

29. At Molotov's ⁶⁰ invitation, I called on him last night. He handed me an *aide-mémoire* dated January 3 the substance of which was as follows:

"In Gromyko's note of October 31st ⁶¹ concerning the Fourth Protocol, it was stated that the Soviet Government would put forward for our Government's consideration its proposals for a long-term credit to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government accordingly wishes to state the following: Having in mind the repeated statements of American public figures concerning the desirability of receiving extensive large Soviet orders for the postwar and transition period, the Soviet Government considers it possible to place orders on the basis of long-term credits to the amount of 6 billion dollars. Such orders would be for manufactured goods (oil pipes, rails, railroad cars, locomotives and other products) and industrial equipment. The credit would also cover orders for locomotives, railroad cars, rails and trucks and industrial equipment placed under Lend-Lease but not delivered to the Soviet Union before the end of the war. The credits should run for 30 years, amortization to begin on the last day of the 9th year and to end on the last day of the 30th year. Amortization should take place

⁵⁸ The Third (London) Protocol, covering the period from July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944, was signed on October 19, 1943, by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union; Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, p. 51.

⁵⁹ List presented to Ambassador Harriman on October 17, 1944, was also enclosed in note from the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, October 30, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1150. List not printed.

⁶⁰ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁶¹ Note dated October 30, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1150.

in the following annual payments reckoned from end of 9th year: First 4 years $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ of principal; second 4 years $3\frac{1}{2}\%$; third 4 years $4\frac{1}{2}\%$; fourth 4 years $5\frac{1}{2}\%$; last 6 years 6% . Soviet Government will be entitled to pay up principal prematurely either in full or in part. If the two Governments decide that because of unusual and unfavorable economic conditions payment of current installments at any time might not be to mutual interest, payment may be postponed for an agreed period. Annual interest to be fixed at $2\frac{1}{2}$ [$2\frac{1}{4}\%$].

The United States Government should grant to Soviet Union a discount of 20% off the Government contracts with firms, of [on] all orders placed before end of war and falling under this credit. Prices for orders placed after the end of the war should be left to agreement between the American firms in question and Soviet representatives."

After reading the memorandum, I stated that there would be no use in my making any general comments thereon and that I would report it at once to my Government. I called Molotov's attention, however, to the fact that at the present time our Government has authority from Congress to deal only with that part of this proposed credit which concerns the period of Lend-Lease. I explained that this authority stops with the termination of hostilities and that thereafter new authority from Congress would be a prerequisite. I said that as he knew we had been trying for months to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government with respect to financing those requests which we had received from them for industrial equipment under the Fourth Protocol. I pointed out that the interest rate we had offered was $2\frac{3}{8}$ not $2\frac{1}{4}$ [%]. I stated that I did not recall the figures on price adjustments but it was not 20%.

Molotov stated that he understood my position and the necessity for my referring this matter to my Government but wished to know whether I personally considered the present moment appropriate for raising this question. I answered, speaking entirely personally, that I thought the moment entirely favorable for arriving at a final agreement about the Lend-Lease orders for the war period and for the opening of preliminary discussions on the question of credits after the war. I pointed out that it would take some time to work out an agreement and to obtain the required authority from Congress and that for this reason discussions should be begun before the war was over.

I added that I was sure that my Government would wish to divide into two parts the proposal advanced in the memorandum, namely, the Lend-Lease period and postwar. With respect to the Lend-Lease period, I was satisfied that our answer would be the final terms that had already been submitted to the Soviet Government.

Molotov agreed that of course the Lend-Lease questions must be settled and stated that an answer had been sent through Gromyko that same day⁶² but he thought that the remainder of the question

⁶² *Supra.*

should also be given consideration. The future development of Soviet-American relations he said must have certain vistas (prospectus [*prospects*]) before it and must rest on a solid economic basis. The question of the Lend-Lease credit under the Fourth Protocol was only a small part of the question now before us. The Soviet Government considered the present moment appropriate to raise the broad question of postwar credits in general. The Soviet Government was of course interested in this question itself but it seemed to him that American industry and the American Government must also be interested in knowing in advance what the wishes of the Soviet Union are in this respect.

I asked him over what period the Soviet Government would expect to obtain delivery of these 6 billion dollars worth of goods. He said over a period of several years, the limits of which would have to be determined by agreement between the two Governments.

In conclusion I reminded Molotov that it would take some time to study and work out a solution to this question. In answer to his remark about American industry, I called his attention to the fact that we were now short of labor in the United States and looked at the present Lend-Lease requests entirely from the standpoint of giving assistance to the Soviet Union.

I will send the Department in a subsequent cable my comments on this proposal extraordinary both in form and substance.

HARRIMAN

861.24/1-545

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1945.

Russia continues to be a major factor in achieving the defeat of Germany. We must, therefore, continue to support the U.S.S.R. by providing the maximum amount of supplies which can be delivered to her ports. I consider this a matter of utmost importance, second only to the operational requirements in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

The U.S.S.R. has been requested to state requirements for a Fifth Protocol, to cover the period from July 1, 1945 to June 30, 1946. It is desired that, within the limitations of available resources, every effort be made to meet these requirements.

Pending the formulation of the Fifth Protocol, it is my desire that every effort be made to continue a full and uninterrupted flow of supplies to the U.S.S.R.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

861.24/1-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 5, 1945—10 p. m.
[Received January 6—8:45 a. m.]

58. I have taken no action here on Department's cable 2856, December 19, 9 p. m.,⁶³ as I have not received an answer to my 4940, December 21, 10 p. m.⁶⁴ Part of my inquiries was clarified by the Department's cable 2871, December 22, 2 p. m.,⁶⁴ namely, that the last paragraph of the note handed to the Soviet Ambassador⁶⁵ referred only to action on our part if the Soviet Government had not obtained the prior approval of the United States.

Before discussing this matter with the Soviet officials here, I am anxious to know what our policy is in regard to transfers now being made such as flour to the Poles, trucks to Tito,⁶⁶ American equipment to the Polish army, et cetera, and our attitude towards requests of the "Polish Provisional Government." Is it desired that I should make inquiry as to the facts on any of these or other transactions which have come to the attention of the Department or Embassy?

HARRIMAN

861.24/1-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 6, 1945—10 a. m.
[Received 11:30 p. m.]

61. ReEmbs 29, January 4, 2 p. m. Now that I have recovered from my surprise at Molotov's strange procedure in initiating discussions regarding a post-war credit in such a detailed *aide-mémoire*, I believe the Department will be interested in receiving my reactions.

1. I feel we should entirely disregard the unconventional character of the document and the unreasonableness of its terms and chalk it up to ignorance of normal business procedures and the strange ideas of the Russians on how to get the best trade. From our experience it has become increasingly my impression that Mikoyan⁶⁷ has not

⁶³ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1158.

⁶⁴ Not printed.

⁶⁵ Handed to Ambassador Gromyko on December 19, 1944; *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1157.

⁶⁶ Josip Broz Tito, leader of Partisan guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia and President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia.

⁶⁷ Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.

divorced himself from his Armenian background. He starts negotiations on the basis of "twice as much for half the price" and then gives in bit by bit expecting in the process to wear us out.

2. Molotov made it very plain that the Soviet Government placed high importance on a large postwar credit as a basis for the development of "Soviet-American relations". From his statement I sensed an implication that the development of our friendly relations would depend upon a generous credit. It is of course my very strong and earnest opinion that the question of the credit should be tied into our overall diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and at the appropriate time the Russians should be given to understand that our willingness to cooperate wholeheartedly with them in their vast reconstruction problems will depend upon their behavior in international matters. I feel, too, that the eventual Lend-Lease settlement should also be borne in mind in this connection.

3. It would seem probable that the timing of the delivery of this note had in mind the prospects of "a meeting". I interpret it therefore to indicate that should there be a meeting the Russians would expect this subject to be discussed.

4. It would seem that the time had arrived when our Government's policy should be crystallized and a decision reached on what we are prepared to do provided other aspects of our relations develop satisfactorily.

5. It is my basic conviction that we should do everything we can to assist the Soviet Union through credits in developing a sound economy. I feel strongly that the sooner the Soviet Union can develop a decent life for its people the more tolerant they will become. One has to live in Russia a considerable period of time to appreciate fully the unbelievably low standards which prevail among the Russian people and the extent to which this affects their outlook. The Soviet Government has proved in this war that it can organize production effectively and I am satisfied that the great urge of Stalin and his associates is to provide a better physical life for the Russian people, although they will retain a substantial military establishment.

6. I believe that the United States Government should retain control of any credits granted in order that the political advantages may be retained and that we may be satisfied the equipment purchased is for purposes that meet our general approval.

7. I notice in the note recently delivered to the Department by Gromyko⁶⁸ accepting the Fourth Protocol the request by the Soviet Government that we should put into production industrial equipment "which the Soviet Government agrees to pay for under the terms of the long term credit". No reference, however, is made to the terms of this

⁶⁸ Note of January 4, p. 940.

credit and I assume therefore that the Soviet Government refers to the terms proposed in the *aide-mémoire* handed me. If this is correct, it would seem that the Soviet Government is attempting to improve our proposals for the 3-C credit under Lend-Lease⁶⁹ in this new proposal for combining the Lend-Lease and postwar credits.

8. Quite apart from the question of the postwar credits, I recommend that the Department inform the Soviet Government promptly, either through Gromyko or through me to Molotov, or both; *a/*that the credit under Lend-Lease must be segregated from the consideration of postwar credits; *b/*that the Department has already given its final term[s] for the credit under 3-C; *c/*that agreement must be reached on the terms of this Lend-Lease credit before any further long range industrial equipment can be put into production. From the experience we have observed in the length of time the Russians are taking to erect the tire plant and oil refineries there is little likelihood that equipment for long range projects now put into production will have a direct influence on the war, and unless the Soviet Government is willing to accept the generous terms of our offer of financing it would not appear that the equipment for these projects is urgently needed at this time.

HARRIMAN

861.24/1-645

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1945.

Subject: Soviet Request for Long-Term Credits

Molotov has presented to Harriman an *aide-mémoire* requesting from the United States six billion dollars in post-war credits to run for thirty years at an interest rate of two and one-half percent. In transmitting the text of the *aide-mémoire*, Harriman has also in the enclosed telegram⁷⁰ submitted his own reactions thereto which I believe you would be interested in reading in full.

Harriman indicates his belief that the Russians will expect this subject to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting⁷¹ and states his view that (1) it is to our interest to assist in the development of the

⁶⁹ See *aide-mémoire* handed to Ambassador Gromyko on May 24, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1087. For the Master Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed at Washington, June 11, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500. See also bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 708.

⁷⁰ No. 61, January 6, 10 a. m., *supra*.

⁷¹ Pencil marginal notation: "i.e., Yalta". For passing reference to long-term credits by the United States to the Soviet Union, see minutes of luncheon meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 5, 1945, *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 608-610.

economy of the Soviet Union, (2) the Russians should be given to understand that our cooperation in this respect will depend upon their behavior in international matters, and (3) the discussion of these long-term credits should be wholly divorced from the current lend-lease negotiations.⁷²

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

861.51/1-1045

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1945.

A \$10 BILLION RECONSTRUCTION CREDIT FOR THE U.S.S.R.

I suggest consideration be given to a financial arrangement with the U.S.S.R. to provide her with \$10 billion credits for the purchase of reconstruction goods in the U.S., with provision for repayment to us chiefly in strategic raw materials in short supply in the U.S.

1. The interest rate could be 2%, amortized over a period of 35 years. A schedule of repayments is attached.⁷³

2. The Russians have more than adequate means to assure full repayment. There are three principal sources from which she can obtain the necessary amount of dollars.

(a) Selling to us strategic raw materials which are in short supply in the U.S. because of our depleted natural resources. (See attached memorandum.)

(b) Russia will be able to develop substantial dollar assets from tourist trade, exports of non-strategic items to the U.S., and from a favorable balance of trade with the rest of the world.

(c) Russia has a stock of gold estimated at \$2 billion now and is reported to be able to produce from \$150 to \$250 million per year. These gold resources can be used to pay her obligations to the United States to the extent that her other dollar sources are not adequate.

3. An important feature of this proposal is that we will be conserving our depleted natural resources by drawing on Russia's huge reserves for current needs of industrial raw materials in short supply here. We would be able to obtain a provision in the financial agree-

⁷² In a meeting on January 9, the Secretary of State called the attention of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal to the significance that this *aide-memoire* could have in future negotiations with the Soviet Union. Secretary Stimson expressed the belief that our relations depended largely upon obtaining a specific *quid pro quo* from the Soviet Union and suggested that it should be thought through what the United States wanted in return for any concessions it would give to the Soviet Union.

⁷³ The attachments to this document are printed in *Accessibility of Strategic and Critical Materials to the United States in Time of War and for Our Expanding Economy*, Senate Report No. 1627, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 373-376.

ment whereby we could call upon Russia for whatever raw materials we need without giving a commitment on our part to buy.

4. This credit to Russia would be a major step in your program to provide 60 million jobs in the post-war period.

HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.

861.24/1-1145

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1945.

Subject: Fourth Soviet Protocol and Postwar Trade Proposal with the Soviet Union.

Reference is made to Moscow's telegrams nos. 29 and 61, January 4 and 6, respectively (copies attached for convenient reference). There is also attached a copy in translation of a note which has been received from the Soviet Embassy⁷⁴ indicating that, with certain qualifications the Soviet Government is prepared to sign the Fourth Soviet Protocol. Copies of these documents have been made available to Major General Wesson,⁷⁵ Division for Soviet Supply, FEA, and Major General York,⁷⁶ President's Soviet Protocol Committee, who have been asked to study the question and to make their recommendations as soon as possible. Both General Wesson and General York have indicated that they hope it will be possible to have a meeting with State Department officials not later than Monday or Tuesday of next week (January 15 or 16). I promised to let them know as soon as it might be possible to fix a definite time for the meeting.

The essence of the problem may be summarized as follows:

1. The Soviet proposals for post-war credits constitute an attempt to make applicable to all post-war trade and credits with the Soviet Union the terms and low rate of interest offered as a special exception under the so-called 3(c) amendment to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement. Since the industrial equipment offered under the 3(c) agreement could be justified as contributing to the Soviet war effort in the event it should be erected before the termination of hostilities against the common enemy, we were able to make this offer by using lend-lease facilities and lend-lease funds. For this reason only we were able to offer exceptionally low interest rates which are undoubtedly lower than those which the Export-Import Bank could offer on a straight

⁷⁴ Dated January 4, p. 940.

⁷⁵ Maj. Gen. Charles M. Wesson, United States Army, director, Division of Supply, Foreign Economic Administration (FEA).

⁷⁶ Maj. Gen. John Y. York, Jr., United States Army, Deputy Chairman and Executive, President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

post-war credit or that private banking concerns or the proposed international bank would be in a position to make available. Moreover, there are legal restrictions at the present time to granting straight post-war credits (the Johnson Act, etc.).

For the above reasons it will not be possible for us at this time to accept the full Soviet credit proposal. The most we can do in this connection is to reiterate our offer under the proposed 3 (c) agreement. Before making this offer again, it might be necessary to reexamine some of the industrial equipment which we proposed to furnish through lend-lease on a long-term credit basis in order to make sure that we can still justify putting into production certain of this equipment which will take a long time to produce. With this thought in mind, we should, in reiterating the 3 (c) proposals, emphasize most emphatically to the Soviet authorities that not only is this the only legal means by which we can now start production on industrial goods which have both a war-time and peace-time use but that if the 3 (c) agreement is not signed in the very near future it might be necessary for us to reconsider our offers on the larger items of industrial equipment which we might not now be able to justify as coming within the terms of lend-lease. Moreover, in view of the interest rate problem referred to above, it might be well in reiterating the 3 (c) offer to make it clear that for various specific reasons it might not be possible to offer straight post-war credits at such advantageous rates of interest.

2. The Soviet Embassy's note, agreeing, with some qualifications, to the signing of the Fourth Protocol, raises the question as to whether we are willing to sign the Fourth Protocol without obtaining the advantages of the proposals contained in schedule I of the suggested 3 (c) agreement. The question involved is whether we would be prepared to waive the advantages of a Soviet obligation to take and pay for specified items in the 3 (c) agreement which would be in the pipeline after the termination of hostilities. In other words, these proposals under schedule I may be classified as an orderly liquidation of lend-lease. By signing the Protocol without the 3 (c) agreement we might be subject to criticism if hostilities against Germany should end within the next few months and we had not made some previous provision for the liquidation of straight lend-lease material in the pipeline. If the war against Germany should last until the beginning of the Fifth Protocol year or if the Soviet Union should enter the war against Japan, there would be no reason why we should insist on tying the signature of the Fourth Protocol with the 3 (c) agreement.

If you concur that it would be advisable to have a meeting in the near future with the Lend-Lease Protocol officials and officers of the Department, I will gladly make the necessary arrangements.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

861.24/1-1345

*The Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration
(Crowley) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945.

DEAR ED: Ambassador Harriman's cables of January 4, 1945, and January 6, 1945, concerning Molotov's proposal for a long-term credit arrangement with the Soviet Union raise a number of questions which may be discussed with the President at the forthcoming conference.

These questions are so important I would like to suggest that you and I speak with the President about them for a few minutes.

I am enclosing a rough draft of the points which we would like to see made in the reply of this Government to Molotov's proposal and Ambassador Gromyko's note of January 4, 1945.

I know that you appreciate the importance of having the President informed of our united views on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

[Enclosure]

DRAFT REPLY TO MOLOTOV'S PROPOSAL FOR LONG-TERM CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND AMBASSADOR GROMYKO'S NOTE ON THE FOURTH PROTOCOL

1) Projects financed under the Lend-Lease Act ⁷⁷ are part of this Government's war supply program. They must be segregated and processed entirely apart from projects which may be financed under long-term credits for postwar requirements.

2) With regard to the question of long-term credits for postwar projects, this Government is now making a study as to the ways and means of accomplishing this. However, it will require some time to effect the necessary legislative enactments and a determination of the amounts that may be available for this purpose. These are conditions precedent to the formalization of a definite agreement. This Government feels that such long-term credits will be an important element in the development of postwar relations between the two countries and is pleased to receive from the Soviet Union at this time as much information as possible as to the magnitude and scope of Soviet requirements and terms of repayment the Soviet Government is prepared to offer.

3) The proposed amendment to the Master Agreement offered the Soviet Government some months ago ⁷⁸ provides the only method now

⁷⁷ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

⁷⁸ See note of December 19, 1944, to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, p. 1157.

possible for this Government to render greater aid to the Soviet Union than is being currently rendered under Protocol arrangements.

4) Within the authority contained in the Lend-Lease Act and taking into account the amount of lend-lease funds available at that time, this Government offered in the proposed amendment the maximum program of projects which could then be undertaken to meet the requirements of the Soviet Government. The terms of credit, the price of the goods and other conditions set forth in the amendment were arrived at after giving due consideration to the views of the Soviet representative, Mr. Stepanov,⁷⁹ who registered his non-concurrence. On more than one occasion it was indicated to Mr. Stepanov that the terms offered were final.

5) This Government does not understand Ambassador Gromyko's request that we should put into production industrial equipment which the Soviet Government agrees to pay for under terms of long-term credit, inasmuch as no agreement has been reached with the Soviet Government with respect to the terms of the lend-lease credit offered in the amendment to the Master Agreement. It has been and is the position which this Government must necessarily take that before any further long-range industrial equipment can be put into production under the Lend-Lease Act, agreement must be reached on the terms of the credit proposed in the amendment.

6) Much time has elapsed since the amendment to the Master Agreement was offered to the Soviet Government. Since then, the increased tempo in the war both in Europe and the Pacific has brought about greatly increased demands on the internal economy of this country in the categories of manpower, production facilities and raw materials. The diversion of these to the production of capital goods and semi-finished products to meet Allied requirements has become increasingly difficult.

7) To guide our future approach to these problems we should receive without further delay a definite indication from the Soviet Government as to its acceptance or rejection of the proposed amendment to the Master Agreement. The answer will have a definite bearing on the extent of Soviet requirements it will be possible to include in the war production program for the next fiscal year and on estimates of the required funds now being prepared for early submission to the Congress.

⁷⁹ Mikhail Stepanovich Stepanov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.

861.50/1-245

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury
(Morgenthau)*

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have studied your letter of January 1 to the President relating to the Treasury's plan for comprehensive financial aid to the U.S.S.R. during her reconstruction period. In this connection you will have received paraphrases of Ambassador Harriman's two telegrams regarding the recent Soviet request for a large post-war reconstruction credit.

We have been considering these matters and would be very pleased to sit down with you and members of the Treasury staff to discuss your plan and the Soviet request.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.51/1-1745

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the
Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1945.

Subject: Meeting with Secretary Morgenthau regarding Credits to Russia

1. Everyone is agreed—Harriman, State, Treasury and FEA—that the matter of aid to the U.S.S.R. in acquiring industrial equipment of war significance (that involved in the proposed 3-C agreement) must be separated from true postwar reconstruction credits.

2. There is general agreement between the Department, General York of the Soviet Protocol Committee, and FEA to proceed with the Fourth Protocol (Generals York and Wesson will draft a reply to Gromyko's note) and to instruct Harriman, as he has recommended, to inform the Soviets that discussion of true postwar credits must be separated from consideration of wartime programs, that no long term industrial goods can be put into production until the 3-C agreement is concluded, and that we have presented our final terms on the 3-C agreement (FEA is drafting on this).

3. We *expect* Treasury to suggest different 3-C terms—no interest, a schedule of deferred payments, and no concessions on contract prices.

4. The Treasury will probably devote most attention to the matter of postwar credits and will probably formally present a broad proposal. We understand that the proposal may involve a very large credit at very low rates of interest tied up with an option to buy petroleum and minerals from the U.S.S.R. over a thirty or forty year period. This will raise many questions as to the form of lending

authority which we will have to seek from the Congress, rates of interest and periods of amortization and their relation to the Export-Import Bank, International Bank and private operations, the amount of the credit and whether it should be made entirely by the United States or in part through international agencies, and the commodity and commercial policy aspects of the option arrangement.

5. It is recommended that today you hear the Treasury's proposal for long term credits and perhaps engage in some exploratory discussions, but that no attempt be made to reach any decisions as the matter involves issues touching on almost the entire range of political and economic foreign policy.

861.24/1-1745

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Lend-Lease Section of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Ferguson)*⁸⁰

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1945.

In the light of the discussion on January 16 with Generals Wesson, York and Spalding,⁸¹ and the probability of further discussions, I think a summary of the Russian lend-lease situation might be helpful.

It has been the practice for some time for the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada to agree upon Protocols with the Soviet Union covering specified periods of time. Under these Protocols, we agree to supply certain quantities of goods of various types on lend-lease. The last Protocol actually signed was the third, and the fourth has been under negotiation for some time. The latter covers the period through June 30, 1945, and substantial agreement has been reached with respect to the supplies to be furnished from the US. Procurement has not been held up pending signature.

The Secretary of State has received a memorandum from the President directing the early negotiations of a Fifth Protocol and requesting that nothing be allowed to interfere with the flow of supplies to the Soviet Union, so it seems highly desirable for the US to complete its Fourth Protocol negotiations without delay.

Last spring when the Fourth Protocol was being prepared, it was also proposed to the Russians that they agree, should the war end during the fiscal year 1945, to take on credit terms any supplies covered by the Protocol and under contract but not delivered prior to the end of war. The principal advantage to us of such an arrangement is that it provides for the orderly liquidation of the procurement program undertaken in accordance with the Protocol. At the time

⁸⁰ Addressed to the Chief of the Division (Collado) and to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton).

⁸¹ Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, Chief of the Supply Division, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union, was returning to Moscow.

this proposal was made, it was also suggested to the Russians that we would be willing to enter into an agreement covering certain industrial plants which we were not willing to have covered by the Protocol, provided the Russians agreed to pay in full for such plants on credit terms under Section 3(c). The exclusion of these plants from the Protocol arrangements was not because of any legal inhibition contained in the Lend-Lease Act. Whether goods are supplied on straight lend-lease or credit is irrelevant for the purpose of determining their legal eligibility under the statute. Whatever the basis of settlement, they can only be supplied if their procurement is found to be in the interest of our national defense. Of course, aside from the legal question involved, it is true that, as a matter of policy, we are inclined to be more generous in our interpretation where repayment is provided than where the supplies are to move under straight lend-lease. In the case of the plants, it was felt that the long procurement period involved and the length of life of the plants would have made them more politically unpalatable under straight lend-lease than the goods covered by the Protocol. This was particularly true viewed from the vantage point of last summer when the war in Europe seemed to be nearing its end.

The credit terms which we proposed to the Russians for the Protocol items not delivered until after the war (which were included in Schedule 1 of the proposed 3(c) agreement) and the plants for which the Russians were to be obligated to pay whenever delivered (which were included in Schedule 2 of the proposed 3(c) agreement) were identical. They involved (1) a thirty-year amortization period; (2) 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ % interest; and (3) certain reductions in price because of anticipated savings to this Government from renegotiation as well as willingness to give the Russians the advantage of the prices at which comparable goods were being sold at the time of delivery to the Russians.

The discussions last summer continued for many weeks, and eventually the Russian representatives returned to Moscow with what we flatly stated were our final terms.⁸² Silence descended on the matter and has been broken only recently by a note handed to Mr. Harriman. This note proposed a \$6 billion credit covering the war and postwar periods at 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ %, and provided that all prices charged the Russians should be reduced by a flat 20% to cover renegotiation, taxes and anticipated drops in prices after the war.

In view of the lack of authority in this Government to make any commitments with respect to postwar credits at this time, it is agreed that such portion of the \$6 billion proposal must be separated from

⁸² See telegram 2221, September 16, 1944, 7 p. m., to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1135. For text of proposed agreement, see telegram 2226, September 16, 1944, 11 p. m., to Moscow, *ibid.*, p. 1139.

the war financing problem. The remaining question is whether we will adhere to the 3(*e*) credit terms proposed by us to the Russians last summer or whether we shall counter with a new proposal.

The Treasury Department has raised the question of offering the Soviet Government an agreement covering the Protocol supplies undelivered at the war's end, as well as the industrial plants, on the basis of deferred payments with no interest and no price reductions (one possible exception being the 5% reduction covering anticipated renegotiation savings). The Treasury would probably want to set the period of deferment at less than thirty years so that the saving in interest would greatly exceed the concessions asked for by the Russians in their recent counterproposal.

Because of the history of the 3(*e*) negotiations with the Russians, any change in proposals involves a question of possible tactics, and if the Treasury suggestion were to be followed, it would be necessary to make it clear to the Russians that we were now willing to proceed on an entirely different basis than we discussed last summer. This might be done by saying that in view of their interest in postwar credits and our desire not to confuse such credits with the furnishing of war supplies, we would like to drop the credit idea and talk about a straight reimbursable lend-lease transaction. We would explain that the Treasury's proposal differs from other such transactions only in the degree of deferment of payments. We already have cash reimbursable arrangements for North Africa for civilian goods, but repayment is more or less current in that case, and we have arrangements with the South American countries for partial payments with respect to arms shipments deferred over a fairly short period.

861.24/1-1745

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Collado)*⁸³

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1945.

Subject: Aid to the U.S.S.R. in the Acquisition of Industrial Equipment

1. This memorandum is designed to provide background for the Secretary's meeting with Secretary Morgenthau on Wednesday at 3:30.

2. The relevant papers include:

(*a*) Secretary Morgenthau's letter to the President of January 1 indicating that the Treasury has a comprehensive plan of financial

⁸³ Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and to the Secretary of State.

aid for Soviet reconstruction, which has been referred to State for a reply.

(b) Ambassador Gromyko's note of January 4 indicating Soviet willingness to sign the Fourth Protocol subject to certain conditions.

(c) The President's memorandum of January 5 urging all possible effort to continue Lend-Lease deliveries to the Soviets, and the prompt negotiation of a Fifth Protocol.

(d) Ambassador Harriman's telegram of January 4 transmitting Molotov's *aide-mémoire* requesting immediate and post war credits of \$6 billion at 2¼ percent interest, amortization beginning in the ninth and ending in the thirtieth year, with 20 percent off government contract prices on items ordered before the close of the war.

(e) Ambassador Harriman's telegram of January 6 recommending that we tell the Soviets that discussion of true post war credits must be separated from consideration of wartime program, that no long-term industrial goods can be put into production until the 3-C agreement is concluded, and that we have presented our final terms on the 3-C agreement.

(f) Mr. Crowley's letter of January 13, suggesting a reply to Gromyko and Molotov which would in general follow Harriman's recommendations.

3. While we have not been informed officially of the Treasury's proposals, I understand that they will be substantially as follows:

(a) Separate 3-C from true post-war credits.

(b) Follow Harriman's recommendations with respect to 3-C but offer *no* interest, a schedule of deferred payments over say 30 years, and make *no* concessions on contract prices.

(c) Seek legislation (either specific or as part of expansion of the Export-Import Bank—I am not sure which the Treasury will finally recommend) to permit extension of a \$6 billion (or even at \$10 billion) credit at low (say 2 percent) rate of interest, and amortizable over 30 or 40 years. Justify the low rate of interest by an *option* to purchase in the U.S.S.R. for 30 or 40 years, and at reasonable world prices, petroleum, minerals, and other raw materials as a U.S. conservation measure.

4. A meeting took place Tuesday between Mr. Acheson,⁸⁴ Mr. Clayton, and others from the Department and Generals York, Wesson, and Spalding (who has left for Moscow) and Messrs. Cox and Davidson⁸⁵ to discuss the Fourth Protocol and related 3-C issues. It was tentatively decided:

(a) To proceed with the Fourth Protocol—Generals York and Wesson will draft a reply to Gromyko's note.

(b) Subject to general clearance and White House approval, to instruct Harriman as he has recommended—standing on our previous terms. (There was a majority agreement on the question of terms,

⁸⁴ Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

⁸⁵ Oscar Cox, Deputy Administrator, and Alfred E. Davidson, General Counsel, Foreign Economic Administration.

but I strongly urge that we adopt the Treasury's proposal unless there are overwhelming reasons arising out of the negotiating history. The Treasury terms would provide an excellent basis for a 3-C agreement with the British covering food and other materials in the pipeline, and a useful basis for the French and other nations. They would also provide a means of getting out of the present impasse with the Soviets.)

(c) To authorize Harriman, at his discretion, to offer the Soviets an interim agreement whereby orders could be placed for the long-term industrial equipment against cash on delivery. This agreement to be superseded by an eventual 3-C agreement. (This is similar to the interim French arrangements.⁸⁶) The purpose of this is to forestall Soviet criticism—of dubious validity, it is true—at the Big-3 meeting that war production is being delayed. General Wesson and Mr. Cox are going to try to draft on points (b) and (c).

5. With respect to 3-C, the only problem for discussion with Secretary Morgenthau will be the matters of terms discussed above.

6. The Treasury will probably devote most attention to the matter of post-war credits and its proposal which I believe will be as outlined above. It is recommended that the Department take no position until it has had a chance to study the Treasury's formal proposal. The following are some tentative comments on various aspects of the matter:

(a) *Authority*—We have generally felt that the Congress would rather grant general lending authority to the Export-Import Bank or other agency than to legislate specific credits. The China loan of 1942⁸⁷ was so special as not to constitute a precedent. We also question the desirability from point of view of relations with other nations of requesting specific legislation for one.

(b) *Terms*—We have felt that there would have to be some very distinguishing characteristic to an arrangement to make possible the extension of especially favorable terms. Our experience has been that when we reduced Export-Import Bank interest rate for one nation we were submitted to irresistible pressure to reduce them for all other nations. The Treasury staff admits the force of this argument (so does the Export-Import Bank but not the FEA proper) but feels the option purchase arrangement would constitute the distinguishing feature.

The whole problem of rates of interest is very complicated. The Export-Import Bank has been lending at 4 percent, a rate roughly equivalent to the best private market rate for best foreign risks—that is, the Netherlands. While some have advocated a lower rate of interest—since the United States can borrow at long-term at 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ percent—most have felt that the effect of such a rate on private lend-

⁸⁶ Signed at Washington, February 28, 1945, between the United States and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 455, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1304, 1307.

⁸⁷ Loan agreement signed at Washington, March 21, 1942; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 23, 1942, p. 263, or *United States Relations With China*, p. 510. See also bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, China, p. 490.

ing would be harmful, and that commercial banking support for the Export-Import Bank would be jeopardized.

The Bretton Woods Bank is to lend only when private lending "at reasonable rates" is not available. Moreover, most of its operations will require access to private market funds in which cases it must add a commission of 1 percent to the market rate—a total of at least 4 percent.

The problem is whether we can and should attempt to get Congressional authorization for special terms to the U.S.S.R. and perhaps a few other countries. We will have to consider this further in view of widespread differences of opinion both within and outside the Government.

(c) *Amount*—The Soviet request for \$6 billion is all that they can service at their terms with their current gold production. We believe that their gold production will thus determine the amount of borrowing that they will undertake. At more costly terms they would borrow less, and vice-versa.

The Treasury will suggest that the United States should extend the entire credit—for political reasons. Ambassador Harriman has stated that a smaller amount—say a billion—might suffice as a starter at least. The answer probably lies in the amount of specific or blanket authorization which the Congress will enact. If we choose a lower amount, the Soviets can be referred for the remainder to the Bretton Woods Bank—where the interest rate seems certain to be about 4 percent which they will probably reject.

(d) *Commodity option*—The first reaction of the commodity experts of the Department to this idea is not enthusiastic. The Treasury has a memorandum from Interior stressing weak points in our raw materials resources—petroleum, zinc, bauxite, etc.—and indicating a strong conservation interest in husbanding these and purchasing abroad. On the other hand the directly affected interests—petroleum and mining—are apt to be opposed, and in addition the British and others are apt to view the arrangements with concern.

The commodity option would probably not be as strong an argument with the Congress as the Treasury believes, and at the same time it does not appear to provide a fully distinctive basis for offering special terms to the U.S.S.R. To some degree, many other countries could offer us similar arrangements.

Finally, it is questionable whether the proposed arrangement is consistent with the Atlantic Charter,⁸⁸ our attitude towards the British on bulk purchases, and our general foreign economic policy. Coupled with especially low credit terms which might be said to constitute a form of export subsidy, it might be said to embody certain elements of "Schachtism."⁸⁹

(e) *United States interests in a credit to the U.S.S.R.*—

i. It is our general policy to extend credits for sound economic development.

ii. Our export industries will be aided, but this argument is not nearly as important as the Soviet *aide-mémoire* suggests.

⁸⁸ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

⁸⁹ Hjalmar Schacht, President of the German Reichsbank, 1933-39; Minister of Economics, 1934-37; Minister without Portfolio, 1937-43.

iii. We are desirous of improving overall diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. This involves, among other things, Soviet participation in the Dumbarton Oaks program;⁹¹ Soviet participation in economic collaboration such as the Bretton Woods proposals; Soviet participation in the United Maritime Authority; the establishment of a proper role for the United States in the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and eventually Germany; establishing a proper role for the United States in general economic relations with and the reconstruction and development of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkan nations; and establishing a proper basis in Iran.

iv. There must be considered several questions which have been outstanding for a very long time. These include the Kerensky obligations to the United States Government,⁹² and the claims of private American citizens who have had properties in the U.S.S.R. In 1934 the First Export-Import Bank refused to extend credits to Russia because of failure to obtain settlement on some of these matters.⁹³ In view of the much larger amounts of credit now suggested our bargaining position might be better. In general it has been the Department's experience that specific balancing of claims against credits has not been a successful diplomatic technique. In our dealings with the Russians it might be more successful than in the case of most nations.

861.24/1-1745

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Collado) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1945.

There is attached a background memorandum⁹⁴ for you and the Secretary in connection with the meeting this afternoon with Secretary Morgenthau on Russian credit matters.

As indicated on page 1 there are outstanding a number of telegrams, documents, and letters which require reply. Generals York and Weson and Oscar Cox yesterday agreed to start drafting on certain of these matters. I do not believe it necessary for the Department to prepare a reply to the Secretary of the Treasury's letter to the President (as requested by the President on January 11) until after this afternoon's discussion.

With respect to our talk yesterday about the Treasury's proposed terms relating to 3-C, I still feel the Treasury has a very good point

⁹¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 713 ff.

⁹² See memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Litvinov), November 15, 1933, *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 26.

⁹³ For negotiations to implement the agreements of November 1933 in regard to claims, credits, and other matters between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1934 and 1935, see *ibid.*, pp. 63-191.

⁹⁴ *Supra.*

which might be especially useful in connection with the British and possibly the French discussions, as well as an aid to the President in his forthcoming talks with the Russians. I have always recognized that the case for no interest was somewhat weaker in connection with the Schedule II items, the large industrial plants, but with respect to Schedule I items,⁹⁵ which have something of the nature of surplus property, I believe the case for no interest is excellent. In the British case there will be no items comparable with Schedule II, and if an agreement is reached it will probably relate only to foodstuffs and other materials in the pipe line. I would be surprised if the French lend-lease arrangements contemplated any complete industrial plants, but rather items needed to rehabilitate existing communications, transportation, public utility, and other war essential plants. Thus the interest-less 3-C would be particularly appropriate in the British and French cases.

It occurs to me that it might be possible to compromise with the Treasury and maintain a proper position for dealing with the British and French by applying the Treasury's terms to Schedule I of the Russian arrangement while keeping the present terms for Schedule II. This may seem unduly complicated. The present form of the agreement, however, provides entirely separate sections dealing with Schedule I and with Schedule II, although the same financial terms have been reproduced in each. It should not be impossible, therefore, to consider separate types of terms for the separate types of transactions.

861.24/1-1745

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State

PROPOSALS MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY TO SECRETARY OF STATE REGARDING POSTWAR TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

During the course of the conversation in Mr. Stettinius' office on January 17, 1945, Secretary Morgenthau and Mr. Harry White of the Treasury Department outlined the following proposal for postwar trade with the Soviet Union:

Mr. Morgenthau referred to the long delay which had taken place in connection with the negotiations for a 3(c) supplementary agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement by which it was proposed to make available at this time to the Soviet Union certain industrial plants which have both a wartime and peacetime use. He stated that he felt it was too bad more than nine months had passed since negotiations were started and still no agreement had been reached. He

⁹⁵ For schedules I and II, see text of proposed agreement quoted in telegram 2226, September 16, 1944, 11 p. m., to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1139.

attributed this to the fact that we had endeavored to bargain and bicker with the Soviet negotiators instead of making a clear-cut, very favorable proposal which would be considered by the Soviet Government as a concrete gesture of our good will. He added that he did not agree⁹⁶ with Ambassador Harriman's suggestions in his telegram no. 61 of January 6, 1945, which recommended that we remain firm in the stand that we have already taken in regard to the 3-(c) negotiations and indicate to the Soviet Government that this continues to be the most favorable offer we could make.

Instead of this course of action, Mr. Morgenthau stated that Treasury experts have been giving consideration to this entire question and have come to the conclusion that we should make new proposals for the 3-(c) agreement which would offer to the Soviet Union the same amount of goods on approximately the same terms except that we should charge them no interest on the credit extended, but on the other hand we should not accept any reduction in cost as proposed by the Soviet Government.

Because of the position we had taken with the Soviet representatives in the 3(c) negotiations, which was to the effect that we could not accept a rate of interest lower than that at which the United States Government could borrow money, and because of the fact that the delays in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Government on this question had been due primarily to the Soviet Government's reluctance to accept the terms offered, Mr. Acheson pointed out the following facts in regard to these negotiations:

He stated that early last year when representatives of the State Department, Treasury, Foreign Economic Administration, and other interested agencies were endeavoring to work out a scheme by which the Soviet Government could be immediately furnished under Lend-Lease industrial plants which took a long time to produce, had a long life, and which could be used for both wartime and peacetime purposes, it had been suggested that we might be able to offer these plants under Lend-Lease on a deferred-payment basis at no interest. This suggestion had, at that time, been vetoed by representatives of the Treasury Department who stated that we could not offer such long-term credits at a lower rate of interest than that at which the United States Government itself had to pay in order to borrow money. With this criteria in mind, there had been worked out a proposed agreement which was submitted to the Soviet Government on May 24, 1944.⁹⁷ Mr. Acheson pointed out that it was not until the Soviet delegate to the Bretton Woods Conference brought up the subject that we received any concrete indication that the Soviet Government

⁹⁶ Pencil marginal revision as follows: "He indicated that he was inclined not to agree".

⁹⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 1087.

was interested in the suggested agreement. Mr. Acheson then gave a brief summary of the protracted negotiations emphasizing the extremely liberal terms offered in the final agreement proposed by us which, however, the Soviet Government has not seen fit as yet to accept. Mr. Morgenthau indicated that, nevertheless, he felt that it would be advisable, from a good will point of view, to make a new 3(c) offer without interest. It was indicated that this matter would be given consideration.

Apart from this proposal for the immediate extension of approximately a billion dollars credit at no interest, Mr. Morgenthau referred to a memorandum to the President prepared by Treasury⁹⁸ which proposed the granting of an immediate credit of ten billion dollars to the Soviet Government in order to finance postwar trade. He stated that he felt that we should go beyond the suggestion recently made by the Soviet Government to grant a six billion dollar thirty-year credit at two and one-fourth percent interest by offering them a ten billion dollar thirty-five year credit at two percent interest with the proviso that the United States Government would be given the option to take in re-payment certain strategic materials, a supply of which was becoming greatly depleted in the United States. Mr. Morgenthau indicated that he felt that such a gesture on our part would reassure the Soviet Government of our determination to cooperate with them and breakdown any suspicions the Soviet authorities might have in regard to our future action.

Mr. Morgenthau suggested to the Secretary that they should both recommend to the President that he make such a concrete proposal to Stalin at the forthcoming meeting.

861.24/1-545 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1945—10 p. m.

115. In connection with the questions raised regarding lend-lease supplies to the Lublin Poles, Tito, etc., referred to in your 58, January 5, the Department is of the opinion that you should, in discussing the note referred to in Department's 2856, December 19,⁹⁹ bring up the question of the transfer of lend-lease supplies to the Lublin and Tito forces. In this connection, you should make it clear that in compliance with the principles set down in the above-mentioned note, we feel that the Soviet Government should discuss with us in advance the question of the transfer of lend-lease supplies to these forces or

⁹⁸ Dated January 10, p. 948.

⁹⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1158.

others and give us details as to the amount of supplies turned over to them with a clear indication of the use to which these supplies are to be put. You may state that we recognize that there will be cases where such transfers will be in the interests of the common war effort.

For your confidential information, the Department is of the opinion that when either Polish, Yugoslav or other forces are operating under the direct control of the Soviet High Command and for all intents and purposes thus acting as integral parts of the Red Army in the fight against our common enemy, we should raise no objection to the transfer of lend-lease supplies under these circumstances. On the other hand, if any indication should be received that these forces are using lend-lease supplies for political reasons, such as suppressing opposition groups in the countries concerned, we should immediately take the matter up with the Soviet authorities and inform them that in view of such developments we cannot consent to the further delivery of lend-lease supplies for re-transfer to the forces in question.

You should, of course, make no commitments in regard to lend-lease aid to the Lublin Government and should refer any requests or inquiries on this subject which you receive, either from Soviet or Polish sources, promptly to the Department.

STETTINIUS

861.24/1-2045

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY: I feel that it would be helpful, in connection with any discussions you may have with the President or Secretary Morgenthau, to have the following comments on the proposals recently made by Mr. Morgenthau in regard to postwar trade with the Soviet Union:

Proposed 3(c) supplementary agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement.

1. In regard to the Treasury proposal that we should now offer the Soviet Government the proposed 3(c) agreement without interest charges, it is felt that, if at this time we should change our ground, it, in all probability, would cause definite repercussions in other political or economic negotiations we may have with the Soviet Government. In this connection, we told the Soviet negotiators, in full good faith and with definite Treasury concurrence, that the last 3(c) proposals we made to them were our final offer, and that because of legal and other grounds, we could not grant them any better terms. If we

should now make the same proposals except for the exclusion of interest charges we could not help but give the impression to the Soviet authorities that what we said last summer was not true, and thus we might unwittingly kindle the fire of suspicion which they have had in the past as to our good faith. Moreover, by making this new proposal, we would definitely give the impression that we were most anxious, almost on any terms, to make available postwar goods to the Soviet Union. While we are naturally desirous to increase our trade with the Soviet Union to the maximum, and it is in our interest to do so, it would be tactically harmful to deepen the impression they already have that no matter what happens we are going to have to sell goods to the Soviet Union in order to keep our own economy going.

2. Apparently one of the reasons motivating the Treasury suggestion that the 3(c) agreement should bear no interest rate is tied with certain suggested proposals which may be made to the British and French providing for delivery of certain types of goods on a deferred-payment basis with no interest charges. I understand that in the case of the British these proposals only involve food stuffs which may be in the "pipeline" after the termination of hostilities and therefore would not amount to a great deal, and that the deferred payments, in all probability, would cover a comparatively short period. Moreover, the British are paying for all capital goods now delivered under Lend-Lease including many items offered to the Soviet Government in Schedule 1 of the 3(c) agreement (locomotives, freight cars, machine tools, etc.). In regard to the French negotiations, it is understood that Mr. Monnet¹ has suggested arrangements by which they would obligate themselves on a deferred-payment basis to compensate the United States for all capital goods furnished during hostilities as well as subsequently. It will be seen, therefore, that the propositions which may be suggested to the British and French are not comparable to the proposals made under the Soviet 3(c) agreement. In view of this, the French and British proposals would not appear to be precedents for the Soviet case.

For the above reasons, it is felt that we should accept Ambassador Harriman's suggestions that the Soviet Government be informed again that the proposals made in our 3(c) agreement are final.

Postwar Credits.

In regard to Secretary Morgenthau's proposal to offer the Soviet Government at the present time ten billion dollars at two percent interest coupled with an option to the United States to receive in repay-

¹ Jean Monnet, Head of the French Economic Mission in Washington.

ment strategic raw materials, it is believed that the following factors make it impossible at this moment to accept the suggestions:

1. Because of legislative restrictions, it is impossible to offer post-war credit to the Soviet Union until these restrictions have been lifted by Congress.

2. From a tactical point of view, it would seem harmful for us to offer such a large credit at this time and thus lose what appears to be the only concrete bargaining lever for use in connection with the many other political and economic problems which will arise between our two countries. Ambassador Harriman concurs in this opinion.

3. The Soviet Government itself has only proposed a credit of six billion dollars, and there is some question as to their ability to pay interest and amortization charges on a ten billion dollar loan as well as finance future trade after the initial purchases are made. Moreover, there is also some question as to the amount of surplus strategic materials which the Soviet Union will have available for sale abroad, and whether they would be willing to bind themselves categorically to furnish these strategic materials over a long period. Before making any proposals of this kind, careful studies must be made to ascertain the probable amounts of such strategic materials as might be available.

851.24/1-2545

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Clayton)*

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] January 25, 1945.

French Lend Lease

Russian Lend Lease—3 C credits

Secretary Morgenthau ² said that if we still felt that we should stand on an interest rate of $2\frac{3}{8}\%$ on these credits, he would not further oppose it.

Russian Long-Term Postwar Credit

Secretary Morgenthau said that he disagreed with the view of the President and the Secretary of State on this subject and felt that we should consider immediately a long-term credit of \$10 billion to the Russians at a low rate of interest and not condition it on anything else, and stated that he felt sure this is what we would do in the end.

W[ILLIAM] L. C[LAYTON]

² Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau was accompanied by Harry Dexter White and Josiah E. DuBois, Jr., Assistants.

861.24/1-645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1945—11 p. m.

173. Everyone here—State, Treasury, and FEA—is agreed that the matter of aid to the U.S.S.R. in acquiring industrial equipment of war significance (that involved in the proposed 3-C agreement) must be separated from true post-war reconstruction credits (your telegrams 29 and 61). Separate telegrams will be sent to you regarding our reply to Ambassador Gromyko's note of January 4, indicating that we will proceed with the Fourth Protocol; and instructing you to reply to Molotov's *aide-mémoire* with special reference to the 3-C agreement. The present message is to provide you with background information regarding Washington views on post-war credit possibilities.

A study prepared in the Department which will be sent to you for comment highlights the following points in Russia's interest in foreign credits:

[Here follow subparagraphs (a) through (f) as given in paragraph 5 of memorandum dated January 4 by Mr. Collado, printed on page 938.]

The Treasury has suggested a \$10 billion credit at 2 percent, 35 years, coupled with an option for United States purchases at reasonable world prices of petroleum and minerals from the Soviets over a like period.

Preliminary views of the Department are that such a proposal can of course be made only after Congressional action of some sort; that it would be preferable to obtain blanket loan authority rather than seek specific loan authorization for the U.S.S.R. or any particular nation; that the rate of interest entails many complications in our relations with other countries, with general Export-Import Bank operations, with proposed transactions of the Bretton Woods bank, and with private investment; that from a tactical point of view it would seem harmful at this time to offer such a large credit and lose what little bargaining exists in future credit extensions; and that the suggested commodity arrangement would probably not be as strong an argument with the Congress as the Treasury believes, would arouse the opposition of petroleum and mineral interests, would not provide a fully distinctive basis for offering special credit terms to the U.S.S.R., and might raise questions of general commercial and commodity policy.

The general matter of credits to Russia has been discussed with the President who has displayed a keen interest and believes that it should not be pressed further pending actual discussions between himself and Marshal Stalin and other Soviet officials. Meanwhile the Department would appreciate your further comments on the Soviet proposal and your views on the Treasury suggestion.

GREW

861.24/1-2745 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 27, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 8 : 30 p. m.]

250. In the matter of transfer of Lend-Lease supplies to third parties, discussed in Department's 115, January 18, 10 p. m., Ambassador Harriman, prior to his departure, still had certain points on which he wished further clarification before taking the matter up with the Soviet Government.

In the belief that he may wish to raise these questions himself on his return, I am taking no action at this time on the Department's instruction under reference.

Meanwhile I wish to invite the Department's attention not only to the proposed sale of grain to Finland but also to the decision, announced in today's Soviet press, to give 60,000 tons of grain to the city of Warsaw (see my next following telegram³ in clear). This decision is being given major propaganda build up in the Soviet press and no doubt in Poland as well. I am sure that Ambassador Harriman would welcome an indication of the attitude the Department would wish him to adopt on these specific transactions.

KENNAN

861.24/1-445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1945—10 p. m.

183. We will send you copy of Department's reply⁴ to note of January 4 from Gromyko concerning Fourth Protocol. Gromyko is being advised that we will shortly deliver to him the U.S. schedule to the Protocol in anticipation of signature in Ottawa in the near future. He is being further advised that we do not understand his request that

³ Not printed.

⁴ February 2, p. 971; text was transmitted in telegram 226, February 3, 10 p. m., to Moscow, not printed.

industrial equipment for which the Soviet Government agrees to pay under the terms of long-term credit be put into production, since no agreement has yet been reached with the Soviet Government concerning the credit terms already offered in the proposed amendment to the Master Agreement. We are also advising him that the Soviet proposals made through you for a long-term credit are being considered and a reply will be given through you as soon as possible to the Soviet Government.

With respect to Molotov's proposals regarding arrangements for postwar credits, you are authorized to reply as follows:

1. Lend-Lease can be used to finance projects which are a part of the war supply program of this Government, but it is necessary to segregate and finance such projects entirely apart from the financing of projects for purely postwar requirements under long-term credits.

2. This Government is now studying ways and means of providing long-term credits for postwar projects. It will be some time before the necessary legislation can be enacted and a determination made with respect to the amounts we can make available for this purpose. Until this can be done, no definite agreement can be formalized with respect to a credit for supplies of a purely post-war nature. It is the definite opinion of this Government that long-term postwar credits constitute an important element in the postwar relations between our two countries. Pending the necessary legislation, we will be pleased to receive at this time from the Soviet Union all possible information concerning the repayment terms which the Soviet Government is prepared to offer and the size and scope of their requirements.

3. The only legal authority which this Government has at the present time under which it could finance supplies for the Soviet Union from this country is contained in the Lend-Lease Act. The only method now available by which this Government can furnish greater aid to the Soviet Union than is being currently furnished under Protocol arrangements is by the proposed amendment to the Master Agreement which we offered some months ago to the Soviet Government.

4. In the proposed amendment we offered the maximum program of projects which we could undertake to satisfy the Soviet Government's requirements within the authority of the Lend-Lease Act and taking into account the amount of lend-lease appropriations available at that time. We arrived at the credit terms, the prices of goods and the further conditions provided in the amendment after giving full consideration to Mr. Stepanov's, the Soviet Representative, views. At that time he stated his non-concurrence. That the terms we offered were final was indicated to Mr. Stepanov on several occasions.

5. This Government can take no other position than that agreement is necessary with respect to the credit terms proposed in the amendment before any additional long-range industrial equipment (that is, the items contained in Schedule 2) can be put into production under the Lend-Lease Act. To avoid delay in initiating production on such industrial equipment which we offered under the proposed amendment to the Master Agreement, and to avoid any implication that our failure to agree to the Soviet proposals might interfere with the Soviet war effort, if you think it desirable you are authorized to express the

willingness of this Government to enter into the following interim arrangement within the limitation of the strategic and production situation, this Government is prepared to procure the items in Schedule 2 on the same general conditions which appear in the Protocol, provided the Soviet Government agrees to pay the cost of the equipment to the U.S. upon delivery and agrees to accept delivery. It will be understood that this interim arrangement will not prejudice the terms of payment which may be finally mutually agreed upon. Several other lend-lease countries have entered into a similar kind of interim arrangement with this Government.

6. Since we offered to the Soviet Government the amendment to the Master Agreement, many months have elapsed during which period greatly increased demands on our domestic economy in the categories of manpower, raw materials and production facilities have occurred because of the increased tempo in the war in Europe and the Pacific. It has become increasingly difficult to divert our domestic production of completed goods and semi-finished products in order to meet the requirements of our Allies.

7. A definite indication as to the acceptance or rejection by the Soviet Government of the proposed amendment to the Master Agreement should be received without further delay in order that we may be in a position to guide our future approach to the problems which confront us. The extent to which it would be possible to include the Soviet requirements in the production program for the next fiscal year and the estimates now being prepared for early submission to the Congress concerning the required funds will depend in large measure upon the answer from the Soviet Government.

The substance of this message is being made available to Ambassador Harriman⁵ and as he may have discussion on this subject, it is suggested that no action be taken on this message pending further instructions from him or the Dept.

GREW

861.51/2-145: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Canada
(Atherton)*

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1945—7 p. m.

13. We understand that Russian-Canadian negotiations on Mutual Aid Pact dealt with post war credits to Russia.

Department wishes to be advised whether this is correct and to learn further details on negotiations, particularly terms and purposes of credits offered, and their connection with Mutual Aid Pact.

Sent to Ottawa, repeated to Moscow.⁶

GREW

⁵ At the conference in Yalta.

⁶ As No. 206, with added request for information obtainable on subject.

861.24/12-644

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union
(Novikov)*

WASHINGTON, [February 2, 1945.]

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of the Embassy's note of January 4, 1945 relative to the Fourth Protocol, in which it is stated that the Soviet Government accepts the proposals of the United States Government as set forth in its note of November 28, 1944⁷ relative to the offerings and selections for a Fourth Protocol under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942.

Due consideration has been given to the specific additional requests made in the note under acknowledgment and there are given below the United States Government's replies thereto.

Your Government may rest assured that every effort will be made to meet your changing war needs in the implementation of the Fourth Protocol. In this connection I take pleasure in informing you that the coal mining program which has been submitted by your Government has been approved for procurement of such items as can be produced in a reasonable time within the provisions of the proposed Fourth Protocol. While it is impossible to determine the quantities of aviation petroleum products and alcohol that may be made available and shipped in future months, every effort will be made to meet your needs for these products. Non-ferrous and ferrous metals will receive especial consideration in accord with your Government's request but no commitment beyond that in this Protocol can be made at this time.

In regard to your Government's suggestion that, without awaiting final agreement and signature of the proposed supplementary agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, instructions be issued for the immediate acceptance of Soviet orders for the industrial equipment referred to in the above-mentioned supplementary agreement, I have to inform you that my Government cannot accept this proposal. In this connection, I must point out that it was explained to Mr. Stepanov at the conclusion of the negotiations for the proposed supplementary agreement that the draft agreement constituted the final United States offer. Moreover, it was again pointed out in this Government's note of November 28, 1944 that these items could not be put in production until the agreement has been signed unless your Government wishes to proceed without the financial assistance of the Lend-Lease Act. The machinery of the Lend-Lease Act is the only legal basis at present available under United States law by which such items could be offered and put into production on a credit basis.

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1154.

The proposals of your Government for a long-term credit to cover Soviet postwar requirements which were recently submitted to Ambassador Harriman are receiving careful consideration. A response to these proposals will be made as soon as possible.

Concerning the question of shipping, I have to inform you that while an effort will be made to ship the maximum tonnage possible, my Government feels that in view of the severe shipping shortage, it cannot expand the present offer to ship 5,700,000 short tons plus such of the tonnage as may be made available in connection with the list submitted on October 17, 1944.⁸

For your convenience and information there is attached a copy of the final draft⁹ of the preamble and United States schedule revised in accordance with the principles set forth in our exchange of notes and as it will appear in the proposed Fourth Protocol. Now that agreement has been reached between our two Governments, it is anticipated that the formal signature of the Fourth Protocol will take place shortly in Ottawa.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.51/2-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Canada (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

OTTAWA, February 5, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

6. Bankhead¹⁰ and Fox¹¹ discussed with Carl Fraser, Director of Mutual Aid Administration, inquiry transmitted your No. 13, February 1, 7 p. m. According to Fraser, there is no new development in connection with post war credits for Russia other than already subject of discussion with American Lend-Lease officials. Fraser suggests inquiry may have arisen as result of fact that Canadian authorities have accepted credit arrangements regarding certain Russian protocol purchases of equipment having long term value while similar credit arrangements have not yet been accepted by the United States regarding protocol purchases from the United States (the difficulty in the latter case being a matter of interest rate). Should your inquiry relate to some other point, please advise and we will discuss again with Canadian authorities.

ATHERTON

⁸ List not printed, but see note from the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, October 30, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1150.

⁹ Draft not printed.

¹⁰ Henry M. Bankhead, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs.

¹¹ Homer S. Fox, Commercial Attaché in Canada.

861.24/2-745

*Memorandum by Mr. Edward S. Mason, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)*¹²

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1945.

Subject: The Treasury Proposal for a \$10 Billion Credit to the USSR.

1. *The Treasury Proposal.* The Treasury proposes that a \$10 billion credit be extended to the Russians to finance purchases on their part of reconstruction goods in the United States. An interest rate of two per cent is proposed, and amortization would be over a 35 year period. It is proposed also that payment be chiefly in strategic raw materials in short supply in the United States plus gold production.

2. *Russian Need for Credits.* The Soviet Union is in a position to take a highly independent position in the negotiation of foreign credits. The success of Russian reconstruction will depend only to a very limited extent on foreign loans. Consequently, the question of credits probably offers a bargaining point of only limited value in the settlement of vital political issues, though it may carry some weight in negotiations of an economic character or of a subordinate political character.

3. *Effect on the United States Economy.* Purchase of \$10 billions in capital goods during the transition period would provide a healthy stimulus to capital goods industries in the United States and would facilitate the maintenance of a high level of employment.

4. *The Credit Terms.* The two per cent interest rate proposed by the Treasury is slightly below the average rate the United States Government is now paying on long-term debt and only half the rate currently charged on long-term development credits by the Export-Import Bank. The proposed rate is also considerably below the rates to be charged by the Bretton Woods Bank.

Since the proposed lending rate is below the United States borrowing rate, the loan would involve an element of subsidy. Strong pressure would certainly be brought by other borrowing countries on the Bretton Woods Bank and the Export-Import Bank to obtain terms as favorable as those given the Russians. If a two per cent rate granted to the Soviet Union results in a general reduction in the interest rates on inter-governmental loans, it will have acted as a strong stimulus to state socialism, by enabling governments to undertake developmental investment on more favorable terms than those available to private investors.

¹² Addressed to Mr. Clayton. Mr. Mason was also Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, of which Mr. Clayton became Chairman on January 25.

5. *The Repayment Problem.* The Treasury repayment schedule calls for payments rising to \$400 millions in the 10th year, \$500 millions in the 15th year, and \$600 millions in the 25th year. Whether the Russians will in fact be able to meet this schedule (ignoring for the moment the possibility of a special United States import program designed to conserve United States reserves of strategic materials) is entirely conjectural, depending upon the long-run trend of world trade. United States imports from the USSR never rose above \$31 millions in the 1930's. Assuming a United States national income after the war of \$140 billions, imports from the USSR may rise as high as \$100 millions, of which \$75 millions would be in forest products and furs. If to this sum is added Russia's current annual gold production of some \$200 millions, a total of \$300 millions annually in gold and dollars might be available for servicing the debt. This sum would be adequate only until the 8th year, and until then only if no allowance is made for current Russian imports from the United States.

6. *Special Imports for Conservation Purposes.* The Treasury proposes that we enable the USSR to service its debt by supplying strategic raw materials to meet our current needs while we conserve our depleted resources. It is suggested that a provision be written into the financial agreement "whereby we could call upon Russia for whatever raw materials we need without giving a commitment on our part to buy."

Such a provision in the agreement may hardly be regarded as a *quid pro quo*, since we should be able to buy all the strategic materials we need from Russia and from the rest of the world even if we did not make a loan to Russia.

A proposal to close down United States mines and wells as a conservation measure is probably politically impossible. The fate of the United States-United Kingdom oil agreement¹³ suggests the reception that such a plan would meet. Stockpiling of strategic materials imported from abroad would not be subject to the same objections, but the Treasury figures appear to overestimate the dollar value to the USSR of United States imports of strategic materials. The figure of \$80 millions annually for metals and metallic ores seems completely out of line; the estimate of \$50 millions for petroleum is equally hazardous, since there is no assurance that Russia will have a large export surplus; the estimate of \$10 millions for oils and oilcake is hard to understand, since we expect to have domestic surpluses of these products.

¹³ For documentation on Anglo-American petroleum discussions and agreement signed August 8, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 94 ff. Concerning revised agreement signed at London, September 24, 1945, see bracketed note, *ibid.*, 1945, vol. VI, section under United Kingdom entitled "Revised Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement Signed at London, September 24, 1945." Neither agreement was ratified by the Senate.

Russia is a principal producer of three materials (manganese, platinum, iridium) on the stockpile list of the Army-Navy Munitions Board. If we import half of the ANMB maximum stockpile figures for these materials from the USSR (or slightly more than Russia's normal share of the U.S. Trade), the total trade would be worth \$135 millions to the USSR. This is not an annual, but a total figure.

The Treasury may perhaps contemplate that we shall concentrate in Russia most of our purchases of strategic materials. If we choose to do this, it would not be difficult to provide the USSR with enough dollars to service the loan. The effect on our relations with other countries would, however, be most unfortunate. The reduction or cessation of our purchases (for example) of Canadian nickel and asbestos, Cuban manganese, Chilean copper, and Brazilian mica would raise serious political questions with these countries, and would at the same time involve us in a form of bilateral trading which we have consistently opposed.

7. *The Japanese War.* If the Russians declare war on Japan, they will probably continue to receive lend-lease shipments after V-E Day. As at present, many types of goods which would be shipped in the interest of increasing Russia's immediate military capabilities would at the same time help her to reconstruct her economy. Her needs for postwar capital goods imports would accordingly be altered.

861.24/2-1345

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Canada
(Atherton)*

No. 592

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1945.

SIR: There are enclosed copies of the final draft¹⁴ of the Preambles and United States Schedules agreed upon with the Soviet Government for the furnishing of military supplies, raw materials, industrial equipment and food to be made available to the Soviet Union during the period July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945 under the Fourth Soviet Lend-Lease Protocol.

You are requested to forward copies of the enclosed document to the Canadian Government indicating that it constitutes the exact text of the agreed preambles and the United States schedules to be incorporated into the final document to be signed at Ottawa by the United States, Canada, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Copies of this document have been sent informally to the Canadian Embassy in Washington.

You are authorized to sign the Fourth Protocol on behalf of this Government at the earliest possible date. Following signature of the

¹⁴ Not printed.

Protocol you should transmit to the Department the original official copy for the United States Government.

The Department is of the opinion that the publicity to be given at the time of the signing of the Protocol should be handled in Ottawa. You are authorized to discuss with the Canadian authorities the text of the press release to be issued at that time, and you are requested to make available to the Department in advance a copy of the agreed text in order that the Department may be in a position, if the Canadian Government concurs, to issue simultaneously an appropriate release in Washington at the time of the signature of the Protocol. In view of the delay which has taken place in the signature of the Fourth Protocol, it is felt that it would be advisable to include in the announcement regarding the signature a statement to the effect that the date of signature has in no way affected the flow of supplies to the Soviet Union which has been continuous since the expiration of the Third Protocol on June 30, 1944. Moreover, it is felt that it would be appropriate to include in the public announcement an indication that under the Protocol the Soviet Government reaffirms its determination to furnish raw materials and other supplies and services needed by the other signatories for the prosecution of the war.

There is enclosed for your information and possible use a suggested statement ¹⁵ on the Fourth Protocol which was drafted by the Foreign Economic Administration, Division for Soviet Supply. You may also suggest to the Canadian authorities that since the United States Government has already initiated discussions with the Soviet Government for a Fifth Protocol it might also be appropriate to include in the public announcement of the signing of the Fourth Protocol a statement that discussions are going on for the conclusion of a Fifth Protocol.

For your confidential information, the Soviet Government has not yet agreed to sign a proposed United States supplementary agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of 1942 under the terms of which we would furnish to the Soviet Union on a credit basis under Lend-Lease certain types of industrial equipment which it is felt cannot be delivered under straight Lend-Lease. In as much as numerous items have appeared in the press indicating that we were negotiating such an agreement it is felt that it would be advisable to make clear at the time the signing of the Fourth Protocol is announced that it does not provide for delivery of these types of plants. It is proposed therefore to have the Secretary at the time the statement regarding the Fourth Protocol is released inform correspondents for background purposes that the signature of this agreement will not mean that there will be placed additional large orders for equipment for delivery under the Fourth Protocol since the commitments assumed by the

¹⁵ Not printed.

supplying Governments are almost entirely contracted for under the working arrangement which has been in effect during the period since July 1, 1944.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:
WILLIAM L. CLAYTON

861.24/2-2045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1945.

The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Nikolai V. Novikov, called on me this afternoon at his request and left with me the appended sheets, marked 1, 2, 3 and 4,¹⁶ which he asked me to regard as an oral communication setting forth the comments of his Government on our note of February 2 concerning the Fourth Protocol. Mr. Novikov said that his Government greatly appreciated our proposal and desired merely to make these few proposals in connection therewith.

I said to Mr. Novikov that we would study these proposals and would reply to them in due course. Mr. Novikov said that he would be glad to come to the Department whenever we should send for him.

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.24/2-2045

Oral Communication by the Chargé of the Soviet Union (Novikov) to the Acting Secretary of State on February 20, 1945

1) *Credit clause.*

Concerning the supplies to the Soviet Union in pursuance of the Fourth Protocol of that part of equipment which the Soviet Government agrees to pay for according to terms of a long-term credit the Soviet Government as it was mentioned in the Memorandum handed to Ambassador Harriman on January 3, has in mind the realization of such supplies on the basis of a special agreement concerning the long-term credit not connected with the Agreement of June 11, 1942. It was the very agreement that was mentioned in Ambassador Gromyko's note of January 4, 1945, addressed to Secretary of State Stettinius.

In this connection it would be desirable to omit from section 3 of the introductory part to the group V "Machinery and Equipment" of the program of shipping and supplies by the United States the following:

"the terms of a proposed agreement supplementary to the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942, when executed, draft of which

¹⁶ *Infra.*

was transmitted for the consideration of the USSR by the U.S. on May 24, 1944."

substituting it for [*for it?*] the following:

"the terms of a possible agreement concerning the credit between the Governments of the USSR and the United States in the future."

With the same purpose it is proposed to include in the first paragraph of Article IV of the Protocol, after the words "by Mutual agreement" the following: "or with the terms of appropriate agreement concerning the credit."

ARTICLE IV

"The financial arrangements concluded between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States in connection with the supplies furnished in pursuance of the present protocol may be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, and with the terms and conditions of any amendments to said agreement which have been or may hereafter be concluded by mutual agreement or with the terms of appropriate agreement concerning the credit or the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may elect to purchase from the United States schedules of supplies for cash."

SECTION III OF GROUP V—MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT

Items designated by the symbol III in the following schedules totalling approximately \$481,807,000 represent supplies requested by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for its war production programs, which require a long period to produce, or to reproduce it [*if*] already constructed, and have a long period of useful life. Except as otherwise noted, items included under this paragraph will be subject to the terms of possible agreement concerning the credit between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States in the future. Items under this paragraph may also be placed on order without the financial assistance of the Lend-Lease Act. All items under this paragraph are also subject to the following conditions.

2) *Schedule of Supplies.*

It is necessary to ascertain whether we understand correctly that the schedule of supplies, outlined in Annex II, does not include quantities of articles of supply delivered during the Third Protocol period but unshipped from the United States by July 1, 1944.

From the whole text of the last draft of the Protocol as well as when comparing this draft with the American draft of August 25¹⁷ such a conclusion suggests itself; however, it would be desirable to introduce into the text of Annex II an appropriate direct provision as follows:

¹⁷ See paragraph numbered 4 of telegram 2066, August 29, 1944, 3 p. m., to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1123, 1126.

“Quantities of articles of supply, delivered during the Third Protocol period, but unshipped from the United States by July 1, 1944, are not included in the quantities mentioned in this Annex, provided however, that the shipments of the quantities unshipped by July 1, 1944, will be subject to the provisions of the first paragraph of the section ‘Supplies’ of the United States schedules of shipping and supplies.”

3) *Transitory Supplies.*

The Soviet Government, taking into consideration the statement set forth in the note of the Department of State that the shipping during the Fourth Protocol period will comprise a minimum of 5,944,000 short tons and the shipping from the Western Hemisphere to the Soviet Union during the same period will comprise minimum 55,700,000 short tons, including 356,000 short tons from Canada, — expresses the wish that the figure of minimum transitory supplies of 600,000 short tons be included in the Fourth Protocol in conformity with the statement mentioned in the United States draft of August 25, 1944.¹⁸

FOR STOCKPILES

Note to Annex I

“Grand total for six groups is 5,944,000 short tons, of which 5,344,000 short tons for shipment within the period from July 1, 1944 through June 30, 1945 and balance, i.e. 600,000 short tons as stockpiles by July 1, 1945.”

4) *List of Supplementary Deliveries.*

The Soviet Government authorized me to draw your attention to the fact that up till now a list of deliveries in accordance with the requirement, transmitted to the United States Government by the Government of the USSR on October 17, 1944¹⁹ has not yet been prepared by the Government of the United States and the Soviet Government would appreciate it if this list be prepared in the near future that it might be included in the Fourth Protocol.

861.24/2-2445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 24, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 5:35 p. m.]

539. Due to my absence from Moscow, action on Department's 115, January 18, 10 p. m. was deferred till my return.

¹⁸ See paragraph 5 of telegram cited in footnote 17, p. 978.

¹⁹ List not printed, but see note from the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, October 30, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1150.

The question of transfer of lend-lease materials to third countries has since been taken up at my direction with Foreign Trade as a matter affecting future deliveries of lend-lease material. That the Soviet master agreement and the lend-lease act both require the consent of the President before transfer was cited. Also, the necessity for considering the transfer of items similar to those being received under lend-lease as being in the safe category was pointed out. Specific cases were cited:

(a) Soviet press January 13 and February 2: Exchange with Finland of 30,000 tons of grain, 1,000 tons of sugar and 300 tons of confectionery products (presumably containing sugar) in return for raw materials, military supplies and labor.

(b) Soviet press January 27: Plan to give 60,000 tons of grain to Warsaw.

(c) Common knowledge that trucks have been given to Yugoslav and Polish armies. Also, that American trucks have been used for Polish civil economy.

A request was made that

(a) Advice be given by the Soviets of transfers of this nature that had been made in the past, showing the need from the standpoint of the war and the reason for not obtaining approval.

(b) Consulting with representatives of the United States before such transfers are made in the future.

It was pointed out that prompt reply would be made to request for retransfers. General Semichastnov²⁰ of Foreign Trade, with whom the matter was taken up, agreed to try to find a solution. This matter will be followed up at future conferences.

HARRIMAN

861.24/2-2645: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1945—8 p. m.

432. There is quoted below text of four "oral communications" which Soviet Chargé left with me which he stated set forth comments of his Government on our note of February 2 concerning the Fourth Protocol. The Chargé stated that the Soviet Government greatly appreciated our proposal and desired merely to make these few proposals in connection therewith. I promised to study them and said that we would give them a reply in due course.

It will be noted that communication 1 suggests a general provision in the Fourth Protocol referring to possible agreements concerning

²⁰ Maj. Gen. Ivan Fedorovich Semichastnov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.

credits between the two Governments and infers that the items in the 3-C Agreement should be put in production on the understanding that they would be paid for on the basis of such long-term credit arrangements as may be made in the future. In other words it may be interpreted that Soviet Government has rejected the United States 3-C proposals. Questions raised in the communications are being studied and as soon as any decisions have been reached, you will be informed.

[Here follows quotation of text of Oral Communication, consisting of four proposals, printed on page 977.]

GREW

861.24/2-2745

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*²¹

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1945.

The Soviet Ambassador called on me this afternoon and, in continuation of the talk which I had last week with the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, brought up the possibility of the inclusion in the Fourth Protocol of a provision for the application of \$300,000,000 for industrial equipment prior to July 1, 1945, but the equipment to be made available to Soviet Russia after July 1, 1945.

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.24/2-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 28, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received 11:29 p. m.]

590. Reference is made to my cable 539 dated February 24, 2 p. m., concerning the transfer of Lend-Lease supplies to third countries. General Semichastnov has furnished preliminary information.

With regard to the exchange with Finland, he said that this was absolutely essential to the war effort in order to obtain vitally needed strategic materials promptly and that the grain transferred was of Soviet origin.

In regard to the trucks which had been used by Polish troops, he said that all of these had been engaged in supply work for the Red Army, as well as for the Polish Army; that on the Polish front the same units were supplying all troops engaged, whether they were of Polish or Soviet nationality. All Polish troops were integrated into

²¹ This conversation was reported to Moscow in telegram 467, March 2, 1945, 4 p. m., not printed.

the Red Army and there was a common supply system for all. This was true of food, ammunition, and other supplies, whether of American origin or Soviet.

General Semichastnov was emphatic in stating that units of the Polish Army were not acting independently, that any American equipment which was issued to Polish troops was in the same status as Soviet equipment so issued, namely being used by them for the time being in current operations. All of the equipment furnished as, for example, American trucks or Soviet tanks, was listed as Red Army equipment and a thorough accounting and checking of this equipment was maintained, the same as in the case of that used by the Red Army.

General Semichastnov did not know of any specific cases where American trucks were being used by civil authorities. He said, however, that it was normal Red Army practice after a city had been liberated for the Red Army to help in getting the city functioning as quickly as possible.

When asked about the equipment reported as being given to the Yugoslavs, General Semichastnov replied that this equipment was only issued to those units operating directly under the Soviet command, either in the forces of Marshal Tolbukin²² or Marshal Malinky,²³ and that the same situation existed as in the case of equipment used by Polish troops.

Since the last meeting General Semichastnov has been investigating this matter with Red Army officials and he can find no case of any American equipment of type used by the Red Army having been delivered to any third country.

When asked about the donation of grain to Warsaw, General Semichastnov said he had not yet checked this point but that he thinks it was Soviet grain.

The necessity of settling this whole matter as promptly as possible was urged and also that approval of the United States Government must be formally requested by the Soviet Government. It was pointed out that it would be most unfortunate if it was found necessary to stop the flow of any item of supply on account of an unauthorized transfer to a third country. General Semichastnov said that he would continue his investigation.

HARRIMAN

²² Marshal of the Soviet Union Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin.

²³ Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky.

861.24/3-145

Memorandum by the Executive of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee (York) to the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1945.

Subject: Ambassador Gromyko's Request for Inclusion in the Fourth Protocol of a Provision for \$300,000,000 worth of Industrial Equipment to be developed after July, 1945.

It is suggested that Mr. Grew in talking with the Ambassador on the above subject make reference to the fact that this Government submitted through Mr. Hopkins²⁴ on January 5, 1945 to General Rudenko²⁵ an invitation to file requirements for the Fifth Protocol to begin July 1, 1945. As yet, we have had no indication of what these requirements will be. We feel it unnecessary to include any provision in the Fourth Protocol relating to the supply of items under the Fifth Protocol. We shall, of course, consider the desirability of accepting requisitions in advance of the commencement of the Fifth Protocol, when we have determined what the requirements are and the extent to which we are prepared to meet them.

For your background information, may I remind you that in the Third Protocol we provided for the acceptance of requisitions for industrial equipment, not to exceed \$300,000,000 to be delivered after the end of the Third Protocol. This was done in order to assure an even flow of production. We realized that the industrial equipment program would continue throughout the Fourth Protocol period and we decided that under the circumstances it would be desirable to prepare the programs well in advance and to begin production. As it happened the U. S. S. R. was very much delayed in presenting its programs under this provision, and for that reason production was delayed beyond what we had intended.

In preparing the Fourth Protocol we realized that the war was considerably farther advanced and that it could not be certain that industrial equipment would play as large a part in the supply program in the future as it had in the past. We understood, however, the need for an even flow of production and we provided in the preamble to Group V—Machinery and Equipment on page 24 of the Proposed U. S. Schedules to the Fourth Protocol that "on the basis of a continuing review the U. S. will from time to time inform the U.S.S.R. as to the extent to which it will consider any orders under this program."

²⁴ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt and Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

²⁵ Lt. Gen. Leonid Georgiyevich Rudenko, Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A.

In the event the Fifth Protocol requirements, when they are received, indicate that the U.S.S.R. has an industrial equipment program which we would feel related closely to the war and which we could supply, we should certainly consider the acceptance of requisitions before the beginning of the Fifth Protocol Period. We do not feel, however, that it is desirable to write these provisions into the Fourth Protocol, or to make any statement regarding future industrial equipment programs which might be regarded as binding.

JOHN Y. YORK, JR.
Major General, U.S. Army

861.24/3-345

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1945.

The Soviet Ambassador called this afternoon at my request and I handed him two memoranda²⁶ marked "oral" as replies to the oral communication made to me by Mr. Novikov on February 20, and to the second communication handed to me by the Soviet Ambassador on February 27 relating to the Fourth Protocol.²⁷ With regard to the second memorandum,²⁸ the Ambassador said that it was important for his Government to be able to count in advance on a provision for \$300,000,000 of industrial equipment to be made available after July 1, 1945 because even though the provision might be placed in the Fifth Protocol, this would be too late for arranging for the production of the desired equipment. In reply to that point, I said to the Ambassador that the President's Soviet Protocol Committee would be prepared to consider the desirability of accepting requisitions in advance of the commencement of the Fifth Protocol when it has determined what the requirements of the protocol are and the extent to which this Government is prepared to meet them. The Ambassador said that he would refer the two documents to his Government.

JOSEPH C. GREW

²⁶ For the first of the memoranda, see *infra*. The Department summarized both in telegram 507, March 5, 1945, 8 p. m., to Moscow, not printed (861.24/-2-2645).

²⁷ See Mr. Grew's memorandum of February 27, p. 981.

²⁸ Not printed; it was based upon the information contained in the first paragraph of General York's memorandum dated March 1, *supra*.

861.24/3-345

*Oral Communication by the Acting Secretary of State to the
Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko)*

1) *Credit Clause*

The only financial arrangements possible under existing legislation are those authorized by the Lend-Lease Act and are fully provided for under Article IV of the Preamble to the Fourth Protocol which reads as follows:

“The financial arrangements concluded between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States in connection with the supplies furnished in pursuance of the present Protocol may be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, and with the terms and conditions of any amendments to said agreement which have been or may hereafter be concluded by mutual agreement or the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may elect to purchase from the United States schedules of supplies for cash.”

The above provisions adequately cover the only possible arrangement under existing United States laws by which supplies of the classes specified in the proposed supplementary agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942 submitted to Mr. Stepanov on September 14, 1944 can be made available on credit terms. The terms set forth in this proposed agreement were reached after careful consideration and long discussion with representatives of the Soviet Government and, as the Soviet Ambassador was informed in the Department's note of February 2, 1945, constitute the final United States offer.

The Soviet Government's proposals submitted in its memorandum of January 3 are being given careful consideration. They constitute, however, a separate matter and must be considered apart from the Fourth Protocol.

2) *Schedule of Supplies*

The understanding of the Soviet Government is correct that the offerings listed in Annex II do not include items pertaining to the Third Protocol but remaining unshipped on July 1, 1944. These items, in so far as they have not been diverted to other uses, are available for shipment from the United States under the terms of the Proposed Fourth Protocol. With reference to this question it is believed that the text, as submitted, is adequate.

This text contains the following paragraph, appearing on page 1 of the United States Schedules of Shipping and Supplies. The pertinent words have been underlined.²⁹

²⁹ Printed in italics.

“The Government of the United States will make available for shipment to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period of this Protocol, July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945 from supplies made available under the Third Protocol but unshipped on July 1, 1944, and from quantities to be made available under this Protocol a minimum of 5,944,000 short tons of supplies as set forth in Annex I provided the quantities of specific items to be made available do not exceed the quantities of specific items offered in Annex II.”

In view of this paragraph the change in the wording suggested in your memorandum seems unnecessary. If any question as to interpretation should arise in the future, this memorandum clarifying the point should be conclusive.

3) *Transitory Supplies*

The need for reasonable stockpiles of supplies in the United States to facilitate shipping operations is appreciated and every effort will be made to provide such stockpiles. However, recent requests of the Soviet Government have been filed for an accelerated shipping program. Such increases in shipping programs, if accomplished, will correspondingly reduce the amount of stocks remaining at the end of the Fourth Protocol period. In view of the large number of unknown factors in the shipping and war situation, this government regrets that it cannot commit itself to end the Fourth Protocol period with stocks of any specific quantity. Measures, with which the Soviet Government is familiar, have already been taken in this connection to provide metals and some other materials and equipment for shipment after July 1, 1945.

4) *List of Supplementary Deliveries*

The list of supplies, which is to be designated as Annex III, is not yet in final form and will not be available in time for the signature of the Fourth Protocol. It will be delivered subsequently. The Soviet Government may rest assured that every effort is being made to meet as fully as possible the requirements stated in this list.

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1945.

861.24/3-1045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1945.

The Soviet Ambassador called on me this morning at his request and said that his Government, having considered our replies to the points brought up in connection with the Fourth Protocol, is now ready to instruct its representative to sign the Protocol, provided the

following clause be inserted therein (the Ambassador left the text of this clause with me in the Russian language and it is translated by Mr. Bohlen³⁰ as follows):

“The reference in the Protocol to a supplementary agreement to the agreement of June 11, 1942 does not mean the consent of the Soviet Government to the conclusion of such an agreement. The Soviet Government counts on the solution of the question of the financial conditions for the deliveries in question on the basis of the proposal outlined in the *aide-mémoire* handed to the Ambassador of the United States in Moscow on January 3, 1945.”

The Ambassador said he understood that the Protocol is to be signed in Ottawa and, on hearing of our acceptance of the proposed Soviet clause, he will inform his Government and believes that instructions will be sent to the Soviet representative in Ottawa to sign the Protocol.

I said I would look into the matter and would give the Ambassador a reply in due course as to our reaction to the proposed clause.

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.24/3-1245

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Parsons) to Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr.,³¹ of the Division of Eastern European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] March 12, 1945.

MR. THOMPSON: Ambassador Atherton telephoned this morning to say that the Soviet Ambassador had just called on him and asked for a change in the opening sentence of the American draft for the Fourth Protocol. The Ambassador said that the change would conform to the language of the British draft and to that of the United States Third Protocol. He pressed very strongly for this change which is designed to eliminate reference to “aid” to the Soviet Union. His suggested text is:

“Subject to the provisions of Article II of this Protocol, the Government of the United States undertakes to make available to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for shipment from the western hemisphere to the Union”, etc., etc.

Will you please let me know if this change is acceptable so that I may advise Ambassador Atherton.

J. G[RAHAM] P[ARSONS]

³⁰ Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State for White House liaison.

³¹ Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom and Consul at London; also designated as political and liaison officer, U.S. delegation, United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco in April.

861.24/3-1645: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1945—midnight.

622. On March 10 the Soviet Ambassador proposed yet another amendment to the Fourth Protocol to the effect that (1) the reference to a supplementary agreement to the agreement of June 11, 1942 does not mean that the Soviet Government consents to such an agreement and (2) the Soviet Government is counting on the solution of the question of the financial conditions for the deliveries in question on the basis of the proposal outlined in the *Aide-Mémoire* handed to you on January 3, 1945.

In view of military developments and recent discussions in Congress FEA now feels that it cannot proceed with the 3(c) agreement in its present form and is suggesting that in reply to the Soviet Ambassador's proposal we withdraw the 3(c) offer but agree to discuss a new agreement. The intention would be to eliminate most of the long range equipment from the new agreement.

Foregoing for your information and not to be discussed with the Russians. Please cable urgently any comments you may have.

STETTINIUS

861.24/3-2045: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, March 20, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received March 21—10 a. m.]

823. ReDepts 622, March 16, midnight. I fully agree that the 3-c offer should be withdrawn and that in connection with any new agreement most of the long range equipment should be eliminated. We now have ample proof that it takes very much longer than we had been led to believe for the Soviets to erect, install and get into operation new plants. This is due to the incompetence of the Soviet engineers, the shortage of qualified labor and to the loss and damage to components during shipment and storage. Also a number of the factors which led me to recommend a year ago that favorable consideration be given to some of this long range equipment are obviously no longer present. In addition the labor and material needed for our own accelerated war effort have now clearly a prior claim. There may be certain requirements for equipment for plants which are excep-

tional but these should not be accepted without prior consultation and approval of General Deane³² and the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

I would be much interested to learn of the present ideas of the terms of a new 3-c offer as suggested by the phrase "but agree to discuss a new agreement". Unfortunately I believe the Soviet officials have gotten the idea that our motivation in making the original 3-c offer was primarily to assist American postwar economy rather than to be helpful to Russia. This is probably due to comments in our press, statements by our manufacturers and also certain public officials. Great care therefore should be exercised in connection with any negotiations to offset as far as possible this impression.

Unless agreement is reached before discussions begin regarding the Fifth Protocol requirements I believe we should make it plain to the Soviets that this lack of agreement will affect our Fifth Protocol offers. In other words, unless we know the Soviet Government is going to take and pay for, after the cessation of hostilities, goods put into production for them we must screen more carefully and reduce the quantities offered during the Fifth Protocol period. In any event I believe our interests can now be better served by giving greater consideration to the Lend-Lease requirements of our western Allies, rather than maintaining the high priority previously accorded to all Soviet requests. This principle should be taken into consideration not only in connection with the Fifth Protocol but also in connection with allocation of shipping and new Russian requests for the balance of the Fourth Protocol.

In connection with the Soviet Ambassador's reference to the *aide-mémoire* handed me on January 3 regarding postwar financing, I feel that no commitment or implied commitment should be put in writing at this time in connection with the protocol but that we should give energetic and detailed consideration to the issues raised. Since this question was not discussed at Yalta, I have taken no action on Department's cable 183, January 27, 10 p. m. I would appreciate further instructions in light of subsequent developments.

I am satisfied the Soviet Government places the highest importance on obtaining equipment from us for postwar reconstruction and we should continue to give them justifiable hopes that reasonable arrangements can be worked out.

HARRIMAN

³² Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

861.24/3-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 22, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received March 22—3:43 p. m.]

862. ReEmbs 539, February 24, 2 p. m. General Spalding has had several talks with the Vice Commissar for Foreign Trade regarding our requirement of Soviet Government to give us full information about transfers of Lend-Lease or similar items to third countries already made and to obtain our prior approval in future such transfers. Although he has had verbal explanations of some of the transactions, no other results have been obtained.

We now have an increasing number of cases in connection with the Poles. Polpress reported several days ago that 500 motor trucks were presented by Marshal Stalin to the Provisional Government for Warsaw. More recently from the same source it is reported that 1,000 trucks have been received by the city of Lodz as a gift from the Red Army for transporting coal from Silesia; also the delivery by the Soviet Government of radio station equipment for the Warsaw radio.

I recommend that I be instructed to go to Molotov or Vyshinski³³ and inform them that unless the Soviet Government within a reasonable time gives us full information regarding all transactions in the past to third countries, shipments of certain items under the protocol such as sugar (which the Department will recall was delivered by the Soviets to Finland) and flour (delivered to Poland) will cease, and advising the Soviets that we are going to have to take action in the case of trucks also if further trucks are delivered by the Soviets to third countries without our approval. I hesitate to take action regarding trucks unless we have a further incident of retransfer as I believe they are needed by the Red Army.

I do not, however, wish to take this matter up with the Foreign Office unless I obtain full assurance that the United States Government will stop shipments of some definite items such as sugar and flour in the event the Soviet Government does not comply with our requirements. I believe that if I am authorized to take this action it will have a salutary effect on our relations with the Soviet Government, although we may find unpleasant immediate repercussions. General Deane concurs.

HARRIMAN

³³ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

861.24/3-2345

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State and the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to President Roosevelt*³⁴

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1945.

Subject: Withdrawal of Agreement Offered in September 1944 to U.S.S.R. under Section 3 (c) of Lend-Lease Act.

The Soviet Government has not indicated any willingness to accept the terms offered by us for the proposed agreement under Section 3 (c) of the Lend-Lease Act, the first draft of which was submitted to it in May 1944, and the final United States terms for which were communicated to the Soviets in September 1944. On the contrary, they have indicated that they expect to finance the deliveries contemplated in the proposed 3 (c) agreement through a long-term postwar credit which they have requested in the amount of six billion dollars. Furthermore, in view of the present military situation, the initiation at this time of a program of procurement under a 3 (c) agreement of industrial plants requiring a long time to manufacture, ship and install, might possibly be considered by the Congress as a use of the Lend-Lease Act for postwar reconstruction purposes.

We recommend that the Soviet Government be informed that we cannot maintain the offer contained in the draft agreement submitted in September 1944 but that we believe it would be to the interests of both Governments to conclude a 3 (c) agreement concerning the disposition of certain lend-lease supplies in inventory or under contract at the end of hostilities against the common enemy. There is attached an *aide-mémoire* which we propose to be handed to the Soviet Ambassador³⁵ if you approve this recommendation.

We are submitting this matter to you in advance because of the possible implications the withdrawal of the agreement offered may have from the military and political standpoints.

JOSEPH C. GREW
LEO CROWLEY

861.24/3-2445

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*³⁶

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In a conversation on March 10, 1945, the Soviet Ambassador left with the Acting Secretary of State the text of a clause which the

³⁴ Notation by President Roosevelt: "OK FDR".

³⁵ *Infra*. The Department reported its contents to Moscow in telegram 712, March 26, 1945, 7 p. m., not printed.

³⁶ Handed to the Minister-Counselor of the Embassy (Novikov) on the afternoon of March 24, 1945, by the Acting Secretary of State (Grew). The Department in its telegram 30, March 26, 7 p. m., to Ottawa, reported the contents and authorized signature of the Fourth Protocol if and when the Soviet Government agreed to the amendments (861.24/3-2645).

Soviet Government wished to have inserted in the text of the Fourth Protocol. This clause was as follows :

“The reference in the Protocol to a supplementary agreement to the agreement of June 11, 1942 does not mean the consent of the Soviet Government to the conclusion of such an agreement. The Soviet Government counts on the solution of the question of the financial conditions for the deliveries in question on the basis of the proposal outlined in the *aide-mémoire* handed to the Ambassador of the United States in Moscow on January 3, 1945.”

The United States Government wishes to advise the Soviet Government that at this time it can give no assurance concerning the Soviet Government's proposals for a postwar credit outlined in the *aide-mémoire* handed to the Ambassador of the United States in Moscow on January 3, 1945. As the Soviet Government was advised in a memorandum to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires of March 3, 1945, these proposals are being given careful consideration but constitute a separate matter and must be considered apart from the Fourth Protocol. It is further desired to emphasize that these proposals, which would necessitate the enactment of additional appropriate legislation by the Congress beyond the scope of the Lend-Lease Act, would, in any case, require a considerable amount of time to effectuate.

The United States Government had not intended by the inclusion in the Fourth Protocol of reference to the proposed supplementary agreement to the agreement of June 11, 1942 to imply in any way that the Soviet Government agreed to the conclusion of the proposed agreement. In order to make this perfectly clear the United States Government agrees to delete the words “have been or” in Article IV of the Fourth Protocol, which would then read as follows :

Article IV

The financial arrangements concluded between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States in connection with the supplies furnished in pursuance of the present Protocol may be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, and with the terms and conditions of any amendments to said agreement which may hereafter be concluded by mutual agreement or the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may elect to purchase from the United States schedules of supplies for cash.

In view of the fact that negotiations regarding the proposed supplementary agreement under the Lend-Lease Act have now extended over a period of ten months during which time the Soviet Government has not indicated its willingness to agree to the final terms offered by this Government, the United States Government considers that the proposals which were made to the Soviet Government in its note of May 24, 1944³⁷ and stated in final form in the draft submitted to Mr.

³⁷ *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, p. 1087.

Stepanov on September 14, 1944³⁸ have lapsed and that the negotiations on these specific proposals have come to an end.

Accordingly it will be necessary to revise paragraph III, page 24 of the United States schedules annexed to the Fourth Protocol to read as follows:

Items designated by the symbol "III" in the following schedules totalling approximately \$481,807,000 represent supplies requested by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for its war production programs, which require a long period to produce, or to reproduce if already constructed, and have a long period of useful life. Items under this paragraph will not be financed under the Lend-Lease Act, but may be purchased by the U.S.S.R. if it so elects. All items under this paragraph are also subject to the following conditions etc.

The United States Government considers that the prompt signature of the Fourth Protocol is to the interest of both Governments and hopes that the signature of the Protocol with the amendments described above can now take place.

The United States Government also considers that it would be to the mutual interests of both Governments to conclude an agreement concerning the disposition under the Lend-Lease Act to the Soviet Union, after the termination of hostilities against the common enemy, of certain supplies which the United States may undertake to furnish to the Soviet Union for use in the prosecution of the war and which are under contract or in inventory at the termination of hostilities.

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1945.

861.24/3-3145

The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State

[Translation]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In view of the fact that in the *Aide-Mémoire* of the Department of State of March 24, 1945 it is proposed that a new draft be made of pertinent portions of the text of the Fourth Protocol, conforming to the wishes of the Soviet Government, and, namely, that it is proposed to exclude from the text mention of the supplementary agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, a copy of the proposed text of which was handed to Mr. Stepanov on September 14, 1944, the Soviet Government is agreeable to the signing of the Fourth Protocol with the changes proposed in the *Aide-Mémoire* mentioned, without the reservation which the Soviet Government had in view to make before

³⁸ See telegram 2226, September 16, 1944, 11 p. m., to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 1139.

the signing of the Protocol, in as much as the necessity for this reservation no longer exists.

[WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1945.

861.24/4-645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1945—8 p. m.

807. In reference to Department's 173 of January 26, which outlined a Treasury proposal for a ten-billion dollar credit to Russia, and stated Department's preliminary opinions on this proposal, your detailed comments on the Treasury's suggestion, with special reference to the amount and terms of the proposed loan, and particularly to the provision for repayment partly in strategic materials, would be appreciated by the Department.

ACHESON

861.24/4-1145 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, April 11, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

1127. In reply to the Department's telegram addressed to me personally (No. 807, April 6, 8 p. m.), I fully concur to the preliminary opinions of the Department expressed in its 173, January 26, 11 p. m. relative to the Treasury's suggested 10 billion dollar credit to the Soviet Union. I do not, however, find myself in full agreement with the study prepared in the Department regarding Russia's interest in foreign credits, as highlighted in the second message referred to above. This study overlooks the determination of the Soviet Government not only to reestablish its capital investment destroyed by the war but to embark upon an ambitious program of expanding her industrial machine. The Department will recall that in conversation with [of?] Marshal Stalin with Eric Johnston³⁹ the above program was exposed and I had an opportunity to ask him, for example, how large it was planned to expand Russian steel production. In reply he said 60 million tons, which is some three times the prewar production. He did not specify the time element but this gives us a measure of the scope

³⁹ Eric A. Johnston was president of the United States Chamber of Commerce. For reports concerning his visit to the Soviet Union June 1-July 7, 1944, to discuss future trade possibilities, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 955-979, *passim*.

of the enormous plans for the expansion of industrial production during perhaps a 15 or 20 year period. It will be recalled that Mikoyan has mentioned to me that the Soviets were now planning on a 15 year program. To accomplish the above the Soviets intend to exact the maximum reparations from Germany and to buy from US and other countries on credit the other required capital equipment. In the case of the US it is obvious that they will limit their purchases, because of our higher prices, to those items where the type or quality cannot be obtained from any other source and which are therefore essential items in carrying out their entire program. It is evident that the Soviets estimate this to be, at a maximum, 6 billion dollars in the immediate postwar years, as this is the sum for which they have asked credits. Thus on the one hand we should discard the Treasury estimate of 10 billion dollars and on the other the statement contained in the Department's study "that the Soviet Union will be able to take a highly independent position, since 2 billion dollars in credits would speed up by only 3 or 4 months its reconstruction program". In my opinion the Soviets are keen to obtain from US a credit up to 6 billion dollars to enable them to carry out their program. In this connection I also believe that they have figured their possibilities of repayment very carefully and therefore will attempt to stand firm on the terms proposed in Molotov's memorandum handed to me.

Turning to the question of how large a credit we can safely extend to the Soviet Union :

1. It would seem that the first question of policy which we must consider is the extent to which we are prepared to accept gold in repayment. I would not be surprised if the Soviet gold production was already in excess of 200 million. This alone would service large foreign credits if they were at low interest and long term repayment. This question involves our overall gold policy and I will not attempt to discuss it in the compass of this message.

2. Although I am in sympathy with the Treasury proposal for stock piling strategic materials as a defense measure, I am not in a position here to estimate the value of the strategic materials which we might wish to obtain from Soviet production for this stock pile. It certainly should be borne in mind that our basic interests might better be served by increasing our trade with other parts of the world rather than giving preference to the Soviet Union as a source of supply. For example, we must weigh the advantages, economic and political, of purchases of manganese from Brazil and British possessions (West Africa and India) as against Russia. In any event it would not seem that our purchases from the Soviet Union for stock pile could play a major role in the repayment of as large a credit as under consideration.

3. In spite of the adverse political influence of special business interests at home I earnestly endorse the concept that the US should enter on a program reasonably to conserve our natural resources, in order that their life may be extended over as long a period as practicable. There is no better time to begin this policy than in the immediate postwar period when the world needs American products and

will have large productions of raw materials stimulated by the war to offer in direct repayment for purchases or to serve credits. The extent to which such a policy can be implemented will naturally have a substantial influence on the possible imports from the Soviet Union to serve credits extended to her.

4. Certainly before any definite figure can be fixed as a maximum credit to Russia certain basic decisions must be made and information must be obtained from the Soviet Government as to its export policy in connection with commodities which we might wish to acquire.

Turning now to the Department's preliminary views, I heartily endorse the view that blanket foreign loan authority should be obtained from Congress rather than specific loan authorization for the USSR. Although I feel that it is to our interest to give the most favorable possible interest and repayment terms to the Soviet Union I see no advantage to US in selecting them alone for especially favorable treatment. I also feel strongly that the administration should retain within its control the current decision as to which countries loans are to be granted, bearing in mind our changing economic and political interests. I have discussed this policy in further detail in my No. 1038, April 4.⁴⁰

Although I am hopeful that the Bretton Woods Bank may play a very important part to promote international trade, I believe that we should obtain authority for the Export and Import Bank to extend loans direct when it is in our interest to do so. I certainly agree that we should not grant large irrevocable credits to Russia without retaining to ourselves the power to restrict or reduce them as we may see fit.

Our experience has incontrovertibly proved that it is not possible to bank general goodwill in Moscow and I agree with the Department that we should retain current control of these credits in order to be in a position to protect American vital interests in the formulative period immediately following the war.

In conclusion I further recommend that we continue to give the Soviet Government encouragement to feel that we are favorably and sympathetically disposed toward assisting its postwar reconstruction, that we should make every effort to obtain from Congress the loan authorization as discussed above and enter into active negotiations with the Soviet Government as soon as possible. It would be inadvisable to give the Soviets the idea that we were cooling off on our desire to help, although we should at all times make it plain that our cooperation is dependent upon a reciprocal cooperative attitude of the Soviet Government in other matters.

HARRIMAN

⁴⁰ *Ante*, p. 817.

861.24/4-1745

The Ambassador in Canada (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

No. 2432

OTTAWA, April 17, 1945.

[Received April 24.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's Secret instruction No. 592 of February 13, 1945, enclosing the final draft of the Soviet Fourth Protocol and, in compliance therewith, to enclose the original official copy for the United States Government, duly signed today in Ottawa ⁴¹ by me on behalf of the United States Government, by the Right Honorable Malcolm MacDonald ⁴² for the United Kingdom, by Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King ⁴³ and Mr. J. L. Ilsley ⁴⁴ for Canada, and by Mr. G. Zaroubin for the Soviet Union.

Respectfully yours,

RAY ATHERTON

811.516 Export-Import Bank/4-1945

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Financial and
Development Policy (Collado)*⁴⁵

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1945.

Subject: Long-term Reconstruction Credits to the U.S.S.R.

1. Attention is called to the Treasury proposal of a \$10 billion long-term reconstruction credit to the U.S.S.R., the Russian request for a \$6 billion credit, and the views expressed at length on these developments by Mr. Harriman in a recent cable (Moscow 1127, April 11, 1945).

2. With respect to the question of long-term postwar credits to Russia, OFD recommends as follows:

a. Legislative arrangements should be made to put the Export-Import Bank in a position to begin negotiations with the Russians—shortly after the conclusion of the San Francisco conference, if

⁴¹ For text of signed protocol, see Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, pp. 89-156; for announcement of signature, made at Ottawa on April 20, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 22, 1945, p. 723.

⁴² British High Commissioner in Canada.

⁴³ Canadian Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs.

⁴⁴ Canadian Minister of Finance.

⁴⁵ Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton); the latter noted: "I agree. W.L.C. 4/19/45." In a covering memorandum of the same date Mr. Collado expressed the opinion that the recommendations "should obviously be discussed with Ambassador Harriman who, I am informed, has just arrived." On April 20 the Secretary of State asked the Under Secretary, Mr. Grew, to handle the matter discussed in the memorandum and to let him know if there was anything he should discuss with Mr. Molotov, who was attending the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, April 25-June 26, 1945. No record has been found of further conversation on this subject at this time or at the Conference.

political conditions are favorable—on a \$1 billion long-term reconstruction credit. (A separate memorandum makes recommendations regarding Export-Import Bank legislation and organization.)

b. The special rate of interest which the Russians have requested, 2¼ percent, should not be granted. The rate should be fixed to take into account the rates charged by the Export-Import Bank on other long-term loans and also the rates which the Bretton Woods Bank is likely to charge.

c. Control might be exercised to assure that the funds lent the Russians were expended on U.S. reconstruction goods, but the detailed checks which the Export-Import Bank usually exercises over expenditures of loans would be impractical to try to enforce. Russia's gold stocks and production provide adequate assurance that she will be able to service the loan.

d. Arrangements for U.S. purchases of strategic materials from the U.S.S.R. should not be made a part of the loan contract; at least, difficulties which might arise in the way of completing such arrangements should not be allowed to stand in the way of the granting of the credit.

e. Consideration should be given to the advisability of extending future additional long-term credits to the U.S.S.R. in part at least through the Bretton Woods Bank, rather than entirely through the Export-Import Bank.

711.61/5-945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)

SAN FRANCISCO, May 9, 1945.
[Received May 9—8:56 p. m.]

10. I have discussed our relations with the Russians with Ambassador Harriman and he will present to you and the President our conclusions which are along the following lines:

1. The programs for assistance to our western Allies that have been or may be agreed to in the future should have priority over such assistance to the Russians from the standpoint of availability and transportation.

2. We should begin curtailing at once our Lend-Lease shipments to Russia and scrutinize carefully requests for shipments after July 1st with a view to our own interests and policies.

3. The MILEPOST⁴⁶ (Pacific) program should continue to be energetically pressed, giving it highest possible priority.

4. That generally in our attitude toward the Russians with respect to Lend-Lease and similar matters we should be firm while avoiding any implication of a threat or any indication of political bargaining.

Please bring the foregoing to the attention of the President.

[STETTINIUS]

⁴⁶ Code name referring to the stockpiling of supplies in eastern Siberia for the use of Soviet forces in the war against Japan.

861.24/5-1145

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State and the Foreign
Economic Administrator (Crowley) to President Truman*⁴⁷

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1945.

It has been the policy of the United States Government, in view of the outstanding contribution of the U.S.S.R. in the prosecution of the war against Germany, to provide that country with the maximum possible lend-lease assistance in meeting its war needs for military supplies, raw materials, industrial equipment and food.

Commitments of lend-lease aid to the U.S.S.R. under the Fourth Protocol expire, with certain exceptions, on June 30, 1945. These commitments are subject to review by this Government in the light of major changes in the war situation.

In order to plan for the continuing provision of lend-lease aid to the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to take into account:

- (a) The end of organized resistance in Europe.
- (b) The fact that the U.S.S.R. has not declared war against Japan.
- (c) The anticipated entrance of the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan at some future date.

On the basis of these considerations, we wish to make the following recommendations, which are concurred in by the War and Navy Departments and by Ambassador Harriman:

1. Deliveries of supplies under current lend-lease programs for the U.S.S.R. should be adjusted immediately to take account of the end of organized resistance in Europe. So long as it is anticipated that the U.S.S.R. will enter the war against Japan, it is proposed to continue deliveries under the program in Annex III of the Fourth Protocol which includes military supplies, raw materials, industrial equipment and food to support Soviet military operations in the Pacific theater. Additional supplies now on hand or on order for the U.S.S.R. would also be delivered to the extent that they are necessary to support such military operations. Supplies needed to complete industrial plants already partially made available under previous commitments should be delivered. Other lend-lease supplies now programmed for the U.S.S.R. should be cut off immediately as

⁴⁷ This memorandum was approved by Ambassador Harriman and Mr. Clayton.

In a memorandum of May 11, Mr. Grew recorded a conference with President Truman, attended also by Mr. Crowley, Assistant Secretary of State Clayton, and Charles E. Bohlen. Mr. Grew wrote: "Mr. Clayton presented our proposed Lend-Lease agreement with Soviet Russia, the highlights of which he and Mr. Crowley explained to the President, as well as Mr. Clayton's testimony before the Senate Committee this afternoon. The President approved and signed the agreement." See *infra*. In a memorandum of a telephone conversation prior to the meeting, Mr. Grew indicated that Mr. Crowley told him that "he wanted to be sure that the President thoroughly understands the situation and that he will back us up and will keep everyone else out of it. He stated that he would be having difficulty with the Russians and he did not want them to be running all over town looking for help." (861.24/5-1145)

far as physically practicable, and such goods and the related shipping tonnage should be diverted to the approved supply programs for Western Europe. Future supply programs for the U.S.S.R. should be designed to meet new military situations as they arise.

2. Current and future supply programs should be developed, without the conclusion of a Fifth Protocol, on the basis of reasonably adequate information regarding the essentiality of Soviet military supply requirements and in the light of all competing demands for supplies in the changing military situation.

If you approve these recommendations, it is proposed that the attached note be sent to the Soviet Ambassador.⁴⁸

The above recommendations contemplate that the programs of supplies for the U.S.S.R., because of their military importance, will continue to have the priority ratings given to supplies under the Fourth Protocol and that the Soviet Protocol Committee will continue to have responsibility, to be exercised in accordance with its existing instructions, for the over-all coordination of the Soviet supply program in conformity with policies approved by you.

JOSEPH C. GREW
[LEO T. CROWLEY]

861.24/5-1145

Memorandum by President Truman to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) and the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley)

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1945.

I approve the policy of lend-lease supplies to the U.S.S.R. recommended in your memorandum of May 11, 1945. In carrying out the policy, you should, until further notice, proceed on the assumption that the U.S.S.R. will enter into the war against Japan.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

861.24/5-1245

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union (Novikov) ⁴⁹

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1945.

SIR: It is the desire of this Government to continue to provide the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with assistance in meeting its military needs for such supplies as are required in the

⁴⁸ See note dated May 12, below.

⁴⁹ A paraphrase of this note was sent in telegram 1062, May 13, 6 p. m., to Moscow. The telegram further advised: "The Foreign Economic Administration issued a statement to the press on May 12 indicating that all lend-lease programs, including that of the Soviet Union, were being revised in the light of the changed military situation." (861.24/5-1345)

light of war conditions. Deliveries of supplies under the current lend-lease program for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be adjusted immediately to take into account the end of organized hostilities in Europe. This Government intends to fulfill under the terms of the Fourth Protocol the program in Annex III and to deliver such other supplies now on hand or on order for the U.S.S.R. as are justified on the basis of adequate information regarding the essentiality of Soviet military supply requirements and in the light of competing demands for such supplies in the changed military situation. Future lend-lease programs will be designed, on the same basis, to meet new military situations as they arise. This Government therefore proposes that the essential military requirements of the U.S.S.R. be met in this manner without the conclusion of a Fifth Protocol.

On January 5, 1945, your Embassy was requested to furnish the United States Government as soon as possible with a statement of the military requirements of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for supplies after July 1, 1945. It is urgent that you furnish this Government, with a minimum of delay, a statement of the military requirements of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for all categories of lend-lease supplies for the remainder of the calendar year 1945 and adequate information regarding the essentiality of these requirements in the light of the new military situation.

Accept [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

861.24/5-1345

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1945.

Subject: Retransfer by Soviet authorities to third countries of goods similar to those furnished under Lend-Lease.

In view of the President's directive of May 4 ^{49a} ordering the curtailment of lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union and careful screening of all lend-lease supplies which may be shipped to that country in the future, the question of the transfer by the Soviet authorities of lend-lease or similar goods to third countries has lost some of its importance.

Since July 6, 1944 the United States Government has been endeavoring to reach an agreement with the Soviet Government regarding the retransfer of lend-lease or similar supplies to third countries.⁵⁰ It was explained to the Soviet authorities that unless they obtained the

^{49a} No directive dated May 4 has been found; but see memorandum by President Truman of May 11, p. 1000.

⁵⁰ For *aide-mémoire* handed the Chargé of the Soviet Union on July 6, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1098.

prior consent of the United States Government to the retransfer of such supplies we might find it necessary to curtail the shipment of such supplies to the Soviet Union on the theory that such retransfers would be evidence that the Soviet Government no longer needs the supplies from the United States.

Although this question was taken up formally with the Soviet authorities on several occasions subsequent to July 1944, they never have asked the prior consent of the United States Government before transferring lend-lease or similar goods to third countries. When representatives of our embassy in Moscow discussed this question with the Vice Commissar for Foreign Trade he denied that any American equipment or supplies had been transferred by the Red Army to third parties, but he did admit that trucks, grain and other supplies had been turned over to the Polish or other authorities in liberated areas. He added, however, that these goods were in general of Soviet origin and not lend-lease supplies, and indicated that any lend-lease supplies which may have been turned over to the Polish military authorities for instance were in fact turned over to an integral part of the Red Army engaged in pursuing the war against the common enemy. The general thesis maintained by the Soviet authorities was that there was no need for them to inform us of the transfer of similar goods of Soviet origin to third countries. It was made clear to them, however, that if they should continue to transfer similar goods to those being furnished under lend-lease it might be necessary for us to curtail the shipments of such supplies.

Late in April consideration was given by the Coordinating Committee⁵¹ to instructing Ambassador Harriman to again take up the matter with the Soviet authorities and to make it absolutely clear to them that if they failed to provide full information concerning past transfers as well as the right to pass upon future transfers of lend-lease and similar goods the United States Government would cease shipments of specific items which had been transferred without authority. Before this question could be finally decided the cessation of hostilities in Europe took place and thus a new situation has been created.

Under the present directives regarding lend-lease to the Soviet Union which requires that the Soviet authorities furnish adequate information regarding the essentiality of Soviet military requirements it would appear that the question of retransfer could be handled by making it clear in each instance that the United States Government could not furnish any particular item if the Soviet authorities are transferring similar items to third countries. This

⁵¹ The Coordinating Committee of the Department, with the Under Secretary of State as chairman, dealt especially with matters of policy or action arising in daily operations and questions of interoffice relations.

question is of particular importance now in view of the recently concluded Soviet-Bulgarian trade agreement,⁵² which according to an unofficial copy received from Sofia calls for the transfer to Bulgaria of a large number of goods similar to lend-lease supplies which have been sent to the Soviet Union. It is recommended, therefore, that this aspect of future lend-lease policy to the Soviet Union be brought to the attention of the Foreign Economic Administration in order that in the screening process they will bear in mind the possibility of retransfer to third countries.

There is attached a table⁵³ containing a list of articles similar to those furnished under lend-lease which according to Soviet press reports or other reports have been transferred by the Soviet authorities to third countries. This list is only partial and confirmation of such transfers is not available in each case.

861.24/5-1645

The Chargé of the Soviet Union (Novikov) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1945.

SIR: I have the honor to submit for your information the following communication of my Government.⁵⁴

"The Soviet Government has received the note of the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Grew, of May 12 in reference to the discontinuance of deliveries to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease.

The note referred to and the discontinuance of deliveries have come as a complete surprise to the Soviet Government. Nevertheless, if the Government of the United States of America sees no other course, the Soviet Government is prepared to take cognizance of the above-mentioned decisions of the Government of the USA."

Accept [etc.]

NOVIKOV

⁵² Signed at Moscow, March 14, 1945; the text was not published.

⁵³ Not printed.

⁵⁴ On May 30 Mr. Novikov sent as a supplement to his note a statement with an enclosure of a "Request of the U.S.S.R. for supplies from the U.S.A. within the period July 1 through December 31, 1945" which had been handed to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow on May 29. The request listed military, naval, and quartermaster supplies, machinery and equipment, raw materials, food-stuffs, and miscellaneous products. A concluding note stated that specified items ordered but not shipped as of July 1, 1945, "must be shipped to the Soviet Union over and above the quantities" listed here. (861.24/5-3045)

861.24/5-1845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 18, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 10 a. m.]

1639. Today's papers published brief item quoting Secretary's statement⁵⁵ that Lend-Lease deliveries will be continued in amounts necessary for achieving quick and final victory with minimum losses and that no other consideration than changing military situation will dictate changes in Lend-Lease program after defeat of Germany.

Nothing has appeared in Under Secretary's statement⁵⁶ regarding reduction in Lend-Lease program for Soviet Union.

KENNAN

861.24/5-3045

*The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Acting Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. (Eremin)*⁵⁷

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1945.

DEAR MR. EREMIN: With reference to General Wesson's conversation with you on this subject, I wish to state that the FEA is prepared to permit deliveries to the Soviet Government to go forward on industrial plants covered by approved requisitions of the Soviet Government which have already been partially shipped. However, with respect to those plants on which proportionately small deliveries have been made to date, we believe, in view of the present military situation, that further deliveries should be made upon cash payment by the Soviet Government of the total cost of the plants including the cost of any licenses under applicable patents. The plants in this category would include the oil refining units covered by Requisitions Nos. R-8888, 8889, 8890, 9274, 41106, 41107, and 41668; the tie plate mill covered by Requisition No. R-7522; and the glass bulb plant covered by Requisition R-5698.

I would appreciate it if you would advise me as promptly as possible whether your Government is willing to accept these plants on a cash payment basis.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

⁵⁵ Made at San Francisco, May 15, 1945, Department of State *Bulletin*, May 20, 1945, p. 940.

⁵⁶ Released May 14, *ibid.*

⁵⁷ Copy transmitted to Moscow in instruction 633, June 8, not printed.

861.24/5-3045

*The Director, U.S.S.R. Branch, Foreign Economic Administration (Wesson), to the Acting Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. (Eremin)*⁵⁸

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1945.

DEAR MR. EREMIN: We are reviewing, in the light of the changed military situation, the industrial materials and equipment now on hand or on order which were contracted for prior to the end of hostilities in Europe for the purpose of providing lend-lease aid to the Soviet Government. As soon as our review of the information on essential Soviet military requirements has been completed, we shall be able to advise you of our decision with respect to particular items.

It would seem that, in any event, a large portion could not be approved for transfer on lend-lease terms to the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the principles which were announced to your Government as governing the continued provision of lend-lease aid to the U.S.S.R. in the changed military situation. I would, therefore, appreciate it if you would advise me whether your Government desires to purchase on a cash basis any industrial materials and equipment now on order or in stock which are in excess of the eligible requirements of the Soviet Government on straight lend-lease terms.

It is urgent that you advise me as soon as possible of the desire of your Government in this matter in order that your requirements on this cash payment basis may be considered along with the urgent requirements of other claimants.

We shall be pleased to explain to you the procedure for cash reimbursable transactions under the Lend-Lease Act.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. WESSON
Major General, U. S. Army

861.24/5-2145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Temporarily in the United States

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1945.

Could I secure advice from you concerning the policy which this Government should follow about retransfers of lend-lease items by the U.S.S.R.: More specifically, do you feel that the recommendation you made to the Department late in March, to the effect that penalties

⁵⁸ Copy transmitted to Moscow in instruction 633, June 8, not printed.

for retransfers should be applied by stopping shipments of specific items, requires modification because of V-E Day and the subsequent change in lend-lease transfers?

In one sense the need for a strict U.S. policy is greater than ever because the U.S.S.R. has negotiated supply agreements with Bulgaria, Rumania and Finland which provide that the U.S.S.R. will supply these countries with certain goods similar to those being provided through lend-lease.

On the other hand, the sharp curtailment of lend-lease which will be put into effect henceforth, together with stricter screening, will give us a much narrower base upon which to levy penalties. Moreover, the military may regard stoppage of any particular transfers as inimical to the war effort. And finally while the retransfers will be of items already in Eastern Russia the penalties will apply against items to be delivered mostly by way of the Pacific.

The two Recommendations given below have been discussed in the Coordinating Committee. Your opinion will be decisive in securing their acceptance, or rejection, or alteration. You will note that Recommendation 2 puts very complete power in the hands of the Embassy.

1. The United States Government should again formally ask the U.S.S.R.:

(a) To provide it with full information, within a reasonable period, concerning past transfers of lend-lease goods and of similar goods to third governments or any other public authority.

(b) To accept the principle that it will authorize no assignment to a third government or other public authority of items similar to those received from the United States as lend-lease aid until the matter has been referred to and agreement received from the Government of the United States.

2. In the event that such information and assurances are not secured after a reasonable time, the United States Government will, upon the recommendation of its Embassy in Moscow, cease shipments of specific items which have been transferred without authority.

861.24/5-1645

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union
(Novikov)*

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1945.

SIR: I have received your note of May 16 in reply to my communication of May 12 with reference to the future United States policy covering the delivery of Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union.

I am pleased to note that the Soviet Government is prepared to take cognizance of the decision of the Government of the United States that

the new situation created by the end of organized hostilities in the European Theater makes it necessary to readjust the current Lend-Lease program covering the delivery of supplies to the Soviet Union.

As I pointed out in my note of May 12 the United States Government intends to fulfill the agreed to program in Annex III of the Fourth Protocol and to deliver such other supplies as may be now on hand or on order for the Soviet Union which may be justified on the basis of adequate information regarding the essentiality of Soviet military supply requirements and demands for such supplies in the changed military situation. Moreover, as indicated in my note of May 12 future Lend-Lease programs for the Soviet Union will be based on the same criteria of adequate information regarding the essentiality of Soviet military requirements and of the competing demands for such supplies in the changed military situation. My Government urges upon you the need for furnishing the necessary information as promptly as possible.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.24/5-2845 : Telegram

*The Chief of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union
(Deane) to the War Department*⁵⁹

Moscow, 28 May 1945.

M 24482. To Protocol Committee (York) from Spalding: At a meeting with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Mikoyan 28 May, a lend lease program for the period 1 July to 31 December 1945 was submitted to Ambassador Harriman. All of the program was stated to be directly related to the support of projects visualized under annex III, and to be in addition to the annex III, Arctic, Airways, fishing program, and to certain Fourth Protocol equipment undelivered by July 1945.

All the supplies were to be shipped in the existing Pacific Fleet via the Pacific, unless interrupted, when the Fleet would be diverted to Soviet northern ports. One exception was made in the case of 10,000 short tons of petroleum products per month from Abadan which were to be shipped via Iran.

The Ambassador requests that steps be taken to leave, for the time being, sufficient tank cars in Iran to provide for this movement. This should not affect current plans for PGC as shipments could be handled by Iranian railroad without use of American personnel.

The total tonnage of the program: 800,000 short tons, of which 400,000 short tons would be tanker products.

A study of the program will be made here and recommendations

⁵⁹ For suggestion of the conference reported in this telegram, see meeting between Harry L. Hopkins and Marshal Stalin on May 27, *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, vol. I, p. 35.

submitted as soon as possible. These will include: food products, locomotives and rolling stock, the subject of recent cables.

General Rudenko is submitting the list in Washington.⁶⁰ [Spalding.]

[DEANE]

861.24/5-3045: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 30, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received May 30—3:20 p. m.]

1812. From Harriman supplementing Deane's Army cable M-24482, May 28, to President's Protocol Committee. In my call at Stalin's suggestion on Molotov and Mikoyan yesterday afternoon to discuss Lend-Lease matters, Mikoyan stated that he had been informed that we had been diverting to France, Belgium, UNRRA, etc., industrial equipment ordered by the Soviet Govt under the Third and Fourth Protocols which thus far had not been delivered. These undelivered orders, he said, totalled about \$330,000,000. He requested that such equipment be not transferred to third parties and that orders for industrial equipment placed in the US by the Soviet Govt be not cancelled or at least that the Soviet Govt be advised in advance of any cancellations.

I stated and reiterated several times that their failure to accept our proposal for the 3-c credit agreement was the cause of the present situation. I explained the legal limitations with which we were faced in connection with Lend-Lease on the termination of hostilities in Europe and reminded them that their representatives in Washington beginning a year ago had been fully and repeatedly forewarned that the present situation would result without an agreement on 3-c. Molotov inquired whether I had any suggestions to make which might facilitate in clearing up the present deadlock. I replied that I could offer no suggestion under Lend-Lease and that, in my opinion, it would now be necessary to obtain legislation from Congress repealing the Johnson Act⁶¹ and authorizing postwar credits. I added that I would, of course, advise my Govt of the conversation and request information. I request that I be urgently informed on this question including our decision regarding remaining equipment for partially completed projects and whether any arrangements other than cash payment can be made whereby deliveries of any of the other equipment on order can be effected.

⁶⁰ Regarding the list submitted by the Soviet Embassy on May 30, see footnote 54, p. 1003.

⁶¹ Approved April 13, 1934; 48 Stat. 574.

I assured them that I knew all Soviet requests would be viewed sympathetically and that the new situation did not signify any unfriendly attitude on part of my Govt. However, I did not give them any encouragement that the equipment in question could now be delivered to the Soviet Govt under Lend-Lease terms.

Molotov stated that no reply had been received to the Soviet note of January 30 [3] and asked for such a reply. Although I reminded Molotov that I had told him at the meeting in which he handed me the note that in my opinion, it was inadvisable to combine the Lend-Lease period and postwar credits, I do feel that some reply or explanation is due the Soviet Govt to this note of January 30 [3] and would appreciate being informed so that I can officially advise Molotov of our position in regard to his note.

HARRIMAN

861.24/5-3045

*The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. (Rudenko)*⁶²

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1945.

DEAR GENERAL RUDENKO: With reference to General Wesson's letter of May 19, 1945, to Mr. Eremin and the subsequent discussion between them, I am setting forth the cash payment procedure and terms that would apply to the transfer to the U.S.S.R. of supplies now on order or in stock and covered by Soviet lend-lease requisitions which the Soviet Government desires to purchase and the FEA agrees to furnish on this basis.

The supplies which your Government desires to obtain on a cash basis should be described in letters to the FEA in terms of the serial numbers of the Soviet requisitions, or portions thereof, covering such supplies.

The Soviet Government shall agree to pay for the supplies in dollars upon the presentation of bills to the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission by the FEA. These bills would include:

(a) The contract price of the supplies plus 15% of such contract price to cover transportation, storage and accessorial charges; or a proper portion of the contract price plus 15% thereof, where only a portion of the supplies covered by a contract are involved.

(b) In cases where the supplies are moved on WSA⁶³ vessels, the bills would include the ocean freight on the supplies, which includes port, stevedoring and other cargo expenses directly related to the handling of the supplies. In cases where the supplies are moved on

⁶² Copy transmitted to Moscow in instruction 633, June 8, not printed.

⁶³ War Shipping Administration.

Soviet flag vessels, the Soviet Government would pay the port, stevedoring and other cargo expenses directly related to the handling of the supplies.

If the Soviet Government makes a request to purchase specified supplies on the above basis and the FEA agrees to provide the supplies, and the Soviet Government subsequently determines not to accept the supplies, the Soviet Government shall pay any net losses to the United States, including contract cancellation charges, resulting from such determination by the Soviet Government. The United States Government shall have the right to dispose as it sees fit of any supplies which the Soviet Government does not call forward and ship within six months after it is advised of their availability on a cash payment basis and the Soviet Government shall pay any net losses to the United States resulting therefrom.

I would appreciate it if you would advise me whether the above procedure and terms are acceptable to your Government.

As General Wesson stated in his letter of May 19, 1945 to Mr. Ereminev, it is urgent that we be advised of the desire of your Government to purchase supplies in stock or on order in excess of eligible Soviet requirements on straight lend-lease terms in order that your Government's requirements on this cash basis may be considered along with the urgent requirements of other competing claimants for the supplies.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

861.24/6-145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes)

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1945—3 p. m.

153. Consumption of indigenous supplies by Soviet troops in your country and exports to Russia or other Russian controlled areas on basis of reparations or other grounds are factors which must be considered by supply authorities in connection with allocation of world supplies on most efficient basis. Although it is realized that accurate information is difficult to obtain please telegraph any information available on consumption of food or other essential supplies by Soviet forces in your country and exports to Russia or Russian controlled areas, including exports farm machinery, maintenance and operating supplies and comparable items.

Sent to Sofia, Bucharest, Belgrade and Budapest;⁶⁴ repeated to Moscow.⁶⁵

GREW

⁶⁴ As Nos. 153, 278, 119, and 65, respectively.

⁶⁵ As No. 1191.

861.24/5-3045 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1945—8 p. m.

1208. Your 1812, May 30, 6 p. m. We have continued handling and discussing Russian lend-lease and credit policies along the lines discussed with you here. We will inform you separately regarding exact volume of industrial equipment cancelled or diverted.⁶⁶

FEA advised the Soviet Purchasing Commission on May 18 that it is prepared to continue deliveries on partially shipped industrial plants covered by approved requisitions. The Commission has been advised, however, that further deliveries on the plants for which proportionately small deliveries have been made should be made on cash payment of the total cost of the plants including the cost of patent rights. Plants in this category would include the Third Protocol oil refineries not the Second Protocol refineries, and would include also the tie plate mill and the glass bulb plant. The Purchasing Commission has not yet replied.

With respect to credits, the Department's views remain substantially as stated in Dept's 173 and 183 of January 26 and 27, in departmental memo of April 19⁶⁷ handed to you in Washington and in your helpful 1127 of April 11. At present no arrangements other than cash payment can be made whereby delivery of equipment excluded by President's directive of May 11 regarding lend-lease may be effected. On May 19 FEA asked the Soviet Purchasing Commission whether it desired to purchase on a cash basis any of these supplies ineligible for straight lend-lease and the procedure for cash payment on delivery was explained to the Commission in a letter of May 30. The Commission has not yet replied.

Hearings are taking place in the Senate Finance Committee on the repeal of the Johnson Act (re private credits) and early action is expected. The Department and Treasury have indicated no objection to a Chase Bank proposal that it buy \$6,000,000 of Soviet gold at Vladivostok for shipment to U.S.

State and Mr. Crowley are recommending that the President during next few days send a message to Congress requesting expansion of Export-Import Bank to \$3,500,000,000 and elimination of default restrictions. This amount would include about a billion for possible negotiation with the Soviets if events so warrant. The Congressional Committees would be so informed in executive session.

⁶⁶ See telegram War 13071, 6 June, to Moscow, *infra*.

⁶⁷ See memorandum by Mr. Collado, p. 997.

With respect to Molotov's note of January 3 or 4 (your 29), Dept's 183 authorized you to reply. Since then this Government has withdrawn the 3-c offer, and the suggested interim arrangement re Schedule 2 (point 5) is no longer appropriate. You are again authorized to reply with appropriate modifications in light of new conditions.

GREW

861.24/6-645 : Telegram

The President's Soviet Protocol Committee to the Chief of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)

WASHINGTON, 6 June 1945.

War 13071. To Harriman from Protocol Committee (York) signed Wesson reference your State 1812 of May 30, 1945.

1. Reference Mikoyan's comments on cancellation of orders and diversion to France, etc., we have proceeded under Protocol Committee decisions at meeting you attended to cancel all unproduced raw material.

2. (a) Requisitions for industrial equipment cancelled where contracts not entered into and contracts are in process of cancellation when W.P.B.⁶⁸ advises no production has started.

(b) Equipment requirements for Annex III and supporting programs as approved by Protocol Committee being manufactured and delivered on AA-1 rating.

(c) Diversions of equipment being effected to fulfill approved requirements of western European claimants under policy directive of Protocol Committee.

(d) Remaining equipment offered to Sov Purchase for cash, terms cost plus 15% accessorial charges including storage and inland freight. No reply to offer received from Sov Purchase. Unless reply to purchase received forthwith cancellation instructions will be issued in order to liquidate account economically for U.S. Government.

861.24/6-845 : Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the War Department

Moscow, 8 June 1945.

M 24603. To Protocol Committee (York) : The Ambassador concurs in the following and urges that immediate action be taken.

Since receipt of Soviet list of 28 May stating their requirements for last half of 1945, we have maintained continuous pressure in an effort

⁶⁸ War Production Board.

to have Soviet authorities justify requests. They have made some attempt to do this in oral discussions, but generally speaking, we have had little success. The climax came this morning with the receipt of a letter, from Vice Commissar of Foreign Trade of which pertinent extracts follow:

“During our last conversations, I gave you detailed explanations regarding the matters connected with our requisition of 28 May 1945 on Lend Lease deliveries for the period from 1 July through 31 December 1945; furthermore, your attention was called to the fact that this requisition is to cover the minimum requirements of the Far East in deliveries of equipment and material necessary in order to meet the urgent needs and to strengthen the defense capabilities of this region and likewise, for undertaking measures connected with the Far East. In particular, I have emphasized more than once that the requisition of 17 October 1944 (Annex III)⁶⁹ was only an addition to the Fourth Protocol and has never been considered by us fully satisfying the full requirements of the Far East.”

“Communications equipment: There should be no doubt whatsoever that this equipment, as well as all other, is fully for the Far East, and for the undertakings in connection with this region.”

“Taking into consideration the urgent nature of the measures being undertaken in the Far East, the short time of delivery (until the end of this year) and the necessity of avoiding dragging out of deliveries, I shall be grateful to you for the quickest information of your offers in carrying out our requisitions.”

The above comment on communication equipment is typical of comments on other items. From this you may obtain some indication of the difficulty which we are having in changing the Soviets' point of view and procedure that has been in existence since the inauguration of Lend Lease. Nevertheless, we have ample justification for supporting the purposes for which Annex III and the list of May 28 are intended. If our support is to be effective, it must be accomplished with the minimum delay. We definitely believe that it is to the United States' interest to make certain that our support is timely and effective even at the risk of supplying the Soviet Union some items over and above the needs which could be fully justified. For this reason, we have selected a list of items from the May 28 list which we know will be required to support the purposes of Annex III, at least in some amount. In most cases, we cannot give full justification for the amounts requested and an effort to force the Soviet authorities to do so would be so time consuming as to destroy the effectiveness of our aid. Factors considered in making up this list and our recommendations are:

(1) A reduction of the East-bound load on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, as this railroad is the limiting factor in the Far East military effort.

⁶⁹ See footnote 59, p. 942.

(2) That no material will be approved unless it can be shipped prior to 1 January 1946.

(3) That no equipment will be approved unless it can be installed and ready for operation by 1 February 1946.

(4) That, at an early date, an alternate plan will be made, to become effective if the capacity of the Pacific route is reduced by enemy action, this because the recommended list should then be reduced by the amount of those items then available in Western Russia but which had not been shipped by rail to the Far East because of the limitations of the Trans-Siberian capacity.

(5) As detailed breakdown of many items is not available, it is assumed that appropriate screening will be done in Washington.

(6) The supply of raw materials which will be fabricated in the Far East is justified in view of the rail transportation situation.

(7) Shipments should be scheduled not on an equal monthly basis, but so that for each month the full capacity of the Pacific Fleet is utilized, and shipments of any items advanced to the maximum practicable. The possible interruption of the route makes this imperative. Every effort should be made to fill to capacity all ships available for sailing in July.

It is recommended:

(a) That the Soviet Purchasing Commission be informed that except as indicated in the following, no item or quantity will be approved without adequate justification.

(b) That the Soviet Purchasing Commission be informed promptly of the action taken on those items which are approved (and the Military Mission be advised).

The list referred to above and the specific recommendations are contained in M 24602.⁷⁰

[DEANE]

861.24/6-945: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1945—7 p. m.

1265. Part I. The Coordinating Committee of the Dept recently considered the problem of transfers of lend-lease goods and of similar goods by the USSR to third governments. It made the following recommendations after consultation with you:

"1. The US Government should again formally address the USSR as follows:

⁷⁰ Dated June 8, not found in Department files, but see footnote 54, p. 1003.

“(a) Requesting full information concerning past and future proposed transfers of lend-lease goods to third governments or any other public authority so that such retransfers may be considered by the US for approval in accordance with the terms of the Lend-Lease Act and the Master Agreement.

“(b) Demanding acceptance by the USSR of the principle that it will authorize no assignment to a third government or other public authority of items similar to those received from the US as lend-lease aid until the matter has been referred to and agreement received from the US Government.

“(c) Indicating that should such information and assurances not be forthcoming the US will take these factors into account in considering the essentiality of items requested by the USSR.

“2. In the event that such information and assurances are not promptly obtained, the US Government should, upon the recommendation of the Embassy in Moscow, cease shipments of specific items.”

These Recommendations become the policy of the Department. The substance of Recommendation 1 should be presented by you to the Soviet Government in Moscow. Implementation of Recommendation 2 will fall primarily upon the Supply Mission in Moscow.

A copy of the complete Coordinating Committee document is being forwarded to you.⁷¹

Part II. As implementation of Recommendation 1, you should inform the appropriate officers of Soviet Government in Moscow as follows:

1. No answer has been received from the Soviet Government to an *aide-mémoire* of July 6 and note of December 19⁷² on the question of transfers to third countries or authorities of articles similar to those received under lend-lease. As a matter of principle this Government expects all countries receiving lend-lease to consult it before transferring similar items.

2. The Lend-Lease Act and the Lend-Lease Agreement with the USSR provide that lend-lease articles will not, without the consent of the President of the United States, be transferred to third countries or authorities. According to information received by this Government some such transfers have been made by the Soviet Government, and the US Government now requests full information concerning such past transfers, as well as future proposed transfers, in order that appropriate consideration may be given to such cases of retransfer with a view to determining whether such transfers can be approved by the US Government or what other action might seem appropriate to take in the circumstances.

⁷¹ Not printed.

⁷² *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1098 and 1157, respectively.

3. In the event that articles or materials of lend-lease origin, or of articles or materials similar to those received from the US under lend-lease, are in fact transferred by any receiving government to third countries, other than in accordance with the principle of consultation and agreement with this Government, the U.S. Government will regard such transfers as evidence that the government in question no longer needs from the US the specific articles or materials thus transferred.

4. Since the Soviet Government has not as yet formally replied to previous requests which ask it to confirm acceptance of the above mentioned principles, the US Government must of necessity consider this fact in determining the essentiality of future requests by the Soviet Government until a reply has been obtained.

5. It is the earnest hope of the US Government that an early reply accepting these principles will be received from the Soviet Government in order to avoid delays in reaching an understanding concerning future deliveries.

GREW

861.24/6-1145 : Telegram

*The Chief of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union
(Deane) to the War Department*

Moscow, 11 June 1945.

M 24647. To Protocol Committee (York) from Harriman: Ref War 14274 dated 9 June 1945.⁷⁴ Please show to Clayton.

Spalding and I saw Mikoyan this afternoon in order to obtain latest information for your meeting tomorrow morning. He showed every disposition to attempt to give us as much information as possible as to why they needed the items on the May 28 list.

1. His first request is that the available shipping be filled to capacity during July and August. He said, "every day is precious." I believe that it is vitally important to fulfill this request and strongly urge that in addition to annex III, items from the new list be ordered forward to fill these ships to capacity both for weight and measurement during this period.

2. He emphasized the need of trucks and hoped that shipment of all the trucks in annex III could be completed as soon as possible and in addition at least 7,000 trucks a month during July and August. I recommend that as many trucks as possible be shipped during this period as there can be no question that they will be of great value and save fail [*rail?*] transportation urgently needed for troops and other supplies.

⁷⁴ Not found in Department files.

3. He asked for maximum shipment of meat both as requested in annex III and in the new list. Although I explained the difficulty of the meat situation he insists on the importance of this request. There can be no doubt that the meat is needed if it can be made available.

4. He stated that the Army boots requested in annex III and the new list were of particular importance and he hoped that earliest possible delivery could be made. He said that the troops in that area had no replacement boots.

5. He explained that the request for items covering oil pipe, for borings, pumps, compressors, etc. was to develop the capacity of the Sakhalin Fields and to complete the Sakhalin pipeline from Sovisky to Komsomolsk. Additional oil production in this area and completion of the pipeline would undoubtedly be of great value. I therefore recommend acceptance of these items.

6. In explaining some of the other items he emphasized the importance of fulfilling the uncompleted Fourth Protocol shipments which are also included in the new list. He mentioned for example radio items and other equipment. He explained the need for radio stations because of the lack of communications in the very large area of the theater.

7. He explained the need for PBY⁷⁵ aircraft not only for reconnaissance but for communication over the water route between the ports of Vladivostok, Sov[yetskaya] Gavan, Amur River ports, Sakhalin ports, Nagaevo and Kamchatka. I recommend approval if planes are available.

8. He emphasized the need for petroleum and other tanker products to the Far East and the blending agents including those from Abadan. He is very anxious that the Abadan product should be delivered over the Persian route.

9. He stated that all of the industrial equipment requested was for facilities in Siberia and emphasized the need of the port equipment both Naval and Merchant. I spoke of the length of time that it might take to deliver the equipment and he said he was ready to work out a credit arrangement for the portion unshipped at the termination of hostilities if we so desired.

10. I did not have the time to go over many of the other items but he confirmed my opinion that the recommendations for approval of items we have made so far are sound under the conditions described above.

11. He said that all of the raw materials were necessary but he did not select any particular items of priority. I got the impression that he knew the list well and that the need for individual items had been carefully studied.

⁷⁵ "Catalina" twin-engine Navy patrol bomber.

To sum up, I recommend that we keep shipments to the Far East at full capacity of the shipping available as long as these ports are open. I recognize that it will be desirable to make some adjustments to be effective when this route is closed. Before that time we should have more information on which to act.

Please telegraph if there is any information on particular items which you wish me to take up personally with Mikoyan.

I am sending Spalding to Washington leaving in the next few days to consult there and be of such assistance as he can in connection with the above. [Harriman.]

[DEANE]

861.24/7-2245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page)⁷⁶

Moscow, June 11, 1945.

Present: Mr. W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
Major General Sidney P. Spalding, Chief of Supply
Division
Mr. Edward Page, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy
Mr. A. A. Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade
Soviet Interpreter

Subject: Termination of Lend-Lease.

The Ambassador stated that after his recent talk with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Mikoyan on Lend-Lease matters he had immediately telegraphed to Washington regarding the industrial equipment items of the Fourth Protocol that had remained unshipped. He explained that the undelivered parts of plants on which shipments had already been made were receiving special consideration but that as far as other items were concerned there was no way those shipments could be made under the law except against cash payment. The Ambassador continued that he never understood why the Soviet Government had been unwilling to come to an agreement on the credit terms previously offered to it under 3C. He had written on August 31, 1944 about his concern as to what would happen unless such credit arrangements were made. This was past history; however, the Ambassador wished to make it clear that the American authorities had over a year ago given notice to the Soviet Government as to the situation which would arise in connection with Lend-Lease upon the termination of hostilities in Europe in case credit arrangements were not made. The fact that Marshal Stalin had said that such notice had not been given had greatly disturbed the Ambassador and had caused him carefully to go

⁷⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department in covering despatch 1824, June 22, from Moscow; received July 26.

into the record. For that reason he wished to refer to his letter of August 31 and to quote several sentences of it. These stated:

“I have been asked to call to your attention the fact that until a financial agreement along the lines proposed is reached it is impossible for my Government to put into production these items, that after the termination of hostilities there is at present no legal way that my Government can extend credits to the Soviet Union to the extent required, and that unless some financial agreement is reached prior to the termination of hostilities with our common enemy, shipments under Lend-Lease will automatically cease. There is at present no other legal way my Government can finance future shipments and considerable time may elapse before other financial arrangements can be made. A situation of this kind would be regretted by my Government since as you know it is its policy and desire to render the fullest assistance within its power to the Soviet Union.”

The Ambassador said that his letter also expressed his personal concern over the situation and his willingness to come in and see Mr. Mikoyan at any time to discuss the matter.

The Ambassador continued that his main reason for going into past history was to make it absolutely clear that his Government had done everything in its power to take measures to meet the Lend-Lease situation which would arise upon the termination of hostilities in Europe. In this connection he wished also to point out that in May 1944 Assistant Secretary Acheson had explained fully the situation to Mr. Stepanov. Therefore Marshal Stalin's statement that the Soviet Government had not been given sufficient notice did not conform to the facts.

The Ambassador continued that the American authorities were now trying to work out some measure to permit the shipment of items for uncompleted plants. He did not know exactly where this matter stood at the present time but knew that the Soviet Purchasing Commission and the Lend-Lease authorities were working on it. However on other items the Soviet authorities in the United States had been informed that they would be delivered only against cash. Under existing American law there was no other way to arrange this.

Mr. Mikoyan stated that the Ambassador's statement was not the one the Soviet Government had expected. With respect to the back history he must remark that Marshal Stalin was correct in his statement that sufficient notice had not been given. It was true that the Ambassador and Mr. Acheson had stated that upon the termination of hostilities supplies should be made available on a credit or cash basis. The American authorities had put forward certain proposals and it would have been surprising if the Soviet authorities had merely turned down the United States proposals without putting forward their own. They had done so and also stated that they would agree

to pay for undelivered items after the war. This had never been disputed. The negotiations over credit however were still going on—there had been no rejection or refusal to discuss this matter. In addition Mr. Mikoyan had been informed that the American Government was continuing its studies on post war credit arrangements. Mr. Mikoyan stated that he had hoped that the Soviet Government would be given notice in advance concerning the cessation of shipments. If the United States desired to stop shipments he expected that before doing so the two sides might get together and work out some kind of a *modus vivendi* to cover the intermediary period. Mr. Mikoyan stated that the very good collaboration, insofar as supplies were concerned, that existed during the war gave him reason to believe that a way could be found to handle Lend-Lease shipments upon the termination of hostilities and thus to wind up a good job. He expressed gratitude for the assistance rendered the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease.

The Ambassador stated that perhaps Mr. Mikoyan did not understand the functioning of the American Government. The American Government was not run by administrative decisions but by authority from Congress. No action could be taken except under the authority from Congress. The Ambassador continued that he could not accept Mr. Mikoyan's statement that the Soviet Government had not been advised in good time as to the present situation. American officials had repeatedly explained to the Russian authorities how Lend-Lease would terminate upon cessation of hostilities. This was necessitated by law—by Congress. Definite suggestions had been made to cover the present situation. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Stepanov had discussed the matter for over six months. The American Government had made as great concessions as it possibly could to meet the wishes of the Soviet Government. Before the end of last year the Soviet Government was informed that the maximum concessions had been offered to it and that this was the final offer. In addition the difficulties which would arise if the American proposals were not accepted were pointed out. The Ambassador stated that the Soviet Government had of course the right to accept or decline the American proposals. However, the present situation had been fully explained and the American Government could not be blamed for the difficulties that have arisen. Soviet officials had been informed that the American authorities were giving consideration to the question of postwar credits. It was possible that arrangements would be made in the near future but Congressional authority must first be obtained. That would cause delay. The Ambassador concluded that he "simply could not accept any intimation that his Government had not acted in the best of faith and had not made every effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on this question. If the present situation was not satisfactory to the Soviet Union it was the Soviet Union's own doing."

Mr. Mikoyan stated that he could not agree with what Mr. Harriman had said and added that there would seem to have been some change in the situation since the Crimea Conference. For example, up to April the United States authorities had stated that they wished to obtain the Soviet requirements under the Fifth Protocol. They knew the war in Europe would shortly be over. This appeared to be proof to Mr. Mikoyan that neither the American nor Soviet authorities at that time contemplated the cessation of Lend-Lease shipments with the end of hostilities in Europe. The Soviet Government could not understand how the United States would decide to stop shipments without attempting to reach an agreement on the matter. During the war both sides had always been successful in reaching agreements because there was good will on both sides.

The Ambassador stated that Mr. Mikoyan was evidently laboring under a complete misunderstanding. He said that he regretted that Mr. Mikoyan felt that the United States Government had not been fair in this matter and again pointed out that Mr. Acheson, other officials of the American Government as well as he himself had again and again explained the situation to Soviet authorities. He was unable to say any more at the present time, except to assure him that the American Government had tried to be as fair and frank as possible. He regretted that he was unable to find words to convince Mr. Mikoyan of the position of his Government. He could only state the facts.

Mr. Mikoyan stated that he did not claim to understand the workings of Congress and the United States Government. But he knew that they were institutions that would always find a satisfactory solution when the interests of the country so demanded. He concluded that he, too, was sorry that he was unable to convince Mr. Harriman of the rightness of the Soviet position.

Mr. Harriman stated that Prime Minister Churchill had once said that no man could understand the politics of another country and few were wise enough to understand the politics of his own. So with Mr. Churchill's advice he would not attempt to explain American politics as he was not sure that he was wise enough to know them himself.

Mr. Mikoyan agreed with good humor with the Ambassador's remarks and the conversation, which had been somewhat strained, took an easier turn in the discussion of these matters.

861.24/6-1245: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 12, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received June 12—6:30 a. m.]

2017. ReDept's 1208, June 2. My formal reply to Molotov's *aide-mémoire* of January 3 made on June 9 referred to Under Secretary's communication to Ambassador Gromyko February 2 informing Gromyko that proposals were receiving careful consideration but that Lend-Lease Act provided only legal basis then available under US law by which industrial equipment items could be offered and put into production on a credit basis. I stated that the Soviet Govt had at an earlier date been advised that draft agreement for proposed supplement to Lend-Lease Agreement including 3-c had been the final offer possible for the US to make and remarked that it had been a source of regret to my Govt that Soviet Govt had not considered it possible to accept this offer as this was only legal method under which my Govt after defeat of Germany could continue to furnish most of undelivered equipment ordered under Protocol.

I also reminded Molotov that Soviet Embassy Washington had been again informed on March 24 that Soviet proposals for postwar credits were being carefully studied; that they would have to be considered apart from Fourth Protocol and that action in pursuance to them would require legislation and in any case take considerable time to be effected.

I concluded that my Govt had asked me to call above to his attention in response to his verbal inquiry at our meeting on May 28 and also to inform him that my Govt was of definite opinion that long term postwar credits constituted an important element in postwar relations between our two countries; that the enactment of necessary legislation for an extension of long term credits for postwar projects was being actively pursued but that until it was enacted by Congress no agreement could be formalized with respect to such credits.

HARRIMAN

861.24/6-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 12, 1945.

[Received June 12—2: 34 p. m.]

2029. Today's press publishes prominently on front page Stalin's and Molotov's messages to President and Secretary ⁷⁷ expressing gratitude and felicitations of Soviet people to American people and Government on third anniversary of Soviet-American Lend-Lease agreement.

[HARRIMAN]

861.24/6-1245

Memorandum by the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1945.

Subject: U.S.S.R. Request for Supplies for the Period July 1, 1945 Through December 31, 1945 Submitted to State Department May 30, 1945 ⁷⁸

1. As a result of my review of the items in this request, which it is my responsibility as Foreign Economic Administrator to determine whether or not they should be furnished with Lend-Lease funds, the following answer should be made to the Soviet Ambassador.

2. As regards the program of October 17 ⁷⁹ (Annex III of the Fourth Protocol) every effort is being made to supply the materials included in this program. As regards materials and equipment requested under the Fourth Protocol for the Arctic Region, Aviatrassa, Dalstroi, Narkomribprom, Sakhalin, Petropavlovsk and Soviet Harbor, these are being delivered within the limits of availability. For the Norilstroy program, only the food and petroleum products requested are being made available.

3. As regards the Soviet request for delivery during the period July 1–December 31 of equipment ordered under the Fourth Protocol but not shipped as of July 1, 1945 (estimated value \$300,000,000), and in addition \$98,000,000 of new orders, it is desired to point out that

⁷⁷ For Marshal Stalin's message of June 11, see text printed in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), vol. II, doc. 336, p. 244. For President Truman's reply of June 14, see *ibid.*, doc. 341, p. 247, or the extract in *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 96. For exchange of messages between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius on June 11 and 15, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 24, 1945, p. 1162.

⁷⁸ See footnote 54, p. 1003.

⁷⁹ See footnote 59, p. 942.

by July 1, 1945 the U.S. will have shipped to the U.S.S.R. under the several Protocols over \$1,000,000,000 worth of machinery and equipment. This is made up of power, electrical and metallurgical equipment, machine tools (\$375,000,000), construction equipment, general and special purpose equipment of various kinds and several plants of large capacity such as tire making, rolling mills, chemical plants and oil refinery plants. With few exceptions, everything asked for by the U.S.S.R. that could be fabricated, shipped and brought into production in a reasonable time was made available. The various programs which made up this equipment were approved by the U.S. when the war situation was still critical and its delivery to the U.S.S.R. has no doubt been a large factor in attaining the large production of munitions which the U.S.S.R. was able to deliver to the Red Army and Air Forces in the extensive military operations which brought Germany to her knees. With the defeat of Germany these production facilities must be many times more than adequate to meet any demands now foreseen. A continuation of the supply of equipment in quantity is not considered essential to Soviet military requirements and would serve in general only for rehabilitation of Soviet industry and would be contrary to the spirit of the Lend-Lease Act under which aid to Russia has and is now being given.

4. In view of this, equipment in excess of that necessary to meet the several programs specified in the second paragraph, which include items of machinery and equipment of over \$50,000,000 exclusive of transportation equipment, will not be furnished on lend-lease terms unless in specific cases satisfactory explanation of its need in support of operations in Siberia is furnished.

5. The United States is prepared, however, to transfer to the U.S.S.R. under the terms set forth in the letter of May 30, 1945 from the Foreign Economic Administrator to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, such of this equipment as the U.S.S.R. desires to purchase and as can be offered by the United States in the light of competing demands and availability.

6. The U.S. feels that it can no longer make the expenditures necessary to continue to produce or hold this equipment in the absence of an undertaking by the Soviet Government to purchase it. Accordingly we have found it necessary to take steps to protect the interests of the United States through the initiation of procedures for diversion of the equipment to other requirements and for cancellation in cases where no requirement exists or no production has begun. Since these plans are well under way, it is urgent that requests to purchase any of this equipment be received promptly.

7. As regards undelivered plants the Foreign Economic Administrator has written to the Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. asking to be advised

whether the Soviet Government agrees that further deliveries of certain plants, on which proportionately small shipments have been made, will be upon cash payment by the Soviet Government of the total cost of the plants including the cost of any licenses under applicable patents. A prompt reply should be made to this letter in order that this matter may be settled.

8. As regards the raw materials, petroleum products, chemical products, rubber products, foodstuffs and miscellaneous materials requested, I am prepared to support the items listed in Cable M-24602 of 8 June 1945 to the War Department from the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow.⁸⁰ I assume that the advice as to the quantities which will be approved will be sent the Russians after the Protocol Committee has determined their availability.

861.24/6-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 15, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received June 15—4: 05 p. m.]

2106. For the Acting Secretary. In my talk with Mikoyan, referred to in Army cable M 24647, June 10 [11] to York and Clayton, I also answered the question he raised as reported in my 1829 [1812], May 30, 6 p. m., in accordance with information received in army cable War-13071, June 7 [6], re the possibility of delivery of the unshipped items of industrial equipment under the Fourth Protocol.

[Here follows summary of conversation reported in memorandum of June 11, printed on page 1018.]

I have a feeling he is very much on the spot with his own people. When I remained firm he became more reasonable and expressed the hope that something could be done.

In connection with the industrial equipment requested under the new list of May 28 he said the Soviet Govt was ready to agree to purchase under credit terms the unshipped items at the termination of the Pacific war. This was reported in first Army cable referred to above.

I would appreciate receiving information as to our policy in respect to reopening the question of 3-c in the event Russia participates in the Pacific war. If we are ready to do so would it be possible to negotiate now a 3-c agreement under which the Soviet Govt paid for such items as cannot be shipped promptly under long term credit? If this

⁸⁰ Not found in Department files, but see telegram M 24603, 8 June, from Moscow, p. 1012.

seems desirable I would suggest that I be instructed to attempt to negotiate such a credit with Mikoyan direct because of the difficulty which Mr. Acheson had in attempting to deal with Stepanov in Washington. I don't know whether I can be any more successful here. I feel that many of the items requested on this new list would be useful to the Russians if the war against Japan lasts a considerable period of time and thus benefit US. They would also be useful to the Russians after the termination of hostilities.

As a matter of policy I hope a way can be found to offer again the 3-c agreement for industrial items which can be justified as possibly contributing to the purposes of Annex III.

HARRIMAN

861.24/6-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 21, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received June 21—4: 15 p. m.]

2210. Personal for Harry Hopkins.⁸² Am gravely concerned over delays in action on Russian Lend-Lease requests submitted while you were in Moscow.⁸³ Hope you can see Sid Spalding, now in Washington, and after obtaining from him the facts and our recommendations do what you can to get immediate action.

HARRIMAN

861.24/6-1545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945—7 p. m.

1402. Referring to suggestion in your 2106, June 15, of reopening 3(c) discussions, Department feels that no such discussions should be undertaken as long as Russia is not in the Pacific War. With reference to your suggestion that such discussions when undertaken should be carried on in Moscow, present feeling of the Department is that on account of many technical questions involved it would be preferable to have discussions here.

Present position of FEA is that in view of large deliveries of industrial equipment to Russia and Congressional attitude on lend-lease it cannot furnish on lend-lease terms undelivered industrial equipment in Fourth Protocol (exclusive of Annex III and Arctic program) and

⁸² Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

⁸³ For documentation on the Hopkins mission to Moscow, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, pp. 21 ff.

industrial equipment in new list of requirements submitted to you on May 29, unless Russians give full justification making clear why equipment is necessary to support military operations in the Pacific. Even if Russia enters Pacific War and 3(c) Agreement is made to cover items undelivered at end of war, industrial equipment can be delivered currently on straight lend-lease only on basis of justification of essentiality to support military operations in Pacific Theatre. Dept is replying shortly to Soviet Embassy's note of May 30 which transmitted list of new requirements through end of this year.⁸⁴ Summary of this note will be telegraphed to you.

GREW

861.24/6-2645

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union
(Novikov)*⁸⁵

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1945.

SIR: The statement of the lend-lease requirements of the Soviet Government that you transmitted, with a covering note of May 30, 1945,⁸⁴ is being carefully studied by the United States Government in the light of the principles of lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union that were explained in my note of May 12, 1945. As soon as possible you will be advised as to the action of this Government as regards this statement of requirements.

I wish, however, to advise you now that as regards Note One at the end of your list of requirements, every effort is being made to supply the materials included in the October 17, 1944 program⁸⁶ and that programs have been approved for the Arctic Region, Aviatrassa, Dalstroi, Narkomribprom, Sakhalin, Petropavlovsk and Soviet Harbor. These programs, which contain substantial quantities of machinery and equipment, have been approved on the basis of being in direct support of the October 17, 1944 program. The food and petroleum products requested in the Norilstroy Program are also being made available.

With reference to your request for machinery and equipment ordered under the Fourth Protocol, and undelivered as of July 1, 1945, and the additional items included in II (Machinery and Equipment) of your statement of requirements of May 30, I wish further to call your attention to the principles set forth in my note of May 12, 1945 that the delivery of supplies on lend-lease terms must be justified on the basis of adequate information regarding the essentiality of Soviet

⁸⁴ See footnote 54, p. 1003.

⁸⁵ The substance of this note was sent in telegram 1430, June 27, 4 p. m., to Moscow.

⁸⁶ See footnote 59, p. 942.

military supply requirements and in the light of competing demands for such supplies in the changed military situation. In the absence of adequate justification, the United States Government cannot supply on lend-lease terms any undelivered machinery and equipment ordered under the Fourth Protocol, or the items listed in II (Machinery and Equipment) in your note of May 30. In general, the future supply on lend-lease terms of machinery and equipment, in addition to that included in the approved programs mentioned in paragraph 2 above, will be limited to the items required in connection with field operations of Soviet forces.

Consequently, in the absence of an undertaking by the Soviet Government to purchase such undelivered machinery and equipment ordered under the Fourth Protocol as is in excess of that referred to above as eligible for lend-lease, the United States Government feels that it can no longer make the expenditures necessary to continue to produce or to hold this undelivered machinery and equipment. Accordingly, we are taking steps to protect the interests of the United States by diverting machinery and equipment to other requirements and by cancellation in cases where other requirements do not exist. Since these plans are well under way it is urgent that we be informed promptly if you wish to purchase any of this machinery and equipment. I am informed that much of this machinery and equipment can be delivered to your Government if you decide promptly to accept delivery under the terms transmitted to the Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. by the Foreign Economic Administrator, who is responsible for the distribution of this machinery and equipment.

As regards undelivered portions of plants the Foreign Economic Administrator has written to the Chairman of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission asking to be advised whether the Soviet Government wishes to accept further deliveries of certain plants on which proportionately small shipments have been made, upon cash payment by the Soviet Government of the total cost of the plants including the cost of any licenses under applicable patents. A prompt reply would be appreciated in order that this matter may be settled.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.24/6-2745

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union
(*Novikov*)⁸⁸

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1945.

SIR: In my note of June 26, 1945 I informed you that the statement of lend-lease requirements of the Soviet Government, transmitted

⁸⁸ Text quoted in Department's telegram 1435, June 27, 7 p. m., to Moscow.

with your covering note of May 30, 1945,⁸⁹ was being carefully studied by the United States Government and that you would be advised as soon as possible as to the action of this Government as regards this statement of requirements. I also advised you that every effort was being made to supply the materials included in the program of October 17, 1944, and in certain Arctic and related programs, and I indicated the policy of this Government in regard to the supplying of machinery and equipment. I now wish to inform you with reference to the remainder of the requirements in your request of May 30.

In view of the urgency of the situation, the United States Government is prepared to make available for shipment such of the above described remainder of supplies on your list of May 30, 1945 as can be procured and loaded on board ship on or before August 31, 1945, under the terms of our note of May 12, 1945 and in the light of available appropriations and competing demands for supplies in the changing military situation.

With the exception of the programs referred to in the note of June 26, the U.S. Government is prepared to accept requisitions, for production planning purposes only, for such items in your list of May 30 as can be made available under the terms of our note of May 12 requiring adequate information concerning Soviet military requirements and in the light of available appropriations and competing demands in the changing military situation, but which cannot be loaded on board ship until after August 31, 1945.

The President's Soviet Protocol Committee will advise the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington as to the items that may be requisitioned.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.24/7-1245

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union
(Novikov)

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1945.

SIR: In my note of June 27, 1945 I indicated to you the conditions under which the United States Government was prepared to make available for shipment certain of the lend-lease requirements of the Soviet Government transmitted with your note of May 30, that had not been covered by my note of June 26.

I now wish to inform you that the United States Government has extended by one month the period mentioned in my note of June 27, and is now prepared to make available for shipment the items referred to in that note if they can be procured and loaded on board ship on

⁸⁹ See footnote 54, p. 1003.

or before September 30, 1945, under the terms of our note of May 12, 1945 and in the light of available appropriations and competing demands for supplies in the changing military situation. In the case of items that cannot be loaded on board ship until after September 30, 1945, this Government will continue to accept requisitions on the basis indicated in the third paragraph of my note of June 27.⁹¹

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.24/8-1345

The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. (Rudenko)

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1945.

DEAR GENERAL RUDENKO: Reference is made to the agreement dated June 6, 1943 between the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union with respect to engineers and technicians from the United States who may perform duties within the U.S.S.R. in connection with the installation of projects transferred to the U.S.S.R. under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act. There are at present in the U.S.S.R., under this agreement, certain engineers and technicians performing duties in connection with the construction of the Second Protocol Oil Refineries and the construction of the tire manufacturing plant transferred to the U.S.S.R. under the Lend-Lease Act. A portion of the cost of these engineers and technicians is being paid for by the United States on a lend-lease basis.

We wish to advise your Government that upon the cessation of hostilities against Japan, the services of these engineers and technicians presently in the U.S.S.R. will cease to be eligible for provision on lend-lease terms. However, it is my understanding that the construction of the two projects referred to is approaching completion and it is not contemplated that the services of these engineers and technicians will be required for more than a few months longer. Accordingly, in order to avoid serious interference with the installation of the two projects in question, the United States would be prepared to continue the present arrangements under the agreement of June 6, 1943 provided that your Government will reimburse the FEA in dollars for the full cost to the United States of the services of these engineers and technicians on and after V-J Day, as proclaimed by the President of the United States. The continuation of the present arrangements on such a reimbursable basis will be subject to termina-

⁹¹ The notes of June 27 and July 17 were based upon decisions made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 23 and July 11, respectively.

tion upon notice to the Purchasing Commission by the FEA. It is suggested that reimbursement be made upon the presentation of bi-monthly bills to the Purchasing Commission by the FEA—the first bill to cover costs up to and including the last day of the second month following the month in which V–J Day shall occur.

It is urged that you advise me promptly if your Government agrees to such reimbursement, since, in the absence of such an agreement, it will be necessary for us to recall the engineers and technicians from the U.S.S.R.

In view of the imminence of V–J Day, and unless major unforeseen developments in the military situation arise, I wish to advise you that we shall probably not be able to furnish your Government with the operators from the United States requested in connection with the operation of the Second Protocol Refineries. I wish, therefore, to suggest that your Government may desire to make its own arrangements for the obtaining of operators for this purpose.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

103.9169 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1945—10 p. m.

1877. From FEA Crowley [to] U.S.S.R. Deane for Spalding.

1. Supplementing Protocol Committee's report on termination action included in War 50599 dated August 17,⁹² following is sent for your general information:

2. President on 18 August approved general policy for all countries as follows: (a) No new contracts will be entered into for goods to be furnished under Lend-Lease except for such items as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may approve for payment out of military appropriations, (b) Countries with which 3(c) agreements are in effect will take and pay for goods involved in contracts yet to be completed, goods awaiting shipment, those in transit, and inventories abroad, (c) Countries which have not entered into 3(c) agreements may obtain goods now in process of manufacture, in storage, awaiting shipment, being shipped, or in inventory abroad, upon their agreement to pay for them on such terms as may be determined by this Government, and (d) All uncompleted contracts for goods not to be delivered under (b) and (c) above shall be immediately reviewed to determine whether their completion would

⁹² Text of President Truman's directive of August 17 terminating Lend-Lease is included in telegram 7012, August 18, 4 p. m., to London, vol. VI, first section under United Kingdom. For subsequent modification of a portion, see telegram 7056, August 20, 6 p. m., to London, *ibid.* See also memorandum of August 21, *infra.*

be in the best interest of the U.S. Government and, unless so determined, such contracts will be cancelled.

3. In notifying General Rudenko on 20 August, the following letter was sent as to FEA items :

"In view of the termination of hostilities, the Foreign Economic Administration is desirous of entering into discussions and negotiations immediately with you relating to the discontinuance of its lend-lease aid to your government in an expeditious manner which will best promote the mutual interests of our respective governments and which will be consistent with the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act. I suggest in connection with such discussions and negotiations with respect to the lend-lease programs undertaken by the Foreign Economic Administration that the following general principles should apply: (a) No new contracts should be entered into for goods or services to be furnished on lend-lease terms. (b) Supplies which are now in the process of manufacture, in storage, awaiting shipment, or not yet transferred to your government, and services within presently agreed programs, may be obtained by your country to the extent that they are available against payment on appropriate terms and conditions. We also desire to discuss with you the amount and the terms and conditions of payment for existing lend-lease supplies which are in shipment or in inventory under the control of the U.S.S.R."

4. Discussions referred to will take place in Washington. You will be advised of progress. Meanwhile advise us of any considerations you believe necessary in preparing for discussions and advise as to possibilities of estimating inventory under control of U.S.S.R. [Crowley.]

BYRNES

861.24/8-2145

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property (Maxwell)

[WASHINGTON, August 21, 1945.]

LEND-LEASE TERMINATION

The Soviet Protocol Committee on August 17 sent out orders to the effect that loadings of Soviet ships in United States ports were to be stopped at once. Loadings of United States ships were also to be stopped and their cargoes discharged. In short, so far as practicable, transfers of lend-lease cargo to the U.S.S.R. were halted at the ports on August 17.

With respect to other lend-lease countries transfers are to be stopped only as of V-J Day.⁹³ The outcome is, therefore, that the U.S.S.R. is being treated on a different basis from other countries.

⁹³ The signing of surrender by Japan took place September 2; for documentation on the Japanese surrender, see vol. vi, section under Japan entitled "Surrender of Japan . . .", Part I.

When I inquired from John Hazard⁹⁴ about this, he informed me that the decision was taken deliberately and probably was part of a general squeeze now being put on the U.S.S.R. Certain reasons can, however, be alleged for the discrimination, such as the fact that the U.S.S.R. does not provide us with reverse lend-lease and the fact that the U.S.S.R. does not assist us with redeployment.

103.9169 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 25, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received August 25—3 p. m.]

3054. For Crowley. Have heard briefly on the radio this morning that you have announced a policy of offering repayment for equipment under order over 30 years at 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ percent interest.

It would be most helpful if I could be informed of the details in case this subject comes up in conversation with Soviet officials. Is this reimbursement under Lend-Lease or a credit offered by Export-Import Bank?

I fully understand that all negotiations will be conducted in Washington but would appreciate being kept generally informed of developments in negotiations with General Rudenko.

HARRIMAN

861.24/8-2745

The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. (Rudenko)

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1945.

DEAR GENERAL RUDENKO: Reference is made to my letter of August 18, 1945 outlining certain general principles with respect to the discontinuance of lend-lease aid to your Government.⁹⁵ I wish now to advise you concerning the application of these general principles in the special field of shipping.

In order that there may be no serious dislocation prejudicial to our mutual interests in the operation of vessels carrying supplies to your country, we are prepared to continue to provide on lend-lease terms,

⁹⁴ Secretary of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

⁹⁵ See telegram 1877, August 20, 10 p. m., to Moscow, p. 1081.

pursuant to practices prevailing prior to August 18, 1945, ocean transportation on U.S. owned or controlled vessels and services and supplies, with the exception of repairs, to vessels in U.S. ports owned or controlled by your Government. It should be understood that the supplies referred to in subparagraph (b) of my letter of August 18, 1945 would be included in the supplies in connection with which ocean transportation and shipping services and supplies would be provided on lend-lease terms under the proposed arrangement.

The proposed arrangement shall be operative from August 18, 1945 until 30 days after V-J Day, as officially announced by the President. In the absence of an extension beyond that date, the general principles outlined in my letter of August 18 shall become operative in the field of shipping at that time.

General C. M. Wesson will be pleased to discuss with you the implementation of the proposed arrangement.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

861.51/8-2845

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. (Rudenko) to the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley)*⁹⁶

In accordance with your offer concerning the purchase of the equipment and materials remaining in the United States after the termination of Lend-Lease and under outstanding Lend-Lease contracts the Government of the U.S.S.R. anxious to contribute in every possible way to the settlement of this problem agrees to obtain a credit for the procurement of the Lend-Lease materials and equipment remaining in the U.S. after the termination of Lend-Lease and under outstanding Lend-Lease contracts on the total amount of about 400 million dollars.

In addition to that in accordance with your offer our Government wants to obtain through the Export-Import Bank of Washington a credit of 1 billion dollars to finance new orders and the purchase of various kinds of goods.

Thus the total amount of the two credit arrangements approximates 1.400 million dollars.

I. We propose the following terms of the credit for the purchase of the Lend-Lease materials:

(1) The U.S.S.R. agrees to purchase such Lend-Lease equipment and materials as will be mentioned in our list on the amount of about 400 million dollars including locomotives, diesel-electric locomotives,

⁹⁶ Marginal notation on the original: "Submitted by General Rudenko to Mr. Crowley at meeting on August 28, 1945."

rails, pipes, spare parts for trucks, meat products, fats, breadstuff and industrial equipment. The complete list of these materials and equipment will be furnished by us within a few days.

(2) The period of the complete repayment of the credit is to be 30 years.

The following conditions of the repayment of the credit are suggested:

The repayment will start at the end of the 9th year and will proceed in the following manner:

Each year during the first four years

2,5% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid;

each year during the following four years

3,5% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid;

each year during the following four years

4,5% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid;

each year during the following four years

5,5% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid; and

each year during the last 6 years

6% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid.⁹⁷

(3) The annual interest rate of the credit is to be 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ % of the used part of the credit not repaid at the time when the payment is made.⁹⁸

(4) 10% of the price of the Governmental contracts with firms will be deducted.⁹⁹

(5) The storage expenses incurred by the U.S. Government will be paid according to their actual cost and the transportation expenses will be paid according to the export rates.¹

⁹⁷ On a retyped copy of this memorandum after this section the following passage has been interpolated:

"Comments on (2)

"Mr. Crowley stated that the FEA would try to work out these terms of amortization if this is possible without interference with negotiations with other countries on the disposition of lend-lease materials in inventory and under contract."

⁹⁸ On a retyped copy of this memorandum after this section the following passage has been interpolated:

"Comments on (3)

"Mr. Crowley agreed to this rate of interest."

⁹⁹ On a retyped copy of this memorandum after this section the following passage has been interpolated:

"Comments on (4)

"General Rudenko stated that manufacturers were offering the U.S.S.R. lower prices on new production than the Government contract price, that because of lower costs of production in the future manufacturers could sell at lower prices, and that in export trade it is customary for manufacturers to give discounts in prices.

"Mr. Crowley stated that the FEA could not agree to a 10 percent deduction in contract prices but that we would discuss the matter with the War Department and as soon as the amount of supplies which will be covered by the transaction is determined, we should have another meeting to discuss the prices at which the supplies will be transferred."

¹ On a retyped copy of this memorandum after this section the following passage has been interpolated:

"Comments on (5)

"Mr. Crowley said that the FEA would agree provided that it was administratively feasible to determine actual storage and transportation expenses."

II. General Rudenko would like you to instruct the F.E.A. to furnish us with complete information concerning the inventories of our orders.²

III. The following terms of a One Billion Dollar Credit which the Soviet Government wishes to obtain from the Export-Import Bank are proposed:

(1) The period of the complete repayment of the credit will be 30 years,

(2) The repayment will start at the end of the 9th year and will proceed in the following manner:

Each year during the first four years

2,5% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid;

each year during the following four years

3,5% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid;

each year during the following 4 years

4,5% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid;

each year during the following 4 years

5,5% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid;

each year during the last six years

6% of the total amount of the credit will be repaid.

(3) The annual interest rate of the credit is to be 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ % of the spent part of the credit not repaid at the time when the payment is made.³

103.9169/8-3145 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1945—noon.

1935. From FEA—Crowley. Your 3054 August 25. Soviet Government through General Rudenko on August 28 requested credit of

² On a retyped copy of this memorandum after this section the following passage has been interpolated:

“Comments on II

“General Wesson stated that the FEA had already begun work with the Treasury on such an inventory but that a complete and detailed study would take several weeks.

“It was agreed that General Rudenko would submit a list of the materials and equipment which the U.S.S.R. agrees to purchase and that the commodity representatives of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would proceed immediately with discussions to determine the amount of supplies available in each category in the list.”

³ On a retyped copy of this memorandum after this section the following passage has been interpolated:

“Comments on III

“Mr. Crowley stated that he would recommend to the Board of the Export-Import Bank the proposed 30 year period and terms of amortization. He said that he could not agree to a rate of interest of 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ percent but that he would recommend to the Board a rate of 3 percent. Mr. Crowley pointed out that the rate of interest on loans by the Export-Import Bank must be uniform for the various countries but that terms of amortization should be worked out in such a manner as not to embarrass the U.S.S.R. in the repayment of the loan and in the reconstruction of their country.”

\$400,000,000 to cover Lend-Lease material on hand or on order in the U. S., lists to be submitted subsequently. They offer repayment at $2\frac{3}{8}$ per cent interest and amortization beginning ninth year at $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent for first 4 years, $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent for second 4 years, $4\frac{1}{2}$ percent for third 4 years, $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent for fourth 4 years and 6 per cent for last 6 years. They also request that actual warehouse and transportation charges, rather than a percentage figure, be used in this transaction. They also request a discount of 10 percent from the contract price of the goods in question. They have been advised that the interest rate and amortization terms are probably acceptable but that no reply can be given as yet on the requested discount until clarification of the amounts and types of commodities to be sold is obtained.

It is contemplated that this proposed sale of Lend-Lease goods on hand and on order would take place under the Lend-Lease Act.

Soviet Government through General Rudenko has also requested an Export-Import Bank credit of \$1,000,000,000 for new purchases of additional material on interest and amortization terms identical to those requested on the Lend-Lease material. They have been advised that the interest rate at the Export-Import Bank must be uniform for all countries and that a rate of 3 percent, together with their proposed amortization terms, will be recommended to the Board of the Bank.

The Lend-Lease goods which they desire to obtain are informally understood to include among others, industrial equipment, locomotives, food, rails, pipe and steel. [Crowley.]

BYRNES

861.24/9-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 6, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received September 6—12:30 p. m.]

3182. ReDept's 1265, June 9. Vyshinsky has written me under date of September 2 along following lines:

In connection with your letter of June 12⁴ and Kennan's letter of August 2,⁵ I would like to inform you as follows:

The acceptance of the proposal contained in these letters concerning goods, similar to those received under Lend-Lease, would mean making a substantial change in the agreement of June 11, 1942 between the USA and the USSR⁶ (Article 3) which merely provides that

⁴ Based on telegram 1265, June 9, 7 p. m., to Moscow. p. 1014.

⁵ George F. Kennan, Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union, was Chargé during Ambassador Harriman's absence when the latter was attending the Conference of Berlin. Mr. Kennan's letter was a follow-up of the earlier one.

⁶ Signed at Washington: for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500.

the Soviet Govt without the agreement of the President of the US will not transfer defense materials received under Lend-Lease to third countries. Kennan's interpretation of this article in the sense that the Soviet Govt does not have the right, without the agreement of the President to transfer to third countries goods similar to those received under Lend-Lease is, therefore, unfounded and the USSR cannot agree to such an interpretation.

Taking into consideration the volume and character of Lend-Lease deliveries to the Soviet Union on the one part and the volume and character of Soviet exports on the other, the Soviet Govt finds no basis to introduce a change in the June 11 agreement.

Notwithstanding the importance of Lend-Lease deliveries to the Soviet Union, it should be kept in mind that the share of these deliveries in the over-all volume of resources and requirements of the USSR is comparably small.

Concerning Soviet exports during the war, these were very limited and were made to the degree necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. In exchange for goods exported, and in particular for goods similar to those received under Lend-Lease, the Soviet Union received from the countries to which these goods were sent raw material and produce which were greatly needed by the USSR in its wartime economy.

The fact that the Soviet Union exported materials similar to those received by it under Lend-Lease, therefore, cannot be regarded in any way as proof that the Soviet Union does not need to receive from the US materials or goods provided for in the Lend-Lease protocols.⁷

HARRIMAN

861.24/9-1345

Memorandum by Major General C. M. Wesson, Director, U.S.S.R. Branch, Foreign Economic Administration, to the Administrator (Crowley)

[WASHINGTON,] September 13, 1945.

Subject: Transfer by the U.S.S.R. to Third Nations Commodities Which are Similar to Those Received Under Lend-Lease Without the Approval of the U.S. Government

Our Government has been writing notes to Russia on this subject for nearly two years. These notes have been systematically ignored and the U.S.S.R. continued to export goods similar to those received

⁷ In telegram 3098, August 29, 3 p. m., from Moscow, printed in vol. II, p. 1022. Ambassador Harriman had stated: "Having observed carefully the effect on the Soviet Government of our generous Lend-Lease policy over the past four years I have not found that we have obtained any benefit in good-will on the part of the Soviet Government in connection with their actions which affect our interests. During the war we have obtained in my opinion full value for our Lend-Lease shipments through the strengthening of the Soviet war effort. However now that the war is over I see no gain to the United States in dealing with the Soviets on any other than a realistic reciprocal basis. I have found in my experience that such a policy is understood and respected by the Soviet Government and is more apt to obtain reasonably satisfactory results." (840.50-UNRRA/8-2945)

under Lend-Lease from the United States. It was not until September 2, when Lend-Lease to Russia had practically ceased, did Vyshinsky take up the matter with Mr. Harriman pointing out the Russian Government's attitude on this question, as expressed in the copy of the attached cable.⁸

If we desire a trade agreement with Russia protecting patents, etc., and if we want an agreement on fishing rights in the waters of the Aleutians and the Bering Sea, or any sort of settlement on Lend-Lease stocks now in the U.S.S.R., or any other agreements where there is a conflict of interest, we should find out where we stand before we grant any Export-Import loan.

861.24/9-1845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 18, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received September 18—12: 50 p. m.]

3305. For the Under Secretary. In view of Stalin's statements to both the Congressmen and to Senator Pepper that our Govt had not answered Soviet Govt's proposal of Jan. 3 with regard to long-term credit to Soviet Union,⁹ I have taken the liberty of addressing a letter to Vyshinski today inviting attention again to Ambassador Harriman's letters of June 9 (reEmbs 2017, June 12, 10 p. m.) and Aug 9 (reEmbs 2827, Aug 9, 10 p. m.)¹⁰ on this subject and asking Vyshinski to see that these communications are brought once more to Stalin's attention.

Sent Dept; rptd London, for Ambassador Harriman as 463.

KENNAN

861.24/9-2145

*The Executive of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee (York)
to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)*

WASHINGTON, 21 September, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. CLAYTON: Attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee, which was approved by the President on 20 September,

⁸ Telegram 3182, September 6, 2 p. m., from Moscow, *supra*.

⁹ See telegram 3277, September 15, 2 p. m., from Moscow, p. 881.

¹⁰ Not printed; it reported Ambassador Harriman's letter to Commissar Molotov stating that the Export-Import Bank had been authorized by legislation to extend credits to foreign countries and within its authority was prepared to give consideration to proposals which the Soviet Government might wish to put forward in Washington (840.50 UNRRA/8-945). For the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, approved July 31, 1945, see 59 Stat. 526. See also telegram 7910, August 6, from London, and telegram 6627, August 7, to London, vol. II, pp. 1003 and 1005, respectively.

1945. This memorandum terminates the existence of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee and no further business will be transacted by this agency.

I am sure that each member and each alternate member of the Committee can be justifiably proud of the record which has been achieved by the President's Soviet Protocol Committee. Obviously, the task could not have been accomplished without the continuous and whole-hearted support of all Governmental agencies connected with the program. For the Chairman, and in my own behalf, I wish to express my sincere gratitude for the support and cooperation which have been accorded my office throughout the history of the Protocol Committee.

With best wishes for your continued future success, I remain

Sincerely yours,

JOHN Y. YORK, JR.
Major General, U.S. Army

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee (Hopkins) to President Truman*¹¹

WASHINGTON, 7 September 1945.

Subject: Completion of the Work of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee

1. The President's Soviet Protocol Committee was established by direction of the President in October, 1942 to be responsible for the over-all coordination of Lend-Lease matters affecting Russia through action by appropriate existing agencies and in conformity with policies approved by him. (Copy of letter establishing Committee attached)¹²

2. The official proclamation of 2 September, 1945 as V-J Day logically terminates the duties assigned to the Committee. It is, therefore, recommended that the Committee be dissolved.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

861.24/9-2445

The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U. S. A. (Rudenko)

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1945.

DEAR GENERAL RUDENKO: Reference is made to the memorandum which you submitted to me at our meeting on August 28, 1945 con-

¹¹ Notation by President Truman: "Approved 9/20/45 Harry S. Truman".

¹² Not attached to file copy. The Committee was established by President Roosevelt on October 30, 1942; see the memorandum from President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, November 9, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 743.

taining the terms on which the Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to purchase lend-lease articles available for transfer to the U.S.S.R. out of articles on hand or on order in the United States. Your memorandum contained the following proposal with respect to the purchase of lend-lease supplies:

[Here follows text of the memorandum of August 28, 1945, from the beginning through section II, except for the second and third unnumbered paragraphs; the memorandum is printed in full on page 1034.]

On September 19, 1945, General Wesson transmitted to you a draft of the text of an agreement which this Government proposes.¹³ This draft dealt with the above points raised in your memorandum as follows:

1. The list of articles prepared as the result of conferences between representatives of this Administration and the Purchasing Commission has been attached to the draft agreement as Schedules I-A and I-B. The agreement provides for the transfer to your Government of such of these articles as were in inventory or procurement in the United States but not transferred prior to September 10, 1945 and as the Government of the United States determines are available for transfer to the U.S.S.R. General Wesson and his staff have explained to you that the total amount of articles which may thus be determined to be available for transfer to the U.S.S.R. under the agreement will probably be substantially less than \$400 million. This will probably be the case even after other requisitions and contracts not covered by the present list in Schedule I of the draft agreement are added to the list.

2. The terms of amortization proposed by your Government have been adopted in the draft agreement submitted to you.

3. The rate of interest proposed by your Government has been adopted in the draft agreement.

4. The deduction in contract price proposed by your Government has been adopted in the draft agreement to arrive at the fair value of non-foodstuffs in the aggregate.

5. In lieu of payment of actual costs of storage and inland transportation, the draft agreement proposed that your Government pay a flat percentage, 10%, of the fair value of non-foodstuffs, in other words, 9% of the contract price. The reason for proposing a flat percentage instead of actual costs of storage and inland transportation is that it is administratively impracticable for the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department and the War and Navy Departments to determine such actual costs for each of the tremendous number of items listed in Schedule I of the draft agreement.

With regard to point II of your memorandum, we have advised you that to prepare a complete and detailed inventory of articles available for transfer to the U.S.S.R. would take several weeks and we

¹³ The draft agreement had been submitted by Mr. Crowley to Assistant Secretary of State Clayton under cover of a letter of September 13, not printed.

believe that the draft agreement makes the preparation of such an inventory unnecessary.

At our meeting on September 20, 1945, it was agreed as follows in order to expedite the issuance of instructions to call articles forward for shipment and the signing of the agreement:

1. Accounting and other representatives of this Administration and the Purchasing Commission will meet to study the factors comprising a flat percentage charge for storage and inland transportation in order that a mutually satisfactory formula may be arrived at.

2. Legal and other representatives of this Administration and the Purchasing Commission will meet to discuss the technical provisions of the draft agreement and arrive at mutually satisfactory language for such provisions.

With the exception of these two matters and subject to their resolution as stated above, it is my understanding that the draft agreement is acceptable to your Government. I should appreciate your confirmation of this understanding.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

800.24/10-1245

The Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union (Novikov) ¹⁴

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and desires to inform him that the President recently sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the issuance of lend-lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to Allied Governments. Besides outlining the general terms for such issuance, the President directed that "maintenance items" for United States equipment now in the possession of allied armies might be issued, for purposes other than those specifically approved as eligible, against payment on terms and conditions to be determined by the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration in accordance with established procedures.

The Chargé d'Affaires is hereby advised that until further notice, the War and Navy Departments may issue such maintenance items on the understanding that his government make full cash payment

¹⁴ Sent also, *mutatis mutandis*, to the diplomatic representatives in Washington of Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

upon presentation of a bill by the Foreign Economic Administration. In view of the current readjustments in procurement by this government of munitions and military and naval equipment, it is suggested that this government should be informed of the requirements of the Soviet Government for the maintenance items in question.

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1945.

861.24/10-1545

The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. (Rudenko)

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1945.

DEAR GENERAL RUDENKO: I wish to confirm our conversation of today in connection with the signature of the agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the purchase by your Government of the lend-lease supplies in inventory or under contract in the United States.¹⁵

With reference to Article V, I wish to assure you that it is the intention of this Government to provide your Government with articles of good quality. Since this Government cannot, however, guarantee the quality of the articles we have agreed to assign to your government any assignable rights we may have against the suppliers. As I have told you, we will also cooperate with your Government in its efforts to effectuate satisfactory settlements in connection with any claims which may arise under such assignment.

With reference to the lists of articles and contracts in Schedules I-A and I-B, it is provided in Article III of the agreement that additions or deletions to such lists may be made from time to time by mutual agreement of the parties. In view of the fact, however, that the present lists do not include the latest additions or deletions desired by your Government, we will accept (a) such additions as may be submitted by you during the next two days which meet the requirements set forth in the first paragraph of Article II, and (b) such deletions as you may submit during the next two days not in excess of \$15 million in value.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

¹⁵ For text of agreement on disposition of Lend-Lease supplies in inventory or procurement in the United States, signed at Washington on October 15, 1945, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3662*, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements Series*, vol. 7 (pt. 7), p. 2819.

103.9169 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1945—4 p. m.

2202. From FEA Hazard for Crandall.¹⁶ Crowley on October 15 wrote Rudenko that all recipients of Lend-Lease aid have been asked for inventory of goods in possession end of hostilities, and asking Rudenko to report on progress in preparing such inventory in anticipation of negotiations looking toward conclusion of Lend-Lease settlement agreement. Also advised that we were analyzing supplies reasonably expected to be on hand. Request made for presentation of Soviet data earliest possible opportunity so that final arrangements for transfer of ownership may be agreed. Advise Ambassador and take such measures to press response as he agrees upon. [Hazard.]

BYRNES

861.24/10-2345 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1945—6 p. m.

2213. Agreement between U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed October 15 covers U.S.S.R. purchase of approximately \$400 million of lend-lease supplies in procurement and inventory in the United States exclusive of military equipment. Terms are substantially the same as 3(c) proposal made U.S.S.R. last year, including provision that amortization payments will be in 22 annual installments beginning in 1954 and interest payments of 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ percent on the unpaid balance will begin July 1, 1947. Copy of agreement being air mailed.

BYRNES

103.9169 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, October 24, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 11:38 p. m.]

3648. Re Department's 2202, October 22, 4 p. m. From Crandall for FEA Hazard. Ambassador and I feel that question of obtaining inventory of Lend-Lease goods in possession of Russians at termina-

¹⁶ Lt. Col. Francis W. Crandall, United States Army, head of supply division of U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union, Maj. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding having been relieved in August of his duties with this mission.

tion of hostilities should be handled in Washington and that there is little we can do here at present time to expedite reply from Russians. In any event, it would be impossible for us to proceed until we are furnished full information on our objectives and what has transpired in Washington. We think it highly unlikely that Soviets will ever furnish any useful estimate and therefore suggest that estimate be prepared in Washington based on arrival of material.

In view of paucity of statistics here on shipments of Lend-Lease supplies especially in last few months, I do not believe that any estimate made by me of goods in possession of Russians at end of hostilities would be of assistance to you. After estimate has been made in Washington, I am sure that this Embassy can be helpful in commenting on it based on such information as we can obtain here from observations and otherwise. [Crandall.]

HARRIMAN

861.24/10-2545

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson)*¹⁷

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On September 21, 1945 Mr. Crowley, Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration, wrote to you in regard to agreements that the Foreign Economic Administration was negotiating with foreign countries for the delivery under the Lend-Lease Act, after V-J day, of certain goods in procurement or in inventory, and for financial settlement for these goods. He authorized and requested you to transfer to foreign governments under the Lend-Lease Act such goods, financed out of military appropriations, as might be included in the agreements to be worked out.

On October 15 Mr. Crowley signed an agreement with the U.S.S.R. providing for the delivery of certain lend-lease goods in procurement or in inventory in this country. The function of the Foreign Economic Administration in connection with the administration of the Lend-Lease Act has since been transferred to the Department of State. I enclose a copy of the agreement of October 15.¹⁸ Some of these goods are being financed out of appropriations made to your Department and I would appreciate it if you would issue appropriate instructions so that the terms of this agreement may be fulfilled.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. L. CLAYTON

Assistant Secretary

¹⁷ Identical letter sent to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal).

¹⁸ See footnote 15, p. 1043.

861.24/10-3145

*The Secretary of State to the War Shipping Administrator (Land)*¹⁹

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1945.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LAND: At the time of the conclusion of the agreement with the Soviet Union on October 15, 1945, covering lend-lease goods in production [*procurement?*] or in inventory in the United States, it was understood that there would be cargoes available for shipment to the Soviet Union to cover seventeen sailings of United States vessels prior to the expiration of the sixty-day extension of lend-lease aid for ocean transportation charges, i.e., prior to midnight October 31. Shipments to the Soviet Union which would normally have been handled under the sixty-day extension previously granted by Mr. Crowley were held up by this Government pending the signing of the 3 (c) agreement. Consequently, the Soviet Union received less favorable consideration in this regard than other countries which either had signed such an agreement prior to V-J day or which continued to receive lend-lease shipments after V-J day without a formal agreement but on the basis of an understanding that an agreement would be signed. The Department furthermore understands that the shipments which were agreed upon at the time of the conclusion of the October 15 agreement have been unavoidably delayed due to these special circumstances, thus making impossible their loading prior to the termination of the sixty-day period of extension of lend-lease payment for ocean transportation.

In view of these circumstances, the War Shipping Administration is authorized to use lend-lease funds to cover ocean transportation for shipments to the USSR in seventeen War Shipping Administration vessels provided such vessels are berthed prior to midnight November 15, 1945.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. L. CLAYTON

Assistant Secretary

¹⁹ Vice Adm. Emory S. Land.

861.24/11-2945

Memorandum by Mr. John N. Hazard, Chairman, U.S.S.R. Working Group, United States Lend-Lease and Surplus Settlement Committee,²⁰ to the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (McCabe)

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1945.

Subject: U.S.S.R. Position on General Lend-Lease Settlement

Rear Admiral Yakimov, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, was discussing several matters with me yesterday. I used the occasion to mention informally the growing sentiment in Congress for a general settlement in the near future of the Lend-Lease obligations of the various countries. Admiral Yakimov's reactions may be helpful to you in considering the problem of a general settlement with the U.S.S.R.

Admiral Yakimov explained that he did not feel that the majority of the people of the United States would expect a general settlement with the U.S.S.R. under which the U.S.S.R. would make a transfer of money, if the people were sufficiently well informed of the situation in the U.S.S.R. He recounted the losses of the U.S.S.R. in the war, pointing out in large measure the same figures which have been used in the joint indictment against the Axis criminals now on trial at Nurnberg.²¹ He said that under the circumstances the losses of the U.S.S.R. were suffered in the common cause and that he felt the American public would appreciate this fact if it were properly presented to them, even though it meant that no funds were to be requested of the U.S.S.R. for Lend-Lease aid.

Admiral Yakimov referred to President Roosevelt's earlier statements to the effect that the Russians had already paid in blood for the Lend-Lease aid which they had received and said that he felt that these statements had been very favorably received at the time. I pointed out to him that since that time there has been a considerable discussion in Congress and in the newspapers about a settlement and that Mr. Crowley had written the U.S.S.R. asking for an inventory.

²⁰ This Committee was established November 16, 1945. Mr. Hazard had been with the Foreign Economic Administration, but, in accordance with Executive Order 9630 of September 27, FEA had been terminated and the Office of Foreign Liquidation in the Department of State had been established to take action on the continuing functions pertaining to lend-lease obligations, among other duties. Thomas B. McCabe became Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and also Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

²¹ For the indictment presented to the International Military Tribunal sitting at Berlin on October 18, 1945, see Department of State, *Trial of War Criminals. Documents: 1. Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President. 2. Agreement establishing an International Military Tribunal. 3. Indictment* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 23 ff.

He said he had noted the discussion in the papers but that he had also noted in many of the papers that there was a discussion about a future war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. He said that this latter discussion of possible war was entirely irresponsible and he felt that the voices requesting a payment from the U.S.S.R. for Lend-Lease aid were equally unrepresentative. I pointed out that there is considerable discussion of the desirability of a settlement at least for the industrial equipment which has been transferred and will be of postwar use to the U.S.S.R., particularly when some persons anticipate that this very equipment will be used to manufacture goods which may appear in the international market in competition with American produce. He said it was absurd to think of any such competition because the Soviet shortages at home were so great that it would probably take from 30-40 years to meet them.

Admiral Yakimov concluded by saying that the opinions he expressed were solely his own and he did not know whether they were the opinions of his Government. It happened, however, that these same opinions, in less extensive form, have already been given as personal opinions by Mr. Eremin, another Deputy Chairman of the Purchasing Commission.

You may also be interested in the Admiral's statement that the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission would move to New York during the first quarter of 1946 since it feels that the primary activity is now to be with American business and not with the Government.

861.24/11-2945 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1945—8 p. m.

2431. Urtel 4009, November 29.²² From Clayton. Since preliminary discussions between Mr. Crowley and General Rudenko in which General Rudenko requested a line of credit of \$1 billion for purchase of equipment in U.S. and which did not result in any commitment on part of this Government, no further discussions have taken place.

Dept has been pursuing policy of not encouraging active discussions and at present matter is dormant. [Clayton.]

BYRNES

²² Not printed; it requested information on "status of any negotiations of Soviet Govt for Export-Import Bank credit." (861.51/11-2945)

861.50/12-1145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 11, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received December 11—9:15 a. m.]

4137. Little information has been received by this Embassy regarding our over-all economic policy towards the Soviet Union and particularly as it relates to Soviet economic policies. This Embassy has not been requested for information or recommendations on the influence or possible effect of our policies on Soviet economic or political positions. From Moscow it would appear that certain decisions are being made in the economic field without relating them to our over-all policy. I have in mind the decision to grant credits for shipments previously ordered on Lend-Lease; UNRRA agreement to provide Ukraine and White Russia with free UNRRA aid;²³ policy regarding future Export-Import Bank credits; and settlement of Lend-Lease under section VII. We have no information on this latter subject and as I have indicated in my letter of October 12 to Clayton,²⁴ I feel full consideration should be given in this connection to all aspects of Soviet economic policies which affect us. It has been my feeling that the longer we delay stating our position the weaker our case will be.

In connection with Soviet economic policy we have protested against or objected to a number of Soviet steps such as trade and economic collaboration agreements with ex-enemy satellites under Control Commission regimes; Soviet seizure of American-owned assets in Red Army-controlled areas; stripping of Korea of Japanese property; the maintaining of large Red Army forces in countries to which we are supplying UNRRA aid, thereby draining off this aid. From Moscow it would appear that piecemeal dealing with these economic subjects can not lead to satisfactory results.

Since Soviet political policy appears to be influenced by economic objectives it would seem that we should give at this time greater attention to the concerting of our economic policy with our political policy towards the Soviet Union.

²³ For documentation on this subject, see vol. II, pp. 1001-1049, *passim*. For an account of UNRRA aid to Byelorussia and the Ukraine, see George Woodbridge, *UNRRA, The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (3 volumes, Columbia University Press, New York, 1950), vol. II, pp. 231 ff. For texts of agreements between UNRRA and the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics, signed December 18, 1945, see *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 255, 260, 332, and 337.

²⁴ Not found in Department files.

I hope I may have an opportunity to discuss this question during your visit to Moscow ²⁵ because I feel Molotov has economic matters very much in mind.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 Council/12-1445: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

[Extract ²⁶]

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1945—8 p. m.

2527. Secdel ²⁷ 7. For the Secretary.

II. *Considerations Relating to Lend-Lease Shipping.* USSR now has in its possession 36 Liberty ships, 3 Liberty tankers, 5 T-2 tankers, 48 dry cargo ships built some years before war, 1 pre-war tanker, and 3 tug boats, all furnished by WSA during war as Lend-Lease transfers. There are also number of Army and Navy vessels, including 3 icebreakers, 1 steam schooner, 15 river tugs, 9 Wye tankers, and 2 floating repair shops. In addition, there are numerous combat ships which have been transferred by Navy, concerning which Alusna, Moscow, doubtless has information.

Cargo vessels transferred by WSA cannot be sold to USSR except on basis of ship disposal bill, which has not yet been passed. Objective is to arrange for payment of charter hire on ships now in Soviet possession which are desired by USSR until ship disposal bill can be used as basis for sale. Problems involving disposal of merchant ships are very complex due to legal aspects of situation, and it is therefore opinion of Dept and WSA that all negotiations with respect to such ships should be conducted in Washington.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/12-1845: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1945—7 p. m.

2566. Secdel 18. For Secretary and Ambassador. At first meeting Thurs of Interdepartmental Committee on Soviet Lend-Lease Settle-

²⁵ The Secretary of State attended the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States, December 16-26, 1945.

²⁶ The first portion of this telegram is printed in vol. II, p. 1384.

²⁷ Series indicator for telegrams to Moscow concerned with matters before the Conference of Foreign Ministers.

ment²⁸ discussion was held of inventory question (Deptel 2202, Oct 22; urtel 3648, Oct 24). Granting improbability getting satisfactory inventory from Soviets, Committee nevertheless felt that since all other recipients Lend-Lease have been asked to supply inventories and since an effort to secure inventories is necessary to rendering a proper accounting for Lend-Lease program, request to Soviets should be reiterated for sake of record. Renewal of request also seems desirable to forestall so far as possible Soviet request for delay in order to prepare inventory on plea of not having received sufficient notice that inventory was necessary. It is also felt that use of inventory being prepared here from our records (urtel 3648) might give rise to Soviet objection if they are not given adequate notice that inventories will be necessary.

In view possibility that Moscow meeting may speed initiation credit negotiations and since it was sense of Committee that it would be disadvantageous to conclude credit negotiations without concurrently securing satisfactory Lend-Lease settlement, prompt follow-up to Crowley's letter to Rudenko of Oct 15 seems advisable. Committee in doubt whether letter should be addressed to Embassy or Purchasing Commission.

Text proposed letter in immediately following telegram. Action will be withheld pending receipt your comments.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/12-1845: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1945—7 p. m.

2567. Secdel 19. For Secretary and Ambassador. Following text of proposed letter referred to in immediately preceding telegram on assumption letter to be addressed to Rudenko:

"On October 15, 1945 Mr. Leo J. [T.] Crowley, Foreign Economic Administrator, wrote you concerning the preparation of an inventory of Lend-Lease supplies in the possession of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or subject to its control at the end of hostilities. The inventory was requested as a part of the information believed to be desirable in preparation of a Lend-Lease settlement with your Government, under the terms of the Master Agreement of June 11, 1942. Mr. Crowley asked that the data be presented at the earliest possible opportunity.

"I understand that Mr. Crowley's communication was transmitted to Moscow. Since more than two months have elapsed without a re-

²⁸ This meeting on December 13, 1945, was of the USSR Working Group, John N. Hazard, Chairman, of the United States Lend-Lease and Surplus Settlement Committee (USLL).

sponse, I would be glad to know when such an inventory might be expected.

"In the preparation of an inventory estimate, it has been found convenient in the case of other countries to divide supplies into two groups: (1) those destined for direct use by the armed forces, or in their actual possession, and (2) those destined for use or consumption by other agencies. It has proved desirable to arrange the information in accordance with the following separation into three basic categories of supplies, allocating to each of the two groups the categories or parts of categories concerned: (a) durable capital equipment, whether distributed to the ultimate user or not; (b) non-durable goods, such as raw materials which require further fabrication (an inventory of goods in category (b) is desired only for goods not distributed to the ultimate user or processor by the end of hostilities); (c) equipment or materials transferred in finished form, other than durable capital equipment. This last category would include weapons, airplanes, trucks, vessels, food, petroleum products, etc. An inventory of category (c) goods is desired only of such equipment or materials as was still in central distribution centers or en route to them at the time of the end of hostilities.

"All inventories are desirable in terms of units, rather than rubles or dollars, and it is not necessary that they should be stated in great detail.

"I should appreciate hearing from you in the near future as to when inventory estimates may become available. If this request should be transmitted to an official other than yourself, please advise me to that effect."

ACHESON

861.24/12-1845

The Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (McCabe) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, [December 18, 1945?]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There is enclosed herewith a copy of "Report of War Aid Furnished by the United States to the U.S.S.R."²⁹ This report summarizes the supplies and services which the United States provided to the U.S.S.R. from the outset of the U.S.S.R. war effort, June 21, 1941, to the sailing of the last vessel with Lend-Lease supplies intended for the war effort, September 20, 1945. It is the final report of a series, the first of which was issued as of December 31, 1941. The information contained in this report supersedes any that has been submitted in previous reports.

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS B. McCABE

²⁹ This detailed, 29-page statistical report is not printed.

EFFORTS TO ARRANGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE ACCEPTANCE AND ONWARD SHIPMENT OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND MAIL FOR THE BENEFIT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNED CIVILIANS IN JAPANESE-CONTROLLED TERRITORY ³⁰

711.94114 Supplies/1-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 18, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received January 19—10:30 a. m.]

173. ReEmbs 5002, December 26, 6 p. m.³¹ Foreign Office has informed us in a note dated January 16 that on January 10 an *aide-mémoire* was transmitted to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow stating that since the question of transferring relief supplies and mail for Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees through the station Manchuriya ³² had not been settled by the Japanese Government, the Soviet Government found it possible to permit a Japanese vessel to call a second time at Nakhodka Bay.

In the *aide-mémoire*, the Foreign Office proposed that the Japanese and Soviet Governments come to an agreement concerning the despatch of a Japanese vessel to Nakhodka Bay, the quantity of cargo to be carried by the vessel, the date of its arrival at the approach point and other details connected with the entry of the vessel into a Soviet port.

At the same time the Japanese Government was reminded in the *aide-mémoire* of the necessity for an early solution on its part of the question of the future use of Manchuriya as a transfer point.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Supplies/1-1945

The British First Secretary of Embassy (Gore-Booth) to the Assistant Chief of the Special War Problems Division (Kuppinger) ³³

102/14/45

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1945.

DEAR MR. KUPPINGER: With further reference to your letter of the 4th January ³⁴ regarding the continued use of a Soviet Pacific port for the trans-shipment of relief supplies for Allied nationals in

³⁰ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1159-1198. For further documentation, see *ibid.*, 1945, vol. vi, section under Japan entitled "Efforts by the United States to send financial and other assistance to American nationals held by Japan."

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1196.

³² Manchuli (Manchouli) or Lupin, on the former Chinese Eastern Railway, opposite Otpor in the Soviet Union.

³³ Eldred D. Kuppinger, in acknowledging the receipt of this letter on January 26, included the substance of telegrams 173, January 18, 8 p. m., from Moscow, *supra*; 128, January 20, 7 p. m., to Moscow, *infra*; and 181, January 27, 8 p. m., to Moscow, p. 1054.

³⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1197, footnote 23.

Japanese custody, I am sending you herewith the text of a telegram which the Foreign Office have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow,³⁵ from which you will see that His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to acquaint the Soviet Government of the concern of the United Kingdom and British Dominions in the representations which the United States Ambassador at Moscow has made to the Soviet Government looking towards their consent to further shipments being made through the port of Nakhodka.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL GORE-BOOTH

711.94114 Supplies/1-1845: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*³⁶

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1945—7 p. m.

128. ReEmbs 173, January 18. Department gratified at Soviet Government's willingness to arrange further transfer of relief supplies at Nakhodka.

Inquiry has revealed that Soviet shipping authorities on Pacific Coast have not as yet been authorized to accept further supplies for shipment to Vladivostok. In view of the time required for such supplies to reach Vladivostok, it would seem necessary that shipment be made immediately. Request Soviet authorities to authorize their shipping agents in the United States to accept a further shipment. Department hopes this authorization will permit shipment of up to 2,000 tons. In this connection and with reference to negotiations now in progress between Soviet and Japanese Governments regarding despatch of Japanese vessel to Nakhodka, convey to Soviet authorities this Government's hope and desire that Japanese ship to be sent will be of sufficient size to take aboard at least as much as did *Hakusan Maru* and preferably more.

STETTINIUS

711.94114 Supplies/1-1845: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1945—8 p. m.

181. While the information conveyed in Embassy's 173, January 18, is a source of some encouragement, it is quite evident that the Soviet reluctance to permit Japanese ships in their waters will preclude

³⁵ Enclosure not printed; Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr was the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

³⁶ The substance of this telegram was transmitted by the Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Office in a note on January 22.

the establishment of a regular and continuous means of shipping relief supplies to the Far East via Nakhodka or any other Soviet Pacific port. It seems highly unlikely that shipments can be made in the desired amounts overland via Manchuriya. Therefore, in order to achieve our goal of putting into operation a regular supply line for the benefit of Allied nationals in Japanese custody, it would appear that other possibilities should be explored.

Since Soviet ships proceeding from the American West Coast to Vladivostok pass through La Perouse Strait, the best present solution might be that these ships unload relief cargo at either Odomari or Wakkanai. If the Japanese would not want Soviet ships to enter a Japanese port, the relief shipments could be transferred off shore from the Soviet ships to small Japanese boats. Individual shipments would not need to be large if successive shipments could be made frequently. We visualize shipments of several hundred tons each (which should raise no great unloading problem) but frequently enough to result in average monthly total shipments of from 1500 to 2000 metric tons.

A somewhat similar proposal was communicated to the Japanese authorities through Red Cross channels some time ago. No reply was received. Whatever the Japanese attitude may have been at that time however, it seems possible that they might be willing to consider such a proposal at this time.

Please discuss this matter informally with the Soviet authorities at an appropriate time and inform Department of their reaction. We would not wish to risk offending Soviet sensibilities by approaching the Japanese in this regard without the consent of the Soviet Government. On the other hand we are obliged to make every practicable effort to arrange for a regular and continuing means of forwarding relief supplies to the Far East. It might be the case that the Soviet Government would be willing to present the matter to the Japanese Government thereby obviating any inference on the part of the Japanese that arrangements heretofore made between the American and Soviet Governments in regard to the transfer of these supplies have not been satisfactory to this Government. Such an inference might be drawn by Japanese if this Government made the approach to Japanese Government.

It should be made clear to the Soviet authorities that this proposal is not to be construed as in any way critical of them. On the contrary we are extremely grateful for the assistance we have received from the Soviet Government in this regard. Without that assistance it is doubtful whether we could have arranged for any relief shipments to the Far East except in the infrequent exchange ships. We fully appreciate the reasons for Soviet reluctance to agree, on a continuing basis, to operations of this nature in its waters. An arrangement such

as that proposed would seem to solve the problems confronting the Soviets in this connection.

This proposal should not be taken by the Soviets as superseding arrangements for a second transfer of supplies at Nakhodka and, therefore, Embassy may wish to defer presentation of matter to Soviet authorities until arrangements in that regard have become more definite. It is, however, essential that once the shipment of supplies to the Far East has begun, further shipments be made without interruption. Any prolonged delay in making additional shipments will result in a demand on the Department by the American public for an explanation. Obviously it would be undesirable for the Department to be forced to explain that continued Soviet cooperation was not forthcoming. The above proposal, if given effect, would, therefore, spare both the Soviet and American Governments the embarrassment resulting from such an explanation to the American people. In addition, it would be to the Soviet Government's advantage since it would still be in the position of assisting us in the matter (by transporting the supplies) but would be spared the difficulties incident to transfers at a Soviet port. The proposed arrangement would work to the Japanese Government's advantage since, in the eyes of Allied public opinion, it would receive credit for its cooperation in connection with the reception and distribution of supplemental relief supplies sent from abroad without having to send its ships away from Japan to pick up the supplies. From our point of view this proposal would result in the more expeditious and regular shipment of relief supplies to Japan for the benefit of detained Allied nationals.³⁷

GREW

711.94114 Supplies/2-1645: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1945—3 p. m.

345. ReDepts 128, January 20. Further shipment of food packages and medicines has been assembled by Amcross³⁸ with a view to early shipment to Vladivostok. Since Soviet Government has now agreed in principle to a second transfer of relief supplies at Nakhodka Bay, it is hoped that Embassy will be able soon to obtain Soviet authorization for this shipment to go forward. In view of the time interval since the last shipment, we are desirous that further supplies

³⁷ In telegram 285, January 30, 1945, 3 p. m., from Moscow, the Chargé, George F. Kennan, replied: "It would be highly advisable in my opinion to defer making the proposal for the transfer of relief supplies to the Japanese in La Perouse Strait . . . until arrangements for the second transfer of supplies at Nakhodka are well advanced." (711.94114 Supplies/1-3045)

³⁸ American Red Cross.

be ready for transfer to Japanese vessel as soon as possible after agreement in the matter has been reached between Soviet and Japanese Governments.

GREW

711.94114 Supplies/2-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 22, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received February 22—5:18 p. m.]

512. ReEmbs 4056, October 24, 3 p. m.³⁹ Clubb⁴⁰ reported from Vladivostok on December 27 that five sacks of prisoner of war mail had arrived on Soviet trans-Pacific vessels and that the local representative of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade⁴¹ was without instructions concerning them. We asked the Foreign Office to arrange for the forward transportation of this mail to Japan and Clubb now reports that the five bags have been forwarded from Vladivostok.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Supplies/1-1845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1945—10 p. m.

419. ReEmbs 173, January 18. It is assumed that lack of further word concerning proposed second transfer relief supplies Nakhodka results from Japanese delay in replying to Soviet *aide-mémoire*. Department hopes that Embassy will find it possible to induce Soviet authorities to press for immediate Japanese action on this proposal.

GREW

711.94114 Mail/3-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 3, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received March 3—3:15 p. m.]

617. ReDepts 2694, November 17, 8 p. m.⁴² We have finally received a reply from the Foreign Office dated March 1 to our request

³⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1188.

⁴⁰ Oliver Edmund Clubb, Consul General at Vladivostok.

⁴¹ G. I. Stokfish, Plenipotentiary Representative for the Far East of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.

⁴² *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1195.

that prisoner of war mail be transported by plane via Alaska. The Foreign Office note states that the appropriate Soviet authorities are prepared so far as possible to meet the desire of the American Government for the transmission of mail for American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan by airplanes dispatched from the United States to the Soviet Union through Alaska. Unfortunately, however, the interested Soviet authorities do not think it is possible at present to forward such mail "more or less frequently" since these planes are used primarily for the transportation of urgently needed military supplies and Government mail. In these circumstances and in view of the fact that flights on this route are made irregularly, mail for American prisoners of war in Japan from the United States can be transported on these planes at irregular intervals only, and by agreement in each individual case.

The note makes no reference to our parallel request that prisoner of war mail from Japan to the United States be carried by eastbound planes which transport Soviet ferry pilots to the United States.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Supplies/3-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 6, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 5:20 p. m.]

649. ReDepts 419, February 24, 10 p. m. We were informed orally today by an officer of the American Section of the Foreign Office that a direct reply to the proposal regarding a second transfer of relief supplies at Nakhodka had not been received from the Japanese. The Foreign Office had however received an inquiry from the Japanese Embassy concerning the quantity of supplies presently in Vladivostok and expected to furnish this information in the near future. We were promised that every effort would be made to induce the Japanese to take prompt action on the proposal.

The Foreign Office has not replied to our request of January 22 that Soviet shipping agents in the United States be authorized to accept up to 2,000 tons of supplies for immediate forwarding to the Soviet Union, or to our subsequent note of February 20 stating that the shipment had been assembled. (ReDepts 128, January 20, 7 p. m. and 345, February 16, 3 p. m.) Apparently the Soviet authorities are reluctant to have the supplies go forward until the Japanese have definitely agreed to the second transfer at Nakhodka.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Supplies/3-645: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1945—1 p. m.

542. ReEmbs 649, March 6. We trust that in replying to Japanese communication Soviet authorities will not fail to state that it is our intention to ship additional supplies to Vladivostok in time for loading on a Japanese ship to be sent under any arrangement that may be made. Since there are only a few hundred tons of supplies now at Vladivostok, it would be most unfortunate if the impression were conveyed to the Japanese that only these supplies were involved.

GREW

711.94114 Supplies/3-2345: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 23, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received March 23—1:06 p. m.]

872. ReDepts 542, March 9, 1 p. m. Foreign Office has informed us in a note dated March 22 that the representative of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States has been authorized to load during the first decade of April on a Soviet vessel in a West Coast United States port up to 1500 tons of relief supplies for Allied nationals in Japanese custody, and to deliver this freight at the port of Nakhodka.

The note goes on to say that the Japanese Embassy in Moscow has been informed that a supplemental shipment of relief supplies from the United States will be delivered at Nakhodka on a Soviet vessel in the near future, and that the date for the transfer of the cargo at Nakhodka will be communicated later to the Japanese Embassy.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Mail/4-1945: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1945—6 p. m.

913. Please ascertain if Soviet authorities will accept and forward approximately 100 kilos monthly of medical parcels for American prisoners of war held by Japan. Such parcels would be prepared by American Red Cross and shipped in Soviet vessels which now carry POW mail to Vladivostok. These parcels would be in addition to those now sent via Tehran. They would be addressed to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Tokyo, which will receive and distribute such parcels to American prisoners of war. Parcels would be ad-

dressed in accordance with instructions set forth in your 3742, September 30.⁴³

Please ascertain if possible the route or routes used by Soviet authorities in forwarding mail from Vladivostok to Japan. (Your 512, February 22).

STETTINIUS

711.94114 Mail/4-2345 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 23, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received April 23—2:58 p. m.]

1315. ReDepTel 913, April 19, 6 p. m. Before approaching Soviet authorities we would be glad to know whether Japanese Government has agreed to accept these additional shipments of POW parcels. It will be recalled that arrangements for shipments of POW and civilian internee mail via Tehran for transshipment through the Soviet Union and delivery to Japanese authorities were held up last year because of Soviet requirement that first an agreement on this subject had to be reached between the Governments of United States and Japan (reEmbtel 1219, April 8, 1944, 11 a. m.⁴⁴).

Please advise also how it is planned to ship the parcels—via freight or via the ordinary postal facilities of the three countries. If the latter, then under what classification of mail will they be sent?

The Consul General at Vladivostok is being requested to furnish any information he may have as to routes used by Soviets in forwarding POW mail to Japan from that port. If he cannot give any precise data a note will be addressed to the Foreign Office requesting the information.

KENNAN

711.94114 Supplies/4-2645 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 26, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received April 26—6:23 a. m.]

1352. ReEmbs 872, March 23, 4 p. m. Embassy has received note from Foreign Office dated April 24 stating that Japanese Embassy in Moscow informed Foreign Office on April 7 that Japanese Government had decided to send to Nakhodka the *Awa Maru*, a vessel of 11,200 tons displacement to transport cargo to Allied prisoners of

⁴³ Not printed, but see telegram 3656, October 26, 1944, 9 p. m., to Bern. *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 1065.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. iv, p. 1164.

war in Japan and that the vessel would be ready to proceed to Nakhodka the middle of April.

Note continues that on April 18 Foreign Office received second note from Japanese Embassy stating that Japanese Government had been obliged to cancel the planned dispatch of the *Awa Maru* since the vessel has been lost on a return voyage from the south where "it had delivered the first part of a cargo" and that the Japanese Embassy had alleged in its note that it had learned from an official American statement that the *Awa Maru* had been sunk by a United Nations submarine in spite of a guarantee of safe conduct given by the United Nations.⁴⁵

The Soviet note is not clear as to exactly what is meant by the "first part of a cargo".

KENNAN

711.94114 Mail/5-345: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 3, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received May 3—5:20 p. m.]

1451. ReDeptel 913, April 19, 6 p. m. Clubb reports following data regarding routes used by Soviets in forwarding POW mail to Japan:

All available information indicates that since November 9, 1941, there has been no traffic by sea between Primore (district of which Vladivostok is capital) and Japan. Only exceptions are cases such as trip last March of Soviet SS *Bistri* to Japan to take off survivors of wreck ["COZ-28," and visit last November of Jap SS *Hakusan Maru* to Nakhodka to load relief supplies.

Reports also are in agreement that rail traffic into Manchuria via Voroshilov and Pogranichnaya⁴⁶ was suspended long before outbreak of European war in 1939. To Clubb's direct question on this subject, diplomatic agent at Vladivostok⁴⁷ stated there is no mail or other traffic via that route.

Only other route considered is that by rail from Chita and Otpor into Manchuria. When question of forwarding five sacks POW mail was discussed last January between Diplomatic Agent and Clubb (reEmbtel 512, February 22, 6 p. m.) Agent indicated the mail would probably go via Chita and Otpor unless taken by another vessel

⁴⁵ For documentation concerning the sinking of the *Awa Maru*, see vol. vi, section under Japan entitled "Sinking by a United States submarine of the Japanese ship *Awa Maru* . . ."

⁴⁶ Pogranichnaya (Suifenho), at the eastern end of the former Chinese Eastern Railway, was near the Manchurian border opposite Grodekovo in the Soviet Union.

⁴⁷ Semen Petrovich Dyukarev until July 2 when he was replaced by Dmitry Mikhailovich Ryzhkov, Representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union at Vladivostok.

designated to load relief supplies. When no such vessel arrived subsequent inquiry elicited information the mail had been forwarded but the agent did not know by what route. He presumed however it had been shipped by rail via Chita.

The agent has given impression there naturally would normally be no regular mail except diplomatic handled via Chita-Otpor route. Clubb states it seems reasonably evident that this route which was used in previous shipment of POW mail would be used again for any future shipment.⁴⁸

KENNAN

711.94114 Supplies/5-1545: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1945—7 p. m.

1076. ReEmbs 173, January 18 and related telegrams. There follows a list of the items composing the shipment recently authorized by the Soviet Government of relief supplies to Vladivostok:

Under Bills of Lading RC 1 to RC 14 inclusive:

28,788 cartons Amcross food packages.

14,375 cases Cancross⁴⁹ food packages.

449 cases, 6 crates containing recreational, athletic, religious and educational material.

5,190 cases medical supplies.

Cubic feet 109,471; weight 3,224,142 pounds, value \$873,972.

These supplies are now en route aboard the SS *V[toraya] Pyatiletka*, which departed from Portland about May 1. Inform Vladivostok.

We have been informed by the Legation at Bern⁵⁰ that the Japanese Government, owing to the sinking of the *Awa Maru*, has decided to abandon a plan previously outlined under which that ship would proceed to Nakhodka to pick up these supplies and deliver them to various Japanese-controlled areas where Allied nationals are held. Legation states that Japanese Government has so informed Soviet Government.

While not explicitly stated, it is assumed that the Japanese are not presently planning to send any ship to Nakhodka to pick up these

⁴⁸ In telegram 2954, August 18, 6 p. m., Ambassador Harriman reported that the Foreign Office had notified him that 15 tons of POW parcels were delivered on August 3 by the Soviet Consul at Manchuriya station to the Japanese Consul there, delivery being made on the basis of a warrant issued to the latter by Dr. Marcel Junod, the International Red Cross representative at Otpor. (711.94114-Supplies/8-1845)

⁴⁹ Canadian Red Cross.

⁵⁰ Telegram 2672, May 9, printed in vol. vi, section under Japan entitled "Efforts by the United States to send financial and other assistance to American nationals held by Japan."

supplies. Clarification on this point can probably be obtained from Soviet authorities. On the assumption that the Soviet authorities not only are desirous of assisting the American Government in connection with the onward shipment of these supplies, but also that Soviet authorities will not desire to have these supplies on hand for a prolonged period at Vladivostok, it is suggested that Embassy approach Soviet Foreign Office and bespeak the latter's further intercession with Japanese Government with a view to reinstating the arrangement made between Soviet and Japanese authorities under which Japanese were to pick up these supplies at Nakhodka. Alternatively, or if Soviet authorities unsuccessful in further negotiations with Japanese, explore possibility of onward carriage of these supplies to Japan via Soviet ship. If not convenient for Soviet authorities to assign a ship solely for this purpose perhaps arrangements could be made whereby the supplies could be put aboard a Soviet ship proceeding to the U.S. to be offloaded at a Japanese port en route. Assurances should be given Soviet authorities that all expenses incurred in connection with shipment by this means would be promptly reimbursed by Allied authorities. In this connection Embassy may wish to point out to Soviet authorities that thus far no account has been rendered with respect to expenses incurred by Soviet Government in connection with first transfer of supplies at Nakhodka last November. Reimbursement of such expenses will be made promptly upon the submission of a statement.

Embassy's comments invited as to timeliness of approaching Soviet authorities along line suggested in Department's 181, January 27.

GREW

711.94114 Supplies/5-1845: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 18, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received May 18—6:20 p. m.]

1656. Note was sent today to Foreign Office giving all of information in Dept's 1076, May 15, 7 p. m. concerning POW supplies for the Far East and requesting their intercession with Japanese in reinstating former plan.

The various suggestions for use of Soviet ship to deliver the POW supplies to Japanese have not as yet been made to Soviets nor was subject mentioned of expenses incurred by Soviets in connection with last shipment. I believe these suggestions form a practical basis for our next step if Soviets are unsuccessful in arranging with Japanese for a Japanese vessel to pick up the supplies at Nakhodka. Suggesting use of a Soviet ship might at this time confuse both Soviets and

Japanese. As indicated by Dept, we are not absolutely certain as yet that the Japanese definitely have decided not to enter into arrangements for another ship to go to Nakhodka.

KENNAN

711.94114 Supplies/5-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 30, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received May 30—4:50 p. m.]

1813. ReDeptel 1076, May 15, 7 p. m. POW supplies are now being unloaded in Vladivostok, Clubb reports they are being stored in same warehouse with other supplies already there but are kept separate from them. The Soviet official in charge will report to Clubb when unloading is finished and tally and condition of cargo will then be checked.⁵¹ This official has no information concerning onward forwarding of supplies.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Supplies/8-445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1945—2 p. m.

1740. Immediately following clear telegram gives text of proposal submitted to Jap Govt through Swiss Govt regarding shipment by air of relief supplies for Allied nationals in Jap custody.⁵²

Communicate proposal to Soviet FonOff for its information. Add statement that if Jap Govt does not object it is proposed to use American pilots flying from American bases. In your discretion you may add that if Jap Govt refuses to permit American pilots to fly over Jap territory while otherwise approving delivery by air of relief supplies it would be appreciated if Soviet Govt would consent to employment of Soviet pilots for these flights and if necessary the use of Soviet bases although of course US planes and supplies would be used.

GREW

⁵¹ The Plenipotentiary Representative for the Far East of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union, Viktor P. Boyko, informed Consul General Clubb by letter, dated June 2, that these supplies, totalling 48,808 pieces, had been unloaded from the steamship *Vtoraya Pyatiletka* (Second Five-Year Plan) and stored at Vladivostok, all in good condition according to external appearance. This information was reported by the Consul General to Ambassador Harriman, who relayed it to the Department in telegram 1929, June 6, 7 p. m. (711.94114 Supplies/6-645).

⁵² Telegram 1741 not printed; it quoted telegram 2457, August 4, to Bern, printed in vol. vi.

711.94114 Supplies/8-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 8, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received August 8—6 p. m.]

2807. ReDeptel 1740, August 4. Text of proposal to Japanese re shipment by air of relief supplies to internees sent to Foreign Office today. No mention made of possibility of later asking Soviets for use of Soviet pilots as I believe no practical benefit would accrue by taking up this subject now.⁵³ We will do so later in case Japanese turn down our proposal.

HARRIMAN

861.48 RCO/8-1545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Vladivostok (Henry)

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1945.

23. For all American, British, Netherlands or other Allied prisoners liberated by Russian armies, Allied Red Cross societies placed at your disposal any part of POW relief goods now Vladivostok which Russians may be able to fly or otherwise rapidly transport to prisoner camps liberated by them. U.S. army advises that Allied prisoners in Japan will be served directly from advance U.S. Quartermaster stores and does not therefore contemplate movement Vladivostok POW goods to Japan.

BYRNES

711.94114 Supplies/8-2045 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Vladivostok (Henry) to the Secretary of State

VLADIVOSTOK, August 20, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 4:07 p. m.]

69. After 2 days' delay (DipAgent⁵⁴ knew I wanted to see him but avoided me) I saw DipAgent this morning in effort to get Red Cross supplies to liberated prisoners⁵⁵ in accordance Deptel 23, Aug 15, repeated Moscow as my 139, Aug 18.

I told him gist of telegram and asked him to transmit following requests to Soviet military authorities: (1) to inform me of any prisoners liberated with full details; (2) to transport or assist me to transport supplies to such liberated prisoners.

⁵³ Marginal notation: "Academic now."

⁵⁴ Dmitry Mikhailovich Ryzhkov.

⁵⁵ For documentation concerning the surrender of Japan on August 14, see vol. VI, section under Japan entitled "Surrender of Japan . . .", Part I.

In conclusion I emphasized well-being of former POWs is matter of utmost import to American people and Govt and consequently requested full cooperation Soviet officials this matter.

Although DipAgent stated he would "do his best" I doubt that anything can be accomplished here without instructions from Moscow and respectfully suggest Dept request Embassy to act. I already asked Embassy by my 140, August 18, 6 p. m.⁵⁶ whether it has received any instructions on this subject.

I shall do my utmost to promote matter here and shall report all developments.⁵⁷

Repeated Moscow as 141.

HENRY

711.94114 Supplies/8-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 24, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received August 24—5:30 p. m.]

3042. ReDeptel 1894, August 23.⁵⁸ Note sent Foreign Office today requesting appropriate Soviet officials arrange with Henry at Vladivostok for rapid transportation of POW supplies to camps in Soviet occupied zone. We stated matter is urgent and stressed importance of immediate despatch of supplies.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Supplies/11-645 : Telegram

The Consul General at Vladivostok (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

VLADIVOSTOK, November 6, 1945.

[Received November 7—12:37 a. m.]

101. Reference Department's 40, 31st.⁵⁹ Of Red Cross supplies remaining from 1944, reported Vladivostok's 37, May 4,⁶⁰ and 48,808 parcels shipped here second half April per SS *Vtoraya Pyatiletka* as covered by Amcross, Washington letter May 8 this Consulate, 714 [715] food parcels weighing 15,015 kilograms were forwarded by rail July 14 to International Red Cross representative Junod at Otpor in

⁵⁶ Not printed.

⁵⁷ Telegram 1894, August 23, 7 p. m., to Moscow (26 to Vladivostok), authorized the Embassy to make urgent representations to the Foreign Office, stressing the time element, and added: "Highly desirable that supplies reach internees as soon as possible after liberation." (711.94114 Supplies/8-2045)

⁵⁸ Not printed, but see footnote 57, above.

⁵⁹ Telegram 40, October 31, 1945, not printed; it requested a report as to American Red Cross supplies sent to Vladivostok in the spring (861.48/10-3145).

⁶⁰ Not printed; it reported satisfactory condition of relief supplies on hand in Vladivostok amounting to 29,484 packages and 2,034 packages, respectively, from the American and British Red Cross societies (711.94114 Supplies/5-445).

accordance with Embassy's instructions. All rest of cargo remains Vladivostok inasmuch as facilities for distribution contemplated by Department's 23, August 15, were not made available by Soviet authorities.

CLUBB

800.142/12-1145: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1945.

2497. Amcross preparing to move approx 2000 tons relief supplies now stored Vladivostok in WSA⁶¹ vessel. Supplies will be moved southward, food parcels having been sold British and Dutch. Other supplies will be used at various points Far East. Soviet authorities should be notified of plans to avoid delay in loading when ship arrives at Vlad[ivostok]. Inform Consulate Vlad.

Amcross interested in closing accounts regarding POW operations. Statements have never been received from Soviet authorities regarding transshipping costs at Vlad in Nov 1944, warehousing, and other charges for that shipment and supplies now stored Vlad. Inform Soviet authorities Amcross desire settle these accounts and suggest that they render statement at their convenience.⁶²

BYRNES

**ARRANGEMENTS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT AND RECIPROCAL
REPATRIATION OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR
AND INTERNED CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY ALLIED FORCES⁶³**

711.62114/1-445

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union
(Novikov)*

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1945.

SIR: I refer to your Embassy's *Aide-Mémoires* dated January 4, and January 18, 1945,⁶⁴ as well as to our previous correspondence

⁶¹ War Shipping Administration.

⁶² In telegram 2588, December 20, the Department advised that WSA ship *Edward J. Berwind* had left Portland, Oregon, on December 9 and should reach Vladivostok by the end of the month. After unloading its cargo, it would be available to take on the stored relief supplies, all of which would be discharged at Shanghai consigned to the American Red Cross (800.142/12-1145). In Moscow the Red Cross was attempting to obtain from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade a statement of the charges to date for warehousing, labor, and other costs.

⁶³ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1241-1273.

⁶⁴ Neither printed; they set forth Soviet complaints regarding the treatment by American authorities of claimants to Soviet citizenship among German prisoners of war in camps in the United States (711.62114/1-445, 1-1845).

with regard to the German prisoners of war segregated at Camp Rupert, Idaho.

The American military authorities have informed me that, in compliance with assurances given your Embassy in our note of November 8, 1944,⁶⁵ persons captured by the United States armed forces in German uniforms who claim Soviet citizenship are being permitted to return to the Soviet Union. The military authorities state that approximately 2600 of these persons who claim Soviet citizenship have departed on Soviet ships bound for Siberian ports. Approximately 1200 additional persons are undergoing processing at Camp Rupert by representatives of your Embassy and of the War Department. Groups of these who are found to be claimants to Soviet citizenship are going forward from time to time as Soviet shipping is available.

I am informed that a difference of opinion has arisen between your Embassy's representatives at Camp Rupert and the American military authorities with regard to the cases of a small number of German prisoners of war who maintain that they are German soldiers and officers and demand that they be treated as such under the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention⁶⁶ to which the United States and Germany are both parties.

Since your representatives at the Camp have apparently misunderstood the motives behind the treatment that has been given to the cases of these persons, I should like to outline to you the reasons why in the opinion of the American authorities these persons cannot, without creating serious difficulties, be delivered for shipment to the Soviet Union. In this connection, I can assure you that the action taken by the American military authorities in regard to these persons arises from no desire on the part of the American Government to hold Soviet nationals or to prevent the return to the Soviet Union of individuals who have established claims to Soviet citizenship.

This action has been taken because the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention does not specifically provide for situations such as that which has arisen from the incorporation by the Germans of captured persons of foreign nationality into German military formations. It appears to the appropriate American authorities, who have given most careful consideration to this situation, that the clear intention of the Convention is that prisoners of war shall be treated on the basis of the uniforms they are wearing when captured and that the detaining power shall not look behind the uniforms to determine ultimate questions of citizenship or nationality.

⁶⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1262.

⁶⁶ The International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929, *ibid.*, 1929, vol. i, p. 336.

There are among enemy prisoners of war held by this Government a number of prisoners who have claims to American nationality. This Government is not, however, screening out these persons for special treatment since it desires to avoid a violation of what appears to be the intent of the Convention and weakening its ability to protect every wearer of an American uniform who may fall into enemy hands regardless of his nationality.

There are numerous aliens in the United States Army, including citizens of enemy countries. The United States Government has taken the position that these persons are entitled to the full protection of the Geneva Convention and has informed the German Government over a year ago that all prisoners of war entitled to repatriation under the Convention should be returned to the custody of the United States regardless of nationality.

In view of the fact that the United States has taken this position in regard to American prisoners of war in German hands, it is the opinion of the competent American authorities that, if we should release from a prisoner of war status persons who claim protection under the Geneva Convention because they were captured while fighting in German uniform as members of German formations, the German Government might be afforded a pretext to subject to reprisal American prisoners of war in German hands.

Your Government, I am sure, will readily understand that this Government cannot justify to the American people the taking of any steps that might jeopardize the situation of American prisoners of war in enemy hands.

While we have and will turn over to Soviet control those prisoners of war captured in enemy uniform who themselves are claimants to Soviet citizenship and who do not fall into the above category, the United States Government, in view of its fundamental interest in protecting the status of American prisoners of war in German hands, must reserve the right to retain as prisoners of war persons whose detention is deemed to be vital to the protection of American personnel in the hands of the enemy.

The complaints made by Mr. Gromyko to me as well as those recited in your *Aide-Mémoires* of January 4 and January 18 have been forwarded to the military authorities for investigation. The military authorities are conducting thorough investigations in order to uncover the full facts in each incident alleged and be in a position to take such action as may be warranted on the basis of the results of the investigations. The American military authorities have informed me that

additional time must ensue before these investigations can be completed, but as soon as they are terminated you will be advised further.⁶⁷

In regard to the status of the Soviet nationals under discussion, I feel that I must in all sincerity remind you that they were not captured by American forces while they were detained in German prisoner of war camps but were serving Germany in German military formations in German uniforms. They are not, therefore, to be compared with American or Soviet military personnel who may be liberated from German prisoner of war camps.

Soviet military personnel found by advancing American armies on German or German-controlled territory in a prisoner of war status will, of course, be returned without question by the American authorities to Soviet control. In like manner, the American Government expects that American military personnel found by advancing Soviet armies in a prisoner of war status in Germany or German-controlled territory will without question be returned to American control by the Soviet authorities.

The persons now at Camp Rupert were not, however, found in the status of prisoners of war held by the enemy. Instead, as pointed out above, they were taken by American forces in German uniform employed against American troops. There was no reason to believe, until these German soldiers declared themselves, that they were anything but German military personnel. They were therefore classified by the American military authorities as German prisoners of war and so notified to the appropriate German authorities. They were fed, clothed, and otherwise treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention and the regulations issued by the American authorities to carry out this Convention.

All German prisoners of war, except commissioned and non-commissioned officer personnel, are compelled to work. The information you received to the effect that German prisoners of war in the United States are not compelled to work is not correct.

After their preliminary segregation, some claimants to Soviet nationality continued to be employed at Camp Winchester and other places as a contribution to the Allied war effort. For such labor they were paid at the established rate of 80 cents per day. You will recol-

⁶⁷ In a note to Ambassador Gromyko dated March 8, 1945, the Acting Secretary of State stated that as a result of investigations by the Office of Inspector General of the War Department, necessary remedial action had been taken in the few cases where the Soviet complaints were found to be substantiated. The Acting Secretary of State also brought to the attention of the Soviet Ambassador the information that the War Department investigations had revealed a substantial lack of military courtesy on the part of certain Soviet officers assigned to collaborate with American authorities and that the attitude of the Soviet officers contributed to the friction which developed and was responsible for many of the complaints made. (711.62114/2-545)

lect, in this connection, that your Embassy was asked in our note of November 8 for its views as to the general types of work upon which it would be agreeable to have these persons employed while awaiting transportation to the Soviet Union and it was stated that pending receipt of your views it was the intention to employ them in suitable civilian occupations, primarily though not exclusively, in agriculture. No reply was received to this communication. In this connection it should be pointed out that upon their final segregation at Camp Rupert, your nationals were not required to perform any labor except in connection with the administration, management, and maintenance of the facilities occupied by them. In this they are on the same footing as American soldiers who police and take care of the camps occupied by them.

As I have previously assured you, this Government has not propagandized and has no intention or desire of allowing the propagandizing of your nationals or suggesting to them that they not return to Soviet control. If any of the American personnel at the camps where they have been held have engaged in any such propaganda in violation of this policy, you may be assured that appropriate steps will be taken with regard to them.

I feel certain that your Government will agree that the comprehensive steps, taken by the American authorities to turn over to Soviet control, as soon as practicable under the circumstances, prisoners of war captured in enemy uniform who themselves are claimants to Soviet citizenship and who could be released without contravening the United States Government's obligations under the Geneva Convention, have amply proved our good faith in endeavoring to meet the wishes of the Soviet Government. I feel further assured that your Government fully understands, in view of the extraordinary circumstances under which these Soviet nationals fell into the hands of the American military authorities, that until their status was determined they were naturally and rightfully treated as German prisoners of war. At all times and as required by the Convention, every effort was made to accord them treatment similar to that given to the American Armed Forces.

Considering the sincere and full efforts which have been made by the American authorities to handle this complex and difficult situation in order to meet in a most sympathetic and friendly manner the wishes of the Soviet Government, it is difficult to understand the unhelpful attitude assumed by certain Soviet officials who have been assigned to collaborate with the American military authorities in this work.

You may be certain that the United States Government will continue to do everything within its power to comply with the wishes of your Government with respect to these persons provided, as explained

above, any action taken in this regard will not jeopardize the lives or treatment of American prisoners of war in German hands.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

[On February 11, 1945, at Yalta, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union concluded an Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces Operating Under Soviet Command and Forces Operating Under United States Command; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, page 985, or Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 505, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1874. For additional documentation regarding the conclusion of the agreement, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pages 413-420, 440, 445, 455, 506, 687-688, 691-697, 751-752, 754-757, 863-866, and 946.]

*The Chief of Staff of the Army (Marshall) to the Chief of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)*⁶⁸

[WASHINGTON,] 3 March 1945.

War 47058. Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshal Stalin⁶⁹ at once and also deliver a copy of it to Admiral Archer⁷⁰ for transmission by him to Mister Churchill.⁷¹

I have reliable information regarding the difficulties which are being encountered in collecting, supplying and evacuating American ex-prisoners of war and American aircraft crews who are stranded east of the Russian lines. It is urgently requested that instructions be issued authorizing ten American aircraft with American crews to operate between Poltava and places in Poland where American ex-prisoners of war and stranded airmen may be located. This authority is requested for the purpose of providing supplementary clothing, medical and food supplies for all American soldiers, to evacuate stranded aircraft crews and liberated prisoners of war, and especially to transfer the injured and sick to the American hospital at Poltava. I regard this request to be of the greatest importance not only for humanitarian reasons but also by reason of the intense interest of the American public in the welfare of our ex-prisoners of war and stranded aircraft crews. Secondly on the general matter of prisoners of war in Germany I feel that we ought to do something quickly. The number of these prisoners of war, Russian, British and

⁶⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁶⁹ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁰ Rear Adm. Ernest Russell Archer, Head of the British Military Mission to the Soviet Union.

⁷¹ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

U.S., is very large. In view of your disapproval of the plan we submitted⁷² what do you suggest in place of it?

[MARSHALL]

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁷³

[Moscow,] March 5, 1945.

I received your message of March 4⁷⁴ concerning the question of prisoners of war. I, once again, consulted our local representatives who deal with these questions and have to inform you about the following.

The difficulties, which we had to meet on the first stages in the cause of speedy evacuation of American prisoners of war, when they were in the zone of active military operations, have now considerably decreased. At the present time the organization on the affairs of foreign prisoners of war, specially formed by the Soviet Government, has an appropriate number of people, transport facilities and food stuffs, and each time when new groups of American prisoners of war are found, measures are urgently taken to render help to these prisoners of war and for their evacuation to the gathering points for the subsequent repatriation. According to information which is at present at the disposal of the Soviet Government, on the territory of Poland and in other places liberated by the Red Army, there are no groups of American prisoners of war, as all of them, except the single sick persons who are in the hospitals, have been sent to the gathering point in Odessa, where 1200 American prisoners of war have already arrived and the arrival of the rest is expected in the nearest future.

In view of this under the present conditions there is no necessity to carry on flights of American planes from Poltava to the territory of Poland on the matters of American prisoners of war. You may feel assured that the appropriate measures will be urgently taken also in respect to crews of American planes having a forced landing. This, however, does not exclude the cases when the help of American planes may become necessary. In these cases Soviet military authorities will apply to the American military representatives in Moscow on the subject of sending American planes from Poltava.

⁷² The efforts by Major General Deane to implement a plan to dispatch small teams of American officers to liberated Poland to contact and collect American prisoners of war are described in John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-Operation With Russia* (New York, The Viking Press, 1947), pp. 194-201.

⁷³ Copy of message obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

⁷⁴ Reference here is to the message contained in telegram from Marshall to Deane, *supra*.

Having at the present moment no proposals on the question of condition of Allied prisoners of war who are in the hands of the Germans, I want to assure you that on our part we shall do everything possible for the creation of favorable conditions for them, as soon as they will be on the territory which will be taken by the Soviet troops.

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*⁷⁵

Moscow, 8 March 1945.

M-23119. In light of Marshal Stalin's reply to your message regarding our liberated prisoners of war I feel you will be interested to have from me a brief review of the situation.

Our information received from our liberated prisoners indicates that there have been four or five thousand officers and enlisted men freed. The Russians today claim that there are only 2,100 of whom 1,350 have arrived at Odessa and the balance being en route by train.

Russian information is based on reports from concentration points within Poland where our prisoners have been collected. Meantime there appear to be hundreds of our prisoners wandering about Poland trying to locate American contact officers for protection. I am told that our men don't like the idea of getting into a Russian camp. The Polish people and Polish Red Cross are being extremely hospitable, whereas food and living conditions in Russian camps are poor. In addition we have reports that there are a number of sick and wounded who are too ill to move. These Stalin does not mention in his cable. Only a small percentage of those reported sick or wounded have arrived at Odessa.

For the past 10 days the Soviets have made the same statement to me that Stalin has made to you, namely, that all prisoners are in Odessa or entrained thereto, whereas I have now positive proof that this was not true on February 26th, the date on which the statement was first made. This supports my belief that Stalin's statement to you is inaccurate.

I am glad to say that the reports from our contact officers in Odessa indicate that the Russians have done a first rate job in providing quickly a reasonably adequate camp in Odessa and our prisoners are reasonably well provided with food, etc. Our officers there also are allowed to communicate with us daily. I have no present reason to complain about the situation in Odessa or about the speed with which

⁷⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. This telegram was transmitted through the facilities of the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

our prisoners have been moved from Poland by train, considering the shortage of transportation.

I am outraged, however, that the Soviet Government has declined to carry out the agreement signed at Yalta ⁷⁶ in its other aspects, namely, that our contact officers be permitted to go immediately to points where our prisoners are first collected, to evacuate our prisoners, particularly the sick, in our own airplanes, or to send our supplies to points other than Odessa, which is 1,000 miles from point of liberation, where they are urgently needed.

Since the Yalta Conference General Deane and I have been making constant efforts to get the Soviets to carry out this agreement in full. We have been baffled by promises which have not been fulfilled or have been subsequently withdrawn. We succeeded after considerable delay in getting one contact team of an officer and a doctor to Lublin but they have not been permitted to move to other points and our infrequent communications with them have been largely through the friendly intervention of the Polish Embassy here.

Ten days ago the Soviet Foreign Office finally authorized General Deane to go to Poland to review the situation but no action has been taken so far. Impressed it again last night and hope to hear today. I have proposed that he go with a Russian officer and report jointly to the Soviet authorities and myself as to whether their information or ours is correct.

I am not so worried about our prisoners who are well. These, I believe, will gradually be assembled and shipped to Odessa. I am extremely concerned, however, over the sick and wounded. I hope to get an answer today about Deane's trip. If it is not satisfactory I will recommend that you cable Stalin again.

[HARRIMAN]

740.00114 EW/3-945

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*⁷⁷

WASHINGTON, 9 March 1945.

The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations,⁷⁸ has asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for certain information with regard to the agreement entered into 11 February 1945 between the United States and the U.S.S.R. with re-

⁷⁶ Reference here is to the agreement of February 11, 1945, between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding liberated prisoners of war and civilians; see bracketed note, p. 1072.

⁷⁷ This memorandum, designated SWNCC 46/1, was considered and approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at their meeting on March 10, 1945, and was forwarded to the Secretary of State.

⁷⁸ Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney.

gard to liberated prisoners of war and civilians.⁷⁹ Specifically he has requested information concerning:

a. What test is to be applied in determining what persons are within the category "all Soviet citizens liberated" in Article 1 of the agreement.

b. What is the status of those liberated persons who are nationals of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland east of the 1939 line of demarcation (or of the Curzon Line⁸⁰).

c. What is the status of persons already liberated who are claimants to citizenship of countries other than the U.S.S.R. but who are now under the control of U.S.S.R. and whose claim to citizenship has already been accepted by representatives of the country whose citizenship they claim.

The War Department has been informed of the policy adopted by the Department of State as set forth in the Acting Secretary of State's note of 1 February 1945 to the Soviet Embassy concerning those prisoners of war of Soviet nationality, captured in German uniform, who object to repatriation to the U.S.S.R., and has been further informed by representatives of the Department of State that the policy set forth in that note has not been altered by the agreement of 11 February. In the light of these circumstances and subject to a definitive interpretation by the Department of State of the agreement of 11 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom the Secretaries of War and the Navy⁸¹ concur, have tentatively construed the agreement as requiring the following action by the United States:

a. The return to the Soviet Union of all Soviet military personnel held as prisoners of war by the Germans and liberated while in prisoner-of-war status from German prisoner of war camps.

b. The return to the Soviet Union of all liberated civilians (not physically within the territorial limits of the United States) who are Soviet citizens.

c. The return to the Soviet Union of Soviet citizens captured in German uniform, other than those who demand that they be retained as German prisoners of war and thus come under the Geneva Convention.

d. Since up to the present the United States Government has not formally recognized any territorial changes brought about by the present war in Europe, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians and Poles whose homes are east of the 1939 line of demarcation or of the Curzon Line cannot be repatriated to the Soviet Union unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship.

⁷⁹ General McNarney's request for information was set forth in military communication FX 28712, February 17, 1945, not printed. A similar request for information by the Displaced Persons Branch of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 2207, March 3, 1945, from London, not printed. (740.00114 EW/3-345)

⁸⁰ For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794. See also *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. III, p. 1220, footnote 15.

⁸¹ Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal.

e. To the extent practicable, the return to United States control should be sought of individuals falling under the provisions of subparagraph d. above who do not affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship but who have been hitherto erroneously turned over to the control of the Soviet authorities.

It will be appreciated if the Department of State will inform the Secretaries of War and the Navy as a matter of urgency whether it concurs in the foregoing.

Since agreements in identical terms were entered into by this Government and the British Government with the U.S.S.R., and since these agreements will be administered by the respective United States and British commanders in combined theaters, the Department of State may wish to give consideration to coordinating the course of action described above with the British Government. In this connection it is requested that the Department of State advise the Secretaries of War and the Navy whether, in its opinion, the foregoing course of action may appropriately be taken by the United States Government without awaiting such coordination, or should be deferred pending coordination.⁸²

When the course of action to be taken has been finally determined, appropriate instructions accordingly will be communicated to the commanding generals of the interested theaters and to other interested military agencies.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:
JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President
Roosevelt*⁸³

Moscow, 12 March 1945.

M-23174. Supplementing my M-23119, March 8th, after 48 hours of continued pressure on the Foreign Office I finally received an answer

⁸² In identic letters to Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, dated March 24, 1945, the Acting Secretary of State concurred in the proposed action as set forth in this memorandum. The Acting Secretary of State's letter also enclosed a copy of a note to the British Ambassador, dated March 23, 1945, notifying him of the action to be taken by the United States Government. The Acting Secretary of State's letter added that it was the opinion of the Department of State that the proposed action could be taken immediately without awaiting a reply from the British Government with respect to its interpretation of the agreement with the Soviet Union with regard to liberated prisoners of war and civilians. (740.00114 EW/3-945) Telegram 2509, March 31, to London, repeated to Paris as 1283, to Caserta as 279, and to Moscow as 766, informed these posts of the policy on repatriation of former nationals of the Baltic republics and nationals of that part of Poland annexed by the Soviet Union as set forth by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and concurred in by the Department of State (740.00114 EW/3-345).

⁸³ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. This telegram was transmitted through the facilities of the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

last night disapproving General Deane's trip to Poland on the grounds that as there were no longer any American ex-prisoners of war in Poland the reasons for his trip fell away.

As I have had continued reports on the presence of American ex-prisoners of war including a substantial number hospitalized at various points confirmed by a direct message from our contact officer at Lublin that there were ten seriously sick left there on March 10th and more coming in and out every day, I wrote a strong letter to Molotov⁸⁴ protesting and insisting that the Soviet Government grant the "small courtesy" to the United States Government of allowing General Deane to make a survey of the situation in Poland and visit our prisoners particularly our sick and wounded who we knew still remained in Poland.

Today I am informed by General Deane that the permission for our contact team to remain at Lublin has been withdrawn and that a plane scheduled to leave today from Poltava for Lublin with a load of supplies had been cancelled. This team at Lublin has been the only means by which we have been able to give help to our ex-prisoners in Poland and has been working day and night with those who have found their way to Lublin. I am therefore protesting to Molotov today that our contact team should be allowed to remain in Lublin.

It seems obvious that the Soviets have been attempting to stall us off by misinformation from day to day in order to hold up the sending in of more of our contact officers until they get all of our prisoners out of Poland. General Deane and I feel strongly that we should make an issue of the matter of having our much needed contact officers in Poland which is clearly within our rights under the prisoner of war agreement signed at Yalta, not only in order to take care of those who are still in Poland but also because of the probability that there will be substantial numbers liberated by the Red Army in the future.

I therefore recommend, with General Deane's concurrence, that you send another message along the following lines to Marshal Stalin:

"There appears to be conflicting information emanating from Poland regarding the status and numbers of American prisoners of war in Poland who have been liberated by the advance of the Red Army. In reply to my last message you indicated that there was no need to accede to my request that American aircraft be allowed to carry supplies to Poland and evacuate the sick because according to your information all of our liberated prisoners, except a very few sick in hospitals, were either in Odessa or en route there. On the other hand, I have had information that I consider positive and reliable that at the present time there are not only a considerable number of sick and injured Americans in hospitals in Poland, but also numbers of liberated prisoners of war in good health who are awaiting entrainment in Poland to the transit camp in Odessa or who are still at large in small groups and have not yet made contact with Soviet authorities.

⁸⁴ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

In view of this conflicting information I ask that you agree to send General Deane with a Red Army officer to Poland to make a survey of the prisoner of war situation in order that we may work out a method of implementing our agreement signed at Yalta which will be mutually satisfactory both to care for those now in Poland and for those liberated in the future and which will convince the American people that everything possible is being done for their soldiers. In the meantime I also request that you allow our contact officers now in Lublin to remain in Poland and to receive emergency supplies."

[HARRIMAN]

740.00114 EW/3-1445: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*⁸⁵

Moscow, March 14, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 7:58 p. m.]

738. I assume the Department has been informed by the War Department of the great difficulties General Deane and I have been having with the Soviet Government in regard to the care and repatriation of our liberated prisoners of war. In the beginning it appeared that the Soviet authorities were going to interpret our agreement substantially as we did, namely that we be allowed to send our contact officers to several points within Poland to which our prisoners first find their way, to fly in emergency supplies and to evacuate our wounded on the returning trips of the planes, although in Soviet planes rather than United States planes. We obtained authority for one contact team of an officer and doctor to go to Lublin with one plane load of supplies and they have done extremely useful work there. No other teams or supplies have since been permitted and authority for the Lublin team to remain has recently been withdrawn. The Soviets have now contended that Odessa is the only present "camps and points of concentration" referred to in the agreement to which our contact officers are to be permitted. The Soviets are, however, planning also to establish camps at Lwow, Bronnits and Volkowisk which are just east of the present Polish border and will be accessible to our officers, but even these camps are a long way from the original points of liberation.

⁸⁵ A copy of this telegram was transmitted to President Roosevelt by the Secretary of State under cover of the following memorandum: "I believe you will be interested in looking over the enclosed message from Harriman in which he describes the difficulties we are encountering in facilitating the evacuation from Poland of liberated United States prisoners of war. It would appear that the Soviet authorities may be endeavoring to use our desire to assist our prisoners as a means of obliging us to deal with the Warsaw Government." (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.) At the time of this telegram, the United States Government was in the midst of negotiations regarding the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity; for documentation regarding these negotiations, see pp. 110 ff.

Our prisoners have suffered serious hardships from lack of food, clothing, medical attention, et cetera, in finding their way to concentration points in Poland and on the long rail trip to Odessa because we have been stopped from sending in our contact teams and emergency supplies. A considerable number of sick and wounded are still hospitalized in Poland. I have been urging for the last 2 weeks that General Deane be permitted to survey the situation with a Red Army officer. This was first approved in writing with the qualification that arrangements must be made with the Polish authorities. An officer of our Military Mission informally approached the Polish Embassy here and was advised that no Polish authorization was necessary as it was entirely within the competence of the Red Army. We have been unable, however, to get authorization for Deane's trip.

It seems clear that the Soviets have changed their point of view during the last several weeks and are now rigidly determined that none of our officers shall be permitted in Poland.

I saw Molotov again today about the situation. He maintained that the Soviet Government was fulfilling its obligation under the agreement and both the Red Army authorities and the Polish Provisional Government objected to the presence of our officers in Poland. When I pressed him on what valid objection the Red Army could possibly have, he pointed out that we had no agreement with the Polish Provisional Government. In spite of my contention that this was a Soviet responsibility he kept reverting to the above fact. I then directly asked him if he was implying that we should make such an arrangement with the Poles and if so, whether the Red Army would remove its objections. He did not answer this question directly but left me with the impression that he wished me to draw that deduction.

I am satisfied that the objection comes from Soviet Government and not the Provisional Polish Government as our military mission has been in informal contact with the Polish Embassy here who have been extremely cooperative as have all Polish authorities including the Polish Red Cross to our prisoners in Poland.

I feel that the Soviet Government is trying to use our liberated prisoners of war as a club to induce us to give increased prestige to the Provisional Polish Government by dealing with it in this connection as the Soviets are doing in other cases. General Deane and I have not been able to find a way to force the Soviet authorities to live up to our interpretation of our agreement. We have used every argument to no avail. Unless some steps can be taken to bring direct pressure on the Soviets our liberated prisoners will continue to suffer hardships, particularly the wounded and sick. I recommend that the Depart-

ment consult with the War Department with a view of determining what further steps might be taken here or elsewhere to induce the Soviets to change their present uncooperative attitude.

It is the opinion of General Deane and myself that no arguments will induce the Soviets to live up to our interpretation of the agreement except retaliatory measures which affect their interests unless another direct appeal from the President should prove effective. We therefore recommend that the first step be a second request from the President to Marshal Stalin along the line of the suggestion I have already made in my Army cable March 12,⁸⁶ perhaps now amplified in light of developments since.⁸⁷ In the meantime, however, we recommend further that the Department and War Department come to an agreement on what retaliatory measures we can immediately apply in the event an unfavorable answer is received by the President from Marshal Stalin.

Consideration might be given to such actions as, or combination thereof: (1) That General Eisenhower⁸⁸ issue orders to restrict the movements of Soviet contact officers in France to several camps or points of concentration of their citizens far removed from the points of liberation, comparable to Lwow and Odessa; (2) that Lend-Lease refuse to consider requests of Soviet Government additional to our Fourth Protocol commitments for such items as sugar, industrial equipment or other items that are not immediately essential for the Red Army and the Russian war effort;⁸⁹ (3) that consideration be given to allowing our prisoners of war en route to Naples to give stories to the newspapers of the hardships they have been subjected to between point of liberation and arrival at Odessa and that in answer to questions of correspondents, the War Department explain the provisions of our agreement and the Soviet Government's failure to carry out the provisions of the agreement according to any reasonable interpretation.

I request urgent consideration of this question and the Department's preliminary reaction. General Dean requests that this cable be shown to General Marshall.

HARRIMAN

⁸⁶ M-23174, p. 1077.

⁸⁷ In telegram 781, March 16, 7 p. m., from Moscow, Ambassador Harriman and General Deane set forth the draft of a considerably longer and more detailed message to be sent by the President to Stalin (740.00114 EW/3-1645).

⁸⁸ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.

⁸⁹ For documentation regarding the conclusion of wartime assistance from the United States to the Soviet Union, see pp. 937 ff.

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*⁹⁰

[WASHINGTON,] 17 March 1945.

209. With reference to the question of evacuation of American prisoners from Poland I have been informed that the arrangement for General Deane with a Soviet Army officer to make a survey of the U. S. prisoners of war situation has been cancelled. In your last message to me⁹¹ you stated that there was no need to accede to my request that American aircraft be allowed to carry supplies to Poland and to evacuate the sick. I have information that I consider positive and reliable that there are a very considerable number of sick and injured Americans in hospitals in Poland and also numbers of liberated U. S. prisoners in good health who are awaiting entrainment in Poland to transit camps in Odessa, or are at large in small groups that have not yet made contact with Soviet authorities.

Frankly I cannot understand your reluctance to permit American officers and means to assist their own people in this matter. This Government has done everything to meet each of your requests. I now request you to meet mine in this particular matter. Please call Harriman to explain my desires in detail.

ROOSEVELT

*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁹²

[Translation]

I have received your message concerning the evacuation from Poland of former American prisoners of war.⁹³

In regard to the information which you have about a seemingly great number of sick and wounded Americans who are in Poland, and also those who are waiting for departure for Odessa or who did not get in touch with Soviet authorities, I must say that that information is not exact. In reality, on the territory of Poland by March 16 there were only 17 sick Americans, except a number of Americans who are on the way to Odessa. Today I have received a report that very soon they (17 persons) will be taken to Odessa by planes.

In regard to a request contained in your message I must say that if that request concerned me personally I would readily agree even to the prejudice of my interests. But in this case the matter concerns

⁹⁰ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁹¹ Stalin's message of March 5, p. 1073.

⁹² Copy of message obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁹³ *Supra.*

the interests of the Soviet armies at the front and Soviet commanders, who do not want to have extra officers with them, having no relation to military operations but at the same time requiring care for their accommodation, for the organization of meetings and all kinds of connections for them, for their guard from possible diversions on the part of German agents who have not yet been caught, and other measures diverting commanders and officers under their command from their direct duties.

Our commanders pay with their lives for the state of matters at the front and in the immediate rear and I do not consider it possible to limit their rights in any degree.

In addition to this I have to say that former American prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army are in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps in good conditions, at any rate in better conditions than former Soviet prisoners of war in American camps where they have been partially placed together with German prisoners of war and where some of them were subjected to unfair treatment and unlawful inconveniences up to beating as it was reported to the American Government more than once.

[Moscow,] March 22, 1945.

740.00114 E.W./2-2745

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union
(Gromyko)*

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated February 27, 1945,⁹⁴ in which you acknowledge the receipt of my note of February 1, 1945, concerning Soviet nationals captured by the United States armed forces in German uniforms.

As I stated in my note of February 1 the American military authorities are doing everything in their power to assist the representatives of the Soviet Embassy in establishing the status of the Soviet citizens captured by the American armed forces serving as members of German formations in German uniforms. These persons are separated from the Germans with whom they were captured and are permitted to return to the Soviet Union.

It would appear that the position of this Government with respect to the retention by the American authorities of a small number of German prisoners of war who claim to be German soldiers and whom the representatives of the Soviet Embassy believe to be Soviet citizens has not been clearly understood. The retention of these prisoners of

⁹⁴ Not printed.

war in the status of prisoners of war under the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 has nothing to do with questions of their citizenship or nationality status but arises solely from their demand to be treated as German prisoners of war under the Prisoners of War Convention.

As I pointed out in my note of February 1 the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention contemplates that prisoners of war are entitled to be treated on the basis of the uniform worn at the time of capture and that the detaining Power shall not without their consent look behind the uniforms to determine questions of citizenship or nationality. Furthermore, this Government has taken the position that aliens in the American armed forces are entitled to the full protection of the Prisoners of War Convention and has informed the German Government that all such prisoners of war entitled to repatriation under that Convention should be returned to the United States regardless of nationality. In view of the position taken with regard to American prisoners of war held by the German Government it is the opinion of the competent American authorities, that if this Government should reject the demand of prisoners of war who were captured while fighting in a German uniform as members of German military formations to be treated as German prisoners, the German Government might be afforded a pretext to subject to reprisal American prisoners of war in its custody. This Government must therefore reserve the right to retain all prisoners of war who make such demand under the Prisoners of War Convention in a prisoner of war status in order to safeguard the protection under that Convention of American prisoners of war in Germany.

This Government will continue to return to Soviet control all Soviet citizens captured as members of German formations in German uniform other than those who demand to be treated as German prisoners under the Prisoner of War Convention. With respect to those who make such demand, this Government must retain them for the time being in its custody. However, the Soviet Government may be assured that their disposition will be taken up again between the two Governments when organized resistance in Germany shall have ceased.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President
Roosevelt*⁹⁵

Moscow, 24 March 1945.

M-23408. Molotov has given me a copy of Stalin's answer⁹⁶ to your message regarding American liberated prisoners of war in Poland.

⁹⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. This telegram was transmitted through the facilities of the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

⁹⁶ Of March 22, p. 1082.

No doubt the Red Army has reported that on March 16th there were no more of our liberated prisoners in Poland except the 17 sick to which he refers. On the other hand General Deane and I believe that there are a number of our ex-prisoners, including sick, still at large in Poland. Since February 26th we have had continual definite statements from the Foreign Office and the Red Army Staff to the effect that there are no prisoners left in Poland and each time these statements have been proved to be wrong. The American Red Cross representative recently returned from Poland tells me that on the day he left Praga,⁹⁷ March 18th, he talked to one American officer in the street.

Stalin's statement that our liberated prisoners are in Soviet camps under good conditions is far from the truth. Soviet facilities in Odessa meet the barest minimum needs but are improved as a result of the work of our contact officers and the American food, clothing, and medical supplies that we have been able to furnish. Until arrival at Odessa the hardships undergone have been inexcusable. No effort whatsoever has been made by the Red Army to do anything until our men drifted into camps at Warsaw, Lodz, Lublin, or Wrzesnia which the Red Army advertised as point of assembly. These are some hundreds of miles from points of liberation and our men would have starved if it had not been for the generosity and hospitality of the Polish people. Individual headquarters of the Red Army have sometimes given a meal to our men. On the other hand reports indicate that in other places not only was nothing done but Red Army soldiers have taken wrist watches, clothing, and other articles at the point of a gun.

The unsatisfactory conditions existing in these camps have been ameliorated at several points by the activities of the Polish Red Cross. Conditions at the Rembertow camp at Warsaw were unbelievable. Our men were mixed with civilian refugees of all kinds, sleeping on floors, utterly no sanitary or washing facilities. Food was served twice a day at irregular intervals and consisted of barley soup, bread, potatoes, or kasha, and tea or coffee. There were no delousing facilities. I believe as a result of your cables to Stalin and General Deane's and my pressure our liberated prisoners have been moved to Odessa somewhat more rapidly than would otherwise have been the case. It may be there are only a relatively few of our men still in Poland, but on the other hand additional numbers may be liberated at any time and there is no reason to believe that their care will be any better than that experienced so far. Reports from our liberated prisoners when they arrive home will show that they have great gratitude for the Polish people and Polish Red Cross but nothing but resentment for

⁹⁷ Suburb of Warsaw.

the treatment received from the Russians, despite the fact that upon liberation they were deeply grateful to the Russians. The only exceptions to this are the dozen who had the good luck to get through to Moscow quickly.

Stalin's statement that the Red Army command cannot be bothered with a dozen American officers in Poland to look after the welfare of our liberated prisoners is preposterous when we think of what the American people have done in supplying the Red Army with vehicles and food. There was no thought of having our contact officers in the combat zone but I understand from General Eisenhower that he is giving Soviet contact officers complete freedom of movement to visit Russian citizens wherever they may be.

When the story of the treatment accorded our liberated prisoners by the Russians leaks out I cannot help but feel that there will be great and lasting resentment on the part of the American people.

I suggest that you reply again to Marshal Stalin, expressing thanks for his promise to fly out the 17 sick but stating that you cannot accept his position, using such of the above or other material available in the War Department as you think appropriate. I further recommend that since the Russians cannot do less than they are now doing for our men, General Eisenhower be instructed to limit the movements of the Russian contact officers in France to several camps where Russian citizens are collected, far to the rear. We should, of course, continue to give the best treatment possible to liberated Soviet citizens and all reasonable courtesies and assistance to their contact officers at these camps in the rear.

[HARRIMAN]

711.62114A/4-245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 2, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received April 3—3 p. m.]

1008. In compliance with the suggestions contained in the President's message No. 216 of March 26,⁹⁸ I wrote a letter to Molotov on March 27 setting forth our complaints regarding the treatment of our prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army. The following is a summary of the pertinent parts of this letter for the Department's information and information of the War Department:

I told Molotov that I was submitting this letter as per his request during our conversation of March 13, at which time he had indicated

⁹⁸ Not found.

that he would investigate such complaints with a view to taking necessary corrective action. I commented on my Government's appreciation to the Red Army for the liberation of our POWs⁹⁹ and for the many acts of kindness and generosity by individual officers and men of the Soviet armies towards our released soldiers. I stated that I was thoroughly aware of the operational requirements of any army in the field and that, therefore, I would confine my comments to those conditions which we felt might be corrected without infringing upon the efficiency of military operations. I pointed out that I was not raising the question at this time of permission for our contact officers to go to the first points of concentration as we understood the Yalta agreement. The complaints listed were the following:

1. Lack of cooperation of Soviet military authorities made it impossible effectively to set up an organization for handling American prisoners of war as liberated. The United States had been trying to effect such plans since June of last year with no results.

2. Because of this lack of planning American prisoners of war who were liberated in Poland and Germany were forced, although some of them were sick, to wander through Poland uncared for by anyone and without instructions as to where they should assemble. It is recognized that some of the sick and wounded were cared for in Red Army hospitals. It took our liberated soldiers weeks to find their way to certain points of concentration in Polish cities from which they were entrained for Odessa.

3. During the period from the time of their liberation until they managed to reach these concentration points our American prisoners of war were almost entirely dependent upon the generosity of the Polish people and the Polish Red Cross for the barest necessities of life.

4. It was nearly one month after their liberation that American authorities in Moscow were notified officially of the liberation of American prisoners of war.

5. It was a month after time of liberation before instructions were issued to our prisoners of war, at which time posters were distributed directing them to Wrznesia, Praga, Lublin, or Lodz.

6. Reports have reached us, amply substantiated by witnesses, that many of our soldiers, while wandering through Poland, had their watches and personal effects forcibly taken from them by Red Army soldiers.

7. When points of concentration were finally set up they were poorly administered as to sanitary conditions, food and replacements for worn out clothing.

⁹⁹ Prisoners of war.

8. The worst concentration point was that at Rembertow, near Warsaw. There existed serious conditions of overcrowding, shortage of beds and bedding, poor food, and inadequate sanitary conditions. Food was meager and served only twice a day at irregular intervals. The processing of large numbers of civilian evacuees aggravated this problem for some time. Conditions at other points of concentration were a little better but existing facilities were still inadequate.

9. In the trains from these points in Poland to Odessa our prisoners were placed in box cars where there were stoves but no fuel, making it necessary to forage for fuel when the trains would stop. Food was scarce and an insufficient number of blankets were issued.

10. During the entire period our prisoners were under Soviet control they were prevented from contacting the Military Mission in Moscow. Prisoners at Odessa were kept in strict confinement.

11. There is no way of knowing exactly how many sick or injured American prisoners are still in Poland, but we have reason to believe that many of them are still either in hospitals in Poland or in private homes in small communities.

12. The sending of American supplies to liberated prisoners was not permitted except for a small quantity which accompanied the United States contact team to Lublin. Requests to send supplies to Odessa were granted after considerable delay in each case.

In closing I stated that questions at Odessa were not being dealt with in my letter as they were being handled by our contact officers there and our Military Mission in Moscow. I also stated that I believed the complaints listed could be corrected and I requested that the Soviet authorities take the necessary steps to insure that such conditions will not exist in the future. I asked Molotov to keep me informed of corrective action which might be taken.

Sent to Department as 1008; repeated to Paris for Murphy's¹ information and SHAEF² as 56.

HARRIMAN

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*³

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1945.

MY DEAR ED: The Prime Minister and Anthony have received replies to personal messages which they addressed to Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov respectively regarding the failure of the Soviet authorities to repatriate liberated British prisoners of war and to permit visits of British contact officers and furnishing of supplies to certain

¹ Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser for Germany.

² Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

hospitals and other places under Soviet control where British subjects are collected for repatriation.⁴

The reply from Marshal Stalin states that there are no grounds for anxiety about liberated British prisoners of war since they are living in better conditions than has been the case with Soviet nationals in British camps where they are alleged to have suffered persecution and, in some cases, blows. The Marshal adds that all recaptured British prisoners of war are now on the way to Odessa or on the homeward voyage. The reply from M. Molotov states that he cannot agree that the Yalta agreement had not been satisfactorily carried out by the Soviet authorities, nor could he agree to exaggerated claims which did not follow from the agreement. He concluded with the assurance that the liberated British prisoners of war are enjoying good conditions and that the Soviet authorities will continue to care for them in future.

I understand that the President has also received a reply to a message which he sent to Marshal Stalin on the subject of the treatment of liberated American prisoners of war in the hands of the Soviet authorities.

Anthony is of the opinion that it would be better for the present not to renew the attempt to secure permission for contact officers to enter Poland proper in order to visit liberated British prisoners of war, chiefly because the British contact officers have now proceeded to camps at Lwow and Volkovysk where they will report whether points of concentration exist west of the Curzon Line, the estimated number of ex-prisoners remaining to be evacuated to these two camps and also the general condition of the ex-prisoners. So far the Soviet authorities have denied that there are any points of concentration or any prisoners of war in hospitals in Poland west of the Curzon Line. The above-mentioned replies from Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov ignore this aspect of the question and there is an obvious advantage in waiting for reports from contact officers before deciding whether to return to the charge, since if these reports bear out what has already been said to the Soviet authorities, a better position will have been obtained for renewing the attempt to secure permission for contact officers to enter Poland proper. Anthony has no doubt that this would be strongly op-

⁴ For Prime Minister Churchill's message of March 21 to Stalin and Stalin's reply of March 23, see *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945* (Moscow: 1957), vol. 1, pp. 306-308. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden sent a message to Foreign Commissar Molotov on March 21 complaining of the serious delays which were occurring in collecting and evacuating liberated British prisoners of war in Poland and elsewhere and urged that the British-Soviet Agreement of February 11, 1945, regarding the treatment and repatriation of liberated Soviet and British citizens be carried out at once in full. Molotov's reply of March 23 denied that the British-Soviet agreement was being unsatisfactorily carried out.

posed, because the Soviet Government suspects that the contact officers would, under cover of dealings with prisoners of war, proceed to contact Polish leaders, and, in fact to convert themselves into the proposed Observation Mission.⁵

Anthony has requested me to communicate to you his views set forth in the preceding paragraph regarding the next step to be taken in these discussions with the Soviet authorities and to enquire whether the United States Government are in agreement.

The Prime Minister is not communicating the above to the President and I have been asked to enquire if you will be so good as to do so in view of his personal interest in the matter.⁶

HALIFAX

711.62114/4-1045

The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In answer to your note of March 23 on the question of the Soviet citizens liberated by the American armies, I have the honor to state the following.

As has already been pointed out in the Embassy's note of February 27,⁷ the Germans, in violation of universally accepted rules of international law, through threats and repressions are frequently compelling Soviet prisoners of war and Soviet civilians forcibly deported to Germany to enter special units organized by the Germans which are used for various types of military tasks, including work in the immediate rear of the German army, in connection with which the Soviet citizens mentioned are occasionally outfitted by the German military authorities in German military uniforms. It is fully evident that these unlawful activities of the Germans are juridically invalid, and Soviet citizens falling into the hands of the Allied armies, even though they be dressed in German military uniforms, cannot be counted as military personnel of the German army, but must be considered as ordinary liberated Soviet prisoners of war or civilians, deported to Germany.

⁵ In the course of the negotiations in the Moscow Polish Commission, it was proposed by the United States that British and American observers be allowed to enter Poland to report to the Commission on conditions there. The Soviet Union opposed such a mission.

⁶ Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt, received a copy of this letter from the Department of State on April 9, 1945, and sent it by mail to the President, who was then at Warm Springs, Georgia. There is no indication that the President, who died on April 12, took action on this document.

⁷ Not printed.

From the above it is clear that the analogy between the Soviet citizens mentioned and foreign citizens serving in the American armed forces brought out in your note cannot be admitted as proved.

Consequently, the Soviet Government again insists that all Soviet citizens, liberated and being liberated by American armies in the course of military operations against Germany, are subject to transfer to the Soviet authorities for return to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government considers it necessary, in this connection, to refer to Article 1 of the agreement signed in the Crimea on February 11, on the strength of which all Soviet citizens, without exception, liberated by armies operating under American command are subject to transfer to the Soviet authorities.

Accept [etc.]

A. GROMYKO

711.62114/4-1845

The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In accordance with instructions of the Soviet Government, I have the honor to bring to your attention the following:

According to information published in the press within the past few days the Anglo-American command in Europe is taking measures not to return Soviet prisoners of war and Soviet citizens interned in Germany to the Soviet Union. According to the information at hand the command of the American Ninth Army has developed, toward this end, a program under which it is proposed that former Soviet prisoners of war and interned citizens remain, after liberation from German captivity, in the German prisoner-of-war camps, homes and farm-houses in which they were found. The Anglo-American command is encouraging the hiring by Germans of Soviet citizens liberated from German captivity, persuading them to remain in Germany by mentioning that their homeland is too far distant for it to be possible for them to be repatriated. The command intends to accomplish the return of the Soviet citizens mentioned to the Soviet Union after the Anglo-American armies unite with the Red Army.

In accordance with instructions of the Soviet Government, I am obliged to state that it is extremely perturbed by the inadmissible activities of such a character on the part of the Anglo-American command and that it in no way can agree with such a plan for the return of liberated Soviet prisoners of war and civilians as worked out by the Anglo-American command.

In accordance with instructions of the Soviet Government, I insist on the immediate cancellation of this plan and of all the measures of the command mentioned above and on the inadmissibility of their continuing in effect. I desire also to emphasize the necessity, in accordance with the agreement of February 11, 1945, of immediately directing all Soviet citizens liberated by armies under American command to special collection camps, of providing them with proper food, clothing and medical assistance, of immediately informing representatives of the Soviet repatriation authorities in regard to all such discovered persons, and also of taking steps to hasten their dispatch to their homeland.

The Soviet Government expects the taking by the Government of the United States of America of appropriate and effective measures, envisaged in the agreement of February 11, 1945, for the repatriation of Soviet citizens to the U.S.S.R. and the exact fulfillment of the above-mentioned agreement.

Accept [etc.]

A. GROMYKO

740.00114 EW/4-3045: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 30, 1945—midnight.

[Received April 30—8:35 p. m.]

1426. Vyshinski⁸ called me to the Foreign Office this evening and proposed that we agree, now that our forces have linked up in Germany, to effect repatriation of our respective liberated prisoners of war directly across our line of contact in Germany instead of by sea. If I could obtain our Government's agreement in principle to this proposal, our respective military authorities, Vyshinski said, could work out the details.

I undertook to submit the proposal to my Government. In case the proposal is accepted, I think it likely that the Russians will do their best to interpret our acceptance in such a way as to oblige us to hand over at once all the Russians we find, regardless of their status, before we have had a chance to do any sifting among those found to have been fighting with the Germans. The Department may wish to phrase its answer in such a way as to anticipate this possibility.⁹

⁸ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁹ Telegram 1030, May 7, 1945, 7 p. m., to Moscow, stated that the Department of State agreed in principle to the repatriation of liberated prisoners of war across the lines of contact in Germany instead of by sea; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force was being asked to contact the Western Commander of Soviet forces to work out details effecting repatriation in such a manner (740.00114 EW/4-3045). Telegram 1514, May 8, 1945, 10 p. m., from Moscow, reported that Vyshinsky had been informed of the Department's assent (740.00114-EW/5-845).

The British Chargé has wired his Government in connection with the Golikov statement (reEmbs 1425, April 30) recommending that a factual refutation of Golikov's shameless distortions be given to editors in England.¹⁰ I am heartily in sympathy with this recommendation. I can see no reason why our public opinion should be left under any misapprehension as to the true facts of this situation.

Repeated to Paris for Reber¹¹ as 88, to Caserta as 78.

KENNAN

711.62114/4-1045

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union
(Novikov)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1945.

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of the Ambassador's note of April 10, 1945, replying to my note of March 23, 1945, concerning Soviet nationals captured by the American armed forces.

All persons who claim Soviet nationality captured by the American armed forces while serving as members of the German armed forces in German uniforms are transferred to the Soviet authorities for repatriation to the Soviet Union. However, this Government must reserve the right to retain in a prisoner of war status those persons who themselves of their own accord insist upon being treated as German prisoners of war thereby bringing themselves within the scope of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. The reasons for the retention by this Government of these persons in a prisoner of war status are set forth in previous communications and in the Secretary of State's note of April 9.¹² As stated in the note of April 9 the German Government has recently notified this Government through the protecting Power that persons of nationality other than German captured in German uniforms should also be considered as German prisoners of war, and has threatened, if such prisoners of war are transferred to the custody of the Government of the country of which they are nationals,

¹⁰ Telegram 1425, April 30, 1945, from Moscow, not printed; it transmitted the summary of an interview with Colonel General Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, Representative of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union for Repatriation Affairs, which was featured on April 30 in the newspaper *Pravda*, the organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In his interview, Golikov made startling allegations regarding mistreatment of Soviet citizens in British and American prisoner-of-war camps and contrasted the unfavorable treatment accorded them with the generous treatment allegedly accorded American and British prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army (740.00114/4-3045). On May 3, 1945, the Department of State released to the press a statement concerning the Soviet allegations on Allied prisoners of war; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1945, p. 864.

¹¹ Until April 25, 1945, Samuel Reber, Jr., was Counselor of Mission on the staff of the United States Political Adviser, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and served as Political Officer for the liberated countries.

¹² Not printed.

to take retaliatory action against prisoners of war in its custody who are members of the American armed forces but who do not possess American nationality.

This Government has no intention of retaining these persons permanently and will be glad to take up their disposition again when there are no longer any American prisoners of war in the custody of the German armed forces.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

711.62114/4-1845

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union
(Novikov)*

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1945.

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of the Ambassador's note of April 18, 1945, concerning press reports that measures have been instituted by the Anglo-American command in Europe which would prevent the return of Soviet nationals to the Soviet Union.

I assure you that no measures to prevent the return of Soviet citizens to their homeland have been undertaken by my Government. On the contrary my Government will facilitate the repatriation of all persons of Soviet nationality who are liberated from German control except those persons referred to in the Department's note of February 1, 1945, who claim protection under the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.

If, as reported by the press, the military authorities have devised some program whereby these persons are being temporarily sheltered in former German camps, I can only believe that such a program has been adopted as a practical solution to the problem of obtaining housing and transportation facilities on a continent devastated by the exigencies of modern warfare.

I am certain that your Government understands that the rapid advances of the Allied armed forces in Germany, which have liberated hundreds of thousands of United Nations nationals, have created a most difficult transportation problem so that it has not been possible to transfer immediately all those liberated persons either to their homelands or to the rear areas.

In view of the new situation created by the junction of the Anglo-American armed forces and the Soviet armed forces, it is possible that the military authorities under the command of General Eisenhower may be contemplating initiating a more expeditious procedure for the repatriation of Soviet nationals liberated in Germany. Thus, the necessity of causing these persons to make the long arduous journey to the Soviet Union by circuitous sea routes may be avoided.

With a view to clearing up your Government's misconceptions which have apparently arisen from the press reports to which the Ambassador refers, I have taken up this matter with the military authorities and have requested further details concerning the exact measures taken by our field commanders.¹³

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

740.00114 EW/3-945

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy
(Forrestal)*¹⁴

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to the memorandum dated March 9, 1945, from the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee to Mr. Stettinius concerning the interpretation of the United States-Soviet reciprocal agreement on liberated prisoners of war and civilians and to my letter in reply thereto dated March 24, 1945, in which I concurred in the proposed action to be taken by the United States Government as set forth in this memorandum.¹⁵ Under this interpretation of the agreement this Government is returning to the Soviet authorities all Soviet citizens captured in German uniform other than those who demand that they be retained as German prisoners of war and thus come under the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.

¹³ A note of July 12, 1945, to Soviet Chargé Novikov transmitted a copy of an extract of a report dated June 14, 1945, from General Eisenhower, which stated that every possible effort had been made to expedite the repatriation of liberated Soviet nationals. General Eisenhower's report further stated that every available means of transportation by land, sea, and air had been used to repatriate Soviet citizens, and to date more than 400,000 were known to have been repatriated or sent into the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. At a conference between representatives of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and the Supreme Command of the Red Army at Halle on May 23, 1945, a plan for repatriation of Allied nationals liberated by the Anglo-American and Soviet forces was mutually agreed to according to which it was hoped that up to 30,000 or more Soviet citizens per day would be returned to the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. General Eisenhower's report further stated that while it was impossible to obtain accurate figures, it was estimated that more than a million Soviet citizens awaited repatriation in the areas of Germany occupied by the Allied Expeditionary Force and in Western European countries, and all possible means were being taken to effect the repatriation with the utmost speed. (711.62114/6-2645)

¹⁴ The questions raised in this letter were considered by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at their eighteenth meeting on May 18, 1945. The Committee approved the turning over of the 118 Soviet citizens held as German prisoners of war to the Soviet authorities for repatriation to the Soviet Union, and agreed to defer action on the proposal by the Secretary of State to give blanket approval to similar transfers of custody in all cases where persons of Allied nationality were held as German prisoners of war pending further study of the entire problem. The Committee decisions were communicated to the Secretary of State in a memorandum dated May 23, 1945, not printed (740.00114 EW/5-2345).

¹⁵ The Acting Secretary of State's letter of March 24, 1945, not printed, but see footnote 82, p. 1077.

As you know there have been several exchanges of notes with the Soviet Ambassador with respect to the retention in United States custody of approximately 118 German prisoners of war who claim to be German soldiers and who the representatives of the Soviet Embassy believe to be Soviet citizens. The Soviet Ambassador was informed that these persons are being retained in a prisoner of war status because of their having insisted upon being treated as German prisoners of war thereby bringing themselves within the scope of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. The Soviet Ambassador was further informed that in order to safeguard the protection under the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of American prisoners of war in German custody this Government reserved the right to retain these persons in its custody until organized resistance in Germany ceased and there were no longer any American prisoners of war in the custody of the German armed forces. The Soviet Ambassador was assured that at that time the disposition of these persons would be taken up again through diplomatic channels.

I assume, now that Germany has unconditionally surrendered, that all American prisoners of war held by the German armed forces have been liberated and that therefore there no longer exists any danger that the German authorities will take reprisals against American prisoners of war. I therefore believe that it would be advisable to turn over these 118 persons to the Soviet authorities for repatriation to the Soviet Union, as well as any other persons of similar status who may be found in United States custody in the future. However, the policy which has been adopted with respect to the repatriation of the other categories of persons mentioned in the memorandum of March 9, 1945, from the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee should remain unchanged.

I am also of the opinion that it would be advisable to transfer to the custody of the authorities of the other Allied Governments all persons believed to be of their respective nationalities who were captured by the American armed forces while serving in German military formations in German uniforms who insist upon being treated as German prisoners of war.

I should appreciate an expression of your views in this connection at the earliest opportunity. I am also addressing a similar letter to the Secretary of War.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

740.00114 EW/6-1145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 11, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received June 11—5 p. m.]

2013. Reurtel 2064, June 7, 7 p. m. to Dept.¹⁶ While Embassy has no evidence to support reports of stern treatment of Soviet citizens repatriated from Allied occupied areas, it would be unwise to discount the general basis for these reports. Soviet Govt and military authorities have never been at pains to disguise their scornful attitude toward Soviet troops taken prisoner. Soviet Govt is not signatory of Geneva Convention and during entire course of war refused all overtures from enemy powers for agreement regarding treatment of prisoners which might have improved lot of Soviet prisoners in Germany.

Furthermore, many Soviet prisoners and civilians removed to Germany apparently accepted service in German military or labor formations and were in German uniform when "liberated". Soviet attitude toward such individuals will inevitably be harsh and many of them will probably be considered guilty of actions harmful to state, one of most serious crimes in Soviet book.

Although repatriation of liberated Soviet citizens has now been proceeding for months, Embassy knows of only a single instance in which a repatriated prisoner has returned to his home and family in Moscow and resumed his prewar pursuits. This man was suffering from tuberculosis and was released after being held under guard in a camp near Moscow for four months.

It is known that repatriates are met at ports of entry by police guard and marched off with little ceremony to unknown destinations. Trainloads of repatriates are passing through Moscow and continuing east, the passengers being held incommunicado while trains stand in Moscow yards. Although little info is available, it is believed that repatriates are first subjected to an intense screening by police. Given Soviet attitude towards surrender, it is probable that prisoners are assumed guilty of desertion unless they can present convincing evidence of mitigating circumstances. Those found serving in German uniform will probably be charged with anti-state activity. It is quite possible that persons considered guilty of deliberate desertion or anti-state activity are being shot, while some few with good war records

¹⁶ Telegram 2064 from Stockholm, which had also been sent to Moscow (not printed), reported information regarding the reluctance of liberated Soviet prisoners of war to return to the Soviet Union and the rumor that Soviet firing squads were busy in Murmansk dealing with repatriated citizens returning by way of that port (740.00114 EW/6-745).

who have been captured when severely wounded or under similar circumstances and have refused service with Germans may be released to return home. Great bulk of repatriates, however, are probably being placed in forced labor battalions and used on construction projects in Urals, Central Asia, Siberia or Far North under police supervision.

Attitude of Soviet authorities toward surrender and anti-State activity is, of course, well known to Soviet citizens not yet repatriated and they can have few illusions concerning treatment awaiting them on their return. It is, therefore, not surprising that many of them do not display enthusiasm at prospect of return to Soviet Union and are seeking to avoid it by any means at their command.

Reports of executions at Murmansk may be result of this state of mind. Embassy is attempting to verify and will keep you advised of developments.¹⁷

Sent to Stockholm as 29 ; rptd to Dept as 2013 and London as 265.

HARRIMAN

711.62114/7-1045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy), at Hoechst

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1945—7 p. m.

201. Under the Yalta prisoner of war agreement US Govt took the obligation to return all Soviet liberated prisoners of war and displaced persons. No distinction was made as to whether these persons were German prisoners of war, had been forced into or voluntarily joined the German army or were ordinary displaced persons who had been obliged by the Germans to work for them. With respect to Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, and Poles whose homes are east of the 1939 Line of Demarcation or of the Curzon Line, U.S. Govt has interpreted the Yalta Agreement as not requiring their repatriation since the US Govt has not formally recognized any territorial changes brought about by the present war in Europe.

In the US we have already returned to Soviet jurisdiction approximately 3800 German prisoners of war of Soviet nationality. Among the German prisoners of war of Soviet nationality in US

¹⁷ Telegram 1805, August 11, 1945, 7 p. m., to Moscow, asked for information as soon as possible as to whether any decrees were issued by the Soviet Government during the war divesting Soviet nationals of their citizenship because they were captured by the enemy, and if any such decrees were issued, whether they subsequently were rescinded (711.62114/8-1145). In telegram 2924, August 16, 1945, 7 p. m., from Moscow, the Embassy reported that it had found no evidence that any such decree had ever been published but had been privately informed that, in general, Red Army men considered to have surrendered without adequate justification were regarded as traitors, whereas, those who fell into enemy hands through circumstances beyond their control were merely considered guilty of breach of discipline (711.62114/8-1645).

approximately 154 insisted that although they were Soviet citizens they be treated as German prisoners of war and not returned to the Soviet Union. In order to protect American prisoners of war in German hands, this group was not delivered to Soviet jurisdiction while American prisoners of war were still held by the Germans. Now that all American prisoners of war have been released, consideration is being given to sending this group to Germany where they will be divested of their prisoner of war status and turned over to the Soviet authorities. This action is being taken on the basis of a decision on May 18, 1945, of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.¹⁸ This group as well as the group reurtel 143, July 10,¹⁹ apparently falls in the same category, namely, they were captured by our forces while forming part of active enemy military units. They not only were apparently prepared to engage in military operations against our forces, and many of them did, but by joining the enemy forces they became traitors to one of our allies. For the above reasons Dept is of the opinion that the members of Vlasoff's²⁰ army or any other Soviet citizens captured while forming part of German military organizations should be turned over to the appropriate Soviet authorities in accordance with arrangements already in effect to repatriate Soviet nationals. Moreover, the CCS²¹ authorized SACMED²² in June to transfer to the Soviet authorities approximately 50,000 Cossacks who were serving with the German armed forces at the time of capture. These Cossacks may have formed part of Vlasoff's army.

In regard to General Schilenkow²³ and General Vlasoff or any of their lieutenants who may be considered as war criminals, their cases should be handled in conformity with standing instructions relative to persons falling within this category.

GREW

¹⁸ For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee decisions of May 18, 1945, see footnote 14, p. 1095.

¹⁹ Not printed; it reported that the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, had asked for advice in respect of the disposal of members of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia and members of the Armed Forces of that Committee who were under house arrest in the Tyrol (740.00119-Control (Germany)/7-1045).

²⁰ Lt. Gen. Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov, captured by the German Army in the spring of 1942. In December 1942 Vlasov became the head of the Russian National Committee, a liberation movement sponsored by the German forces. Vlasov was Chairman of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia founded in Prague in November 1944, and he became Commander of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia on January 28, 1945.

²¹ Combined Chiefs of Staff.

²² Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander).

²³ Maj. Gen. Grigory Nikolayevich Zhilenkov, member of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

711.62114/7-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1945—6 p. m.

1692. War has referred to Dept for reply Deane's M24904 and M24905 of July 5 transmitting text of two letters from General Golubev with respect to recent disturbance at Fort Dix and repatriation of German prisoners of war of Soviet nationality since Dept has received two notes from Soviet Embassy, Washington, on this subject.²⁴ In view of receipt of communications through both diplomatic and military channels on this subject, the question has been raised by War as to whether the Soviets desire communications on this and related subjects to be transmitted through diplomatic or military channels. War has pointed out in this connection that frequently complaints concerning the repatriation of liberated Soviet nationals have been made the subject of official representations through both military and diplomatic channels and that when replies have been made to the Soviets, such replies have been disregarded and the allegations renewed in their original form. In this connection particular reference is made to the protests of the Soviets concerning the reported mistreatment by the American authorities of 4,000 Soviet nationals at Dachau and 1,700 Soviet nationals in the United Kingdom. In the latter case despite the communication of the known facts concerning the treatment accorded to these Soviet nationals, the Soviet Govt reiterated these charges in a recent public statement. In the future, therefore, in cases where information has already been transmitted to the Soviet Govt, this Govt will not accept further communications or protests on the same subject unless a specific request for additional information or new protests are made.

The allegations made by General Golubev in his letters to Deane are further evidence of the attitude with which the Soviets have approached the entire repatriation question. The Soviet Govt has made repeated and unfounded allegations of violations by this Govt of the Yalta Agreement and has further made numerous exaggerated state-

²⁴ Neither the two military communications from Major General Deane nor the two letters from Lieutenant General Konstantin Dmitriyevich Golubev, Deputy Chief, Soviet Commission for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War, are printed. The "disturbance at Fort Dix" refers to the riot which occurred among 154 German prisoners of war believed to be of Russian nationality when, on June 29, 1945, they were being assembled at Fort Dix, New Jersey, in preparation for their return to Europe and delivery to Soviet authorities. The disturbances, which resulted in the suicide by hanging of three prisoners and the serious wounding of several others, apparently originated in the reluctance of the prisoners to be returned to the Soviet Union.

In a note to the Department of State dated June 5, the Soviet Embassy expressed its insistence that all Soviet citizens, without exception, who were liberated by American armed forces, including those who were taken while in German military uniform, be returned to the Soviet Union (711.62114/6-545).

ments on the mistreatment of Soviet citizens while in U.S. custody awaiting repatriation. In at least one instance Soviet repatriation representatives have shown a lack of military courtesy. Furthermore, the Soviet Govt has refused to abide by the spirit of the Yalta Agreement and in many cases by its terms. In this respect it has refused to permit: 1) American transportation to transfer liberated American POWs from areas under Soviet control when it was practical to do so; 2) the establishment and control by the American authorities of the internal administration of camps accommodating liberated American POWs; 3) American repatriation representatives in the numbers desired and contemplated by the Yalta Agreement to enter into Soviet controlled territories.

An immediate investigation of the Fort Dix disturbance was conducted on June 29 and was completed prior to the receipt of a request from the Soviet Embassy for representatives of the Embassy to participate therein. Contrary to General Golubev's allegations that these POWs wished to return to the Soviet Union, this investigation has definitely revealed that this disturbance was caused by these POWs because of their reluctance to return to the Soviet Union and that the three who committed suicide did so for this reason. The POWs interviewed in this investigation stated that they intended to commit mass suicide by provoking the use of force on the part of the American authorities. The precautions taken by the American authorities were appropriate and effective and the prompt use of tear gas prevented additional suicides by hanging. The American authorities are making every effort by segregation, adequate guarding and other appropriate means to prevent further disorders and suicides. In the view of the aforementioned findings of this investigation, this Department would appreciate receiving from the Soviets information which would serve as a basis for General Golubev's statement that these persons did not protest their return to the Soviet Union.

The Dept has informed the Embassy that in view of the completion of this investigation it will not be possible for representatives of the Embassy to participate therein. However, Soviet military representatives were authorized to visit these POWs at Fort Dix and to be present at the time for their embarkation. They have recently returned from a visit to Fort Dix where they interviewed 20 of these POWs, all of whom indicated in no uncertain terms that they did not wish to return to the Soviet Union and stated that they were being very well treated by the American authorities. The Soviet representatives after having obtained such testimony from these 20 POWs, canceled further interviews which had been arranged and stated that they did not wish to speak to any more of these POWs.

The number and whereabouts of persons claiming Soviet nationality among German POWs in US, except those now at Dix claiming

protection under the Geneva Convention, were immediately communicated to Soviet Emb. Such persons were segregated and placed in separate camps where they were visited by representatives of the Emb. All such persons have now been repatriated direct to Soviet Union via U.S. west coast ports with the exception of a few who at the request of the Soviets have not been moved for reasons of health.

Since the group at Fort Dix insisted upon being treated as German POWs under Geneva Convention, representatives of the Emb have not been permitted to visit them heretofore and they were not and will not be transferred direct to Soviet Union for the reasons which have been repeatedly communicated to the Soviet authorities. Moreover, for the same reasons their proposed transfer to Fort Dix was not made known before being carried out. However, Soviet Emb was notified immediately thereafter of their proposed return to Germany for transfer to Soviet authorities. This Govt therefore has fulfilled its undertaking under Art. 2 of the Yalta Agreement particularly in view of the exceptional circumstances in the case of these persons.

At the time of the visit of the Soviet representatives at Fort Dix it was ascertained during the questioning that although careful screening had been carried out by Army at least one of POWs was not a Soviet citizen and doubt existed as to the Soviet nationality of some of the others. In view of this finding a joint State-War Board will re-question all of the prisoners to ascertain whether in fact they are Soviet citizens. Pending the receipt of findings of Board and further study of entire question, a final decision regarding this group cannot be made.^{24a}

You are requested at your discretion to communicate with the FonOff along the lines of the foregoing.

GREW

[President Truman, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill (later British Prime Minister Clement Attlee), with their advisers, met in conference at Berlin, July 17–August 2, 1945. For the record of discussions and other related documentation regarding the consideration given the question of the repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, volume I, pages 794–801, and volume II, pages 259–260, 367–368, 374, 497, 499, 503, 504, 549–550, 563, 574, 603, 604, 1162–1166, and 1600.]

^{24a} In a note to the Soviet Ambassador on August 7, the Acting Secretary of State transmitted the findings of the investigation of the Fort Dix disturbances conducted by the Inspector General's Office of the War Department. The note drew attention to the investigation's conclusion that the disturbance was apparently caused by the prisoners of war because of their reluctance to return to the Soviet Union and that the precautions taken by the American military authorities were considered appropriate and effective under the circumstances (711.62114/7-2045).

740.62114/8-745 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force
Headquarters, to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, August 7, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 5:35 p. m.]

3228. ReDeptels 92, Feb. 3, 7 p. m., and 279, March 31, 6 p. m.²⁵ Military authorities have received petition signed by 118 Russians captured with German Armed Forces addressed to General Marshall and another to International Red Cross requesting that they be given political refuge and not be sent back to Russia, but be allowed to go to some other area where they would be protected. They claim they are "political refugees", were not enemies of US and UK and fought with Germans in hope of "renaissance of a new Russia." Requests made in "name of humanity" and claiming articles of Geneva Convention covering ["political emigrants".

On basis of JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) paper No. 1266-5 dated June 8, 1945,²⁶ which provided for the return of [to] Russia of Soviet citizens captured wearing German uniforms, military authorities plan to deliver them to Soviet authorities without forwarding petitions. In submitting matter to us for comment we stated that on basis of JCS paper there seemed to be no other alternative but requested that action be withheld pending report to Dept and receipt of its views. Present schedule calls for move of these Russians about Aug 10 to 15.

We would appreciate receiving urgently from Dept statement of policy in the light of JCS paper with special reference to sub-paragraph (c) (policy) of tel 279. What is policy concerning Soviet civilians who will not admit to Soviet citizenship but yet cannot claim other nationality. Are they to be treated as "stateless" and placed in category of displaced persons, or are they to be screened by Soviets and returned if demand is made?

KIRK

²⁵ Neither printed. Telegram 92, February 3, transmitted the text of the note of February 1 from the Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé, p. 1067. Regarding telegram 279, March 31, see last sentence of footnote 82, p. 1077.

²⁶ The operative part of J.C.S. 1266/5, June 8, 1945, consisted of the following military communication from the War Department to the Headquarters, European Theater of Operations: "118 Soviet citizens who had claimed status as German prisoners of war are being returned to Europe for repatriation to the Soviet Union. Pursuant to governmental decision, transfer to Soviet authorities is to take place in United States zone in Germany. Similar action will be taken as to any other German prisoners held in United States custody in this category who are claimed to be Soviet citizens." (Lot 52 M 64 Box G 603)

740.00114 EW/8-745 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser,
Allied Force Headquarters, at Caserta*

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1945—7 p. m.

729. Reurtel 3228, Aug. 7. In conformity with commitments taken at Yalta US Govt is obligated to return to the Soviet Union all Soviet citizens. In carrying out this agreement, the policy has been adopted of turning over to Soviet jurisdiction all Soviet citizens who were domiciled in the Soviet Union within the 1939 Soviet frontiers.

In recent screening at Fort Dix of group of 153 Soviet citizens captured in German uniforms, prisoners were questioned to ascertain whether any of them were Poles, citizens of the Baltic States or other countries, or were "stateless" persons (such as Russians who have lived abroad for a number of years before the outbreak of the present war). Persons found to fall in these categories will not be turned over to Soviet jurisdiction unless they so desire.

On the other hand persons who claimed that they were "stateless" but who on the basis of careful questioning were clearly Soviet citizens at the time of outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union are considered by us still to be Soviet citizens within the meaning of the Yalta Agreement regarding prisoners of war and displaced persons.

Therefore before turning over any of the group referred to in your message, they should be carefully screened to ascertain whether in fact they are Soviet citizens.

BYRNES

740.62114/8-2745 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the
Secretary of State*

BERLIN, August 27, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received August 27—4:50 p. m.]

383. For Matthews.²⁷ There has been discussion at United States Forces European Theater and United States Group Control Council regarding the forcible repatriation of Russians taken as German prisoners of war who refuse to return to Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In applying the policy of forcible repatriation there has been a number of unpleasant incidents involving violence such as the forcible seizure by our troops of 100 Russians at a church service resulting in serious injuries on both sides. A considerable number of suicides by Russians in this category apparently are also taking place.

²⁷ H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

Please clarify my understanding of our policy. Did we at Yalta assume the specific obligation to return these Russians by force if necessary? In the protocol which I have seen informally I find no reference to this subject but understand the Chiefs of Staff made an agreement on this subject.

Gray²⁸ has suggested that where force is necessary we might wish to permit Russian troops to enter our zone for the purpose of removing these individuals. G-5²⁹ estimates there are from twenty to thirty thousand of them.

MURPHY

740.62114/8-2745: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy), at Berlin

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1945—3 p. m.

363. From Matthews. Reurtel 383, August 27, 7 p. m. Full text agreement signed Yalta being forwarded by airmail. Briefly agreement provides all Soviet citizens liberated by US forces be separated from enemy POW's and maintained separately until handed over to Soviet authorities. Military authorities each contracting party required without delay to inform competent authorities other party regarding citizens found by them and at same time to take necessary measures to implement all provisions of agreement.

While agreement makes no mention of Soviet citizens captured in German uniforms nor of the use of force, Soviets have consistently claimed it covers all their citizens and Department has interpreted it as covering POW's of Soviet nationality prior to 1939 and in concurrence with War Department ordered return to Europe and turned over to Soviet authorities a number of POW's brought to this country and later ascertained after thorough screening to be Soviet citizens. Incidents involving resistance requiring use of force by our military authorities occurred in connection with this group.

For your confidential information, Department has been anxious in handling these cases to avoid giving Soviet authorities any pretext for delaying return of American POW's of Japanese now in Soviet occupied zone, particularly in Manchuria. [Matthews.]

BYRNES

²⁸ Cecil W. Gray, Counselor of Mission, Office of United States Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs.

²⁹ Civil Affairs Division.

740.62114/9-2845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*³⁰

LONDON, September 28, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received October 3—6:35 a. m.]

10125. Mr. Bevin³¹ informs me that there is in Italy a group of some 500 Cossacks formerly of Vlasov's Army at present in the custody of the Allied military authorities. Molotov has again raised question of repatriation of Soviet nationals now in the hands of the Anglo-American authorities.³² Bevin and I are most anxious to have all Soviet nationals repatriated as soon as possible. Of course I realize there are some difficulties as to individuals with respect to their nationality. Bevin seems, however, to feel that these 500 Cossacks could be returned. He says Field Marshal Alexander has already referred the matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.³³ Could you let me know as soon as possible what our Chiefs of Staff's position is on this particular group. Bevin indicates that repatriation of this particular group might involve the use of force. I would of course hesitate about the use of force.

[BYRNES]

740.62114/9-2945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1945—8 p. m.

8641. Secdel³⁴ 147. Your unnumbered telegram September 28, 11 p. m.³⁵ Question of use of force in repatriating Soviet citizens, both civilian and military, has been raised by USFET³⁶ and

³⁰ The Secretary of State was attending the First Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, September 11–October 2, 1945. For documentation on the participation by the United States in the Council session, see vol. II, pp. 99 ff.

³¹ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

³² See the Soviet delegation's memorandum of September 12, 1945, circulated at the Council of Foreign Ministers, vol. II, p. 151. For further consideration of this question at the Council meetings, see *ibid.*, pp. 159, 326, 349, 360, and 457.

³³ Telegram 3721, September 27, 11 p. m., from Caserta, reported that the British Chiefs of Staff had informed Field Marshal Alexander that the British Foreign Office was pressing strongly for repatriation from Italy of the 500 Cossacks and considered that persons ordinarily living on Soviet territory within the September 1, 1939, boundaries, including Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians, must be viewed as Soviet citizens if Soviet authorities asked for them (740.62114/9-2745).

³⁴ Series indicator for telegrams to London concerned with matters before the Council of Foreign Ministers.

³⁵ London's telegram 10125, *supra*.

³⁶ United States Forces, European Theater. General Eisenhower, Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater, in a message dated September 4, 1945, reviewed the policy in effect with respect to the repatriation of liberated Soviet citizens and requested that the subject be examined in its entirety and he be instructed whether or not United States troops would be used forcibly to collect and repatriate Soviet citizens. At the request of the Joint

SACMED indicating reluctance of commanders to use force in repatriation. Paper has been prepared for consideration SWNCC³⁷ committee on this question, proposing following two solutions: (a) Interpret the Yalta agreement as meaning that all Soviet citizens should be repatriated by force if necessary; (b) Since the Yalta agreement contains no provision whatsoever for the use of force in the repatriation of Soviet citizens and was in fact an agreement to facilitate the return of the citizens of each signatory on desire to return, there is no obligation on either signatory to use force to bring about repatriation of the citizens of the other party.³⁸ Therefore, it might be held that the US Gov will have fulfilled the agreement if it facilitates the return of all liberated Soviet citizens who desire to return. Admittedly this interpretation has no specific justification in the text of the agreement. It is envisaged that this interpretation of the agreement would not apply to Soviet citizens who joined the forces of the enemy and are therefore considered to be traitors of an ally of the US who should be returned to their native land as traitors, using force if necessary. Other categories of Soviet citizens would not be repatriated against their will.

Articles have already appeared in the press reporting the reluctance of American and British troops to force the repatriation of Soviet citizens against their will and suggesting that the Yalta agreement may have to be revised or abrogated. We are thus placed in the dilemma of going against our traditional policy of political asylum or not accepting the interpretation of the Yalta agreement calling for use of force in repatriating all liberated Soviet citizens. It is realized, of course, that if we insist upon interpretation (b) the Soviet authorities may accuse us of not living up to the agreement and they might even take counter measures.

Action has not been taken on the requests for instructions from the two theater commanders regarding the use of force to repatriate Soviet citizens who are not traitors, or by our Chiefs of Staff on the question raised in your message under reference, since it was felt advisable to await your return in order that you could give consideration to the entire question on the basis of the discussions which have taken place in London.

Concerning the 500 Cossacks from Vlassov's army, it is felt that in view of the action we have already taken in forcibly repatriating

Chiefs of Staff on September 6, 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee took cognizance of General Eisenhower's request, referring it on September 7 to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe for study, report, and preparation of a reply, as a matter of urgency.

³⁷ State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

³⁸ Paper summarized in this paragraph not found in Department files, nor is there any record that such a paper was submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

as traitors Soviet citizens captured in German uniform, such as those returned from Fort Dix, we have no choice but to concur in the repatriation of this group, using force if necessary.

In regard to the other categories of Soviet citizens you may care to postpone a decision in this matter until your return. .

ACHESON

740.00119 Control (Germany)/12-2145

Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 21 December 1945.

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has considered the question of the use of force in effecting the repatriation of Soviet citizens under the Yalta Agreement of 11 February 1945. The following directive has been sent to CG, USFET, and CG, USFA, in that regard: ³⁹

"Over 2,034,000 Soviet citizens have already been repatriated from Western Germany, leaving only approximately 20,000 Soviet citizens in the U.S. zone in Germany. It is the policy of this Government, pursuant to the agreement with the Soviet Union at Yalta, to facilitate the early repatriation of these persons to the Soviet Union. In the execution of this policy you will be guided by the instructions which follow:

1. Persons who were both citizens of and actually within the Soviet Union on 1 September 1939 and who fall into the following classes will be repatriated without regard to their wishes and by force if necessary:

a. Those captured in German uniforms.

b. Those who were members of the Soviet armed forces on or after 22 June 1941 and who were not subsequently discharged therefrom.

c. Those who are charged by the Soviet Union with having voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy, where the Soviet Union satisfies the United States military authorities of the substantiality of the charge by supplying in each case, with reasonable particularity, the time, place and nature of the of-

³⁹ The question of whether the United States should employ troops to compel the repatriation of Soviet citizens in Germany and Austria, regardless of their individual wishes, was under consideration by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe during September, October, and November 1945. The report of the Subcommittee, submitted to the full State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on November 21, 1945, as document SWNCC 46/8, recommended the draft text of a directive to cover the question. By informal action on November 28, 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 46/8, and on December 20, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, perceiving no objections, from a military point of view, to the recommendations contained in the report, informed the Committee that the Directive had been issued to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, European Theater and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Forces of Occupation in Austria. (SWNCC Lot File: Box 13: SWNCC Series 46)

fenses and the perpetrator thereof. A person's announced resistance to his repatriation or his acceptance of ordinary employment in German industry or agriculture shall not of itself be construed as constituting rendition of aid and comfort to the enemy.

2. Every effort should be made to facilitate repatriation of persons who were both citizens of and actually within the Soviet Union on 1 September 1939, but who do not fall into any of the classes defined in paragraph 1. However, in the case of such persons, you are not required to compel involuntary repatriation. With respect to these persons you are directed:

a. To permit Soviet authorities, on their own request and responsibility, free access to these persons for the purpose of persuading them to return voluntarily and assisting them to do so.

b. To take such practical steps as you may deem appropriate to minimize the development of organized resistance to repatriation, such as separating existing groups into smaller groups, segregating known leaders of any resistance groups, and such other practical measures as you may deem appropriate to prevent the continuance or recurrence of organized resistance.

c. To continue vigorous efforts to prevent the dissemination of propaganda of any kind designed to influence these persons against repatriation.

3. You are authorized in your discretion to permit Soviet authorities to have access to persons not specified in paras. 1 and 2 who are claimed to be Soviet citizens by the Soviet Union for the purpose of persuading them to return to their homes under practical arrangements which exclude the use of force, threat, or coercion.

4. Efforts should be continued to facilitate the transfer to the Soviet Union of all persons who since 1 September 1939 have been given the right to become Soviet nationals, who affirmatively assert this right, and who indicate that they desire the transfer."

CG, USFET, and CG, USFA, have been instructed to show the foregoing directive to the appropriate Soviet authorities interested in the repatriation of Soviet citizens.

This Committee recommends that a copy of this directive be furnished to the Soviet Government through diplomatic channels.⁴⁰

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

Chairman

⁴⁰ The Secretary of State circulated the text of the Directive at the informal meeting of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers on the afternoon of December 21, 1945; see the United States delegation record of this meeting, vol. II, p. 710. Molotov raised the question of the repatriation of Soviet citizens at the Fifth Formal Meeting of the Conference on December 20, when he circulated a memorandum drawing attention to alleged delays in the repatriation; see the United States delegation record of the meeting, *ibid.*, p. 692, and the memorandum by the Soviet delegation, December 19, 1945, regarding problems of Allied policy toward Germany, *ibid.*, p. 703.

800.4016 DP/12-2745

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1945.

Mr. Pares of the British Embassy called to discuss the most recent War Department directive to USFET relative to the repatriation of Soviet citizens under the Yalta agreement. A copy of the directive was made available to Mr. Pares informally on December 22. Mr. Pares submitted the attached paraphrase of a telegram from the Foreign Office⁴¹ containing the latter's comments on the American directive. It will be noted that the British Government feels that it is obligated under the Yalta agreement to repatriate all Soviet citizens, using force if necessary. The British Government hopes, therefore, that the United States Government will agree with it that all Soviet citizens in our control will be sent back to the Soviet Union, using force if necessary.

I explained to Mr. Pares that this particular point was discussed at long length by the appropriate officials of the American Government, who were of the opinion that the Yalta agreement makes no provision whatsoever to use force to carry out its provisions but on the contrary definitely states that we will "facilitate" the repatriation of Soviet citizens. The United States Government, therefore, does not consider that Soviet citizens who are not traitors, deserters, renegades or quislings should be forced to return to the Soviet Union against their will. I further explained to Mr. Pares that since this particular point had been approved by all interested agencies of this Government I did not feel that it would be possible to change our position on this point. Mr. Pares expressed the hope that if the United States Government did not feel it could change its position in regard to the use of force in repatriating Soviet citizens, at least pending an arrangement for the SACMED area, we would have no objection to using force to repatriate Soviet citizens who are considered to be traitors, deserters, war criminals or renegades. I told Mr. Pares that since the directive had been sent to USFET and USFA I assumed the American military authorities in these areas were now repatriating persons in these three categories, using force if necessary. I stated that therefore I did not believe there would be any objection from the American point of view if force were used to repatriate persons in these three categories from the SACMED area. I added, however, that this of course was a decision that must be taken by the American military authorities.

In regard to the other problem referred to in the British telegram, namely, the question of permitting Soviet repatriation officers to visit

⁴¹ Not found attached.

camps containing persons from areas incorporated in the Soviet Union after September 1, 1939, I explained to Mr. Pares that this provision had been included in the directive since this practice was already being carried out by the theater commanders on the basis of a theater directive of about two months ago. I added that the Soviet repatriation authorities had been informed that they could visit such camps and therefore it was felt that we should continue this practice.

Mr. Pares indicated that the British authorities on CCAC⁴² would bring up the two points mentioned in the attached telegram.

ELBRIDGE DUBROW

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION; REPLACEMENT OF AMERICAN PRIEST, FATHER BRAUN, IN MOSCOW⁴³

861.404/1-645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945—6 p. m.

85. ReEmbs 70, January 6, 10 a. m.⁴⁴ Department has issued re-entry permit to Metropolitan Benjamin⁴⁵ and according to press reports he is already en route to Moscow via Alaska.⁴⁶

A representative of the branch of the Orthodox Church in the United States headed by Metropolitan Theophilos⁴⁷ has also been invited to attend the Sobor scheduled to be held in Moscow on January 31.⁴⁸ Representatives of this branch of the church have been in touch with the Department, Metropolitan Benjamin and the Soviet Embassy and are also considering sending a delegation to the Sobor.

⁴² Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

⁴³ For previous documentation on the interest of the United States in freedom of religion and religious conditions in the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1211 ff.

⁴⁴ Not printed.

⁴⁵ On November 22, 1933, the Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna, Sergey, who was then the locum tenens of the patriarchal throne, appointed Archbishop Benjamin (Venyamin), who had been sent from the Soviet Union, to administer the North American parishes which had remained faithful to the Mother Church, with the title of Archbishop of the Aleutians and North America, Exarch of the Moscow Patriarchate in America. Later he became Metropolitan.

⁴⁶ Metropolitan Benjamin arrived in Moscow on January 24.

⁴⁷ Archbishop of San Francisco, elected Metropolitan of All America and Canada succeeding Metropolitan Platon, deceased, at a church council in Cleveland in 1934. Since 1924, this branch of the Orthodox Church in America maintained independence from control of the church leadership at Moscow and declared itself to be temporarily self-governing and managed its own property. At a council in New York in 1937, it was legally incorporated under the name of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of North America.

⁴⁸ A local church council of the Russian Orthodox Church had been called to assemble for the purpose of electing a Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia to succeed the Patriarch Sergey, who had died on May 15, 1944. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1212-1213 and 1223.

Information reaching the Department indicates that there is considerable movement toward unity among some factions of the Orthodox Church in this country. In view of the wide representation which it is apparently planned to have at the Moscow Sobor, it is possible that courts in this country will give considerable weight to its decisions with respect to the control or ownership of church property in the United States.

GREW

861.404/2-345 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 3, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received February 4—12:15 a. m.]

319. On January 31, 1945, the Holy Synod⁴⁹ of the Russian Orthodox Eastern Church was convened for the purpose of electing a new patriarch to succeed Sergei who died on May 15, 1944. Invitations to attend, in the capacity of visiting dignitaries, were extended to the four patriarchs of Constantinople,⁵⁰ Antioch,⁵¹ Alexandria⁵² and Jerusalem.⁵³ Antioch and Alexandria accepted personally. The other two sent rather imposing delegations of Metropolitans, Archbishops and Bishops.⁵⁴ There has been no public announcement of invitations being extended to the national churches, but representatives appeared from the Rumanian and Yugoslav churches.⁵⁵ The Greek Ambassador in Moscow⁵⁶ states that no request, official or unofficial, was made for the Hellenic Church to send a representative. It is not surprising that no representative is present from the Bulgarian Church, which is still schismatic though understood to be again attempting to receive acceptance by the Oecumenical Patriarch at

⁴⁹ The Holy Synod consisted of six members who were diocesan bishops, under the presidency of the Patriarch. Three members (Metropolitans) were permanent; the other three were temporary, and serving in rotation. The assemblage here convened was a local council (sobor).

⁵⁰ Benjamin I, the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.

⁵¹ Alexandros (Alexander) III, Patriarch of Great Antioch and All Orient.

⁵² Christophoros (Christopher) II, Pope and Patriarch of Alexandria and All Africa.

⁵³ Timothy, Patriarch of Jerusalem and All Palestine.

⁵⁴ The Metropolitan Hermanos of Phiatir (Thyatria) represented the Oecumenical Patriarch, and the Archbishop Athenagoras (Afnogor) of Sebastieh (Sevastir) represented the Patriarch of Jerusalem.

⁵⁵ Bishop Joseph of Arges (Aržes) with 3 delegates represented the Orthodox Church of Rumania, and Metropolitan Joseph of Skoplje (Skopyane) with 12 delegates represented the Orthodox Church of Serbia (Yugoslavia). These representatives were indeed excluded from some events. In airgram A-36, February 10, from Moscow Chargé Kennan remarked that the fact that they had "appeared anyway indicates that the Soviet Government favored their coming, since they could not have gotten to Moscow without the permission and active assistance of the Soviet Government." (861.404/2-1045)

⁵⁶ Athanase G. Politis.

this time.⁵⁷ Also present were the Catholicos of Georgia⁵⁸ and Benjamin, Metropolitan of North America and the Aleutians, both dependents of the Russian Church.

The invitations at least in the case of the Near Eastern Prelates, were extended through official Soviet diplomatic channels. Official facilities were made available for travel to Moscow. The visitors are housed in Moscow in rooms of the Hotel National usually reserved for distinguished official guests; and some appear to have applied themselves to the enjoyment of the worldly amenities of that hostelry, as well as of the Moscow Ballet, with an enthusiasm which has caused some raising of eyebrows even in Orthodox Communist circles.

The opening session of the Synod [*sobor*], held in one of the secondary churches of Moscow,⁵⁹ was begun with the usual impressive Orthodox Mass. The handling of the ritual seemed slightly rusty and the priests were noticeably nervous. Matters were not improved by water dripping from the ceiling. Following the Mass, the Synod [*sobor*] was convened and speeches of greeting were made by the official representatives of the Soviet Government, by the locum tenens of the church,⁶⁰ by the Metropolitan Nicolai⁶¹ and by the Patriarch of Alexandria, speaking on behalf of the visitors.

On February 2, in the second session, Alexei, Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, and locum tenens since the death of Sergei, was elected Patriarch by a vote of 44-0. Alexei was born in Moscow in 1877 and in 1899 graduated from the juridical department of Moscow University. In 1904 he graduated from the Moscow Theological Academy, having taken vows in 1902. He was appointed inspector of the Pskov Theological Seminary in 1904 and in 1906 as rector of Tula Theological Seminary with a rank of Archimandrite. In 1911 he was made rector of the Novgorod Theological Seminary and Dean of the Antonievsky Monastery in Novgorod. In 1913 he became Bishop of Tikhvin. In 1921 he was appointed first Vicar of the Leningrad Diocese, of which he became supervisor in

⁵⁷ The Bulgarian Church had been declared schismatic by the local synod of the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople on August 29, 1872. After a period of negotiations beginning in 1944, the Patriarchate consented to annul this pronouncement on February 22, 1945. The Holy Synod in Sofia announced the formation of the Bulgarian Patriarchate on June 22, thereby establishing the autocephaly of the Bulgarian Church. The rumor was spread by Communist sources that this had been accomplished upon the recommendation of Moscow, although this was repeatedly denied in Orthodox circles.

⁵⁸ Kallistrat (Callistratus), the Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia.

⁵⁹ The Church of the Resurrection in Sokolniki.

⁶⁰ The Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, Alexey (born Sergey Vladimirovich Simansky). In interim periods between Patriarchs the administration of the Russian Orthodox Church is incumbent on the locum tenens jointly with the Holy Synod. The functions of the locum tenens are entrusted to the senior by ordination of the permanent members of the Holy Synod.

⁶¹ Nikolay (born Boris Dorofeyevich Yarushevich in Kovno on January 12, 1892), Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna since January 1944, and a permanent member of the Holy Synod.

1922. In 1926 he was appointed head of the Novgorod Diocese and was promoted to the rank of Archbishop. In 1927 he became a member of the Holy Synod. In 1932 he was promoted to the rank of Metropolitan. In 1933 he was transferred to Leningrad as Metropolitan. He remained in Leningrad during the entire period of the German siege which tremendously increased his prestige with the population of that city. Since death of Sergei he has been guardian of the patriarchal throne.

The election, which was preceded by a short mass, was conducted in full hierarchical panoply, with each of the members of the Synod [*sobor*] being called upon by the administrative general of the church⁶² to voice his opinion.

The Coronation, which is to take place tomorrow, February 4, will be in effect the ceremonial climax to the reestablishment of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union.

In my next following telegram⁶³ I shall submit certain interpretive comment on this event.

To Department as 319; repeated to AmEmbassy Rome as No. 7, to Ankara as No. 4, to Cairo as No. 13.

KENNAN

861.404/2-345: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 3, 1945—4 [9] p. m.
[Received February 4—12:17 p. m.]

320. Following interpretive comment may be of interest to Department in connection with election of new Russian Patriarch, reported in my immediately preceding telegram.

1. It will be recalled that the institution of the Patriarchate was revived just before the revolution, after a 200-year interruption, during which time the church had been administered by a state synod.⁶⁴ The Patriarch elected at that time died in 1925,⁶⁵ and the anti-

⁶² The Cathedral Archpriest, Nikolay F. Kolchitsky.

⁶³ *Infra*.

⁶⁴ Peter the Great had caused the office of Patriarch to remain vacant after the death of Adrian in 1700. He abolished the Patriarchate and issued an ordinance in 1721 by which the church was to be governed by a Holy Synod over which he placed a layman called the *Ober-Procuror*, whose duty it was to see that the Synod did nothing which would displease the Tsar. This began the secularization of the church authority. Under the Provisional Government following the February/March 1917 revolution, the office of the *Ober-Procuror* was abolished, a church assembly (*sobor*) met in August to consider changes in the government of the church, and on November 21 decided to restore the Patriarchate.

⁶⁵ The Patriarch Tikhon had been elected at the end of November 1917. After many vicissitudes, and persecution by the Bolshevik régime, he died on April 7, 1925, in the Donskoy monastery in Moscow. Concerning an appeal to President Harding on behalf of Tikhon, on trial before a Soviet tribunal, see *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. II, pp. 835-840.

religious policy of the regime made the election of a successor impossible until a year ago when another election was permitted.⁶⁶ This election, about a year ago, took place quietly, without fanfares and without prominent foreign visitors. The new Patriarch, Sergei, died after only some 4 months in office; and the immediate purpose of the present ceremonies is the election of a successor.

2. The revival of the Patriarchate is the result not of any spontaneous movement on the part of the church but [of] a deliberate policy on the part of the Soviet Regime. This policy, in the Embassy's views, has little or nothing to do with state of religion in the Soviet Union. It is founded in the determination of the regime to make available for its own use every possible channel of influence in foreign affairs. The all-Slav policy alone would dictate an effort to appeal to religious sentiments of the other Slav populations. But the aims of Soviet church policy go beyond the Slavic world alone. Through the apparatus of the church the Soviet Government wishes to have (1) a direct channel of influence to all believers of the Eastern Church wherever they may reside, (2) an iron in the fire of Near Eastern politics through Russian Church property and traditional privileges, and (3) a means of disarming criticism and gaining sympathy in western religious circles. In order to achieve these objectives it is necessary that the Russian Church, however [over] the foreign activities of which the influence of the regime is complete, should make the most of its possibilities as numerically the most powerful of the branches of the Eastern Church. The revival of the Patriarchate, which enables the Russian Church to deal [on] substantially equal terms with the other Eastern Patriarchs, is the first and most elementary step in this direction.

3. The circumstances of the present ceremonies reveal clearly the extent to which they are beamed on the outside world. Except for one or two brief and inconspicuous notices concerning the arrival of high visiting dignitaries and a brief factual report in the government *Izvestiya* (not in the party *Pravda*) of the election of Alexis, together with his photograph biography, no news of the event has been noted in the Soviet press, and the Soviet public is no better informed on the election of the Patriarch of Moscow and all the Russias than on the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. The ceremonies, on the other hand, were exhaustively photographed and it is noted that the horde of government newsreel photographers were the same as those who usually prepare photographs for distribution outside the Soviet Union. Access to the

⁶⁶ On the election of the Patriarch Sergey on September 8, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 856; and concerning his death on May 15, 1944, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. IV, pp. 1212-1213.

various ceremonies, while free to foreigners, appears to have been severely restricted in the case of Russians. The church was filled and surrounded on all occasions by numerous contingents of secret police. The assembled spectators were subjected to careful scrutiny; and an old lady who had the temerity to offer for sale an Icon "from Riga" was unceremoniously hustled off to an unknown destination.

4. An interesting factor was the North American angle. The only non-Russian to participate in the election was the Metropolitan [Benjamin "of North America and the Aleutians". He is the only foreign member of the Synod. In his rank of Metropolitan]⁶⁷ he is also fourth ranking official in the entire Russian Orthodox Hierarchy.⁶⁸ In casting his vote, Benjamin stated that he had not had the opportunity to consult his parishioners or his priests on his choice, as should have been done in accordance with church law, but that he had decided to vote for Alexei in the conviction that his choice would receive the unanimous consent of the North American branch of the church. It is also interesting to note that his speech received more attention not only from the congregation but also from the cameramen than any other made. As for Theophilus, head of the Schismatic branch of the Russian Orthodox Church in America, one of the priests in the church told an officer of the Embassy that he had decided at the last minute not to come. In order for him to be received formally back into the church it will be necessary for him to come to Moscow in order to admit the error of his ways, to enter a monastery, to be stripped of his rank and to be returned to that rank through gradual stages. The priest added, however, that he believed Theophilus would be coming to Moscow before long in order to rehabilitate himself. It is hardly necessary to say that this is a step greatly desired by the Moscow Patriarchate since Theophilus controls most of the Orthodox property and communicants in the United States.⁶⁹ Plainly, if Benjamin, by virtue of a recantation on the part of Theophilus, were to come into control of this property and these communicants, it would give him a material prestige more commensurate with his hierarchical standing. It should be remembered that as a dependancy of the Moscow Church the North American Metropolitanate is subject to the administrative jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The North American Metropolitanate is unique in this respect and represents the only area outside of the Soviet Union in which the Moscow Patriarch has direct administrative jurisdiction.

⁶⁷ Corrected on basis of text in Moscow Embassy files.

⁶⁸ The Metropolitan Benjamin (Fedchenko) had come to the United States from the Soviet Union in 1933 (see footnote 45, p. 1111). He was not a member of the Holy Synod, but was in attendance at the Local Council held to elect the new Patriarch.

⁶⁹ The number of parishes which recognized the jurisdiction of Benjamin was 13, whereas 358 parishes recognized the jurisdiction of Theophilus.

5. The immediate effect which this ceremonious patriarchal election may have on the Russian Church itself should not be exaggerated. It is true that it has made possible the most imposing gathering of churchmen since the revolution, and that one of them, at least, has now acquired a prominence and international connections which will give him a certain independent dignity even in the eyes of the regime.⁷⁰ It is also true that knowledge of the event will spread throughout the entire Russian religious community and will give encouragement and hope to many believers at a moment when the calamities of war have done much to stir religious feeling. But the realities surrounding the teaching and practice of religion in Russia can be scarcely affected by these events. The situation cannot be compared with that prevailing before the revolution, when the Russian rulers officially shared the ideology of the church. Today the church, in its relations with the state, is dealing with what purports to be in effect a rival religion, no less Byzantine in conception and no less Russian in method. There has been, and can be, no accepted dogmatic relationship between the Holy Sepulcher and Lenin's tomb. In the Communist Party, dignitaries of the Russian Church will encounter other churchmen no less astute, no less experienced, and considerably more disciplined than themselves, armed in addition with all the attributes of physical power. In this case, there can be no question whose interests will be served first. As long as no young person in Russia can hope for normal advantages of recreation and association unless he belongs to the Pioneers, as long as the Young Communist League⁷¹ and the party remain the stepping stones to almost every respectable career, and as long as no Pioneer, Young Communist or party member can admit to the holding of religious beliefs, so long the Russian church must remain at the bottom largely a withering church of old priests and old women [and] at the top one of a number of fronts for the policies of the Kremlin in the outside world.

Sent to Department, repeated to Rome as 8, to Ankara as 5, and to Cairo as 14.

KENNAN

⁷⁰ At the session of the Local Council on January 31, the Statute on the Administration of the Russian Orthodox Church was adopted unanimously. By its provisions all the aspects of church life are determined. This Statute declared that in the Russian Orthodox Church supreme authority in matters of doctrine, administration and church justice—legislative, administrative and judicial—belongs to the Local Council periodically convened and consisting of bishops, clerics and laity. The Patriarch presides over the Local Council.

⁷¹ The Young Communist League (the All Union Leninist Communist League of Youth; the Komsomol) was founded in 1918, with membership of youths between 15 and 28 years of age, and it also directed the activities of the Young Pioneers, founded in 1924 for children between 10 and 15 years of age.

861.404/2-845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 8, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 6:20 p. m.]

361. I received a visit yesterday from the Metropolitan Benjamin. He struck me as a sincere and highly astute churchman richly endowed with the Russian genius for rationalization and well equipped by natural ability and education to defend the pro-Soviet position he has taken for some years in the American branch of the church. He is, I believe, a Soviet citizen.⁷² In any case, he is not an American citizen, and he is an ardent Russian patriot.

He told me that the representatives of Theophilus, namely Bishop Alexis and Archpriest Joseph Dzvonchik, who had tried to fly here via Alaska in time to be present at the election of the Patriarch, had been forced by weather to abandon their flight at Krasnoyarsk, and were now on their way to Moscow by train.⁷³ He doubted that these representatives would succeed in reaching agreement with the Moscow authorities on this occasion, and thought it probable that they would have to return to the United States and consult the officials and congregations of their 250 churches (Benjamin himself has only 30) before coming to any definite arrangement. He, Benjamin, did not expect, I gathered, to participate in the conversations. He is leaving in a few days for France, where his task will apparently be to try to effect a similar reconciliation of the local Russian church with the new Moscow Patriarch. After that, the present idea is that he should return to the United States. He is himself opposed to this plan, considering his usefulness there outworn and his person rather an obstacle than a help to the establishment of harmonious relations between the American Metropolitanate and Moscow.

He voiced the hope that I would use my influence to persuade the representatives of Theophilus to accept the authority of the Patriarch, arguing that it would be in the general political interest of our country that the Russian Church in America should not take an anti-Soviet line at this time. I made no comment on this suggestion, other than to observe that in my personal opinion the more the mother church in Russia becomes free to lead its own religious life, as people in

⁷² According to Georgy Grigoryevich Karpov, Chairman of the Council for Affairs of the Orthodox Church attached to the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, Metropolitan Benjamin was not a Soviet citizen but travelled on a Nansen (League of Nations) passport.

⁷³ Metropolitan Theophilus did not go to the Local Council because of his age and health. Theophilus therefore appointed four delegates to make the trip, but only Bishop Alexey Panteleyev, of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and Archpriest Joseph O. Dzvonchik, the vice president and secretary of the Metropolitan Council of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of North America, succeeded in going. They arrived in Moscow on February 10, and left on February 17, 1945.

America understand that conception, the easier it will be for the American branch to approach this problem of their mutual relations.

Benjamin was non-committal about the chances for unhampered church development in Russia and professed indifference to this question, taking the position that a certain amount of opposition and trouble was good for the church.

What was important was the spirit of the believers and not the degree of favor the church might enjoy with the state. He had taken a great personal liking however to Karpov, head of the government Committee for Religion, and suspected that the latter was at heart religious.

Sent to Department, repeated to Rome as 10, and to Paris as 18.

KENNAN

861.404/2-845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 8, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

368. With respect to the events which have been taking place in the religious field, I wish to add the following further comments to those submitted in my No. 320, February 3, 9 p. m., in the light of what has occurred since that telegram was despatched.

1. The publication by *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* of appeals of the Synod [*sobor*] to Christians throughout the world and to the Russian Church, and the holding of a religious concert at the Moscow conservatory, have made a deep impression in Moscow and have caused much speculation as to the lengths to which this patronizing of the church may be carried. On this point, I have little to add to what was stated in my telegram under reference. It does indeed appear that the church will be permitted a relatively free hand within that sphere of activity which it already embraces. It will probably be allowed greater physical facilities for maintenance of churches and ecclesiastic premises, for internal administration and for the training of priests (it is rumored for example that the Monasteries of Bessarabia, which are understood to be largely intact, will be turned over to the church for its use) but there is still no evidence that the church will be encouraged to widen this existing sphere and particularly to gain adherents among young people. It is significant that no official of the Soviet Government other than Karpov attended any of the ceremonies connected with the election and enthroning of the patriarch or received the visiting dignitaries, and that the historic Kremlin churches were not made available for these occasions.

2. The current leniency toward the church is explained in Communist circles as a mark of greater confidence on the part of the regime in the maturity and loyalty of the population and as a token that as this confidence increases still greater opportunities will be granted for the enjoyment of liberties which are set forth in the Soviet Constitution. This explanation, while it should not be allowed to lead to exorbitant hopes, is probably not devoid of substance.

3. The statement read by the announcer of the religious concert, and the glowing press reviews of the new Soviet film on Ivan, The Terrible, in which the religious motif is dominant, both indicate that the Government has come to the conclusion that the beauty and symbolism of Russian Church music and ritual are necessary for the expression of the emotional experiences undergone by the Russian people in the present war. The Government is obviously seeking a means of enlisting the pageantry of the church in the service of Russian nationalism without undermining orthodox Communist dogma.

4. A feature worth bearing in mind in connection with these changes is the Soviet relation to the Roman Catholic Church. There may be a direct connection between the unfruitful outcome of Father Orlemansky's mission⁷⁴ and the present sponsoring of the Russian church by the Government. If Moscow had been able to come to terms with Rome the Russian Church might conceivably have remained in its former obscurity. Today, all things indicate that the Kremlin is prepared to do open battle against the influence of the Vatican. It has always been widely believed here, rightly or wrongly, that the initial reverses suffered by the Russian Church under the Bolshevik regime were a source of comfort and hope to the Vatican as providing a possibility for the eventual overcoming of the age old schism. The instilling of new hope and strength into the Eastern Church would therefore appear in Russian eyes a logical means of resistance to Catholic aspirations. The Metropolitan Benjamin, in his conversation with me, spoke bitterly about the Catholic Church and proposed the intention of writing a polemic against it for publication here in the near future. It is perhaps also significant that the Soviet press has accompanied the recent ceremonies with a running series of attacks on the Vatican.⁷⁵ How this anti-Catholic tendency will affect Soviet

⁷⁴ Information regarding the visit of Father Stanislaw Orlemanski to the Soviet Union between April 28 and May 6, 1944, is in *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. III, pp. 1398-1409, *passim*. The text of a letter of May 5 from Premier Stalin to Orlemanski, regarding the possibility of improved relations between the Soviet Union and the Roman Catholic Church is quoted in telegram 1618 of May 9, 1944, from Moscow, *ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 868.

⁷⁵ Ambassador Harriman had reported in telegram 105 on January 11, that the "Soviet press has recently renewed attacks upon [the] Vatican." The Christmas address of Pope Pius XII was criticized as being an attempt "to shield Germany from responsibility for her war guilt." (866A.404/1-1145) On February 9, Professor Boris Efimovich Stein, who before the war had been Ambassador of the

policy in Poland, Hungary and Croatia is however still not apparent. A strong bid will probably be made for reconciliation of the Uniate Church ⁷⁶ with Moscow, but the regular Catholics in Central Europe will constitute another, and highly delicate, problem for Russian Church diplomacy.

Sent to Department, repeated to Rome as 11; repeated to Ankara as 7; repeated to Cairo as 19.

KENNAN

861.404/2-845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 8, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received February 9—2:04 a. m.]

366. Following further developments in the religious field have occurred here since despatch of my 319 and 320 of February 3, 8 and 9 p. m.

1. On Sunday February 4 the coronation of the new Patriarch took place in the Epiphany Cathedral, on the northern outskirts of Moscow, at present the leading Moscow church outside the walls of the Kremlin.⁷⁷ Tradition would have indicated the old Epiphany Cathedral in the Kremlin. The long ceremony and divine service, attended and assisted by the visiting dignitaries, was highly impressive and would have been more so if it had not been for the constant flare of batteries of arc lights set up inside the church and the unceasing activities of the photographers. Entrance to the church was again closely restricted, and large detachments of militia formed cordons around the building. Those admitted appeared to be in large part foreigners or members of the Orthodox priesthood.

2. On the evening of the same day the new Patriarch gave a formal dinner at the Metropole Hotel for visiting Patriarchs and delegations, the members of the Synod, the pastors of local churches and representatives of the congregations.

Soviet Union to Italy, gave a public lecture on "The Diplomacy of the Vatican". He emphasized the anti-Soviet attitude of the Vatican and concluded with a warning against the danger of the machinations of papal diplomacy in the contemporary world. From the other side, Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to the Pope, at times reported on official articles appearing in the *Osservatore Romano* protesting against Soviet propaganda attacks on the Vatican. These recriminations continued throughout the year.

⁷⁶ This church arose from the efforts to unite the Greek Orthodox Church with the Roman Catholic Church in the eastern regions of Poland and the western parts of the Ukraine in the sixteenth century. At a congress in Brest-Litovsk in 1596 the advocates of unity passed a resolution of submission to the Pope, while retaining the Eastern rites and language. The process for reincorporation of the Uniate Church in the Orthodox Church, begun in the summer of 1945, was nearly completed in 2 years.

⁷⁷ The Church of the Epiphany in the former village of Yelokhovo had become the Patriarchal Cathedral in 1943.

3. On Tuesday February 6 *Izvestiya* carried two remarkable documents over the signature of the Synod [*sobor*]. Today these same documents were even published by the Moscow *Pravda*. Translations are being submitted by despatch.⁷⁸ The first is an appeal of the Synod [*sobor*] to the Christians of the entire world. The second is a message to the Archbishops, pastors of the true followers of the Russian Orthodox Church. The first of these is noteworthy as an example of prompt implementation of the Government's determination to use the church as an instrument of foreign policy. It pronounces thundering condemnation on all persons who advocate mercy towards the Germans. These tendencies toward mildness are described as "monstrous distortions of the divine teachings of the Saviour."

The message to the Russian Church and its followers presents a remarkable mixture of old church and modern Soviet phraseology. Calling upon the believers to maintain "unhypocritical fidelity and obedience to the power ordained by God", it notes with satisfaction the following phenomena: (a) the great wave of self-sacrifice and spiritual solidarity shown by the Russian people in the war against Germany; (b) the religious revival and the unity of the devout people around the heads of the church; (c) the response of the believers to the church appeal for patriotic sacrifice; (d) the gradual but now almost final cessation of the systematic errors of the "Living Church"⁷⁹ and others.

At the same time the message views with alarm the following: (a) neglect of the observance of rank and hierarchy on the part of many priests; (b) neglect of ritual; (c) the habit "existing among many believers" of permitting the marriage union to [be]come effective without the sanction of the Holy Sacrament; (d) neglect of proper preparation for the receipt of the Holy Sacraments of Confession and Eucharist.

With particular sorrow the Synod [*sobor*] notes the fact that priests not properly appointed by canonical procedure are holding services and sacrilegiously performing the holy rites of the church.

The Synod [*sobor*] expresses the wish that the church might, as in ancient times, "shine with faith and piety and serve as a bulwark of might and prosperity of the motherland, creating the Kingdom of God on earth."

⁷⁸ Full translations were sent in telegram 351 from Moscow on February 7, 1945. The first, "Message of National Assembly of Russian Orthodox Church to Christians All over the World", is printed in the *Information Bulletin* of the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Washington, February 13, 1945, pp. 5-6; and the second, "Message of National Assembly to the Most Reverend Prelates, Pastors and All True Children of Russian Orthodox Church", is printed *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁷⁹ The group called the Living Church was formed in 1922. Despite some toleration by the Soviet Government it did not have much influence for long, although it lingered for many years.

The unprecedented feature of these documents was not so much their content (although that was noteworthy enough) but rather the fact of their publication in the official organ of the All Union Communist Party.⁸⁰

4. On February 7 a concert of Russian church music was held in the great hall of the Moscow Conservatory. The announcement that it would take place appeared to occasion equal perturbation in church circles, where it was viewed as a profanation of religious music, and in Communist circles, where the use of the hall for religious purposes seemed incomprehensible. No one has been able to say for certain how the audience was selected; but it was a motley crowd, with a large smattering of somewhat bewildered priests and their relatives, a number of Soviet officials and cultural celebrities, all looking slightly guilty, and the ubiquitous secret police. The program was opened by an announcement to the effect that the music should be regarded as an expression of the emotional experience of the Russian people in the war. The announcer was noticeably upset and seemed overcome by the shattering quality of the statement he was reading. The magnificent choral singing which followed was again marred by unceasing play of arc lights and by photographing both of singers and audience. The new patriarch, accompanied by his guests and by Karpov (now facetiously referred to in Moscow as the Narkombog, or People's Commissar for God), sat in the box of honor, and was besieged between the acts by worshippers and admirers.

5. Today's papers contain an announcement that Karpov, in the presence of the Patriarch and the three leading Russian metropolitans, received all the visiting representatives.

Sent to Department as 366, repeated to Rome as 12, Ankara as 8, and Cairo as 20.

KENNAN

861.404/2-945 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 9, 1945.

[Received February 10—4:45 a. m.]

375. *Izvestiya* for February 9 announces that Patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria and representatives of Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem left Moscow February 8.⁸¹

⁸⁰ *Pravda*.

⁸¹ The American Chargé in Damascus, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, informed the Department in despatch 258, March 7, that Patriarch Alexandros of Antioch upon his return had had no illusions that "the members of the Soviet Government have suddenly become devotees of the Church, and remarked on the fact that a large proportion of the faithful seem to be women. He said, however, that the Soviet Government does appear to be truly appreciative of the valuable support which the Orthodox Church has given the Government in its war effort and expressed the opinion that the comparative freedom which the Church now enjoys is probably a reward for this support." (861.404/3-745)

Izvestiya also announces that Yugoslav Church delegation was received February 7 by G. G. Karpov, President of the Council for Affairs of Russian Orthodox Church, in presence of Patriarch Alexei, Metropolitan Nicolai of Krutitsky [*Krutitsy*] and Metropolitan Ioann of Kiev and Galicia.⁸³

Sent to Department; repeated to Rome as 13, Cairo as 21 and Ankara as 9.

KENNAN

861.404/2-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 24, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 9:25 p. m.]

544. ReEmbtel 494, February 21, 6 p.m.⁸⁴ In conversation yesterday the Patriarch of the Orthodox Russian Church told an officer of the Embassy that satisfactory arrangement had been reached between the Moscow Patriarchate and the representatives of Theophilus, who are now en route to the United States. He said that the terms offered Theophilus are, in his opinion, such that Theophilus can hardly afford to refuse them.⁸⁵ Once the reconciliation has been effected the council of the North American diocese will meet to elect a new Metropolitan.⁸⁶ He intimated that this Metropolitan will probably be Theophilus. He added that he hopes this reconciliation will terminate the very costly lawsuit which has been pending for so many years.

The Patriarch then went on to state that as soon as this question has been settled the Moscow Patriarchate will file suit to recover possession

⁸³ Ioann was Metropolitan of Kiev and Galich, Patriarchal Exarch of the Ukraine.

⁸⁴ Not printed.

⁸⁵ The two American representatives had been presented, without prior discussion on February 16, with Patriarchal ukaz No. 94 to take home. This document presumed to set forth the conditions and procedures required in order to establish the reunion of the American church with the Mother Church. The ukaz proved to contain a number of provisions which were unacceptable to the American church now "flourishing in an atmosphere of democratic freedom" and the ukaz was rejected at a Bishops Council which met at Chicago May 22-24, 1945. A clear explication of the position adopted toward the ukaz by the Metropolitan Council of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of North America was set forth in detail in a communication of July 10, approved by the Metropolitan Theophilus, to the Clergy and Lay People of the Russian Orthodox Church of America.

⁸⁶ The Archbishop Alexey of Yaroslav and Rostov arrived in New York on September 15, 1945, with his secretary, Anatol Nikolayevich Kozlovsky. Archbishop Alexey visited parishes of the American church as the representative of the Patriarch Alexey with the object of obtaining the submission to the Patriarch of the Church in America. Some objections were expressed against his activities, and some of his remarks seemed to indicate that he was actually a representative of the Soviet Government although outwardly he was supposed to be a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church. His mission to the American church was not successful.

of the Cathedral of St. Nicholas in New York to which the Living Church now holds title. The Patriarch maintains that this church is properly the possession of the Russian Orthodox Church and that Archbishop Kedrovski wished to hold it principally because his mother has a sentimental interest in keeping it.

The Moscow press yesterday announced that the representatives of Theophilus had been here and were now en route back to the United States.

HARRIMAN

861.404/4-1945

*Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman),
Temporarily in Washington, to the Secretary of State*⁸⁷

[WASHINGTON,] April 21, 1945.

I saw Father Braun⁸⁸ before I left Moscow. He seemed to be very well. It is true that he has been in Russia too long and is in a nervous condition.⁸⁹ Confidentially, Mr. Flynn⁹⁰ believes that he should be replaced and I would heartily endorse this recommendation.

It will be impossible to bring in an assistant for Father Braun. The only chance there would be of getting in a new priest would be on the understanding that Father Braun would leave on the arrival of his replacement. Mr. Flynn said he would take this matter up on his return, and if this is worked out with the Catholic authorities I feel strongly the Department should support a request for a visa, but we can only be successful, in my opinion, on a replacement basis.

Father Braun lives in a small flat in the French Embassy. He has our commissary privileges which adds to the meager Russian ration he receives. He also has available the medical attention of our Navy doctor in Moscow.

W. A. H[HARRIMAN]

⁸⁷ The substance of this memorandum was sent to Mr. Taylor in telegram 56, May 12, 1945. Mr. Taylor gave this information to Pope Pius XII at an audience on May 17. The Pope regretted that the proposal to send an assistant would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and he also voiced "a general expression of fear of growth of Communism in Europe". (811.001 Roosevelt—Condolences/5-1745)

⁸⁸ The Reverend Father Leopold Braun, an American Catholic priest of the Order of Assumptionists, had come to Moscow in 1934, where he had thereafter been in charge of the only Catholic Church of Saint-Louis-des-Français.

⁸⁹ In his telegram 92 of April 19, 1945, the personal representative of the President, Myron C. Taylor, reported upon an audience with the Pope which he had had that morning: "We discussed the declining state of health of Father Braun the Catholic priest conducting the only remaining Catholic Church in Moscow concerning whom the Pope expressed deep concern. Father Braun had formerly lived in the official residence of the French Ambassador to the Soviet Government but 'under pressure' has moved to a private residence." (811.001 Roosevelt—Condolences/4-1945)

⁹⁰ Edward J. Flynn of New York City, an influential Catholic layman who had been in the Soviet Union earlier in the year.

740.0011 E. W./5-445: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 4, 1945.

[Received May 4—2:20 p. m.]

1465. According to Moscow press for May 4 Patriarch Aleksei has sent message to Stalin in connection with capture of Berlin. Translation follows:

“News of the capture of Berlin by our valiant troops led and inspired by your genius has filled the hearts of all true sons of our homeland with boundless joy and rejoicing. Our church offering grateful prayer to God on this historic day deepens its prayers for you, beloved supreme leader of our people, and for our army and it beseeches Divine blessing on the recent martial feats in the name of final victory.”⁹¹

[KENNAN]

861.404/5-1645: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 16, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received May 16—7:45 a. m.]

1601. Father Braun was summoned to appear before a Soviet court last evening where he was charged by one Knyazev, yardman at the French Embassy, with assault and battery alleged to have taken place on October 31, 1944, in the French Embassy.⁹² He was given a copy of the charge dated April 12 and deposition of the plaintiff dated November 2, 1944, and was instructed to appear before court on May 18 to stand trial.

I am seeing the French Ambassador⁹³ today who is also interested in this case and will telegraph later concerning some of its implications and the question of what action, if any, the Embassy should take.⁹⁴

KENNAN

⁹¹ The Chargé also reported, in telegram 1572 on May 14, 1945, that a long statement by the Patriarch was printed in *Izvestiya* for May 12, 1945, wherein the activities and assistance of the Church during the war were recounted, with lavish praise for the “leader beloved of people and whose wisdom exceeds that of all other leaders of people.” (740.00119 E. W./5-1445)

⁹² This incident had been reported to the Department in telegram 4437 of November 20, 1944, not printed. The Embassy had just learned that Father Braun had allegedly struck an employee of the French Embassy who was a Soviet citizen, and who had preferred charges in the People’s Court. No intercession by the American Embassy seemed necessary in the preliminary stages, as there was no sign that Father Braun was not being given due benefit of the law. (861.404/11-2044)

⁹³ Gen. Georges Catroux.

⁹⁴ The Embassy in Moscow did take interest in Father Braun’s case. It sought legal advice through the official collegium of lawyers “on the points of Soviet law and procedure applicable to the charges” preferred against him. (861.404/5-1645) Advice and recommendations for his conduct were given to him, although

861.404/5-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 30, 1945.

[Received May 30—6:10 p. m.]

1800. Moscow press for May 29th announced that Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia had departed together with church delegation to visit countries of Near East.⁹⁵ Embassy's translation of announcement follows:

At invitation of the Patriarch of Alexandria Most Blessed Christopher, the Patriarch of Jerusalem Most Blessed Timothy, the Patriarch of Antioch and All the East, Most Blessed Alexander III, a church delegation consisting of 12 persons headed by the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Most Holy Alexsei departed from Moscow on May 28th for return visits to Cairo, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Damascus and Beirut.⁹⁶

The following are included in the delegation accompanying the Patriarch: Metropolitan Krutitsi Nikolai, Archbishop of Tula and Belev, Vitali; Archpriest Nikolai Kolchitski and other churchmen and ecclesiastics.

Metropolitan Krutitsi Nikolai, accompanied by Archpriest Nikolai Kolchitski and Priest Iuvenali will go from Cairo to London at the

they were not always followed. Father Braun's trial in the People's Court was once postponed on May 18 because of illness of the judge, but was held on July 2, with a representative of the Embassy and of the French Embassy, as well as American correspondents, in attendance. After the hearing, Father Braun was found "guilty of assault and battery and of disturbance of the peace" and was fined 100 rubles. (861.404/7-245) At this time Father Braun declared that he did not wish to appeal, although he had the right, and expressed his readiness to pay the fine. Subsequently, however, he changed his mind, made an appeal, and on July 27 "was completely exonerated." (861.404/8-1345)

⁹⁵ The return of the church delegation from this visit was announced in the Moscow press for June 27.

⁹⁶ The Department received several descriptive accounts of this visit from along the way. Despatch 13034, November 26, 1945, from Bern, reported a significant article in the *Gazette de Lausanne* for October 16, which drew attention to the efforts of the Soviet Union to revive its contacts and influence particularly in Syria and the Lebanon through the Orthodox Church. At the time of the election of the Patriarch Alexey, "the Patriarchs of Syria and Alexandria implicitly recognized the authority of the Russian Patriarch over their dioceses. This was renewed by a gesture which passed almost unnoticed the traditional Russian protectorate over the Orthodox groups in the Near East. Although some may say that this is a purely religious question, it should not be forgotten that religion in Russia is above all a political instrument in the hands of the Kremlin." Furthermore, while he visited in Jerusalem, the Patriarch Alexey "took occasion to state that he was taking possession in the name of the Russian Church of all monasteries, convents, schools, and other property, which had previously been under the control of the Russian Church. Thus Russia took back after an interruption of 28 years its protectorate over the Orthodox Churches of the Near East without any voice having been raised in the West or in the East, as paradoxical as this may seem when at Yalta the Soviet Union refused to recognize any special rights of France in the Levant. Even the Arabs remained quiet on this score. Were even they taken in?" (761.00/11-2645)

invitation of the Archbishop of Canterbury and will return the Archbishop of York's visit to the Moscow Patriarchate.⁹⁷

Sent to Department as 1800, repeated to Jerusalem to Cairo as 65; Beirut and London as 229.

HARRIMAN

861.404/5-2645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Truman to Pope Pius XII

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1945—7 p. m.

71. Reurtel 128, May 26⁹⁸ and Moscow's unknown number to you on same subject.⁹⁹ Both Flynn and Michael Doyle¹ have been kept fully informed on Father Braun case and Department understands that Catholic authorities here are considering matter of sending a replacement.

As you know from Department's 56 of May 12² Embassy Moscow is of the opinion that the only possibility of sending another priest to Moscow is as a replacement for Father Braun rather than as an assistant to him. Answering Department's query as to Soviet attitude on overlapping period of 6 to 8 weeks between arrival of successor and Father Braun's departure, Embassy sees possibility of satisfactory Soviet reaction only when Embassy is in a position to furnish name of successor and possible arrival date. In view of all the circumstances of this case, the Department believes it would be advisable for you discreetly to urge the Vatican authorities to send a replacement for Father Braun as soon as possible. The possibility is not excluded that the indefinite postponement of the trial might have come about in order to afford time to arrange for a replacement. The Embassy is continuing to provide all possible assistance to Father Braun. Factual and well reasoned accounts of circumstances leading up to summons of Father Braun to trial have appeared in several papers here.

GREW

⁹⁷ This delegation left Cairo, where it was on a journey with the Patriarch Alexey, and arrived in London on June 11, being met there by the Archbishop of York. For the visit of the latter to the Patriarch Sergey in 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 858-859.

⁹⁸ Not printed.

⁹⁹ Ambassador Harriman had informed the Department in telegram 1814 on May 30 that a brief message had been sent to Mr. Taylor, and he recommended that "it would be preferable if the details of the matter were to be communicated to Mr. Taylor by the Department . . ." (861.404/5-3045) The Department sent information in telegram 85 of July 5, about the verdict of Father Braun's trial on July 2, and in telegram 102 of August 18, on the result of his appeal on July 27. (861.404/7-545, 8-1845)

¹ Michael Francis Doyle was a prominent Catholic layman in Philadelphia, Pa.

² Not printed; but see footnote 87, p. 1125.

861.404/5-2645 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1945—5 p. m.

1506. ReEmbs 1768, May 26, 9 p. m.³ Rev. G. Antonio Laberge has made application for Soviet visa in Washington on basis of proceeding to Moscow as a successor to Father Braun.⁴ Soviet Embassy informed that Father Braun will leave Moscow after Father Laberge has been properly installed. Catholic authorities suggest that 60 days be allowed for this purpose. Please take appropriate steps to encourage approval of Father Laberge's visa application and of overlapping period desired.

BYRNES

860J.404/7-745 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, July 7, 1945.

[Received July 8—9: 40 p. m.]

2455. July 4 press carried one-third column message from President of Armenian Church Assembly to Stalin declaring that through Soviet Government's assistance Assembly had been able to elect Archbishop Geork Cheorkkchyan as Catholicos.⁵ It declared that "great is our joy and admiration in seeing unprecedented development of state and national life of our country". We realize, continued message, "that all this has become possible only because the Armenian people has the happiness to be part of the great Soviet Union".

³ Not printed.

⁴ The Apostolic Delegate, the Most Reverend Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, in a letter of June 11 explained the intentions of the Catholic authorities toward the replacement of Father Braun and noted that so far Father Laberge had been unable to start because the Soviet Government had not granted a visa. In a reply on June 18, Acting Secretary Joseph C. Grew advised that Father Laberge should make a new application at the Soviet Embassy, pointing out that he would be going as successor to Father Braun. Then the Department of State would be glad to use its good offices to expedite the issuance of the visa. (861.404/6-1145)

⁵ Kevork Chörekjian, locum tenens of Echmiadzin, acting head of the Armenian Church after the death of Catholicos Horen I in 1938. This church assembly was held in Echmiadzin, near Yerevan, June 16-25. The new Catholicos of Echmiadzin and Supreme Patriarch of All Armenians became known as Kevork VI. Three delegates from the California district of the Armenian Church in America reached Moscow on June 5 on their way to this assembly. Seven other delegates were reported as coming by sea from the east coast of the United States. In telegram 1925 of June 6, Ambassador Harriman declared: "It is obvious that arrangements would not have been made by the Soviet Govt for these delegates to attend the congress unless their participation was considered to advance Soviet interests." (860J.404/6-645)

Concluding message stated "we sincerely hope that the political wisdom of the Soviet Union will find means and solutions for removing the injustice of which the Armenian people has been a victim since the First World War".

Sent Department as 2445 [2455] repeated Ankara as 35.

HARRIMAN

861.404/10-345: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 3, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received October 3—4: 26 p. m.]

3440. Re Dept's 1506, July 3, 5 p. m. French Chargé has informed me that during recent visit to Paris he discussed Moscow Catholic Church situation with leading officials of Assumption and Jesuit orders respectively. He says it has been arranged that Father Laberge (who I understand has now received his visa) will come to Moscow in capacity of locum tenens. Meanwhile the French are endeavoring to obtain a visa either for Monseigneur Neveu, who was formerly here,⁶ or for Father Thomas,⁷ to come to Moscow to take charge of French Church here in which Father Braun has been officiating. It is my understanding that such an arrangement would not preclude Father Laberge's participating in work of Church and giving spiritual aid to members of American colony. Dept will recall that Church in question is French Govt establishment and French Embassy is very conscious of its prerogatives in this connection.

I understand that French now have in Soviet Union one more Catholic priest who was liberated by Russians from German imprisonment in Estonia.⁸ This priest, who bears the somewhat unpromising name of Father Bourgeois, is evidently not considered by the French as entirely suitable for the Moscow Church, but they hope that if no hitch is encountered in admission of Father Laberge and a French priest, it will be possible to utilize services of Father Bourgeois in the Leningrad Catholic Church which has perforce remained closed for some years through lack of any clergyman to conduct services there.

⁶ Pius (Pie) Eugène Neveu, a French Assumptionist who was the Apostolic Administrator of Moscow in 1926, in the spring of that year having secretly been made a bishop. He had remained in Moscow until 1936, when he returned to France for medical treatment. He was thereafter unable to obtain a visa for re-entry.

⁷ Father Jean de Matha Thomas, who became assistant to Father Laberge and later succeeded him.

⁸ Ambassador Harriman had reported in his telegram 2408 of July 4, 1945, the recent release of an elderly Jesuit French priest, Father Bourgeois, by the Red Army in Lithuania and his presence in Moscow (861.404/7-445).

Would appreciate confirmation as to issuance of Father Laberge's visa since this matter is still pending between Embassy and Foreign Office here.

KENNAN

811.79600 Reservations/10-545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1945—8 p. m.

620. Father Laberge, newly appointed American priest in Moscow, is leaving Washington October 10, via ATC⁹ for Moscow. SovEmb has assured him of onward air transportation from Berlin. Please assist Father Laberge to arrange for reservations on Soviet plane.¹⁰

Repeated to Moscow as no. 2101.

ACHESON

THE KRAVCHENKO CASE: ATTEMPTS BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN HIS DEPORTATION FROM THE UNITED STATES¹¹

861.01B11/1-445

*Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State for White House Liaison*¹²

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1945.

Subject: Kravchenko¹³ Case.

The more we think of this case the more we are convinced that only if his character as a military deserter can be thoroughly established can we risk attempting to have the Army or some other agency arrest him and turn him over to the Soviet authorities. We must anticipate that if any such attempt is made there will be publicity of a very ugly sort and we must be prepared to justify our action on the grounds of his military desertion. The difficulty is that he entered this country as a civilian and is so registered in the Department of State and we have only the bare statement of the Soviet Embassy as to his military connections.

⁹ Air Transport Command.

¹⁰ Father Laberge arrived in Moscow on October 26. After turning over the duties of his office to his successor, Father Braun left Moscow on December 27, in the airplane of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who had been attending the Conference of Foreign Ministers held there December 16-26, 1945.

¹¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1224-1241.

¹² Addressed to the Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.; Mr. Bohlen had been Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs until December 20, 1944, when he was succeeded by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow.

¹³ Viktor Andreyevich Kravchenko.

I suggest, therefore, that when the Soviet Ambassador ¹⁴ calls this afternoon you might care to tell him the following:

1. After the most careful investigation of the laws of the United States the Attorney General ¹⁵ has come to the conclusion that in the absence of an extradition treaty ¹⁶ covering such offenses between the United States and the Soviet Union there is no possibility under civil law of turning Kravchenko back to the Soviet authorities.

2. If his status as a military officer who deserted from the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union can be established there *might* be a possibility of handling the case as desired by the Soviet Government on military grounds.

3. However, before approaching the military authorities on this point it is necessary to have some evidence as to his military status at the time of his departure from the Soviet Purchasing Commission ¹⁷ since, in so far as our records indicate, he entered this country as a civilian and is so registered. If the Soviet Government can supply proof of his military status the matter can then be taken up with the appropriate military authorities.¹⁸

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

861.01B11/1-545

The Attorney General (Biddle) to the Secretary of State ¹⁹

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I acknowledge your letter of December 6th,²⁰ enclosing a copy of the *aide-mémoire* ²¹ from the Soviet Ambassador requesting this Government to return Victor A. Kravchenko to Russia.

¹⁴ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

¹⁵ Francis Biddle.

¹⁶ The Extradition Convention of March 16/28, 1887, with Imperial Russia was not regarded as being in force. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 1228, footnote 11.

¹⁷ The Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. had been appointed by the Government of the Soviet Union on February 27, 1942.

¹⁸ Mr. Bohlen wrote at the end of this memorandum, "Approved by Mr. Dunn. Mr. Hopkins also thought it was a good approach." (James C. Dunn was Assistant Secretary of State, and Harry L. Hopkins was Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.) Ambassador Gromyko did see the Secretary of State, who explained the matter to him. The Secretary pointed out that it would be necessary for the Soviet Union to establish the fact that Kravchenko was a member of the Red Army before the matter could be further considered by the U.S. Government. To this the Ambassador made no comment. (861.01B11/1-445)

¹⁹ This letter was handed to the Secretary of State by the Attorney General after a Cabinet meeting on January 5. In a memorandum of the same date the Under Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, recorded that during "a conference today with the Secretary, the Attorney General, and Mr. J. Edgar Hoover [Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation], the Kravchenko case was discussed and it was the consensus of opinion that Kravchenko should not be turned over to the Soviet authorities unless they could submit evidence proving that he was in the Soviet Army when he came to the United States." (861.01B11/1-545)

²⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 1238.

²¹ *Aide-Mémoire* of November 24, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 1235.

The only available methods by which this Russian national might be lawfully apprehended and deported from this country are either extradition or deportation under the immigration laws.²² Apparently it is not suggested that he is subject to extradition and it is not understood that the Soviet Government is requesting his return under any extradition treaty. It does not appear that extradition would be applicable to such a case, but this of course is a matter for your consideration.

Deportation under the immigration laws traditionally is a matter between this Government and the alien. It has not been and cannot be used as a substitute for extradition at the request of a foreign government. Deportation can be accomplished only after a formal hearing prescribed by the immigration procedure at which the individual must be given an opportunity to prove that if deported to a particular place he would be subject to political persecution. In such a case the immigration practice requires that the deportation order give the individual a reasonable time to depart voluntarily to any country of his own choice in lieu of deportation to the country whence he came. In many cases, due to the war-time restrictions on travel, individuals have been given a period of four months after the termination of hostilities to depart voluntarily in lieu of deportation to a country in which they claim they would be subject to political persecution.

In the regular course of events a warrant for the arrest of this individual in a deportation proceeding will be issued and eventually an order of deportation, in the event of his failure to depart voluntarily, will be made. In this case, as in thousands of others, deportation proceedings have not been instituted immediately upon the termination of the lawful temporary residence of the alien because immediate deportation or voluntary departure is not possible.

It is noted that the *aide-mémoire* from the Soviet Ambassador refers to the fact that this Russian national was on active military service in the Red Army. However, his status in this country is not a military one. His passport, I am informed, described him as an "engineer in the Division of Metals in the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission."

In connection with this case it has been called to my attention that the military authorities of the United States have entered into informal arrangements with the military authorities of Canada, Great Britain and Mexico whereby deserters in the United States from the military forces of those co-belligerents are apprehended in the United States by military police, transported to our borders and surrendered to representatives of the governments of those countries. I am advised

²² Immigration Act, approved May 26, 1924, as amended on July 1, 1932, and July 1, 1940; 43 Stat. 153, 47 Stat. 524, 54 Stat. 711.

that no such arrangement has been made with the Russian military authorities in the absence of any use for such an arrangement up to the present time. Moreover I am advised that this practice is not based upon any executive agreements or other formal arrangements with these governments; and I am not aware of any legal authority for this practice. I shall appreciate it if you will advise me of any information in your possession on the matter.

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS BIDDLE

861.01B11/1-445

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*²³

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1945.

You will recall that last week we spoke to you about the case of Kravchenko, a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, who is regarded by the Soviet Government as a military deserter and whose return to the Soviet Union on this basis has been demanded by the Soviet Government. You will recall that during our discussion you agreed that if the man is in fact a military deserter, in the interests of our relations with the Soviet Union, we should endeavor to find some means of complying with the Soviet request.

Since our conversation I have gone into the whole matter again most thoroughly with the Attorney General and with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. As a result of this discussion it is now entirely clear that in the absence of a specific treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union covering such offenses there is absolutely no legal ground for turning Kravchenko back to the Soviet authorities as a civilian.

Since Kravchenko was admitted to the United States in a civilian capacity and was so registered in the Department of State, we have no official proof that he had any direct military connections at the time of and during his service with the Soviet Purchasing Commission. We have only the bare statement in a communication from the Soviet Embassy that he had military status. Before this Government, therefore, could apply military law to him on the basis of military desertion, it will be necessary to have some proof that he was actually a member of the Soviet Armed Forces, when he entered the United States. I have explained our position to the Soviet Ambassador and have asked him to endeavor to obtain for us the necessary evidence as to Kravchenko's military status which would

²³ Mr. Bohlen explained in a memorandum of January 9 to the Secretary of State that he had prepared this memorandum, after discussion of the Kravchenko case with Mr. Grew and Mr. Dunn, for the Secretary to approve and sign in order "to bring the President up to date on the latest developments in this case." (861.01B11/1-445)

enable us to consider his deportation under military law. This the Soviet Ambassador has promised to take up with his Government.

The present status of the case is, therefore, that we are waiting proof that Kravchenko is connected with the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union before proceeding any further with this matter. I shall, of course, let you know of any further developments in this case.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

861.01B11/1-1345

The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

[Translation ²⁴]

As the Soviet Government indicated in its *aide-mémoires* of May 6 and November 24, 1944,²⁵ handed to the Secretary of State, and also more than once orally through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, the former inspector of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission on temporary official mission in the U.S.A., military engineer of the third rank V. A. Kravchenko, was on active military service in the Red Army. Having deserted in April 1944, Kravchenko violated his oath, the military laws of the U.S.S.R. and his military duty. Being on duty in the Red Army, Kravchenko was registered in the Kiev Military District in the city of Moscow.

In June 1943 at the time of the request made by the Consular Section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for a visa for Kravchenko, the Embassy of the U.S.A. at Moscow was provided with replies on the standard questionnaire of the Embassy. To the question about the position occupied, the reply was given that Kravchenko was an engineer in the Chief Administration for Metal Manufacture in the People's Commissariat of Local Industry from 1943. To the question about the place of work of Kravchenko during the last two years preceding the position occupied by him, the reply was given that he was a student of the Moscow Military Engineering School.

Upon completion of the Military Engineering School, Kravchenko served in the Red Army. Being in service in the Red Army, he was assigned to duty in the capacity of military engineer in the People's Commissariat of Local Industry, and later, being as before in the

²⁴ The Secretary of State sent a copy of this translation to the Attorney General with a letter of January 18, 1945, in which he wrote: "You will note that the information contained in the *aide-mémoire* provides evidence that Kravchenko was a military person." (861.01B11/1-1345)

²⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, pp. 1230 and 1235, respectively.

service of the Red Army, he proceeded, as did other military employees, on temporary assignment to the U.S.A. for the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

The Soviet Government communicates the foregoing information in view of the wish, expressed by the Secretary of State in conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on January 4 of this year, to receive confirmation of the fact that V. A. Kravchenko at the time of desertion was in actual fact on active service in the Red Army.

The Soviet Government again expresses the hope that its request for the turning over to Soviet authority of Kravchenko will be satisfied by the Government of the U.S.A. in the near future.

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945.

861.01B11/1-545

The Acting Secretary of State to the Attorney General (Biddle)

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I thank you for your letter of January 5, 1945 relative to the case of Victor A. Kravchenko.

I note that it is your opinion that the only lawful methods by which a Soviet national may be apprehended and deported from this country are either extradition or deportation under the immigration laws. Since there is no extradition treaty between this Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the first method would not appear to be applicable to this case.

I also note that you refer to the Soviet Ambassador's statement that Kravchenko was on active military service in the Red Army but you indicate that his status in this country was and is not a military one. The Ambassador has been asked to clarify his statement in this regard and to submit further evidence in support of the premise that Kravchenko is in fact a deserter from the Red Army.

With reference to the question raised in the last paragraph of your letter regarding an arrangement with Canada, Great Britain and Mexico for the return of deserters from the military forces of these countries, I have looked into this matter and have learned that the State Department has not assisted in the conclusion of any such agreement. If such an informal arrangement exists, it was probably concluded by the military authorities of the United States.

I shall immediately pass on to you any information which the Soviet Ambassador submits with respect to Kravchenko.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.01B11/1-2745

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting
Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1945.

Mr. William Green of the American Federation of Labor telephoned to say that he had been advised that there was a possibility that the Soviet Government had been requesting the extradition of Mr. Victor Kravchenko, who was formerly with the Soviet Purchasing Commission. Mr. Green said that the American Federation of Labor would be strongly opposed to the granting of any application for extradition since it was felt that this would mean the loss of Mr. Kravchenko's life.

I told Mr. Green that we have had this particular case before us for a long time, but that in the final analysis, the decision would rest with the War Department.²⁶ I assured him that, in any event, the case would be settled only after a very careful exploration of the entire situation.

JOSEPH C. GREW

861.01B11/2-745

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European
Affairs (Durbrow) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1945.

At your suggestion I called Mr. Herbert Wechsler, Assistant Attorney General, to ask him if any new developments had taken place in regard to the Kravchenko case.

Mr. Wechsler said that he did not know exactly what was being done in regard to this case but stated that he was sure that the State Department understood the Department of Justice's point of view on that question; namely, that as far as Justice is concerned, while Mr. Kravchenko may, under Soviet law, be considered as having been in the United States in a military status, under United States law, he was in this country as a civilian having received a visa as a civilian and having worked for the Soviet Purchasing Commission here in that status. Therefore, Mr. Wechsler stated that, in view of our long-standing policy and traditions regarding asylum, he would not be subject to return to the Soviet Union.

²⁶ The words "War Department" have been underscored and in the margin "Justice?" suggested. In a memorandum of January 20 to Mr. Grew, Mr. Bohlen had written: ". . . The Secretary suggests that you should see the Attorney General in order to ascertain from him whether he is planning to take up this case with the military authorities. The Department of State has done everything it can in the premises and the matter is now between the Attorney General and the military authorities." (861.01B11/1-2045)

I asked Mr. Wechsler whether he knew if the Department of Justice had discussed the case with the Army on the basis of information received from the Soviet Embassy relative to Kravchenko's alleged military status. He stated he was not certain exactly what had been done in this regard but promised to look into the matter and let me know in the next day or so. He indicated that in any event, the Department of Justice would reply to the Department's last communication dated January 18, 1945.²⁷

861.01B11/2-745

The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The United States Government has given the most careful consideration to the request of the Soviet Government that Victor Andreevich Kravchenko be turned over to the Soviet authorities for prosecution for desertion and has explored every possibility of finding a solution of this matter satisfactory to the Soviet Government and at the same time consistent with the laws of the United States. The Department of Justice, which is the Department of the United States Government charged with the responsibility of determining the applicability of United States laws, informed the Department of State as follows:

"It is appreciated that as a matter of Soviet domestic laws the Soviet Government may have viewed Kravchenko's status in the United States as a military one. In view of the capacity, however, in which he applied for a visa and came to the United States as an engineer and not as a member of the Red Army, he must be dealt with under United States law as a civilian. In this capacity, as I have stated previously, he may be deported from this country only as the result of a regular statutory deportation proceeding in which he is entitled to obtain permission to depart from the United States voluntarily to a country of his choice."

In view of the foregoing opinion of the Attorney General of the United States, there would appear to be no legal basis upon which the United States Government could turn Kravchenko over to the Soviet authorities for prosecution.²⁸

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1945.

²⁷ Not printed, but see footnote 24, p. 1135. The Attorney General did send a reply dated February 7, to the Secretary of State, which was consonant with the statements in this memorandum. The pertinent paragraph of this letter is quoted in the Department's *aide-mémoire* of April 12, 1945, to the Embassy of the Soviet Union, *infra*.

²⁸ By Private Law 365, "An Act for the Relief of Viktor A. Kravchenko," approved on February 14, 1950 (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A8), the Attorney General (James Howard McGrath) was directed to record the admission of Kravchenko into the United States at Niagara Falls, New York, on August 18, 1943, as a lawful admis-

DISSATISFACTION OF THE SOVIET UNION WITH UNITED STATES
POLICY TOWARD FOREIGN MERCHANT SEAMEN DESERTERS AS
APPLIED TO DESERTERS FROM SHIPS OF THE SOVIET UNION²⁹

861.8623/1-945

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern
European Affairs (Durbrow)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 9, 1945.

Mr. Kapustin, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, called today and asked the Department's assistance in connection with the case of Alexander Feodorovich Lebanov,* a Soviet merchant seaman, who, Mr. Kapustin stated, had deserted from the SS *Ural* in Portland on December 26, 1944.³⁰ Mr. Kapustin stated he understood that Lebanov had been arrested in Seattle a few days later by United States immigration authorities, and he requested that the Department make arrangements with the immigration authorities to have Lebanov turned over to the Soviet consular officials on the West Coast in order that they might make arrangements to return him to the Soviet Union. During the conversation Mr. Kapustin laid emphasis on the fact that he is a deserter.

I did not discuss the case further with Mr. Kapustin, but indicated that I would look into the matter without making any promises.

In view of the long-standing American policy of not requiring foreign seamen who have deserted in the United States to return to their native country or leave on one of their own flag vessels, which policy has been explained in full in writing to the Soviet Embassy in connection with case of Seaman Yegorov,³¹ it would not appear advisable to comply with the request of the Soviet Embassy to turn Lebanov

sion for permanent residence. If otherwise eligible, Kravchenko could become naturalized as an American citizen. The Act further provided that upon its enactment the Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) should reduce by one number the quota of the alien's nationality for the fiscal year then current or next following.

²⁹ For the establishment of the policy of the United States against the arrest of deserting seamen, see the Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1164, and *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 3 ff.

*or Labanov. [Footnote in the original.]

³⁰ His correct name was Alexander Fedorovich Lobanov. He was a seaman, 1st Class, aboard the SS *Stary Bolshevik*, which had reached Portland, Oregon, on May 7, 1943. He remained there in the employ of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. until his desertion on December 27, 1944, when he was kidnapped by Soviet officials. En route to another ship, SS *Ural*, he was rescued by American police officers and held for immigration hearings on January 4, 1945, at Seattle.

³¹ Alexander Simenovich Yegorov (Egorov) had deserted his ship on April 22, 1942, at San Francisco, had been apprehended by U.S. immigration authorities on July 16, had been allowed to depart from San Francisco as a seaman aboard a neutral vessel on July 28, and had been forcibly taken aboard a Soviet vessel at San Francisco on October 7, 1943. Immigration authorities there were assured by the Soviet Consulate General that the vessel would not depart until Yegorov's case had been cleared with the Department of State, but the ship left with him on October 10 contrary to this assurance.

over to Soviet officials in this country. There have been many other instances of Soviet merchant seamen deserters, and the Soviet Embassy has been informed, whenever inquiry has been made, of the United States policy in this regard. In all these cases, in compliance with our long-standing policy, the United States immigration authorities have permitted these deserting seamen to depart from the United States on any foreign vessel on which they can obtain employment or passage, since the only offense deserting seamen are considered to have committed against United States law is that of being illegally in the country.

Before replying to the Soviet Embassy, it would be appreciated if VD³² would obtain all pertinent details from the immigration service regarding the case of Lebanov.

861.8623/1-2445

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 24, 1945.

Mr. Kapustin, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, called to request that the Department assist the Embassy in making arrangements to turn over to the Soviet authorities in this country Ivan Matraeevich Pika,³³ a Soviet seaman who deserted his ship in Portland, Oregon, on November 11, 1944. According to Mr. Kapustin, Pika was a member of the crew of the Soviet steamship *Alma Ata*. Mr. Pika is now apparently in the custody of the Immigration authorities in Seattle.

I told Mr. Kapustin that it might be difficult for us to comply with this request as well as his previous request to turn over to Soviet control Lobanov, another Soviet sailor who has deserted his ship in this country and about whom Mr. Kapustin made inquiry some time ago.

Mr. Kapustin stated that he felt that both these men should be turned over to the Soviet authorities since they are considered as being in the Soviet Armed Forces, and therefore have the status of military deserters.

I reminded Mr. Kapustin that over a year ago we had outlined American policy in regard to deserting seamen and explained that

³² Visa Division.

³³ Ivan Matveyevich Pik was a seaman (fireman) on the Soviet SS *Aleut*, which had reached Portland, Oregon, on April 17, 1944, to undergo repairs. He was employed on this ship until November and then on SS *Alma Ata*, likewise being repaired, but decided to leave this employment because of threats of deportation to his country for meeting non-Soviet persons. He was held December 30 for immigration hearings on January 4, 1945, at Seattle.

because of this traditional policy it is not certain that it would be possible to comply with his request. I promised, however, to look into the matter and inform him in due course.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

861.8623/3-2045

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., of the Division of Eastern European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1945.

I informed Mr. Kapustin, with reference to his inquiry made some time ago in regard to Lobanov and Pik,³⁴ Soviet seamen who had deserted their ships, that after trial, Lobanov had been allowed to depart from the United States in lieu of deportation and had departed from Seattle during the month of January. I said that a similar trial of Pik had been held and that he had also been ordered deported to the Soviet Union unless he departed from the United States voluntarily within a limited time. Mr. Kapustin asked me to ascertain whether Pik had actually departed, and I said I would be glad to endeavor to do so.³⁵

861.8623/3-2945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1945.

The Soviet Ambassador³⁶ called this afternoon at his request and left with me the appended memorandum³⁷ asking for the extradition of two Soviet seamen, who had allegedly deserted their vessels on the West Coast. Mr. Gromyko said that a law (ukase) had been passed by his Government last May declaring that the desertion of Soviet merchant seamen would be regarded in the same light as the desertion of officers or soldiers in the Army or Navy. The Ambassador said that it was on these grounds that his Government requested the extradition.³⁸ He added that the matter had already been taken up through Soviet consular officers on the West Coast, but without result.

JOSEPH C. GREW

³⁴ The Counselor of the Soviet Embassy had made inquiries on January 30 and February 5 regarding developments in these two cases. He had been advised that no official reports had been received from the Department of Justice, but that he would be told as soon as any information was obtained.

³⁵ Pik had departed in February from Seattle aboard a foreign ship.

³⁶ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

³⁷ *Infra*.

³⁸ See footnote 16, p. 1132.

861.8623/3-2945

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*³⁹

[Translation]

MEMORANDUM

At the end of 1944 the Soviet Government received knowledge of the desertion at Portland, Oregon, of two seamen of the Soviet merchant fleet, seaman-stoker, first class, Ivan Matveevich Pik who deserted from the Soviet vessel *Alma Ata* on November 11, 1944 and seaman Alexander Feodorovich Lobanov, who deserted from the Soviet vessel *Stari Bolshevik* on December 27, 1944. In spite of the demand of the Soviet Consul General in San Francisco⁴⁰ for the transfer of these two deserters to the Soviet representatives, Pik and Lobanov were arrested by the Portland police and later were transported to Seattle and there handed over to the American immigration authorities.

On the 9th and 22nd of January, 1945,⁴¹ oral representations were made by the Counselor of Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Washington, A. N. Kapustin, to Mr. Durbrow, Chief of the Eastern European Division of the State Department, regarding the transfer of Pik and Lobanov to the Soviet authorities for their despatch to the U.S.S.R. Not receiving any answer to these representations, the Soviet Embassy, through Counselor A. N. Kapustin, was obliged on the 25th and 30th of January, 1945, to approach the State Department again⁴² with a request to hasten a decision on the question of the transfer of Pik and Lobanov to the Soviet authorities, pointing out that, according to information in possession of the Embassy, the files of both deserters had been transmitted from Seattle to the central immigration authorities in Washington and that, as a consequence, full opportunity existed for the decision due on this matter.

In connection with the above, the attention of the State Department is drawn to the ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of May 9, 1944, in accordance with which the regulations of the ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of April 15, 1944 "regarding the institution of military status for all railroads" of the Soviet Union are applied to seamen of the merchant fleet of the U.S.S.R. In conformity with this ukase, seamen of the Soviet merchant fleet are considered in time of war as having been mobilized and are answerable for their offenses in the line of service on the same basis as military personnel of the Red Army. Cases concerning all offenses of seamen of the Soviet mer-

³⁹ Handed by the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Acting Secretary of State on March 29.

⁴⁰ Andrey Evtrovich Vasilyev.

⁴¹ See memoranda dated January 9 and 24, pp. 1139 and 1140, respectively.

⁴² See footnote 34, p. 1141.

chant fleet must be considered by military tribunals in accordance with wartime laws.

On the basis of the above, and guided by the necessity of introducing the most severe discipline among workers of the merchant fleet of the U.S.S.R., which is particularly important for the uninterrupted delivery of war freight from the U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government cannot consider the seamen Pik and Lobanov other than military deserters, failing in their wartime duty.

The Soviet Government firmly believes that the Government of the U.S.A., in conformity with the friendly relations existing between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., will take prompt measures for the transfer of the military deserters, Pik and Lobanov, to the appropriate Soviet authorities.

[WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1945.

861.8623/3-2945

The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the memorandum of the Soviet Ambassador of March 29, 1945 and to previous conversations regarding the Embassy's desire that Ivan Matveevich Pika and Alexander Fedorovich Lobanov be returned to the Soviet authorities as deserting seamen.

The report of the competent United States authorities shows that Pika arrived in the United States as an alien seaman regularly signed on as a member of the crew of the Soviet SS *Aleut*. He was admitted at Seattle, Washington, on March 13, 1944 for a period of twenty-nine days. When Pika was examined by the Immigration Inspector at Seattle, Washington, on January 4, 1945, he was found to have overstayed the period for which he was admitted and it was consequently recommended that in accordance with Sections 14 and 15 of the Immigration Act of 1924⁴³ he be deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Pika was further informed of the alternative provided by law under which he would be permitted to depart from the United States by reshipping foreign to any country of his choice within ninety days.

The immigration records show that Pika availed himself of this latter procedure and shipped on a foreign vessel, leaving the west coast of the United States in February 1945.

According to the report of the competent United States authorities, Lobanov arrived in the United States at Portland, Oregon, as a member of the crew of the SS *Stary Bolshevik*. On May 7, 1943, he was admitted to the United States for the usual period of twenty-nine

⁴³ Approved May 26, 1924; 43 Stat. 153.

days. The records of the Immigration Service show that Lobanov, shortly after his arrival in the United States, took a job as assistant to the Soviet Reserve Crew Inspector in Portland. It further appears that from September 16, 1943 to December 19, 1944 he was employed as a guard in the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Portland.

After examination by the Immigration Inspector on January 4, 1945, Lobanov was found guilty of having remained in the United States beyond the twenty-nine-day period for which he was admitted in May 1943. It was recommended that under Sections 14 and 15 of the Immigration Act of 1924 he be deported to the Soviet Union.

The immigration records show that Lobanov availed himself of the alternative provided for by United States statute and that he departed by reshipping foreign from a west coast port in January 1945.

Reference is made in this connection to the Department's memorandum of October 6, 1943⁴⁴ and to the Department's note of January 8, 1944⁴⁵ (case of Alexandre Simeonovitch Yegorov) which outlined in detail the long-standing practice of the United States Government in dealing with questions of deserting seamen under which a foreign seaman, who has deserted his ship and remained in the United States illegally, may either be deported to his native country or, if he so desires, be permitted to depart from the United States within ninety days on any non-American vessel of his own choice.

In conformity with this long-standing practice, the two above-mentioned seamen departed from the United States under the procedure which is applicable in the cases of all foreign seamen who have deserted their ships in the United States and, therefore, these two individuals are no longer under the jurisdiction of United States law. Under the circumstances, it will be impossible to comply with the Embassy's request that these individuals be turned over to the Soviet authorities.

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1945.

861.8623/5-1745

The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State

[Translation]

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State and, referring to its memorandum of May 2, 1945, it has the honor to communicate the following:

⁴⁴ Not printed; it dealt with the cases of two Soviet seamen, Lenj and Poplovkov.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

Repeatedly and in the course of a great length of time, the Embassy placed before the Department of State the question of the delivery of the deserters—sailors of the Soviet Navy Pik and Lobanov—to the hands of the Soviet Authorities.

Declarations of this nature were contained in the oral statements made by Mr. Kapustin of the Soviet Embassy on January 9, January 22, January 25 and March 1 of 1945,⁴⁶ as well as in the Memorandum of the Embassy of March 29, 1945.

As is evident from the confrontation of the representatives of the Embassy on the subject of the deserters Pik and Lobanov and the leaving of the territories of the U. S. A. by the latter—Lobanov in January, 1945, and Pik in February, 1945—some of the *démarches* of the Embassy took place when Pik and Lobanov were no longer within the boundaries of the U. S. A. It is evident that this phenomenon was caused only because the Department of State, which at that time undoubtedly could have had the necessary facts at its disposal, did not inform the Embassy thereof. Thus, for example, upon the *démarches* of the Embassy on January 9, January 22, January 25 and March 1, the corresponding functionaries of the Department of State confined themselves in their answers to a reference to the lack of information from the immigration authorities, who had arrested Pik and Lobanov, instead of informing the Embassy about the actual state of affairs. The Embassy is obliged to state that the delay in the settlement of this case on the part of the Americans has resulted in the fact that Pik and Lobanov have now been deported, and the lawful request of the Government of the U. S. S. R. concerning the delivery of these deserters to the hands of the Soviet Authorities has not been complied with.

The Embassy requests that the Department of State communicate as soon as possible the exact date of the deportation of Pik and Lobanov, the name and national ownership of the ships on which they were deported, and for what country the deserters in question left the U. S. A. The Embassy is certain that the competent American Authorities have at their disposal the information necessary, and will be so good as to cooperate with it in the search for the sailor deserters Pik and Lobanov, since they are Soviet citizens.

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1945.

⁴⁶ See memoranda dated January 9 and 24, and March 20, pp. 1139, 1140, and 1141, respectively.

861.8623/5-1745

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union
(Novikov)*

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and refers to the Embassy's note dated May 17, 1945 requesting certain data concerning the departure of two Soviet merchant seamen, Pika and Lobanov, who left their vessels in a port of the United States and who later shipped out on other vessels.

The Embassy's note indicates that the Embassy is of the opinion that the Department failed to furnish certain desired information regarding these cases when such information was available to the Department. The Embassy states in its note that the Department's delay in furnishing the Embassy the desired data regarding these cases resulted in the seamen being deported instead of their being turned over to Soviet authorities as requested.

A review of the records regarding these cases shows that the Embassy's original requests for information concerning Lobanov and Pika were made orally by an officer of the Embassy on January 9, 1945 and January 24, 1945. After the receipt of these requests the matter was taken up with the immigration authorities of the United States. The subsequent requests by the Embassy were made prior to the receipt in the Department of the reports requested from the immigration authorities. Consequently, negative statements were necessarily given to the Embassy on each occasion. After the reports were finally received from the immigration authorities the Embassy was informed by the Department's note dated May 2, 1945 that both Pika and Lobanov had departed voluntarily in lieu of deportation. They were not deported from the United States and the Department desires to correct the apparent misunderstanding of the Embassy in this connection.

As the Embassy has, in expressing its interest in these cases, made charges of improper conduct on the part of the officers of the Department it is deemed necessary to discuss certain important aspects of these cases from the viewpoint of the conduct of officers of the Government of the Soviet Union in this country.

The official records of this Government show that Mr. Lobanov was forcibly removed from his place of temporary residence in this country by officials of the Soviet Union and that he was being taken to a vessel of the Soviet Union against his will at the time the automobile carrying him was intercepted by American police officers at Portland, Oregon. The records further indicate that Mr. Lobanov entered the United States in the status of a seaman and was employed ashore by the Soviet Purchasing Commission for a number of months, although a search of the files does not disclose that an official notification (on

Form PR-X) was submitted by the Embassy for Mr. Lobanov as required by the Espionage Act of 1917⁴⁷ and the Act of 1938,⁴⁸ as amended, by the Acts of August 7, 1939⁴⁹ and April 29, 1942,⁵⁰ requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals.

While the Government of the United States has not heretofore registered a diplomatic complaint regarding this flagrant example of the unauthorized exercise by officers of the Soviet Union of police powers on American soil, and while no request has thus far been made by this Government for the removal from the United States of the particular officers of the Soviet Union, their improper exercise of authority having been considered as possible personal over-zealousness, the attempt on the part of officers of the Soviet Union in this country to exercise the police powers of this Government, and to remove forcibly a person from territory of the United States without due process of law, cannot be sanctioned by this Government.

When an alien seaman signs off or leaves his vessel in a port of the United States and within a reasonable time thereafter ships out on another vessel, it is usually considered that he has complied with the requirements of the immigration laws of the United States and this Government usually takes no further interest in his whereabouts. There do not appear to be any circumstances in these cases which require the application of a different policy. In this respect the Embassy is referred to the Department's memorandum note dated October 6, 1943⁵¹ concerning the cases of Lenj and Poplovkov.

In view of the attempt of the officers of the Soviet Union to exercise extraterritorial authority in these cases, and the fact that the Embassy's request was made after the failure of that attempt, this Government does not feel obliged to furnish any further information regarding these cases as requested by the Embassy.

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1945.

861.8623/10-1145

The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State

[Translation]

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State and, referring to the Department's note of October 2, 1945, has the honor to communicate that, in view of the lack of cooperation on the part of the Department of State, a decision has not been reached on the question of the transfer

⁴⁷ Approved June 15, 1917; 40 Stat. 217.

⁴⁸ Foreign Agents Registration Act, approved June 8, 1938; 52 Stat. 631.

⁴⁹ 53 Stat. (pt. 2) 1244.

⁵⁰ 56 Stat. 248.

⁵¹ Not printed.

by the American authorities to the Soviet authorities of seamen Pik and Lobanov, who deserted in time of war.

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1945.

**EFFORTS TO ASSIST SOVIET SPOUSES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND
DETAINED AMERICAN CITIZENS TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION**⁵³

811.32/2-1745 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, February 17, 1945—6:15 p. m.

[Received March 3—6 p. m.]

A-40. Reference is made to the Department's airmail instruction no. 429 of January 26, 1945.⁵⁴

Ensign Byron Uskievich was married on September 18, 1944 to Margarita Nikitichna Osipova. On October 28, Mrs. Uskievich filed a petition for the renunciation of Soviet citizenship. On December 6 the Embassy wrote a note to the Foreign Office requesting that the competent Soviet authorities be informed of its interest in Mrs. Uskievich's case and its hope that action would be taken on it at an early date. To this communication no reply has been received. Ensign Uskievich left Moscow for the United States of [on] February 14, 1945.

The Embassy will give Mrs. Uskievich all possible assistance in her effort to obtain permission to leave the Soviet Union.

HARRIMAN

124.613/2-345

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

No. 1500

Moscow, February 23, 1945.

[Received March 17.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's instruction No. 408 of January 10, 1945⁵⁴ (file no. 124.613/12-1144), requesting

⁵³ For previous documentation concerning the problem of Soviet spouses of American citizens and their difficulties in obtaining exit permits to leave the Soviet Union, see despatch 520 of May 31, 1944, from Moscow; despatch 884 of September 1, 1944, from Moscow; memorandum by Charles E. Bohlen of September 29, 1944; and instruction 355 of November 21, 1944, to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 877, 914, 920, and 935, respectively. For previous references to this persisting problem, see *ibid.*, p. 877, footnote 76.

⁵⁴ Not printed.

information concerning the welfare of Valentine Serge Malitsky,⁵⁵ who was arrested in 1936 by the Soviet authorities and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

Previous to the receipt of the Department's instruction, the Embassy had written to the Foreign Office, on November 24, 1944, with regard to Mr. Malitsky. A copy of the letter in question is enclosed. A second letter on the subject, of which a copy is also enclosed, was written on February 6, 1945.⁵⁶

A letter has now been received from the Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office,⁵⁷ dated February 16, 1945, which states that "according to information received recently by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs from the appropriate Soviet authorities, V. S. Malitski continues to serve out the term of his sentence."⁵⁸

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
WARWICK PERKINS
First Secretary of Embassy

340.1115/3-3145: Airgram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 31, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received April 23—7 p. m.]

A-70. Department's telegram no. 667 dated March 22, 1945⁵⁹ concerning the repatriation case of Jan Czechel.

The Embassy is informed by the Bank for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow that there has been remitted by Sylvester A. Bartose \$140 and by Ksaweri Yuzskiewicz \$120 for Mr. John Czechel.

Mr. Czechel applied in January 1945 to "OVIR" (Bureau of Visas and Registration of Foreigners) of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs for an exit visa, but was told that he would have to

⁵⁵ Valentin Sergeyeovich Malitsky had been a Soviet employee of the Embassy. For earlier interest by the United States in this case, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, p. 319.

⁵⁶ Enclosures not printed.

⁵⁷ Semen Konstantinovich Tsarapkin.

⁵⁸ This information was sent to Mrs. Malitsky, who then requested that a message be sent for her husband and in addition asked for the assistance of the Department of State in obtaining permission from Soviet authorities to write to him. Mrs. Malitsky's message and request were brought to the attention of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in a note from the Embassy in Moscow. When no answer had been forthcoming, the Embassy renewed the request for permission to allow Mrs. Malitsky to write directly to her husband, but had to inform the Department that the Foreign Commissariat only replied in a note of October 19 that Mrs. Malitsky should apply direct to the appropriate Soviet organizations in any matters concerning her husband. (124.613/10-2345)

⁵⁹ Not printed.

return to his place of last residence, a village in Grodnenskaya Oblast, Belorusskaya S.S.R., and apply there for an exit visa through the appropriate authorities. The Embassy explained to OVIR that, according to Mr. Czechel, there was no office of OVIR in the village from which he came whereupon the Embassy was advised to address a note to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs regarding Mr. Czechel's case.

On January 23, 1945 the Embassy addressed a note to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs enclosing Mr. Czechel's American passport No. 118/FS70947 with the request that a Soviet exit visa be affixed to it so that Mr. Czechel could continue on his way to the United States. It was pointed out that Mr. Czechel had traveled to Moscow for the purpose of applying for documentation so that he could return to the United States.

On January 30, 1945 the People's Commissariat replied that the question of the departure of Jan Czechel from the Soviet Union was "under study" by the competent Soviet authorities, and that the Embassy would be apprised later of the results.

In a note dated February 26, 1945, the Embassy drew attention to the time that had elapsed since it had requested an exit visa for Mr. Czechel, and requested information from the People's Commissariat regarding the present status of the case.

No reply having been received to the second note, the Embassy inquired again on March 28 and was informed that the case of Mr. Czechel was still under consideration by the competent Soviet authorities. The Embassy has been unable to ascertain the nature of the investigation that is being conducted in Czechel's case. It was informed orally by the Chief of OVIR in a casual way that Czechel had violated a Soviet war-time regulation pertaining to the travel of foreigners within the Soviet Union by having traveled to Moscow without a "propusk" (permit).

HARRIMAN

361.1121/6-1245

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

No. 650

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1945.

The Acting Secretary of State refers to the Department's instructions numbers 259 of August 14, 1944⁶⁰ and 532 of April 17, 1945⁶¹ concerning Mr. Isaiah Oggins who is imprisoned in the Soviet Union.

⁶⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 771, footnote 22.

⁶¹ Not printed; it enclosed a message from Mrs. Nerma Oggins for her husband and requested any information which might be obtained concerning Mr. Oggins (361.1121/2-1245).

The Officer in Charge is requested to report to the Department whether it has been possible to obtain any recent information from the Soviet authorities concerning Mr. Oggins' welfare or his possible release, and whether Mrs. Oggins' message contained in the enclosure to instruction number 259 was delivered to her husband.

340.1115/6-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 29, 1945—midnight.

[Received June 29—8:40 p. m.]

2333. Citizenship case of Jan Czechel was summarized in Emb's airgram A-70, March 31.

Ref also his application for passport dated June 6. On date this passport was issued June 6 it was sent to FonOff with lengthy note reviewing entire case. It was pointed out that he had made application for Soviet exit visa Jan 3 and that no communication had been received from the FonOff concerning him since Jan 30. The note ended as follows:

"As there is no question involved of Mr. Czechel possessing either Polish or Soviet citizenship and as his Amer citizenship has been clearly established, the Emb will be obliged unless an exit visa is issued to him promptly to report to the US Govt that an Amer citizen is being detained in the Soviet Union against his will."

Three more weeks have now elapsed and no reply has been forthcoming. We consider this a clear cut case of detention of an Amer citizen and accordingly request instructions as to what further action should be taken.

HARRIMAN

811.32/2-1745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1945—4 p. m.

1586. ReEmb's A-40, February 17, and others. If Embassy has not done so recently it should bring to the attention of Soviet authorities its continued interest in favorable action on the applications for permission to leave the Soviet Union made by Soviet wives of American citizens, pointing out unfavorable impression created on American relatives who fail to understand why authorization is not granted. Particular case in point is hardship of separation expressed by Uskievich who is about to go on combat duty and who before leaving

United States has again requested Dept and Naval Operations to endeavor to obtain permission for his wife to come to the United States.

GREW

340.1115/7-1345 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 13, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received July 13—5:30 p. m.]

2559. ReDepcirtel July 5.⁶² Re possible repatriation cases Embassy knows of no persons in Soviet Union with citizenship established and in possession of exit visas who would be available for repatriation.

It is estimated that persons who have contacted this Embassy claiming American citizenship total 5 in Estonia, 5 in Latvia, 500 Lithuania, 100 Western Ukraine and Belo Russia and 10 Bessarabia. They are unable to establish their claim without traveling to Moscow in order to make application for registration before consular officer. Soviet authorities rarely will issue travel permits for this purpose.

Inasmuch as we have no persons available for repatriation it is proposed not to report monthly on this subject as instructed in telegram under reference unless Dept specifically instructs us to do so.

In view large number persons in Lithuania claiming citizenship and plan for visit of repatriation ship to north Europe ports we propose to request permission for career officer and clerk to visit Kovno in order to hear claims of citizenship and to document those whose citizenship is established. It is not probable that such request will receive any early reply, particularly a favorable one. Nevertheless, we see no harm in making request and will do so unless Dept perceives objection.

KENNAN

361.1121/7-1345

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

No. 1878

Moscow, July 13, 1945.

[Received July 26.]

The Ambassador has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's instruction No. 650 of June 19, 1945 concerning the case of Mr. Isaiah Oggins who is imprisoned in the Soviet Union.

⁶² Not printed.

In its despatch No. 1807 of June 13, 1945,⁶³ the Embassy reported that it had addressed a note to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stating that it hoped that the competent Soviet authorities would now consider the possibility of releasing Mr. Oggins. The Embassy inquired regarding Mr. Oggins' state of health.

No reply has as yet been received to the Embassy's note. Any information that is received will be communicated to the Department.

The Embassy may add that the case of Mr. Oggins does not fall within any of the categories of offenses covered by the amnesty decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of July 7, 1945.

811.32/7-1745 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 17, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received July 17—7:35 p. m.]

2603. Re Dept's telegram 1586, July 12. On July 6 Ambassador Harriman wrote Vyshinski⁶⁴ on general subject of Soviet wives of members of official American staff, expressing hope that now that hostilities in Europe concluded release of these women might be arranged. Similar letters were written at about same time by British, Canadian, Netherlands, Australian, Colombian and Uruguayan Missions and it was common hope that together these approaches might cause Russians to relax restrictions on departure of women in question from Soviet Union. Thus far I am not aware that any results have been forthcoming.

Ambassador Harriman recently rec'd letter from Uskievich asking him to take up his case individually and enclosing copy of letter of thanks he had received from Russian Naval Commander for work in training Soviet crews. I do not feel it would be proper to introduce this letter in support of his case or that it would do any good to write Foreign Office separate letter on his behalf at present during Three Power meeting.⁶⁵ Possibly it will be possible to review entire situation after Three Power meeting and try to learn something of Russian plans in this respect.

KENNAN

⁶³ Not printed.

⁶⁴ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁶⁵ The Potsdam Conference, July 17–August 2; for documentation on this Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, 2 vols.

811.32/7-1745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1945—1 p. m.

1658. ReEmb's 2603, July 17. Senator Green⁶⁶ and Congressman Forand⁶⁷ have approached Dept and expressed deep interest in case of Lt. Uskievich's wife. When you discuss this case with Soviet authorities please inform them of their interest and express the hope that Mrs. Uskievich will be permitted to leave shortly.⁶⁸

GREW

340.1115/6-2945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1945—2 p. m.

1659. Your No. 2333, June 29th. Reference detention American citizen Jan Czechel. Render Czechel all possible assistance and inform FonOff that Department is seriously concerned by the dilatory tactics of the Soviet authorities which thus far have resulted in preventing a native born American citizen from returning to his homeland. Add that immediate action and a favorable decision in the matter is anticipated and desired.

GREW

340.1115/8-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 10, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 3:50 p. m.]

2844. No answer yet received to Embassy's note to FonOff of July 27 written in accordance with Dept's 1659, July 21 re detention American citizen Jan Czechel. As explained in Embtel 2333, June 29, this is clear-cut case of Soviet's preventing American citizen returning to United States and refusing to correspond with us about his case. Since January, Embassy has written five notes on subject without receiving any reply except routine acknowledgment on [of]

⁶⁶ Theodore Francis Green, of Rhode Island.⁶⁷ Aime J. Forand, of Rhode Island.⁶⁸ In its telegram 1694, July 27, 8 p. m., the Department sent a further instruction that, in view of Senator Green's active interest and that of the Navy Department in the Uskievich case, representations should be renewed to the Soviet Government, after the return of Ambassador Harriman from Berlin, in the various cases pending (811.32/7-2345).

first note saying matter was "under study". In note of July 27 we stated we were protesting Soviet lack of action on direct instructions from US Govt.

If this Embassy is to enjoy any respect with Soviet authorities in its efforts to protect American citizens in areas under Russian control it is essential that we now take some action to make Soviets feel our displeasure. I recommend I be authorized to have facts of this case made available to local American newspapermen. If reporters' stories are not allowed to be filed from here then Dept should release story to American press.⁶⁹

The countless delays and contradictions which are experienced both by Embassy and by resident American citizens in attempting to obtain from Russian officialdom rulings on status of possible dual nationals and to conquer labyrinth of red tape before receiving exit visas are an expression of the arrogance of Soviet secret police, who control these matters, and of their confidence that the American individuals and lower officials concerned will never really have the backing of higher levels of our Govt in these obscure and disheartening battles. In the past circumstances have generally proved them right. If we ever mean to establish the position that our people and our representatives must be treated with respect in these matters, this is a good case with which to begin.

HARRIMAN

124.61/9-1745 : Airgram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 17, 1945.

[Received September 27—6 p. m.]

A-231. In Note No. 378 of July 6, 1945, the Ambassador again requested Vyshinski to use his good offices with appropriate Soviet authorities to expedite issuance of Soviet exit visas to nine Soviet women who have married members of the staff of this Embassy. This request was repeated in Embassy's Note 416 of August 4, 448 of August 13, and 521 of September 7. These notes were in support of the applications for exit visas of the following wives:

Mrs. Edward Ames
 Mrs. James Alexander Collins
 Mrs. George John Golubowski
 Mrs. Louis Maurice Hirshfield
 Mrs. Ernest Arthur Jacques
 Mrs. Joseph Lew Richardson

⁶⁹ In its telegram 1982, September 8, 5 p. m., the Department authorized the Embassy in Moscow to release to American correspondents the facts in the Jan Czechel case provided there had been no subsequent evidence of Soviet willingness to permit his return to the United States (340.1115/8-1045).

Mrs. Kemp Tolley
 Mrs. Byron Uskievich
 Mrs. William Elwood Wallace

On September 13, a reply was received from the Foreign Office stating that the issuance of exit visas had been authorized for:

Mrs. Edward Ames
 Mrs. James Alexander Collins
 Mrs. George John Golubowski
 Mrs. Ernest Arthur Jacques
 Mrs. Joseph Lew Richardson

It is interesting to note that the five exit visas were authorized for the first five names on the Embassy's alphabetical list, excluding Mrs. Hirshfield whose case is in a special category.⁷⁰

For reasons which the Embassy is utterly at a loss to comprehend, some of the others whose names were not mentioned in the Soviet reply have now been orally given to understand that if they would now apply for passports, these would be granted and they, too, would be permitted to leave the U.S.S.R.

It is suggested that the Department may wish to communicate to Senator Green and Congressman Forand the substance of the above, in as much as it pertains to Mrs. Uskievich, in whom they have both expressed a deep interest. Reference Department's telegram No. 1658 of July 21.

KENNAN

124.61/10-1245 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
 (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1945—4 p. m.

2133. In view of indications that permission is now being granted for Soviet wives of foreigners in Moscow to renounce Soviet citizenship, you are requested to press strongly with SovForOff for action on remaining cases with view to early departure from Soviet Union of all remaining wives of members of Embassy staff and of military personnel. In addition to case of Mrs. Collins, Dept understands that favorable action has also been taken on Mrs. Jacques and that several Soviet wives of British personnel were recently released. Dept is

⁷⁰ Mrs. Mela Borisovana Savine on June 18, 1943, had married Louis M. Hirshfield, a clerk in the American Embassy in Moscow, where she had also been employed. For the beginning of this case, see telegram 273, May 1, 1943, to Moscow, and telegram 422, May 10, 1943, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 518 and 524, respectively.

under constant pressure in these cases, particularly regarding Mrs. Uskiewicz and Mrs. Tolley.

Hirshfield has sent frantic telegram to President complaining that visas are being issued in cases more recent than his and requesting President's personal intercession in his behalf. This telegram has been referred to Dept for appropriate action. Hirshfield is well aware that question of granting exit visas for his wife is not a matter over which the President or USGov has any control. He is fully aware of the continued efforts which have been made in endeavoring to obtain the release of all Soviet wives of American citizens. If, for reasons of its own, the SovGov has not yet seen fit to include his wife among those who have received exit permits it is not through any lack of interest on the part of this Gov in his wife's case. You may take such appropriate steps as you see fit in explaining this to Hirshfield.

In view of manpower shortage Dept during war years permitted Embassy personnel marrying Soviet citizens to continue service in Moscow until wives were able to leave. With end of hostilities and renewed availability of competent replacements Dept henceforth will transfer promptly any personnel marrying Soviet citizens in view of reduced usefulness to Embassy which such marriages entail. Please bring foregoing to attention of all members of your staff and make Dept's policy clear to newly arrived personnel.

BYRNES

124.61/9-1745 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1945—4 p. m.

2211. Your airgram 231, Sept. 17, Dept's telegram 2133 Oct. 12. Senator Connally,⁷¹ Representative Bloom,⁷² and Representative Sumner⁷³ have inquired of the Dept regarding the case of Mrs. Louis M. Hirshfield.

Unless you feel that the case would be prejudiced by such action, you are requested to again take up with the SovFonOff.

Please explain why Mrs. Hirshfield is considered to be in a special category.⁷⁴

BYRNES

⁷¹ Tom Connally, Texas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

⁷² Sol Bloom, New York, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

⁷³ Jessie Sumner, Illinois.

⁷⁴ Mrs. Hirshfield earlier had some employment with the Soviet Government and had been employed since 1934 in the American Embassy in Moscow.

124.61/9-1745: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1945—8 p. m.

2271. UrAir 231, September 17. Navy Secretary Forrestal has requested Dept to make strong representations to Soviet Govt with regard to case of Mrs. V. I. Tolley.⁷⁵ Unless you feel that the case would be prejudiced by such action you are again requested to take up with the SovFonOff.

Was Mrs. Tolley among those given oral understanding? Please inform Dept which persons given oral understanding.

BYRNES

124.61/11-1545: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, November 15, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 15—11:23 a. m.]

3865. ReDeptel 2271, November 2. Department may be assured that we are continually pressing cases of Soviet spouses. I have today brought the Tolley case to attention of Vyshinski pointing out that Secretary Forrestal was interested in it.

On September 17 Mrs. Tolley and Mrs. Hirshfield again applied to renounce Soviet citizenship. They were told that under certain new regulations Russians marrying foreigners should apply for passports valid for foreign travel and were given to understand that if they did so they would be permitted to leave Soviet Union. They thereupon applied for foreign passports. Mrs. Tolley again applied for a passport on November 2 and was told that her case would be definitely settled within 3 weeks. She was unable to obtain any idea, however, whether case would be settled favorably.

HARRIMAN

340.1115/12-1945: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1945—8 p. m.

2581. Senator Green of Rhode Island has expressed strong interest in case of Jan Czechel. Please renew representations with Soviet authorities with view to obtaining exist visa.

ACHESON

⁷⁵ Vladilena Isayevna Tolley (Mrs. Kemp Tolley).

124.61/12-1945 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1945—8 p. m.

2582. ReDeptel 2133, Oct 12, 1945. Congressman Forand has again expressed deep interest in obtaining permission for Lt. Uskievich's wife to leave the Soviet Union.

He is now on duty U.S. Fleet Weather Station at Khabarovsk and contemplates detachment for return U.S. about Dec 20. Desires to bring his wife now pregnant home with him.⁷⁶

Please renew representations to Soviet FonOff presenting the above facts and stressing humanitarian angle.

ACHESON

124.61/10-1245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1945—6 p. m.

2592. ReDeptel 2133, Oct. 12, 1945. It is understood that progress is being made in case of Mrs. Kemp Tolley. Please do anything possible to expedite her departure as soon as she receives permission to leave the Soviet Union.

ACHESON

124.61/12-2545 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 25, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received December 25—3:25 p. m.]

4268. ReDeptel 2592, December 20, 6 p. m. Department's information is incorrect with respect to case of Mrs. Tolley. I have no evidence that any progress is being made or that Soviet authorities have any intention at this time of permitting Mrs. Tolley to leave

⁷⁶ At the end of 1945, Lt. Uskievich and his wife were at Vladivostok, where he was scheduled to depart for the United States following the closure of the United States Navy Weather Central at Khabarovsk. Because all efforts to obtain the requisite Soviet travel documents that would allow her to leave the Soviet Union failed, the Consul General at Vladivostok, O. Edmund Clubb, requested from local travel authorities on December 31 that she should be provided with train space on January 2, 1946, to enable her to return to her home in Moscow.

Soviet Union. The Secretary, however, has taken up question of wives with Molotov.⁷⁷

HARRIMAN

CONSIDERATION OF THE DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING CONSULATES BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY; DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL AT VLADIVOSTOK

702.6111/2-2145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Thompson)

[WASHINGTON,] March 7, 1945.

Participants: James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State.⁷⁸
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Acting Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs.
Jess Fletcher, Vice President, Building Service Employee's International Union, Seattle, Washington.
Congressman de Lacy, Washington.

Mr. Fletcher called to present the attached documents⁷⁹ including a letter⁸⁰ addressed to the Secretary of State from the Governor of Washington⁸¹ and a joint memorial⁸² of the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Washington urging the reestablishment of a Soviet Consulate at Seattle, Washington. Mr. Fletcher explained that this proposal had wide support in the State of Washington and he hoped that the State Department could also give its support.

He said he had an appointment to see the Soviet Ambassador⁸³ later in the day.

Mr. Dunn said that he saw no reason why the Department would not regard favorably any request of the Soviet Government to open

⁷⁷ Secretary Byrnes was attending the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States, December 16-26. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov was the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Mr. Byrnes took this occasion to point out to Mr. Molotov the interest of members of Congress in the question of Soviet wives of American citizens being allowed to leave the Soviet Union and informed him that the Soviet Government's attitude was not understood in the United States and was causing difficulties. This conversation was confirmed by Mr. Byrnes in a letter of December 24 to Mr. Molotov, and therein Mr. Byrnes called particular attention to the case of Mrs. Byron Uskievich, stating that her position had been pending a year and stressing the humanitarian aspects involved.

⁷⁸ Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs.

⁷⁹ None printed.

⁸⁰ Dated February 21.

⁸¹ Mon C. Wallgren.

⁸² No. 3, dated February 9.

⁸³ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

a consulate in Seattle, but pointed out that the proper procedure would be for the request to come from the Soviet Government. He said he could assure Mr. Fletcher that such a request would receive sympathetic consideration. He thought, however, that Mr. Fletcher's proposed representations to the Soviet Ambassador were quite in order and would be more effective if made independently of the Department.

Both Mr. Fletcher and Congressman de Lacy expressed themselves as being very pleased at the Department's attitude and promised to inform the Department of any further developments.

702.6111/3-1045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1945.

The Soviet Ambassador called on me today at his request and said that his Government wishes to establish "representations" in Portland, Oregon and Seattle, Washington, of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. This does not mean that the Soviet Government wishes to open consulates in those places, but merely to establish offices which are very much needed in view of the fact that great amounts of Soviet supplies pass through those ports, and many questions arise with regard to these shipments. The Ambassador said he thought that such a step would be helpful also to us as he is constantly receiving letters from the Governors and Senators in the States of Oregon and Washington asking for information of one kind or another.

I said to the Ambassador that I knew of no procedure for establishing what he referred to as a "representation" and I asked him whether, if such offices were opened, they should not be in charge at least of subordinate consular officers such as a vice consul. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative and said that the purpose of his Government was to establish branch offices of the main office in San Francisco, but not to open new consulates as such.

I said I would look into this matter and let the Ambassador know as soon as possible of our attitude towards his Government's proposal.

JOSEPH C. GREW

702.6111/3-1245

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs
(Matthews)*⁸⁴

[WASHINGTON,] March 12, 1945.

The explanation of the Soviet Ambassador's unusual proposal for the establishment in Portland and Seattle of "representations" of the

⁸⁴ Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) and the Under Secretary of State (Grew); Mr. Dunn noted: "I concur".

Soviet Consulate in San Francisco is probably that the Soviet Government is afraid that, if they should request permission to open two new consulates, we would use this as a basis for requesting permission to open additional American Consulates in the U.S.S.R.

It is suggested that you inform the Ambassador that we would sympathetically consider a request of the Soviet Government to open consulates or vice consulates in Portland and Seattle, but that we believe the status of these offices and their personnel should be regularized in order that there might be no misunderstanding of their functions and to avoid difficulties that might arise if the persons in charge of these offices did not have regular consular status. You might add that it would be for the Soviet Government to decide whether or not these offices would be subordinate to the Soviet Consulate at San Francisco.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

702.6111/3-2145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1945.

The Soviet Ambassador called on me this afternoon at his request. I referred to his request expressed not long ago⁸⁵ that his Government be permitted to open branch offices in Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington, of the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco, these branch offices to be "representations" and not separate consulates. I said to the Ambassador that after examining this matter I had found that it would be difficult to accede to the Soviet request as we felt that the status of the offices to be opened should be regularized according to usual procedure as otherwise public misunderstandings would arise. I said that we would be very glad to consider a Soviet request to open consulates or vice consulates in those two cities. The Ambassador then asked if he could inform his Government that we had refused the Soviet request to establish "branch offices". I replied that this was a question of interpretation of nomenclature which I myself did not feel competent to determine, and after consulting Mr. Matthews, who had entered the conference, I suggested that the Soviet Ambassador send a member of his staff to talk with Mr. Thompson of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, who would be glad to discuss the technical aspects of the problem. The Ambassador said, "You have given me a negative answer to the question that I asked, and you have given me a positive answer to a question which I had not asked".

⁸⁵ See memorandum of March 10, p. 1161.

I said to the Ambassador that before reporting to his Government, it would be well to conduct the conversation which I had suggested on an expert level.

JOSEPH C. GREW

702.6111/3-2245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Thompson)

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1945.

Participants: Stanley Woodward, PR ⁸⁶
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., EE
Alexander N. Kapustin, Counselor of Soviet Embassy.

It had been arranged by Mr. Grew for Mr. Kapustin to call to discuss the Soviet desire to open branches of their San Francisco Consulate in Seattle and Portland without, however, calling them consulates or vice consulates.

Mr. Kapustin explained that the offices would be very small and would probably consist of one officer, a clerk, and a typist. They would deal chiefly with shipping matters and, because of the small size of the office, they did not wish to call them consulates but rather "consular representations" and that they should be branches of the San Francisco Consulate.

Mr. Thompson pointed out that there is a considerable amount of friendly rivalry between various American cities and states, and that the people in Seattle and Portland might be inclined to resent having the offices there considered as branches of an office in another state. (Mr. Kapustin did not seem to be concerned about the opinions of the people of Seattle and Portland.) This need not prevent the Soviet Government from making these offices subordinate to the San Francisco office, but the name proposed for the offices was not one normally used and its meaning would not be clear.

Mr. Woodward inquired whether the officials in charge of these offices would be regular consular officers. Mr. Kapustin replied that the intention was that they would be either consuls or vice consuls, probably the latter.

Mr. Thompson also pointed out that these Soviet officials would have relations with American officials such as the police and the police port authorities and various city officials. It would, therefore, be desirable that they have the regular consular status and be granted an *exequatur*. After some discussion, Mr. Kapustin proposed that the offices could be called "Soviet Consulate, San Francisco—Seattle (Portland) office." Mr. Woodward said this would be satisfactory

⁸⁶ Chief of the Division of Protocol.

provided the officers in charge had commissions as consular officers. He said the procedure should be for the Soviet Embassy to address a note to the State Department stating that it desired to open these offices in Seattle and Portland. The Department would reply agreeing to this proposal whereupon the Embassy would notify the Department of the persons appointed and would request provisional recognition. When the commissions of the officers were presented to the Department, their exequaturs would be issued. Mr. Kapustin expressed himself as satisfied with this arrangement.

Mr. Kapustin later telephoned Mr. Thompson to inquire whether a note was really necessary. Upon being told that it was, he inquired whether he could inform his Government that the matter was approved without waiting for the exchange of notes. Mr. Thompson replied that he felt that he would be justified in informing his Government that the State Department approved the proposal in principle.

702.6111/3-2245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Protocol (Woodward)

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1945.

Participants: Alexander N. Kapustin, Counselor of Soviet Embassy.
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., E.E.
Stanley Woodward, P.R.

Supplementing the attached memorandum⁸⁷ of the conversation between Mr. Kapustin, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Thompson (EE) and myself, I told Mr. Kapustin that I thought the best arrangement for the consular offices at Portland and Seattle would be to call them consular agencies if the Soviet Government did not wish to call them consulates or vice consulates. Mr. Kapustin said the Soviet term was consular representation which Mr. Thompson and I explained was about the same thing as consular agency but that the latter form would be better understood.

The position that I tried to take with Mr. Kapustin was that insofar as the name of the office was concerned it was primarily a Soviet Government matter but that we were interested in having the officer in charge at each post a recognized consul.

The impression I received was that Mr. Kapustin agreed to call the offices consular agencies, and he definitely stated that the officer in charge at each post would have a consular status, and that he would probably be a vice consul.

⁸⁷ March 22, *supra*.

I suggested to Mr. Kapustin that the Embassy write in and ask for the recognition of the vice consuls following the procedure already established in the appointment of Soviet Consular Officers.⁸⁸

125.677/4-2345 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 23, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 2:48 p. m.]

1313. ReEmbs 1290, April 21, 5 p. m.⁸⁹ In view of the opening of Odessa to US citizens proceeding to the Soviet Union it is likely that that port will soon become the major transit point for American personnel, baggage, effects, mail, and supplies coming to this mission. Because of increasing problems connected with American ships and personnel proceeding to and from Odessa Admiral Olsen⁹⁰ strongly recommends that some provision be made for stationing of a State Department representative there. He adds that his WSA⁹¹ representatives now stationed there will have difficulty in looking after State Department interests on the scale expected to develop. I personally feel that maximum use should be made of the Odessa facilities for communication between this mission and the US and that the establishment of a Vice Consulate there would be desirable. I therefore suggest that the Department discuss with Ambassador Harriman⁹² the advisability of this.

If we decide to request Soviet authority for the establishment of a Consular office in Odessa we should of course be prepared to limit the Consular district to the city of Odessa as was done in the case of Vladivostok.⁹³ It might prove feasible to assign our new language students to Odessa on a rotation basis.

KENNAN

⁸⁸ In a memorandum by Mr. Woodward in July 1946, he stated that the files and records of the Department of State failed "to disclose the receipt of a request from the USSR for the recognition of a Soviet consular representative at Portland or the establishment of a consular office in that City." Some reports had been received, however, that Konstantin Alexeyevich Efremov, who had been officially recognized as Vice Consul of the Soviet Union at San Francisco, claimed to be Vice Consul stationed at Portland. Mr. Woodward noted that the Consul General at San Francisco, Mikhail Sergeevich Vavilov, had consular jurisdiction in the states of Oregon and Washington. "Any one of the recognized Soviet consular officials at San Francisco may perform consular functions anywhere in the Consul General's jurisdiction. A shield at the door would be permissible providing it does not convey the impression that a Soviet Vice Consulate exists at Portland." (702.6111/7-346)

⁸⁹ Not printed.

⁹⁰ Rear Adm. Clarence E. Olsen, Naval member of the U. S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

⁹¹ War Shipping Administration.

⁹² Ambassador Harriman was on a visit to the United States.

⁹³ For documentation regarding the establishment of the Consulate General at Vladivostok, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 460 ff.

125.677/4-2345: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1945—6 p. m.

1635. Dept agrees in principle with Embassy's telegram 1313, Apr 23, 2 p. m. concerning advantages of opening a Consulate in Odessa, but before taking any action desires your views on advisability of taking up the matter at the present time.

In this connection Dept has in mind the cutting off of lend-lease supplies to European Russia⁹⁴ and the expected opening up of new routes to Moscow via Central and Northern Europe. Under existing circumstances there appears to be little possibility, outside of an occasional UNRRA⁹⁵ ship, of American ships calling at Odessa in the near future.

GREW

125.677/7-2145: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 21, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 10:10 a. m.]

2624. Re Department's 1635, July 18. In view falling off of American shipping to Odessa I quite agree that question of opening Consular office there should not be activated at this time.

Department may wish to consider, however, general desirability of our eventually opening some State Department establishment somewhere in European Russia besides Moscow, if suitable opportunity arises. While American officials stationed in provincial Russian cities would doubtless be extensively cut off from personal contact with local officials and population, nevertheless mere maintenance of such offices would enable us to do something toward breaking down existing restrictions on travel and residence and would give us wider circle of observation than we at present enjoy.

I have not discussed this matter with Ambassador Harriman⁹⁶ and it is a subject on which his views should, of course, be consulted before any definite plans are taken under consideration.

KENNAN

⁹⁴ For documentation on conclusion of wartime assistance from the United States to the Soviet Union, see pp. 937 ff.

⁹⁵ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

⁹⁶ Ambassador Harriman was attending the Berlin Conference; for documentation on this Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, 2 vols.

125.0061/9-1345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1945—5 p. m.

2006. Re Kennan's telegram 2624, July 21, 10 a. m. Dept feels that it is now appropriate to raise with SovGov question of opening additional consular offices in Soviet Union. Since it is not desired to raise at this time question of status of UkSSR,⁹⁷ Dept feels that our initial effort should be toward establishment of Consulate at Leningrad. If you perceive no objection you are accordingly instructed to make such proposal to SovGov, stating that with end of war AmGov desires to expand representation in Soviet Union and wishes first to open Consulate at second largest city in country and leading Baltic port. In your discretion you may add that Dept contemplates establishment of relatively small office staffed at outset by not more than two career officers. You should make clear to SovGov that this is initial request and that in all probability Dept will desire to open other Consulates in Soviet Union at later date.

If SovGov agrees to opening of Leningrad Consulate express desire of AmGov that customs privileges on basis reciprocity be accorded American consular officers assigned to Soviet Union. Proposed text for exchange of notes to effect such arrangements follows by airmail.⁹⁸

ACHESON

125.0061/9-2445 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 24, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received September 24—1 : 36 p. m.]

3360. Re Department telegram 2006, Sept. 13. I see no objection to taking up with Soviet Government question of opening Consulate at Leningrad. I feel, however, that it would be preferable to propose opening the office approximately at time of reopening of navigation in Leningrad next spring, i.e., in the latter part of April. Before that time there are not apt to be many American travellers in Leningrad nor as far as we here are aware any American vessels. If a request is made to open an office this fall, I fear this will confirm Russians in their ever-present suspicions that intelligence work is our consuming passion in Russia and that we are impatient to get consular officials into Leningrad for this purpose. Furthermore, I think we would be wise

⁹⁷ Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.⁹⁸ Airgram A-403, October 12, to Moscow, not printed.

to spare ourselves the problem of trying to find quarters in Leningrad in a hurry and to heat them during the winter months. By spring, conditions in Leningrad should be considerably better. And if Russian assent can be obtained this fall to our opening up there, Leningrad Soviet will have winter months in which to select and put into condition a building for our use. I would therefore prefer to make request at this time but to stipulate next spring as time of opening Consulate. In making request I think it might be well to add expression of hope that consular office would prove helpful in furthering contacts between numerous Leningrad cultural institutions and cultural circles in the United States. I have wired the above views to Ambassador Harriman⁹⁹ who has asked me to express his concurrence.

Would appreciate Dept's authorization to proceed on this basis.¹

KENNAN

125.977/10-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 13, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received October 14—8:08 p. m.]

3537. Following message has been received from Vladivostok:²

191, October 5, 11 a. m. It is my belief that advent of peace brings need for redefinition of status of Consulate General at Vlad. As is well known to Embassy and Dept, present status does not give to Consular Office and its personnel adequate scope for their functioning and activities. Local Soviet authorities maintain with respect to official matters an attitude technically as correct as that reputedly met by Embassy in Moscow and they can't well be charged with direct obstruction of official American functions.³ This said, it must be noted that

⁹⁹ Ambassador Harriman was attending the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in London, September 11-October 2.

¹ Authorization was given by the Department in its telegram 2074, October 1, 1 p. m., not printed. In note 76, dated May 15, 1947, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov, informed the Department that his Government had "found it possible to authorize the establishment of such a Consulate at Leningrad." (125.0061/5-1547)

² Oliver Edmund Clubb was Consul General at Vladivostok. Telegram corrected on basis of original in Vladivostok post files.

³ In a memorandum of a conversation on August 23, 1945, with the Diplomatic Agent, Dmitry Mikhailovich Ryzhkov, the American Vice Consul in charge at Vladivostok, David Henry, recorded these views:

"We concluded in a general discussion about the 'strangeness of Vladivostok' and the 'difficulties' of doing business here. Mr. Ryzhkov was apparently feeling quite unhappy about the hardship of his position, caught between my demands and the recalcitrance of the local powers, and developed his complaints against Vladivostok at some length, although always in cautious language. He sounded almost pathetic at moments. I encouraged him as much as possible to expound on this theme, expressed my sympathy and let him know that I appreciated his

present delimitation of Vlad Consular district and further delimitation of legitimate function[s] of Consular Office in mind of Soviet police authorities to narrow area suggested by ingrained suspicion of intellectual curiosity and "foreign influence" result inevitably in such cramping of normal American consular processes that value of this office cannot possibly even nearly equal that for instance of Soviet Consulate General San Francisco.

Care of Soviet authorities to maintain superficially outward relations naturally makes difficult such portrayal of case that its actuality can[not] be fully appreciated, but citation of certain specific factors will suggest that reality. I was informed orally by previous Dip Agent ⁴ that Americans might not proceed in any manner past 19 [kilometers] limit consular district without specific permits for such travel. Difficulty of obtaining such permits will be appreciated. This particular restriction which is applied only to foreigners is in notable contrast with comparative freedom of travel by car or train enjoyed over substantially larger area by American personnel stationed at Moscow. Further, Consular personnel have been unable obtain for their use summer cottage in generally unrestricted Dacha district. Finally, in town and out, on foot or in car, Consular personnel are persistently dogged by NKVD ⁵ agents whose purpose cannot well be to keep such personnel away from military installations, inasmuch as such installations are always presumably adequately guarded against Soviets and foreigners alike. One natural result of NKVD surveillance, which is also maintained continuously over Consular residential premises, is to cut down to barest minimum contacts of personnel with Soviet population. A small number of Soviet officials and wives do accept formal invitations for social functions at residence of Consul[ate] General. For Soviets to contend, however, as did former Dip Agent, that Americans residing Vlad are free to have social contacts with whom they will is meaningless verbal jugglery in light of dominating circumstance that individual members of Soviet population on their part, far from being free to maintain contacts with Americans, from all outward indications are rightfully fearful of retribution of NKVD if they attempt to develop such contacts. (Example offering support [to] this observation [is] seen in recent developments respecting social contacts of American Khabarovsk weather

difficulties, and made it clear that I am not content with the restrictions on my own position here. . . .

"I am personally convinced of Mr. Ryzhkov's sincerity and of the fact that he is trying to do his best to satisfy my requests but is prevented from doing so by the lack of prestige of his position here, by the inefficiency of local Soviet inter-departmental contact, and by the unapproachability of the Army."

⁴ Semen Petrovich Dyukarev, the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union at Vladivostok, who left on July 2, 1945.

⁵ People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.

group.⁶ That group began such contacts only to see Soviet acquaintances disappear or become "sick" or "busy" and [or] inaccessible.) General result is that Consular personnel is kept effectively outside social pale, and contacts are limited, in main, to those [few] with [high] local officials with a chosen few who act as NKVD agents at same time they give Soviet officials ground for argument that Americans are not denied social contacts and with Soviets met casually under various circumstances with little likelihood of a second meeting. Such isolation of Americans, of course, hampers severely their representative functions vis-à-vis Soviet population in general and cripples their efforts to contribute to development [of] friendly relations and mutual understanding between [the] two nations. Such official matters as are handled by Consulate General are neither extensive nor numerous enough to give personnel adequate foothold for use in surmounting existing social barriers.

Typical of evident desire of local Soviet authorities to reduce to minimum any regular American participation in local affairs was failure to notify this office upon arrival September 29 at nearby field of American Army plane which is presumed to have brought Soviet Ambassador Malik⁷ here from Japan. Roullard⁸ was told on 3rd of plane's arrival by Red Navy liaison who said that he would have contacted so that American representative could have met plane but Roullard had unfortunately left for Khabarovsk that day. Roullard observed that this pertinent letter had directed that any matters concerning him in his absence should be taken up with Consular [Consul] General and asked why liaison had not contacted me instead. Liaison's reply was "not convenient". Local Dip Agent⁹ undoubtedly knew of visit but evidently felt no need to inform me appropriately.

Minor improvement noted in recent months bears no substantial promise that situation will undergo by natural process major favorable change in visible future. [I] submit that Consulate General in present status lacks that range for its functioning appertaining properly to American representative organ here. Reference to similar unenviable position occupied presently by Chinese and previously by Jap Consul[ate] General can't obscure that fact. If acceptance such position by American side was justifiable by reference to wartime exigencies which have co-existed with this office since its establishment, it can hardly be supported in same way under normal peace-

⁶ U.S. Navy Weather Central of Khabarovsk. The U.S.S. *Starr* arrived at Vladivostok on the evening of December 27, 1945, for the purpose of evacuating the personnel of this station after it had been closed.

⁷ Yakov Alexandrovich Malik, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Japan until August 9-10 when the formal declaration of war by the Soviet Union on Japan was announced.

⁸ Comdr. George D. Roullard, Assistant Naval Attaché at Vladivostok.

⁹ Dmitry Mikhailovich Ryzhkov was the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Vladivostok from July 2, 1945.

time conditions. Current acceptance of situation would indubitably make it doubly difficult to effect improvement later when reference to precedent would have its force. [I] would therefore express my earnest convictions that matter calls for present remedial measures. Respectfully request Embassy's consideration of subject and at its discretion appropriate discussion of matter with Dept. I feel that matter can be resolved only by reference to highest Soviet levels on basis of American representations, which patently threaten loss to Soviet side in event non-compliance. With reasonable American request directed toward obtaining for official American personnel at Vlad (1) substantially increased freedom of movement and freedom from surveillance and (2) liberal social access to various strata of local Soviet population in measures at least bringing us up to Moscow level in those respects. I believe achievement those ends would contribute notably to raising prestige and authority this office to higher level in eyes of general population and local officialdom alike. Should ends be unattained, value this office would in all probability remain narrowly limited as at present, which possible contingency ought, I feel, to be clearly recognized in connection [with] comparative assessment American Consular functions in USSR and Soviet Consular functions in US[A]. Clubb.

HARRIMAN

861.00/10-1345 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1945—6 p. m.

2442. Urtel 3537, October 13, 10 p. m. With reference to difficulties experienced by Clubb in work at Vladivostok Consulate General please inform Dept whether you consider any useful purpose would be served by continuing to maintain office there or whether any substantial improvement in working conditions at Vladivostok would result from strong representations at Moscow along lines suggested by Clubb.

BYRNES

125.977/12-645 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, December 6, 1945—9 a. m.
[Received December 6—8:32 a. m.]

4071. ReDepts 2442, December 3. Despite difficulties experienced by Clubb in Vladivostok I consider it definitely desirable that we

continue to maintain a small establishment there of one officer and one American clerk. I do not consider that any substantial improvement in working conditions for our personnel at Vladivostok could be brought about by representations in Moscow and I feel that American personnel stationed there must be prepared to be confined to the city, isolated from Soviet population and held under strict police observation during period of service in that city.

If we are to continue to maintain this establishment, however, I would urge that this Mission be given blanket authority to staff Vladivostok establishment by detailing members of the Moscow Mission for service at that post at and for such times as it may see fit without reference to the Dept. I consider it essential to the successful operation of the Vladivostok office that persons asked to serve there should have complete confidence that their service will be of definitely limited duration and that they will be punctually relieved at the end of that period and I think it easier for the Embassy to arrange this by disposal of its own personnel here than for the Dept to attempt to assure these conditions by action from Washington. It is a desirable experience for our younger officers for limited period of 3 to 6 months.

HARRIMAN

125.977/12-745 : Telegram

The Consul General at Vladivostok (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

VLADIVOSTOK, December 7, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 9—9:04 p. m.]

122. Having been informed by Embassy that Vladivostok's October 5, 11 a. m., was repeated to Department¹⁰ so that matter might be discussed with Kennan (Embtel October 13, 12 midnight, to Vladivostok) I now forward as of possible interest certain recommendations in brief regarding future of Vladivostok Consular Office. Despatch follows.¹¹

I believe that it is of value to USA to maintain office at Vladivostok in peacetime even if it will have but minor functions as respects shipping or other American interests for following reasons: 1. Possession of listening post in Soviet territory bordering an area where Soviet imperialism might be made manifest in years immediately ahead would enable US Govt occasionally get indications current Soviet trends unobtainable in Moscow or elsewhere in western USSR; 2. Post offers personnel training point in environment radically different from that of Moscow giving valuable knowledge of USSR; 3. Presence here of American outpost gives channel for bringing di-

¹⁰ Telegram 3537, October 13, 10 p. m., from Moscow, p. 1168.

¹¹ No. 175, December 18, not printed.

rectly or indirectly some American culture to another small segment of Soviet population.

Office should be fully staffed with Americans and equipped so as to be largely self-sufficient because of (1) unreliability of Soviet employees, (2) ineffectual services and limited supply rendered by concerned Soviet organs and (3) isolation of American personnel from local population. Both office and living quarters should be completely furnished. Full exploitation of possibilities of post can be achieved only thru liberal policy of staffing office with experienced personnel. Exploitation should be along positive lines.

Any basic increase in value of Vladivostok, however, will be in direct proportion to leverage exercised by US Government vis-à-vis USSR Government to obtain for American personnel greater freedom of movement and greater access to local population. Political levers available to USA are of course numerous, therefore in this connection merely record my belief that American policy toward USSR should be exercised on strict bargaining basis as single coordinated unit with reference for instance of elements in Southeastern Europe to factors in Eastern Asia even where they are superficially unrelated and diverse.

Current Soviet concentration on development Dairen and probably future emphasis on rail transport westward via Chinese Changchun RR (railroad) instead of via Vladivostok and Primorskoe facilitates implementation of previous plan of developing Vladivostok as naval base without incidental necessity of making Nakhodka into port. It is therefore conceivable that Soviets themselves will in due course make Vladivostok closed port and initiate move to cause withdrawal of consular offices as in case of Sevastopol about 20 years ago. In such event office at Khabarovsk would prove best available substitute but inability USA demonstrate any American commercial interest there might force acceptance some port location of less value.

Repeated Moscow as 240.

CLUBB

YUGOSLAVIA

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR YUGOSLAVIA ¹

860h.01/1-645 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav
Government in Exile (Patterson), at London*

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1945—5 p. m.

Yugos 2. Reurtel 4 January 6, midnight.² You may say to King Peter that your report has been sent to the President. As regards the King's request that the President communicate with Mr. Churchill before the resumption of discussions of the Subasic-Tito agreement, you should say that the views of this Government as set forth in the Department's 6³ and 7⁴ of December 23 to you have already been communicated to the British Government through the Embassy in Washington,⁵ together with a somewhat detailed statement of our policy concerning the Yugoslav question in general. In view of Mr. Churchill's personal interest in the Yugoslav discussions it is supposed that this statement has been brought to his attention. The contents of it have also been communicated to the White House. For the moment, the Department cannot say whether the President, on re-examining these documents, will have further observations to communicate to the British Government. As King Peter knows, the President has given much thought to the developments in Yugoslavia, and it is believed that the instructions sent to you and the memorandum already communicated to the British Government reflect his views on the matters in question.

STETTINIUS

¹ For previous documentation relative to the concern of the United States with internal conditions in Yugoslavia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1330 ff.

² Not printed. In this telegram Ambassador Patterson reported that despite British urging, King Peter II was reluctant to give his assent to the agreements drawn up in November and December of the previous year between the President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and the Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Yugoslavia, Dr. Ivan Subasich. The King expressed the hope that President Roosevelt would support his position to Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill of Great Britain. For documentation on the Tito-Subasich agreements, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1417-1433, *passim*, and *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251-265.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, p. 1443.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 255.

860h.01/1-1145 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 11, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

Yugos 6. Yesterday King Peter talked to me at length about his conversation January 9 with Churchill, and later Stevenson ⁶ called to inform me about this and Churchill's previous talk with Subasic. Eden ⁷ and Stevenson were with Churchill on both occasions. Principal points of interest made by King and/or Stevenson are as follows:

At Monday's meeting, Churchill showed Subasic the King's letters regarding unconstitutionality of proposed regency ⁸ and interim legislative power for Avnoj.⁹ Eden had studied latter question and was impressed by King's views. Subasic replied that King under the constitution ¹⁰ would appoint regents under article 116, second paragraph of which required all acts done under the article to be validated later; and it was clear that acts of Avnoj were subject to confirmation by the duly elected legislative body. Churchill remarked it was pity Subasic had not made this clear in the agreement nor to the King. Subasic replied he had not seen King in 3 weeks. He said that on his return to Yugoslavia he would try to broaden Avnoj by including in it some members of the pre-war Parliament.

British Cabinet discussed Yugoslav problem Monday evening and decided Churchill should advise King to sign agreement.

King Peter was pleased at his friendly reception by Churchill and Eden on Tuesday. Churchill earnestly advised King to sign agreement adding: "But I am not a Yugoslav. You know your people best. It is for you to decide." When King raised his objection to legislative power for Avnoj, Eden brought up proposal to add to Avnoj some members of old Parliament and said he thought agreement should be changed to this effect.

King then said he wanted to choose his regents at which Churchill barked: "You cannot choose them yourself. As a constitutional monarch you must always take the advice of your Ministers" and proceeded to give King a short lecture on constitutional monarchy.

Churchill added emphatically: "The three great powers will not lift one finger nor sacrifice one man to put any King back on any

⁶ Ralph C. Skrine Stevenson, British Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

⁷ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁸ The letters referred to were written by King Peter to Prime Minister Churchill on December 29, 1944, and January 4, 1945. Copies of them were sent to the Department at King Peter's request under cover of despatch 13, January 2, 1945, and despatch 14, January 6, 1945, from the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at London; neither printed.

⁹ The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia.

¹⁰ Presumably the Constitution of September 3, 1931, is intended.

throne in Europe." He said that if Peter went back to Yugoslavia Tito would ask him to sign many death warrants. If he refused his life would be in danger.

Churchill then spoke of his desire that liberated peoples have full and fair chance to choose their own Government. He was thinking of making proposals to Stalin and Roosevelt regarding methods of ensuring honest plebiscites—perhaps along lines of an international trust which he mentioned in Athens. But he thought King Peter might have a better chance of returning if decision were made by assembly rather than plebiscite. He also said that Tito would need King's help in many ways and want him for the peace conference. If the King signed he would retain his constitutional position. If he refused he would be by-passed and left "isolated and impotent."

Churchill asked King to give him prompt decision—a yes or no, or else state he could not make up his mind.

After conference with Churchill Eden offered to give King friendly help. He said he thought the King had too many incompetent advisers living in London on Yugoslav pensions. If they wanted to engage in politics they should go back to Yugoslavia.

Stevenson saw Subasic yesterday and asked him what he would do if King does not sign. Subasic replied that it depended on how King expressed his refusal; that he would either go back to Belgrade as Premier and try to effect changes or else resign.

Repeated to Caserta as my 6 and Moscow as my 6.

[PATTERSON]

S60h.01/1-1245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 12, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 9:26 p. m.]

427. We talked today with a Foreign Office official about the King of Yugoslavia's statement. (See Yugos 7, January 11.)¹¹ The Foreign Office's views on this matter are the following:

King Peter has ruined his chances of returning to Yugoslavia by taking this step. He would have been much better advised to accept the Tito-Subasic agreement as it at least preserved the form of a monarchy. Not only are his chances of returning remote but also the retention of the monarchy seems doubtful.

The King decided to take this action on his own initiative without informing either the British or Subasic whom he had not seen for 3

¹¹ This telegram, which contains the text of King Peter's press statement of January 11, is printed in *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 258.

weeks.¹² The King was extremely annoyed at his Prime Minister for not reporting to him on either of his conversations at Belgrade or Moscow. The Foreign Office believes that there was some justice in the King's annoyance. However, it is very strange that he should have made this statement to the press without consulting Subasic.

Subsequent developments will depend entirely on Tito who will either form a provisional government in Yugoslavia or else decide that the King has not slammed the door but has left it open for further negotiations. The Foreign Office however, considers it unlikely that Tito will follow the second course unless he wishes to preserve the monarchy which is extremely doubtful. Subasic, we were told, has telegraphed Tito urging him not to act precipitously [*precipitately?*]. In conclusion, the Foreign Office official remarked rather wryly that the King had shown far more initiative and strength of character on this occasion than he had ever previously displayed.

WINANT

860h.01/1-1245 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 12, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 10:41 p. m.]

Yugos 10. Just talked with Subasic regarding King Peter's communiqué. He gave me copy of letter he was about to send to the King, the essence as follows:

I express my satisfaction at your decision to accept agreement I concluded with Tito. As authentic interpreter of the agreement I am sure that objections raised in your press statement can be resolved quickly and without difficulty and I beg for an audience at your earliest convenience.

Subasic then gave me 3-page statement which he was sending to Eden and I am transmitting it by air despatch.¹³ He concludes that King's statement shows that King accepts agreement. He then proceeds to answer King's objections to terms of agreement but answer is legalistic and does not appear to resolve the fundamental conflict between his and King's viewpoints. He also complains that King published his views without previously consulting his government, pointing out that this action will cause doubts as to King's observance of constitutional practices.

¹² In telegram Yugos 8, January 11, 1945, from London, Ambassador Patterson reported that King Peter when informing him of this action, added: "I may get my throat cut for this." (860h.01/1-1145)

¹³ Sent to the Department under cover of despatch 16, January 13, 1945, from the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at London; not printed.

Subasic said he had thought of resigning but decided it was his duty to remain in office to assist in creating a government that would be recognized by all the Allies so that Yugoslavia could help them in the war and not be a cause of dissension among them.

Repeated to Caserta as my 9 and to Moscow as my 9.

[PATTERSON]

860h.01/1-1545 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,¹⁴ to the Secretary of State¹⁵

CASERTA, January 15, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received January 16—7 p. m.]

166. OSS¹⁶ has informed us that Tito appeared very pleased that King Peter had made declaration which he did with regard to Tito-Subasic agreement and expressed view that Peter had only damaged his own cause.¹⁷ Although Tito first intimated he would give up idea of a unified government, he later admitted that if Peter accepted agreement within next few days, he would go through with it but if there were any more delay, he would repudiate it. Belgrade newspaper editorials of January 14 confirm this decision and forecast pursuance of national liberation plans for time being. In event Peter should remain firm, Belgrade opinion is that agreement would be repudiated by Tito, Avnoj would be declared provisional supreme administrative organ and Tito would be named Premier of National Committee. Thereafter, the Allies would be faced with question of recognition in which Anglo-Saxons are expected to be more hesitant than Russians and other continental governments.

KIRK

¹⁴ Mr. Kirk was also Ambassador to Italy.

¹⁵ This telegram was sent to the President as an enclosure to a memorandum by the Secretary of State on January 17, 1945, not printed.

¹⁶ Office of Strategic Services.

¹⁷ In telegram 133, January 13, 1945, from Caserta, the U.S. Political Adviser reported that the King's declaration was "received in Belgrade with enthusiasm by ever increasing portion of the population which is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with present regime." On the other hand, he observed that the declaration was attacked vigorously in the Partisan press. (860h.01/1-1345)

860h.01/1-1645 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*¹⁸

CASERTA, January 16, 1945—11 p. m.
[Received January 17—10:20 a. m.]

177. Macmillan¹⁹ said last evening that he had just been informed that the Foreign Office was instructing Halifax²⁰ to inform Department of British position with regard to Tito-Subasic agreement since recent declaration of King Peter. He stated that he gathered from message he had received that Foreign Office was preparing to "throw over" King Peter.²¹ He added that Halifax had been told to tell us politely that it was all very well and good for United States to stall on Yugoslav situation, but that British Government was obliged to take a definite position and could not afford to take same "waffling" line as the State Department.

Repeated to Moscow as 17, London for Patterson as 33.

KIRK

860h.01/1-1745 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 17, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received January 17—10:40 a. m.]

Yugos 12. Last evening King Peter informed me he had sent a telegram to Tito through Velebit²³ in which he (1) proposed meeting Tito at time and place to be named by Tito, and (2) made following counter proposal which he said would meet his two objections to Tito-Subasic agreement: "The regency as well as the legislative power is to be wielded by the Government by constitutional method until free elections of the Constituent Assembly."

¹⁸ This telegram was sent to the President as an enclosure to a memorandum by the Secretary of State on January 17, 1945, not printed.

¹⁹ Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters.

²⁰ Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States.

²¹ President Roosevelt was informed personally of the British position in telegram No. 888 from Prime Minister Churchill on January 14, 1945. After mentioning King Peter's declaration, the Prime Minister said: "We are now examining the situation to see how we can save the agreements and preserve the title of the Royal Yugoslav Government until the people or peoples of those mountainous regions have a chance of going to the poll." A paraphrase of this telegram was sent to the Department in a memorandum from the British Embassy on January 16, 1945, not printed. (860h.01/1-1645)

²² Maj. Gen. Vladimir L. Velebit, Chief of the Military Mission of the National Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia in London.

The King then handed me copy of following letter which he was about to mail to Eden :

"This is, I think, a good counter proposal to ease the situation concerning the form of the regency and for article 2 of the amendment. It is not complicated and it has the advantage of being constitutional. It is based on tradition and on the constitution of 1921 as well as that of 1931. This solution would have more weight than all the complicated unorthodox, farfetched makeshifts that have been proposed up to date."

He advised me further that he felt reasonably sure that all the Subasic Cabinet would go along with his counter-proposal with the exception of Subasic and General Ristic.²⁴

Stevenson when calling on me later said that Subasic Cabinet would today attempt to compose a document which the King could accept as overcoming his objections. He agreed that the King would probably insist on counter proposal quoted above and added that if no agreement were reached the "British would undoubtedly continue to recognize the King but deal with Tito."

Repeated to Caserta as my 11 and Moscow as my 13.

[PATTERSON]

860h.01/1-1745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson), at London

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1945—7 p. m.

Yugos 5. Your recent telegrams on the Yugoslav crisis have been most useful. As further developments in the situation occur, the following observations may be helpful for your general background.

The Department believes that in view of the military situation in Southeastern Europe and the trend of political events as these territories are progressively liberated, the Allies in general, as well as the Governments directly concerned, must work together to find the best possible means of solving the manifold problems of the transition period. The statesmen who must work out these solutions must at times come to grips with new political forces resulting from the practical realities of the day. If they are called upon to depart from forms and procedures to which they hold attachment they must base their decisions largely on an estimate of the good will and honest intentions of the parties involved.

As regards the Yugoslav discussions now in progress, we need not reaffirm our respect for the rights of all peoples to choose their form of government. Though we have not adopted the activist policy

²⁴ Gen. Borislav Ristic, Minister of Army, Navy and Air Force.

which other Governments may have considered useful with regard to the political elements in Yugoslavia, we do not find fault with an objective which would enable the Yugoslav Government and the various elements within the country to work together in the tasks arising from the country's liberation.

We think that King Peter's communiqué need not be considered as a rejection of the plan for an agreement for the resumption of governmental functions within Yugoslavia. On the contrary, while exposing what are indeed the faults of the proposed agreement, he has clarified his position in such a way as would enable him now to consider certain modifications, particularly since his statement of position puts the proposed new Government on trial for the equitable implementation of the agreement.

The real merits of some of the questions can hardly be determined so long as the Government remains abroad while a dynamic organization is expanding its administrative functions within the country. We think there would be definite advantages to the Allied cause in general if the diplomatic missions of friendly Governments could soon be established at Belgrade. Apart from the facilities for acquiring information regarding the sentiments prevailing in the country, and thus enabling the Allies to help the Yugoslav people in the difficult times ahead, the presence of Allied missions in Belgrade might serve to create an atmosphere in which an agreement which admittedly has far-reaching implications, could find an equitable implementation.

You should keep the foregoing observations in mind if you have further conversations with the King, Dr. Subasic, or Ambassador Stevenson on these questions. For your own information, we are anxious, for reasons of our own interests in Yugoslavia, to transfer our Mission into the country as soon as possible.²⁵ We prefer, of course, that this should be the regular diplomatic and consular establishment, which would accompany or shortly follow the returning Government. If the Government is unable to return, it will probably be necessary to make some arrangement for provisional representation pending a survey of the situation as indicated in Department's 6 (Yugos) of December 23, 6 p. m.²⁶

Sent to London; repeated to Ampolad, Caserta and to Moscow.

STETTINIUS

²⁵ At this time there were two American Foreign Service officers in Belgrade, Carl F. Norden and Peter Constan, both members of the staff of the U.S. Political Adviser at Allied Force Headquarters. They arrived in Belgrade on January 16, 1945, and were attached to the American Military Mission to Marshal Tito. Their duties were confined almost entirely to reporting, and were hampered by the fact that they were under suspicion of being sympathetic to political opponents of the Tito regime. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1436 and 1446.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1443.

860h.01/1-2145 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 21, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received January 21—4:55 p. m.]

Yugos 16. My Yugos 15, January 20.²⁷ Stevenson called on me today and said that although Velebit did not send King Peter's message to Tito he informed Tito of its contents. Tito replied to Velebit that King was too dictatorial and that he would only receive messages from King through Royal Yugoslav Government. Subasic yesterday advised King by letter of Tito's views and Princess Aspasia²⁸ told me today that letter was "a slap in the face".

The King wrote Churchill yesterday, with reference to latter's statement in Parliament²⁹ that if King Peter's assent could not be obtained it would be presumed. Letter said King could not admit such a presumption and would find it painful to have to protest against it. He reiterated his approval of agreement except for his two previously stated objections and in conclusion said that he wants to insure for his peoples the same advantages of free expression of their will that Churchill has advocated all his life for his people. Text of letter follows by air.³⁰

After receiving this letter Churchill instructed Stevenson to see King at once and advise him that he must promptly sign agreement, subject only to such modifications as Subasic can agree to, or action will be taken without him very soon. Stevenson said he made repeated effort to see King yesterday and today but King has put him off until tomorrow.

Stevenson then said that if King does not act British Government will next Tuesday 23 advise Subasic Government to go to Belgrade immediately and concert with Committee of National Liberation to form new government under Regency. Stevenson will then be accredited to Regency and depart for Belgrade.

Stevenson added that Halifax has been fully informed and instructed to inform Department.³¹

Repeated to Moscow as No. 17 and Caserta as No. 14.

[PATTERSON]

²⁷ Not printed.

²⁸ The mother of Queen Alexandra of Yugoslavia.

²⁹ Reference is to a statement made by the Prime Minister in his speech of January 18, 1945. See *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 407, col. 399.

³⁰ Sent to the Department in despatch 17, January 22, 1945, from the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at London, not printed.

³¹ Department was informed in a note from the British Embassy of January 20, 1945, not printed.

860h.01/1-2245

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and with reference to the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of January 20th³² regarding Yugoslavia has the honour to inform Mr. Stettinius that, according to information just received from the Foreign Office, King Peter asked General Velebit, Marshal Tito's representative in London, to send Marshal Tito a message putting forward the King's proposal that the Royal as well as the legislative power should be exercised by the Government and suggesting an early meeting between the King and Marshal Tito. This action was taken by the King contrary to the advice of His Majesty's Government who were of the opinion that such action would only lead to a rebuff. Marshal Tito has in fact replied refusing to have any direct dealings with the King, and the substance of this reply has been communicated to His Majesty. Marshal Tito has, however, pressed Dr. Subasic and his Government to go to Belgrade immediately and join Marshal Tito's Government on the basis of the agreement.

When His Majesty's Ambassador to Yugoslavia sought an audience with King Peter on January 21st to convey the warning mentioned in the second paragraph of the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* under reference,³³ explaining that he was acting on instructions from the Prime Minister, King Peter refused to see him, putting forward as a pretext that he had to visit the King of Norway.

These developments render it necessary, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, to carry out the action described in the last paragraph of the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of January 20th,³⁴ more particularly since Marshal Stalin³⁵ is pressing for such action and since Marshal Tito may well go back on his offer to deal with Dr. Subasic unless a decision is taken without delay.

³² Not printed.

³³ In this paragraph the Department was informed that in the interests of putting the Tito-Subasic agreement into effect without further delay "The Prime Minister is warning King Peter that unless His Majesty is ready immediately to accept the agreement with such modifications as Dr. Subasic can authorise on his own responsibility and without further negotiation with Marshal Tito, His Majesty's Government will be obliged to take action in the course of the next day or so without further communication with His Majesty." (860h.01/1-2045)

³⁴ The last paragraph read as follows: "The action which His Majesty's Government propose is to invite Dr. Subasic and his Government to proceed to Belgrade and there carry out the Tito-Subasic agreement in concert with the National Committee of Liberation. His Majesty's Ambassador would then be accredited to the Regency set up under the agreement and would proceed forthwith to Belgrade. A communication on these lines will be made to Dr. Subasic at Midday on Tuesday, January 23rd falling prior acceptance of the Tito-Subasic agreement by King Peter." (860h.01/1-2045)

³⁵ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government are most anxious to learn the views of the United States Government as soon as possible and Lord Halifax is instructed, in informing Mr. Stettinius of the foregoing, to invite his urgent observations.³⁶

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1945.

860h.01/1-2345 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 23, 1945—7 a. m.

[Received January 23—4 a. m.]

Yugos 17. King Peter fearing precipitate action by Dr. Subasic contrary to Yugoslav interests, decided yesterday afternoon to dismiss him. He called Subasic, Shutej³⁷ and Kosanovich³⁸ to his office at 6 p. m. and formally surrounded by his personal staff, read his answer to Subasic's letter of January 20.

In this letter, copy of which follows by air,³⁹ King reiterates his position in regard to Tito-Subasic agreement and says he has given many proofs of his gratitude toward the National Liberation movement. He then states that Subasic has acted without consulting him and brought the King and his Government into a difficult and uncalled for situation. Letter continues that King is against the departure of his Government from this country until his viewpoint has been accepted and that he "cannot at the last moment be asked to reply with an unconditional yes or no".

King goes on to say that although Tito consulted Avnoj before conclusion of agreement, Subasic, by his failure to consult King and his Government caused all the present complications; and that Subasic should not have asked endorsement of great Allies before receiving consent of King and his Government.

King concludes by stating he profoundly disapproves of Subasic conduct in this matter and therefore asks for his resignation.

³⁶ In a memorandum of conversation, dated January 22, 1945, Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew wrote that Michael Wright, Counselor of the British Embassy, said at the time of the delivery of this note that "the British Government is reluctant to take this step without knowing the attitude of the United States, but feels that unless prompt action is taken, the Soviet Government may get in ahead by recognizing Marshal Tito, and they believe it to be in our combined interest to take the step promptly. Mr. Wright stated further his belief that King Peter might be acting in the belief that the United States Government would not go along with the British Government, and that a word of advice from us to King Peter might have a very salutary effect." (860h.01/1-2245)

³⁷ Jurej Shutej, Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry in the Subasich Cabinet.

³⁸ Sava Kosanovich, Minister of the Interior in the Subasich Cabinet.

³⁹ Sent to the Department under cover of despatch 19, January 27, 1945, from the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at London, not printed.

According to King, this letter was a shock to his Ministers and Subasic asked to be given until morning to think it over. Later, at 9 p. m., King sent a second letter to Subasic saying that he would expect his resignation in writing by 9 a. m. today. At same time he remarked to his family that if Subasic does not comply, he will issue a royal decree declaring him out of office.⁴⁰

Meanwhile King issued a press communiqué explaining his request for Subasic's resignation, news copy of which is doubtless already in Department's hands.

Repeated to Moscow as No. 18 and Caserta as No. 15.

[PATTERSON]

860h.01/1-2345

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Grew)

[WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1945.

With reference to our conversation yesterday afternoon,⁴¹ I called Mr. Michael Wright of the British Embassy on the telephone at 9:20 this morning and asked if he had heard of any developments in the Yugoslav situation since he had spoken to me. I said that I had especially in mind the King's reported demand for the resignation of Subasic and the reported calling by Subasic of a Cabinet meeting for this afternoon. I wondered if, under these circumstances the British Government might not delay the action which it contemplated taking at noon today.⁴² I said that we would probably go along with the proposed action of the British Government, which I understood would amount to *de facto* recognition of the Provisional Government in Yugoslavia by sending our respective diplomatic representatives promptly to Belgrade to enter into relations with that Government, but always on the understanding that an eventual plebiscite would be held in Yugoslavia for the free and democratic choice of the eventual government.

Mr. Wright said that this was his understanding of the proposed action of his Government and he expressed great satisfaction at our own willingness to go along with them. He said he thought that if our proposed action could be brought to the attention of King Peter immediately it would have a very salutary effect on the situation. I

⁴⁰ In telegram Yugos 18, January 23, 1945, from London, Ambassador Patterson reported that at a Cabinet meeting held at noon on January 23, all but one of the Yugoslav Cabinet Ministers voted not to resign and agreed to go to Belgrade as soon as planes were made available by the British. King Peter expressed his amazement at British action and said that he had not decided what to do next. (860h.01/1-2345)

⁴¹ See footnote 36, p. 1184.

⁴² See footnote 34, p. 1183.

said that I thought the question of timing was important and that it would be helpful for our two Governments to act at the same time. We must also consider the nature and timing of our public announcements. Mr. Wright said that he would put a telephone call through to London immediately to ascertain the latest developments and intentions of his Government and would probably be able to give me a reply in an hour or so. I said that I might be out of the Department at that time and I asked him in that case to get in touch with Mr. Dunn,⁴³ who was thoroughly familiar with the situation.

Our proposed action is of course predicated on the assumption that the Soviet Government favors the proposed step and will take similar action.

JOSEPH C. GREW

860h.01/1-2345

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

King Peter, without consulting His Majesty's Government, dismissed Dr. Subasic and his government on the night of January 22nd. It is not known whether His Majesty intends to try and form another government, but even if he does, His Majesty's Government are not prepared in the present circumstances to recognize it.

Dr. Subasic was informed on the morning of January 23rd that King Peter's action does not affect the intention of His Majesty's Government to see the Tito-Subasic Agreement carried out and that for this purpose they are ready to transport him and his government to Belgrade together with all Yugoslav politicians who desire to go there. His Majesty's Government are also informing Tito to this effect.

In the view of His Majesty's Government united action by the Three Powers is essential, and the quicker and more decisive it is, the less is the likelihood of trouble.

His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to inform the State Department most urgently of the above and to suggest that the Three Great Powers should agree that it is desirable for the Agreement to come into force and should inform Tito that if he will concert with Dr. Subasic and his Government to carry out the agreement, the Powers will recognize the united Government formed in accordance therewith and will accredit Ambassadors to the Council of the Regency. His Majesty's Government also suggest that pending the formation of this united Government, no government formed either by King Peter or Marshal Tito alone should be recognized.

⁴³ James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State.

His Majesty's Government would be grateful to learn at the earliest possible moment whether the United States Government agree to the above proposal.

His Majesty's Government are sending a message on similar lines to the Soviet Government.

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1945.

860h.01/1-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson), at London

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1945.

Yugos 7. The Under Secretary made the following statement at his press conference today "This Government has not participated in the discussions concerning the agreement between Prime Minister Subasic and Marshal Tito for the establishment of a unified government in Yugoslavia. We have been kept informed of recent developments, however, and we approve of the main objective, namely, to enable the Yugoslav Government in exile and the various elements within the country to work together, within Yugoslavia, in the tasks arising from the liberation."⁴⁴

GREW

860h.01/1-2345 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson), at London

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1945—10 p. m.

Yugos 8. Reurtel 17 January 23. In reply to a note received yesterday from the British Embassy and an *aide-mémoire* received this afternoon, concerning developments in the Yugoslav question the Department has informed the British Embassy of the substance of telegram no. 5 of January 17 to you and continued as follows:⁴⁵

Begin paraphrase. The Department is in substantial agreement, therefore, with the objective under which the Yugoslav Government would return to the country to work together with the various elements within Yugoslavia. The Department would of course prefer

⁴⁴ At the same press conference Mr. Grew added in an off-the-record statement that "what this Government most wanted was unification of the various elements within Yugoslavia and also to see eventually a fair and free election in Yugoslavia, so that the people in the country would be able to choose their own government and the form of that government." (Memorandum of Press and Radio News Conference, January 23, 1945, filed under 860h.01/1-2345)

⁴⁵ For text of the note as delivered to the British Embassy, January 23, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 259.

that when that time comes the returning Government should be accompanied or shortly followed by the regular American diplomatic and consular establishment.

Meanwhile the question has arisen as to the attitude of the principal Allied Governments in the event that Dr. Subasic, notwithstanding the events of yesterday evening, should proceed along the lines of his agreement, and in this connection the Department has taken note of the position of the British Government, to wit: (the following five numbered points are in broken order for security reasons) (2) that it has informed Dr. Subasic this morning that King Peter's action does not affect the intention of the British Government to see the Tito-Subasic agreement carried out; (4) that the British Government is also informing Marshal Tito to this same effect; (1) that the British Government is not prepared in the present circumstances to recognize a new Yugoslav Government which might be formed by King Peter as a result of yesterday's events; (5) that it is the suggestion of the British Government that pending the formation of a united Government in accordance with the Subasic-Tito agreement recognition should not be accorded to any government formed either by King Peter or Marshal Tito alone; (3) that for this purpose the British Government is ready to transport him and his government to Belgrade together with all the Yugoslav leaders who desire to go there;

The British Government has suggested that the principal Allies should agree that it is desirable that the agreement come into force and should inform Tito that if he will concert with Dr. Subasic and his Government to carry out the agreement the three principal Allies will recognize the united government and accredit ambassadors to the Council of the Regency. The Department would observe that it would be difficult for this Government to go beyond a provisional representation in Yugoslavia under these conditions. Some arrangement should be made nevertheless, in the Department's opinion, for such provisional representation at Belgrade at an early date. On the assumption that arrangements will be made for the establishment of a truly representative administration, with provision for free elections as set forth in the agreement, such assurances being fundamental to the whole agreement, the regular American diplomatic mission could be used for this provisional representation to the interim government. This would afford facilities for an examination of conditions in the country and, according to the situation then prevailing, for consultation with other governments. *End paraphrase.*

Please inform Dr. Subasic of the Department's position as set forth in the first and last paragraphs of the preceding paraphrase and in Department's telegram no. 5 already cited. You should similarly inform King Peter, unless events now developing have meanwhile so changed the situation that you consider this course inadvisable. The Department is not communicating with Marshal Tito but has no objection if Dr. Subasic either directly or through General Velebit wishes to inform him of this communication.

Sent to London. Repeated to Moscow and to AmPolAd, Caserta.

STETTINIUS

860h.01/1-2645 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 26, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received January 26—12:30 p. m.]

Yugos 20. Last evening a solution to the Yugoslav crisis had been agreed upon by Subasic and Peter in a communiqué to be signed by Peter in which Subasic and his Government would tender their resignations and immediately thereafter the King would call upon Subasic to accept a mandate to form a new government with wider representation. The communiqué further states that the duty of the new government will be to bring into operation the Tito-Subasic agreement taking into consideration the King's two objections made public in the King's communiqué of January 11 and in his letters to Subasic.

Subasic wanted a Regency clause added to this communiqué in which the King would not only appoint but choose the Regents but since the King prefers his counterproposal instead of the original two objections he agreed to write a separate letter stating that in case the counterproposal is not acceptable then the King would agree to Regency clause.

At the eleventh hour General Velebit persuaded Subasic to do nothing until he (Velebit) wired Tito for his reaction.⁴⁶ I believe King and Subasic might have gotten together some days ago if British had taken a less active part as there appears to be a fundamental cordial relationship between the two despite the King's communiqué dismissing Subasic for lack of confidence.

If Tito refuses to recognize the King's objections the King tells me he has prepared a White Paper washing his hands of the whole business, giving the history of the negotiations to date and denouncing his Ministers for having violated the Yugoslav constitution.

My telegraphic reports are based upon daily personal talks with the principals concerned.

Sent Department as Yugos 20, Jan. 26, 2 p. m., repeated Caserta as 24 and repeated Caserta as 18.

[PATTERSON]

⁴⁶ In telegram 301, January 26, 1945, the U.S. Political Adviser in Caserta reported that Tito had expressed his willingness on January 24 to have Dr. Subasich come to Belgrade to implement the agreement. The Political Adviser added that "Tito was in exceptionally good humor probably because he believes that the London crisis has damaged the King's cause irreparably." (860h.01/1-2645)

860h.01/1-2945: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1945—6 p. m.

189. On Saturday afternoon the British Embassy handed us a memorandum⁴⁸ reporting that Stalin would like to see the Tito-Subasic agreement go into force at once with recognition by the three principal Allies with "no reservations of any kind" and asking us to instruct Patterson to do something helpful "in deciding King Peter to play his part." Winant telegraphed in the evening⁴⁹ that Eden had asked Cadogan⁵⁰ to call to say that they both very much hoped we would join the British and Soviet Governments in recognition of the united Yugoslav Government and that they were troubled by our suggestion of provisional representation at Belgrade. (ReDeptel 141, January 23, 1945),⁵¹ Cadogan said he felt that the possibility of a rift between the United States on the one hand and the British and Soviet Governments on the other was an influence in King Peter's holding out against the agreement.

In a telegram to Patterson⁵² we had said that since he had seen to it that both Subasic and the King have a clear understanding of our attitude and intentions, it is neither necessary nor desirable for him to take the responsibility of trying further to influence decisions on major Yugoslav political questions now in discussion in London.

In a telegram to Winant⁵³ we said that we felt we had gone a long way to meet the position that the British had taken with respect to the new governmental authority in Yugoslavia, and that our position had the President's approval. We said that in the light of the President's message to Congress⁵⁴ it would be difficult for us to foreclose

⁴⁸ *Aide-Mémoire* dated January 27, 1945, not printed.

⁴⁹ Telegram 977, January 27, 1945, 8 p. m., not printed.

⁵⁰ Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵¹ Sent to London as Yugos 8, January 23, p. 1187.

⁵² Telegram Yugos 10, January 27, 1945, not printed.

⁵³ Telegram 677, January 27, 1945, not printed.

⁵⁴ In his State of the Union message of January 6, 1945, the President said in part: "We and our Allies have declared that it is our purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. . . . During the interim period, until conditions permit a genuine expression of the people's will, we and our Allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore, to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the people's right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men, they are to live." Department of State *Bulletin*, January 7, 1945, p. 27.

our position with respect to the expected developments in Yugoslavia by a commitment at this time which might be at variance with the declared policy of this Government toward liberated countries in general; that the President's message had won public approval here and we did not believe the American public would support our going out in advance of the developments before we know what the circumstances are.⁵⁵ We said that it did not seem to us that there was any possibility of interpreting our actions as a rift between us and the British and Soviet Governments⁵⁶ as we have stated our willingness to send our diplomatic mission to Belgrade on the assumption that the agreement between Tito and Subasic would be carried out and Ambassador Patterson had received orders to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Belgrade upon the transfer of the Government to Yugoslavia. Both the King and Subasic had been informed in clear terms of our intentions.

We have today telegraphed to Patterson as follows:⁵⁷

"We have today handed a memorandum⁵⁸ to the British Embassy stating that in the light of telegrams received over the weekend and the conversations relative to the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of January 27 a brief restatement of our position in the present Yugoslav crisis may be helpful (reDeptel 10, January 27).⁵⁸ This memorandum says that we understand from the agreement between Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the proposed united Government of Yugoslavia is to be set up for the interim or transitional period pending the holding of national elections in which the will of the Yugoslav people may be freely expressed. We would expect that the new Government would make a public declaration to this effect. We would be prepared to accredit our Ambassador to a government set up within Yugoslavia on this basis.

Please inform both the King and Dr. Subasic of the foregoing and make sure that this telegram comes to Mr. Winant's attention.

The Embassy at Moscow is being requested to inform the Soviet Government of the foregoing."

⁵⁵ In a conversation with the British Ambassador on January 27, 1945, Acting Secretary of State Grew replied to the suggestion that all three of the great powers should grant the Yugoslav government the same degree of recognition by saying: ". . . our position is that we must wait and see what happens after that government is set up and what commitments it makes. . . . we would like to go along with the British just as far as possible but that in our thinking this is a pretty serious matter to go into blindly when we have to consider the Atlantic Charter and the way our people feel about it and I was afraid we wouldn't be justified in committing ourselves. . . . to go ahead and recognize it as a provisional government even without any restrictions at all is a serious matter to us. I didn't believe we could go to that extent." (860h.01/1-2745)

⁵⁶ When, in his conversation with the Acting Secretary, the British Ambassador wondered whether this might not be considered as a divergence of view between the United States and Great Britain if it became public, the Acting Secretary "inquired whether this need come out to the public and the Ambassador thought not." (*Ibid.*)

⁵⁷ Telegram Yugos 11, January 29.

⁵⁸ Not printed.

Please inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the substance of this last telegram to Patterson.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to Ampolad, Caserta.

GREW

860h.01/1-2945

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Cannon)

[WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1945.

In considering the degree of "recognition" to be accorded to an eventual Tito-Subasic Government, if established notwithstanding the opposition of the King (if the King agrees, even under pressure, the question of recognition hardly arises), the following factors are important:

1. Only about half of the country has been "liberated", and Soviet armies are still in the "liberated" region;

2. It has been customary to talk of the opposition to the proposed new regime as being identified with the Serb element. Particular attention should be given to the fact that it is Croatian leaders (Krenjevic and Sutej, the former being the number-two man of the Croatian Peasant Party) who have been supporting the King in his objections to the agreement. The fact that both Tito and Subasic are Croats has led many to believe that the new movement has strong Croat backing;

3. Neither Croatia nor Slovenia are liberated, and there are no indices at all to show the popular sentiments of these regions;

4. The Tito organization has chosen as its particular enemy the Croatian Peasant Party, which itself being pretty far to the left is Tito's chief competitor for "democratic reform". Those Peasant Party leaders who joined the Partisan movement represent only one wing, and some of them are considered renegades from the party. The spokesman of Macek⁵⁹ (the great peasant leader) who went to negotiate with Tito appears to have been "arrested". Several leaders of other Yugoslav parties who have joined the Tito organization are reported to have been repudiated by their parties;

5. In recent months it has not been a question of Tito *vs.* Mihajlovic.⁶⁰ Mihajlovic is now only one leader, though perhaps still the strongest, in the Nationalist movement, the main strength of which is probably now in Bosnia and Herzegovina rather than in Serbia,

⁵⁹ Vladko Macek, titular head of the Croatian Peasant Party. For information on Dr. Macek's activities at this time, see p. 1230.

⁶⁰ Gen. Draza Mihailovich, leader of the Chetnik resistance forces in Yugoslavia, former Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav Armed Forces.

according to Colonel MacDowell,⁶¹ the last American observer to come out from Yugoslavia;

6. We must not proceed under the illusion that the "three principal Allies" can possibly act on anything like an equal basis in Yugoslavia. This is a cardinal point. Far more important than the presence of Soviet armies and Tito's avowed communist affiliations—since these are open facts and can be dealt with accordingly—is the fact that neither the Soviet Government nor the British have shown any genuine interest in the Yugoslavs themselves in this crisis, but have found Yugoslavia to be the ground where their respective policies for Southeastern Europe are being played out. We know that in their agreement for their respective spheres of influence Yugoslavia was to be, according to the curious scale of percentages reported by Mr. Winant, a 50–50 proposition, though Stalin thought 60–40 would be better.⁶² This, of course, is confidential information, but Churchill's speech of January 18⁶³ announces the substance of it, as regards Yugoslavia, to the world. He admitted that he and Mr. Eden

" . . . reached at Moscow an understanding with Marshal Stalin⁶⁴ by which our two countries pursue a joint policy in these regions, after constant discussions . . . In practice I exchange telegrams on behalf of His Majesty's Government personally with Marshal Stalin about the difficulties which arise, and about what is the best thing to do. We keep President Roosevelt informed constantly. . . . In pursuance of our joint policy we encouraged the making of an agreement between the Tito Government which, with Russian assistance, has now installed itself at Belgrade, and the Royal Government of Yugoslavia, which is seated in London . . . Marshal Stalin and His Majesty's Government consider that agreement on the whole to be wise . . . I do not see what else except this Tito–Subasic agreement could be done by His Majesty's Government and the U.S.S.R. than to contribute what they can to bringing about the widest possible measure of agreement among Yugoslavs, and to ensure that these issues should not become a cause of friction among Allies . . . ”;

7. The Soviet Government has shown no particular interest in learning what the United States thinks about the Yugoslav situation. It frankly has not asked for a common policy. It has its plans and is willing to go ahead. The British are trying to keep even with the Russians, and one cannot but feel that their anxiety to have us go along is in large part a design to prepare a façade of "Allied" action,

⁶¹ Lt. Col. Robert H. MacDowell, chief of the U. S. Intelligence Mission to Mihailovich territory.

⁶² In regard to the plan to share wartime influence in the Balkan countries on the basis of proposed percentages, see Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), pp. 73–81, 227–228, and 231–235.

⁶³ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 407, cols. 398–399.

⁶⁴ For reports on discussions of Balkan affairs during the visit of Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow in October 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1007–1019, *passim*.

to cover the interplay of British and Soviet political forces in the Balkans, and distribute the responsibility when the general public later learns of the real conditions within Yugoslavia and the type of administration the Avnoј expects to set up.

860h.01/1-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 29, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received January 29—3 : 10 p. m.]

1004. Substance of Department's 677, January 27, midnight,⁶⁵ has been given Foreign Office and Ambassador Patterson has been furnished copy.

Foreign Office tells us that arrangements have now been completed for the transfer of the Yugoslav Government from here to Belgrade and that any day now Government will depart.⁶⁶ Foreign Office adds that it is happy that our representatives will be in Belgrade along with British representatives. Foreign Office assumes that Ambassador Patterson and his staff will go to Belgrade on transfer of Yugoslav Government from here, even if a split between King Peter and the Yugoslav Government should at the last minute materialize.⁶⁷ In any event, Foreign Office hopes that Department will not make any public statement⁶⁸ giving impression that we regard the Government going to Yugoslavia differently from the Government that has been functioning here and to which Patterson was accredited.

WINANT

⁶⁵ Not printed.

⁶⁶ On January 29, 1945, King Peter announced that he accepted the resignation of his Cabinet, and then immediately commissioned Dr. Subasich to form a new and enlarged Cabinet charged with putting into effect the agreement with the National Liberation movement. The Cabinet was formed and sworn in the same day. The new Government then telegraphed Marshal Tito and asked if he consented to the changes and if he would agree to the extension of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Avnoј) by the inclusion of former members of Parliament to form a "temporary" Parliament. While waiting for a reply, the Government arranged with the British that it would leave for Belgrade on February 7 regardless of Marshal Tito's answer.

⁶⁷ In a telegram of January 31, 1945, which was transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on February 1, Mr. Eden instructed Lord Halifax: "Please suggest to the State Department that Mr. Patterson should accompany Mr. Stevenson, or his Counsellor if he (Mr. Patterson) has, as we have been told, to consult with the military authorities in Italy before going to Belgrade. There would in our view be considerable advantage in our representatives proceeding to Belgrade together." (860h.01/2-145)

⁶⁸ A press statement of February 1, 1945, by Acting Secretary of State Grew is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 4, 1945, p. 153.

860h.01/2-245 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, February 2, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 7:52 p. m.]

401. Thayer⁶⁹ reports that recent discussions with Tito and his advisers have revealed Partisan concern lest we endeavor to introduce officials into Yugoslavia and to report on political activities who would not be regularly accredited diplomats. It is believed that Tito's readiness to continue to deal with Subasic is in great part based on assumption that in this manner he can achieve satisfactory recognition by the great powers and that were he to suspect that this would not be forthcoming he might change his outlook on the whole subject. In Thayer's view Tito might be persuaded to accept provisionally accredited Ambassadors, but considers it doubtful that Tito would accept much less, especially if he thought that the Russians and British would give more.

In short Thayer believes that although recognition is important to Tito, his program is much more so and his present control over the country is sufficiently well established that it is neither necessary nor to his advantage to permit of any relaxation simply for the sake of recognition.⁷⁰

Sent Department, repeated London for Patterson as 56.

KIRK

860h.00/2-945

*Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Southern European
Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1945.

THE YUGOSLAV NEGOTIATIONS

The question of the Regency Council is still the chief obstacle to a settlement along the lines of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

⁶⁹ Lt. Col. Charles W. Thayer, Commanding Officer of the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito.

⁷⁰ In telegram 402, February 2, 1945, from Caserta, the U.S. Political Adviser reported that in a recent speech "Tito stated that he had made considerable concessions in order to demonstrate his readiness to cooperate with genuine Yugoslavs but that he was not prepared to make any more. The Allied Governments had given indication that they approved the agreement and if London Cabinet was not prepared to accept it as it stood, he could do without the Cabinet. Although not opposed to political parties as such, it was his view that the present was not the time for political campaigns but for unity in struggle for national liberation and that, in any event, the former political parties no longer enjoyed support their leaders seemed to assume. . . . He said that genuine democracy prevailed in Yugoslavia and not among the exiles in London . . . who represented no one but themselves and were forever forming and un-forming governments. He was careful, however, throughout to except such men as Subasic." (860h.01/2-245)

On February 4 Ambassador Patterson reported⁷¹ that King Peter had nominated General Dusan Simovich (Serb, chosen by military leaders of *coup d'état* in March 1941 to form a Government in opposition to Axis), Dr. Juraj Sutej (Croat, Minister of Finance, "number three" in Croatian Peasant Party) and Mr. Dusan Serneck (Slovene, member of Tito's National Committee of Liberation) to serve as members of the Regency Council, and that their names had been telegraphed to Tito for concurrence.

On February 5,⁷² Tito told the OSS representative at Belgrade that he would under no circumstances accept Sutej (in whose stead he had suggested Ante Mandic); and that he was agreeable to Serneck and Simovich. Tito thought the King was "stalling", perhaps believing in American support, and stated that material was being collected to try the King for his "crimes", culminating in his January 11 declaration. Tito also indicated his belief that only the United States would refuse recognition to his Government if King Peter refused to sign the Agreement. The OSS representative suggested that Tito's statements may have been designed to provoke official American reaction, rather than to express his genuine convictions.

On February 6⁷³ Ambassador Patterson was told by King Peter that Subasic had stated that General Simovich and Dr. Sutej were unacceptable. Subasic referred to an alleged "unsigned letter" written by Simovich in April 1941 offering military support to Germany. Subasic also told the King (apparently on instructions from Tito) that Simovich and Sutej "must be replaced" by Sreten Vukosavljevich (Serb, Minister of Agriculture, member of Tito's Anti-Fascist Council) and Ante Mandich (Croat, member of Tito's Anti-Fascist Council). The King insisted on retaining Sutej. He said he would not sanction the Government's departure for Belgrade until he had appointed the Regents; and that if the Government departed without permission he would publish a White Paper.

Although the Foreign Office had advised Lord Halifax that the Yugoslav Government would leave for Belgrade on February 7 whether or not an agreement had been reached, Ambassador Patterson reported on February 6 that the departure had been postponed for "several days".

⁷¹ Telegram Yugos 26, February 4, 1945, from London, not printed.

⁷² Telegram 472, February 8, 1945, from Caserta, not printed.

⁷³ Telegram Yugos 28, February 6, 1945, from London, not printed.

860h.01/2-1145 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, February 11, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received February 12—8:25 a. m.]

503. Thayer has reported from Belgrade that on February 9 Tito told Maclean ⁷⁴ that according to a report he had received from Kosanovich in London, the Subasic Cabinet was greatly concerned with the importance of "legitimacy" and until the composition of the regency was settled, they were anxious to stay in London. The first reaction of Tito was to let the London Government know that it could seek all the legitimacy it wanted but he was proceeding with other arrangements. Eventually however, he decided that until Churchill returned to London ⁷⁵ he would not take any irrevocable step.

Thayer stated that it is evident that Tito is getting impatient with the negotiations but he is probably being urged to proceed without Subasic by his supporters in Yugoslavia. Thayer believes it significant however, that Tito expects Churchill to return from his meeting with Stalin with a formula for the solution of Yugoslavia's internal difficulties, which will be favorable to him.

Sent Department, repeated to Moscow as 25 and to London for Patterson as 66.

KIRK

860h.01/2-1245 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, February 12, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received February 12—10:27 a. m.]

507. Thayer has informed us from Belgrade that last night Maclean received a message from Eden stating that at the Big Three conference the President instructed Thayer to inform Tito that he counseled immediate implementation of the Tito-Subasic agreement provided Avnoj is expanded by the inclusion of uncompromised members of the previous parliament and that all Avnoj decrees were ratified by the

⁷⁴ Brig. Fitzroy Hew Maclean, Commanding Allied Military Mission to the Partisans in Yugoslavia.

⁷⁵ Prime Minister Churchill was at this time meeting with President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin at the Crimea Conference held at Yalta February 4-11, 1945. For documentation on the decisions taken by the Crimea Conference regarding the Yugoslav situation, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, index entries under Yugoslavia, p. 1032.

subsequent Parliament.⁷⁶ Thayer had as yet heard nothing on the matter.

Department presumably will not inform Thayer of this as his mission may be considered as not being competent in political matters but since Russians in Belgrade and Maclean will tell Tito today that Thayer has been instructed to confirm President's recommendation Tito will certainly expect some explanation from Thayer. It may be that instructions for Thayer on this are already en route via General Donovan.⁷⁷

Please instruct urgently so that we may communicate at once with Thayer.⁷⁸

KIRK

860h.01/2-1345 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, February 13, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 6:28 p. m.]

524. Reference my 507, February 12, 1 p. m. We have learned from Thayer that when Maclean informed Tito of the tripartite recommendation, Tito accepted it without reservation and said that the sooner Subasic arrived the better. However, Tito was puzzled as to how the agreement was going to be implemented without the King participating.

Tito's followers seemed highly satisfied with the recommendation inasmuch as they consider most members of the last Parliament to be compromised.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ In section VII of the official "Report of the Crimea Conference," dated February 11, 1945, the three powers agreed that joint recommendations, substantially the same as those described above, be made to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasich. See *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 974. The British Government informed Belgrade of this agreement on February 10, *ibid.*, pp. 919-920. The United States Government, however, did not submit its recommendations to the Yugoslav Government until February 25; see telegram Yugos 26, February 26, 5 p. m., to London, *post*, p. 1202.

⁷⁷ Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

⁷⁸ In telegram 130, February 12, 1945, the Acting Secretary informed the U.S. Political Adviser at Caserta: "The communiqué of the Crimea Conference now being released contains a passage similar to the message of instructions which Maclean thinks Thayer should have received. Neither the OSS nor the Department has any knowledge of instructions to or intended for Thayer on this matter. "Unless he receives such direct instructions he ought not to furnish explanations or interpretations of the communiqué." (860h.01/1-1245)

⁷⁹ In telegram 532, February 15, 1945, from Caserta, the U. S. Political Adviser informed the Department that Colonel Thayer reported from Belgrade that foreign observers felt that it would be difficult to implement the recommendations of the Yalta Conference. The last Yugoslav Parliament consisted of 67 members of the Machek coalition and 306 members of the Stojadinovich coalition. "Stojadinovich [*sic*] is now in exile as a Fascist and Machek is considered in Belgrade as an enemy of the people." (860h.01/2-1545)

Following appear to be terms of the tripartite recommendation.

1. The agreement as it stands is to be put into effect immediately by Tito and Subasic.
2. Thereafter (a) Avnoj will be enlarged by including the members of the last Parliament who are uncompromised and it will be called the "temporary Parliament". (b) Legislative acts of Avnoj will be subject to Constituent Assembly's ratification.

Above terms are being communicated to Tito by Maclean on behalf of British Government.

British Foreign Office now assumes that the United States, together with Russia and Great Britain, will recognize whatever government may be formed by Tito and Subasic.

Inasmuch as the most essential provisions of the recommendation require the appointment of the regents by the King and their oath taken to him, Thayer states it is not entirely clear as to how the agreement can become effective without the King.

Thayer was informed by the Acting Chief of the Soviet Mission that except for the published statement, he had not received any word of the Crimea Conference. Kiselev, the regular Chief, is expected from Moscow at any moment. Bakic⁸⁰ also inquired whether or not Thayer had received any messages from the Conference to which he replied that he had not.

KIRK

860h.01/2-1645: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 16, 1945.

[Received February 16—11:50 p. m.]

Yugos 34. Following statement signed by King Peter, dated February 13, was given to his Government before their departure for Belgrade:⁸¹

"The Royal Government goes to Belgrade with my full accord and is carrying the following instructions from me:

Part I. Regency.

I have given the following names: Dr. M. Grol, Dr. J. Sutej and Dr. D. Serbec.

⁸⁰ Mitar Bakich, Marshal Tito's personal adjutant.

⁸¹ The King and his Government agreed to the Yalta recommendations on February 12.

I hope that the National Committee of Liberation will respect my choice based on careful thought and aimed at representing useful elements to the state and to the smooth functioning of their duties.⁸²

The Regency, when accepted by the National Committee, will be appointed by my royal decree of which the formula will be countersigned by my Prime Minister and left in my care till I get a wire from the Prime Minister saying that the Regency has been accepted.

The Council of Regents is to be sworn in at Belgrade by the high clergy in the presence of the Royal Government who will also invite to be present the President of the Committee of National Liberation, Marshal J. B. Tito.

The Royal Government and then the United Government must be held responsible for the Regency Council to be able to be in constant touch with me and keep me informed of all important developments in the country.

Part II. The United Government.

The forming of the United Government does not start until the Regency has been duly appointed and sworn in. The United Government is to comprise many shades of opinion representing as many political parties and views as is possible. They should be sworn in office by the Council of Regency. This would give this provisional government full legality in the eyes of the people of Yugoslavia and the world.

Part III.

The suggestions made by the great Allies at the Crimea Conference are to be implemented."

Second plane load carrying minor Yugoslav officials also Konsta Tinovic,⁸³ Cankar⁸⁴ and General Ristic left for Belgrade today.

Additional politicians leave next week.

[PATTERSON]

860h.01/2-1945 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, February 16, 1945—noon.

[Received 3:18 p. m.]

587. Subasic at dinner February 15 stated that he felt optimistic with regard to the Regency situation in Yugoslavia. He said that he could not help but feel that Tito would be more reasonable. He commented that now that Tito had become a "Chief of State" he realized how important it was to work out problems in a normal, "democratic" way and consequently would be more amenable.

⁸² In telegram 549, February 16, 1945, from Caserta, the U.S. Political Adviser reported: "According to Thayer, Tito has informed him that he would not accept Sutej as Regent under any circumstances. Thayer commented that Grol was considered reactionary in some circles in Belgrade and he is of the opinion that it may take some time to form the Regency." (860h.01/2-1645)

⁸³ Presumably Sava Kosanovich is intended.

⁸⁴ Izidor Cankar, Minister of Education in the Subasich Cabinet.

The Yugoslav Prime Minister added that he felt greatly relieved finally to be going back to Belgrade.⁸⁵ He asserted that he realized the task which lay before his country was not an easy one but he felt confident all would be well. Subasic went on to say that the keystone of his policy would be close, intimate relations with Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. He said that he did not think that there would be too much difficulty in settling such matters as Macedonia,⁸⁶ Venezia Giulia,⁸⁷ et cetera. He stated that no one could oppose the desirability of a free Macedonia in Federated Yugoslavia. He made it clear that there would be no difficulty from Bulgarians on this matter and expressed the opinion that Greek Macedonia would present no complications. He said that in Greek Macedonia there were about 100,000 Macedonians who could be transferred to Yugoslav soil and thus settle the problem of Greek Macedonia.

The Yugoslav Prime Minister said that there would also have to be certain minor alterations of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier⁸⁸ and the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier. He said he did not know whether Tito would insist on Klagenfurt. He did state, however, that Venezia Giulia would be incorporated into Yugoslavia whether anyone liked it or not. He was not quite so certain that this included Trieste. Subasic launched a violent attack against Italy and said that Yugoslavia would never take up formal relations with Italy until the Italian Government publicly announced that she abandoned imperialism forever.

Although he was in a good mood and spoke freely, Subasic did not seem completely confident and he was not impressive. He appeared to be riding the crest of the wave at the moment but not able to conceal his uncertainty regarding Tito's attitude.

Sent Department; repeated London for Patterson as 77.

KIRK

860h.01/2-2345: Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, February 23, 1945—midnight.

[Received February 23—11:19 p. m.]

676. From OSS we have learned that the Tito-Subasic discussions are not proceeding as well as was expected. Tito again told Maclean yesterday he would not tolerate either Sutej or Grol in the Regency.

⁸⁵ Dr. Subasich arrived in Belgrade on February 15.

⁸⁶ For documentation on Yugoslav aspirations toward Macedonia, see pp. 1304 ff.

⁸⁷ For documentation on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 1103 ff.

⁸⁸ For documentation on this subject, see *post*, pp. 1313 ff.

Subasic is reported to be more harassed than ever. Tito has turned over Regency negotiations to his subordinates during Alexander's stay in Belgrade.⁸⁹

Reported [*Repeated?*] to London for Patterson as 97.

KIRK

860h.01/2-2645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson), at London

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1945—5 p. m.

Yugos 26. The Department yesterday handed the following text to the Yugoslav Chargé:⁹⁰

"In the Crimea Declaration of February 11,⁹¹ President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that agreement. At the same time there was published to the world a declaration on Liberated Europe,⁹² in which the President, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill declared their mutual agreement to concert the policies of their three Governments to assist liberated peoples to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. Among the situations in which this assistance would be applicable would be cases where in the judgment of the principal Allies the conditions within a liberated state require that interim governmental authorities be formed which would be broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsible to the will of the people.

Accordingly the United States Government would like to see Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito reach an early agreement, in accordance with these principles and in a spirit of mutual understanding, in the negotiations now taking place at Belgrade."

Repeated to Moscow and Caserta.

GREW

⁸⁹ Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, was at this time holding conversations with Marshal Tito in Belgrade. For documentation on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 1103-1107.

⁹⁰ Ivan Franges.

⁹¹ See section VII of the Report of the Crimea Conference, *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 974.

⁹² Section V, *ibid.*, p. 971.

860h.01/2-2645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson), at London

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1945—6 p. m.

Yugos 27. By instruction of the Foreign Office the British Embassy has informed the Department that the Subasic-Tito negotiations appear to have reached a deadlock largely over the choice of the Regency Council. Mr. Eden had therefore sent messages to both Subasic and Tito.

To Subasic he expressed the anxiety of the British Government lest the whole agreement be endangered through Subasic's holding out for Grol and Sutej, presumably because they would be acceptable to the King, and reminded him that the Crimea Conference communiqué made no reference to the King, and that the British intention was that while the names of the Regents should be submitted for the King's approval, the agreement would nevertheless come into force if this approval was not forthcoming.

To Tito he expressed the British Government's apprehension because of the disagreement on the Regency, stated that he was urging Subasic to come to an agreement on this point, and said that he earnestly hoped that Tito for his part would not jeopardize the agreement for which "we have all striven and to which we attach such importance".

Through the British Embassies at Moscow and Washington Mr. Eden suggested that the Soviet and United States Governments also send messages to Subasic and Tito, and recommended in the case of Washington that the Yugoslav Embassy be used as a channel of communication.

In a separate telegram ⁹³ of lower security classification the Department is repeating to you the text of a message handed to the Yugoslav Chargé yesterday for transmission to both Subasic and Tito.

Sent to London; repeated to Moscow and Caserta.

GREW

860h.01/2-2845 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, February 28, 1945—midnight.

[Received February 28—9:57 p. m.]

752. Norden saw Subasic yesterday at latter's request. Yugo Prime Minister explained agreement was reached previous evening on

⁹³ *Supra.*

Regency problem and that a message for King was sent through Yugo channels to Yugo Embassy at London. He gave Norden text of this message which is contained in our immediately following telegram.⁹⁴

Subasic was not willing to guess concerning King's probable reaction and choice among the four Serbs but stated he had no alternative other than acceptance.

Since Subasic had made large concessions to Partisans, Norden asked him in view of this if he was receiving a similar concession in return with regard to their pending decisions. Since both Belic⁹⁵ and Mandic had been his suggestions to King and since none of proposed Serbian candidates for Regency were members of liberation movement, Subasic protested that this was not at all the way to look at it. Regency should be above politics, he felt, and it was an error to wish to put political figures into Regency. (Both Budisavljevic,⁹⁶ a Croatian Serb and Mandic, nevertheless, have been active in politics.)

Beyond stating that both London Ministers and most of present Partisan group would probably be included he was unwilling to discuss formation of new government. He hesitated when asked whether Sutej would be Finance Minister. When later in conversation he was asked if Sutej might not make a good head of an economic mission to United States or Ambassador to Washington, Subasic stated that though Partisans were beginning to take more kindly to him, he felt he would wish to send Sutej abroad fairly soon.

Subasic in a rather prolonged conversation persisted in taking a philosophical view of situation; he feels time to be in his favor. But before the Ustachi⁹⁷ problem was settled, he foresaw much bloodshed in Croatia and expressed fear that general political situation in Yugo would hardly go down to normal without some flareups and incidents. He again expressed hope for American economic aid and states that the providing of normal juridical procedure, effective administration and economic reconstruction were true means to internal appeasement. Finding of suitable Ambassador to Washington he considers to be one of his most difficult tasks. Subasic expects to be Foreign Minister and hopes to go to America soon after new government is formed.

Sent Department repeated London for Patterson as 109 and Moscow as 45.

KIRK

⁹⁴ In telegram 753, February 28, 1945, from Caserta, the Department was informed that as the result of the agreement between the Royal Government and the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation, the names of two candidates to the Regency, one Slovene and one Croatian, were submitted to the King for his approval. The names of four Serbian candidates were also submitted, and the King was to choose one of them as the third regent. (860h.01/2-2845)

⁹⁵ Alexander Belich, President of the Serbian Academy of Sciences.

⁹⁶ Srdjan Budisavljevich, member of the Independent Democratic Party and former Minister in several Cabinets.

⁹⁷ Ustashi, or Croatian National Liberation Movement.

860h.01/3-145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson), at London

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1945—8 p. m.

Yugos 31. Reurtel 41 March 1.⁹⁸ You may advise Stevenson that we are not disposed to press the King with respect to his selections for the Regency Council, since we consider that your standing instructions fully express our views.

GREW

860h.01/3-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 4, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received March 4—2 : 12 p. m.]

Yugos 46. King Peter received Dr. Rybar⁹⁹ yesterday at 2:45 p. m. in the presence of the Queen and gave him the decree appointing Budisavljevic, Mandic and Sernec the Royal Regents (text of decree being forwarded by airgram¹). Decree bears signatures of King and Dr. Subasic by whom it was signed beforehand in blank and is back-dated to March 2nd to correspond with communiqué issued by King Peter to the press (reference my 44 of March 3²).

Dr. Rybar told me he thought the King, who appeared to be in good spirits, was finally persuaded to sign by his talk with Eden and messages he received from Molotov³ and Subasic. The message from Subasic repeated Molotov's telegram already handed the King by the Soviet Embassy and described by Rybar as "approximately the same" as message Department gave Yugoslav Embassy in Washington (reference Department's 26 of February 26) and referred to but did not give text of Department's message.

Commenting on King's choice of Budisavljevic, Rybar said he thought King had chosen him in order to have someone who had been

⁹⁸ Not printed; in his telegram Ambassador Patterson reported that Mr. Stevenson, the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia, told him that he was instructed to press King Peter to accept the regents immediately, and he asked Mr. Patterson to cable Washington for similar instructions. Stevenson added that "if King does not agree by this week end, his consent will be presumed and the United Government formed." (860h.01/3-145)

⁹⁹ Ivan Ribar, President of the Presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia.

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed; this telegram reported that King Peter had issued a communiqué to the press on March 2 before he had informed either Dr. Subasic or Dr. Ribar of his decision (860h.01/3-345).

³ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

in exile. The choice is also popular in Serbia Rybar added and went on to say that he had seen a message to that effect last night from Reuters' correspondent in Belgrade which stated that his reputation for honesty is enough to offset his being a Serb from Croatia instead of Serbia proper.

Simultaneous with the issuance of the decree King Peter signed a telegram notifying Subasic of his choice of Regents.

Sent Department as Yugos 46, repeated Moscow as 87 and Caserta as 44.

[PATTERSON]

860h.01/3-545 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, March 5, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received March 5—2:41 p. m.]

822. A reliable source informed Norden on March 1st that Subasic has stated that if he had insisted upon the King's making the choice of nominees for the Regency the Partisans were prepared to go it alone. Since he was faced with the choice of promising returning to London or breaking off negotiations he believed it better to make the best of things. Norden stated his informant said that Subasic showed extreme loyalty to the King during his conversations and that the course he took was the only feasible one. Norden believes that both this source and another who are close to the Prime Minister hope to "put some water in Tito's wine" and to displace some of the extremist influences by playing along. These also state that because of relatively unimportant details it is hard for them to refuse to cooperate in time of war.

Norden has also learned that Partisan leaders have little expectation of the King's acceptance of the new proposals and that if Tito and Subasic decide to proceed without approval of the King if Yalta recommendations are followed it is expected that Russia and Britain will grant recognition. Implementation of these recommendations is proposed by setting up a joint commission to include members of the Government in London which will decide whether the members of the previous Parliament are eligible. The Partisans' viewpoint is that since the Parliament was dissolved legally before the war those who are approved will be members as individuals only of Avnoj and will be on the same basis as other Avnoj members. In addition by inclusion of some other new names who will also be passed by Joint Commission it is planned to enlarge Avnoj. With such enlargement it will be possible to prepare a new electoral law by which a constituent assembly can be chosen. It is stressed by the Partisans that they

cannot afford to grant concessions to London Ministers as that will weaken their control. Only to get the economic and political benefits of recognition have they made any concessions. The Socialists especially recognize the benefits of an economic nature and Kardelj,⁴ recently stated that a great deal of the criticism of Belgrade except that of Pan-Serb origin would be alleviated. Kardelj being relatively "moderate" looks upon the economic problem in Marxian terms and believes that foreign aid is a means toward creating a society devoid of capitalist exploitation. When speaking of foreign capital need he says it should "cooperate with enterprises of the state."

KIRK

860h.01/3-845: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, March 8, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received March 8—1:48 p. m.]

872. OSS has reported from Belgrade that regents took oath on March 5 when Subasic read King's proclamations. Tito was not present.

There is reported to be widespread despair among Serbs over absence of genuine Serb in Regency and feeling that Subasic failed to restrain Partisans.

Alexander's visit to Belgrade first encouraged populace to anticipate increased Allied military assistance and effective influence of western democracies on Tito and Partisans. However, publication of Alexander's and Tito's speeches have destroyed hopes of opposition for Allied intervention in their present predicament. Creation of the Regency and formation of a unified government has ended some uncertainty and suspense of past weeks but has not produced general rejoicing in Belgrade as reported by BBC⁵ broadcast.

KIRK

860h.01/3-1345

The Secretary of State to the Yugoslav Chargé (Franges)

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1945.

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of your note no. 184 of March 13, 1945⁶ informing me that in accordance with the Constitutional Act

⁴ Edvard Kardelj, Vice-President of the Presidium of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia. On March 5, he became Second Vice Premier and Minister for the Constituent Assembly.

⁵ British Broadcasting Corporation.

⁶ Not printed.

of His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia dated January 29, 1945 concerning the transfer of the Royal Powers to a Regency Council, and in accordance with the Royal Decree of March 2, 1945 concerning the nomination of the Regents, the Yugoslav Regency Council has been formed, and that the members of the Regency, Dr. Srdjan Budisavljevich, Dr. Ante Mandich and Mr. Dusan Serbec, assumed the functions of their office on March 5, 1945.

There has also been received your note no. 185 of March 13, 1945⁷ informing me that upon the formation of the Yugoslav Regency Council on March 5, 1945, the Royal Yugoslav Government and the Committee of National Liberation submitted their resignations to the Regents, and that on March 7, 1945, a united Yugoslav Government was formed under the Presidency of Marshal Tito and the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs was assumed by Dr. Ivan Subasich, former Prime Minister.

I have to inform you that upon receipt of your notes herein acknowledged, Ambassador Richard C. Patterson, Jr., and his staff were authorized to proceed to Belgrade to establish the American Embassy there.⁸ A list of the officers and other personnel of the Embassy staff is enclosed,⁷ with the request that it be communicated to your Government.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
JAMES C. DUNN

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES WITH INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA⁹ AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE FEDERAL PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

860h.01/1-845: telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,¹⁰ to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, January 8, 1945—10 p. m.
[Received January 8—8:08 p. m.]

70. Thayer¹¹ has reported from Belgrade that during a conversation on January 6 Tito¹² discussed at length attitude of American officers and officials in Italy toward Yugoslavia and (his movement).

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Ambassador Patterson arrived in Belgrade on March 31, 1945.

⁹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1330-1446.

¹⁰ Mr. Kirk was also Ambassador to Italy.

¹¹ Lt. Col. Charles W. Thayer, Commander of the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito.

¹² Josip Broz Tito, President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia.

When Thayer (suggested?) that lack of cooperation and hospitality experienced by American field officers was causing suspicion as to Tito's real objectives both military and political, Tito denied he had anything to hide and expressed bewilderment at (amazing) political attitude of some Americans in Italy. Tito said he had just received reports from Smodlaka¹³ of (incredibly irritating) actions of American officials; said that American reactionaries incited by Fotich¹⁴ had damaged his (Tito's) reputation; and that "majority of Americans were opposed to his regime but what were they going to do about it".¹⁵ Thayer refuted Tito's statements and suggested he study President's statements and American press on which he has ample material.

When Tito complained about meager supplies furnished him by Allies, Thayer quoted official figures to prove Allies had equipped almost half the Partisans. Tito requested and was furnished complete lists of equipment supplied him by the Allies, which figures apparently impressed and surprised him.

KIRK

860h.01/2-545 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, February 5, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 7:03 p. m.]

439. Norden¹⁶ has reported from Belgrade that in the course of a conversation with Smodlaka on February 3, the latter stated that, with regard to the post war world, it was Marshal Tito's belief that "Russian-United States relations are the key to peace, far more than Russian-Anglo relations or any other". He spoke disparagingly of British pretensions to "domination" of the Mediterranean which he said was a "Moslem, Slav and Latin lake just as the Black Sea is a

¹³ Josip Smodlaka, Yugoslav representative on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy.

¹⁴ Constantin Fotich, former Yugoslav Ambassador in the United States.

¹⁵ Telegram 107, January 11, 1945, from Caserta, informed the Department that Colonel Thayer had suggested that it would be unfortunate, "if the impression were permitted to gain currency that we might in any way short of military measures alter the present course of events in Yugoslavia. . . . there is not the slightest evidence that any form of pressure from United States would increase the chances of the population to express itself freely in a genuine election . . ." (860h.00/1-1145)

In telegram 233, January 20, 1945, from Caserta, the United States Political Adviser informed the Department that Colonel Thayer had reported "his opinion that despite superficial professions of warmest friendship for United States, we are regarded by Partisan officials with a suspicion which, though far less acute than that directed at British, is so deep rooted that it will require much patient effort to overcome." (740.00119 Control (Italy)/1-2045)

¹⁶ Carl F. Norden, member of the United States Political Adviser's staff stationed in Belgrade since January 16, 1945.

Russian lake". The loss by British of such "domination" he seemed to take for granted.

Smodlaka also stated that it was not the Marshal's wish to depend upon Russia exclusively, as Russia needed help herself and had nothing material to give. In "the longer future" only could material assistance be given to Yugoslavia by Russia. Yugoslav policy therefore, should be based equally on friendship with America, although friendship with Russia should be retained for sentimental racial reasons.

Norden stated he made no comment and did not ask whether the pro-Russian indoctrination used exclusively in the army and schools had any connection with "the longer future".

Ribnikar¹⁷ has spoken to Norden twice of the need for American capital and the theme of American financial and technical aid is often heard. This may reflect the regime's serious preoccupation which has more slogans than ability on economic lines, and is also responsive to popular demand. The people are very impressed by the Russians and if the regime is to succeed must offer some material things, at least things which in the popular minds stands for America. A leading Serb businessman with an impeccable occupation record and a former Deputy, stated to Norden in contrast to above, that everyone would prefer to do without rather than have this regime have it.

Smodlaka also referred to the impending arrival of Subasic¹⁸ and stated with regard to the personalities of the regents that some adjustments might have to be made but he felt this would not be hard.

The impression is that both the population and the regime are anxious to have a government formed. Foreign aid will undoubtedly be required and there are very serious monetary and economic problems which should have urgent attention but are being held up. In general the present regime is referred to by the people as "those people" and it seems evident that once the government is established a great deal will be expected of it. That it will be the same thing as at present under different color is realized only by a relative few.

KIRK

¹⁷ Vladislav Ribnikar, Acting Minister of Education in the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Avnoj), and publisher of the Belgrade newspaper *Politika*.

¹⁸ Ivan Subasic, Premier of the Royal Yugoslav Government in London.

860h.01/2-945 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, February 9, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 11:55 p. m.]

483. Following sidelights on Yugoslav situation from Norden are based on information deriving from unofficial contacts in Belgrade during past fortnight.

1. Regime has restored order and the most essential utilities in city and distinct improvement in aspect of town is noticeable when over past 2 weeks stores are reopening, streets and restaurants wore banners, atmosphere seems more cheerful. There is ample food but salaries are wholly inadequate to meet rising costs and many people live under most difficult circumstances by sale of their belongings which are main stock in trade of many stores. There is an informal moratorium on rents and debts generally.

2. Despite outwardly cheerful aspects regime is not liked in Belgrade save among limited sections of population. Persons with out-of-town ties say same is true in provincial Serbia but I cannot judge accuracy of these reports. Reasons given are many but principal one is that this is not sort of liberation people expected. Propaganda and engineered "spontaneous" demonstrations in a forced labor [*sic*], high-handed and summary requisitioning, arrests and punishment, sense of intimidation are too reminiscent of occupation. Fear and dislike of Communism and Communists, excess of Croats and Montenegrins in regime and police, presence of Bulgar troops as allies, interference with religious education of youth are other factors. Dispatch of poorly trained and equipped forces levies to front with heavy casualties said to have alienated many but this is slowly being remedied. In general, regime's appeal based partly on mistakes of predecessors diminishes with own errors.

3. Opposition, however, not crystallized and may not do so. Rightly or wrongly regime is regarded as a passing military makeshift and there is no argument with its stand on seeing war through, war weariness notwithstanding. Many of its avowed objectives have wide approval especially of younger people who look less to methods than to ideals, and generally criticism is in proportion to age of informant with oldest indulging in straight Nedic¹⁹ line. Expectation especially in business circles is that coming of London Government and of peace will mark new departure. Weakness of London Ministers not generally appreciated and few who do so pin hopes on Su-

¹⁹ Colonel-General Milan Nedich, President of the Nazi puppet state of Serbia.

basic and Sutej²⁰ and above all Anglo-American support of constitutional principles. Mood in general is optimistic wait and see. Subasic Croatian color not a live issue as any change thought to herald improvement, for instance, Catholic Archbishop views Subasic as Churchill's instrument for achievement of a compromise to result in free and honest plebiscite.

4. There is much whispered talk of going to forests in spring and we hear several nationalist groups presiding in Serbia. Great disillusionment would doubtless follow failure on Subasic's part to bring freer and more representative government, and many feel this would result in active opposition to regime. There, however, we enter realm of conjecture and some realize precipitate action might provide pretext for general liquidation of opposition. Successful right revolt on other hand feared as bringing even worse blood bath whence sentiment heavily favors constitutional solution.

5. King popular especially rural sections but his importance would diminish greatly if he were to be viewed by people as another dictator or a front for reaction. Few want return to old times.

6. Draza's²¹ stock lowering unsavory reputation his associates and his own lack of political acumen and military strength. It is generally admitted Draza would have been worse than Tito.

7. We must assume regime is fully aware of foregoing and will seek to make needed adjustments to prevent pot from boiling over as long as this is to its advantage and compatible with objectives. While criticism external and internal and administrative and economic troubles appear to have put it somewhat on defensive, (see Tito speech to Anti-Fascist women) its toughness, resourcefulness, energy, determination must not be underestimated. Though Yugoslavs are a different breed from Russians and proud of it and Russian precedents need not of necessity apply it would be rash to ignore effect instant intensive indoctrination may have on malleable younger generation unless soon modified.

8. Under cover NKVD²² activity rumored which would appear subject for more discreet investigation.

9. Foregoing should of course be appraised in light of limitations under which it was gathered. Longer sojourn and formal contact might well lead to revision. The all important question of intentions

²⁰ Juraj Shutej, Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry in the Subasic Cabinet.

²¹ Reference is to Gen. Draza Mihailovich, leader of the Chetnik resistance forces in Yugoslavia, former Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav Armed Forces.

²² Special Political Police of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.

of regime cannot be adequately judged by spot checking of this type, value of which is necessarily limited. All of above from native sources.

Sent Department; repeated to London for Patterson as 64.

KIRK

860h.01/3-1845: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, March 18, 1945—noon.

[Received March 19—12:06 p. m.]

1029. Norden reports that the successive disappointments resulting from Alexander's visit,²³ the weakness of the Regency, the unrepresentative character of the new government, the weakness of its policy declaration and the squabble which has followed it have effaced much of the optimism inspired by the arrival of the London Ministers²⁴ some weeks ago. The appointment of Kardelj²⁵ as Minister for the Constituent Assembly has likewise had a depressing effect among informed circles as he is regarded as Tito's No. 2 man and a determined Moscow schooled Communist of the newer dispensation and one of the men least likely to yield any of the real sinews of power to other elements. Some hope is still placed in Grol²⁶ and Shutej²⁷ although the latter is avoided by the Partisans and is reliably reported at outs with Subasic because of the latter's lack of firmness. There is as yet little sign of a turning away from high handed and terroristic methods, some of the Croat politicians from London are afraid to see Americans, little is known of many recent arrests. The real power is reportedly still held by a small clique largely Moscow trained includ-

²³ Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, visited Belgrade during the third week in February 1945. See vol. iv, pp. 1103-1107.

²⁴ The Yugoslav Ministers who had been resident in London arrived in Belgrade during the first week in March. A United Provisional Government, comprised of elements from the factions in exile and those inside Yugoslavia, was formed. On March 5, the regents took their oath of office. On the following day, the former London Ministers submitted their resignations to the Regency Council, and the Ministers of the National Committee of Liberation, Marshal Tito's Cabinet, submitted their resignations to the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation, the Partisan assembly. A new Cabinet of 28 Ministers was sworn in on March 7. The Cabinet contained 15 representatives of the former National Committee of Liberation, 6 representatives of the former Royal Government in London, and 7 representatives of other factions inside Yugoslavia. For the Department's evaluation of this Cabinet, see telegram 849, April 12, to Moscow, p. 1219.

²⁵ Edvard Kardelj, Second Vice-Prime Minister and Minister for the Constituent Assembly.

²⁶ Milan Grol, First Vice-Prime Minister.

²⁷ Shutej became Minister without Portfolio in the new government.

ing Tito, Kardelj, Hebranj,²⁸ Djilas,²⁹ Cholakoviç,³⁰ Juric³¹ and the Ozna head³² and some others whilst the administrative services have been sufficiently penetrated to offset the influence of more democratic department heads.

On the other hand, Kosanovic³³ is reported to be asserting himself courageously on behalf of democratic procedure as is Grol.

The strategy of the Subasic group now is said to be concentrating upon securing for the Regents the King's prerogative to name or at least pass upon civil appointments and upon broadening Avnoj³⁴ in the sense of the Yalta decisions.³⁵ Members of Avnoj state there is now talk of adding 47 former Skuptshina³⁶ members and others to the 100-odd present membership of Avnoj but fear that the new body will not enjoy full freedom of debate in line with Djilas recent speech. Of the opposition leaders, Lazer Farkovic, Serb radical, seems most energetic and resourceful and hopes to be able to speak his mind in the new parliament. The underground opposition claims Mihailovic has been replaced by a General Kostic³⁷ as leader.

The most significant development in the opposition has been a firming up and closing of ranks among Serb elements and this tendency seems likely to continue. Serbia may be compared with a condenser battery steadily accumulating a charge—nothing is outwardly visible but in due course the pent-up voltage may let go. It is realized, however, that the time is not yet ripe, the country must first be liberated, the Ustashi³⁸ liquidated and the Russians leave.

KIRK

860h.01/4-545 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson)*³⁹ to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, April 5, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received April 14—1:30 p. m.]

13. After calling on the Regents April 2, I exchanged calls with Marshal Tito and other members of the Government, and on April 4

²⁸ Andrija Hebrang, Minister of Industry.

²⁹ Milovan Djilas, Minister for Montenegro.

³⁰ Radoljub Cholakoviç, Minister for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

³¹ Not positively identifiable.

³² It was reported at this time that Ozna (Committee for the Defense of the People), the secret political police, was under the direction of Col. Jevto Sasich.

³³ Sava Kosanovich, Minister of Information.

³⁴ Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, the national assembly of the Partisan movement.

³⁵ For documentation on the Yugoslav question at the Yalta Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, index entries under Yugoslavia, p. 1032.

³⁶ The pre-war parliament of Yugoslavia.

³⁷ Possibly Gen. Josef Kostich.

³⁸ The Croatian National Liberation Movement.

³⁹ Ambassador Richard C. Patterson arrived in Belgrade on March 31, 1945.

Tito gave a large dinner for the British, American and Soviet Ambassadors.

During our 55-minute talk on my initial visit to Tito he expressed most cordial sentiments towards the United States and hopes for our assistance in rebuilding Yugoslavia. I took occasion to bring up some questions of interest to us, such as facilities for Air Transport Command operations and establishment of a direct radio circuit to the United States, to which Tito gave favorable replies. I suggested that he make a short visit to the United States some time after the war and he seemed to like the idea.

In answer to a question, Tito said he was confident that the Germans will be forced out of Yugoslavia within 45 days.

Dr. Subasic told me that Tito is leaving for Moscow today on first formal visit to Stalin. Subasic disclaimed knowledge of any special object, but observed that with Soviet armies now surrounding most of Yugoslavia, there would be much to discuss at Moscow. Subasic will accompany Tito and is to return here to leave with the UNCIO⁴⁰ delegation on April 12. During his absence Vice-Premier Kardelj will act as Foreign Minister.

Sent to Department, Caserta and Moscow.

PATTERSON

860h.01/4-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 8, 1945—11 p. m.
[Received April 9—1:30 a. m.]

1090. Tito's present visit to Moscow, as stated in my 1043, April 5, 10 a. m.,⁴¹ came as a complete surprise to me and I have no basis on which to form any reliable judgement of its purpose. In considering its possibilities, however, the following factors come to mind.

1. This is to my knowledge Tito's first visit to Moscow since the occasion last fall when he disappeared so abruptly from his headquarters at Vis⁴² and his first public visit here in the role of a foreign dignitary. From the care taken to notify the Diplomatic Corps of his arrival and from the pomp of his reception at the airport it is clear that the Soviet Government wishes the visit to serve as a political demonstration. The secrecy with which it was prepared reflects

⁴⁰ The United Nations Conference on International Organization, which met at San Francisco April 25 to June 26, 1945. See vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

⁴¹ Not printed; this telegram informed the Department that Marshal Tito and Foreign Minister Subasic arrived in Moscow on April 5 (860h.01/4-545).

⁴² See telegram 510, September 23, 1944, from Caserta, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 1410.

the Kremlin's traditional belief in surprise as a diplomatic and political weapon. It is entirely possible that the visit may end with some formal expression of Russian-Yugoslav intimacy and solidarity. It is impossible to say, however, whether the visit was arranged for the specific purpose of staging a demonstration or whether it was merely decided to exploit for this purpose a visit arising out of the real need for direct personal consultation between Soviet leaders and Tito at the present time. I am rather inclined to the latter hypothesis; for the end of the war will raise several urgent questions of Tito's foreign policy; and I suspect that it is sometimes not much easier for Moscow's satellites than it is for ourselves to discover from a distance what the Russians are thinking and what their wishes are.

2. The present entry of Soviet forces into Austria raises in an acute form the question of Austrian Carinthia. As the Department is aware the question of the postwar inclusion into Yugoslavia of Austrian territory inhabited by Slovenes has been raised at various times by the Yugoslav Government in exile and Tito has apparently only recently indicated his intention of occupying certain Austrian territory.⁴³ As far as I am aware, this question has not been a matter of discussion between either the British or ourselves on the one hand and the Russians on the other, but in view of Russian entry into Austria and the contemplated participation of Russia in the subsequent tripartite administration,⁴⁴ it is clear no move along these lines could be taken by Tito without affecting directly Russian interests. It is entirely probable that Tito has not yet been able to get a firm clearance from Moscow for the occupation of this territory by Yugoslav forces and that the breakup of German resistance in Austria has created the necessity for an immediate clarification of this question.

3. On March 19 pursuant to the Department's 594, March 14, 11 p. m.,⁴⁵ I wrote Molotov⁴⁶ of our desire to maintain the principle that during the period of joint Anglo-American military responsibility in Italy, and thereafter until the peace settlement, no unilateral action should be taken either by Italy or Yugoslavia with respect to Venezia Giulia and that the territory should remain during that period under Allied Military Government. No reply has yet been received and the question is thus still formally pending with the Soviet Government. It is plain that until a decision has been taken in Moscow that Tito's hands remain bound in this problem as well. Military developments have doubtless heightened Tito's impatience for a decision on this question.

⁴³ For documentation on Yugoslav territorial claims in Austria, see pp. 1313 ff.

⁴⁴ For documentation on this subject, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

⁴⁵ See vol. IV, p. 1115, footnote 69.

⁴⁶ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

4. Recent press manifestations of Soviet sentiment have indicated that in the Soviet view the Stalin-Churchill understandings of last fall with relation to Greece⁴⁷ and the other Balkan countries are wearing thin. Soviet press has again begun to show ill feeling over British action in Greece and support for the anti-British forces there. There have quite recently been indications of a new and sharper tone against Turkey.

There is reason to suspect that Anglo-American attempts to achieve the application of the Liberated Europe declaration⁴⁸ to Rumania⁴⁹ may well have been taken in Moscow as inconsistent with the spirit of the understandings reached with Churchill last fall, and that Moscow may accordingly feel that its own hands are now relatively free. In these circumstances it is not improbable that the Russians should conclude that the time was now ripe and the road open for further action in the direction of a south Slav federation, in which Macedonia as well as Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania might participate. A first step in this direction might be the conclusion of the contemplated alliance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Department is familiar with the background of this matter, which was discussed at the Crimea, and will recall that Molotov, in his letter of March 10 to me,⁵¹ favored the conclusion of such a treaty, expressed inability to understand the motives which caused us to oppose it and supported the Secretary's suggestion that consideration of this question be continued in Moscow. It was evident from this reply that the Soviet Government did not consider this matter closed and was concerned to retain complete freedom with respect to its future course of action. Despite Molotov's hint, we have not pursued the matter further. This may be considered by the Soviet Government as sufficient justification for them to authorize Tito and the Bulgarians to proceed at this time. In any case, there can be little doubt that this question will be given most careful scrutiny during the present visit, and the measures which come up for discussion may even go beyond the mere conclusion of this bilateral alliance.

5. It is not probable that any announcement would be forthcoming of any understandings which may be reached with regard to points 2, 3, or 4 of this message. Any such understandings will presumably become apparent only in subsequent actions of the Governments concerned.

⁴⁷ Reference is to decisions reached by Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill during their meeting in Moscow, October 9-18, 1944. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1002-1024, *passim*.

⁴⁸ The Declaration on Liberated Europe issued at the tripartite conference at Yalta, February 11, 1945; for text, see section V of the Report of the Crimea Conference, *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 971.

⁴⁹ See pp. 464 ff.

⁵¹ See telegram 722, March 12, from Moscow, p. 1309.

6. While the above is speculative, I will endeavor to obtain more concrete information on the objectives and results of the visit.

HARRIMAN

860h.01/4-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, April 9, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

21. In contrast to other Government members with whom I exchanged visits last week, Vice Premier Grol was most pessimistic about future of Yugoslavia. His main points were as follows:

1. He is only one in Government still arguing daily for democratic processes and his influence is nil. Subasic is a prisoner in Foreign Office and powerless.

2. More Communists are appointed to office daily and in a month entire administration will be Communist. Terrorism and executions are increasing. Belgrade is a fortress occupied by Tito's best troops while ill equipped boys are sent to the fronts. Opposition to regime is growing but has insufficient leadership and arms for revolt.

3. Serbian Parliament which met April 7 was composed of Communists and unimportant figures selected by minor parties. Grol, head of Democratic Party, was not even notified of meeting. He thinks this Parliament will be model for those of other federal states and that through tightly controlled State Parliaments Communists will retain in all real power even if Avnoj is broadened to comply with Yalta declaration.

4. Government is under almost complete Russian control. Only chance for democracy is pressure from Washington and London on Moscow to make spirit of Yalta declaration effective.

5. Tito's summons to Moscow was part of Russia's plan to mobilize her satellites into a united front preliminary to San Francisco Conference.

[PATTERSON]

760h.61/4-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 9, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received April 9—4:50 p. m.]

1099. Vyshinski⁵² requested me to call this afternoon. He referred to Marshal Tito's presence in Moscow and requested me to inform my

⁵² Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

Government that the Yugoslav Government had proposed to the Soviet Government that a treaty similar to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 1942⁵³ or the Czechoslovak Treaty of December 1943,⁵⁴ be concluded between the two Governments. The Soviet Government had replied favorably to the Yugoslav proposal and the treaty in question was now being drawn up.

In reply to my question Vyshinski stated that there would be no conflict between the proposed Yugoslav-Soviet Treaty and the World Organization as both were directed against aggression.

He, however, dodged my further question as to whether the treaty would contain a specific provision similar to the British Treaty which would bring it within the scope of a World Organization by comparing it again with the Czech Treaty.

I inquired whether Mr. Vyshinski could give me any information on other matters being discussed with Tito. He replied that he was unable to do so since he was working only on the above-mentioned question.

HARRIMAN

860h.01/4-1245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1945—8 p. m.

849. Reurtel 1131, April 11.⁵⁵ Six members of the Subasic Government at London are included in the present Cabinet. Two of them were Tito appointees after the negotiations at Vis last summer⁵⁶ and one, Kosanovic, had been the chief Tito protagonist in the United States.⁵⁷ The remaining three at the time of the move to Belgrade were Subasic, Sutej and Grol, the latter two being thus the only real representatives of elements not coordinated with the Tito regime, in a

⁵³ Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, signed at London on May 26, 1942. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353; also telegrams 2897 of May 24, and 2922 of May 26, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 558 and 564, respectively.

⁵⁴ Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Postwar Collaboration, with Protocol, between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed at Moscow on December 12, 1943; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlv, p. 238, or Department of State, *Documents and State Papers* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), vol. I, p. 228. In regard to the negotiation of this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 670-734, *passim*.

⁵⁵ Not printed; in this telegram, Ambassador Harriman asked the Department for a description and analysis of the Yugoslav provisional government (860c.01/4-1145).

⁵⁶ For Subasic's account of these negotiations with Marshal Tito, see telegram Yugoslav Series No. 2, July 4, 1944, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 1384.

⁵⁷ Kosanovich was a former member of the Yugoslav Information Center in New York.

"United Government" of 28 members. Grol is vice premier, but without other portfolio and Sutej is one of the two Ministers without portfolio.

Of the 22 appointed at Belgrade 9 are communists, 11 are Partisans (possibly communists and probably communist sympathizers). All of the Partisans were Ministers in Tito's Avnoj. The remaining two are regarded as Tito supporters, though nominally one is an Agrarian and one a Republican. Of the three Regents two are Partisans.

The weighting of the present Government is thus apparent. Sutej and Grol are the only members willing to take an independent line on occasion and, as noted above, neither of them holds a portfolio.

STETTINIUS

860h.00/4-1245

Memorandum by Mr. Carl F. Norden⁵⁸ of the Division of Southern European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] April 12, 1945.

Immediately prior to my departure from Belgrade, I arranged with the cooperation of a personal friend, Mr. Sepic, private secretary to Mr. Subasic, and with Ambassador Patterson's permission to pay a farewell call on Dr. Kardelj. I saw him for about forty-five minutes the morning of April 2nd. I had had one previous conversation with Dr. Kardelj about a month earlier, also at Sepic's suggestion.

I told Dr. Kardelj that I was proceeding to Washington and would probably be asked a number of questions, particularly with regard to the implementation of the Yalta Declaration, and that I would prefer to have the answers directly from him, as he is the minister charged with preparations for the Constituent Assembly. He was most responsive and stated that he appreciated my coming to see him.

In reply to a number of specific questions he informed me that the committee for investigating the qualifications of the proposed additions to Avnoj membership, concerning which he had informed me a month earlier, had just been appointed and that it was proposed to add about fifty former deputies and probably some other persons as well. This could not, however, be done until the whole country had been liberated, and meanwhile it was proposed to enlarge the Praesidium of Avnoj by the inclusion of a number of the London ministers and possibly of some other London people. He went on to explain, as he had done previously, that the problem of enlarging Avnoj by the inclusion of members of the last parliament was most difficult since this parliament had not been freely elected and was not representative of the

⁵⁸ Mr. Norden had been recalled to Washington, and left Belgrade on April 3, 1945.

country. I interjected that I believed the C. P. P.⁵⁹ people at least would be representative since they had been in opposition to the dictatorship. Mr. Kardelj replied that while this might be the case, the bulk of the Croat deputies had irreparably compromised themselves by collaborating with the Pavelitch⁶⁰ regime and that it would be difficult to find many clean people.

I asked Dr. Kardelj whether Dr. Ribar's⁶¹ recent speech at the University of Belgrade, stating that the Jajce decisions⁶² were inviolable, should be considered an official pronouncement of the Government. He seemed rather taken aback by the question, and, after a moment's consideration, stated that Dr. Ribar spoke in his own name and not in the name of the Government and that all these things would have to be decided by the Government as a whole. I told him that, while I could not of course speak for my Government, my feeling had been that the Ribar speech, coming shortly after the Djilas editorial, could give the impression of an intent to depreciate the substance of the Yalta Declaration. Dr. Kardelj protested that this was not the case, but that we should understand the difficulties the Government is sure to encounter in seeking to start on a new basis. He went on to say that there were many unfriendly elements who only desired a return to the old order in which they had had disproportionate political and economic power. These were the same elements who had either compromised with the Germans or failed to take a clean-cut stand, and were not representative of the nation. It was proposed, he said, in due course to permit an opposition and the presentation of opposition lists at elections, but these lists would not be permitted to include representatives of "reaction" and persons hostile to the objectives of the National Liberation Movement. The American type of democracy was not suitable for Yugoslavia, with its long record of dictatorship, conspiracy and falsified elections, the Yugoslavs would have to go about democracy in their own way.

Dr. Kardelj again expressed his regret that we in America did not appear to have sufficient understanding of what the movement stood for. I asked him if I could be helpful in this respect, and he responded most enthusiastically, going on to say that we must understand that

⁵⁹ Croatian Peasant Party.

⁶⁰ Ante Pavelich, Poglavnik (leader) of the German-dominated Independent State of Croatia.

⁶¹ Ivan Ribar, President of the Presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia.

⁶² Meeting at Jajce on November 29, 1944, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia passed a resolution transferring the authority of the Government-in-Exile to itself as the supreme legislative and executive body of the Yugoslav state. In subsequent resolutions the King was forbidden to return to Yugoslavia, and it was decided that the question of King and monarchy would be settled by the people by its own will after the liberation of the country. A provisional government, the National Committee of Liberation, was then elected.

Belgrade is not Yugoslavia but a city of disgruntled former functionaries and financial interests bent upon resuming their old position and exploiting "the masses". Under the old system many appointments were made through family ties without regard to the real capabilities of the persons involved, and naturally these people were unhappy to find themselves now no better than others.

I told Dr. Kardelj that I had been very favorably impressed with the vital and forward-looking spirit which I had seen among the Yugoslav people and that I believed Belgrade, in particular, had very great possibilities of future development if leeway were permitted for the expression of these energies. I asked him whether the apprehensions of small businessmen over the recent decree raising the taxes on small business ten-fold were justified. In his usual enthusiastic way he replied that these apprehensions were definitely unfounded and that not only small but also big business must live and was necessary, but that the state must become the principal factor in the country's economy (in the course of the earlier conversation I had asked whether his socialization program might not lead toward autarchy, which had been a factor in bringing about this war, and he had replied that as a small country Yugoslavia could not be autarchic but on the contrary desired cooperation of foreign capital with its state enterprises, and a lively interchange of goods with other countries. Dr. Kardelj said, however, that "the exploitation of the proletariat" must cease.)

I used the opportunity to tell Dr. Kardelj that while I could speak only in a personal capacity, it was my feeling that a very great forward step in the stabilization of internal conditions would have taken place when a real amnesty could be proclaimed and all Yugoslavs, other than war criminals convicted as such by duly constituted courts, could return to their homes and contribute their share to the progress of the country. He agreed somewhat reluctantly but was careful to state that the list of traitors and war criminals was large and that a very big job of epuration would have to be done in the still occupied portions of the country and Serb "reaction" eliminated. Meanwhile, good progress in setting up an administrative organization had been made, concerning which he showed great satisfaction.

The interview was most cordial throughout. Kardelj impresses me as a sincere intellectual and patriot, honest and shrewd, but one who sees through glasses heavily tinted by his Comintern training and possibly Comintern directions. He is full of enthusiasm as are most of the new ministers, and like them finds it somewhat difficult to understand that everyone does not see things their way. He is considered the brains of the Government, although not a leader who would have much appeal to the public at large. I have suggested to Ambassador

Patterson and Mr. Shantz⁶³ that they pay him particular attention. In my dealings with him I have avoided ideology and sought to make clear that our policies concerning liberated countries are the same for all regardless of whether their governments happen to be Right or Left, looking to a free expression of the popular will.

760h.61/4-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 13, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received 6:50 p. m.]

1156. Department will note principal differences between Yugoslav-Soviet treaty⁶⁴ (Department see my immediately following press telegram⁶⁵ not repeated to Caserta) and the Czech-Soviet treaty which was obviously used as a model in drafting the former are as follows:

1. Czech treaty contains article binding signatories not to enter into any negotiations with Germany or satellite states without mutual consent. Absence of such article in Yugoslav treaty under present circumstances is of course not surprising.

2. Mutual aid clauses in both treaties are almost identical and are apparently automatic in application. Czech treaty refers in this connection to the "Drang Nach Osten" policy of Germany whereas Yugoslav treaty merely refers to renewing of German policy of aggression. This difference would not appear to be in substance of importance.

3. Czech clause on close and friendly cooperation in postwar period brings out principles of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs of the other. Yugoslav pact does not spell out these principles.

4. Principal innovation in Yugoslav treaty would appear to be article 3 which declares that the contracting parties would participate, in a spirit of the most sincere cooperation, in all international activities directed to secure peace and security and would fully contribute their share in effecting these high aims. Second paragraph declares that application of present treaty would be in conformity with international principles "in the acceptance of which they (the contracting parties) have participated".

This clause does not appear in Czech pact. Its meaning is not clear either in context or as to exactly what international principles

⁶³ Harold Shantz, Counselor of Embassy in Yugoslavia.

⁶⁴ Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation, between the Soviet Union and the Regency Council of Yugoslavia, signed at Moscow on April 11, 1945; for text, see Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I, p. 231, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 22, 1945, p. 774.

⁶⁵ Not printed.

are referred to. *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* editorials which commented at length on the treaty and paraphrased to some extent the articles passed over in silence the second paragraph of article 3.

It will be recalled that when Vyshinski informed me of the Yugoslav treaty on April 9 (reEmbs 1099, April 9, 8 p. m.) in reply to my question he stated that the treaty would not conflict with future world organization. In view of the interest that was raised in connection with Franco-Soviet pact⁶⁶ vis-à-vis the world organization and of the fact that it raised this question again in connection with the Yugoslav pact it is not beyond the realms of possibility that Vyshinski, who said he was then personally working on the draft of the Yugoslav pact, considered it advisable to include in it a clause which, however ambiguous and obscure in context, might be interpreted as bringing the instrument more in line with world organization. I would like to point out, however, that until further clarification article 3 as it now stands appears to be subject to various interpretations.

Sent Department as 1156, repeated to Caserta for Patterson as 53.

HARRIMAN.

860h.01/4-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 19, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received 9:25 p. m.]

4014. A Foreign Office official told us today that "high British authorities" were considerably annoyed that Tito had ignored in talks in Moscow the very real help given him by the western allies and had concentrated only on the great assistance given by the Soviets; moreover, he had talked about his great friendship for the Bulgarians.

Repeated to Moscow and Caserta.

WINANT

860h.01/4-2645: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, April 26, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received April 27—10:02 a. m.]

55. Yesterday Dr. Grol asked Read of OWI⁶⁷ to see him and said that he wanted Washington to know about conditions in Yugoslavia on eve of San Francisco Conference. Grol described conditions much

⁶⁶ Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, between the Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, signed at Moscow on December 10, 1944; for text, see Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I, p. 230. See also telegram 4770 of December 11, 1944, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, p. 937.

⁶⁷ Clifton R. Read, Office of War Information official assigned in Belgrade.

as reported in my No. 21 for April 9. He said that Communists are ruthlessly eliminating their opponents; men who were with Mihailovich or gave him funds are constantly being tried and executed; private properties and firms are confiscated without justification. He and other Liberals in government are powerless to prevent this. He has told his followers to keep out of politics since he cannot protect them from reprisals. Avnoj has not been enlarged; and meanwhile he said drastic laws are being enacted while guarantees of fair trial are meaningless.

Grol asked what the British and American attitude is to all this; whether they mean to implement the Yalta declaration; and whether he can count on our support if he stays in office.

I have faith in Grol's honesty. He perhaps sees only the dark side of the picture since he is inundated by appeals from relatives of those being arrested. Incidents brought daily to our attention tend to confirm Grol's view but do not appear to offer grounds for us to intervene except on behalf of American rights as we are now doing so.

[PATTERSON]

860h.01/4-545

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Cannon) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

[WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1945.

MR. MATTHEWS: The underlying draft telegram to Belgrade⁶⁸ seeks further information on Ambassador Patterson's invitation—completely on his own initiative, so far as we know—to Marshal Tito to visit the United States. I was somewhat taken aback when Mr. Gavrilovic,⁶⁹ in rather formal language "accepted" the invitation on behalf of Marshal Tito and asked that an early date be set.

I disposed of the matter for the moment by saying that in view of the death of President Roosevelt,⁷⁰ and the pre-occupation of the higher officials of the Department with the San Francisco conference, I wondered whether it might not be necessary to hold in abeyance all projects for visits of individual foreign statesmen. This of course was a stop-gap answer, and someone will have to make a more definite reply, either to the new Yugoslav Ambassador⁷¹ or to the Yugoslav delegates when they return from San Francisco. I question whether it would be advisable to instruct Patterson to handle it himself, at

⁶⁸ Not printed.

⁶⁹ Stoyan Gavrilovich, Yugoslav Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who visited Washington en route to the San Francisco Conference.

⁷⁰ April 12, 1945.

⁷¹ Stanoje Simich became Yugoslav Ambassador in the United States on April 24, 1945.

least until we know more about what Patterson may actually have said.

It may be, of course, that Marshal Tito "misunderstood" Mr. Patterson. Tito has a way of jumping the gun, as witness the unexpected arrival of his military mission at SHAEF⁷² recently. It would be characteristic of the dynamism of the Partisans to look upon a suggestion for "a short visit to the United States some time after the war" (Patterson's telegram of April 5) as meaning a firm invitation to be taken up at once.

As for the merits of the proposition, there is a chance that Tito could be worked on here, and an engagement extracted from him to bring about some moderation of the straight and ruthless totalitarian administration he has set up.

Over against that, is the general supposition that his regime would not survive any major democratic change, and he is determined to remain in power. An official visit to this country, where our reserve toward his program has probably been responsible for what few concessions he has made to date, would certainly be interpreted everywhere as definite and long-range acceptance of his Government. We hope that bit by bit we can bring about some half-way compliance in Yugoslavia with the principles of the Yalta Declaration. Until we see some sign of Tito's moving in that direction it seems to me that it would be a great mistake to build him up by having him come to America.

C[AVENDISH] W. C[ANNON]

740.0011 E.W./5-145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1945—7 p. m.

424. Reurtel 1837, May 1, 9 a. m.⁷³ The Department approves your position regarding anti-Partisan Yugoslav troops in Venezia Giulia, which may now be amplified in the light of a report and recommendation sent by your British colleague to the Foreign Office, and shown to us by the Embassy here.

The three alternatives mentioned in the British telegram are (a) that these Yugoslavs should be used as auxiliary troops; (b) that

⁷² Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

⁷³ Not printed; it reported that the question of the disposition of some 15,000 anti-Partisan Yugoslav troops in Venezia Giulia was under discussion at Allied Force Headquarters. To a suggestion that these troops should be turned over to Marshal Tito in order to avoid Allied responsibility for them as displaced persons, Ambassador Kirk had insisted that this was a matter which had to be referred to Washington and London for decision. (740.0011 E.W./5-145) For documentation on the subject of Venezia Giulia, see vol. iv, pp. 1103 ff.

they should be handed over to the Yugoslav Army; and (c) that they should be disarmed and placed in refugee camps. The British Foreign Office considers that alternative (c) is the only possible solution.

We agree that the troops in question who wish to surrender to American or British commanders in northeast Italy should be disarmed and placed in base camps for investigation; that those wishing to return to Yugoslavia as individuals should be permitted to do so; that all others should be removed to refugee camps; and that those against whom there is evidence of war crimes should be handled as such.⁷⁴ We are communicating these views to the British Embassy, and since they are in substantial agreement with the position of the Foreign Office we understand that Ambassador Stevenson will be instructed to inform the Yugoslav Government accordingly. This telegram is being repeated to Patterson for his information and for use in replying to any inquiry on the subject which he may receive from the Yugoslav authorities.

Sent to Caserta, repeated to Belgrade.

GREW

860h.01/5-1045: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1945—7 p. m.

2045. Urtel 2519, May 10.⁷⁵ On April 29 Minister Sutej informed Embassy Belgrade⁷⁶ of Partisan plan to shoot Machek, then reportedly held at his Zagreb home. In view of bitter Partisan attacks and accusations against Machek over considerable period of time, we have no reason to doubt information in question.

On basis of available evidence we believe Machek should be regarded as a political refugee and under no circumstances be delivered to Yugoslav Provisional Government (Tito). On the grounds (1) that he represents a very considerable democratic element of the Yugoslav population; and (2) that this element has been completely isolated from the Allies except for the pretensions of somewhat

⁷⁴ In telegram 2329, May 23, 1945, from Caserta, the Department was informed that Allied Force Headquarters had issued orders that Yugoslav collaborators were to be treated as prisoners of war. Dissident Yugoslavs were to be sent to displaced persons centers. "Under no circumstances will Yugos who are in custody of Allied troops be returned to Yugo." (740.00119 Control (Italy)/5-2345)

⁷⁵ Not printed; it reported that the U.S. Seventh Army had custody of Dr. Vladko Machek, the titular head of the Croatian Peasant Party, who had asked to contact Allied political leaders (860h.01/5-1045).

⁷⁶ Information transmitted to Department in telegram 60, April 30, 1945, from Belgrade, not printed.

dubious spokesmen, it would doubtless be useful for Allied political authorities to accede to his request for an interview.

It may later be important to have a clear account of the circumstances of his incarceration in Zagreb and removal therefrom; whether he was imprisoned by Germans or Pavelic or both; his political attitude and actions during the conflict; his negotiations if any with Mihailovic, Tito, Pavelic, Italians or Germans; and the reason and manner of his removal to place where he was taken into custody.

It would be preferable if his statement could be obtained before the considerable publicity and controversy which may be expected when it becomes known that he is in Allied hands.

GREW

860h.01/5-1445 : Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

CASERTA, May 14, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 7:50 p. m.]

2156. We have learned that General Jovanovic, Tito's Chief of Staff, rudely requested the British and American Military Missions in Belgrade (and their field representatives) to leave Yugoslavia on the ground that their work could be handled by the respective Military Attachés. It has been pointed out that this is obviously a retaliation for the British American attitude on Trieste and Austria. When the British representative was informed of this request he replied to General Jovanovic that he, of course, realized that Yugoslav Missions in Cairo, Rome and Bari would also be requested to withdraw. This did not seem to disturb Jovanovic. When the head of the American Military Mission⁷⁷ endeavored to explain to General Jovanovic the benefits that Yugoslavia has derived from the Allied Mission to Belgrade (recognition, material aid, et cetera), Jovanovic stated that the Partisans would have won with or without Allied support and then went into a rage as to who had first seized Venezia Giulia and Trieste. OSS are issuing instructions to its mission in Belgrade to begin making preparations for thinning out of its representation in Yugoslavia.

[Here follow details of a proposed reduction in the strength of the British Military Mission in Yugoslavia.]

KIRK

⁷⁷ Lt. Col. Charles W. Thayer.

860h.24/5-1845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State*⁷⁸ *to the Acting Secretary of State*

SAN FRANCISCO, May 18, 1945.

[Received May 18—10:50 p. m.]

12. I received Subasic⁷⁹ this afternoon at his request. He had submitted in writing a memorandum⁸⁰ on the Yugoslav desire to receive Lend-Lease aid. I informed him that we could not discuss questions such as Lend-Lease until the Venezia Giulia and Carinthian situations had been cleared up. I emphasized the seriousness of the situation and pointed out that at a time when we were trying to create an organization for the peaceful and orderly settlement of disputes we could not understand Yugoslav actions in this matter. I made clear, however, that the eventual disposition of the territory in question was not involved in the present issue.

The Minister appeared to be very much disturbed but said that he had great difficulty in maintaining communications with his Government. I said that in any event the matter could not be discussed here and expressed the hope that a prompt and favorable reply would be received to the note⁸¹ we had sent to his Government.

[STETTINIUS]

860h.00/5-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, May 18, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 8:15 p. m.]

92. Oral information reaching us daily confirms Dr. Grol's statements on internal conditions as reported in my 21 of April 9 and 55 of April 26. Partisans are still executing former followers of Mihailovic, persecuting their families, confiscating their goods and requisitioning their homes for the army or minor government offices.

Ijbn Liraddche⁸² Ozna secret police keeping Partisans terrified by making sudden arrests without explanation or on flimsy charges. Visitors tell us they are often questioned after leaving the Embassy; two Embassy employees were arrested during the past week; we asked

⁷⁸ The Secretary of State was attending the United Nations Conference on International Organization, meeting at San Francisco, California, April 25-June 26, 1945. For documentation on this Conference, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

⁷⁹ Ivan Subasich, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, was a delegate to the San Francisco Conference.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ See telegram 86, May 14, 11 a. m., to Belgrade, vol. IV, p. 1161.

⁸² Apparent garble.

for an explanation which has not yet been given. Partisans told a third employee that he should not work for US and warned him against further "collaboration" with Americans or British. So many Yugoslavs were arrested after being seen in the company of British soldiers that my British colleague protested to Marshal Tito 2 weeks ago. Nevertheless dozens of Yugoslavs have since been arrested after attending parties where American and British soldiers were present. Some were told quite frankly that their arrest was due to their association with British and Americans.

Yugoslav civilians have informed us that Chetniks⁸³ who surrender after [are?] being imprisoned by Ozna while preparations are made to send them to their home villages where they are taken before special Partisan tribunals and that while an organized mob demands their heads with cries of "enemy of the people, collaborationists, ustashi" they are summarily tried and sentenced to death. Several anti-Partisans one of whom sent evidence that he had protected American aviators have appealed to us to help them escape from Yugoslavia.

Sent Department as 92, Caserta as 36, Moscow as 6.

PATTERSON

860h.01/5-1845 : Telegram

The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 18, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 11:43 p. m.]

2732. Reference Department's 2045, May 12, 7 p. m. . . .⁸⁴ happened to be in Paris and in view of his background in Yugoslav affairs, I requested that he interrogate Machek, who arrived in Rheims on May 15 from Zagreb by automobile. Machek was accompanied by his wife and two children and his secretary, Branko Peselj, and the latter's American-born wife, in addition to five men of the Croatian *Gendarmerie*. This party departed from Zagreb on May 6 and proceeded via Celje, Klagenfurt and Villach to Salzburg, where it met elements of the Seventh Army. The party then proceeded to Augsburg under American military auspices and thence via Saarbrücken to Rheims, arriving there on May 15. . . . saw Machek yesterday afternoon at Rheims and there follows a brief summary of Machek's account of his activities from March 27, 1941, to date:

1. He was approached by a German emissary in Zagreb on March 29, 1941, with a request to collaborate with Germany in the imminent attack against Yugoslavia. Machek refused and proceeded im-

⁸³ Resistance forces led by General Mikhailovich.

⁸⁴ Name of the officer is omitted here, and in subsequent instances in this telegram.

mediately to Belgrade and assumed his post as Vice President in the Simovich Cabinet.⁸⁵ He went to Uzice with the Yugoslav Government on April 8 but declined to proceed abroad with this Government, preferring to remain with his people. He returned to Zagreb on April 9.

2. He was approached several times by the Germans but consistently refused to collaborate. He retired to his farm near Zagreb under instructions by the Germans to remain there and engage in no political activity. On October 10, 1941 he was again approached by the Germans who, he stated, urged his collaboration as it had become obvious that Pavelich and the Ustashi could not maintain order in Croatia. Machek advised the Germans to dissolve and disarm the Ustashi as he hoped to stop the Ustashi-instigated massacres of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Machek was thereupon arrested by the Ustashi and interned at Jasenovac, where he remained incommunicado until March 1942. He was kept closely guarded and entirely incommunicado by the Ustashi at his farm at Kupinac and at Zagreb until March 3, 1945 when Archbishop Stepinach of Zagreb⁸⁶ was allowed to visit him.

3. Machek states categorically that from October 10, 1941 until May 3, 1945 it was absolutely impossible for him to communicate with anyone by any means whatsoever. He therefore had no dealings of any description with Mihailovich, Tito, Pavelich, or with the Italians or the Germans during this entire period.

4. Machek stated the Domobranci⁸⁷ provided him with two automobiles and that he made his way unhindered to the American lines. He said the Wehrmacht withdrawal from Croatia was so precipitant and disorganized it was possible for his party to get through without being controlled or having to show documents.

5. Machek states he is not an enemy of the present Yugoslav Government nor should he be considered a refugee from Yugoslavia. He stated he is prepared to cooperate with the present regime at Belgrade but on a free basis. He desires to proceed immediately to London for consultation with Krnevich⁸⁸ and in particular desires to communicate with and later consult with Subasic in London upon the latter's return from San Francisco. He is today contacting British political adviser Steel⁸⁹ at Rheims. Machek made it quite clear that he is counting on

⁸⁵ The Cabinet of Gen. Dushan Simovich which took over the government on March 27, 1941. For documentation on the affairs of Yugoslavia at this time, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 937 ff.

⁸⁶ Msgr. Alojzije Stepinach, Archbishop of Zagreb and Primate of the Catholic Church in Croatia.

⁸⁷ The Croatian Home Guard.

⁸⁸ Juraj Krnjević, a leading member of the Croatian Peasant Party.

⁸⁹ Christopher E. Steel, British Political Adviser on Germany at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

the Yalta declaration and on Anglo-American support in his endeavor to have free elections and democratic processes in Yugoslavia.

It is . . .'s opinion, based on conversations with Yugoslav leaders of all colors during the past year, that Machek in no way collaborated with the enemy or its puppet leaders. In spite of every endeavor made by various political elements in Yugoslavia to gain access to Machek and enlist his support, there is no evidence whatever that there was any communication with him during the entire period of his incarceration by the Ustashi.

Copies of . . .'s interrogation report are being pouched as soon as typed.⁹⁰

[MURPHY]

860h.01/5-1945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1945—7 p. m.

2324. Urtel 2810, May 19.⁹¹ Subasic has been requested by Tito to return urgently to Belgrade and is leaving San Francisco for Washington today and will probably leave the United States approximately one week hence. He is uncertain whether to travel direct or via London.

British Foreign Office has instructed Embassy here to advise us it has no objection to Subasic-Macek meeting, provided it does not take place on British soil. Since Subasic has little influence in present Government and no freedom of action, and in view of recent Yugoslav official broadcasts branding Macek as a traitor and collaborationist, we are not inclined to sponsor a Macek-Subasic meeting, which might introduce new complications at Belgrade. We shall, however, discuss the matter with Subasic here.

For your information we understand that Subasic's diabetes and throat ailment have weakened him and that his condition is aggravated by discord with Partisan members of his delegation and anxiety over conditions in Croatia, not to speak of the serious international situation of the Yugoslav Government as a result of Tito's actions in Venezia Giulia and Carinthia.

GREW

⁹⁰ Not printed.

⁹¹ Not printed; it reported that Dr. Machek desired to meet with Dr. Subasich and other Croatian leaders in London, and requested the Department to inquire if Dr. Subasich could stop off in London on his return from San Francisco (860h.01/5-1945).

500.CC/5-2645

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Political and Liaison Officer to the United States Delegation at the San Francisco Conference ⁹²

Persons present: The Secretary
Mr. James Clement Dunn ⁹³
Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson
Dr. Ivan Subasic, Prime Minister [*Foreign Minister*] of Yugoslavia

Dr. Subasic called to say goodbye and presented the Secretary with an autographed portrait. The Secretary expressed his appreciation and in turn presented Dr. Subasic with a redwood bowl in commemoration of their association at the San Francisco Conference.

THE SECRETARY: inquired whether there was anything he could do for the Foreign Minister before his departure.

DR. SUBASIC: said that the one thing that would help him and help his people would be if the Secretary could give him some hope that Yugoslavia would receive economic assistance from the United States.

THE SECRETARY: replied that there was, of course, hope of this but he again reminded the Foreign Minister that assistance of this kind would involve Congressional authority which reflected public opinion in the United States. As he had said before, public opinion, and consequently Congress would be affected by any serious political difficulties such as had been threatened over Venezia Giulia.

DR. SUBASIC: said he fully appreciated this. He was not, however, so much concerned by current difficulties which he felt could probably be surmounted, but by the fact that there would probably be similar difficulties in the future. In this connection he referred to the fact that there were some indications that there might be other difficulties in the Balkans in respect to projects for the establishment of some sort of federative system which might include Bulgaria. He was afraid that a series of political disturbances of this kind might prejudice the granting of economic assistance to the Yugoslav people who would be so weakened as a result that they would be unable to establish their political independence. He emphasized that he was not concerned with assistance for the present regime which would eventually change, but with assistance for his people. They are already weak and would be more and more in the need of hope for the future. If assistance were denied from the United States they might tend to resort to the only door open to them.

⁹² This conversation was held May 25, 1945, 4 p. m., at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California.

⁹³ Assistant Secretary of State.

MR. DUNN: said we fully appreciated the dilemma with which the Foreign Minister was faced and assured him that we had the greatest sympathy for the Yugoslav people. The Foreign Minister's problem was to try and prevent these political disturbances.

DR. SUBASIC: said he would like to see the President during his stay in Washington.

THE SECRETARY: replied that the Department had already been informed of this and he felt sure that if the President could find the time in spite of his very heavy schedule, he would be glad to see him. In any event, he said that Mr. Grew and officers of the Department would be very glad to see Dr. Subasic and to discuss Yugoslavia in greater detail.

860h.01/5-3045

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*⁹⁴

[WASHINGTON,] May 30, 1945.

Participants: Dr. Ivan Subasic, Minister of Foreign Affairs⁹⁵

Mr. Grew, Acting Secretary

Mr. Cannon, Chief of SE

The Yugoslav Foreign Minister was received by the Acting Secretary this morning at 10:30 for a second conversation (see memorandum of conversation on May 28)⁹⁶ on American relations with Yugoslavia.

Dr. Subasic said that he had examined the exchange of correspondence with Marshal Tito on the Venezia Giulia and Carinthia problems and hoped that a satisfactory settlement could shortly be reached. He said that he wished to refer particularly to Marshal Tito's most recent reply on the Venezia Giulia matter⁹⁷ in which he had proposed a certain arrangement for Yugoslav participation in the administration under the authority of Marshal Alexander. It was explained to Dr. Subasic that a reply to Marshal Tito's note had not yet been sent to him for the reason that the matter was now receiving the attention of the British and American Governments with consideration of the views of the military authorities for the technical aspects. Mr. Grew observed that since the Allied Commander would be responsible for the administration the arrangement must leave no doubt that the authority could be exercised in a just and equitable manner by using machinery which at the same time would provide a practicable administration for the whole area. He said that he was confident that

⁹⁴ This memorandum was drafted by Cavendish W. Cannon, Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs.

⁹⁵ Dr. Subasic was returning to Yugoslavia after attending the San Francisco Conference. On May 29 he had an interview with the President.

⁹⁶ Not printed.

⁹⁷ Vol. iv, p. 1170.

Dr. Subasic now fully appreciates our disinterested approach to this problem in the interest of all the peoples involved and the earnestness with which we were looking forward to Marshal Tito's early agreement to the plan.

Dr. Subasic spoke of the great suffering of his people during the war, the impatience and vitality of the young leaders who had grown out of the resistance movement and the difficulty sometimes encountered in dealing with them because of their tendency to seek rapid solutions and take matters into their own hands. He said that he would do the best he could upon his arrival in Belgrade to impress upon his associates in the Yugoslav Government the points of view which had been expressed to him here. Mr. Grew said that he felt sure that these conversations had been most useful and that Dr. Subasic, of whose difficulties in Yugoslavia we are well aware, could render a definite service by returning to Belgrade at this time.

Upon Mr. Grew's references to the Yalta formulas, Dr. Subasic discussed briefly the steps being taken to establish a more representative Government in Yugoslavia. He said that the progress had been slow because so many political leaders were considered to have been compromised as a result of the "factionalism" and "collaborationism" in Yugoslavia during the war, and he did not know what further steps had been taken in recent weeks, since, except for a day or two after his return from Moscow, he had been absent from Belgrade since early April. He said that he and some of his colleagues would in any case do their best to achieve broader representation in the Avnoj which he hoped would be reflected in the policies of the government.

He again referred to the pressing economic needs of his country, and Mr. Grew stated that an arrangement would be made, immediately after this interview, for him to speak with Mr. Dort⁹⁸ (LA) and Mr. Cannon for a discussion of the technical questions of lend lease, surplus property, relief, et cetera. In this connection, as also in his remarks on the political questions, Mr. Grew gave special emphasis to the influence of public opinion in this country. He said that there was a genuine desire on the part of this Government to help Yugoslavia, as in other liberated countries in Europe, in the reestablishment of the institutions of government and the restoration of national economy, but that we were guided by public opinion and our progress in this respect would to a large measure depend on the impression which the American public will gain from the policies and events in the countries recently liberated.

In this connection Mr. Grew assured Dr. Subasic of his continuing interest in Yugoslav questions, noting that he had been Acting Secretary at that time when the united Yugoslav Government had been

⁹⁸ Dallas Dort of the War Areas Economic Division.

formed and had therefore given his personal attention to all the questions in our relations with Yugoslavia in recent months.

Dr. Subasic again expressed his appreciation for the frankness with which we had discussed these problems with him and said that he would do his best to see that our views on the several matters which had been mentioned in his conversations were promptly put before the Government at Belgrade.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

860h.01/6-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, June 6, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received June 6—6:20 p. m.]

140. I had a talk today with Dr. Subasic, who arrived June 4, and found him improved in health and determined to do all he can to make his govt colleagues realize the necessity of creating a genuine democratic regime here.

He said that American opinion was entirely adverse to Yugoslav stand on Istria and Carinthia and he believed the American and British notes of June 2⁹⁹ should be accepted at once.

However I understand that the Yugos may object to pgh No. 6 on the grounds that they have deported no one and confiscated no property.

He was pleased with his talks with the Secretary, Mr. Grew and others at the Dept and impressed by the firmness of their decision not to provide economic help to Yugo unless satisfied that the regime here is democratic and stable.

He felt he had not been back long enough to comment on the internal situation but thinks it is "not hopeless". He stated that the prime need, in order to build a democratic system here, is economic help from the US and he believes that all Balkan countries will be greatly influenced by the course of events in Yugo the key country.

In reply to my questions Dr. Subasic agreed that: (1) There is a complete dictatorship here today, and said "this must be changed", (2) there is no freedom of speech or press and added "but the first freedom the people must have is freedom from fear" (3) Ozna has "too much power".

Finally Dr. Subasic said he understood what the four freedoms mean in America and that he is determined to see that Tito-Subasic and Yalta agreements are carried out in letter as well as in spirit.

PATTERSON

⁹⁹ See telegram 106, May 26, 1945, to Belgrade, vol. IV, p. 1176.

860h.00/6-845

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Huston)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1945.

Participants: Assistant Secretary Holmes: Mr. Huston (SE): Mr. . . . and Mr. . . .^{1a}

Mr. . . . and Mr. . . . [in] the staff of our Embassy to Yugoslavia while that Mission was established in London, was [were] received by Assistant Secretary Holmes at 4:00 p. m. yesterday, June 7, to enable Mr. . . . to give an account of his conversations with Dr. Ivan Subasic, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, during the San Francisco conference. Mr. . . . not only is a close friend of Subasic but managed while he was in London to have rather intimate contacts with King Peter and other Yugoslav personalities there.

Some of the main points contained in Mr. . . .'s narration were:

(1) On the occasion of Dr. Subasic's visit to Moscow with Tito, Mr. Stalin said, when the suggestion was made that the British "might cause trouble" in the Carinthia and Venezia Giulia areas, that "if the British start interfering with us there, we will start interfering with them."

(2) When Mr. Molotov questioned Dr. Subasic regarding the situation in Yugoslavia, the latter replied: "when the people look for the brains of Yugoslavia, they turn toward Moscow; when they look for the arms of Yugoslavia, they also look toward Moscow." Molotov replied that the Soviet Government would like to help Yugoslavia but there were limitations on what could be done. "We ourselves," he said, "will have to look to the West—we will ask about ten billion dollars."

(3) At the San Francisco conference, Dr. Subasic supported Mr. Molotov at every stage. There was one exception, when Dr. Subasic did not think that the rotating presidency was sufficiently important for him to get up and make a speech in support of Molotov's proposal, and Mr. Molotov subsequently called him to task for it.

(4) The Yugoslav Minister of Finance, Sreten Zujovic, was probably sent to San Francisco with the Yugoslav delegation in order to "keep on eye on" Subasic.

(5) In Belgrade, Subasic is weak. He does not even have anything to say about the members of the Foreign Office staff. Grol and Sutej likewise are unable to do much. Everything is in the hands of Tito and his favored henchmen, such as Kardelj (Deputy Premier) and

¹ Cloyce K. Huston became Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs on June 1, 1945.

^{1a} Names of officers are omitted here, and in subsequent instances in this memorandum.

Djilas (Minister for Montenegro) both of whom are violent communists.

(6) Despite the friction in Yugoslavia, Dr. Subasic does not believe that there will be civil war as the country is "too weak" to bring forth the effort required for active civil strife.

(7) Although he, as a patriot, would like to see Trieste given to Yugoslavia, Dr. Subasic feels that the Venezia Giulia affair has been "a bad thing for the country."

(8) Dr. Subasic was quite ill at San Francisco and his diabetes was in an acute stage, but he benefited greatly from the excellent care he was given there.

860h.01/6-745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France
(Caffery)*

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1945—6 p. m.

2622. Department approves action proposed in last paragraph urtel 3362, June 7,² concerning Machek.

For your information Ambassador Patterson has already been instructed³ to concert with his British colleague in informing Yugoslav Foreign Office of Machek's having come into Allied hands and his having been removed to rear where no restraint was being placed upon his movements.

No information in Department's possession concerning Machek's activities during and preceding German occupation of Yugoslavia indicates that he has collaborated with or otherwise assisted enemy. However Department has been informally advised that, while information available to British is similarly favorable to Machek, British Government is inclined to feel that his presence in England at this time would only further complicate already difficult British-Yugoslav situation existing in London.

GREW

² Not printed; in this telegram the Ambassador reported that he had been asked to assist in arranging Dr. Machek's transportation to London for meetings with exiled Yugoslav political leaders there. Feeling that such action might be misinterpreted, Ambassador Caffery gave a non-committal reply and requested instructions from the Department. (860h.01/6-745)

³ Telegram 116, May 30, 1945, 7 p. m., to Belgrade, not printed.

860h.01/6-1445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France
(Caffery)*

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1945—7 p. m.

2757. Deptel 2622 June 8. During a discussion of Yugoslav matters with Foreign Minister Subasic who passed through Washington returning to Belgrade from San Francisco reference was made to Machek. Subasic rather regretted M. had felt it necessary to leave Yugoslavia. He thinks M's enemies exaggerated the dangers in order to get rid of him, and still relies on Tito's promise not to persecute M though he admits that the violent anti-Machek attacks at Belgrade remained unchecked. He asked that warm personal greetings be conveyed to M who should "be made to realize that he still has great political strength in the country" and should so conduct himself as not to prejudice his chances for returning at an opportune time. Subasic said he meant by this that M should be very reserved in relations with the press or with *émigrés*. He does not recommend M's proposed trip to London because of the "Yugoslav atmosphere" to which he would be exposed.

Franges, who has been Chargé here for nearly a year and who will probably retire when Ambassador Simic returns from San Francisco, says that he would personally undertake for a time at least to provide funds for the support of M and family if in financial distress, but could not of course undertake to care for the whole group.

The foregoing may be communicated to M in your discretion. We would be willing to admit M to this country, but suppose he realizes that he would inevitably be drawn into the politics of the Yugoslav-American groups. If he should then desire to return from the US to Yugoslavia we could not, because of the obvious implications, provide official travel facilities unless requested by the Yugoslav Govt.

GREW

860h.01/6-2145

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Huston) to Mr. Samuel Reber of the Office of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1945.

Ambassador Patterson ⁴ has suggested tentatively the idea that it might be a good thing for him to give a statement to the press regarding Yugoslavia. He would speak quite bluntly, pointing out several

⁴Ambassador Patterson had been called to Washington for consultation. He left Belgrade on June 9 and did not return until October 8.

major aspects of essential conditions under the Tito regime in the hope that it might "do some good".

Mr. Patterson felt that he could make such a statement to the press while in Washington, which would have considerable weight when reported back to Belgrade; at the same time, neither the Acting Secretary nor the Department would be directly involved, and we can later, if desired, indicate that his statement represented only his own personal views.

It may be that such a statement would have a useful effect and we could leave it squarely on the Ambassador's shoulders, which he does not mind.

We could:

- (1) Advise the Ambassador against making a statement to the press;
- (2) Allow the Ambassador to make his statement without prior knowledge of its content; or
- (3) Let him know that he may make the statement but suggest that we informally examine its content before issuance.

I would suggest the latter procedure as being preferable.
May I have your views? ⁵

CLOYCE K. HUSTON

860h.01/5-1445:Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia
(Patterson)*

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945—6 p. m.

153. Caserta's 2156 May 14. As a result of peremptory request by General Jovanovic early in May that British and American Military Missions in Yugoslavia be withdrawn the British FonOff, after consultation with the Dept, is instructing British Ambassador in Belgrade, upon receipt of concurrence of AFHQ, to join with you in requesting that the Yugolsav Govt withdraw its Military Missions from Italy.

You are authorized, upon receipt of AFHQ approval, to concert with the British Ambassador in presenting such a request to the Yugoslav Govt.⁶

Sent to Belgrade, repeated to Caserta.

GREW

⁵ A penciled note in the margin reads: "Mr. Huston. I have talked to Doc. [H. Freeman Matthews], who agrees that the timing of the statement would be bad and we recommend none be made prior to the Big 3 meeting. SR."

⁶ The request was subsequently made, and the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry informed Ambassador Patterson on July 13 that all missions were to be withdrawn from Italy by July 26.

860h.01/7-245

President Truman to King Peter II of Yugoslavia

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1945.

MY DEAR KING PETER: I hasten to express my appreciation of the friendly sentiments you were so good as to convey to me in your letter of May 24, 1945.⁷

I hope you will feel assured that I, no less than my predecessor, the late Franklin Roosevelt, am fully conscious of the heroic sacrifices endured in the cause of freedom by the gallant people of Yugoslavia and am equally anxious that, in accordance with the principles of the Crimea Declarations on Yugoslavia and Liberated Europe, free representative institutions shall be established there by democratic processes. You are no doubt aware that it has consistently been the policy of the Government of the United States not to favor one faction in the political life of Yugoslavia to the exclusion of another. The United States Government has at all times sought to give reality to its pledge to concert action with a view to the implementation of the Yalta Declarations. It is my hope that, with such assistance as may be necessary, the people of Yugoslavia will be able to work out the urgent political and economic problems they face today and will, as a result, enjoy the full benefits of their liberation from Nazi tyranny and the full exercise of the four freedoms.

With assurances of my highest regard,

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

860h.01/7-245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1945—5 p. m.

639. On instruction from FonOff, Brit Embassy has inquired Dept's views concerning request made by Yugoslav Ambassador in London that General Milan Nedich, Milan Acimovic⁸ and 40 other members or supporters of collaborationist regime in Serbia, who Ambassador alleges have been "captured by the forces of Field Marshal Alexander in the Tyrol" be surrendered as "traitors of Yugoslavia." In requesting AFHQ and SHAEF to report whether any of these persons full list of whom FonOff is furnishing AFHQ and SHAEF are in fact in Allied hands FonOff states that while none of them should be handed over pending further instructions it feels that it may have to agree to their surrender to the Yugoslavs in due course but raises

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Former Minister of the Interior in the Nedich government.

question regarding "how far we should first try to satisfy ourselves whether by asking Yugoslav Government or otherwise that request is genuine and that at least prima facie case of guilt exists in each case."

Dept has informed Brit Embassy that it agrees with FonOff view that such prominent Yugoslav collaborationists as Nedic should be turned over eventually for judgment by people of Yugoslavia. We added that we believe however that such action in immediate future might be premature pending determination whether character of Provisional National Government of Yugoslavia, or any successor to it, is sufficiently representative to assure that decisions taken by such Government in these cases would in fact conform to principles of justice and will of people as a whole and not merely to dictates of minority faction in country.

Sent to Ampolad Caserta and Amembassy Paris for Murphy, repeated to Belgrade.

GREW

860h.01/7-545: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser,
Allied Force Headquarters*

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945—7 p. m.

646. The Brit Embassy has repeatedly brought up the question of General Mihajlovic with a view to determining a joint policy for recommendations to SACMED,⁹ preferably for the "rescue and honorable detention" of Mihajlovic. While the earlier Brit recommendations have in part been overtaken by events, it may shortly be necessary to take a position regarding Mihajlovic. We have therefore informed the Embassy (1) that we have never had any information indicating that Mihajlovic wanted to give himself up for purposes of his own security; (2) that we would not agree to having an American military group, or a joint Anglo-American mission, sent into Yugoslavia to rescue him from the Partisans; (3) that if he joins up with Allied armies we think that he and any followers having the semblance of armed forces should be immobilized, moved to the rear, and held according to the program proposed for any dissident Yugoslavs as set forth in our no. 424 May 2; (4) that as regards notification, since factors of military security would not now be involved, we see no reason why, if Mihajlovic enters Allied lines, the fact should not be made public at once by a general announcement rather than a special and separate communication to Marshal Tito. If the Brit consider

⁹ Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

it desirable for their Ambassador at Belgrade to make such a communication, we would be willing to supply Patterson with instructions for guidance in replying to any inquiry the Yugoslav authorities may make of him.

We suppose that if Mihajlovic gets through to Allied forces the Yugoslavs will at once demand that he be turned over as a war criminal. Pending the adoption of definite procedures for handling war criminal cases, our position as regards Mihajlovic is as follows:

The complexity of the Mihajlovic case arises from the fact that during a large part of the war he was acclaimed as an Allied general; that the Govt which he served terminated his functions as Minister of War but left his military status in considerable ambiguity; and that during the last 18 months he has been a controversial figure on the political plane, repudiated by the faction which then gained the ascendancy and which controls the Govt now accepted as the Provisional Govt of Yugoslavia. For some months before the cessation of hostilities he had been in effect immobilized as a military leader, largely, as we think, on political grounds. As regards his military operations in the last year the reports have been so contradictory that final judgment should be reserved.

Since Marshal Tito and his Govt have publicly proclaimed the verdict as well as the "trial" if Mihajlovic falls into their hands, his case should be considered from the point of view of the general instability in Yugoslavia in this interim period. We think therefore that in no circumstances should he be turned over to the Yugoslav authorities as the situation now stands. Later, and depending on the war crimes procedures which may be adopted, it might be necessary to review this position. We could reasonably hold, however, that in view of the political character of the case, he should not be returned to Yugoslavia until there is satisfactory evidence that the present provisional Govt has fulfilled its obligation to set up a representative administration and has relaxed the rigid controls under which democratic freedoms are now denied to the Yugoslav people though the military justification therefore no longer exists.

We consider the question to be one transcending Mihajlovic personally, in that the Nationalist movement is a major political element entitled to a voice in determining the future of Yugoslavia. There is a clear obligation under the Yalta formula to prevent the elimination of such groups or leaders or at least to determine the procedures for examining the evidence upon which the charges against Mihajlovic are allegedly based.

Sent to Caserta; repeated to Belgrade.

860h.00/7-645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, July 6, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 5:35 p. m.]

236. Deptel 156 June 25.¹⁰ We and the OWI here feel that for US to supply true accounts of local developments for broadcasts in Serbo-Croat is apt to lead to denunciatory Yugo press and radio replies and is going to do more harm than good.

Problem here is not to inform Yugos of the facts of their dictatorship which are widely known. Basic need is for picture of American policy, statement of its purposes when it impinges on Yugos as in Trieste, and for vigorous presentation of American opinion about Yugos. In exceptional cases as in Gen. Fox's¹¹ answer to Dachau charges, material originating here will be sent for radio use. We also assume our daily press review telegrams are made available to OWI for use and information.

In any case we shall send weekly suggestions for topics and radio treatment. First suggestions, most of which are of continuing importance, follow :

1. Use reports from Trieste showing fairness of Allied admin, ease with which Yugos may cross border into Trieste, general sanity of our handling of difficult problems.

2. Serious problem here handicapping rehabilitation is failure of Yugos to show signs of demobilization either in fact or spirit. Army grows as more classes are called up. Our army plans for releasing hundreds of thousands even though war in Pacific continues should be described. Point should be clearly made that Americans wonder why Yugos does not start beating their Bren Guns into ploughs, why it continues to beat its breast with warlike talk.

3. Some steps might be taken to counteract press campaign over Macedonia which is heading for trouble. Any US editorial opinion questioning warlike spirit of Yugo press would be valuable as would any suggestion that as spirit of new covenant of United Nations a non-partisan, non-Yugo, non-Greek committee investigate area and report.

4. American interest in forthcoming elections in liberated areas might be made more specific by emphasis on parties, their freedom in America and by pointing out our expectation that old parties in Yugo will be permitted similar freedom to campaign.

Rptd Rome as 20 for Linen, USIS.

SHANTZ

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ Possibly Brig. Gen. Leon A. Fox of the U.S. Typhus Commission.

740.60h114/7-1245: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, July 12, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received July 13—12: 50 a. m.]

262. Yugoslav prisoners of war from Germany are being officially received here with suspicion and often ill treatment. We feel State and War Departments should know this because of role USA officers play in repatriation and consequent responsibility returning men and their families believe them to bear.

Majority of POWs were captured in April, 41 have been over 4 years in prison. Nevertheless, according to testimony of several relatives, they are coldly received by Partisans, officers frequently stripped of insignia and decorations. They are ridiculed as "King Peter's Army", warned against expressing pro-American or British sentiments and given short leave in home villages before having to join Partisan Army. Numerous cases men and officers refusing to accept Red Star of Tito and imprisoned as result. Many returning prisoners kept in confinement for no given reason while wives, children or parents gather outside the prison hoping for glimpse of the men. Many those released soon exasperated by political situation here, by unhappiness of families, prevalence of espionage and frequent arrests for outspoken criticism. Some POWs had their watches, shoes and clothes stolen by Partisans.¹²

Sergeant who returned from Stalag 13 near Nuremburg June 22 came to Embassy yesterday to say he will do anything at risk of life to return to his camp to warn 8000 officers and men, also those of nearby camps through prisoners' underground of conditions prevailing here and undesirability returning. Says he was sent by camp to investigate and his report anxiously awaited. Also says relatives of prisoners whom he visited to give news of these men insist men should not come home now.

In view of this, suggest US authorities responsible for repatriation of Yugoslav POWs give them chance to inform selves fully as possible about conditions in Yugoslavia and to make up minds freely and individually about their future.¹³ Our sources indicate many would be glad to join US Army in war against Japan.

SHANTZ

¹² Telegram 2897, July 7, 1945, from the U.S. Political Adviser, Caserta, reported from British sources that many repatriated prisoners were arrested immediately upon their return to Yugoslavia and were sentenced in some cases to as much as 5 years' imprisonment (740.60h114/7-745).

¹³ In despatch 80, July 16, 1945, from Belgrade, the Second Secretary of Embassy, William N. Fraleigh, wrote: "The fate of these returning prisoners presents a problem to which the American Government would seem to owe some attention. The impression among many people of Belgrade as well as the

(Footnote 13 continued on p. 1246.)

[For further documentation on political developments in Yugoslavia during the month of July, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, Volume I, pages 826-840. For documentation on the discussions of the Yugoslav question at the Berlin Conference, see *ibid.*, index entries under Yugoslavia, Volume I, page 1088, and Volume II, page 1644.]

740.00119 Control (Italy)/8-445: Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, August 4, 1945—noon.

[Received 6:39 p. m.]

3187. Re our 2162, May 14, 11 p. m.¹⁴ We have just learned that despite our informing Chief of Staff,¹⁵ Chief Administrative Officer, Resident Minister,¹⁶ and G-5 section¹⁷ of Department's views as set forth in Deptel 484, May 15, 7 p. m.,¹⁸ the instructions contained in Robertson's draft telegram in which we did not concur were carried out. Thus between May 23 and 31 following were turned over to Tito: 12196 Croats, 5480 Serbs, 8263 Slovenes, 400 Monte[ne]grins.

While British field military authorities reported that Tito troops to whom these "anti-Allied Yugos" were handed over accepted them formally and correctly, and that no reliable evidence of their subsequent treatment was available, Miha Krek, former Deputy Prime Minister of Royal Yugo Govt has addressed a letter to SAC¹⁹ requesting that no more be turned over to Tito, that those still alive be pro-

(Footnote 13 continued from p. 1245.)

prisoners themselves is that the Americans are helping these men to return without due regard to the conditions awaiting them, and of course this is true though the American responsibility is not quite as the Yugoslav public sees it. The problem is similar to that presented by the brutal treatment of men and families of men who joined Mihailovic, in which the American Government also bears a share of responsibility, at least in the eyes of many Yugoslavs, for having at one time supported Mihailovic's movement." (740.60h114/7-1645)

¹⁴ Not printed. In this telegram, the U.S. Political Adviser reported that unmanageable numbers of refugees and prisoners of war were materially hampering military operations in northern Italy. Accordingly, Lt. Gen. Sir Brian H. Robertson, the Chief Administrative Officer at Allied Force Headquarters, had requested Mr. Kirk's concurrence in a draft telegram authorizing the British 8th Army to turn over to the Yugoslav Partisans a large number of dissident Yugoslav troops. Mr. Kirk replied that he could not concur without referring the matter to his Government. (740.00119 Control (Italy)/5-1445)

¹⁵ Lt. Gen. William D. Morgan.

¹⁶ Harold Macmillan.

¹⁷ Military government section.

¹⁸ Not printed; this telegram approved Mr. Kirk's refusal to concur in General Robertson's draft telegram, and instructed him to inform the Supreme Allied Commander that "we are strongly of the opinion that such contemplated violation of agreed Anglo-American policy cannot be justified on grounds of administrative expediency." (740.00119 Control (Italy)/5-1445)

¹⁹ Supreme Allied Commander.

tected by Allied Missions, and enclosed "eye witness" accounts by escapees of mass murder by Tito's forces of hundreds of those surrendered.

We have also seen a telegram from Brit Major Gen. Hurray²⁰ who executed Robertson's orders stating that he collected these people together and then instructed them to march without giving them any indication as to their destination. When they reached their destination and realized they were being turned over to Yugo forces some of them attempted to escape and a few were fired at by Yugo guards.

If Dept wishes further action taken in matter we will be glad to receive instructions.

Dept may wish to give consideration to plight of some 70,000 Yugo displaced persons majority of whom are unable to return to their country. They are living in most cases in open air in stadiums or athletic fields and while their lot is tolerable during summer weather it will not be so during winter. See our 3152 of Aug. 1, 3 p. m.²¹ KIRK

860h.01/8-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 10, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received 7:14 p. m.]

8100. Foreign Office official today made following remarks about statements of Tito²² and King Peter:²³

1. The King was unwise in making precipitate statement despite Tito's provocation. Whole Yugoslav situation regarding monarchical question will be discussed thoroughly with Bevin²⁴ on Monday. Of-

²⁰ Possibly Maj. Gen. Horatius Murray, commander of the 6th Armoured Division (British).

²¹ Not printed; this telegram reported that former Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill had recently expressed concern to the Supreme Allied Commander over the fate of political refugees who refused to return to their native country. Mr. Churchill said that "every person . . . who was forced to return to his native country was a future enemy of England." (800.4016 DP/8-145)

²² Reference is to a speech delivered by Marshal Tito to the delegates of the National Liberation Front in Belgrade on August 7. Marshal Tito urged the creation of a liberal republican regime, and declared that monarchy was "incompatible with democracy" in the Yugoslavia of the future. Since the monarchy was "outmoded, tyrannical institution rejected by the vast majority of the people," King Peter and all of the reactionary *émigrés* were to be barred from the country. (See the *New York Times*, August 8, 1945, p. 1, col. 3.)

²³ In telegram 8032, August 9, 1945, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom reported that on the previous day King Peter had issued a statement in which he charged that Marshal Tito's words were "the final repudiation" of the Tito-Subasich agreements. After pointing out in some detail Marshal Tito's past failures to live up to the agreements, the King concluded: "I consider that the Regents have not been allowed to perform my constitutional duties and that they have overlooked their oaths and obligations given to me. I hereby proclaim that they can no longer represent me or work in my name. I have therefore decided to withdraw the authority which I gave to them." (860h.01/8-945)

²⁴ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ficial stated in strictest confidence that Bevin had shown no inclination to depart from former Govt's policy towards Tito;

2. Ambassador Stevenson wired that Yugoslav Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs²⁵ called on him and said that Subasic might be forced to make statement following King's action. Stevenson told Under Secretary that in his personal opinion it would be better to avoid such statement if possible and if necessary should be made only on legalistic lines. Ambassador continued by expressing opinion to Under Secretary that Tito-Subasic agreement was still in force and therefore the Regency Council would also continue remain in force despite King's action.

Foreign Office official said that Stevenson's attitude was probably correct but that British policy on this matter would not be clarified before Monday.

Sent Department as 8100; repeated Belgrade as 10.

WINANT

860h.00/8-1145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, August 11, 1945.

[Received August 12—1 a. m.]

358. As already reported by press third session Avnoj met August 7 and adopted motion enlarging itself by inclusion following groups:

36 members of 1938 Parliament including Subasic and Sutej, 69 representatives political groups including Grol and Kosanovic with 6 seats still vacant, and 13 individual additions.

At final session August 9 Avnoj proclaimed itself Provisional National Parliament. Minister Kardelj read declaration on behalf Yugoslav government recounting history or legally [*historical legality?*] and concluding: "Until the final decision of the Constituent [*Constituent*] Assembly regarding the form of government is concluded, the royal Regents will continue to remain the only source and executors of the royal prerogative, and until such time King Peter II cannot constitutionally and legally assume any governmental or royal authority except the nomination of new regents, as the agreement of 1 November 1944 provides, in the event of the death or resignation of the above mentioned Regents."

Following is brief press summary of law on electoral lists adopted by Provisional Parliament yesterday.²⁶

²⁵ Stoyan Gavrilovich.

²⁶ In telegram 390, August 23, 1945, from Belgrade, the Chargé reported that the Provisional Parliament passed the electoral law by a vote of 370 to 16 on August 22. He also reported that people were already being refused the right to vote under the sweeping terms of the law. (860h.00/8-2345)

Permanent lists of voters will be established for all elections of government and court officials in each local, village, ward, and municipal district.

All male and female citizens of Yugoslavia over 18 years as all present and former soldiers in Yugoslav Army, Army National Liberation and Partisan detachments regardless of age will have right to vote and be elected with following exceptions: (1) Ministers in Cabinets from 6 January 1929 to 5 February 1939 except those distinguished by their activities in struggle against occupier; (2) members of all military formations which fought against Yugoslavs; (3) members of German Kulturbund or Italian Fascist organizations; (4) active officials and prominent members of all Quisling organizations includ[ing] those of Nedich, Lyotich,²⁷ Mihailovich, White Guard,²⁸ Blue Guard;²⁹ (5) individuals in service of special police under occupier; (6) military and economic collaborators; (7) those deprived of civil rights by Court of National Honor; (8) wards of state.

Exceptions to Article 2 though even will [be?] made in case individuals can prove their activities were under duress or they helped Yugoslav Army.

Local Committees or electoral boards will establish electoral lists, electoral boards will consist of local presiding judges, members of Country Peoples Committee and member Local Peoples Committee, or presiding judge and two members Municipal Peoples Committee, or three members army selected by staff commander. Citizens may appeal to Local Committee electoral board and finally to local court in case names omitted unjustly. Local Committees begin drawing up electoral lists within 20 days after adoption law. The Council of Ministers will issue directives for proper execution of law.

Press publishes long statement made by Grol on electoral law in which stated, "This law cannot be accepted without prior promulgation of general laws which will guarantee civil rights". He concluded statement, "I must announce with regret that group I represent is unable to commit itself regarding these measures and laws and must abstain from voting".

SHANTZ

²⁷ Dimitrije Ljotich, a Serbian Fascist leader associated with the Dobrovoltzi or Serbian Volunteer Guard.

²⁸ The Slovene White Guard, a military formation associated with the Slovene Clerical Party. It fought against the Partisans in collaboration with the Italians and the Germans.

²⁹ A military formation organized in early 1945 out of remnants of Mihailovich's Chetniks in Slovenia and Istria. It fought the Partisans in association with the White Guard and other German-sponsored organizations.

740.00119 Control (Italy)/8-1445: Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, August 14, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received August 14—5:21 p. m.]

3285. On receipt of your telegram 719, August 6³⁰ we addressed memorandum to Supreme Allied Commander in accordance with Department's instructions. We have today been informed by Deputy Chief of Staff³¹ on behalf of Supreme Allied Commander that decision to turn over to Tito Yugoslav nationals under reference was made on grounds of military necessity in view of conditions existing at that time. It was stated that Supreme Allied Commander took note of our nonconcurrence and pointed out that British Resident Minister had concurred in proposed action but that in any event Supreme Allied Commander took his decision because of conditions existing of which he was better aware than Dept. The communication from Deputy Chief of Staff added that in view of divergent political views expressed to him on subject, by Resident Minister and ourselves, Supreme Allied Commander suspended transfer of dissident troops as soon as emergency conditions ceased to exist. It was set forth that while Supreme Allied Commander of course seeks the advice of his political advisers on all occasions he must reserve unto himself right to decide matters of an urgent military nature as he sees fit.

In conversation with Alexander this morning he stated to us that he was obliged to receive surrender of almost 1,000,000 Germans in mid-May and could not deal with anti-Tito Yugoslavs as he would have liked. We stated we had nothing to add to our memorandum under reference except to point out to him again that Resident Minister acted contrary to policy agreed upon after consultation by Department and Foreign Office.

KIRK

860h.00/8-1945: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, August 19, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3:54 p. m.]

380. Grol resigned yesterday morning as Vice Premier. He and his 14 party followers will remain in Avnoj for time being. Copy of his

³⁰ Not printed; this telegram instructed Mr. Kirk to inform Field Marshal Alexander that the Department was unable to understand why the instructions contained in Gen. Robertson's draft telegram, "which did not conform to view of British and U.S. Govts and in our opinion could not be justified on grounds of administrative expediency were not countermanded in time to prevent transfers . . . You should add that we assume that further transfers of such persons to Yugoslav forces have now been halted . . ." (740.00119 Control (Italy)/8-445)

³¹ Probably Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, United States Army.

letter of resignation to Tito is being sent Dept by despatch.³² In broad outline it reiterates his position that present regime is maintaining itself by undemocratic methods, among them Ozna, a large army and terroristic methods; and that under the present system elections will be meaningless.

No other Minister joined Grol in resigning. In talk with Fraleigh³³ he maintained that Subasic would probably join him but for fact that Croats are generally adopting passive attitude towards regime.³⁴ Organized opposition is now limited to Serbia and it will therefore probably be difficult to do anything effective at the moment towards modifying the political situation in Yugo.

Sent Dept, rptd Caserta and Moscow.

SHANTZ

860h.01/8-2245: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, August 22, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received August 23—4: 35 p. m.]

388. In talk with Embassy officer today . . .³⁵ said he and Subasic are not likely to follow Grol in resigning now. He thinks Grol's resignation has made very favorable impression throughout Serbia, but had no further effect. Therefore, although 90 percent of Croatian people are opposed to present regime, nothing can be done until Subasic makes up his mind to act. Subasic knows situation Croatia and is entirely dissatisfied with it, but according to . . . cannot decide to voice his discontent because of preponderating influence of Russia behind present regime.

. . . frightened for own safety surrounds his meetings with Americans and British with great secrecy. He states he has no quarrel with federation or republican system but is against this dictatorship which has filled all prisons and leaves everyone not an ardent Partisan in constant fear. He hopes Subasic will act more boldly after meeting Macek as he now plans to do in Paris early September on way to London for Foreign Ministers meeting.

³² Not printed.

³³ William N. Fraleigh, Second Secretary of Embassy and Vice Consul at Belgrade.

³⁴ In telegram 383, August 21, 1945, from Belgrade, the Chargé reported that Dr. Subasic had informed him that he was "fighting" to have a meeting of the Croatian Peasant Party leaders, but he first had to arrange for the release of large numbers of them from prison. The Chargé further informed the Department: "Grol's resignation has encouraged opponents of regime and given rise to usual fantastic rumors such as arrival of King Peter at Trieste with British naval escort followed [by?] US task force." (860h.00/8-2145)

³⁵ Omissions in this telegram are only name of informant.

. . . receives Deputies regularly from Croatia who tell him he and Subasic are becoming daily more unpopular because of their collaboration with Partisans. They suggest a split away from Subasic. . . discourages this, believing such a split would only increase uncertainty and have no marked effect. He hopes Croatian Peasant Party may soon have congress in Zagreb, although Subasic's coming trip to London and nearness of elections would reduce its usefulness.

Trial of Kosutic and 65 other members of Croatian Peasant Party, including former Deputies and leaders, was to begin before Court of National Honor Zagreb today or tomorrow. Charges, according to . . . are: (1) Advising Domobranci³⁶ not to join Partisans; (2) associating with Lorkovic and Vokic, Ministers in Pavelic Government, in planning *putsch* against Ustachi last year; and (3) meeting Germans in connection with *putsch*. Subasic has had talks with Tito and Kardelj and trial may be called off. This would make congress possible.

. . . summed up present situation as completely lacking in democratic principles and freedom; said he and friends no longer ask for Four Freedoms but would be satisfied now with one: Freedom from Fear. He remarked that new law establishing freedom of press is joke for if paper could be had to print opposition journal no one would dare publish it.

He especially urged that his name not be mentioned in connection with above statements.

Message top secret as to source.

SHANTZ

860h.01/9-445

*Memorandum by the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Patterson),
Temporarily in Washington*³⁷

[WASHINGTON, August 31, 1945.]

I spent thirteen minutes with the President. He first asked me if I were going back soon and I said next week. He then said he had made Tito come to terms on the Trieste problem and I told him what I had put in the memorandum when I went to see Tito on the 72-Hour Ultimatum to him.³⁸ I said I told Tito that without the authority of my government and unofficially he could expect no economic help from my country whatsoever unless he carried out his solemn commitments made at Yalta and upon which we recognized him. The President replied "You did the right thing". I asked him if I could take

³⁶ Domobranci, or Croatian Home Defense Guard.

³⁷ This memorandum was forwarded to the President by Secretary of State Byrnes on September 4, 1945.

³⁸ See vol. iv, p. 1176.

his greetings to Tito and to King Peter and he said "By all means, do so". I said "Mr. President, Tito is colorful, dynamic, hospitable, a military genius, but a thorough Communist, and his economic and political philosophy is not ours. Nevertheless, since he is intelligent I would suggest that I be permitted to bring him back to America for a month of indoctrination,³⁹ provided the elections go reasonably well." The President replied "That's a fine thing and you do it." The President also said "I like the idea". He further stated that I could use a two-fisted, tough policy with Tito.

I told the President that I had a letter from Joe Davies⁴⁰ this morning and that Joe suggested that possibly a constitutional monarchy would work, like England has today. The President replied "A constitutional monarchy sounds good".

Further, I told the President that Tito and I were good friends, that I had seen a good deal of him, and that I was returning with 5,000 cartridges so that we could go hunting at his invitation.

860h.00/9-245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, September 2, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 9:10 p. m.]

425. In talk with Embassy officer today Grol said national elections scheduled November 11⁴¹ cannot solve present situation. Country is now ruled by totalitarian regime and in continual "state of siege." Grol has been meeting leaders of Radical and Socialist Parties with view to possible formation of United Democratic Party composed of men not compromised by collaboration with previous dictatorships. However, he thinks [apparent omission] to polls would be to sanction regime and laws just passed by Provisional Parliament to which he takes violent objection. Furthermore effort to be expended would not be worth the return—possibly 30 or more seats, an impotent minority. Attitude of Croatia he said is decisive but Croats show tendency to return to old passive tactics. Without Croat support coverage of Serbs will be "platonic". According to Grol solution may be looked for from elections if: [1] They are postponed until spring; (2) army

³⁹ In his covering memorandum of September 4, 1945, the Secretary of State informed the President: "I have taken the liberty of telling Patterson not to extend the formal invitation to Tito until I return. I took the liberty of doing this because I thought we should find out what is his attitude toward the Italian settlement before inviting him to visit you. Upon my return I will remind you of it." (860h.01/9-445)

⁴⁰ Joseph E. Davies, American Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1937-38; in Belgium 1938-39.

⁴¹ General elections for the Skupshtina of the Constituent Assembly were to be held on November 11.

is demobilized;⁴² (3) Allies insist on more representative Provisional Government concentrating all political [parties?]; (4) Allies insist on changes in recent laws governing aduinis,⁴³ judiciary and education; (5) [apparent omission] voting is overseen. Postponement of elections another 6 months would allow power of regime to subside to more normal level and large numbers of war prisoners still abroad to return home. Present national [apparent omission] is artificial, consisting [not?] of parties but of individuals. Present national state of siege, proven by recent drastic law against enemies of state, fighting in Homolje, Bosnia, Montenegro, continued harangues about Trieste and against Greece keep country in turmoil not conducive to real election. Order must first be restored.

Besides this Grol said economic conditions, especially lack of food, are so bad that severe crisis is likely in November or December. Harvest has been good in [apparent omission] and fair in Voivodina but drought burned crops in Macedonia and Montenegro, Bosnia has not enough man power, only Podravina has food in Croatia, Dalmatia is wholly dependent already on UNRRA supplies. These conditions make anything like normal political activity out of the question.

SHANTZ

860h.00/9-745 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, September 7, 1945.

[Received September 8—3:45 p. m.]

448. *Glas*⁴⁴ today reports speech of Milovan Djilas to plenary session of anti-Fascist youth executive committee concerning elections and monarchy, excerpts from which follow:

“As far as the elections are concerned, it must be clear to all of us that our enemies—both domestic and the foreign reaction which is helping them—wish to bring into question the fate of our entire struggle at these elections. In other words, is that struggle to end in our final victory or full defeat? In other words, they regard these elections as a question which will decide the destiny of our present democratic federative Yugoslavia. I must say immediately that we, the leaders of the national liberation struggle, do not regard this question in this manner. We do not regard these elections a question of to be or not to be.”

⁴² At this time the Yugoslav army was nearly 700,000 strong and continually increasing in size. The official justification for keeping this many men under arms was to prevent a severe unemployment crisis, of the type that the capitalist powers would face once they began demobilizing. In telegram 424, September 2, 1945, the Chargé in Yugoslavia agreed with Yugoslav opposition leaders that the real purpose of the large army was “to maintain regime by force if necessary and to influence outcome of elections.” (860h.20/9-245)

⁴³ Obvious garble.

⁴⁴ Organ of the National Front.

"We consider, Comrades, that the question of victory of the peoples of Yugoslavia in their basic demands, the question of National Government, the question of making possible conditions for democratic progress, was really settled in our armed struggle and that these elections by the peoples of Yugoslavia should only crown our work and endow the results of our struggle with legality and constitutionally."

"Likewise, Comrades, the reaction wishes to conduct these elections—particularly in regions inhabited by Serbs—on the basis of the question 'either Tito or the King!' Of course, we cannot even consider the line 'either Tito or the King' for the simple reason that we consider that the question of monarchy or republic has already been settled by our struggle."

"What is the purpose, then of the elections, Comrades? Their purpose is to enable us to continue along the line of the national liberation struggle."

SHANTZ

860h.00/9-545

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1945—1 p. m.

4236. Please inform Dr. Machek's secretary that Dept does not consider Machek's visit to this country for object stated would serve useful purpose at this time.⁴⁵ Dept is carefully following developments in Yugoslavia through Embassy in Belgrade and will be happy to receive through your Embassy any views Machek may wish to bring to attention of this Govt.⁴⁶

ACHESON

860h.00/9-1345

*Memorandum of Conversation in London Between the Secretary of State and King Peter II of Yugoslavia*⁴⁷

[LONDON, September 15, 1945.]

This meeting took place Thursday, September 13, 1945, between 9:40 and 10:00 A. M., in the suite of Secretary Byrnes, Room 209, Claridge's Hotel, London.

⁴⁵ In telegram 5327, September 5, 1945, 5 p. m., from Paris, the Department was informed that Dr. Machek had expressed, through his intermediary, Mr. Peshelj, a desire to come to the United States in an attempt to persuade the American Government to intervene in Yugoslavia for the purpose of securing a postponement of the coming elections. Machek reportedly felt that "American policy was now determining factor in Balkans and British would follow our lead." (860h.00/9-545)

⁴⁶ From Caserta, the U.S. Political Adviser, Alexander Kirk, reported in telegram 3428, August 28, 1945, 3 p. m., that Dr. Machek, after discussions with King Peter, believed that a reorganization of the government under the King was still possible. "However only persons he suggested as possible components of new govt were older and largely discredited members of former govt in exile most of whom are still residing in United Kingdom." (860h.01/8-2845)

⁴⁷ This memorandum was prepared by Richard C. Patterson, Jr., Ambassador

(Footnote 47 continued on p. 1256.)

King Peter began the talk by asking the Secretary whether the Council of Ministers would discuss Yugoslavia's internal affairs, and the Secretary's reply was "No". With this "no" he carefully explained why; namely, that the agenda laid down at Potsdam for this meeting⁴⁸ must be adhered to; that the first subject for discussion was Italy and the second subject was the Bulgarian peace treaty.

The King then suggested to the Secretary that if the Council took up Italy, it must of necessity bring up Trieste. And that if the Council discussed Bulgaria, it would be called upon to discuss Macedonia. The King therefore concluded that either or both subjects would draw the Council's attention to Yugoslavia.

Secretary Byrnes said he was cognizant of this but that the Council must do its best to adhere to the prepared agenda.

If my memory serves me correctly, the Secretary also stated that the question of international waterways, and the subject of Germany and Roumania, would be discussed.

King Peter said that the four freedoms guaranteed by the Allies did not exist in Yugoslavia, and that Marshal Tito had violated all his promises to the Allies in that he had ignored his commitments outlined in the Tito-Subasic agreement, to which the Secretary replied, in essence, that he had been informed of this.

The King respectfully urged Secretary Byrnes to bring up this problem at the Council meeting, to which the Secretary replied that the Council will last a long time, and said: "We will be meeting again three weeks after this conference is over". (The King thought that the Secretary meant that the five ministers would convene again after this session was over, but I advised him that the Secretary referred to the scheduled conferences of deputies).

The King, in addition to stressing the point that there is no freedom in Yugoslavia, said that the elections set for November 11 would not be a free expression of the people's will. The King urged the Secretary to see that an Allied commission went to Yugoslavia in order to supervise events so that the elections would not be rigged, but would be open and free. The King suggested that this commission decide when conditions were ripe for free voting and postpone the elections until such was the case. At this suggestion the Secretary looked at the King as if he might have a good idea, but made no comment. King Peter said: "If you permit the elections to be held now, and they are

(Footnote 47 continued from p. 1255.)

to Yugoslavia, temporarily in London, who was present at the interview, and was directed to Cavendish W. Cannon, First Secretary of Embassy in Lisbon, who was detailed as a political adviser to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, September 11 to October 2, 1945. For documentation on this meeting, see vol. II, pp. 99 ff.

⁴⁸ See chapter II, paragraph (3) (1) of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, August 2, 1945, *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, vol. II, p. 1500.

not free, then you will be forced not to recognize the government which results from such elections." To this Secretary Byrnes indicated that was a possibility.

The King explained to the Secretary how Tito's soldiers march from one village to another to vote in municipal elections, which the King stated the soldiers have a right to do whenever they are in a village or town at the time of a local election. In other words, The King said they could vote more than once, and whenever there was some doubt in a city as to how the election would go, the soldiers would arrive just in time to cast their ballot. Secretary Byrnes seemed to be amused at this, and I expressed the opinion that Tammany might be interested in this system.

King Peter then said: "We have had many nice words and promises from the Allies but no action." The Secretary replied, in essence, that on that point many people agree.

As the King prepared to depart he showed Secretary Byrnes a letter, dated May 8, 1945, from Prime Minister Churchill, prior to the Trieste incident, in which Mr. Churchill wrote: "I cannot conceal from Your Majesty that events so far have disappointed my best hopes, and that there is much which is happening in Yugoslavia that I regret but am unable to prevent".

With reference to supplementing the agenda the Secretary explained to the King that the Chinese had called upon him to raise new questions about Japan and that he had been forced to refuse to take these questions up at the present Council meeting.

I believe the above is the essence of what transpired two days ago, and that I am substantially correct in what I have here set down.

The King said he enjoyed his opportunity to talk with Secretary Byrnes, and that he had confidence that the Secretary would see to it that the Yalta Declaration was carried out.

860h.00/9-1545 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, September 15, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received September 15—3:55 p. m.]

461. Subasic is still in bed from effects of stroke.⁴⁹ Sutej told us last night this unlucky circumstance and bad weather have combined undo 5 months' planning of Peasant Party leaders. Subasic trip⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Foreign Minister Subasich suffered a stroke on September 11, 1945.

⁵⁰ Dr. Subasich, who had just returned from political discussions in Croatia, had planned to leave Belgrade for Paris on September 11 where he expected to discuss the Croatian political situation with the exiled Croatian leader, Dr. Vladko Machek. From Paris he hoped to go on to London where the Council of Foreign Ministers was meeting and have discussions with political leaders there including the Secretary of State.

would have revealed to world his final realization of impossibility of continuing on present basis with Tito. After talks with Macek and Allied leaders in London, including Molotov, Subasic was to have returned to Belgrade to enter his name with list of opposition candidates before deadline of Sept 30. It was hoped opposition would receive support from London and Washington and elections would be postponed. Sutej has been talking with Grol on plans for joint Serb-Croat electoral list.

With Subasic ill, Sutej feels they must proceed without benefit of previous direct contact with Macek and Allied leaders. Sutej feels he must take responsibility on behalf of Peasant Party and by Monday, 17th, either enter opposition list or decide not to participate. He told us he will welcome advice from America and England, whose interest he feels Subasic and now he represents in Provisional Govt.

Last evening secretary of Subasic asked British Ambassador to call on Subasic, but when Stevenson arrived at his home a few minutes later Ozna guards stopped him from entering grounds. Today Velebit apologized for this, explaining that Subasic has right arm and leg paralyzed, and five doctors in attendance who have ordered that he see no one, not even Tito.⁵¹ Doctors said it would be over a week before they would know whether Subasic will recover. Sutej tells us that two of the doctors are Russian specialists who came here to treat Tito's son for serious wound from pistol shot a few weeks ago.

[SHANTZ]

860h.01/9-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, September 21, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 7:10 p. m.]

483. Remytel 482⁵² to Dept and 33 to London September 21. After issuance of communiqué Grol said opposition list was ready for issuance until last minute deadline. It was not presented owing to internment of Subasic and confusion of Croats. Serbs agreed from beginning among selves not to enter lists under existing conditions but

⁵¹ The Chargé reported in telegram 490, September 22, 1945, that he had seen Dr. Subasich the day before, in the presence of a nurse. He reported that Dr. Subasich was in low spirits and complaining about being prevented from seeing anyone. The Chargé concluded: "I am convinced despite Subasich's present condition that he has been kept incommunicado for political purposes." (860h.002/9-2245)

⁵² Not printed; the Chargé reported that the opposition leaders on September 20 issued a communiqué in which they castigated the Tito regime on its election policy and concluded by declaring: "A constituent assembly based on such elections cannot have either the right or the opportunity to solve the weighty problems of the country. Because of these reasons the coalition of democratic parties in the opposition, Democrats and Agrarians, will not establish their electoral ticket." (860h.00/9-2145)

accepted Croat wish to propose list headed by Subasic in order to induce Subasic to resign. Subasic, sick and weak, first wanted form semi-opposition group and not resign as Minister of Foreign Affairs until later. Serbs could not accept part in parallel rather than genuinely opposing group. Then Subasic subjected [*objected?*] to denouncing laws for which as member of front he had voted. Serbs suggested he simply denounce regime as having failed to carry out Tito-Subasic agreement. Grol says Subasic made promises to Russians and until late hour still hoped to play along with them. Now, however, after his internment in which he has been unable to speak privately even with own secretary, Pocrnic, Grol thinks Subasic finally realizes he no longer holds Tito's confidence and being on every side denounced and discredited has no further illusions. His resignation may therefore be expected. Sutej is ready to lead Croats in disowning him if he does not resign.

Croats badly need leadership. Their two main leaders are abroad, others imprisoned in Zagrab, two still members of Tito Government. Majority according to Grol are still following Machek's lead, and this is added reason why list could not be presented for Machek has come out against elections under present laws and regime.

Grol reemphasized mounting terror against opposition with following latest examples: (1) peasants in Belina carried off in truck at night to unknown destination; (2) lawyer at Palanka, leaving to see Grol, attacked and badly beaten, sent to hospital with taunt "now go see your Grol". Grol says only possible steps now are with aid of foreign intervention to demobilize huge army and nullify elections. Otherwise country's greatest calamity will be upon it. Opposition declaration made jointly with all groups will appear soon perhaps in first issue of Grol's paper *Democracy*. Publication due begin next Thursday on weekly basis.

Sent Department; repeated London as No. 34.

SHANTZ

860h.00/9-2745: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, September 27, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 5:15 p. m.]

505. We believe time has come for our Govt to state publicly opinion that present conditions in Yugoslavia make it impossible for elections on November 11 to express free will of the people, and that postponement is necessary until primary freedoms are found to exist.

Our policy of helping liberated countries (tangibly expressed in UNRRA) was adopted in part to prevent conditions of starvation

and anarchy giving rise to violence and dictatorship. We have sought to foster atmosphere of freedom in which peoples could create democratic institutions of their own choice. Yet a relatively small group of Communists, inspired and directed by Moscow, has succeeded in foisting a ruthless totalitarian police regime on the Yugoslavs. For this state of affairs we, and to a greater degree the British, are partially responsible.

Govt leaders here have already said enough to condemn the elections as fraud against democracy. They have stated that question of regime has already been decided and elections will only serve to confirm and legalize it. The regime and its chief public agency, the "National Front", are in effect tools of Central Committee of Communist Party. Tito is an agent of Moscow. To allow this regime to consolidate its position unchallenged is to abandon all prospect for democracy in this country. To call this Yugoslavia democratic is as fraudulent as to call it federative. The federal governments have no power and all orders come from Belgrade (Moscow).

An all pervading sense of fear dominates country. It is manifest, everywhere, in private as in public life of the people. In cities regime has its committees and spies in every house and block. Its opponents live in daily fear of arrest by Ozna and punishment as "enemies of the people". We are certain that thousands whose greatest offense is that they or their relatives do not support the National Front have been crossed off election lists. There is no sadder commentary upon the situation than remarks of people who defied Nazi military might at its peak that "perhaps Hitler was right after all". On all sides one hears that in comparison with Ozna the Gestapo was mild institution.

In July Tito said he had army of 700,000, double the number in wartime and still growing. Each day witnesses fresh groups of ragged draftees being herded to induction centers while more labor is badly needed for farming and reconstruction. There is no justification for such army, for Yugo is not threatened by foreign aggression. Its real purpose is to serve ends of regime, as means of forcible indoctrination and reservoir of force to compel compliance with Government's demands. We are certain that there is ample material in Department, as in War, Navy and Intelligence agencies, to support our opinion.

We here can see nothing we can do for the unfortunate people of Yugo except to use moral force to lighten tyranny of regime and prepare way for change in govt. Whether this change comes about or not, we are convinced of our obligation to make our position clear to world and to attempt to redress harm we have done by our part

in establishing Tito in power. We believe that whether or not other Allied Govts join with us, we owe it to ourselves and the Yugoslav people to state plainly that we do not consider conditions envisioned at Yalta and elsewhere to have been met. We must do this if high trust and hope Yugoslavs in general have come over many years to have in America is not to be lost. This valuable asset, not gained by any propaganda or deliberate act of ours, exists in spite of the covert anti-American anti-British campaign of government which calls us reactionaries and Fascists.

We realize that mere postponement of elections will not be permanent remedy and possibly will serve to allow regime to tighten its controls. Therefore we suggest that concurrently with public statement of dissatisfaction, Tito and our Allies be informed that certain conditions must be met if our friendly and cooperative interest is to be retained. We have in mind particularly following:

1. Recognition that Tito-Subasic agreement has failed to establish democratic processes in Yugo. (We consider decision of opposition not to enter elections, Embtel 476 of Sept. 20,⁵³ as concrete evidence of this.)

2. A new provisional arrangement must be made under which popular political leaders can share in the govt. This can only be done if National Front is abolished, if Communist Party enters govt as party only, if normal police and juridical administrations are restored, and an army proportionate to Yugo's world position is maintained. Further, guarantees of freedom from fear, personal freedom, liberty of press, freedom of assembly and association, and universal franchise set forth in the Tito-Subasic agreement must be given reality. Any new Govt constituted under these conditions would of course be free to review and repeal legislation passed by Tito's hand-picked Provisional Parliament.

3. Continued failure of Tito to cooperate in carrying out assurances given at Yalta would force us to consider withdrawing our recognition of his regime.

Finally, we are aware that action such as we recommend may bring in its wake renewed persecution of democratic elements in country who are friendly to us and look to us for aid. But we believe that with the confirmation that regime would claim from spurious election now proposed, savage treatment would be meted out to these groups anyway. On positive side, action we propose should give opportunity for new leaders to arise and with natural vigor of the people thus liberated enable the Yugoslavs to free themselves from foreign control and regain self govt. If this new govt also took form of dictatorship, it would at least be indigenous one set up in line with long standing traditions under which Yugoslav people lived before war in relative happiness.

SHANTZ

⁵³ Not printed.

860h.012/10-645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Hohenthal) to the Secretary of State

Belgrade, October 6, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3:12 p. m.]

531. Re Department's telegram 321 of September 28.⁵⁵ New Yugoslav law on abrogation of citizenship passed by Provisional Parliament became effective August 28.

In summary, it provides that citizenship shall be lost by all active or reserve commissioned or non-commissioned officers of former Yugoslav army captured by enemy who refuse to return to their country, all adherents and political leaders of Quisling military formations in service of [occupier] who withdrew from Yugoslav territory with enemy, and other adherents of such formations who left country earlier. They may, however, avoid losing citizenship if within 2 months of official announcement that repatriation has been effected in zone wherein they reside they declare before Yugoslavia diplomatic or military representatives or their delegates their readiness to return to Yugoslav. If illness or distance of separation so justifies, time limit can be extended. Other articles provide for expediting their return; that loss of citizenship under this law or return to the country does not prevent bringing charges against persons in question for other crimes against country; that Ministers of Interior and National Defense are jointly responsible for execution of this law.

Text follows by airgram.⁵⁵

HOHENTHAL

860h.00/10-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, October 9, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 10—11:12 a. m.]

540. Grol told us last night of resignation of Subasic, Sutej, and Vice President of National Bank Juncikovic, [all Croats?]. Their decision, he said, was reached after long talks on Friday and Saturday between Subasic and Sutej. In strongly worded letter of resignation, copy of which Grol has promised to give us, Subasic said terms of his agreement with Tito have not been carried out and therefore his responsibility to people does not permit him to continue in government. Sutej's resignation, according to Grol, merely said he agreed with Subasic. Sutej has gone to Zagreb to stay.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

Marshal Tito confirmed Subasic's resignation in interview with Mundt-Bolton Congressional group⁵⁶ this morning, but added he had not accepted resignation pending early conference with Subasic. Tito said up to now he had had no serious differences with Subasic and readily made concessions to him whenever minor problems cropped up. Resignation was unexpected and unwelcome, Tito said, adding "I attach great value to our agreement". He did not mention Sutej.

Tito also told the Congressmen program for demobilizing 200,000 has just been completed. This would bring Army's strength down to about 400,000. No further call-ups are expected, he added, mentioning that 70,000 had been demobilized soon after German defeat. He said demobilization for Yugoslavia is social as well as military problem since many soldiers have no homes or livelihood to return to. He asked Congressmen to view events here according to long range aims, which he asserted are in accord with the Yalta Agreement and not by frequent unfortunate mistakes which are not basic. Government is opposed to force, he continued, but conditions after 4 years of war have made necessary some severity at beginning. He said capital punishment will soon be abolished.

Finally, Tito admitted his disappointment in opposition whose motives in abstaining from elections he does not find valid; predicted forthcoming elections will produce new strong opposition within Front itself; said Constituent Assembly thus elected will be short-lived and followed by new election for regular parliament under new constitution.

Congressmen on leaving airport today said Tito's presentation of situation was to them unconvincing and it had hedged on important questions of large army and plight of opposition.

PATTERSON

860h.002/10-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, October 10, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

547. Subasic told us this morning that yesterday afternoon Tito sent him letter accepting his resignation⁵⁷ and Kardelj visited him for a long talk. When Kardelj asked him what his aim was in resigning, he replied that his only aim was to try to improve political

⁵⁶ Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, led by Rep. Frances Bolton (of Ohio) and Rep Karl Mundt (of South Dakota), who visited Belgrade in the course of an extensive European tour.

⁵⁷ A translation of this letter was sent to the Department via airgram A-188, October 20, 1945, from Belgrade; not printed.

situation in country. Subasic still thinks that although his resignation has been accepted Tito may want to confer with him on possible new compromise agreement based on concessions to points raised by Subasic in his letter. Subasic said that for his part compromise might be possible, while if Tito does not want to compromise future of Yugoslavia will be very much more difficult. He still believes Tito man of good will, but doubts whether he has enough personal power to make necessary changes. Subasic said Tito is not a free agent, but is controlled by external and especially by internal forces, mentioning Ozna, Communist Party and Yugoslav Army. Three most powerful men in Yugoslavia, he said, are Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic, head of Ozna. He is not sure of their relations among themselves except what he has been able to observe, and does not know whether Tito and Kardelj understand true situation in country. But Subasic said "If they agree with only one percent of what I have told them, they must be profoundly disturbed".

Subasic prefers not to give us copy of his resignation until he sees whether Tito will want to confer with him. Subasic said he also does not want to cause relations between the Big Three to become any more complicated than they are already; but if called upon by Big Three to give his reasons for resigning, he will do so. At this stage he is not asking for outside help. He feels his first responsibility is to do all he can himself and let the foreign powers help if they will. He is fighting for democracy in Yugoslavia and will continue to fight for it even if out of office. He recalled having told Churchill and Eden in London before coming here that Yugoslav democracy must be fought for in Yugoslavia, not only from Hyde Park. He added, however, that it is very important that elections be postponed. He hopes Tito will realize this and take action of his own free will. Another reason Subasic is unwilling to request outside help, he says, is that he has already been accused "from many sides" of being agent of United States and Great Britain in Yugoslavia.

Subasic said state of his health is dangerous. He has had apoplexy which is likely to recur and must try to be quiet; but he cannot find quiet because of his heavy responsibilities. Situation in country is "terrible, terrible". The people won a glorious victory and expected liberation. Instead they were given reign of terror and are even now in a state of "civil war". Here his eyes filled with tears. To him the question was not only that Yugoslavia had fought for the Allies, suffered much and deserved much in return. That was a comparatively small consideration. Far more important was that the happiness of humanity was at stake, not only here but throughout Europe and world. That was real responsibility of Big Three. He said he had constantly in his mind words of President Truman that, in effect, if we do not achieve total peace, we shall have lost the war.

After situation has clarified in next few days, Subasic would like to go to Zagreb to recuperate. He confirmed resignations of Sutej and Jancikovic, saying he and they with other members of Croatian Peasant Party are united as never before behind leadership of Dr. Machek.

Repeated to Moscow as No. 34.

PATTERSON

740.00116 E.W./10-545: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser,
Allied Force Headquarters*

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1945—1 p. m.

888. Yugoslav Govt has to date requested the surrender to it of some 250 specific Yugoslav nationals desired for trial as war criminals or axis collaborators, traitors, etc. said to be in US or Anglo-American custody. Copies of lists of these individuals as presented to Brit and US authorities are being transmitted to you by air mail.⁵⁸

In consultation with Brit Govt, we have agreed to turn over to Yugoslavs without delay such of these persons as may be in US or Anglo-American custody against whom Yugos have made out prima facie case of collaboration with the enemy or war criminality and who are not wanted as defendants or witnesses in connection with trial major war criminals and we and Brit are informing Yugos that we consider acceptable prima facie case has been made against the 40 persons named on list 1, the 20 named on list 2 except nos. 2, 6, 8 and 20, and against Dr. Ante Pavelic named in separate request no. 3. As regards list 4, except for certain individuals also named on lists 1 and 2, we desire additional showing of collaboration or war criminality and as for list 5 no specific charges have been presented. (Caserta's desp 1283, Aug 28; Vienna's tel 228, Sept 19; Berlin's tel 693 Oct 5).⁵⁹

According to Dept's and Brit information following on list 1: Milan Acimovic (no. 2), Milosav Vasiljevic (no. 3), Stefan Ivanic (no. 4), Dusan Pantic (no. 5), Djura Dokic (no. 8), Borivoje Jonic (no. 15), Miroslav Spalajkevic (no. 19), Jovan Popovic (no. 23), Miodrag Djordjevic (no. 26), Ilija Paranos (no. 27), Bozidar Becarevic (no. 28), and Kosta Musicki (no. 34) have been identified as in US or Anglo-American custody. After ascertaining in each case whether individual is wanted in connection trial of major war criminals you should advise US or Anglo-American military authorities to which you are attached to turn over to Yugos without delay any of these 12 who may be in custody of such authorities.

⁵⁸ Copies of these lists have not been found in Department files.

⁵⁹ None printed.

In addition, any of remainder on lists 1 or 2 (except nos. 2, 6, 8 and 20), and Ante Pavelic may be turned over in this manner when found within US or Anglo-American jurisdiction. Dept has conflicting information concerning whereabouts Milan Nedic (no. 1 on list 1), Leon Rupnik (no. 1 on list 2) and Dimitrije Ljotic (no. 33 on list 1) and will appreciate positive confirmation that any of them is in US or Anglo-American custody.

Sent to Caserta, Berlin, Vienna, and London for Hodgson and repeated to Belgrade.

BYRNES

860h.51/10-1245

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson)

No. 84

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1945.

The Secretary of State quotes below, for the information of the Officer in charge of the American Mission at Belgrade, an extract relating to Yugoslavia, from a memorandum prepared in the Division of Foreign Economic Development of the Department, concerning the status of loan negotiations with various European countries:

“Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia has requested, in a note dated August 29, 1945,⁶¹ a loan of \$300 million. The Yugoslavs have had various conversations with officers of the Department in regard to this request. The Yugoslavs are preparing a detailed statement of their requirements to support their request, but this has not as yet been received.

“In view of the political situation in Yugoslavia, SE⁶² feels that the United States should be cool toward a loan to Yugoslavia at the present time. The Export-Import Bank is not contemplating any action on the request until questions of policy are settled by the Department. It is generally agreed, moreover, that the figure of \$300 million is entirely too large.”

860h.00/10-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, October 12, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 6:15 p. m.]

553. Grol received Congressmen Mundt and Bolton at his house Monday at their request. He could not come to Embassy for fear of being attacked in the streets. He reported that Govt speakers at pre-election rally Sunday called him “traitor” and “foreign agent” and so harangued crowds that they afterwards wrote his name as “traitor”

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² Division of Southern European Affairs.

on streetcars and marched past his house shouting threats and insults. He said mounting mob violence against opposition is not necessarily Govt's desire but is direct result of continued press campaign and haranguing speeches condemning all opposition as enemies of the people. He told Congressmen one reason he abstained from elections was that, as he fears to appear publicly for his own safety, he cannot ask his followers to expose themselves to similar danger.

He stressed need for postponing elections, but when Congressmen asked if he wanted American help, he replied "Your help must be given in Moscow."

PATTERSON

860h.00/10-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, October 13, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

562. In view of latest developments in Yugo which are of greatest importance I consider it immediately necessary to make following review of position here with further urgent recommendations and suggestions.

We have already recommended to Department that it should now be made clear to Tito and to world that we do not consider that Yalta declarations have been complied with in Yugo (Embtel 505 of September 27). We have reported that Grol, leader of opposition in Serbia, resigned from Government in protest against Government's undemocratic and terroristic methods under which elections would be meaningless (Embtel 380 of August 19) and has since consistently reported to us a worsening situation, until now he is afraid to leave his house (Embtel 540 of October 9). Sutej also, though having no quarrel with federation of [*or?*] republican system could not support the present dictatorship which he told us was opposed by 90% of Croats (Embtel 388 of August 22) and has awaited only resignation of Subasic to resign, as he has now done (Embtel 540 of October 9). Lazar Markovic prominent leader of Radical Party outside Tito's front has been imprisoned (Embtel 442 of September 6)⁶³ and still awaits trial in solitary confinement. Archbishop Stepinac, with other leaders of Catholic church in Croatia, has published an oral letter strongly condemning present government on 14 charges ranging from sentencing priests to death without fair trial for political views to spreading materialistic and atheistic spirit throughout country. We are airmailing translation of this document to Department.⁶³ We have reported that Metropolitan Josip, acting head of Serbian Church,

⁶³ Not printed.

has long made known his opposition to the Regime largely because of its brutal and undemocratic methods.

Now at last Subasic himself party to agreement which brought this Provisional Government into existence has resigned in protest to terrible situation in country and reign of terror that has been brought upon the people (Embtel 547 of October 10).

With the resignation of Subasic last elements in government which were not Partisan or inextricably bound up with the Partisans have joined opposition, an opposition which, however, is forced by Regime's repressive tactics and use of force and violence to abstain from the elections. Therefore we consider that it is now more than ever incumbent upon my Government to take action as recommended in our telegram No. 505 of September 27, i.e. to tell Tito and world that we are dissatisfied with his Government and that we insist upon the fulfillment of Yalta declarations. We have a right to do this especially since Tito-Subasic agreement on basis of which we recognized Tito is now dead. Moreover, we feel we must do this in interests of American prestige and world peace. Finally since elections have been set for November 11 there is an ever narrowing time limit. Action should be taken not the day before elections which would expose us to accusations of having waited until all arrangements for elections had been completed and might defeat our purpose, time for action seems to us now—in next few days.

I have an engagement to see Tito on Thursday October 18 at 5 o'clock and I request that Department authorize me to tell him plainly at that meeting the views of my Government. I would like to tell him that internal situation is more terrible than ever and shows no sign of moderation; that so long as present conditions exist he can expect no American economic help; and that if elections are held without effective participation of all important democratic groups my Govt could not recognize resulting govt. I propose that statement I make to him should specifically recommend postponement of elections, and afterwards be made public from here as the official American point of view. This would be consistent with instructions given me in Washington by the President and by State Department officials in Washington and London to insist strongly to Marshal Tito that he fulfill Crimea declarations.

I urge that Dept decide promptly on course of action to be taken and advise me accordingly.

PATTERSON

740.00119 Council/10-1545 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1945—8 p. m.

9142. Secdel 175. For Dunn.⁶⁴ Ambassador Patterson reports from Rome⁶⁵ conversation with you on Sept 18, which he interprets as authorizing him, in the event his direct approaches to Tito fail to obtain fulfillment of some of Tito's commitments under the Tito-Subasic agreement, to "make local speeches in Belgrade and send Tito *aide-mémoires*, copies of which Ambassador could give to foreign correspondents." Patterson adds "those speeches and *mémoires* would accuse Tito of bad faith and non-fulfillment of his obligations, at the same time pointing out the value to the Yugoslav people of carrying out his commitments."

As consequences of this proposed course obviously might be far reaching, we are instructing Ambassador Patterson by repeating this telegram to him at Belgrade, that at such time as he feels he has exhausted the possibilities of direct approach to Tito in the normal manner, he should consult Dept further before embarking on a campaign of local public addresses or making any statements which would in effect constitute an appeal to the Yugoslav people over Tito's head. In meantime, he may reemphasize to Tito our support of Yalta Declaration.

Sent to London, rptd to Belgrade.

BYRNES

740.00119 Council/10-1745 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 17, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

10845. Delsec 128 from Dunn. Reference Secdel 175 Embassy number 9142 October 15, 8 p. m. I never said anything of the kind to Ambassador Patterson. I told him it was an Ambassador's role to deal directly and persuasively with the Government to which he was accredited. The Ambassador said that he was continually being called upon by press groups and others to make speeches in Belgrade

⁶⁴ James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, who served as deputy to the Secretary of State at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, September 11 to October 2, 1945. At the conclusion of the Conference Mr. Dunn remained in London for some weeks.

⁶⁵ Reference is to a letter from Ambassador Patterson to the Secretary of State, September 27, 1945, not printed.

and elsewhere and asked whether it would be advisable to criticize the Government in any of those speeches. I told him that this was a matter which should not be decided without a presentation of the situation to the Department and a request for instructions from the Department. I did say that one thing which seemed to me to be always in order was a statement of the facts in the event the press were not allowed freedom of entry into the country and freedom of reporting of events to the outside world. I said even reference to this should not be made until after the matter had been called to the attention of the Yugoslav Government and no satisfaction was obtained. I would not think this a particularly appropriate moment to stir up the Yugoslav political situation.

Repeated to Belgrade. [Dunn.]

GALLMAN

860h.00/10-1745 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 17, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received October 17—6:45 p. m.]

10877. British Ambassador to Belgrade who is in London today remarked to Foreign Office official that in his opinion although Moscow would not always back Tito to the hilt it would not take any action which would jeopardize the position of Communist Party in Yugo. Stevenson therefore did not believe that Soviets would ever associate themselves with any representations to Tito regarding internal structure of Yugo or suggestions regarding elections.

Sent to Department as 10877; repeated to Belgrade as 31.

GALLMAN

860h.00/10-1745 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1945—8 p. m.

2179. Dept has given careful study to situation created by resignation from the Yugoslav Govt of Dr. Subasic and has formulated following views:

As the relations of the Allied Govts with the Yugoslav Govt formed in March by Marshal Tito in conjunction with Dr. Subasic were predicated upon the Tito-Subasic agreement which the Allied Govts recommended at the Crimea Conference be put into effect, it seems clear that the departure from that Govt of Dr. Subasic calls for a review by the Allied powers of the position taken by them at Yalta.

It will be recalled that according to the terms of the Tito-Subasic agreement the Govt formed thereunder would "remain in force up to the decision of the Constituent Assembly i. e. until the final constitutional organization of the State will be established." It is also set forth, in connection with the specific guarantees contained therein concerning the freedom of the elections for the Constituent Assembly, that the Govt "will be responsible for the organization of the executive power."

In the circumstances, the question arises whether a Yugoslav Govt so altered during the interim as to contain elements responsive to one of the parties to the Tito-Subasic agreement to the exclusion of the other can be considered a proper instrument to perform the duties toward the whole body of the Yugoslav people devolving upon the united Govt as recommended by the Allied powers. Accordingly, the US Govt suggests that the Soviet and Brit Govts join with the US Govt in expressing to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic their profound hope that no effort will be spared by Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic to find, in direct negotiations between themselves or in concert with the Allies if they so desire, a means of agreement by which the basis for their collaboration in a united interim Govt may be reestablished. The US Govt further feels that the absence of such a unified administration might prejudice the validity, as a free and untrammelled expression of the will of all democratic elements of the people, of any elections conducted under the aegis of one faction of the electorate. Consequently, the US Govt further suggests that, pending the outcome of the negotiations proposed above, the Soviet, Brit, and US Govts also urge upon Marshal Tito that the elections now scheduled for Nov 11 be postponed to a later date.

Please bring the foregoing to the attention of the FonOff and, in informing the FonOff that we will appreciate an early expression of its views in the matter, add that, if agreeable to the Soviet and Brit Govts, the US Govt believes it desirable that a simultaneous approach be made to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic in this sense.

Sent to London and Moscow, repeated to Belgrade.

BYRNES

860h.00/10-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, October 19, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received October 20—1:30 a. m.]

573. I called on Marshal Tito yesterday and in the course of an informal discussion, I emphatically reaffirmed our desire to have Yalta declarations carried out in spirit as well as letter. I told him

that we did not find the Yugoslav people in a situation where they could express themselves freely, vote as they wish, or live without fear. I pointed out that freedom of the press meant nothing when government spokesmen called the opposition traitors and hot-heads were permitted to attack offices and news vendors of the sole opposition paper, as happened this week. I expressed our dissatisfaction that elections promised to be one party affair and with government officials who have publicly stated that only possible outcome is victory for National Front and that any attempt to bring about a different result would be traitorous.

In reply Tito maintained at length that Yalta declarations had been met by enlargement of Avnoj (Yugoslav legislative body anti-Fascist council), passage of laws providing for free elections, free press, et cetera, and arrangements for elections on November 11. He said that the persons who had attacked opposition press had been arrested and would be tried. He did not know what party they represented but suspected they were enemies of the government attempting to make more trouble for it. He said that he genuinely wanted more friendly relations with United States, both for traditional reasons and because Yugoslavia needs our economic and financial help. He added that, speaking personally and not for his group, he felt that western democracies favored the opposition, none of whom had fired a shot against the Germans during the occupation.

Tito then said he wished to explain a situation which I might not be aware of, that there are numerous criminal bands now operating in Bosnia and Croatia. Yugos had trouble with similar groups after last war, but situation now was more serious. Nothing had appeared in the press about this, but their crimes would soon be made public. Preparations are being made to wipe out these bands and he wanted us to understand situation. Misunderstanding might arise because certain "ideological concepts" had been adopted by some of these criminal groups.

Tito's reply contained nothing new and was as unconvincing as the propaganda now pouring out of all government channels. He left me with the impression that he intends to carry out his program regardless of attacks from within or outside the country and despite any representations that might be made to him.

PATTERSON

860h.00/10-2245 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, October 22, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received October 22—5 : 45 p. m.]

11049. Foreign Office official today informed us that British are giving careful consideration to contents of our note based on Department's 9209, October 17,⁶⁶ regarding Yugoslav situation. It appears that late last week British cabled Embassy in Washington to approach Department regarding idea of asking Tito for text of Subasic's letter of resignation.⁶⁷ British wish to avoid accusation against them and US that we connived at Subasic's resignation.

Foreign Office would prefer not to answer our note before learning Department's views regarding Subasic's letter.

GALLMAN

860h.00/10-2445 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State*BELGRADE, October 24, 1945—noon.
[Received 4 p. m.]

580. Department's telegram 353, October 17, 8 p. m.⁶⁶ In Grol's opinion, expressed of course without his knowing Department's views, any attempt to seek new Tito-Subasic agreement is useless. Subasic is sick and weak as well as out of favor with many of his own party members who cannot excuse his joining Front 2 months ago or voting for laws. Grol thinks more important and capable leaders of Croatian Peasant Party should be sought to replace Subasic and suggested Machek or Kosutic. Former is now in exile and latter still imprisoned in Zagreb, but Grol adds personalities are not important. What is needed is government in which all parties are represented. He does not propose laws passed by provisional Parliament be revoked but only corrected in detail and elections be held later under new government and more settled circumstances. He reiterates necessity for replacement of Ozna by ordinary civil police and demobilization of Army as prerequisite for free elections.

Grol states that Tito and Communists are now in such complete control that they are even impeding pre-election campaign of other parties within Front and he foresees 500 or [of] approximately 600 deputies to be elected will be Communist if elections go off as sched-

⁶⁶ Same as telegram 2179 to Moscow, p. 1270.

⁶⁷ In an undated memorandum the British Embassy gave the Department a paraphrase of a telegram to this effect from the Foreign Office, October 20, 1945; not printed.

uled. He said that in effect, if US and UK want Communist regime in Yugoslavia there is nothing to be done. If they do not, they must act immediately to postpone elections.

We agree with Grol that new understanding between Tito and Subasic is probably impossible to realize and that another working arrangement must be reached on lines Grol suggests.

Sent Department, repeated London as 43 and Moscow as 360.

PATTERSON

860h.00/10-2245

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1945—8 p. m.

9488. Deptel 9209 Oct 17. Molotov has now replied to our approach concerning Yugoslav situation in writing along following lines:⁶⁸

Soviet Govt believes there are no grounds for US, UK and Soviet Govts to make any proposals to Yugos Govt on question of collaboration between Tito and Subasic; in addition there is no basis for interference of these three Govts in question of date of Yugos elections; and Soviet Govt takes position that Yugos Govt should be permitted to decide question whether it is proper to postpone elections set for Nov 11 to a later date.

In view of this unwillingness of Soviet Govt to participate in tripartite representations, Dept now suggests that US and UK Govts consider addressing parallel communications to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic setting forth the attitude of the two Govts in the circumstances in the following sense:

“The US Govt has been following developments in post-liberation Yugoslavia with particular attention in the light of the responsibility toward the people of Yugoslavia assumed by the US in conjunction with her Brit and Soviet allies at Yalta. The three signatories to the Crimea Declaration recommended in that Declaration that the agreement between Marshal Tito on behalf of the National Committee of Liberation and Dr. Subasic on behalf of the Royal Yugoslav Govt be put into effect immediately. That agreement provided for the establishment of a unified Govt containing adherents of both parties to exercise the executive authority pending the decision by a freely elected Constituent Assembly on the final constitutional organization of the state. The agreement further called for specific guarantees of

⁶⁸ The Soviet reply was sent to the Department in telegram 3629, October 22, 1945, from Moscow, not printed. The substance as given here is a close paraphrase of that telegram.

personal freedom, freedom from fear, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press, and freedom of assembly and association.

"Elections for a Constituent Assembly have been announced for Nov 11, 1945. However, owing to failure effectively to implement these guarantees, conditions have now been created in Yugoslavia under which a single list of candidates representative of only one section of the electorate will be presented for endorsement on that occasion. In addition, the elections will be conducted and the votes counted by local Liberation Committees and judicial organs of which the controlling membership has been appointed by and is consequently overwhelmingly responsive to the leaders of one faction. Finally, in view of these conditions, one of the contracting parties to the Tito-Subasic agreement has felt called upon to resign from the unified Govt, together with his supporting colleagues.

"The US Govt believes that the developments outlined above demonstrate conclusively that a situation has arisen inimical to the exercise of democratic processes and prejudicial to the validity, as a free and untrammelled expression of the will of all democratic elements of the people, of the elections now contemplated. Accordingly, it profoundly hopes that Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic together with the leaders of other democratic groups in Yugoslavia will spare no effort to find, in direct negotiations between themselves or, if they so desire, in concert with the US, Soviet and Brit Govts or such of them as are willing to assist therein, a means of agreement by which the basis for the collaboration of all democratic elements in Yugoslavia in a united interim Govt may be reestablished to the satisfaction of all parties and with effective provision for the unequivocal execution of the guarantees contained in their previous accord. Pending the achievement of this end, the US Govt urges that the elections scheduled for Nov 11 be postponed to a later date.

"It may be noted that before communicating the foregoing views, the US Govt has consulted the other signatories to the Yalta Declaration. The Brit Govt has indicated that it takes a similar attitude and will transmit similar communications. However, the Soviet Govt has taken the position that no grounds exist for the three Govts to make any proposals in this matter, that in addition there is no basis for interference of the three Govts in the question of the date of the Yugos elections and that the Yugos Govt itself should be permitted to decide the question whether it is proper to postpone the elections set for Nov 11, to a later date."

Please ascertain views of FonOff on foregoing and add that we further suggest that notes in the above sense be addressed to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic by the US and Brit Ambs in Belgrade on Nov 1.

For your information, Dept has indicated to Brit Emb our belief that it is unadvisable (reurtel 11049 Oct 22) to ask for text of Subasic letter of resignation.

Sent to London; rptd to Moscow and to Belgrade.

BYRNES

860h.00/10-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 30, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 30—5:30 p. m.]

11358. See Deptel 9488, Oct. 26. British Ambassador to Yugoslavia this afternoon saw Bevin and immediately afterwards Stevenson told us that a cable was going today to British Embassy in Washington along following lines: ⁶⁹ British Govt is opposed in general to further interference in internal affairs of other nations and feels that in case of Yugoslavia it would prefer to point out effect on relations between Yugoslavia on the one hand and British and US on the other hand should elections be held which expressed only the view of one section of Yugoslav opinion.

Insofar as parallel communications to Tito and Subasic, as set forth in Deptel under reference, are concerned, British would restrict communications to Tito alone. They agree to contents of paragraphs 1 and 2. Regarding paragraph 3, British feel that to ask for postponement of elections would not improve situation as there are no guarantees that subsequent elections would not be held in same manner. They feel therefore that it would be preferable to point out that elections held according to present plan of Yugoslav Govt would result in election of an Assembly which would not represent accurately the feelings of the Yugoslav people with consequence that relations of any such newly elected Govt would suffer from lack of prestige internationally.

British feel that paragraph 4 of proposed communication should be omitted as Tito undoubtedly already knows Russian attitude and it would serve only to underline differences between three principal Allies.

Sent Dept repeated Moscow as 371 and Belgrade as 35.

WINANT

860h.00/10-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, October 30, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 31—9 p. m.]

601. Yesterday Senator Pepper ⁷⁰ had 2-hour conference with Tito, with me as an observer.

⁶⁹ A paraphrase of this cable was communicated to the Department by the British Embassy in a note of October 30, 1945; not printed.

⁷⁰ Claude D. Pepper (of Florida), who was traveling through Europe and the Near East as a member of the Senate Special Committee on Small Business with the object of studying the means by which small business could obtain access to foreign trade.

Senator, saying he was speaking as individual and member of Foreign Relations Committee of US Senate, bluntly told Tito there was impression in US that terms of Yalta Agreement have not been complied with in Yugoslavia and that if Marshal expected American economic and financial help he would first have to show that conditions in his country were democratic. The Senator said frankly opinion in US is that there are neither freedom of press nor personal liberty in Yugoslavia; that there is oppressive secret police, and electoral laws are so framed that opposition has no opportunity to express itself. He added United States had requested Hungary [*Bulgaria?*] to postpone elections.⁷¹ This had been done and things had gone better there since.

Senator told Tito and asked us to quote him in our telegram as follows: Tito should make friendship with US and Russia basis of his policy so that [he could say not only that he had liberated people from Germans]⁷² but also that he had support of two greatest nations of world; US friendship would be of great value to Yugoslavia in helping repair war damage and rehabilitate economy of country, while all we wanted in return besides reasonable assurances of repayment was that Tito should assure Yugoslav people minimum requirements of democracy.

Senator said he hoped there would be an opportunity soon for Marshal Tito and President Truman to talk things over in America and find a harmonious understanding between the two countries.

In reply Tito said the sympathetic feeling of Yugoslavia for America has never weakened and acknowledged with appreciation that US has given Yugoslavia more help than any other nation. He maintained his government had fulfilled Yalta Agreement in expanding Avnoj and in preparing for elections. Stating Grol was put in Cabinet at suggestion of Kardelj without any suggestion from King, Tito said Grol resignation had no connection with Tito-Subasic Agreement or Yalta. Tito also said he had had no conflict with Subasic until his resignation. Subasic had been selected by Cabinet as number two delegate to the Foreign Ministers Conference London but on eve of Conference was urged by Machek party leaders to resign. He suffered stroke and Tito gave orders for his remaining completely quiet until he recovered. When he recovered he claimed Tito-Subasic [agreement had not been]⁷³ fulfilled and resigned. Subasic thus gave in to his friends in Croatia who had collaborated with Pavelic and some of whom are still in prison. Subasic had asked Tito to free them

⁷¹ For details of the Bulgarian election postponement, see vol. iv, pp. 282-310, *passim*.

⁷² Corrected on basis of text of telegram 39, October 30, from Belgrade to Moscow, in Moscow Embassy files.

⁷³ See footnote 72, above.

but for political reasons he could not. Tito said real reason for refusal of Grol and Subasic to take part in elections was to provoke US and Great Britain to intervene in Yugoslavia. He added government is now putting a special box at all polling places for convenience of voters opposed to front.

There is now more freedom of press than ever before, Tito continued, and intentions are to prepare a new constitution which will be completely democratic. Referring to corruption in pre-war Yugoslavia Tito said country now enjoys secret ballot and has 8 million voters whereas formerly there were only 3½ million.

Finally Tito said Yugoslavia cannot recover without aid from US and that if US was going to invest in Yugoslavia it had right to know what was going on there. He added that future plans for Yugoslavia included extensive roadbuilding, railroads in Bosnia, electrification all over Yugoslavia and shipbuilding.

Senator, who saw and approved this cable, left for Bucharest after writing Tito a letter of thanks which concluded as follows: "I do hope at an early date it will be possible for you to visit the US for I am anxious to have our President and our people know you. You will be warmly received."

Sent Department as 601, repeated London 47 and Moscow 39.

PATTERSON

860h.00/10-3045: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1945—8 p. m.

9638. Brit Emb has now communicated to us views of FonOff transmitted in message referred to in urtel 11358 Oct 30 and we have replied to Emb as follows:

1. We agree that communications should be sent to Tito only,
2. Paragraph 3 of our note will be reworded to read:

"The US Govt views with concern the developments outlined above which in its opinion demonstrate conclusively that a situation has arisen inimical to the exercise of democratic processes and prejudicial to the validity, as a free and untrammelled expression of the will of all democratic elements of the people, of the elections now contemplated. Election on a common list without an opposition will give no indication of the real views of the Yugoslav people. Unless the Yugoslav Govt can restore freedom of the electorate by fully implementing the guarantees contained in the Tito-Subasic agreement, and particularly those relating to personal freedom and freedom from fear, it is clear that the regime resulting from the forthcoming election will not enjoy the prestige that attaches to a government that is based on a genuine consultation of the people's will."

3. We believe that the last sentence of the Brit draft of paragraph 3 reading "as a result it will lack authority in international affairs and this is bound to have an effect on its relations with Great Britain and the US" might be construed as implying a commitment to withdraw recognition from Yugos Govt should elections be held under present plans and as we would not wish to obligate ourselves to a specific course of action in advance of the event we prefer to omit this sentence.

4. We feel that, while the third sentence of paragraph 4 should be omitted as no longer applicable in light of above redraft of paragraph 3, we will wish to include in US note the first and second sentences of that paragraph indicating that we consulted with the Soviets before communicating our views to Tito.

5. As regards question of subsequent publication it seems to us that Tito should be given a reasonable opportunity to reply before we release texts of US and Brit notes to press and consequently we would like to consult with FonOff further before that step is taken.

We hope FonOff will be able to agree to foregoing modifications and accordingly in view of the urgency of the matter US Emb in Belgrade is hereby instructed to address a note to Marshal Tito in accordance with the text contained in Deptel 370 Oct 26 to Belgrade ^{73a} as amended by this message as soon as the Brit Emb in Belgrade receives instructions to transmit a parallel similar communication. It is our belief that the Brit and US notes to Tito should be sent to him on the same day.

Sent to London, rptd to Belgrade and Moscow.

BYRNES

740.00116 E.W./11-245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 2, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 11:50 p. m.]

613. Belgrade press yesterday published statement of War Crimes Commission that British Foreign Office informed Yugo Embassy London October 19 that 14 war criminals in British hands will be surrendered to Yugos at once. First name on list is Milan Nedich followed by [Rupnik]⁷⁴ and 12 names given in third paragraph of Department's 342, October 11.⁷⁵

British Chargé Deakin told us today that Milan Nedich was definitely not on the list submitted by British and he has telegraphed London for authority to demand Yugos public statement to this effect.

^{73a} Same as telegram 9488 to London, p. 1274.

⁷⁴ Gen. Leon Rupnik, former leader of the German-Italian sponsored Slovene White Guard.

⁷⁵ Same as telegram 888 to Mr. Kirk, p. 1265.

Addition of Nedich to British list appears to be Yugos effort to bring Nedich case to a head and we suggest if possible that we promptly inform Yugos what we propose to do with him. Re Berlin telegram 693 to Department ⁷⁶ it now appears to be in order to hand him over although we believe he will not be given fair trial and hence many facts concerning real nature of his role during occupation important for history as well as for bearing on his guilt or innocence may never be known.⁷⁷

PATTERSON

860h.00/11-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 3, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 9:21 p. m.]

617. British Chargé Deakin told us yesterday that at diplomatic function October 28 Soviet Ambassador ⁷⁸ asked to talk to him. Sadchikov asked nature of British reply to our suggested joint approach to Tito regarding postponement elections and Deakin pled ignorance. It was clear Sadchikov knew contents of Soviet reply. He then told Deakin that Tito would like to come to terms with Subasic and Croatian Peasant Party and create in effect a "loyal opposition". He said Tito had conferred last week with CPP representatives but negotiations had been deadlocked over composition of executive committee of CPP. Latter insisted on inclusion of members whom Tito would not accept (presumably Koshutich was one) and Tito demanded inclusion leaders of spurious CPP group in National Front.

Sadchikov gave Deakin impression Russians favored successful results from these negotiations as this is first time Sadchikov has volunteered any information on internal affairs to either British or ourselves. Deakin desires conversation kept top secret as to source in hope he will talk more. However, I assume Sadchikov would not have made this approach without instructions from Moscow.

PATTERSON

⁷⁶ Not printed; this telegram from the U.S. Political Adviser for Germany, October 5, 1945, 6 p. m., informed the Department that the Yugoslav government had requested the surrender of Milan Nedich and other individuals who were in the American zone of Germany. Mr. Murphy asked for the Department's instructions. (740.00116 EW/10-545)

⁷⁷ In telegram 398, November 9, 1945, 8 p. m., the Department informed Ambassador Patterson of its willingness to hand over General Nedich to the Yugoslav government. However, the General's whereabouts were not known. Rumors had him simultaneously in custody in the American zone of Germany, and a suicide in Austria. Interested officers were still investigating the matter. (740.00116 EW/11-245)

⁷⁸ Ivan Vasilyevich Sadchikov.

Belgrade Embassy Files : 801

*The American Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the
Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tito)*⁷⁹

No. 211

BELGRADE, November 6, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to transmit, under instructions from my Government, the following message to Your Excellency:

The United States Government has been following developments in post-liberation Yugoslavia with particular attention in the light of the responsibility toward the people of Yugoslavia assumed by the United States in conjunction with its British and Soviet Allies at Yalta. The three signatories to the Crimea Declaration recommended in that declaration that the agreement between Marshal Tito on behalf of the National Committee of Liberation and Dr. Subasic on behalf of the Royal Yugoslav Government be put into effect immediately. That agreement provided for the establishment of a unified government containing adherents of both parties to exercise the executive authority pending the decision by a freely elected constituent assembly on the final constitutional organization of the state. The agreement further called for specific guarantees of personal freedom, freedom from fear, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press, and freedom of assembly and association.

Elections for a constituent assembly have been announced for November 11, 1945. However, owing to failure effectively to implement these guarantees conditions have now been created in Yugoslavia under which a single list of candidates representative of only one section of the electorate will be presented for endorsement on that occasion. In addition, the elections will be conducted and the votes counted by local committees and judicial organs of which the controlling membership has been appointed by, and is consequently overwhelmingly responsive to, leaders of one faction. Finally, in view of these conditions one of the contracting parties to the Tito-Subasic agreement has felt called upon to resign from the unified government together with one of his colleagues.

The United States Government views with concern the developments outlined above which in its opinion demonstrate conclusively that a situation has arisen inimical to the exercise of democratic processes and prejudicial to the validity, as a free and untrammelled expression of the will of all democratic elements of the people, of the elections now contemplated. Election of a common list without an

⁷⁹ According to telegram 624, November 6, 1945, from Belgrade, this note and a parallel British note were delivered to Marshal Tito at noon on November 6. In the same telegram Ambassador Patterson informed the Department of some last-minute editorial changes in the note: "We changed concluding phrase of second paragraph to read 'together with one of his colleagues.' First sentence of paragraph 4 of draft formed last paragraph of note." (860h.00/11-645)

opposition will give no indication of the real views of the Yugoslav people. Unless the Yugoslav Government can restore the confidence of the electorate by fully implementing the guarantees contained in the Tito-Subasic agreement, and particularly those relating to personal freedom and freedom from fear, it is clear that the regime resulting from the forthcoming election will not enjoy the prestige that attaches to a Government that is based on a genuine consultation of the people's will.

It may be noted that before communicating the above views the United States Government has been in consultation with the other signatories of the Yalta Declaration.

Please accept [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

860h.00/11-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 9, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received November 10—4:40 p. m.]

635. ReDeptel 393, November 7.⁸⁰ We changed the phrase "his supporting colleagues" to "one of his colleagues" because we thought the former controversial and one which Yugoslavs might purposely misconstrue.

Grol resigned from government on August 19; Subasic and Sutej on October 8. It is questionable whether Yugoslavs consider Grol a supporting colleague of Subasic as he acted independently after striving in vain to obtain latter's support. Only opposition to government in Avnoj and Parliament was by Grol and his democrats. At no time did Subasic raise his voice in support.

At same time Yugoslavs might purposely read phrase "supporting colleagues" to mean all his colleagues from London Government who joined Tito government, that is, Sutej, Kosanovic and Marusic,⁸¹ and then tell world we were maligning good names of last two, who not only failed to resign but have never even murmured against this totalitarian regime.

We thought this change sufficiently "in accordance with the text" (as instructed in Deptel 386, November 1 ^{81a}) as to be warranted without consulting Department and we thought it important to present note without further delay. British Embassy reasoned likewise and made the same change in its text.

⁸⁰ Not printed; it requested an explanation as to why the text of the note to Tito had been changed. "The language of the US note had been discussed at length with Brit and copies of text as agreed had already been furnished Soviet and French Govts. Any suggestions you had should have been telegraphed to Dept." (860h.00/11-645)

⁸¹ Drago Marusich, Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones.

^{81a} Same as telegram 9638 to London, p. 1278.

In this connection, although first paragraph of draft received in Deptel 370 ^{s1b} consisted of two complete sentences we were not satisfied with it and obtained a repeat which included eight lines omitted from first message.

Part of Deptel 386 had to be repeated due to garbles. Repetitions also contain doubtful words but we are convinced there is no consequential change in note presented other than that explained above.

PATTERSON

860h.00/11-345 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson)

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1945—4 p. m.

399. Urtel 615, Nov 3.^{s2} Dept is in general opposed to its Missions abroad granting asylum and accordingly you should avoid giving refuge to any one in normal course of events.

However, Dept has on various recent occasions indicated its recognition of the fact that political conditions in Europe during this period immediately following hostilities are unusually disturbed and in the circumstances we are aware that cases could arise wherein a rigid adherence at this time to a policy of withholding asylum might give grounds for criticism that this Govt is unmindful of the hazards now being risked by various patriotic leaders of democratic opinion. Accordingly, you are authorized to provide protection, if called upon, provided you have satisfied yourself 1) that the individual in question is in *immediate* danger of his life, 2) that no other avenue of recourse offering a reasonable hope of safety is open to him, 3) that his life is endangered only as a result of his having carried on political activities consistent with the proper exercise of democratic processes, and 4) that the granting of asylum to him will not jeopardize the lives or safety of the Embassy personnel. In view of the practical impossibility of extending protection to any large numbers of persons, you are cautioned against too liberal exercise this privilege which should in any event be granted only on individual merit of each case and not on collective basis or on grounds that person concerned belongs to any group.

You will, of course, telegraph Dept immediately full circumstances any case in which you have felt it necessary to avail yourself of above authority.

BYRNES

^{s1b} Same as telegram 9488, October 26, to London, p. 1274.

^{s2} Not printed; it reported that the British Chargé in Belgrade had inquired what the attitude of the United States might be with regard to the granting of asylum to Yugoslav opposition leaders (860h.00/11-345).

860h.00/11-1345: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 13, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 16—2:23 p. m.]

649. There were no surface indications of irregularities in polling Sunday, but our means of observation were restricted and no check could be made on counting of ballots for opposition "without ticket". Organized demonstrations were not as extensive as in pre-election period and mostly confined to small marching groups, military and civilian, in streets. Posters were numerous, particularly at polling booths, all eulogizing National Front and attacking opposition leaders. Tito's picture displayed prominently everywhere. Opposition was mute.

Belgrade election results announced today show 91% of electorate participating, with Front candidates for General Assembly receiving 81.53% of votes cast to 18.47% of ticketless opposition, and for popular Assembly 83.20% to Front and 16.80% to opposition.

Information received from various sources within and without Belgrade indicate various forms of constraint employed by regime to force voters to polls, but we believe that people in general were sufficiently terrorized by polling time to make extraordinary compulsory measures unnecessary.

PATTERSON

860h.00/11-1745: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson)

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1945—1 p. m.

408. Brit have now suggested that we withhold publication text US and Brit notes to Marshal Tito pending further consultation.

Accordingly we are not releasing text US note to press at this time. However, since we feel it desirable that it be known that we, as one of Yalta powers, informed Tito our views on situation Yugoslavia before elections, we are telling press that we did send a note to Tito at that time but that text thereof is not now being released in hope that we will receive a reply.

Sent to Belgrade, rptd to London and Moscow.

BYRNES

860h.01/11-1945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1945.

Mr. Balfour⁸³ handed me this afternoon the attached paraphrase of a telegram dated November 17 from the Foreign Office⁸⁴ in regard to the proposed Foreign Office guidance to the press in connection with the publication of the British note to Tito of some days ago.

I told Mr. Balfour that we had been considering this matter further and had reached the conclusion that on balance it would be preferable not to publish our note at this time. I added that we had not yet received a reply from Tito and that this was given informally to the press some days ago as a reason why we could not at this time publish our note. I went on to say that the present does not seem to be an especially timely moment to publish the notes. In the circumstances I said that we felt that it was preferable not to publish either our note or for the British to publish their note at this time. Mr. Balfour asked what I thought of the telegram on press guidance. I answered that since we feel that it would be preferable not to publish the notes at this time, I had read the telegram very hastily and had no views to express on it at this time.

Mr. Balfour said that he agreed that it would probably be preferable not to publish the notes at this time, and that he would so recommend to the Foreign Office.

JOHN HICKERSON

860h.00/11-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 19, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received November 21—6:30 a. m.]

673. [To Vienna:] Urtel 1, September 19⁸⁵ received here November 14 by pouch. Of the five categories of Yugos in Austria we believe that only one group, namely those in category of Nedich, Rupnik and Ljorbc should be considered for forcible return to Yugoslavia and these only after careful investigation in individual cases. It would be inequitable to return entire groups because they fit loosely into certain categories. For example the category "Ustasha men of the Pavelic regime" is extremely nebulous and might include many whose only offense is political opposition to present Yugo regime.

⁸³ John Balfour, Minister in the British Embassy.

⁸⁴ Not printed.

⁸⁵ Sent to Department as No. 228, not printed.

We are convinced that anyone accused by this regime may be regarded as already condemned, for trials (then [*when?*] held) are not designed to arrive at decisions based on equitable considerations nor on weight of evidence but rather to give legalistic veneer to decision already made in party councils. A lawyer, member of provisional parliament, who recently dared act as defense counsel for man accused of collaboration was called traitor, beaten by "inspired" mob after trial and barely escaped with life.

If justice is to be served and we are to avoid being instrument whereby persons whose guilt is measured by their political convictions are delivered to executioner we must, in effect, ourselves judge in advance whether each individual so delivered is criminally liable. Stipulation that Yugo Govt make out prima facie case of collaboration or war criminality (Deptel October 11, 1 p. m.⁸⁶) in our opinion represents minimum precautionary measure.

In regard to other categories, undoubtedly a large number of Pavelic adherents and Volksdeutsche collaborated and in appropriate cases should be treated as ex-enemy DPs;⁸⁷ we believe that others should if possible be treated as United Nations DPs.

Sent to Vienna as 5; repeated Dept as 673.

PATTERSON

860h.00/11-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 19, 1945.

[Received November 19—11:45 p. m.]

674. Following is Embassy translation of note from Marshal Tito dated November 17, received 19th: This is for limited distribution.

"Your Excellency: Referring to the note you handed over to me November 6, 1945, please submit to the Government of the United States of America my answer as follows:

1. At the suggestion of the chiefs of the three big powers—Great Britain, America and the Soviet Union—in connection with the Yalta Conference we have started immediately to execute the agreement made between me as the representative of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia and Mr. Ivan Subasic as representative of the Royal Government in London.

a. On the basis of the agreement a common government has been formed from the members of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia and members of the Royal Government of Subasic.

b. The Avnoj (anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) has been extended not only with the members of Parliament of 1932, as it was suggested, but also from all the democratic parties

⁸⁶ See telegram 888, October 11, 1 p. m., to Mr. Kirk, which was repeated to Belgrade, p. 1265.

⁸⁷ Displaced persons.

and groups, so that 124 new representatives entered the extended Parliament.

c. The extended Parliament has decreed whole series of democratic laws, among which also the electoral law, with a tremendous majority of votes, over 400 votes against 14 votes of the opposition, and some of the laws were adopted unanimously.

d. The elections for the Constituent Assembly have been announced for November 11, 1945, for which all the preparations were made in a perfect order in harmony with the laws which has been fully confirmed by the elections themselves.

2. From the above it is clearly seen that the agreement between me and Subasic and the recommendations of the Yalta Conference have been fully executed and we cannot accept the objections of the note which are lacking real base.

3. The fact that Subasic and Sutej left the government of their own free will is purely their own personal matter which in no way effects the fact that the agreements have been fully executed. The more so, as this was not an agreement between me and Subasic, but between the National Committee and Royal Government of Subasic, the majority of which stayed in the government, because they do not share the opinion of Subasic and Sutej. Accordingly, the agreement is not tied to certain persons, nor can it be identified with them.

4. The so-called opposition had all the chances to participate in the elections, but in the last moment they quit purely for reasons of speculation.

5. For the purpose of safeguarding the strict secrecy of the elections due to the abstinence of the opposition Parliament has introduced an amendment to the electoral law to put up a separate box without ticket for all those to vote who are against the ticket of the National Front.

Declaring herewith in the name of my government, on the basis of the above mentioned, that we consider all our obligations as fulfilled and we think that also the Allied Governments are free of their obligations they considered they had in regard to the peoples of [Yugoslavia?], which is best proved by the results of the election of November 11 where the people in perfect freedom by a tremendous majority have expressed their confidence to the government, which [I?] have the honour to be Premier of, and to the National Front.

Also on this occasion I want to assure Your Excellency of the sentiments of my respect. Premier of the Ministerial Council and Action [Acting?] Minister of Foreign Affairs Marshal of Yugoslavia (signed) Josip Broz Tito."

PATTERSON

860h.00/11-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 19, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 20—7:10 a. m.]

675. Stevenson has shown us British draft of press statement for release with publication of exchange of notes with Tito. As worded,

statement read as though it were a whitewash of methods and conduct of recent elections. We are by no means prepared to accept as proved that elections show majority of people support this regime. Our view is that, considering terroristic methods used by regime prior to elections, it is remarkable that such a large proportion of the people dared express their disapproval either by abstaining or by dropping their rubber balls in the blank ballot box.

Complete election returns have not yet been published and published figures continue to be contradictory and confusing. Govt press has stated "adding mistakes exist but they can on [no?] account change the results". Independent paper *Novosti* November 18 publishes results of election in Serbia as compiled from figures published by official press. Results show that 65.51% of the registered voters voted for National Front candidates.

We do not believe that any press release now issued by US should endorse this regime or be subject to the interpretation that we are ready to condone its methods. We recommend that it indicate unequivocally that we are not convinced that civil liberties exist in Yugoslavia and that we are not prepared to give the govt moral or economic support until they do.

PATTERSON

860h.00/11-1945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 19, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 9:35 p. m.]

3898. Acknowledging my letter of November 6 informing Molotov of note to Tito Vyshinski replied on November 18 in translation as follows:

"As you will recall in Mr. Molotov's reply of October 21⁸⁸ the point of view of the Soviet Government was set forth on an analogous question, it being pointed out that the Soviet Government saw [no?] basis for sending to the Yugoslav Government any proposals with reference to Yugoslav matters and particularly the elections to the Parliament. The Soviet Government adheres to this point of view at the present time and does not consider it possible to permit any interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia."

Sent Department 3898, repeated to London 585, Belgrade 57.

HARRIMAN

⁸⁸ See telegram 9488, October 26, to London, p. 1274.

860h.00/11-2445

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Reber) to the Secretary of State*⁸⁹

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY: All indications point to the likelihood that Marshal Tito will at the earliest moment convenient to him after the convocation of the new Yugoslav Assembly on November 29 propose the abolition of the Yugoslav monarchy and the creation of a Republic.

It will be recalled that the Crimea Conference in February 1945 agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic, the Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, that their agreement of December 7, 1944 be put into effect immediately, that a new unified Government be formed on the basis of that agreement leaving the question of the monarchy open and that free elections for a Constituent Assembly be held within three months of the liberation of the whole of the country. These elections have now been held under conditions that make it difficult for us to admit that they constitute the free choice of the people. Details of the terrorization which preceded them and elimination of the opposition through the operation of the single list of candidates are familiar to all.

Newspaper accounts and a preliminary report from the Embassy indicate however that on the day of voting balloting was conducted with due regard for the outward forms of legality. No coercion was apparent and no disturbances took place. The results of such a plebiscite give the appearance of legality to the newly appointed Constituent Assembly and confirm the present system in power with all of its dictatorial tendencies.

Whereas the methods used to bring about this electoral result are repugnant to our conception of freedom and the right of the people to voice their own selection, the opposition in Yugoslavia has lost ground and is in no condition at this stage to offer any effective check to the trend. We shall be faced, probably shortly after the convocation of the Assembly, with a decision whether to afford recognition to the new Republican form of government, which will undoubtedly be set up under conditions which fail to take into account the guarantees of personal freedom given the Yalta Powers when Tito and Subasic made their agreement. In replying to our communication of November 6 Marshal Tito claims, however, that these obligations have been fulfilled and that the results of the elections release the Yalta Powers from the obligations they considered they had assumed toward the people of Yugoslavia.

At the time of the creation of the Republic a positive indication of the position of this country will be required through the necessity

⁸⁹ Marginal notation by the Secretary of State: "I agree. J. F. B."

of reaccrediting our Ambassador whose present letters of credence are to the Royal Yugoslav Government, whereas it would be legally justifiable to withhold this recognition, it is nevertheless thought no useful purpose would be served by thus turning our back on Yugoslavia. Such course of action might also subject us to adverse criticism as evidencing a preference for the monarchy which is of course not the case. Given the character of the Serbian people it seems not too unreasonable to hope that in time their personal traditions of freedom and sense of individualism will effect modifications in the present reign of terror and evolve toward a more representative form of government. On the other hand, it is not considered that we should fortify the Tito regime through unrestricted grants of material support.

Certain steps can now be recommended as possible course of action. At the time the new letters of credence are required for the Ambassador an instruction to him might be prepared, which would govern his relation with the new government and could be made public if desirable. Such an instruction would state that the maintenance of formal diplomatic relations with the regime should not be interpreted to imply approval of the policies of the regime, its methods of assuming control, or its failure to implement the guarantees of personal freedom promised its people.

It could also be said that we expect that the forces of evolution will provide developments which will make possible those relations, political, economic and cultural between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the United States which we on our part most urgently desire to see.

This would carry the implication that if changes are effective, economic aid and assistance would be forthcoming but in the meanwhile we recommend that no financial loans or credit should be considered. A reasonable commercial exchange on a cash and carry basis would, however, not be excluded. The recommendations in this paragraph would not appear in the instruction to be made public but we feel should be our policy.

You will recall that the British Government proposed that UNRRA relief be curtailed because of the maintenance by Yugoslavia of an excessive army⁹⁰ beyond the requirements of its own security, which coupled with Tito's threats against Venezia Giulia and Macedonia threatens the security of his neighbors and implies aggressive intentions in these areas. Furthermore the failure of Yugoslavia to transfer its manpower from the Army to the land shows clearly that Yugoslavia is not exerting all possible effort to help itself. Nevertheless, we do not feel that stoppage of relief to the needy can be

⁹⁰ See memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs, October 22, 1945, vol. II, p. 1032.

justified on this basis. UNRRA should, however, be required to supervise the distribution of its relief supplies with the greatest possible care to insure that they are not being used for political purposes or to strengthen this type of aggression.

The British Government has furnished us with the attached preliminary expression of its views⁹¹ which, as will be seen, do not differ materially from the foregoing, although we do not admit that Marshal Tito has in fact obtained the support of the majority of the peoples of Yugoslavia and we are less optimistic as to the possibilities of creating an atmosphere in which the possibilities for the settlement of the Trieste problem and improvements in the Balkans will be enhanced.

If you approve the foregoing proposals they can be discussed with the British at an early date with a view to arriving at a common policy before we are faced with the accomplished fact of the creation of the Yugoslav Republic.

SAMUEL REBER

711.60h/11-2845: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 28, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 2: 50 p. m.]

700. Following three items exemplifying hostile attitude this regime toward America furnished for Dept's background information.

1. Demobilized soldier until recently guard at Novi Sad bridge states that Americans and British are shadowed by Ozfu [*Ozna?*] agents entire time spent in Novi Sad and full record of activities kept. Guards on Petrovaradin side are required to send notice of American or British arrivals to Novi Sad side at time visitors stopped for examination of papers, in order give time for organization of surveillance.

2. Belgrade book publishers Kosmos officially informed by Russians that if they persist in publishing American and British books they will not be given copyright clearances for Russian books. This particularly interesting view fact that Kosmos has not yet published American or English books but has requested permission to publish one of each.

3. At recent concert here radio Ljubljana Orchestra scheduled to play Slovene, Russian and American music. No American music was played though included in earlier concert. When queried orchestra leader and concert director regretted inability to explain omission,

⁹¹ These views were presented to the Department in a note from the British Embassy on November 19, 1945, not printed.

but intimate friend of former explained that political commissar from Town Command had called on the two and said that earlier concert including American music had been too "noisy" and would be "wise" to play only Slovene and Russian music. To reply that orchestra had "soft and sweet" American music, commissar's rejoinder was that only Slovene and Russian music should be played.

PATTERSON

860h.00/11-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 29, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 30—1 : 30 a. m.]

702. Recent national elections have convinced us that our efforts to help create democratic government in Yugo broadly representative of the people have failed and we are of opinion US should not recognize new Government which is now being formed.

Contrary to wishes of great majority of people, present ruling clique under Communist control maintains itself by force and secret police as satellite of USSR. Democracy, freedom and civil liberty, as we understand these terms, do not exist. As regards foreign policy, Belgrade is like the capital of a Soviet Republic and regime is hostile to America and Britain, ostensibly [because?] of Trieste affair but really because without Russian support and Russian methods it could not remain in power.

This regime is now so firmly entrenched that internal opposition has no chance. The small Communist group in control is dominated by a few fanatics, mostly from backward areas, who have no use for western democracy and would not easily give up seats of power in Belgrade to return to their barren homelands, or relinquish armed power and Communist organization now in their hands.

Our British colleagues say in a free election people would vote overwhelmingly against Communism. Nevertheless they favor recognizing new regime on basis that by withdrawing we would cut off our direct access to information; lend support to Government's contention that Russia is Yugo's best friend; increase misery and discontent especially of opposition; hinder our assisting opposition if, as they think likely, opposition should develop later, perhaps in 10 years; and play into hands of fanatics who find our presence here burdensome and would be pleased to see us go. British further think that elections have increased regime's self-confidence, it having become in sense victim of its own propaganda, and that it will therefore be "less beastly" to opposition. They think we would later have to crawl back on Yugo's own terms, as was British experience in Russia. They

think that we will gradually gain influence with regime and induce it to soften its policy and return liberties to the people. They cite opportunity to exercise economic pressure in this direction.

We consider British hopes vain and our evidence indicates that if regime is given few years to improve its organization and indoctrinate youth, hope of restoring democracy will be completely lost. We feel that by supporting regime we are undermining American prestige by abandoning the agreements we have made and the issues on which we fought the war.

Economically, people are rapidly being stripped of their possessions. Before long private capital and business will have disappeared, even if some business continues to be done in some of private firms. Government gives lip service to private trade hoping to gain our economic support while concealing its ultimate objectives. For example, Government lately suggested returning two American plants to their owners. Both firms are losing money so fast owing to regulations and taxes that if owners take them back they will soon be legally stripped of what capital they still have in Yugo. One plant has no raw materials. The other has had price of its product fixed at 30 percent below cost.

US has no influence on this regime and cannot have as long as normal recognition is extended.

If recognition is withdrawn, Yugo propagandists may at first boast that our support is unnecessary, that "democratic sovereignty and liberties" will not be sold to "Foreign reactionaries" for "imperialist gold".

But propagandists can say this now, when UNRRA is giving more millions of dollars worth of American commodities to Yugo is [*in?*] a month than this country formerly imported in a year. But when UNRRA aid ceases the regime may well be sufficiently in need of our support to be willing to conform to principles of western democracy in order to gain our approval.

But we should not wait until then to withdraw. The presence of this Embassy in Belgrade now is an outward indication of our approval of this regime and its methods, and the propagandists make the most of this. Many people have joined the front, believing that since it enjoys Anglo-American support they have no alternative but imprisonment or starvation. Others still holding to their ideals have lost heart. By withdrawing our support we will restore their courage and perhaps help to rejuvenate an opposition capable of overthrowing the oppressors.

There is also question of whether USSR is to continue to try to set up Communist regimes in foreign countries aided by our maintenance of normal diplomatic and economic relations with the victim-

ized country. We believe that Yugo, where such a Communist regime is firmly established, as [*is*] a good place to call a halt to this situation.

Although our attitude towards Tito's regime in Yugo may be only a small part in the greater problem of American relations with Russia, Department may from this broader viewpoint find it inadvisable to take the step we recommend, we must point out that from the standpoint of the situation in Yugo itself it is time to act.

PATTERSON

860h.00/11-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, November 30, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received December 1—4:10 a. m.]

705. At 4 p. m. yesterday Constituent Assembly unanimously passed declaration proclaiming the Federative National Republic of Yugoslavia and abolishing monarchy. On [*In?*] evening Marshal Tito held reception celebrating second anniversary of founding of Partisan govt at Jajce. Tito told me that decision to establish republic had been made only yesterday morning with object of making November 29 national holiday. He said that within day or two Assembly will appoint Praesidium to which he or "someone else" will be asked to form a temporary govt; this will rule until after passage of new constitution which is expected in 4 or 5 weeks; elections for permanent Parliament will follow and appointment of Praesidium to hold office for 4 years; and President of Praesidium will be nominal head of state. Persons who have read draft constitution tell us that it closely resembles Soviet constitution.

Proclamation of republic yesterday was not unexpected—see Embtel 697, November 27.⁹² No great popular enthusiasm was evidenced although there were fireworks, gun salutes and dancing in streets resembling half dozen previous holidays this year.

Sessions of Constituent Assembly markedly resemble those of the Provisional Parliament of last August except for absence of Grol with his opposition Democrats. Absence Subasic and all members Croatian Peasant Party also noteworthy. There has so far been complete unanimity in proceedings.

PATTERSON

⁹² Not printed.

860h.00/12-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, December 6, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received December 8—2:25 p. m.]

730. Ex Prime Minister Trifunovic called yesterday to express his dissatisfaction with Tito regime and especially with recent elections. He recalled that Grol had joined Tito Govt believing he also would join but he had refused having always held it impossible to collaborate with Communists on any political question.

His chief criticisms of elections were that intimidation and enforced voting were used to get people to polls and that results were falsified. He estimated true vote for regime, even with opposition not participating and in spite of methods employed, at only about 40%. To support this he presented privately obtained evidence from two Serbian counties and detailed criticisms of official returns. This evidence is impressive and is being forwarded to Dept by dispatch.⁹³

He said he would like to see American and British Govts not recognize elections as true and free expression of popular will and refrain from recognizing this Constituent Assembly as People's Assembly. He felt complete US withdrawal from Yugo would be two-edged sword one edge hurting Partisans and other the people by removing their one friend and protector. He said US by remaining here is at least observing what is happening. But he finally said that if choice lay between US recognizing new regime or withdrawing completely he would reluctantly prefer latter.

He said his people are not enemies of Russian people but only want to live their own life freely not under Russian Communist system. He bitterly criticized British for recent official and press statements indicating approval of elections and support of Tito.

Later in day similar statement was made to us by Grol. He also bitterly attacked British saying that if western Allies cannot help Yugoslav people they at least ought not to injure them any further by such statements as the British press has lately been making.

PATTERSON

860h.00/12-645

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

No. 174

BELGRADE, December 6, 1945.

[Received December 19.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum ⁹⁴ concerning the Yugoslav elections to the Constituent Assembly on November 11, 1945,

⁹³ See despatch No. 174, *infra*.⁹⁴ Not printed.

prepared by Vice-Consul Peter Constan, containing evidence of the intimidation of voters and commenting on the official election returns. The Embassy believes that this and other evidence it has received justify Mr. Constan's conclusion that the elections of November 11 were the least free ever held in Yugoslavia and that the results announced bear no resemblance to the votes cast.

Embassy members visited some 20 polling places in Belgrade on election day and saw practically no unfairness at these places. This apparent decency was made much of in Yugoslav news releases, which freely quoted statements of Left-Wing Members of Parliament and British journalists brought here by the Yugoslav government to observe the elections. This point, however, is unimportant in judging whether the elections gave the people of Yugoslavia a free opportunity to express their will at the polls. The decisive facts are that masses of people were frightened into voting for the National Front ticket; that the election machinery was entirely in the hands of the National Front; that there were no opposition or neutral observers in a position to verify the results; and that the unscrupulousness shown by the National Front in pre-election activities supports the belief that its members showed equally low ethical standards in submitting election returns.

The Embassy has received masses of detailed figures from unofficial observers indicating that in all localities reported upon the official returns were untrue. There is reason to believe that many, at least, of these reports are true since they come from observers in villages where the inhabitants are personally known to them.

Before the election several peasants came to the Embassy from considerable distances to tell us of the situation in their home villages. They generally told us that they came secretly and in fear of Ozna to beg us not to recognize the results of the elections, since, although nearly all the villagers were opposed to the regime, the majority would probably vote for it out of fear of what might happen to them or their families if they did not.

There is no good reason to doubt the evidence of intimidation reported by Mr. Constan since even government leaders went so far as to publicly state that it would be traitorous to vote against the Front. A threat of this kind is quite sufficient to intimidate a voter when he is convinced that his job, his clothing, food, shelter and freedom from prison for himself and his family depend upon his being known as a supporter of the National Front.

Mr. Constan's memorandum contains much first hand information, including examples of two Yugoslav soldiers of American birth whose registration applications he had taken, and one of whom served twenty days in jail for falling out of formation while his unit was being marched to the polling booth to vote.

Mr. Constan offers the following comment on one Yugoslav propaganda item :

“Tito is proclaiming that this was the freest and quietest election ever held in Yugoslavia. I submit that a deadly quiet election in the Balkans, and I have seen many of them during the last 25 years, is proof positive of the lack of freedom. When Balkanites cannot have a fight during an election it means that they are afraid to speak their minds. As a matter of fact, in what part of the world, where freedom reigns, do people walk along silently and solemnly and separately, without the slightest show of demonstration, on an election day?”

There was, as the Yugoslav press announced, dancing in the streets far into the evening of election day, but its lack of the usual spontaneity indicated that numbers were dancing, as they had voted, under duress. Terazije Square, Belgrade, on election night was reminiscent of a Times Square, New York, election night only because of the contrast.

Respectfully yours,

RICHARD C. PATTERSON, JR.

860h.01/12-1445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, Temporarily in Moscow*⁹⁵

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1945—8 p. m.

2521. Secdel 8. Yugoslav Ambassador has notified this Govt of the decision taken by the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly to proclaim the “Federated Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia” and to abolish the monarchy.⁹⁶ His note also adds that the Assembly further enacted a law establishing the Praesidium of the Constituent Assembly with executive functions including the appointment of ambassadors and the reception of the credentials of the diplomatic reps of foreign countries. When the Constituent Assembly has enacted the new constitution and becomes the legislative body of the new Republic, its Praesidium becomes the Praesidium of the regular Assembly.

The Brit Embassy has likewise informed us that the Brit Govt has received a similar notification and, subject to our comments, proposes to reply on Dec 15 extending recognition to the new Govt of Yugoslavia subject only to the qualification that “in accordance with international custom and with assurances given to the Brit Ambassador at Belgrade by the Yugos Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the new Yugos Govt will accept responsibility for Yugoslavia’s

⁹⁵ This telegram was transmitted through the Embassy in Moscow. Secretary Byrnes was attending the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, December 16-26, 1945. See vol. II, pp. 560 ff.

⁹⁶ For Yugoslav note of December 10, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 23, 1945, p. 1020.

existing international obligations and that the change in regime will not affect the rights and interests of Brit subjects in Yugoslavia”.

It is the intention of the Brit Govt to restore normal relations with the Yugos Govt and to see how their attitude develops as a result of their “electoral victory”. In these circumstances they propose merely to issue new credentials to their Ambassador and not to send him instructions similar to those which you approved in the memorandum of policy of Nov 24, a copy of which is with the Delegation. The Brit Govt planned to publish its reply on Dec 16 but we have asked that action be withheld in order that we may receive final instructions from you with a view to concerting both replies and publication.

You may wish to discuss this divergence of approach with Mr. Bevin in Moscow. Subject to any such discussion and to your further instructions we suggest that the following course of action might be submitted to the President for his approval and the preparation of new letters of credence for Patterson in his name.

We would answer the Yugoslav note in generally similar terms, and at the same time address an instruction along the following lines to Patterson. Both the note and the instruction would be made public.

The instruction would inform the Ambassador of our receipt of the Yugos notification and of our reply. It would then say (1) that, mindful of the obligations which it had assumed at Yalta this Govt had consistently made known its attitude that the people of Yugoslavia are entitled to expect the effective implementation of the guarantees of personal freedom, freedom from fear, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press and freedom of assembly and association contained in the Tito-Subasic agreement underlying the Yalta Declaration and to have an opportunity to express their will in a free and untrammelled election; (2) that, in view of conditions existing in Yugoslavia, it could not be said that those guarantees of freedom had been honored nor that the elections conducted on Nov 11 had provided opportunity for a free choice of the people's reps; and (3) that, in the circumstances, this Govt desires that it be understood that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the present regime in Yugoslavia should not be interpreted as implying approval of the policies of the regime, its methods of assuming control or its failure to implement the guarantees of personal freedom promised its people. In conclusion, the Ambassador would be informed that he should make it quite clear to the authorities and people of Yugoslavia that we entertain only the friendliest sentiments toward the peoples of the country and that it is our anticipation that the evolution of events will provide developments which will make possible those relations—both political and economic—between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the US which we on our part most urgently desire to see.

740.00119 Council/12-1745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State, Temporarily in Moscow, to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, December 17, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received December 17—noon.]

4195. Delsec 7. Reurtel Secdel 8 and Delsec 4.⁹⁷ We took up with Bevin the question of sending similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Belgrade. British do not wish to send such instructions, but we have told them that we propose to follow the procedure outlined by the Department and they are quite agreeable. You may, therefore, proceed as outlined in Secdel 8 first concerting with the British Foreign Office as to date of public announcement of the two replies to the Yugoslav notes and the Dept's instructions to Patterson.⁹⁸

[BYRNES]

860h.6363/12-145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson)

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1945—4 p. m.

460. Reurtel 707, Dec 1.⁹⁹ With termination Nov 1 of all limitations on petroleum supplies and tankers,¹ no basis for approach to Yugo Govt on petroleum supply arrangement now exists. Nor is this Govt prepared to threaten to withhold oil supplies from UNRRA as a means of forcing Yugo Govt to restore Standard-Vacuum's² properties and business.

You are instructed, however, after consultation with Petroleum Adviser Francis Smith to discuss the Standard-Vacuum problem with Yugo Govt and present a memorandum along following lines.

First, you should make it clear that apparent Yugo policy of leaving undisturbed Standard-Vacuum's American ownership while ruining the company's business is not acceptable to this Govt. Accordingly this Govt urgently requests Yugo Govt, a) to return promptly the

⁹⁷ Delsec 4, December 16, from Moscow, not printed; it informed the Department that the Secretary approved the proposed note to the Yugoslav Embassy and the proposed instruction to Ambassador Patterson (740.00119 Council/12-1645).

⁹⁸ The instructions sent to Ambassador Patterson on December 22 are printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 23, 1945, pp. 1020-1021.

⁹⁹ Not printed.

¹ The Petroleum Administration for War ordered all restrictions on the foreign supply and transportation of petroleum products lifted on November 1. The purpose of this measure was to return petroleum transactions to normal commercial channels. Foreign dealers could now buy petroleum products when they wished and ship them by chartered tanker. An export license was still required, however, to ship petroleum products out of the United States. (See the *New York Times*, October 29, 1945, p. 21, col. 3.)

² The Socony-Vacuum subsidiary in Yugoslavia.

properties of Standard-Vacuum,⁴ *b*) to restore the competitive opportunities which the company enjoyed throughout Yugoslavia before the war and *c*) to give the company access on an equitable basis to the restricted volume of current imports of petroleum.

Second, you should state that if Yugo Govt is not prepared to return the company's properties and to permit it to function on a competitive basis as before the war US Govt will expect Yugo Govt to expropriate the company and make prompt payment in dollars for it on the basis of its full worth as a going concern.

For your information we are advised that cash funds of Standard-Vacuum are almost exhausted as company has had practically no operating income since creation of Yugo-Petrol in May. We are also advised that Yugoslav Govt owes the company substantial dinar amounts on which it has been delaying payment. If Smith confirms this is present situation you are requested to press Yugo Govt to pay to Standard-Vacuum whatever amounts are due in order to provide company with funds to meet payrolls and other current expenses until above mentioned problems concerning company's disposition have been settled.

Dept requested Brit here to ascertain whether Brit Govt prepared to make similar representation to Yugo Govt. They still are without instructions but are informing MFP⁵ London Dept is sending this message without further delay and that you will withhold action for few days to give Brit Emb Belgrade time to receive instructions from London. If such instructions are not forthcoming promptly, or suggested approach does not have Brit concurrence, you are instructed to proceed without them on basis above instructions unless in your judgment some other procedure now is more advisable.

ACHESON

860h.6363/12-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, December 20, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received December 23—3:17 p. m.]

775. ReEmbtel 770, December 20.⁶ We have discussed Socony Vacuum situation here at length with Francis Smith. We have no

⁴Telegram 517, October 1, 1945, from Belgrade, reported that the Yugoslav Ministry of Mines had taken over the operation of the Standard-Vacuum refinery in Bosanski Brod, despite the fact that there was no law supporting such action. The former management of the company was forbidden any sort of contact with the refinery. A state petroleum monopoly, Yugo-Petrol, had also been created which had the exclusive rights to sell petroleum products in Yugoslavia received from UNRRA or other sources. Private companies, thus deprived of the right to sell in Yugoslavia, were furthermore not compensated for transportation and other services they were compelled to render to Yugo-Petrol. Again, there was no legal basis for this action on the part of the Yugoslav Government. (012.3/10-145)

⁵Ministry of Fuel and Power.

⁶Not printed.

illusions that company will ever receive just compensation for claims made against YugGov. It therefore appears they have nothing to lose by having present status continued indefinitely. Smith's primary object in continuing here is purely humanitarian one of protecting company's executives and employees. We believe it probable that after his departure the company's Yugo executives will be charged with collaboration, found guilty and be given long sentences at hard labor, if not executed, and their property confiscated. This is the usual method of nationalizing industries, banks and other firms in this country. See for example Embtel 712 of Dec 3,⁷ concerning execution of head of Bata Shoe Company and Embtel 704 of Nov 30,⁸ [concerning?] first Croatian Savings Bank. Court cases confirm that having sold goods to Germans of any Quisling Govt, even on requisitions executed by force, is sufficient ground for finding victim guilty of collaboration. By current juridical standards, Socony Vacuum Company is as guilty as any other firm in Yugo and while we do not fear this development Francis Smith, who throughout war was outside the country and not in communication with Yugo subsidiary, could be as easily found guilty of collaboration as other foreign businessmen, some of whom have been sentenced in absentia.

We believe Socony Vacuum should be given substance of above so they may have fuller picture of situation here.

PATTERSON

860h.00/12-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, December 26, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 27—7:46 a. m.]

795. Since elections Govt has begun to take decidedly new attitude towards opposition. Former pretense at playing with opposition and allowing it such rights as publication of newspaper has been dropped. Attitude today according to our official contacts through FonOff is that gulf between Govt and opposition is unbreachable. Grol is criticized for having supported London Govt when he knew it was engaging in double game with Mihailovich. Grol is also accused of receiving outside aid presumably from America and England. For a time after his resignation Grol was invited even to offi-

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Not printed; it informed the Department that the directors of the First Croatian Savings Bank, the largest such bank in Yugoslavia, had been convicted of collaboration with the Germans and the Ustashi, and had been given sentences ranging from death to 2 years' imprisonment. Ambassador Patterson remarked that "this case illustrated the favored method now used by the regime to effect the wholesale confiscation of private property." (860h.00/11-3045)

cial Partisan receptions. Now he is shunned. Tito on being invited to my house for New Year's reception made his acceptance conditional upon Grol and other opposition leaders not being invited.

Grol now has no newspaper or other means of expressing his views publicly nor has any other opposition leader. Over 20 clerks and officials of Grol's Democratic Party headquarters and former officers of his newspaper in Belgrade have been arrested in last 6 weeks. Some have been released while others are still in prison awaiting charges. Since Grol denies categorically that he or his staff have been engaging in any secret activities, arrests are apparently attempt to intimidate his supporters into discontinuing party activities. Grol himself is little better than prisoner in his own house for he is afraid to go out after dark and many of his friends are afraid to go to see him.

Partisan attitude towards Americans and British is now perhaps somewhat more conciliatory as if hoping to win us over. We are informed FonOff is proposing to open diplomatic club in Belgrade soon especially for American and British diplomats to enable them to meet Partisan officials and "intellectuals". Meanwhile Yugo press remains completely sold out to USSR. The relatively few articles pertaining to US and UK are mainly designed to place the politics and economics of both in most unfavorable light possible.

PATTERSON

860h.01/12-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, December 26, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received December 27—7:15 a. m.]

796. *Politika* this morning published Tass⁹ announcement of American note to Yugoslav Government recognizing changes in Yugoslav constitution and proclamation of republic. British note is also published in same paper under London Tanjug¹⁰ credit line with additional brief commentary from Reuters.

First reactions in opposition circles to our note are: Former Minister, now in opposition, who read Department's communiqué on my instructions as well as note itself said "now our people can breathe again" but indicated full effect of note would be lost if, as was to be expected, Government failed to publish my instructions in press; many other people, however, express feeling that all hope for change is lost by fact of Anglo-American recognition.

⁹ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official news and communication agency of the Soviet Government.

¹⁰ Telegraph Agency of Yugoslavia.

We, too, would like to insist on publication of instructions as condition to presentation of letters of credence. Please advise.

Repeated Moscow 41.

PATTERSON

740.00116 E.W./12-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, December 27, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received December 30—10:45 a. m.]

809. Yugoslav authorities cannot understand our failure to return admitted war criminals and bring up the question constantly. When Colonel Thayer, former head of our Military Mission, was here on short visit last week, General Velebit greeted him with question "Where is Nedich?" and said that best way to improve Yugoslav-American relations would be to deliver Yugoslav war criminals.

Velebit said today that Yugoslav Government accepts as confirmed the death of Milutan Nedich¹¹ (retel 5, December 7 from Vienna). He added that Yugoslav Government knows Milan Nedich is in American custody. This was confirmed by Berlin telegram 7, November 7¹² to us.

We are informed by Velebit and British Embassy that Rupnik and four war criminals on List No. 1 (Nos. 8, 27, 28 and 34) are to be returned to Yugoslavs at Morgan Line¹³ January 2. Can anything be done to expedite return of Milan Nedich and balance of those we said we would return in October (see Deptel 342, October 11^{13a}) as well as others in American custody?¹⁴

PATTERSON

¹¹ Gen. Milyutin Nedich, brother and former chief of staff to Milan Nedich, committed suicide at Kitzbühel, Austria, on July 24, 1945.

¹² Not printed; in this telegram, which was repeated to the Department as No. 964, the U.S. Political Adviser for Germany reported that Milan Nedich was in the American zone of Germany and inquired whether there was any objection to surrendering him to the Yugoslav authorities (740.00116 EW/11-745). Cf. footnote 77, p. 1280.

¹³ The line of demarcation separating Allied forces from Yugoslav forces in Venezia Giulia. For text of the agreement signed at Belgrade June 9, 1945, which established this line, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 501, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1855. See also vol. iv, p. 1176.

^{13a} Same as telegram 888 to Mr. Kirk, p. 1265.

¹⁴ On December 14, the Yugoslav Government had announced that a note had already been sent to the British Government requesting the handing over of a number of accused war criminals including Milan Nedich. On January 10, 1946, it was announced in Belgrade that Milan Nedich had been handed over to the Yugoslav Government, and on February 6, 1946, it was announced that he had committed suicide while awaiting trial.

860h.01/12-2645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson)

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1946—8 p. m.

2. Urtel 796, Dec 26. We do not feel that publication instruction in Yugos press should be made condition to presentation new letters of credence. Text is being fully reported in Yugos broadcasts from radio this country and to increase circulation in Yugos we think you might properly have copies available at Embassy for distribution to interested callers.

BYRNES

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES WITH VARIOUS PLANS FOR A
BALKAN FEDERATION AND ALLIANCE¹⁵

760h.00/1-245

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

There have recently been signs that the idea of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation is entertained with favour in the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement and that the Bulgarians are preparing once again to foster agitation for a greater Macedonia at the expense of Greece. Some of Marshal Tito's¹⁶ followers have gone so far as to demand publicly the incorporation of Greek Macedonia into Yugoslavia and a Macedonian brigade consisting of Greek Macedonians, has been formed in the Yugoslav army of National Liberation and is stationed at Bitolj. Furthermore, the Bulgarian press has reported a meeting in Belgrade between Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegates, one of whom was a member of the Bulgarian Government, at which the future political organization of Yugoslavia was discussed on the assumption that there would be a federation into which Macedonia would also enter. Macedonia propagandists have also been allowed to hold a meeting in Sofia to discuss the creation of an independent Macedonia within a Slav federation comprising Bulgaria and different sections of the Yugoslav people.

2. Whilst His Majesty's Government would welcome a federation between all the Balkan States, both Allied and enemy, possibly including Turkey, they would not favour an exclusive union or federation between Yugoslavs and Bulgarians, which would not only be unlikely to promote a federation between all Balkan States but would also isolate Greece and thus endanger her position as a Balkan State.

¹⁵ For related documentation, see vol. iv, pp. 1-81 and 135-419; vol. viii, last section under Greece; and *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 1048-1078.

¹⁶ Josip Broz Tito, President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia.

It would also enable Bulgaria, who has in both World Wars joined Germany against her Balkan neighbours and against the Western democratic powers, to escape the consequences of her acts by merging her identity in that of one of the United Nations. As regards Macedonia, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to acquiesce in the creation of a Macedonian State as a federal unit in the future federal Yugoslavia, but they would not wish this State (or the Yugoslav Federal Government speaking on its behalf) to annex or lay claim to any territories whatsoever belonging to either Bulgaria or Greece on the ground that such territories are "Macedonian".

3. In consulting the United States Government, His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn its views on this question.

4. A similar request for their views is being made to the Soviet Government by His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow.

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1945.

760h.01/1-1645 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,¹⁷ to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, January 16, 1945—midnight.

[Received January 17—11:03 a. m.]

179. Maclean¹⁸ has informed British Foreign Office that in a long conversation with Tito on January 12, Tito stated flatly that he was not in favor of a Yugoslav-Bulgar-Albanian federation at this time. Tito added that while relations with the Bulgars had improved enormously in recent months, nevertheless it would take some time before the Yugoslav population could forget the horrible behavior of the Bulgarians during the past 3 years. He stated he intended to do anything he could to [promote?] closer relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia but that he positively would not press for such a federation now.

He was more favorably disposed to early federation with Albania. Tito commented during this conversation with Maclean that it was only natural that Bulgaria and Albania should look to Yugoslavia for guidance and assistance in working out the many problems with which the government of those countries were forced [*faced?*] today.

Repeated to Moscow as 18 and London for Patterson as 34.

KIRK

¹⁷ Mr. Kirk was also Ambassador to Italy.

¹⁸ Brig. Fitzroy Hew Maclean, Commanding Allied Military Mission to the Partisans in Yugoslavia.

740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/1-2645 : Telegram

The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, January 26, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received January 26—4:30 p. m.]

54. I believe that various of my telegrams have made it clear to the Department that an important movement is afoot here in support of the Federation of All South Slavs. I was told some weeks ago by my British colleague¹⁹ that his Government was then in consultation with the Department as to this movement. I have received no instructions with respect to the matter although by inference the subject is somewhat covered in the tentative statement of policy with regard to Greece dated October 23, 1944.²⁰

This afternoon the British political representative gave me the text of instructions just received by him which at the present moment he is communicating in person to the Bulgarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and which in paraphrase are as follows:

“His Majesty’s Government could not approve an exclusive union or federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria although they would welcome a confederation between all the Balkan states both Allied and enemy and including possibly Turkey. Likewise His Majesty’s Government would be strongly opposed to the creation of a greater Macedonian state involving claim upon Greek territory although they are prepared to agree to the creation of a Macedonian state in a future federal Yugoslavia. The activities of Macedonian propagandists in Bulgaria which the Bulgarian Government appear to condone, are therefore looked upon with disfavor by His Majesty’s Government. Also the transfer of any part of Bulgarian territory to the Yugoslav federal state of Macedonia without consent of the United Nations would be an act which His Majesty’s Government does not consider the Bulgarian Government would have the right to perform.”

I understand that Maclean is making a similar statement to Tito.

BARNES

760h.00/1-245

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*²¹

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Reference is made to the British Embassy’s *Aide-Mémoire* of January 2, 1945, concerning agitation among certain Yugoslav and Bul-

¹⁹ William E. Houstoun-Boswell, British political representative in Bulgaria.

²⁰ Printed in vol. VIII, last section under Greece.

²¹ A detailed summary of this note was sent on February 24, 1945, as telegram 50, to the United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes), and repeated to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), the U. S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Kirk), and to the Ambassador to Yugoslavia, in London (Patterson).

garian circles in favor of a "Greater Macedonia" and a South Slav federation including Bulgaria as well as Macedonia and other areas of Yugoslavia. It is noted that the British Government does not wish any Macedonian state (or the Yugoslav Government speaking on its behalf) to annex or lay claim to Greek or Bulgarian territory, and that, while it would welcome a federation including all the Balkan states, the British Government would not favor an exclusive union or federation between Yugoslavs and Bulgarians.

The United States Government holds the view that the pre-war frontiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece in the Macedonian area must be considered as the legal boundaries, and that revision of any of them should be permitted only if it conforms to the freely expressed will of the populations directly concerned and has international sanction as a part of the general peace settlement.

If in the reconstitution of Yugoslavia the Government and people of that country desire to set up a regional and decentralized administration under which the area of southeastern Yugoslavia would have a certain autonomous character, there would of course be no ground for objection on the part of the United States Government. This Government concurs, however, in the view of the British Government that there is no legitimate basis for any claim made on behalf of "Macedonia", whether as an independent state or as a part of Yugoslavia or of a larger South Slav federation, to territory within the boundaries of Greece on the ground that such territory is "Macedonian".

With respect to the frontier between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the United States Government favors the retention of the present boundary but would not be inclined to object to any settlement calculated to contribute to the peace, stability and general welfare of the region, if reached through free negotiation on the part of those two states at such time as it may become clear that their respective Governments are in a position to represent the real desires of the peoples involved, including also those inhabitants of the parts of Yugoslavia still under enemy occupation. It is the view of this Government that changes in the territorial boundaries of Bulgaria should not be made during the period preceding the general settlement with Bulgaria as an enemy state.

The United States Government believes that the union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to constitute a single South Slav federation would under present circumstances be a disturbing rather than a stabilizing factor in Southeastern Europe, since the neighboring non-Slavic states, including Turkey, would consider it a threat to their security. In the opinion of this Government such a union in any case should not be permitted before the conclusion of peace between Bulgaria and

the United Nations. This Government would be willing, however, to give consideration to a plan for regional understandings to include all the states of Southeastern Europe, rather than an exclusively Slavic bloc, should all these states decide, with the concurrence of the principal Allied Governments, that such a grouping would represent a contribution to the welfare and progress of that area.

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1945.

760h.74/3-245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1945—8 p. m.

473. The British Embassy has informed the Department ²² that the British representatives at the Crimea Conference ²³ invited the Soviet Government to consider their suggestion that the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Governments should be informed that the three principal Allied Governments were opposed to the conclusion of the proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance and mutual assistance.²⁴ The Foreign Office desires that we should make a similar approach to the Soviet Government.

The Department feels that during the period in which a former Axis satellite still an enemy state is subject to the control of an Allied Commission its negotiation of treaties or other international agreements of a political character with a member of the United Nations or any other state would be inappropriate, unless specifically endorsed by the three principal Allies and other interested Governments. Please inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of our view in this regard and say that it is being likewise communicated to the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires here for transmission to his Government.²⁵ You should add that, in line with the agreed policy of consultation among the three principal Allies before acting in matters affecting Bulgarian foreign affairs during the period of control under the armistice regime, the Department is delaying for the moment the presentation of its position on this subject to the Bulgarian authorities, with the thought that the Soviet Government may wish to give an early indication of its views.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London for Patterson, and to Sofia.

GREW

²² *Aide-Mémoire* from the British Embassy, February 20, 1945, not printed.

²³ The conference between President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, with their advisers, held at Yalta, February 4-11, 1945.

²⁴ For discussion of the proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact at the Yalta Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 876-877, 881-882, 890-891, 939, 964-965, 981.

²⁵ Memorandum to the Yugoslav Embassy, March 3, 1945, not printed.

760h.74/3-1245: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 12, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received March 14—9:50 a. m.]

722. Re Department's 473, March 2, 8 p. m. Molotov has replied to my letter of March 7 with regard to the proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact in a letter dated March 10 in which he says that the Soviet Government considers the conclusion of such a treaty very useful in our common struggle with Hitlerite Germany, and in the future maintenance of security and peace in Europe and in the Balkans in particular.

It is accordingly not clear to the Soviet Government what motives have led the United States and British Governments to express themselves in opposition to the conclusion of such a treaty between two countries which have actively participated in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany.

The Soviet Government therefore considers it desirable, in accordance with the recommendation made at the Crimea Conference by Mr. Stettinius and supported by Molotov,²⁶ to continue the consideration of this question in Moscow, in order to work out an agreed point of view of the three principal Allies.

Molotov adds that the British Government has been informed of this proposal.

I request instructions regarding the above.

Sent to the Department as 722, repeated to London as 113 for Patterson, and Sofia as 18.

HARRIMAN

760h.75/3-2745: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, March 27, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received March 27—2:01 p. m.]

1183. Reference my 1124, March 24, 4 p. m.²⁷ Stevenson, British Ambassador to Belgrade, has been informed by Kardelj²⁸ and Subasic²⁹ that the Government of Yugoslavia considered Albania a sovereign and independent state. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister added that the Yugoslav Government did not contemplate federation

²⁶ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

²⁷ Not printed.

²⁸ Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslav Second Vice Premier and Minister for the Constituent Assembly.

²⁹ Ivan Subasich, Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs.

with Albania and the future would show whether it would be possible to organize a federation of Balkan peoples. He added that the Government of Yugoslavia did not intend to organize now any such federation.

Sent Department, repeated to Moscow as 97.

KIRK

760h.75/8-2345 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, June 29, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received June 30—7:51 a. m.]

2815. Our 2787, June 27.³⁰ We are today asking Shantz³¹ at Belgrade to try to obtain confirmation of report³² that secret negotiations for federation are now proceeding between Alban and Yugo Govts. Hodgson³³ has reported that while it is quite possible that negotiations are being conducted on this subject he feels there will be considerable opposition in further [*sic*] Alban to such federation because of fear there of Slav penetration. He considers also that Alban Army would be strongly against such a proposal and that due this reason federation might be brought about by infiltration of Yugo forces into Alban on pretext of providing assistance to Alban due to menace Greek aggression against Alban over question of northern Epirus.

KIRK

760h.74/3-1245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1945—2 p. m.

1489. Reurtel 722 March 12. Please inform the Soviet Government that this Government is quite willing to hold discussions immediately at Moscow with a view to enabling the three principal Allies to arrive at a common position with respect to the question of the proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact.

For your information and use in such discussions we hold the following views.

1. We adhere to our previously expressed opinion (Deptel 473 March 2).

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ Harold Shantz, Chargé in Yugoslavia.

³² This report, which seemed to emanate from British military sources, reached the Department in telegrams 2787, June 27, 1945, 2797, June 28, from Caserta, and 54, June 28, from Tirana; none printed.

³³ Brig. D. E. P. Hodgson, Commanding British Military Mission in Albania.

2. We were unable to understand how the proposed treaty could have been useful in the struggle against Germany, since we had assumed that both countries were expending the full measure of their power in the prosecution of the war. However, in view of the cessation of hostilities, we assume that the Soviet Government will no longer press this argument.

3. We cannot subscribe to the Soviet view that the proposed pact would contribute to the future maintenance of peace and security in Europe and the Balkans in particular. On the contrary, we feel that the proposed treaty, particularly at this stage, would introduce a disquieting element into the European political situation, which would find particular emphasis in the Balkans, where the neighbors of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would probably regard such a development with distrust and fear.

4. We believe that our motives in urging that the proposed pact be discountenanced have been made clear. However, for a fuller explanation of our views with regard to the Balkan political situation in general and Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations in particular, you may adduce the considerations set forth in Deptel 420 February 24,³⁴ regarding the Macedonian and South-Slav federation questions.

For your confidential information, if the Soviet Govt persists in its previous attitude in urging the proposed pact, we feel the subject might be discussed at the big three meeting.³⁵

Sent to Moscow, repeated to Sofia, London, and Belgrade.

GREW

760h.75/7-545 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, July 5, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

233. Embtel No. 230 July 3.³⁶ Conversations with Albanian[s?] here fail to substantiate rumors re Yugo-Albanian federation.

Acting Chief of the small Albanian Military Mission told Fraleigh³⁷ "Albania isn't interested in federation but wants only freedom and friendship with her neighbors and great allies". He said trouble on Greek border is largely a "newspaper war"; that Albania is not

³⁴ Not printed, but see footnote 21, p. 1306.

³⁵ The tripartite conference held at Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), July 16-August 2, 1945.

³⁶ Not printed; this telegram informed the Department that Foreign Minister Subasich denied the truth of rumors concerning an impending Albanian-Yugoslav federation (760h.75/7-345).

³⁷ William N. Fraleigh, Second Secretary of Embassy and Vice Consul in Yugoslavia.

concerned greatly about border problems, relying on peace conference for fair settlement.

Albanian Diplomatic Mission expected in Belgrade soon.

Sent Dept, rptd Tirana and Caserta.

SHANTZ

760h.74/7-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 9, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received July 9—7: 05 p. m.]

2485. ReDeptel 1489, July 2. In view of plans of Brit Amb,³⁸ myself, Molotov and Vyshinsky,³⁹ any discussions of question of Bulgarian Yugo pact which could now be arranged would have to be conducted by Kennan⁴⁰ and Roberts⁴¹ with a more junior official of FonOff. In the circumstances, and particularly in view of forthcoming Berlin meeting, I feel that such discussions could now lead only to fruitless repetition of divergent views of three powers already set forth in exchanges of correspondence of Feb and Mar of this year. Unless therefore Dept sees some special objective to be gained by reopening discussions on this subject at this time I would not favor doing so before Berlin meeting. Fact of matter is that despite Soviet Govt's expressed views in favor of conclusion of such pact, nothing further has occurred along these lines and project, for reasons not entirely apparent to us, seems to have been dormant.⁴²

Sent Dept, rptd Belgrade 22, Sofia 65.

HARRIMAN

760h.00/7-2645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, July 26, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received July 27—12: 40 a. m.]

316. Following are some selected comments from informal conversation officer of Embassy had last night with Foreign Office official on subject Yugoslav foreign affairs.

³⁸ Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr.

³⁹ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁴⁰ George F. Kennan, Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union.

⁴¹ Frank K. Roberts, Counselor in the British Embassy in the Soviet Union.

⁴² For a suggestion of possible reasons for the dormancy of the project, see telegram 302, June 7, from the United States Representative in Bulgaria, vol. iv, p. 250.

United States—Yugoslavia does not believe that America has independent policy in Balkans, merely following British lead since 1942.

Great Britain—British Government is baiting Yugoslavia for reasons not yet clear. One bitter result is Yugoslavia has lost Trieste,⁴³ probably permanently. Yugoslav reaction against British has naturally resulted, especially in army. Country has been driven further into arms of Russia whose attitude towards smaller ally is very different and much more friendly. British elections⁴⁴ may make situation less difficult if Labor Party wins.

Rumania—Diplomatic representatives will soon be exchanged and commercial treaty signed and few small strategic territorial adjustments, referred to as “exchange of villages,” will be made in favor of Yugoslavia, a victor nation.

Bulgaria and Albania—with these countries Yugoslavia has every reason for maintaining good neighborly relations, having nothing to fear now from either. Federation is definitely on the program but not in immediate future. Federation with Albania is probably more imminent than with Bulgaria. Asked whether Bulgarian Macedonia should in Yugoslav opinion be united with Yugoslav Macedonia, he countered by asking the same question about Greek Macedonia.

Greece—Relations with Greece are likely to be troublesome.⁴⁵ Greek Government is reactionary. Recent history of Greece has taught Yugoslavia a lesson.

SHANTZ

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES WITH ATTEMPTS ON THE PART OF YUGOSLAVIA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA⁴⁶

863.01/3-3045 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,⁴⁷ to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, March 30, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received March 30—10:55 a. m.]

1242. OSS⁴⁸ reports that General Velebit⁴⁹ stated on March 28 during informal discussion of plans for occupation of Austria and in reply to a question whether Yugoslavs would occupy Villach and

⁴³ For documentation on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 1103 ff.

⁴⁴ Held on July 5, 1945; results were announced July 25, and a Labour government was formed on July 27.

⁴⁵ See vol. viii, last section under Greece.

⁴⁶ For related documentation, see *ante*, pp. 1208-1304, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff., and vol. iv, pp. 1103-1219.

⁴⁷ Mr. Kirk was also Ambassador to Italy.

⁴⁸ Office of Strategic Services.

⁴⁹ Maj. Gen. Vladimir L. Velebit, chief of the military mission in London of the National Liberation army and the Partisan detachments of Yugoslavia.

Klagenfurt after Nazi collapse, that Yugoslavs would occupy both these places as "they belong to Yugoslavia." In addition, Yugoslavia intended to occupy certain "enemy territory".

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Austria)/4-445: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, April 4, 1945—midnight.

[Received April 4—7:44 p. m.]

1336. Gavrilovich⁵⁰ stated today that the Yugoslav Government had decided to make a formal request to the British, Soviet, French and US Governments for a zone of occupation in Austria. He added that Yugoslavs would request the zone to north of the old Yugoslav-Austrian frontier and would include province of Carinthia.

In this connection Macmillan⁵¹ showed us a telegram this afternoon which he received from Stevenson, British Ambassador in Belgrade, confirming above statements of Gavrilovich. Stevenson's message added that he had informed Subasic⁵² that while he sympathized with Yugoslav desire for a zone of occupation in Austria in view of Yugoslav suffering and contribution to war effort he nevertheless felt it would be difficult to accord Yugoslav request as the zone the Yugoslavs wanted included territory which had been object of dispute for some time and if Yugoslavs should be permitted to occupy area they desired such action would prejudge the frontier question.

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Austria)/4-745: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1945—7 p. m.

2825. The following telegram has been received from Patterson⁵³ at Belgrade as no. 16 April 7, 11:27 a. m.:

"Foreign Minister handed me a lengthy note dated April 2 stating that Yugoslavia desires to participate in the military occupation of Austrian territory. Yugoslav government invites Allied Governments to negotiate with them the delimitation of a zone and modalities for its occupation and administration by Yugoslav Army (4) [*for?*]"

⁵⁰ Stoyan Gavrilovich, Yugoslav Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

⁵¹ Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters.

⁵² Ivan Subasic, Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵³ Richard C. Patterson, Jr., Ambassador in Yugoslavia.

allies, proposing a zone extending 'north of the old Yugoslav Austrian frontier between Italy and Hungary including especially the province of Carinthia.'

Note describes Yugoslavia's part in the war, expresses her desire to share allied post-war responsibilities and states that Yugoslav peoples would regard this participation as recognition by the Allies of their struggles and sufferings in the Allied cause.

Foreign Minister strongly supported this request and asked me to do the same. He said the note would be handed also to British, Soviet and French Missions. Copy follows by airgram.⁵⁴

The Department believes it would be both unwise and impracticable to accede to this Yugoslav request.

It would be inappropriate to have Yugoslav forces participate in the occupation or administration of Austria in view of the expressed desire of the Yugoslav Government to acquire territory from Austria.

In view of the great length of time it has taken for most of the governments to study the proposals already circulated in EAC⁵⁵ and formulate views on them, it appears now too late to begin the process anew on the basis of new five-power proposals. In a country as small as Austria five-power occupation and control would in any case be unnecessarily cumbersome.

Repeated to AmPolAd, Caserta, for Erhardt⁵⁶ as Department's no. 319, and to Moscow as Department's no. 843.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 Control (Austria)/4-1945: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kenman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 19, 1945—midnight.

[Received April 20—12:55 p. m.]

1273. Claim made by Yugoslav Foreign Office to American, Soviet, British and French representatives at Belgrade for share in Austrian occupation was subject of note addressed April 12 to Molotov⁵⁷ by British Ambassador.⁵⁸ Ambassador states his Government hopes Soviet Government will concur in suggestion that the four powers addressed should jointly reply that claim is inadmissible

⁵⁴ Airgram A-1 of April 19, 1945, from Belgrade, not printed.

⁵⁵ European Advisory Commission. For documentation on negotiations in the E.A.C. regarding the zones of occupation and control machinery for Austria, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

⁵⁶ John G. Erhardt, U.S. Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs.

⁵⁷ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁵⁸ Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr.

and concurrently communicate to Yugoslavia terms proposed by Eden⁵⁹ at Yalta for settlement of Austro-Yugoslav frontier problem.⁶⁰

Repeated to Belgrade as 2, London 170, Paris as 76.

KENNAN

740.00119 Control (Austria)/4-1745

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The American Embassy at Belgrade has also received from the Under-Secretary of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note in which the Yugoslav Government expressed a desire to participate in the Allied occupation of Austria, similar to the note referred to in the *Aide-Mémoire* (Ref. 1165/11/45) prepared in the British Embassy at Washington on April 13, 1945.⁶¹

The American Government also considers the Yugoslav Government's request inadmissible for the reasons outlined in paragraph three in the *Aide-Mémoire* just mentioned,⁶² and would agree to a joint reply to this effect from the American, British, Soviet, and French Governments.

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1945.

863.014/4-3045: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, April 30, 1945—midnight.

[Received April 30—10:50 p. m.]

1828. British Embassy Belgrade recently requested British liaison officer with Fourth Yugo Army to report on Slovene claims to Austrian territory.

BLO⁶³ has replied that no exact claims have been made but only following general statements:

⁵⁹ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁰ See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 505 and 887.

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² In this paragraph the Yugoslav request was rejected. "Any departure from the principle that only the Great Powers should be responsible for zones of occupation would at once create difficulties with other European Allied governments and there is a special objection to the Yugoslav Government's proposal insofar as they have already put forward territorial claims for those parts of Austria which they now wish to occupy. By acceding to the Yugoslav Government's request the final territorial settlement would inevitably be prejudged." (740.00119 Control (Austria)/4-1345)

⁶³ British Liaison Officer.

All territory containing Slovene minority should be included in Slovenia. All Stajersko and Korosko ⁶⁴ are rightly Slovene. Northern boundaries of these areas are vague but certainly include Vjtlach ⁶⁵ and Klagenfurt and all territory south of Sava, east to Dravograd ⁶⁶ and possibly Volkermarkt east of Dravograd; probably all territory north of Drava will be claimed including Leibnitz. Tarvisio in Italy will certainly be claimed.

Following Partisan troops are north of River Sava: Fourteenth Division consisting of 5 brigades each about 1000 strong.

KIRK

740.0011 EW/5-945 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, May 9, 1945—midnight.

[Received May 9—6:50 p. m.]

2253. General McCreery of British Eighth Army has reported he beat Yugoslavs by 3 hours to Klagenfurt. Partisans were extremely annoyed and beat up Austrian police. It was also stated by McCreery that Partisans are established in many villages inside Austrian Frontier along river near Villach. He added British firmly set up in Klagenfurt and Villach with plenty men and tanks each place. Tarvisio according McCreery contained very large German food dump which Yugoslavs anxious loot.

British troops hope establish contact with Russians near Graz sometime today. About 60,000 Germans have surrendered to British forces in Graz area.

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1045 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, May 10, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received May 10—2:15 p. m.]

2066. My 1336 of April 4 midnight. We have learned that Tito ⁶⁷ has informed British representatives in Belgrade that he has received a favorable reply from Soviet Government to his request that section of Austrian territory be occupied by his forces and that up to present

⁶⁴ Styria and Carinthia.

⁶⁵ Villach.

⁶⁶ Drauburg.

⁶⁷ Marshal Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslav Premier and Minister of National Defense.

time no reply has been forthcoming from British and American Governments. Statement was also made by Tito that he intended to hold any Austrian territory which his troops might seize.

Reports reaching AFHQ⁶⁸ indicate that Tito is insisting on Yugoslav Government for Carinthia.

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Italy)/5-1245 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, May 12, 1945—midnight.

[Received May 13—4:33 a. m.]

2112. Following is summary of a G-2⁶⁹ appreciation of current situation in Carinthia.

Yugoslavs continue infiltrate southern Carinthia and it is probable that bulk of Yugoslav 14th Division is now there. Troops have orders to occupy at least up to Drava and it is clear they intend to establish *de facto* claim to area. Even if solution is found to immediate problem of Venezia Giulia infiltration of Carinthia is likely to continue if only in anticipation of eventual plebiscite.

Situation differs from Venezia Giulia in that Anglo-American troops already possess main strategic points such as Villach and Klagenfurt. If this area can be held in force it should be possible to prevent situation deteriorating further. On other hand, if Anglo-American troops are inadequate either military or political solution to problem will be difficult to obtain. Parallel case is cited of recent events in Greece when EAM⁷⁰ ceased to collaborate and resorted to a *coup d'état* when they realized inadequacy of British forces there.⁷¹

Yugoslav penetration into British Zone in Austria has increased Eighth Army commitment requiring reestimate of garrison for British Zone in Austria.

KIRK

760h.63/5-1245 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 12, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

1556. British Chargé⁷² has written Vyshinski⁷³ to inquire whether Soviet Government is yet in position to supply its views on the British

⁶⁸ Allied Force Headquarters.

⁶⁹ U. S. Army intelligence.

⁷⁰ Communist-controlled Greek resistance organization.

⁷¹ See vol. VIII, last section under Greece.

⁷² Frank K. Roberts.

⁷³ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

proposals for preventing trouble on the Austro-Yugoslav frontier. He points out that the matter is now of extreme urgency as result of Germany's capitulation.⁷⁴

Repeated to Caserta for Erhardt as 96.

KENNAN

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1345: Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman*⁷⁵

LONDON, 13 May 1945.

47. 1. In your message to me number 34 of May 12th⁷⁶ about Venezia Giulia you mention Tito's claims in south Austria (Styria and Carinthia).

2. As these two provinces are in the proposed British zone of occupation, the British Ambassador in Belgrade was instructed on May 10th formally to request Tito on behalf of His Majesty's Government that all Yugoslav forces at present in Austria should immediately be withdrawn. I am asking Halifax⁷⁷ to show you the text of this instruction. It would be a great help if you could now instruct Mr. Patterson to inform Tito that the communication made by the British Ambassador on the subject of Carinthia has the approval and support of the United States Government.

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1445: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson)

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1945—7 p. m.

88. In concert with your British colleague, please address Marshal Tito substantially as follows:

"In carrying out the Moscow Declaration on Austria, dated November 1, 1943,⁷⁸ the American, Soviet, British and French Governments

⁷⁴ Germany surrendered on May 2, 1945. See vol. III, pp. 717-783. In telegram 2116, May 12, 1945, from Caserta, the Political Adviser reported that German troops in the Klagenfurt-Völkermarkt area had been attacked while attempting to surrender to Allied forces. As a result the Supreme Allied Commander, Field Marshal Alexander, had requested Marshal Tito to cease the movement of his troops across the Austrian frontier and to withdraw those who had already crossed it. The Political Adviser paraphrased Alexander's communication to Tito as reading: "Presence of Yugoslav forces in Styria and Carinthia confuses situation and makes SAC's task more difficult. The area will be administered by AMG impartially and without prejudice to Tito's future claims for portions of Austria." (740.00119 Control (Italy)/5-1245)

⁷⁵ This message was sent via the U.S. Military Attaché in London.

⁷⁶ Vol. IV, p. 1156, footnote 41.

⁷⁷ Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States.

⁷⁸ See Protocol of the Moscow Conference, annex 6, *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. I, p. 761.

have elaborated plans for the occupation of Austria within its 1937 frontiers by forces of the countries just named. In accordance with these plans, the forces of the four countries are now in process of effecting the occupation of the 1937 territory of Austria. It is therefore requested that any Yugoslav forces now in that territory be withdrawn, and that the Yugoslav Government adhere to the 1937 frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria pending final determination of frontiers in the general peace settlement."

For your own background information the plans referred to in the foregoing message have not yet been finally agreed, but all four powers have already expressed in the European Advisory Commission tentative agreement in principle to having those plans call for occupation of all of Austria by American, Russian, British and French forces, with allocation to British forces of all of Carinthia and of Steiermark⁷⁹ with the exception of the Burgenland. Soviet forces would occupy the Burgenland and Lower Austria; U.S. forces Salzburg and upper Austria (except perhaps that part of it north of the Danube, which the Russians wish to occupy) and French forces the Tirol and Vorarlberg.

GREW

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1545: Telegram

*Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters,
to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, May 15, 1945—midnight.

[Received May 15—7:35 p. m.]

2184. Following is summary of situation report by AMG⁸⁰ staff with British Eighth Army Austria:

Situation Klagenfurt and SE Karnten [*southeast Carinthia*] confused and difficult owing presence Yugo forces. Many Yugo troops have been withdrawn but many Partisans and administrative troops remain. Yugos in control of town Volkermarkt, their proclamations posted and no British AMG functioning. At Ferlach situation particularly delicate owing large groups White Slovene civilians retreating into Austria in front of Tito forces.

Italian refugees flowing over frontier at Kufing. Estimated 20,000 other nationalities about half Slav in British occupied territory. Some 30,000 Slavs on borders Yugoslavia crossing into British territory as protective forces of White Yugos pushed back by Tito forces. British making temporary arrangements their welfare but request directive as to whether they are to be returned to Tito if called for. Refugees would be unwilling to return and force would be necessary.

⁷⁹ Styria.

⁸⁰ Allied Military Government.

Flour supply will be exhausted by end of month. Sugar stocks exhausted, meat adequate 3 months, milk adequate.

Local police in Villach, and W Karnten [*Western Carinthia*] functioning and gaining confidence. Yugos have disarmed and arrested police put on duty by AMG N [*North of*] Klagenfurt and SE Karnten.

No adequate personnel available for frontier control. Italians being allowed to cross from Austria to Italy but not to return.

Attitude of people is docile to British element, terrified by Yugoslavs. British receive frequent deputations and appeals for protection from Yugos. Austrian, Slav displaced persons and Slav residents in SE Karnten and Klagenfurt equally terrified. Morale of Austrians adversely affected by lack of British action in territory over which British claim military government.

Politically, little pro-Austria or Partisan movement apparent. Complete Gau⁸¹ administration found in Klagenfurt on pre-*Anschluss* basis but includes two Communists, who claim they were self appointed and have no communication with Austrian Provisional Government. Administration consists of Landeshauptmann,⁸² head, executive head and committee of approximately eight persons whose antecedents being investigated. Search also being made for other suitable candidates whom AMG will prefer to install rather than confirm existing administration. Burgomeister appointed in all Kreise⁸³ of Gau before British arrival by Gau administration. Candidate was always last holder of office before *Anschluss* if available.

Health situation general satisfactory.

Labor Office with records in possession of Yugos, and labor generally short. Yugos appear to be leaving Tarvisio area.

KIRK

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1545: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 15, 1945—noon.

[Received May 15—11:50 a. m.]

1582. ReEmbtel 1273, April 19, midnight. In reply to Clark Kerr's note of April 12 expressing hope of British Government that Soviet Government would agree that four powers should jointly reply to Yugoslavia that its claim for participation in Austrian occupation was inadmissible Vyshinski stated on April 16 that Soviet Government considered that Yugoslavia had valid claim to participation with other Allied powers in occupation of enemy territories and suggested that

⁸¹ Regional administrative district of Austria, 1938-45.

⁸² Governor of an Austrian province.

⁸³ Political subdivision of a Gau.

Yugoslav troops might occupy part of Soviet zone in Austria. Vyshinski also drew analogy between such an arrangement and participation of Belgian, Dutch and other Allied troops in occupation of British zone in Germany.

Roberts has now replied stating that British Government sees various objections to this plan and rejecting Vyshinski's analogy to participation of Allied troops in occupation of British zone in Germany as not affording an exact parallel. British note points out that four governments occupying Austria have agreed to different treatment for Germany and Austria since latter country is to be liberated and its independence reestablished; that agreement for occupation of Germany provides for participation of auxiliary contingents, whereas no similar provision exists in draft agreement on Austrian occupation now before EAC, and inclusion of such provision was actually opposed by Soviet representative earlier in discussions; that departure from principle of four power responsibility in Austria would lead to requests of other Allied Governments for participation; and that participation of Yugoslavia, which has advanced claims for Austrian territory, would prejudice consideration of those claims at peace conference.

Sent Department as 1582 repeated to Caserta for Erhardt as 99 and to Belgrade as 4.

KENNAN

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1645: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, May 16, 1945.

[Received May 23—4: 45 p. m.]

88. With reference to my note concerning Yugoslav forces in Austria,⁸⁵ Marshal Tito has sent me following reply dated May 16:

“I have the honor of asking you to transmit to the Government of United States of America the following answer to the communication of 15th May, 1945: The Government of Federative Democratic Yugoslavia regrets much that up to this date its note of 2 April, 1945⁸⁶ asking the Allies to allot Yugoslavia a zone in Austria for occupation by units of Yugoslav Army has not been answered but by the Soviet Union.

After the agreement 1st November, 1943 at Moscow the situation has been greatly changed. Yugoslavia till now participated with a big army in the great Allied efforts which won victory. Yugoslavia of all European countries has most suffered of the German occupation in which a great deal of German units from Austria took part. Therefore, it would be unjust to deny Yugoslav Army the right to pursue

⁸⁵ See telegram 88, May 14, to Belgrade, p. 1319.

⁸⁶ See telegram 2825, April 11, to London, p. 1314.

the enemy over the pre-war frontiers and to occupy the territory liberated from the enemy. Units who have crossed the Yugoslav-Austrian frontier have done so by fighting the enemy who has not submitted himself to the conditions of the capitulation.

With regard that the Government of the Soviet Union agreed that a territory in Austria taken by the Soviet Army would be occupied by Yugoslav Army, Yugoslav Government is of the opinion that the Government of United States of America will assist and enable the Yugoslav units to remain on that Austrian territory which have already been taken with the provision that these Yugoslav forces will be under the Supreme Command of Field Marshal Harold G. Alexander, as the case is with the other forces which will be under the command of the third Ukraine front of Marshal Tolbukhin.

Yugoslav Government deeply believes that such its proposals are justified being done by an Allied country which proportionally has contributed most victims among all European countries to the common Allied cause.

These our demands do not prejudicate the solutions of the peace conference but they only represent the right acquired by effort of our country in war.⁷⁷

PATTERSON

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia
(Patterson)*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1945—4 p. m.

91. Department's 88 May 14, 7 p. m. Department understands that the earlier British request that Tito withdraw his forces from Austria has meanwhile been met with a counterproposal that Tito's forces remain in the British zone in Austria as a part of the occupying forces under the command of Field Marshal Alexander. This is not acceptable to the British Government and would be similarly unacceptable from our point of view.⁸⁷

Please therefore support your British colleague's rejection of the counterproposal, and if the counterproposal should be repeated to you, please reject it forthwith, explaining that it has already come to the attention of this Government and received consideration in connection with the request contained in Department's telegram cited above requesting that all Yugoslav forces withdraw from Austria in order

⁸⁷ The note dated May 16 from Marshal Tito concerning Yugoslav forces in Austria, which was sent by Ambassador Patterson in his telegram 88 of May 16 (*supra*), was not received in the Department of State until May 23 at 4:45 p. m. The Department, however, was informed of the substance of Marshal Tito's note by the U.S. Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters (Kirk), in his telegram 2191 of May 16, which was received at 2:18 p. m. on that day. This telegram also stated that the British Ambassador in Yugoslavia had "recommended to his Government that Tito's request should be refused." (740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1645)

to facilitate the orderly occupation of that territory in accordance with plans of long standing by the signatories of the Moscow Declaration on Austria.

Sent to Belgrade as Department's no. 91; repeated to Caserta for Erhardt as no. 488; to London as no. 3844; and to Paris as no. 2105; and to Moscow as no. 1080.

GREW

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 18, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

2757. For Matthews⁸⁸ from Heath.⁸⁹ Field Marshal Alexander has telegraphed General Eisenhower⁹⁰ personally under date of May 17 that owing to behavior of the Yugoslavs who are endeavoring to set up their own government, the situation in the Fifth Corps area in Austria has deteriorated further. He mentions he cannot stop these activities without the use of force which is not yet possible in view of *démarche* to Yugoslav Government⁹¹ but that open hostilities may break out at any moment.⁹² In order to strengthen his military position, Alexander therefore requests Eisenhower to arrange for certain troop dispositions in SHAEF⁹³ area.

You should also see Alexander's message to Eisenhower FX-76939 of May 16 (Naf 974)⁹⁴ repeated to Agwar⁹⁵ for Combined Chiefs of Staff. [Heath.]

CAFFERY

⁸⁸ H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

⁸⁹ Donald R. Heath, Counselor of Mission on the staff of the Political Adviser for Germany.

⁹⁰ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

⁹¹ For documentation on Allied negotiations with Yugoslavia over Venezia Giulia which were being conducted at this time, and regarding military preparations made by the Allies against possible failure of these negotiations, see vol. iv, pp. 1155-1184, *passim*.

⁹² In telegram 2221, May 18, 1945, from Caserta, the U.S. Political Adviser reported that Field Marshal Alexander had issued a special message to his troops in which he pointed to the dangers of the present situation. "It is, however, Marshal Tito's apparent intention to establish his claims by force of arms and mil[itary] occupation. Action of this kind would be all too reminiscent of Hitler, Mussolini and Japan. It is to prevent such actions that we have been fighting this war . . . We cannot now throw away the vital principles for which we have all fought. Under these principles, it is our duty to hold these disputed territories as trustees until their ultimate disposal is settled at the peace conference." (740.00119 Control (Italy)/5-1845)

⁹³ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

⁹⁴ Not found in Department files.

⁹⁵ Adjutant General, War Department.

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, May 18, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 9:15 p. m.]

95. My 88, May 16. In compliance with Deptel 91, May 16, I sent Marshal Tito a note rejecting his counter proposal on Austria at 7 p. m., May 17, an hour after my British colleague sent his note of rejection.

PATTERSON

740.00119 Control (Austria)/5-2045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, May 20, 1945.

[Received May 20—2 p. m.]

101. Foreign Office last night handed me note from Marshal Tito dated May 19th together with following translation thereof:

“Have the honor of asking you to transmit to the Government of the United States of America the following reply to your note number 36 of the 17th May.⁹⁶

“The Government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia have issued orders to the troops of the Yugoslav Army who are to the north of the American [*Austrian*]⁹⁷ frontier of 1937 in the area west of Dravograd to withdraw to the pre-war boundary line.

“However, in regard the Yugoslav Government declared and reiterated Interson [*intention*] to leave to the peace conference the final settlement of frontiers, the Government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia state with regret that they cannot agree with the view of the Government of the United States of America that the presence of Yugoslav Troops on the territory occupied by them in the fight against common enemies could in any way be considered as a prejudice to the decisions concerning the determination of frontier between Democratic Federative Yugoslavia and Austria.

“The orders of withdrawal to the troops of the Yugoslav Army have been issued in order to stress the desire of the Government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia to comply to the utmost with the wishes of their Allies, the United States and Great Britain, without prejudicing the final settlement of frontier with Austria which will take place at the peace conference.

“The movements of the troops of the Yugoslav Army towards the pre-war frontier are subject to the evacuation of the booty which has fallen into the hands of our Army, and the evacuation of which is being carried out rapidly and according to plan.”

PATTERSON

⁹⁶ See telegram 95 from Belgrade, *supra*.

⁹⁷ Corrected on basis of the translation copy initialed by Marshal Tito which was handed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Patterson (Belgrade Embassy Files).

740.00119 Control (Austria)/6-645: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 6, 1945—noon.

[Received 4:15 p. m.]

1921. ReEmbtel 1582, May 15, noon. In reply to Roberts' letter of May 14 regarding participation of Yugoslav troops in occupation of Austria Vyshinski in note dated May 31 reiterated position of Soviet Govt that Yugoslav troops should be permitted to participate. Rejecting British arguments Vyshinski declared that Soviet Govt saw no grounds for refusing to use Yugoslav troops in joint participation with Red army units in Soviet zone in Austria. Such refusal would be wrong primarily because of contribution made by Yugoslav army to expulsion of Fascist occupants from Austria which has secured to Yugoslavs right to participate in occupation of Austria territory. Yugoslav troops must be granted same right in this respect as was granted in case of Germany by agreement between Four Powers to Dutch, Belgian and other Allied troops which actively participated in fight against Germany.

Vyshinski states that British arguments rejecting analogy between participation of Yugoslav troops in occupation of Austria and participation of troops of western European states in occupation of Germany are unconvincing. He declares that difference between Allied treatment of Germany and Austria does not preclude occupation of Austria as of Germany by Allied troops and therefore does not affect question of occupation. Failure of draft agreement on occupation of Austria to mention participation by troops other than those of principal Allies can have no significance since it is only a draft which has not yet been accepted. Vyshinski also rejects Brit arguments based on claims of Yugoslavia to Austrian territory asserting that territorial question has not been raised and should in the opinion of Soviet Govt not be connected with question of participation of Yugoslav troops in occupation. Solution of questions involving territorial claims must be related to peace settlement and cannot depend on occupation of certain areas by Allied troops.

In view of foregoing Soviet Govt cannot agree to objections raised in Brit note to participation of Yugoslav troops in occupation of Russian zone in Austria and continues to adhere to its point of view on this question.

Sent Dept 1921, rptd to AusPolAd Florence for Erhardt and to Belgrade as 12.

HARRIMAN

[By means of a paraphrase of a Foreign Office telegram of June 13, 1945, handed to the Department on June 19, the British Embassy notified the Department: "As we have already informed the Yugoslav Government that we cannot agree to hand over part of the British zone or permit the Yugoslav troops to participate in the British zone, we see no need to make any further reply at present to the Yugoslav Government's note of April 2." (740.00119 Control (Austria)/6-1945) For the contents of the Yugoslav note under reference, see telegram 2825, April 11, to London, printed on page 1314.

A telegram to the Embassy in Belgrade was prepared in the Department on June 27, 1945, but was not sent. It was in reply to the Yugoslav note of April 2, and rejected the Yugoslav proposal on the grounds that it was impracticable to increase the number of powers participating in the occupation of Austria, and that such a step might prejudice the future orderly settlement of the area in question since Yugoslavia had already declared its intention to annex it. Attached to the file copy of this draft telegram is a notation of July 3, 1945, by Ware Adams of the Division of Central European Affairs, which reads:

"Mr. Grew prefers that we not inform the Yugoslav Government, if it can be avoided, that we would oppose its participation in the occupation of Austria.

Therefore, in view of the already long delay and the considerations just mentioned, Mr. Grew has decided that this message should not be sent, and that no reply should be made to the Yugoslav note of April 2 unless the question should arise again." (740.00119 Control (Austria)/4-945)]

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¹ In indexing persons the intention has been to include all references to persons of significance for an understanding of the record, with the following exceptions: (1) The name of the Secretary of State or the Acting Secretary of State appearing as the signer of outgoing instructions unless there is a clear indication of the Secretary's or Acting Secretary's personal interest; (2) the name of an American officer in charge of a mission appearing as the signer of reports to the Department of State, except for personal items; (3) the names of persons to whom documents are addressed.

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