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United States Department of State

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
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**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1958–1960**

Volume VIII

**Berlin Crisis
1958–1959**

Editor Charles S. Sampson
General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie

United States Government Printing Office
Washington
1993

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. A statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Title IV of the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351 *et seq.*), added by Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991.

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts which contributed to the formulation of policies and records providing supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

The volume presented here, compiled in 1981 and 1982, meets all the standards of selection and editing prevailing in the Department of State at that time. This volume records policies and events of more than 30 years ago, but the statute allows the Department until 1996 to reach the 30-year line in the publication of the series.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a triennial subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the final 3 years (1958–1960) of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This subseries comprises 19 print volumes totaling more than 15,000 pages and 7 microfiche supplements presenting more than 14,000 additional pages of original documents.

In planning and preparing this 1958–1960 triennium of volumes, the editors chose to present the official record of U.S. foreign affairs with respect to Europe, the Soviet Union, and Canada in five print volumes. Volume VIII presents the record of U.S. policy during the first part of the Berlin crisis through the end of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting in August 1959; Volume VII (in two parts) documents U.S. policy on European economic and political integration, NATO, Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Scandinavia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Vatican. Volume IX presents documents on U.S. policy toward Berlin following the Foreign Ministers Meeting with particular attention to the abortive summit conference in May 1960; U.S. relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria; and U.S. policy toward the German Democratic Republic. Volume X (in two parts) documents policies toward Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Finland, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The original research, compilation, and editing of this volume were done in 1981 and 1982 under the Department regulation derived from Secretary Kellogg's charter of 1925. This regulation prescribed that the *Foreign Relations* series include "a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities," presuming that the records of the Department of State would constitute the central core of documentation presented in the series. The Department of State historians have always had complete and unconditional access to all records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized (lot) files of the policymaking levels; the files of the Department of State's Executive Secretariat, which included all the official papers created by or submitted to the Secretary of State; the files of all overseas Foreign Service posts and U.S. special missions; and the official correspondence with foreign governments and with other Federal agencies. Any failure to include a complete Department of State record in the *Foreign Relations* se-

ries cannot be attributed to constraints or limitations placed upon the Department historians in their access to Department records, information security regulations and practices notwithstanding.

Secretary Kellogg's charter of 1925 and Department regulations derived therefrom required that further records "needed to supplement the documentation in the Department files" be obtained from other government agencies. Department historians preparing the *Foreign Relations* volumes documenting the Eisenhower administration, including the editors of this volume, fully researched the papers of President Eisenhower and other White House foreign policy records. These Presidential papers have become a major part of the official record published in the *Foreign Relations* series.

Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other Federal agencies including the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. All of this documentation has been routinely made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. Particular thanks are due to the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library for its assistance in preparing this volume.

Department of State historians have also enjoyed steadily broadened access to the records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joints Chief of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Selective access has been obtained to the records of several other agencies in order to supplement the official record in particular *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Completion of the declassification of this volume and the final steps of its preparation for publication coincided with the development since early 1991 by the Central Intelligence Agency, in cooperation with the Department of State, of expanded access by Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from among those records still in the custody of that Agency. The Department of State chose not to postpone the publication of this volume to ascertain how such access might affect the scope of available documentation and the changes that might be made in the contents of this particular volume. The Department is, however, using this expanded access, as arranged by the CIA's History Staff, for compilation of future volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series.

The statute of October 28, 1991, requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of all the major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the United States Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing

full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. These new standards go beyond the mandate of the prior Department of State regulations for the preparation of the series and define broadened access to the records of other government agencies. The research and selection of documents for this volume were carried out in 1981–1982 in accordance with the existing Department regulations. The editors decided not to delay publication to conduct the additional research needed to meet the new standards, but they are confident that the manuscript prepared in 1981–1982 provides a fully accurate record. The List of Sources, pages XIII–XVII, identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume.

Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume VIII

In selecting documents for this volume, the editors placed primary consideration on the formulation of policy on the “German problem” by President Eisenhower and his top advisers. The selection also aimed at bringing together documentation on the most significant U.S. diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union regarding the status of Berlin. Memoranda of conversations among the President, the Secretary of State, and other top officials and the memoranda of discussion and policy papers of the National Security Council with respect to basic U.S. policies toward Germany and Berlin were the focus of foreign policy decision making in the Eisenhower administration. These papers have been presented here as fully as possible.

The editors had complete access to and made use of memoranda of discussion at National Security Council meetings and other institutional NSC documents included in the Whitman File at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, as well as more informal foreign policy materials in that file and in other collections at the Eisenhower Library. These Presidential files were supplemented by NSC and White House documents in Department of State files.

During the years 1958–1959, the White House and the Department of State worked together closely in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Berlin. Secretaries of State John Foster Dulles and Christian A. Herter (after April 1959) advised President Eisenhower and took part in the deliberations of the National Security Council, while the White House and National Security Council directed the preparation of contingency papers on Berlin that included input from other executive agencies. The Department of State prepared and coordinated exchanges of views and discussions of policy toward Berlin with the French, German, and British Governments and participated in meetings between President Eisenhower and the leaders of these states.

The editors have selected from the files of the Department of State, White House, and National Security Council records of the most important meetings between the President and his principal foreign policy advisers and between them and their counterparts in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. They have also included internal U.S. Government policy recommendations and decision papers relating to the question of Berlin; telegrams that document the important policy recommendations of U.S. representatives at the Missions in London, Bonn, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow; and the records of the several quadripartite working groups that prepared reports on Berlin.

In addition to Department of State, White House, and National Security Council records, the editors had access to a body of declassified JCS files at the National Archives and Records Administration. Copies of classified JCS materials were obtained from the Joint Staff on a request basis. The editors selected documents that indicated major foreign policy recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The editors reviewed records on U.S. military planning and dispositions in Germany and included the most significant of these.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in *Foreign Relations* series follows office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. The amount of material omitted because it was unrelated, however, is not accounted for. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first unnumbered footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting in-

formation. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Declassification Review

The initial declassification review of this volume in 1987 and thereafter resulted in the preliminary decision to withhold more than 15 percent of the documents originally selected primarily because of the continued sensitivity of the Berlin question. Following reunification of Germany, a second declassification review reduced the amount withheld to 4.7 percent of the documents. The remaining documentation provides a full account of the major foreign policy issues confronting, and the policies undertaken by, the Eisenhower administration on the question of Berlin.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;

- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; or
- 9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.


Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, in particular David Haight, who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennon, Charles S. Sampson collected, selected, and edited all the material presented in this volume. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps in the editorial and publication process. Althea W. Robinson, Rita M. Baker, and Vicki E. Futscher did the copy and technical editing and Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Natalie H. Lee, Chief) oversaw the production of the volume. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

June 1993



Contents

Preface	III
List of Sources	XIII
List of Abbreviations	XIX
List of Persons	XXIII
Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959	
January–October 1958: Continuing Soviet harassment of Western access to Berlin	1
November–December 1958: U.S. response to Soviet threats to transfer its functions in Berlin to the German Democratic Republic	
Western reaction to Khrushchev's November 10 speech	46
The Soviet note of November 27 and the Western replies of December 31 ..	133
January–March 1959: Further exchanges of notes leading to the proposal for a Foreign Ministers meeting on Berlin	
The Soviet note of January 10 and the Western replies of February 16	225
February 17–March 30: Soviet acceptance of the Western proposal for a Foreign Ministers meeting on Berlin	373
Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union at Geneva May 11–August 5, 1959	
March–May 1959: Preparations for the conference	540
First part of the conference, May 11–June 20, 1959	687
Conference recess, June 21–July 12, 1959	933
Second part of the conference, July 13–August 5, 1959	982
Index	1117



List of Sources

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Indexed Central Files. The principal source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central files of the Department of State. Many of the documents were selected from the following files:

033.62A11: Visits of West German officials to the United States

396.1: International Conferences

396.1-GE: International Conferences at Geneva

396.1-PA: International Conferences at Paris

396.1-WA: International Conferences at Washington

762.00: German political affairs

762.0221: German territorial issues

762B.5411: Overflights of East Germany

Lot Files. Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows.

Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327

Diaries of Ambassador David K.E. Bruce for the years 1948-1974.

Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences for the years 1956-1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559; Lot 64 D 560

See under Washington National Records Center.

EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291

Files of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, for the 1950s.

Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 64 D 187

Secret telegram summaries prepared by the Executive Secretariat for the years 1958-1960.

INR-NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, including NIEs and SNIEs for the years 1958-1960.

XIV List of Sources

JCS Files

Documents obtained upon request from the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject, country, and chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1957–1961.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the Secretary of State and heads of government and foreign ministers for the years 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary's and Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collection of the minutes of the Secretary of State's daily staff meetings for the years 1952–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master files of National Security Council documents, correspondence, and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top secret records of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the years 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the years 1954–1956, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

UNA Files: Lot 61 D 91

Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs for the years 1959–1960.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Records of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959.

Herter Papers

Papers of Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State and then Secretary of State, 1957–1961.

Project Clean Up

See under White House Office Files.

Staff Secretary Records

From the White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, 1952–1961, including records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., and Christopher H. Russell.

White House Office Files

Several White House Office collections, including Project Clean Up.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name Series, Dulles–Herter Series, DDE Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administration Series, and International File.

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland**Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State**

Conference Files: FRC 83–0068

Lot 64 D 559: Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences for the year 1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Lot 64 D 560: Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences for the years 1958–1959, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Record Group 319, Records of the Department of the Army

Headquarters Department of the Army, Communications Center Files (formerly located at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania).

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698

Country files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for the year 1958.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170

Country files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for the year 1960.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.**Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State**

OSS–INR Intelligence Files

Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, and the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, 1941–1961.

U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Oral History Research Collection

TV Tapes 351 and 352, Interview with General Barksdale Hamlett.

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
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List of Abbreviations

- ABC**, atomic, biological, and chemical
ADN, Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (General German News Service)
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AFL-CIO, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFN, Armed Forces Network; Office of North African Affairs, Department of State
AFP, Agence France Presse (French News Agency)
ALO, Allied Liaison Office
Amb, Ambassador
AmConGen, American Consul General
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States
AP, Associated Press
APO, Army Post Office
A/S, anti-submarine
ATO, Allied Traffic Office
BASC, Berlin Air Safety Center
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BENELUX, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg
BER, series indicator for position papers prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Berlin
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
BRIXMIS, British Military Liaison Mission
CA, circular airgram
C, Counselor of the Department of State
Cahto, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Herter while away from Washington
CC, Central Committee
CDU, Christlich-Demokratische Union, (Christian Democratic Union)
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
CF, Conference File
CG, circular airgram; Commanding General
ChiComs, Chinese Communists
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CinC, Commander in Chief
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Europe
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCUSAREUR, Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe
COB, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Command, Berlin
COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group
CONUS, continental United States
CPD, series indicator for telegrams from Camp David
CP(SU), Communist Party (of the Soviet Union)
CSC, Coal and Steel Community
CSU, Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
C-VR, Council-Verbatim Record
DA, Department of the Army
DDR, Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)
Deldi, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference
Deptel, Department telegram
DGB, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Union)
Didel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference
Dir Gen, Director General
DM(E), Deutsche Mark (East)

- Dulte**, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
- E**, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
- EAC**, European Advisory Commission
- EC**, series indicator for telegrams from the Commander in Chief, Europe
- ECA**, Economic Cooperation Administration
- ECM**, electronic countermeasures
- ECOSOC**, United Nations Economic and Social Council
- EDC**, European Defense Community
- EE**, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
- EEC**, European Economic Community
- EFTA**, European Free Trade Area
- EGR**, East German Republic
- Embdes**, Embassy despatch
- EmbOff**, Embassy officer
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/SOV**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EURATOM**, European Atomic Energy Commission
- FAA**, Federal Aviation Administration
- FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Fed Rep**, Federal Republic
- FIG**, France, Italy, and Germany
- FM**, Foreign Minister
- FMLM**, French Military Liaison Mission
- FMW Ref**, Foreign Ministers Meeting Washington, reference
- FonMin**, Foreign Minister
- FonOff**, Foreign Office
- FonSec**, Foreign Secretary
- ForMin**, Foreign Minister
- FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany
- FTA**, free trade area
- FY**, fiscal year
- FYI**, for your information
- GA**, General Assembly
- GARIOA**, Government and Relief in Occupied Areas
- GDR**, German Democratic Republic
- GER**, Office of German Affairs, Department of State
- GER/GPA**, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, Office of German Affairs, Department of State
- GFR**, German Federal Republic
- GFY**, German fiscal year
- GNP**, gross national product
- GOF**, Government of France
- GPA**, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, Department of State
- GSFG**, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
- HGP D**, Heads of Government Meeting Paris, document
- HMG**, Her (His) Majesty's Government
- HQ**, headquarters
- IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency
- IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- ICA**, International Cooperation Administration
- ICJ**, International Court of Justice
- IDO**, International Disarmament Organization
- IRBM**, Intermediate range ballistic missile
- IS**, International Staff
- ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- IZT**, interzonal trade agreement
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JSSC**, Joint Strategic Survey Committee
- K**, Khrushchev
- L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- L/EUR**, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State
- LS**, Division of Language Services, Department of State
- M**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory Group
- MAP**, Military Assistance Program
- MC**, Military Committee
- MinPres**, Minister President
- MLM**, Military Liaison Mission
- MOD**, Minister of Defense
- MP**, military police; Member of Parliament

- MSP**, Mutual Security Program
MVW US Del MC, Macmillan Visit to Washington, U.S. Delegation, memorandum of conversation
mytel, my telegram
NAC, National Advisory Council; North Atlantic Council
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Company
NCO, noncommissioned officer
NEACC, Near East Arms Control Committee
Niact, Night Action; communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NMM Ref, NATO Ministerial Meeting, reference paper
Noform, no foreign dissemination
NSC, National Security Council
NYT, *New York Times*
OAS, Organization of American States
OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
OCI, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OSD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ourtel, our telegram
P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PermRep, Permanent Representative
PL, Public Law
PM, Prime Minister
POLAD, Political Adviser
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
QBAL, Quadripartite Berlin Airlift
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
reftel, reference telegram
rep, representative
RIAS, Rundfunk in Amerikanische Sektor (Radio in the American Sector)
RM/DOC, Rùunion de Ministères des Affaires Etrangères/Document (Conference of Foreign Ministers/Document)
S, Office of the Secretary of State
S Bahn, Strassenbahn (streetcar)
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
S/AE, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy Affairs
SC, United Nations Security Council
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecDel/MC, Secretary's Delegation/memorandum of conversation
SecState, Secretary of State
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington
Secy, Secretary
SED, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SERB, Soviet External Relations Branch
SHAEF, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Europe
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State
SovEmb, Soviet Embassy
S/P, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-RO, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
STRAC, Strategic Army Corps
SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development

XXII List of Abbreviations

- SVE/MC**, Secretary's Visit to Europe/memorandum of conversation
- SX**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Army, Europe
- SYG**, Secretary-General
- TAC**, Tactical Air Corps
- TASS**, Telegrafnoe Agentsvo Sovitskogo Soiuzs (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
- tel**, telegram
- Tocah**, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Herter while away from Washington
- Topol**, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
- Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State while away from Washington
- Tousi**, series indicator for telegrams to USIA missions
- ttd**, temporary travel document
- U**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- U/CEA**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Communist Economic Affairs
- UKDel**, United Kingdom Delegation
- UN**, United Nations
- UNESCO**, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly
- unn**, unnumbered
- UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
- UNRWA**, United Nations Relief and Works Agency
- UPI**, United Press International
- USA**, United States Army
- USAF(E)**, United States Air Force (Europe)
- USAREUR**, United States Army, Europe
- USBER**, United States Mission at Berlin
- USCINCEUR**, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
- USCOB**, United States Command, Berlin
- USDel(M/C)**, United States Delegation (memorandum of conversation)
- USEP**, United States Escapee Program
- USG**, United States Government
- USIA**, United States Information Agency
- USIB**, United States Information Board
- USMLM**, United States Military Liaison Mission
- USRO**, Office of the United States Mission to European Regional Organizations
- USUN**, United States Mission to the United Nations
- US/VR(S)**, United States/Verbatim Record (Summary)
- VOA**, Voice of America
- Vopo**, Volkspolizei (People's Police)
- VP**, Vice President
- WE**, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
- WEU**, Western European Union
- WG**, working group
- W/MSC**, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Affairs Security Coordinator
- WWG**, Washington Working Group

List of Persons

Note: The identification of persons in this list is generally limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. Where no dates are given, the individual usually held the position throughout the period covered by the volume.

- Achilles, Theodore C.**, Counselor of the Department of State from March 1960
Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Akalovsky, Alexander, Department of State interpreter
Allen, George, Director of the United States Information Agency
Alphand, Hervé, French Ambassador to the United States
Amrehn, Franz, Deputy Mayor of Berlin
Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Treasury
Armitage, John A., Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Barbour, Walworth**, Minister in the United Kingdom
Battle, Laurie C., Representative from Alabama
Baudissin, Georg Graf von, German Representative to the Four-Power Working Group
Becker, Loftus E., Legal Adviser, Department of State, until August 1959
Berding, Andrew H., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Bernau, Phyllis D., Personal Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles
Blankenhorn, Herbert A. von, German Permanent Representative to NATO
Blessing, Karl, President of the Bundesbank
Boegner, Jean-Marie, Diplomatic Adviser to President de Gaulle
Bolz, Lothar, Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic
Brandt, Willy, Governing Mayor of Berlin
Brentano, Heinrich von, German Foreign Minister
Brosio, Manlio, Italian Ambassador to the United States
Brown, L. Dean, Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, from September 1958
Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador to Germany until October 1959
Burgess, W. Randolph, Permanent Representative to NATO
Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations
Burns, Findley, Jr., Political Officer at the Mission at Berlin from August 1958
- Caccia, Sir Harold A.**, British Ambassador to the United States
Calhoun, John A., Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, September 1958-September 1960
Carstens, Karl, Head of the Political Section, German Foreign Ministry, from September 1959; thereafter Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs
Clay, General Lucius D., former U.S. Commandant, Berlin
Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister from June 1958
Creel, Robert C., Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, Department of State, until December 1958

- Dale, William N.**, Deputy Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1959
- Davis, Richard H.**, Minister Counselor at the Embassy in the Soviet Union until August 1959
- De Gaulle, Charles**, Prime Minister of France, June 1958–January 1959; thereafter President of France
- Debré, Michel**, French Prime Minister from January 1959
- Denny, Admiral Sir Michael**, Chairman of the British Joint Services Staff to the United States
- Dillon, C. Douglas**, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until June 1958, thereafter Under Secretary of State
- Dirksen, Everett M.**, Senator from Illinois
- Dittmann, Herbert**, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, German Foreign Ministry
- Dixon, Sir Pierson**, British Representative to the United Nations
- Douglas, James H.**, Secretary of the Air Force until December 1959; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Drinkall, John K.**, Western Department, British Foreign Office
- Dubs, Adolph**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1959
- Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand**, Head of the Eastern Department, German Foreign Ministry
- Dulles, Allen W.**, Director of Central Intelligence
- Dulles, Eleanor L.**, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of German Affairs, Department of State
- Dulles, John Foster**, Secretary of State until April 1959
- Eckardt, Felix von**, State Secretary, Federal Republic of Germany
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States
- Eisenhower, Major John S. D.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President from October 1958
- Elbrick, C. Burke**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until October 1958
- Erhard, Ludwig**, German Minister of Economics
- Etzel, Franz**, German Minister of Finance
- Fessenden, Russell H.**, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, from September 1958, Acting Director from June 1959
- Freers, Edward L.**, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
- Froment-Meurice, Henri**, East European Department, French Foreign Ministry
- Fulbright, J. William**, Senator from Arkansas
- Gates, Thomas S., Jr.**, Secretary of the Navy until June 1959; Deputy Secretary of Defense, June–December 1959; thereafter Secretary of Defense
- Gerstenmaier, Eugene**, President of the Bundestag
- Gibson, William M.**, Director, Office of International Conferences, Department of State, from January 1959
- Globke, Hans**, Federal State Secretary, Federal Republic of Germany
- Gomulka, Wladislaw**, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party
- Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J.**, Staff Secretary to the President
- Gray, Gordon**, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until June 1958; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from July 1958
- Green, Joseph N., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until October 1959.
- Grewe, Wilhelm C.**, German Ambassador to the United States from February 1958
- Gromyko, Andrei Andreivich**, Soviet Foreign Minister
- Grotewohl, Otto**, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic

- Grubyakov, A. M.**, Senior Assistant to the Soviet Foreign Minister
Gufler, Bernard, Assistant Chief of Mission at Berlin
- Hagerty, James C.**, Press Secretary to the President
Halleck, Charles, Representative from Indiana
Hamlett, Major General Barksdale, U.S. Commandant, Berlin
Hammar skjöld, Dag, United Nations Secretary-General
Hancock, Patrick F., British Representative to the Four-Power Working Group
Harriman, W. Averell, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Herter, Christian A., Under Secretary of State until April 21, 1959; thereafter Secretary of State
Heuss, Theodor, President of the Federal Republic of Germany until July 1959
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., Senator from Iowa
Hillenbrand, Martin J., Political Officer, Mission at Berlin, until September 1958; thereafter Director, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Hodes, General Henry I., Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe until March 1959
Hood, Viscount Samuel, Minister of the British Embassy in United States
Houghton, Amory, Ambassador to France
Hoyer Millar, *see* Millar
Humphrey, Hubert H., Senator from Minnesota
- Irwin, John N., II**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until January 1959
- Jackling, R. W.**, Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States
James, Alan G., Assistant Chief, Report and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until November 1959
Jandrey, Frederick W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until April 1958
Jebb, Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn, British Ambassador in France
Johnson, Major General Douglas V., Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Joint Staff, 1958-1959; thereafter Director for Plans and Policy
Johnson, Lyndon B., Senator from Texas
Joxe, Louis, Permanent Secretary General, French Foreign Ministry, until July 1959; thereafter Secretary of State to the Prime Minister
- Kharlamov, Mikhail A.**, Director of the Press Office, Soviet Foreign Ministry
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, Vice Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers until March 1958; thereafter Chairman
Klein, David, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Germany
Klein, Guenther, Berlin Senator for Federal Affairs
Kohler, Foy D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, February 1958-December 1959; thereafter Assistant Secretary
Kotsiuba, Colonel, Soviet Deputy Commandant for Berlin until February 1958
Krebs, Max V., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until June 1958; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Kroll, Hans, German Ambassador to the Soviet Union from May 1958
Kusterer, Hermann, Interpreter, German Embassy in the United States
Kuznetsov, Vasili Vasilevich, Soviet Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Laloy, Jean**, Director, European Affairs, French Foreign Ministry
Lampson, Edward T., Acting Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Laskey, Denis S., Principal Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd

- Ledwidge, W. B. J.**, British Political Adviser in Berlin
- Lejins, Nora M.**, Assistant Chief, Division of Language Services, Department of State, until October 1958
- LeMay, General Curtis**, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
- Lightner, Edwin A., Jr.**, Assistant Chief of Mission at Berlin from June 1959
- Lisle, Raymond E.**, Deputy Director, Office of German Affairs, Department of State
- Lloyd, Selwyn**, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Lodge, Henry Cabot**, Representative to the United Nations
- Loram, Matthew J.**, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Lucet, Charles**, Minister of the French Embassy in the United States
- Lyon, Cecil B.**, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in France from March 1958
- Macmillan, Harold**, British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
- Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich**, Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom
- Markushin, Lieutenant Colonel M.F.**, Soviet Deputy Commandant in Berlin from February 1958
- McBride, Robert H.**, Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until September 1958; thereafter Director
- McCloy, John J.**, former High Commissioner for Germany
- McCone, John A.**, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
- McElroy, Neil H.**, Secretary of Defense until December 1959
- McFarland, James H.**, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- McKiernan, Thomas D.**, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- McSweeney, John M.**, Acting Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1959
- Menshikov, Mikhail Alekseevich**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States from April 1959
- Merchant, Livingston T.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from November 1958
- Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich**, First Deputy Chairman, Soviet Council of Ministers
- Millar, Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer**, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President
- Moch, Jules**, French Representative to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference
- Morgan, George A.**, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from April 1958; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning from August 1959
- Morris, Brewster H.**, Consul General at the Embassy in the United Kingdom
- Mountbatten, Admiral Louis**, British Chief of the Defense Staff and Chairman, Chief of Staff, from July 1959
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs until August 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Nixon, Richard M.**, Vice President of the United States
- Nolting, Frederick E., Jr.**, Deputy Representative to NATO
- Norstad, General Lauris**, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe; also Commander, U.S. European Command, from September 1958
- Nunley, William T.**, Acting United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Ollenhauer, Erich**, Head of the German Social Democratic Party
- Ormsby Gore, William David**, Minister of State, British Foreign Office

- Pella, Giuseppe**, Italian Foreign Minister
- Persons, Major General Wilton B.**, Deputy Assistant to the President until September 1958; thereafter Assistant to the President
- Pervukhin, Mikhail Georgievich**, Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic from February 1958
- Quarles, Donald**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until May 1959
- Raab, Julius**, Chancellor of Austria
- Rayburn, Sam**, Representative from Texas; Speaker of the House of Representatives
- Reilly, Sir Patrick**, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union
- Reinhardt, G. Frederick**, Counselor of the Department of State
- Reinstein, Jacques J.**, Director, Office of German Affairs, Department of State, until July 1958; Counselor of the Embassy in France with rank of Minister from June 1959
- Roberts, Sir Frank**, British Permanent Representative to NATO
- Scherpenberg, Albert H. van**, State Secretary, German Foreign Ministry
- Segni, Antonio**, Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, July 1958–January 1959; Prime Minister from February 1959
- Seydoux, François**, French Ambassador to Germany
- Shilov, Major A.S.**, Soviet Assistant Political Adviser in Berlin
- Smirnov, Andrei Andreevich**, Soviet Ambassador to Germany
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- Smith, James H.**, Director of the International Cooperation Administration
- Soldatov, Aleksandr Andreevich**, Head of American Countries Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry
- Spaak, Paul-Henri**, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Staats, Elmer B.**, Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board
- Steel, Christopher**, British Ambassador to Germany
- Stikker, Dirk U.**, Dutch Permanent Representative to NATO
- Stimpson, Harry F., Jr.**, Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary of State, until July 1959
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.**, First Secretary and Political Officer at the Embassy in France
- Straneo, Carlo Alberto**, Director General of Political Affairs, Italian Foreign Ministry
- Strauss, Franz-Josef**, German Defense Minister
- Strauss, Lewis L.**, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission until June 1958; Secretary of Commerce, November 1958–June 1959
- Sullivan, Charles A.**, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy from February 1959
- Thompson, Llewellyn E.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Thurston, Raymond L.**, Counselor at the Embassy in France until April 1958; thereafter Consul General
- Timmmons, Benson E. L., III**, Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until June 1959
- Toon, Malcolm**, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
- Trimble, William C.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Germany until April 1958; Minister until February 1959
- Troyanovski, Oleg Antonovich**, Soviet translator
- Twining, General Nathan F.**, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Tyler, William R.**, Counselor for Political Affairs in the Embassy in Germany from April 1958
- Ulbricht, Walter**, Consul General, Chairman of the Socialist Unity Party
- Vockel, Heinrich**, German Representative in Berlin

XXVIII List of Persons

Walters, Lieutenant Colonel Vernon A., Staff Assistant to the President

Weber, Heinz, German Interpreter

Wellington, Rebecca G., First Secretary of the Embassy in Germany until March 1959

White, General Thomas D., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Whitman, Ann C., President Eisenhower's Personal Secretary

Whitney, John Hay, Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Wilcox, Francis O., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Wilkinson, P. A., British Embassy in Germany

Williamson, Francis T., Director of Research-Analysis for Western Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1959

Winzer, Otto, Deputy Foreign Minister, German Democratic Republic

Zakharov, Major General Nikolai F., Soviet Commandant in Berlin

Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich, Head, Soviet Delegation to the U.N. Disarmament Commission

Zulueta, Philip F. de, Private Secretary to Prime Minister Macmillan

Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959

JANUARY–OCTOBER 1958: CONTINUING SOVIET HARASSMENT OF WESTERN ACCESS TO BERLIN

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, January 9, 1958, 7 p.m.

2100. Reference Department to Bonn 1709, December 27.¹ I believe it is time we looked at Berlin Allied access problems as a whole and evaluate actions and principles pertaining to land access in relation to air access and vice versa. The uninformed public might not draw a distinction between acceptance of GDR officials at surface checkpoints and refusal to accept GDR traffic control in the corridors even though our air rights may be more solidly based on quadripartite agreements. Soviets have no physical control over movement of aircraft or of passengers, cargo and mail moving by air comparable to their ability to physically control other types of traffic. This fact is a limitation on their ability to harass West Berlin. Some Berliners and Federal Republic officials are concerned that we are not too sure of our air rights and might not maintain strong position on air access in face of Soviet attempts to restrict.

Even though we cannot anticipate nor be prepared for every possible Soviet move affecting access to Berlin, we must be prepared to deal quickly with any action impeding access and infringing upon our rights. While current policy provides for acceptance GDR personnel at checkpoints as "agents" of Soviets, planning for contingencies has not gone beyond assumption that such personnel in this capacity would merely look at documents and pass train. While such might well be the case initially, we would certainly be naive to think this procedure would go no further. It is certain that since acceptance of GDR "authority" by Western powers is underlying Soviet objective, continuous pressure to that end may be expected. The next step would logically and almost inevitably be demand for German translations, questioning status of travel,

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-958. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Berlin and Heidelberg.

¹ See *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXVI, p. 530.

challenging right to move German mail car, insistence on GDR visas, etc. We can anticipate that protests to Soviets will encounter a referral to "sovereign" GDR and we would reach an impasse. (While we are not predicting these events will occur, we would be remiss not to consider such assumptions in connection with policy planning.)

The above situation poses two problems:

(1) At what point beyond mere "showing" of documents is recognition of "authority" involved?

(2) What do we do when we turn back trains rather than recognize GDR "authority"? (Reference to "actual physical interference" in reference telegram not clear unless refusal to pass train considered physical interference.)

On the first problem, I feel that acceptance at GDR request of any condition or procedure not in effect with Soviets would constitute recognizing GDR "authority". Furthermore, there would be no channel for developing a modus vivendi for keeping the trains running when minor questions arose as there has been with the Soviets. Department's comments on this problem would be appreciated.

The second problem involves the "self-imposed blockade," which raises visions of 1948 airlift, even though in assumed situation only consideration of Allied access (not German) involved. Our ability to take and hold a strong line with Soviets in this eventuality and to muster public opinion by dramatizing Soviets' actions blocking our access to Berlin depends upon how long we can accept cessation of military train service and official use of autobahn. With this in mind, I asked USAREUR to estimate what would be required to airlift military surface traffic and they have supplied the following information:

1. Temporary ground blockade of military supply routes (train and autobahn) could be accepted logistically for two to three weeks without serious inconvenience and without instigation of airlift transport other than normal air courier service plus lift for certain perishables.

2. Maintenance normal supply conditions in Berlin would require air transport for 4 tons dairy products and 7 tons APO mail daily. After first week, additional daily requirement 3 tons fresh fruits & vegetables would exist. Translated into aircraft requirements: For first week, 2 C-54 or 2 C-119 or 1 C-124 daily; for second week, 2 C-54 or 3 C-119 or 1 C-124.

3. Present overall baggage, freight and U.S. mail daily average tonnage on passenger trains is 35 tons. As indicated 2 above, only 11 tons required for short period. In addition, about 50 tons of German mail carried daily in Bundespost mail cars into Berlin on military trains; similar amount carried on West bound runs.

4. Trains carry average of 80 passengers daily to Berlin of whom approximately 40 per cent duty travelers.

5. Passenger train service to and from Berlin costs U.S. \$4,000 daily, not including cost of Bundespost mail cars. Paid by Berlin magis-

trate funds. (In addition, the Bundespost contributes about \$1,000 daily to the Bundesbahn for the continued operation of the Bremerhaven-Berlin passenger trains on a daily basis as per an agreement with USAREUR.)

6. U.S. military freight shipments to Berlin, in addition to freight on passenger trains, averaged during last year 3,250 tons per month, of which 86 percent coal (15 tons per day other than coal). Such trains regularly scheduled semi-monthly, but last year actual average 7.5 trains per month.

On basis of above information, I am asking USAFE to explore capability of handling these movements by air on short notice. The operation of only one flight per day of one C-124 for 3 weeks would carry us through the critical period, and even more prolonged air movement would appear feasible. Department's comments on this second problem would also be appreciated.

USAREUR fully concurs desirability considering inter-relationship air & ground access problems and review of principles to be followed in local actions.

Bruce

2. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany

Berlin, January 16, 1958, 9 p.m.

775. Allied Political Advisers met with Kotsiuba at Karlshorst this afternoon. Kotsiuba apologized for being unable to receive American Political Adviser yesterday, stating he had not had time to brief himself on subject which he assumed was purpose of visit.

British Chairman for month opened by stating political advisers had come to protest against unprecedented control measures which Sovs had tried to impose on Allied military trains night of Jan 14-15.¹ He

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1658. Confidential; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Heidelberg, London, Paris, Moscow, and the Department of State as telegram 840, which is the source text, and pouched to DCSI USAFE.

¹ On the night of January 14-15 U.S. military trains were held at the Marienborn checkpoint by Soviet officers who insisted that the movement orders of all passengers had to be stamped by them. Documentation on the incident is *ibid.*, 762.0221.

said that, after lengthy series of discussions with Kotsiuba new forms of documentation had been introduced by Allies in effort to eliminate difficulties which had been experienced at Sov checkpoints. This system had now been disturbed by Sov control officers who had tried to stamp movement orders of individual travelers on Allied trains. During all these previous discussions, Kotsiuba had never mentioned any desire on part of Sovs to stamp movement orders and, during some 12 years of operation of Allied military trains, no such stamps had been placed on documentation of travelers. Political Advisers therefore desired to register protest against this action and to request that instructions be issued that Allied trains be permitted to pass checkpoints in accordance with established procedures.

French and American Political Advisers endorsed statement of British Political Adviser. We added that we felt conduct of Soviet officers at checkpoint in obtaining movement orders by subterfuge from train commander of Berlin–Frankfurt train, and refusing to return them to him until they had all been stamped in checkpoint office, was undignified and should be protested.

Kotsiuba responded that reasons brought to his attention for Allied protest were insufficient and therefore he could not accept such protest. Before answering specifically, he would in turn like to lodge protest with Americans and British for violation of understanding reached during meeting of November 20 last year.² He claimed that at this meeting he had referred to fact that same procedure would apply to rail travel as for autobahn. He stated that one of aims of new procedure was to limit use of travel documentation for one single round-trip. It had appeared that this had been agreed. Sovs had now observed that movement orders were being used for several trips on military trains by same person. Moreover, same movement order was being used by personnel initially traveling on autobahn and making return trip by military train. He cited case of American sgt who had arrived in Berlin on Jan 4 by autobahn and left Jan 14 by military train. He said there were many cases of American soldiers using orders issued with a period of validity of one month for numerous trips, and he did not think these facts could be denied. This was reason, Kotsiuba continued, why new measures of control had to be taken similar to those already in force on autobahn. He could only construe statements made by Political Advisers against these new measures of control as based on desire to continue such violations on American and British side.

² Hillenbrand reported on this meeting in telegram 620, November 19, 1957, but indicated that it had taken place on November 19. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11–1957)

Kotsiuba then launched obviously fabricated tirade against alleged rudeness and "hysterics" (displayed by American train commanders) on night Jan 14–15. He went into considerable detail regarding actions supposed to have taken place which he said "could only cause astonishment". If in future, American train commander displayed such rudeness, he could not be permitted on train, and he (Kotsiuba) would request that he be relieved of duties. He noted that British and French trains had passed same evening without incident and with no notable loss of time. He then referred to conversation on Dec 11 between Soviet Colonel Safronov and American Colonels Forame and Baxter. During this meeting, he said, Col Safronov had drawn attention to violations of movement order procedures which Sovs had noted, and had stated that Sovs intended to put into effect same procedures for rail travel as for autobahn.³

Kotsiuba continued that, on night of Jan 14–15, incidents occurred at checkpoint of kind which had never happened before. Only a technical matter was really involved which Sovs considered came within scope of their authority to "control" travel between Berlin and West Germany. Therefore incidents were entirely fault of United States. In future Sovs did not intend to permit any violation of rules, and he therefore requested that train commanders be appropriately instructed to permit observance of same procedures as at autobahn checkpoints, as well as to avoid rudeness. He recognized that some would be needed to permit proper dissemination of instructions and hence stamping of movement orders would go into effect on night Jan 31–Feb 1.

British Chairman responded that they in turn must decline to accept his protest, which could not be justified. He must repeat that Political Advisers were to ask for abandonment of Soviet attempt to propose new controls. He then asked specific question whether Kotsiuba was actually arguing that traveler could not proceed to Berlin by autobahn and then proceed to West Germany by military train on basis of same movement order. Kotsiuba evaded direct answer, stating that movement order was issued for single round-trip. He then rhetorically asked whether there was any way to insure that movement order was not used for several trips except by placing stamp thereon to show movement order had previously been used.

He could not see what the objection was to stamping movement orders in the same manner as they were stamped at autobahn checkpoints.

To this British Political Adviser responded that point Allies were making was that an established procedure was being disturbed. For 12

³ Hillenbrand reported on this meeting in telegram 706, December 12, 1957. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/12-1257)

years Sovs had not thought it necessary to stamp travel orders. Allies must, accordingly, request that these established procedures remain unchanged, and that new travel documentation continue to be treated in same way as between Dec 2, 1957 and Jan 13, 1958.

Kotsiuba once more said that he could not see what the objection was to stamping movement orders used on military trains, since we did not object to their being stamped for autobahn travel. Defending old system was tantamount to defending violations involved in use of same movement order for repeated trips.

Further inconclusive exchanges of this kind ended with Political Advisers reiterating that Allies saw no need for change of established procedures, maintenance of which must be requested.

To straighten out historical record, American Political Adviser noted that, whatever may have been Col Kotsiuba's understanding of meeting of November 20, Allied record of this meeting and understanding was that nothing had been said which implied that procedures on military trains re handling of movement orders were to be same as those on autobahn. Also pointed out that visit of Cols Forame and Baxter intended to effect delivery of samples of freight documentation which he (Kotsiuba) had requested. They were prepared to answer any technical questions arising out of freight documentation procedures, but had made it quite clear that they were not competent to discuss any substantive questions.

At this point Kotsiuba expressed hope that today's meeting would prove to Allies that there was no real excuse for disturbances which had taken place, due to very minor importance of issue involved. He then asked whether night of January 31-Feb 1 provided enough time appropriately to instruct train commanders. To this, Political Advisers responded that Allies objected to introduction of stamping of movement orders at any time in future, and that their views had been clearly expressed on this point. When Kotsiuba again said he could see no reason for Allied objections, British Political Adviser said there would have to be further communication on these matters, and that Allied position had been made clear. Kotsiuba concluded by saying he thought night of Jan 31-Feb 1 was sufficient time for issuance of new instructions.

Col Forame, Berlin Command Transportation Officer, who accompanied American Political Adviser, concurs in foregoing account.

Hillenbrand

3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, January 22, 1958, 7:15 p.m.

1908. Bonn's 2218 and Deptel 1891.¹ In view of degree of coordination which exists in Germany on course of action to be taken in response to Soviet demand that travel orders of military train passengers be stamped by Soviet officer at Marienborn, Department reluctant to issue instructions. Nonetheless we have serious misgiving about two elements of risk which seem implicit in course of action proposed, which we believe should be considered tripartitely before conversations begin with Kotsiuba.

First, proposed course of action appears to accept Soviet thesis there are abuses in use of travel orders and that existence or elimination of these abuses is appropriate subject for Allied-Soviet negotiation and agreement. Principle under which we act is that authorities issuing travel orders determine who shall proceed to Berlin in connection with occupation of Berlin and how frequently. It follows that any question of validity or abuse of travel orders is internal disciplinary matter within competence these authorities. Any negotiation with Soviets re validity of travel orders amounts to abandonment of this principle. As consequence such negotiation, we could be drawn into dilemma of either having to comply with repeated Soviet demands for procedural changes which Soviets could exploit as means gradually gaining control over Allied travel or of breaking off discussions with Soviets under circumstances in which, having already abandoned above mentioned principle, we appear to public to be stopping Berlin travel on minor procedural issue. We wish stress in this connection that recent changes in form of our travel orders cannot be considered product of negotiation with Soviets but were instituted by us on our own authority in order provide more uniform documentation and thus help eliminate misunderstandings. Copies of new forms given Soviets for their information and not for their acceptance.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-2258. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McKiernan; cleared with Creel, Elbrick, Lisle, Reinstein, and Eleanor Dulles; and approved by Murphy. Also sent to London and Paris and repeated to Berlin, Heidelberg, and Moscow.

¹Telegram 2218 reported that the three Western Embassies had agreed to tell Kotsiuba that their movement orders would not be used more than once and, if this were not satisfactory, that train commanders or officers would stamp the orders. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/1-1758) Telegram 1891 stated that the Department of State had reservations about either procedure and that the Political Advisers should not meet with Kotsiuba until the Department's comments were received. (*Ibid.*, 862B.181/1-2058)

Second, we believe Soviet demand may be basically motivated by desire build up system under which effective Soviet or ultimate GDR control over Allied recognized travel can be established. Stamping of travel orders by Soviet officers would obviously constitute extension of Soviet control and is unacceptable. Proposed alternative that train commander stamp or otherwise confirm or limit validity of travel orders in presence of Soviet officer at Marienborn is in our opinion also highly undesirable, for it appears to us to concede principle of Soviet contention. Making this concession could provide basis further Soviet demands and is not consistent with principle Soviets must accept travel orders issued by competent Allied authorities as conclusive evidence traveler is Allied official personnel and entitled unrestricted access to Berlin on basis quadripartite agreements.

Although we realize normal procedure envisages tripartite discussion questions this type only in Berlin and Bonn, in view time factor request Embassies London and Paris convey our views Foreign Offices.²

Herter

² On January 27 the Western Political Advisers met with Kotsiuba who rejected both proposals put forward by the United States (see footnote 1 above), but extended the deadline for stamping the movement orders until February 10. (Telegram 885 from Berlin, January 27; *ibid.*, 762.0221/1-2758)

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, January 31, 1958, 7:41 p.m.

2015. Bonn's 2328 rptd Berlin 497 USAREUR 371 pouched London, Paris.¹ As indicated Deptel 1908² Department foresees serious dangers in present course of developments re military trains. While it is possible

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-2958. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Lisle and Creel, cleared with Jandrey and Eleanor Dulles, and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Berlin, Heidelberg, London, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 2328, January 29, reported that during a meeting that day of representatives of the three Western Embassies, the British proposed that they agree to Soviet stamping of movement orders if the stamping were done on the station platforms, there were no delay in the train schedules, and train crews had 30-day orders. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/1-2958)

² Document 3.

that Soviet stamping of orders at checkpoint can be regarded as technical detail not incompatible with Allied right of access, it probably forms part of pattern of continuing Soviet effort put themselves in position control who may travel on military trains. We may therefore merely be postponing time at which basic issue must be faced in manner likely involve train stoppage and high level protests. Whatever course of action we may follow on stamping issue, Department considers it imperative we impress on Soviets as forcefully as possible our determination maintain our fundamental position that question of who is to travel on our military trains is solely for decision by Ambassadors and Commanding Generals.

Embassy's and Berlin's reports of British and French position and assessment of Soviet firmness indicate we are now faced with alternative of acceding to Soviet demand re stamping or suffering unilateral suspension our train travel without UK and French support. Our position is weakened further by fact movement orders on US freight trains have been stamped by Soviets for two years. (We agree entirely with USAREUR stamping Autobahn orders in no way analogous to that of passengers traveling on military train). It seems undesirable to make major issue of this procedure if withdrawal is to follow. These factors suggest desirability that any change in procedure be effected in such a way that fundamental principle does not suffer.

If Embassy unable to work out tripartitely any better solution which would offer reasonable prospect of success, we therefore prepared accept position set forth para 1 a, b, c reftel but suggest that Three Political Advisers leave with Kotsiuba memorandum making following points: In deciding to permit Soviets, if they so desire, to put stamp on movement orders Three Powers consider such procedure meaningless. Such procedure does not imply any recognition of Soviet authority to question validity of those orders, either generally or for the particular travel, or to raise any question regarding individual passengers in connection with train clearance. Ambassadors and Commanders-in-Chief in Germany have sole competence to determine who may travel to and from Berlin in connection with occupation of Berlin and whether orders valid for such travel. Role of Soviet authorities in connection with documentation these passengers is solely to clear without delay properly identified Allied Autobahn passengers and properly documented Allied military trains.

Such paper would record officially our position and serve as point of reference in future communications to Soviets in event of further difficulties. Technical conditions suggested by British re stamping might better be presented orally since including them in memorandum stating basic principles would detract from effect.

[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Defense concurs this message.³

Herter

³ Following further discussions among the three Western Allies the Political Advisers again met with Kotsiuba on February 7. During this meeting they agreed to Soviet stamping of movement orders provided that it were done on the train platform, that there were no delay in the train schedules, that the crews had 30-day orders, and that the orders were valid for one way by train and one by autobahn if travelers desired. The new procedure would go into effect on February 13–14. (Telegram 936 from Berlin, February 8; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–858)

5. Editorial Note

On February 7 the President approved Supplement I to NSC 5803 entitled "Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy on Berlin." The text is virtually identical to that in Supplement I to NSC 5727, December 13, 1957, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, volume XXVI, pages 521–525.

6. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 10, 1958.

G–29. Bonn's 2100 and 2102.¹ We have deferred replying these two messages in order take into account series of recent developments re documentation on military trains and problem of overflights. Your

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1–958. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein and Creel on February 7; cleared by Lisle, Jandrey, and Eleanor Dulles; and approved by Murphy.

¹ Telegram 2100 is Document 1. Telegram 2102 reported that the British and French were unwilling to consult with the West Germans on the question of dealing with GDR personnel. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1–958)

message raises number of important issues, on which we have following comments:

1. Your 2100 implies there is inconsistency in our plans for handling land and air access problems because of different approach to question of dealing with GDR personnel. You suggest this may arise from fact our air access rights are more solidly based on legal grounds than ground access and that our making distinction may give rise to confusion in mind of public. We believe however that difference in our approach to surface and air access problems stems primarily from difference in physical situations, not from feeling our legal rights re air access are more solidly based than in case ground access. While it is true the specific modes of exercising these rights are set forth in different documents, they all in final analysis go back to our basic legal position arising from unconditional surrender and the occupation of Berlin pursuant to EAC agreements² and Truman-Stalin exchange of letters.³ In addition ground access was covered by New York and Paris agreements⁴ and our present legal rights in this regard, whatever their origin, are confirmed most clearly in these agreements and based on practices and procedures which they were designed to maintain and protect.

2. Tripartite contingency planning with respect to ground access, which has governmental approval, envisages acceptance of GDR personnel at Autobahn and rail checkpoints in sense that we would if necessary be prepared show Allied documentation to GDR personnel as we are now doing to Soviets. On other hand United States view is that we should not accept GDR personnel in BASC. If this is in fact difference in policy as you suggest, in our view it would arise from fundamental differences in degree of physical control Soviets or East Germans can exercise over our movements. In case of air access we can continue to fly over Soviet Zone regardless of Soviet or East German objections unless physical interference is attempted on scale which could lead to most serious consequences. Furthermore BASC is in our Sector and we can physically exclude GDR personnel from access to BASC offices. In case of ground access not only is substitution of GDR personnel for Soviet personnel in no way under our control but Soviet or East German personnel can physically block our movements. In our view this distinction is entirely sound, and assuming that policy in each case is well founded we see no reason for altering it merely because distinction, in absence

² Regarding the EAC agreements on Berlin, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. III, pp. 539 *passim*; for the air access agreements, see *ibid.*, pp. 1576 ff.

³ Presumably these are the letters of June 14 and 16, 1945, printed *ibid.*, pp. 135-137.

⁴ For text of the New York and Paris agreements of 1949, see *ibid.*, 1949, vol. III, p. 751 and pp. 1062-1065.

our explaining it to them, may not be readily apparent to Germans (see paragraph 6 below).

3. While we recognize that substitution GDR for Soviet personnel at checkpoints would raise problems of various sorts and would be in any case an undesirable development, our feeling is that existing tripartite policy as incorporated in basic policy paper HICOM/P(54)5 Revised/Final⁵ (which was worked out not long after Soviets first announced in 1954 they would treat GDR as sovereign) is basically sound as representing choice of lesser of two evils. Our legal rights with respect to Berlin access are essentially to come and go without interference. Provided there were no interference with our movements it would be hard to make a convincing legal argument insofar as rights of access are concerned that there was a vital difference whether a Soviet or GDR official looked at our papers. While an argument predicated on quadripartite responsibility can be made, it would be directed to a narrow point on which we would not have support of specific language in pertinent agreements. We question whether this is the point over which we should go to the mat with Soviets. We are inclined to feel that analysis in Embtel 265 to USAREUR of December 3 repeated Department as Bonn's 1919 December 17⁶ is fundamentally correct, i.e., that if Soviets turn over administration of checkpoints to GDR this will reflect a fundamental decision which we are not likely be able get them to change.

4. Basic rationale of existing policy on point under discussion is that authorizing Allied travelers to identify themselves to East German personnel at checkpoints and show travel orders on same basis as they have done in past to Soviet personnel would not involve any serious compromise of the basic principle that Soviets are responsible for insuring unrestricted access of properly identified Allied Autobahn travelers, convoys and military trains. It does not appear to us accurate to suggest our planning is based on assumption that if GDR personnel are substituted for Soviets they would content themselves with looking at documents. Present planning takes into account possibility that East German personnel might go beyond this and raise new demands and conditions of types you suggest. We recognize that practical problems might be raised regarding channel of communication for discussing matter. Since our basic position is that personnel at recognized checkpoints, regardless of their nationality or whether they are military or

⁵This 28-page report, dated August 23, 1954, was divided into five sections: 1) Access to Berlin, 2) Passports and Visas Issued by the GDR, 3) Commercial Relations Between the Western Powers and the GDR, 4) Protection of Nationals and Interests in the GDR, and 5) Participation of the GDR in International Organizations. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-2354)

⁶Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/12-1757)

civilian personnel, are acting under Soviet authority, we would continue to hold Soviets responsible for any interference with our movements and would continue to discuss matter only with Soviet authorities. On this basis issue of recognition of "GDR" would not really arise since by hypothesis it would be immaterial whether these new conditions or procedures were imposed by Soviet authorities themselves or by others such as East Germans acting under Soviet authority. While there is of course possibility Soviets might refuse discuss matter with us and refer us to GDR, our further course of action would be based on fundamental principle of Soviet responsibility.

5. Exact point at which we refuse to submit to Communist demands with respect to some question of documentation or procedure is difficult to draw in advance, given variety of circumstances in which issues have arisen over period of time. In general it seems to us our interest is basically to keep lines of communication open. While situations may arise in which it will be necessary to suspend travel temporarily, we think that in borderline case we stand to lose more by dramatizing situation and later acquiescing than by adjusting to situation at the beginning. Basic position we must defend is that we can not accept any action by which Communists seek to substitute their decision for ours as to who can go to Berlin and what can be shipped to Berlin in connection with our occupation responsibilities.

6. As we understand it one of your principal concerns about question our existing policy is based on effect its implementation would have on German opinion. It appears to Department this is matter on which German views should be sought. We do not suggest Germans be brought into all details of Allied instructions and planning with regard to military trains, etc. However fundamental policy re GDR personnel at checkpoints is related to whole series of matters on which we are constantly dealing with Federal Republic. It is type of problem on which we agreed to coordinate views as far back as 1954 and we consider it essential that German comments be sought. In view of nature of Soviet actions to which we have referred, we believe this should be done at high level at early date. If British and French Embassies continue to be opposed, we are prepared raise this matter at governmental level.

7. As for your comments re planning for airlift to meet needs Berlin garrison in event suspension of travel by military train and Autobahn, we are in accord your rationale as to considerations which might make limited airlift necessary and desirable. Re details of planning you are now conducting with USAREUR and USAFE, we see nothing in these details inconsistent with those contained in already agreed quadripartite airlift planning and believe in fact they will constitute useful supplement thereto.

8. In looking ahead we believe that issue of GDR "sovereignty" is likely to be thrust at us more and more. Until recently we had not considered there was any imminent possibility of substitution East German for Soviet personnel at checkpoints. On other hand various Soviet actions which have resulted in bringing about standardization of documentation and practices can be reconciled with possibility Soviets are endeavoring create situation in which, should they desire turn supervision of Allied passage over to GDR, this could be done with least possibility of immediate friction or crisis with Allies. Recent Soviet actions suggest turnover to GDR may be more imminent than previously appeared. Cessation of Soviet visas for Allied personnel for privileged travel, which was accompanied by publicity, altered practice in way which would have been possible [*impossible*] at any time since 1954. Refusal of overflight permit for Ambassador Thompson's plane⁷ which we assume Soviets were aware would result in publicity, also reached into established practices. Finally, GDR sovereignty issue was again thrust at us by publication of exchange of letters on Warsaw courier flight.⁸ While we may be reading too much significance into these actions in light of repeated Soviet posture in recent notes and statements that West must accept reality of status quo under circumstances, we think we must be prepared face intensification of introduction GDR sovereignty issue into Berlin access problem and elsewhere.

9. We agree that elaboration of our detailed contingency planning with respect to these problems would be useful. We believe however that planning of this character must be centered in Germany and do not feel it would be appropriate or useful for us to take matters of detail up with British and French Governments which have not been discussed fully in Germany. There is no accepted center for tripartite discussions among three Governments, and specific problems involved are so much a function of factual situation in Germany and practices which have developed on the ground over many years that raising them at governmental level is likely to result only in having British and French Governments refer them back to Germany for resolution. At any rate practical responsibility for exercise of retained powers in Germany has been vested by Three Governments in Ambassadors by tripartite agreement signed at Paris on October 23, 1954.⁹ Should there be on other

⁷ On January 18 the Soviet controller at BASC stated that granting permission for a flight from Berlin to Moscow and return for Ambassador Thompson through the air space of the German Democratic Republic was a matter that had to be taken up with the East Germans. (Telegram 848 from Berlin, January 18; *ibid.*, 762B.5411/1-1858)

⁸ For texts of these letters, January 18 and 25, see *Dokumente*, III, Band 4/1958, Erster Halbband, pp. 161–162 and 444.

⁹ For text of this agreement, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1439–1440.

hand any reluctance on part British and French Embassies to engage in discussion of contingency planning with view to preparing for eventuality that issue of GDR sovereignty will be pressed on us more intensely, Department entirely prepared raise this general issue with British and French Governments.

10. Embassy requested send copies this message to U.S. Mission, Berlin and USAREUR.

Dulles

7. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 11, 1958.

SUBJECT

Current Status of Berlin and Problem of German Reunification

PARTICIPANTS

Governing Mayor Willy Brandt, Berlin¹
Senator Günter Klein, Senator for Federal Affairs, Berlin
Mr. Albrecht von Kessel, Chargé d'Affaires, German Embassy
The Secretary of State
Mr. Raymond E. Lisle, GER
Mrs. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, GER

The Secretary, after greeting Mayor Brandt, said that we are fully aware of the importance of Berlin and of the impressive strength, industry and courage of its people. He recalled that his last visit had been in 1954, but that he had also been there during the airlift. He said that Berlin had shown tremendous firmness in its position against Communism, but unfortunately the Soviets seemed also firm in their position.

He stated, however, that the President and he have made it a practice, on every possible occasion, to refer to the reunification of Germany.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1058. Confidential. Drafted by Eleanor Dulles.

¹ On November 22, 1957, Mayor Brandt announced that he would visit the United States in February 1958 as a guest of Lufthansa Airlines. Following his announcement the Department arranged a series of meetings in Washington for the mayor. Brandt arrived in Philadelphia on February 7 and, after his conversations in Washington, he visited New York and Boston. Documentation on planning for the visit is *ibid.*, 033.62A11.

He believed that constant pressure on this point and hammering away at the Soviet position would lead the Soviets, at some time, to find that it was in their interests to yield a point and that this might be reunification. Experience with the Austrian Treaty had been along these lines. After hundreds of meetings and constant pressure, they had suddenly decided to grant the State Treaty.² They had done this, in some measure, to secure a Summit meeting.³ At the present time, unfortunately, they probably did not believe they need pay such a high price for a Summit meeting in view of the manner in which many countries were willing to give it to them without a price and were not likely to yield in the German case. Unfortunately, the German problem, unlike the Austrian case, is not an isolated problem, but is related to that of other countries, notably Poland. The Soviets clearly fear the impact of yielding on other countries, particularly those between West Germany and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev is a very dangerous man and the Minsk speech showed the brutality of the Stalin days and many of the doctrines of Lenin.⁴

The Secretary said that he tried last fall, in a long talk with Gromyko, to persuade him that this country did not wish Russia to be surrounded by unfriendly countries. The concept of the Cordon Sanitaire would not work in the case of a strong nation like Russia. He told Gromyko that, unfortunately, their actions were such as to create enemies, rather than friends in the nations surrounding them and that, unless they yielded before the point of no return had been reached, the Soviet Union might become the most hated country in the world.

He had been discussing these matters recently, he said, with Ambassador Thompson⁵ who stated that there were, in his opinion, many weaknesses and signs of change within the Soviet Republic. He believed that Hungary and Poland, where the young had shown their rejection of Communism, were indications of the unsettled state of affairs and referred, in this connection, also to the refugees flowing from East Germany to the West. He asked the Mayor what he thought of the purge in East Germany.⁶

Mayor Brandt replied that he believed that Wollweber had tried to look to the Soviets to circumvent Ulbricht, but the Soviets had con-

² For documentation on the negotiations leading to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, May 15, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 1 ff.

³ For documentation on the Geneva Summit Conference, July 18–23, 1955, see *ibid.*, pp. 119 ff.

⁴ An extract from Khrushchev's speech at Minsk on January 22 is in *Pravda*, January 25, 1958, pp. 2–3.

⁵ Ambassador Thompson had been in Washington for consultations in January and early February.

⁶ On February 8 the German Democratic Republic announced that Wollweber, Schirdewan, and Oelssner had been expelled from the Central Committee and Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party for opposition to Ulbricht.

cluded, quite logically, that they could not tolerate a Gomulka-type⁷ solution in East Germany. He stated that a nationalistic solution, in a divided Germany, could not be acceptable as a safe situation for the Soviets because it would certainly go toward the Federal Republic. Since, however, Ulbricht is the most hated man in all of Germany, they must rely more than ever on their twenty-two divisions.

Mayor Brandt added that they had recently shown their fear of the poison of contact with the West by making it even harder for the people in East Germany to travel to the West and trying to bar students, in particular, from contacts with their friends and relatives in the Federal Republic. Berlin, he said, was, in this case, in the period when it was hard to make substantial progress toward reunification, the one place where we can show our conviction of the final solution of a reunified Germany. It was important, therefore, to establish and increase the links and to strengthen the political connections between Berlin and the Federal Republic and thus maintain Berlin in its assured position with respect to its meaning for the future of Germany.

The Secretary answered that the United States was absolutely prepared to take a strong position with respect to Berlin. He said, unfortunately, the situation was often clouded by technicalities and minor details which made it difficult to make our position known. We would welcome an appropriate opportunity of showing our firmness.

The Secretary then said that he did not know whether the Mayor would agree, but that he believed that the Soviets would never accept a solution of a neutral Germany. He said he based his view, in part at least, on conversations with Molotov, whose ideas still prevail, although he has disappeared; with Zorin in London; with Gromyko, and others. He said a genuinely neutralized Germany would be regarded by the Russians as dangerous and likely to play one party against another in a political game which would bring with it tremendous risks. It was his opinion, he stated, that the Soviets would prefer a Germany under the control of the institutions of the West, WEU, Common Market, and other restraining Western influences to one which was completely uncontrolled. If they could not themselves exercise control, they would prefer to see Germany subject to the restraints of Western European organizations.

The Mayor replied that he understood, indeed, the point made by the Secretary. The Mayor of Free Berlin could not advocate a weak Germany. A Germany which was a part of Western Europe could only be safe in a strong Europe. A Germany which was unstable and not included in the systems of the Western world would, in fact, lead to an

⁷ Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party.

unpredictable and risky situation. He was not sure, however, that the system with which Germany should be linked need be exactly that of the present Western European alliance. He said that there might be adjustments or modifications which would lead to solutions and that one must keep trying to find such solutions.

The Secretary stated that he, too, felt that some modifications of present organization and mechanisms of cooperation could be found. The offers of security and the European Security Treaty of 1955⁸ and the pledges that had been contemplated at that time had never been fully appreciated and, he believed, some changes could be made which would make the search for solutions more profitable.

The Secretary concluded by stating that he was well aware of the astonishing capacity shown by the people of Berlin and that he understood that they were very fortunate in having the leadership of the Mayor.⁹

⁸ Presumably Dulles is referring to the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation on October 31, 1955, at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting.

⁹ In a seven-line memorandum drafted on February 11, McKiernan noted that Brandt was "strongly in favor of the Federal Government's proposal for opening Berlin to international air traffic, provided there should be no adverse effect on Allied air access to Berlin." (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1158)

8. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 11, 1958, 10:59 a.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Governing Mayor Willy Brandt of Berlin

Mr. Albrecht von Kessel, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, German Embassy

Mr. Raymond E. Lisle—GER

In response to a question from the President, Mayor Brandt explained that he was in the United States as a guest of the Ford

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.62A11/2-1358. Confidential. Drafted by Lisle.

Foundation and that a primary purpose of his visit was to convey the gratitude of the Government and people of Berlin for the aid and other support and encouragement given to the City by the United States. He wished to assure the President that American aid had been well used.

The President expressed his confidence that that was the case. He commented on the glowing reports he had had of the Congress Hall.¹ He regretted that he had not seen Berlin for many years and hoped that when any of his friends next visit Berlin they would send him pictures of the City as it is today.

The Mayor explained the great progress made by the City since the end of the blockade. He noted one hundred and ten thousand new buildings have been constructed since 1951. Some 20,000 additional buildings are being built each year. While industrial production has not increased in as spectacular a manner as in the Federal Republic, the increase has been substantial. Since the blockade, during which industrial production was only 17% of prewar figures, the index has risen to over 120%. At present the rate of increase is greater than in the Federal Republic.

The President inquired whether the people of Berlin experience difficulty with their travel and trade to and from West Germany. The Mayor stated there had never been trouble with air travel. At various times since the blockade there have been difficulties with the Soviets over use of the railroads, roads and canals. There was no present difficulty so far as German traffic was concerned. How long the present easy situation would continue he could not say. He understood that the Allies had had occasional difficulties over the military trains.

The President agreed that one never knew what the Soviets were likely to do. It has always been clear that they would like to cut off access to Berlin. However, they realize how serious a step this would be. He, himself, had supported General Clay's idea in 1949 that force could appropriately be used to re-establish access to the City.² The Soviets have broken so many pledges that it is very difficult to put any faith in them. He, himself, thinks that the Soviets now would like to make and keep a few pledges. However, we need some hostage, some general type of guarantee, that any pledges they might give will be kept. He recalled the thinking with regard to Berlin and the East Zone in 1945. Allied planners in Europe had thought that Thuringia should be included in the Western zones. Subsequently, they had thought in terms of building a new

¹ The Berlin Congress Hall, which had been constructed from funds contributed by the United States, West Germany, and Berlin, opened on September 19, 1957.

² Regarding General Clay's views in 1948, not 1949, on the use of force to re-establish access to Berlin, see Jean E. Smith, ed., *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany 1945-1949*, vol. II, pp. 733-746.

capital in Germany at the point where the various zones came together. It had been concluded, however, that Berlin must be re-established as the capital. It became apparent soon after the war had ended that the Soviets were not acting in good faith in Germany.

The President asked what goods were exported from Berlin, and was told by the Mayor that the main exports were electrical goods and women's clothing. Berlin has regained the leading position in Germany in the women's clothing industry. The President inquired about the use of new synthetic fibers and was assured by the Mayor that Berlin, after a late start in this field, was now using them extensively.

The President inquired about the Mayor's itinerary and expressed gratification that Mayor Brandt on a previous trip had seen not only the Eastern seaboard but the West as well.

The President reflected that most of his friends in Germany today were in the Government. He hoped that Mayor Brandt would convey to them his greetings and tell them again how strongly this Government and our people want Germany reunified and a strong and viable nation in Central Europe. However, strongly as we desire Germany to be reunified, this must be by free elections and not by the organization of a confederation of which one part would be controlled by the Soviets.

The Mayor expressed again the gratitude of the people of Berlin for the assistance and support of the United States. He wished to assure the President that the people of Berlin were still filled with the same spirit as during the blockade and that they remain convinced that Berlin is of importance not only because of its local problems but because of its influence upon the whole of Eastern Germany.

The President said he was convinced from the frequent oral and written reports he receives on Berlin that it has become a true show-window for the West. He asked Mayor Brandt when next he had occasion to address the people of Berlin to transmit his greetings and continuing interest in their problems.

9. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 12, 1958.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of Defense
Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of Berlin
Senator Gunter Klein, Berlin
Mr. Albrecht von Kessel, German Chargé d'Affaires
General von Schleinitz, German Military Attaché
General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, United States Army
General L.L. Lemnitzer, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army
Mr. Raymond E. Lisle, Department of State, Office of German Affairs

During a luncheon given by the Secretary of Defense,¹ which was attended, in addition to those named above, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, and senior officers of the Armed Services, discussion was of a general character. However, in responding to a toast, Mayor Brandt explained his views as to one phase of the commemorative ceremonies for the Tenth Anniversary of the Berlin Airlift to be held in Berlin this fall. He said he was going to ask the people of Berlin to contribute to a fund which would be used: (a) to bring to Berlin for the ceremonies the widows and children of pilots killed in the airlift; and (b) to provide scholarships for the children of such pilots at the Free University of Berlin.

After the luncheon, General Taylor asked the German visitors, with the exception of the Chargé, together with General Lemnitzer and Mr. Lisle, to meet briefly with him in his office. In response to questions, Mayor Brandt stated there were no present difficulties with regard to German travel and commercial traffic between Berlin and the Federal

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2158. Confidential. Drafted by Lisle.

¹ In a memorandum, dated February 12, Irwin briefed Secretary of Defense McElroy on the Berlin situation and made the following recommendations:

"In order to dispel any doubts which may be held by Mayor Brandt regarding the U.S. position on this matter, it is suggested that you emphasize the readiness of our garrison in Berlin to take whatever action is necessary for the protection of the city against attacks of any kind from any quarter.

"It is also suggested that you assure the Mayor that the U.S. intends to maintain a hard line against Soviet interference with travel to and from Berlin, i.e., that despite recent harassment of U.S. rail traffic, we adhere strongly to the position that U.S. authorities have the right to determine who travels to and from Berlin and that our rights to an access to the city are clear and inviolable." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, Germany)

Republic; that he understood there had been some minor difficulties with the military trains; that he believed the Soviet Zone authorities would like to make difficulties for West Berlin but were kept in control by the Soviets who desire to avoid creating any serious issue with the Three Western Powers; that the morale of the people of Berlin remained high; that the spirit of opposition continued strong in the Soviet Zone; that he had been troubled by the flight to the West of several East German clergymen a few weeks ago because he believed it essential that the clergymen remain with their East German flocks (General Taylor commented at this point that he had read of the flight of these clergymen in the *Berlin Tagesspiegel*, which he receives daily); that he had no problem which he wished to bring to General Taylor's attention. General Taylor recalled his service in Berlin. General Lemnitzer spoke of the impression made on him by Berlin when he visited the city in the company of the Secretary of Defense earlier this winter.

10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, February 18, 1958, 7:16 p.m.

479. Berlin's 968.¹ Dept has forwarded by pouch copies four memos of discussions political and economic questions² with Brandt during latter's visit here. Brandt meeting with Secretary reported USIA wireless file Feb 10.

Highlights of discussions:

Berlin aid: Brandt informed levels proposed FY 1959 aid. Aid discussions here dealt largely with his plans for Technical University and American hospital but general discussions also touched on other aspects of aid. Instruction follows.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.62A11/2-1758. Limited Official Use. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Creel and Eleanor Dulles, and approved by Lisle. Repeated to Bonn.

¹ Telegram 968, February 17, asked for a summary of the highlights of Brandt's visit. (*Ibid.*)

² Only three memoranda of conversation have been found in Department of State files: Documents 7-9.

Budget support: Brandt said he does not expect serious trouble GFY beginning Apr 1 but believes increasing Fed budget deficit in later years may lead to situation requiring common discussion of financial support problem by FedRep, Berlin and Allies. Said his recent statement recalling Allied interest in Berlin's financial situation had been misinterpreted in some quarters, for he had no intention put pressure on FedRep by appealing to Allies to intervene in this year's budget discussions.

Reaffirmation of guarantee: Following from press release Feb 10: "Secretary of State assured Mayor that in view city's unique position and its significance to rest of world, Berlin is of deep concern to United States. Moreover, security and welfare of city and its continued progress are of direct interest to this Government as stated on many occasions in past. Secretary of State emphasized in particular policy of this Government to assure unimpaired access for both persons and goods to and from Berlin as guaranteed in New York and Paris Four-Power agreements."³ In another meeting, Brandt described Kroeger article⁴ as SED-inspired attempt embolden Soviets take such action as further harassment Allied access and said it would be useful have assistance in form Western rebuttal. In all speeches Brandt emphasized Berlin and FedRep must be associated with West in position of strength (though he did not use words "position of strength") as prerequisite to successful dealings with Soviets.

Voting rights: Brandt reiterated demand for limited voting rights in Fed Parliament but declared further discussions between Bonn and Berlin necessary before matter raised again with Allied Ambassadors.

Brandt visit here successful in every respect. He met President, Vice President, Secretary, Secretary of Defense, Senators, and State and Defense officials. Exchanges of views were frank and cordial, and we believe Brandt very satisfied re continuing American interest in and support for Berlin.⁵

Dulles

³ For text of this press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 3, 1958, p. 329.

⁴ Reference is to Herbert Kroeger's article, "Zu einigen Fragen des staatsrechtlichen Status von Berlin," in *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, January 1958, pp. 10-26.

⁵ Similar reactions were reported in the West German press following Brandt's return to Berlin.

11. Editorial Note

Following his participation in the North Atlantic Council meeting at Copenhagen, May 5–7, Secretary of State Dulles flew to Berlin on May 8 for a one-day visit, before flying to Paris for a meeting of the Western European Ambassadors.

On May 4 Dulles informed Foreign Secretary Lloyd that he would reiterate the U.S. adherence to the 1954 declaration on Berlin but rejected a proposal by the Mission in Berlin that he drive through the eastern sector of the city unless there was a substantive reason for it. (Secto 25 from Copenhagen, May 6; Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/5–658)

The Secretary of State arrived at Tempelhof Airport at 11 a.m. where he was greeted by Mayor Brandt, Ambassador Bruce, and General Hamlett. Following lunch at the Federal President's house he proceeded to the Berlin Rathaus for a reception where he repeated the 1954 tripartite declaration on Berlin and stated that it still had the full support of President Eisenhower and himself. Sometime during the trip to Berlin the Secretary of State also transmitted his greetings to Chancellor Adenauer. He departed for Paris at 4:30 p.m.

Documentation on Dulles' visit to Berlin, including the texts of his address at the reception, letter to Adenauer, and statement at Tempelhof Airport is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1014. The text of Dulles' address is also in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 26, 1958, pages 854–857.

12. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (Hodes) to the Berlin Commandant (Hamlett)

Heidelberg, May 23, 1958, 5:32 p.m.

SX-4099. To USCOB for Hamlett, info AmEmb for Bruce and EUCOM for Palmer. Sgd Hodes.

1. In his office with only General of the Army Zakharov, Major Spahr, and Lt Vturin present, General Hodes stated that there was one

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 319, Headquarters Department of the Army, Communications Center Files. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn for Bruce and to Paris and Washington.

matter of business that he would like to discuss with General Zakharov as one soldier to another. It was a matter with which General Zakharov was probably not familiar, therefore an immediate answer was not expected. General Hodes then stated that it was certain that General Zakharov, as a soldier, understood General Hodes problems regarding the United States garrison in Berlin. That garrison had to be supplied and the troops in that garrison had to be taken out of Berlin to areas in Western Germany periodically for training. Also existing agreement provided General Hodes with the right to execute these supply and troop movements without interference. Marshal Grechko, General Zakharov's predecessor, understood and agreed with General Hodes on these principles.

2. Unfortunately, General Hodes continued, there has developed a maze of procedures which appear to be purely harassments and which cannot be accepted. For instance, if it becomes necessary to transport an officer with 30 troops either into or out of Berlin it should be necessary only for that officer to present a document at the Soviet checkpoint showing the 30 troops, under the command of an officer, are proceeding from Berlin to Helmstedt; in other words, a simple movement order. It should not be necessary to list the names of the soldiers in uniform or to show personal identification cards for each soldier. Similarly, if a column of supply trucks was making the trip it should be only necessary to show a document which listed the number of vehicles, by type, their commander, the number of officers and men involved, and the fact that the vehicles were carrying military supplies and equipment.

3. General Zakharov appeared to agree with General Hodes and asked what seemed to be the difficulty.

4. General Hodes replied that instead of this simple soldierly procedure, Soviet personnel at the checkpoints were demanding documents showing the names of all troops involved in a particular movement, their identification cards, and detached/detailed lists of their trucks and cargo. This procedure was unnecessary, ridiculous, and nothing but harassment.

5. General Zakharov agreed and stated that for troop movements by truck, all that should be necessary is for the officer in charge to procure a document showing that he together with a certain number of troops was going to proceed from checkpoint to checkpoint. This document should then be stamped to affirm that passage was made through the checkpoint if questioned enroute and that was all that should be necessary.

6. Concerning supplies General Zakharov stated that all that should be necessary was a document stating the number and types of vehicles and the types of supplies—bread, flour, military supplies, etc.

7. General Hodes objected stating that he saw no reason to list the types of supplies since all he would be transporting was military supplies and that lists were cumbersome and unnecessary. There was no intention to transport German nationals or any type of supplies other than on military vehicles moving into or out of Berlin.

8. General Zakharov said he meant simply broad categories of supplies such as food and military supplies and that he had no interest in the quantities involved.

9. General Hodes repeated that it should be sufficient to state only that military supplies and/or equipment were being transported.

10. General Zakharov nodded and said that when he returned¹ he would gather the personnel who were involved in these matters and would investigate present procedures.

11. General Hodes stated that the procedures which are used to clear his personal train were an example of the degree of complexities involved in present procedures. A translation of an order which was signed by General Hodes had to be presented at the checkpoint and in addition a demand was made last week to see his personal identification card. The reply which was and would be given to the latter demand was that General Hodes would show his personal identification card to General Zakharov and to General Zakharov only.

12. General Zakharov remarked that General Hodes should give advance notice of his intention to travel by train. General Hodes replied that he always gave at least 24 hours notice of his intention to travel by train.

13. General Zakharov remarked that he had never visited a checkpoint but that he would investigate the procedures when he returned to his headquarters.

14. General Hodes told General Zakharov that he had been certain that General Zakharov would share his viewpoint on this purely military matter and that he hoped that an improvement would result.

15. The meeting lasted approximately 25 minutes.

16. In the opinion of Major Spahr, Lt. Vturin who translated General Hodes' remarks from English into Russian gave an accurate translation which fully reflected the spirit as well as the content of what General Hodes had to say.

¹ Zakharov was returning to Moscow for consultations.

13. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany

Berlin, June 30, 1958, 7 p.m.

1341. Bonn pass information priority USAREUR 315. Reference ourtel sent Bonn 1324, Department 1392, USAREUR 310.¹ Embassy telegram 832 to Berlin.² SX 4947.³

1. At meeting today between Allied Political Advisers and Col. Markushin it quickly became clear that Soviet interpretation of Hodes-Zakharov exchanges⁴ differs radically from American version.

2. As Chairman for month French opened meeting commenting that, because of Hodes-Zakharov exchanges plus recent turnback of US convoy, new elements added to situation which made it desirable that American political adviser lead discussion for Western powers. At prior meeting political advisers British and French had agreed to stand on position A and, if Soviet accepted sample document, that they would recommend it to their superiors.

3. We referred to recent exchange of messages between Hodes-Zakharov, noting that these appeared to provide possible basis for understanding on documentation. Said we had prepared sample document covering all requisite points on one piece paper. Following perusal of sample document, Markushin stated questions raised by document appeared broader than discussion at last meeting had indicated.⁵ He then said he would suggest some amendments to form.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6-3058. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Heidelberg and the Department as telegram 1411, which is the source text.

¹ Telegram 1392, June 25, reported that the Western Political Advisers met the previous day and agreed on the following three proposals to be used in the next discussion with Markushin: (1) the procedure discussed by Hodes and Zakharov would be used by all three Western powers (see Document 12), (2) if this was not acceptable the Political Advisers would suggest a nominal role of personnel and a simple cargo manifest, and (3) in addition to (2) agree to submit individual identity documents as long as the Soviets did not attempt to check them against individual soldiers. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6-2558)

² Telegram 832, June 28, reported that if the Political Advisers could not reach agreement with Markushin, they should refer the question to their Ambassadors. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/6-2858)

³ SX 4947, June 28, transmitted a letter from Zakharov to Hodes rejecting the latter's message of June 23 in which he had protested the Soviet refusal to pass a convoy to Berlin. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, Headquarters Department of the Army, Communications Center Files)

⁴ See Document 12.

⁵ At their previous meeting with Markushin on June 18, the three Western Political Advisers had agreed to present a sample document stating whether convoy cargo was military supplies or equipment. (Telegram 1365 from Bonn, June 18; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6-1858)

These were:

A. More detailed specifications of type of cargo, that is, a breakdown showing cargo carried as armament, foodstuffs or other equipment. B. Total weight of cargo should be shown and number of cases, barrels, or other containers. E [C]. If such a listing made Soviet check-point officer would, of course, reserve right to look into covered trucks to insure that cargo carried agreed with manifest. He added that in this way Soviets would be able fully to carry out procedure of control specified in agreement of June 29, 1945.⁶

4. We replied we thought that, at previous meeting with Markushin, term "supplies and equipment" had been agreed upon as sufficient in principle. We emphasized that we could not agree to points made by Markushin regarding listing of cargo and would only report his position to higher authorities. We did not believe that his suggested breakdown served any necessary purpose. If cargo certified as military supplies and equipment by competent military authority that should suffice. Markushin replied that three categories mentioned were important, and if such breakdown not provided suggested documentation would serve no useful purpose. He added that it was not necessary to describe in detail type armament carried, i.e. rifles, tank parts, machine guns, etc. What was important was category of supplies and in case of foodstuffs (tonnage or kilogram weight) and other equipment (number of cases or other containers). We again stressed principle involved, emphasizing it was Gen Hodes' (and we had thought Gen Zakharov's) understanding if officer certified to General nature of contents, his word should be enough. As to Soviet claim to inspect cargo vehicles, we pointed out, this would be completely incompatible with long-standing precedent and was objectionable in principle.

5. In reply to request for his comments on remainder of form apart from section on cargo documentation, Markushin hedged, stating he had paid particular attention only to disputable item. He did comment, however, that portion of sample document covering personnel would represent weakening of Soviet controls as now enforced. He requested time to study document further and to obtain instructions. Regarding sufficiency of "officer's word", he said he did not mean his comments to infer any distrust of Allies. On contrary, if distrust were involved Soviets would have demanded that individual containers be broken open for inspection, which not done at present nor intended in future. Soviets permitted Allies to bring to Berlin via autobahn practically what they wished. Documentation by cargo type and quantity is necessary measure of control, and it therefore not clear to Soviets why Political

⁶Regarding the June 29, 1945, agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. III, pp. 353–361.

Advisers unwilling agree to have this information on manifest. West has nothing to lose, and Soviets' only aim is to make impossible cases of abuse on part of drivers and NCO's who travel on trucks. Markushin did not believe question of cargo documentation of sufficient importance to necessitate further referral to Commanders-in-Chief. He concluded by stating Soviets would study our draft and at subsequent meeting he would comment on first part.

6. After stating that he supported U.S. position as presented, French Political Adviser then noted that Markushin's suggested procedure appeared much like a customs' check. This Markushin denied, stating in customs' check each individual item examined whereas this not Soviet purpose. Markushin stated: 1. his suggested procedure should not be interpreted as intention to impose customs type control; 2. Soviet checkpoint officers would glance at truck contents only to see if numbers of cases matched numbers listed on manifest. If truck was open, no need to enter vehicle if cargo readily apparent from outside, but if truck covered, checkpoint officer must look in to examine cargo.

7. Markushin asked if British had comment, and British Political Adviser stated only that Soviet proposals represented "a grave departure from established procedures". Otherwise he could only stress his concurrence with U.S.

8. Markushin closed meeting with comment that, if Political Advisers would explain Soviet motives to superiors, he was certain they would agree with his proposals. He queried whether first part of proposed form intended to cover only groups of trucks. We replied that sample document could be modified for use either by single truck or convoy of trucks.

Comment:

9. We have impression that new, stiffer Soviet position on cargo documentation stems directly from instructions issued from General of Army Zakharov's headquarters. Markushin had never previously hinted that verification of manifests was immediate Soviet objective. On June 28 British military radio truck turned back at Nowawes checkpoint when Soviets not permitted have look at contents. In response to protest by Acting British Political Adviser, Markushin stated that Soviet control officer at checkpoint had been instructed by General of Army Zakharov to exercise discretion as to whether he should look at contents of trucks. However, since Acting British Political Adviser had vouched for military nature of contents truck would be allowed to pass in this instance without inspection.

10. While in good humor and courteous in manner, Markushin presented Soviet position without hesitation and gave no indication much scope left for concessions. British and French are obviously not happy

with direction in which situation developing. They find ominous reference to military trains in third paragraph June 28 message from Zakharov to CINCUSAREUR. Also noted with us that reference to quantity and nature of military cargo second paragraph of Zakharov's message forewarned that Soviets would not be satisfied with listing of cargo merely as "military supplies and equipment".⁷

Hillenbrand

⁷ In his diary entry for June 30 Ambassador Bruce wrote: "Earlier in the afternoon, Hillenbrand reported to me on the meeting, held this morning, of the four political advisers. Soviet Colonel Markushin demanded truck and convoy documentation in terms far more exacting than we have ever used. This is an unsatisfactory situation, and belies the understanding General Hodes thought he had reached with General Zakharov. We will sweat with this one." (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

14. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)

July 11, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph on an unrelated subject.]

General Hodes arrived at lunch time, preceded by General Hamlett, Martin Hillenbrand and others interested in the Berlin access affair. I had a long talk alone with Hodes regarding the future course of negotiations on military convoy and individual truck movements, but could not reconcile in all particulars our differing points of view. Later we adjourned to the conference room to have a general discussion. I sympathize with Hank's desire to yield nothing to the Soviets but do not think it is probable they will accept looser documentation than we have been in the habit of giving them. He believes perhaps they will. At any rate, if they refuse he is in favor of stalling the talks as long as possible and his view of "possible" is a period of many months. The British and French would never accept such a postponement if it were to interfere, as it probably would, with their present traffic. We finally decided to let the political advisers in Berlin take one more crack at this problem and insist upon the so-called simple document as presented by General Hodes to General Zakharov.¹

Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.

¹ The Political Advisers met again with Markushin on July 18. In addition to arriving at no final agreement on documentation, the Soviet Deputy Commandant stated that, beginning August 1, Soviet officials would begin to inspect the vehicles in Western convoys.

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Mission at Berlin

Bonn, July 31, 1958, 1 p.m.

65. Reference: USAREUR's SX 5761.¹ On basis reftel, have obtained British and French agreement to following revised message to Markushin which will be telephoned to him by British Political Adviser today:

Begin text—With reference to your telephone message of July 29, I am instructed to inform you on behalf of my French and American colleagues as well as myself that we will not agree to Soviet inspection, even in occasional cases, of any vehicles in a military convoy or of individual military vehicles.

However, we will accept the sample form for documentation as submitted by General Zaharov. It will be necessary to work out certain details such as agreed translations, etc., and therefore the date of August 1, proposed for the introduction of the new documentation, is clearly impracticable. We will send you sample copies of the new forms as soon as they can be duplicated and notify you of the date on which they can be introduced. Meanwhile we expect that military convoys and individual trucks will continue to be cleared through the Soviet checkpoints in accordance with existing procedures.—*End text*.²

It was further agreed here that best place for working out tripartitely agreed translations and other details regarding new movement orders would be Berlin.

Bruce

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/7-3158. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Heidelberg and the Department as telegram 296, which is the source text.

¹ On July 29 Markushin had telephoned the U.S. Mission to say that effective August 1 Soviet officials would inspect the vehicles of convoys going to Berlin. In SX 5761, July 31, Hodes stated: "The Soviets should be told in the strongest possible language that any form of inspection of our convoys or vehicles is completely unacceptable." (A copy of this message was transmitted in telegram 297 from Bonn, July 31; *ibid.*)

² The Western Political Advisers had met on July 29 to work out a draft reply to Markushin, but their draft was rejected by Bruce who strengthened the language concerning Soviet inspection and put it at the beginning of the message. (Telegrams 98 from Berlin, July 29, and 296 from Bonn, July 31; *ibid.*, 762.0221/7-2958 and 7-3158)

16. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany

Berlin, August 8, 1958, 4 p.m.

117. At his request Soviet Commandant General Zakharov called on General Hamlett this morning. Former opened discussion by saying he had some questions to ask about freight on autobahn. First of these was whether, during his exchanges with Chief Group Soviet Forces Germany General Zakharov, General Hodes had been speaking for British and French commanders as well as for himself. He asked this question in view of recent British protests. General Hamlett said that he was not in a position to answer questions since he did not know, but he was able to assure General Zakharov that, since Hodes–Zakharov conversation,¹ matter had been fully discussed tripartitely.

General Hamlett continued that, while simplified form of documentation was step in right direction, Allies have objected to two aspects of Soviet position: (1) their precipitous introduction of new procedures on August 1 which provided inadequate time for Allies to make preparations, and (2) their insistence on right of inspection of Allied vehicles.

Markushin, who accompanied Zakharov, remarked at this point that all Soviets really intended was occasionally to request that American in charge of convoy or vehicle lift up rear covering of truck to permit Soviet control officer to look in. Markushin said he would reveal to us confidentially that actually Soviets had issued instructions to checkpoints to apply only partial controls on convoys and trucks until August 10. He insinuated this action taken by Soviet commandant without reference to higher headquarters.

General Hamlett responded that issue was not whether attempt to look into vehicles was to be occasional or regular. He objected in principle to any maintenance of right to inspect military vehicles. This involved in effect questioning of word of responsible American officers, who would enforce disciplinary measures against any personnel attempt to falsify cargo documentation. To Zakharov's rejoinder that Soviets contemplated action necessary to enable such officers to know whether falsification taking place, General Hamlett said that this was a matter of internal discipline to be controlled by convoy commander. He added that General Zakharov obviously would not wish Americans under similar circumstances to inspect Soviet vehicles.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8–858. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the Department as telegram 124, which is the source text.

¹ See Document 12.

After further exchange along same lines, discussion this subject ended with General Zakharov saying that he could only report General Hamlett's position to his own higher authorities.²

Similar message being sent by USCOB to USAREUR through military channels.

Gufler

²After this part of the meeting, the two Commandants discussed an incident at Steinstuecken on August 7. (Telegram 123 from Berlin, August 8; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-858) Regarding this incident, see Document 17.

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, August 28, 1958, 5 p.m.

505. Reference: Deptel 408, August 21.¹ Main point is we will not be able endure another invasion Steinstuecken without taking more positive and forceful action unless we are willing accept sharp and perhaps vital blow to our position Berlin and West Germany. This, we believe, remains true despite (a) uproar in Berlin aggravated by newspapers and politicians intent on forthcoming elections, and (b) would seem improbable there will be another comparable incident in near future.

Following are answers specific questions reftel:

(1) West German authorities admit their police fell down badly on job and facts have been difficult to ascertain. It seems a man whose identity not clearly ascertained entered Steinstuecken early morning and asked lamplighter if he were in West Berlin. Latter simply replied affirmatively whereupon man telephoned West Berlin police.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-2858. Secret; Limited Distribution.

¹On August 7 an armed group of Volkspolizei had entered Steinstuecken, a U.S. enclave of Berlin, and forcibly removed an East German deserter following a protest by West Berlin authorities. General Hamlett protested this incursion to Zakharov. (Telegram 121 from Berlin, August 7; *ibid.*, 762.0221/8-758) The resulting reaction in the German press resulted in the Department's request in telegram 408 for details on the incident. (*ibid.*, 762.0221/8-2858)

Inadequacy of latter and undoubtedly tapped lines brought Vopos instead. Apparently at some point as many as 800 may have surrounded Steinstuecken but very few entered. Man's whereabouts as well as identity unknown and residents Steinstuecken afraid to talk.

(2) West German authorities have ordered a police radio car posted Berlin border at crossing point into zone and setting up permanent police post there. Also planning two officers, possibly retired policemen, live in Steinstuecken and be equipped appropriate communication devices. We do not wish request Soviets assure unhindered passage US patrols because (a) Soviets will, we believe, refer such request GDR; (b) we wish request nothing which may be refused unless we are prepared use force fulfill our requirements.

(3) Have no indication attitude British and French re possible use of force and consider it inadvisable discuss such measures with them until we have firm US position.

(4) We consider this advisable but are not yet ready recommend how or when and of course would do so only after US position determined.²

(5) Re other US sector enclaves,

(a) Wuestemark uninhabited but partly cultivated by farmer residing Zehlendorf. In June telephone message sent Markushin following this farmer's complaint to Zehlendorf mayor that Vopos preventing access to his Auzstemark [*Wuestemark*] land. Subsequent West Berlin police investigation revealed probability farmer arrested by Vopos because involvement illegal currency transactions. Rathaus official then requested Wuestemark access difficulty not be publicized.

(b) Third US sector enclave, Nuthewiese, is both uninhabited and unused.

(c) Under circumstances, unlikely policy would have to be applied these two enclaves.

Bruce

² Question 4 in telegram 408 reads:

"Is it contemplated steps would be taken make sure Soviets and GDR would be aware our intention cross Soviet Zone territory by force if necessary to preserve order in and protect Steinstuecken?"

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, September 3, 1958, 7 p.m.

534. Repeated information USAREUR 144 for USPolAd by other means. Reference Berlin's telegram 175 to Department.¹ Question Soviet insistence inspection military convoys and trucks on autobahn discussed tripartite meeting this morning.

Wilkinson, British Political Counselor, said British feel unless we prepared submit Soviet inspection procedures we will probably be blockading ourselves in Berlin and in effect helping Soviets accomplish purpose obstructing our access Berlin. British, he added, inclined view Soviet insistence inspection as administrative matter and one which we probably will have to accept. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

We said we considered inspection question political matter not merely administrative problem and not prepared yield Soviet inspection demand. By conceding this Soviet demand we would be jeopardizing position in Berlin.

French Political Counselor supported our view. He argued that if we yielded Soviet inspection demands re closed trucks, we would immediately be confronted with Soviet insistence inspection trains and that if we kept yielding on these questions we would soon find ourselves backed up against wall. It was one thing he said compromise on questions of administrative detail but important that we take strong stand matters principle, e.g. inspection. British Counselor said he would like additional time reflect on matter and suggested later meeting on subject.

Re publicity inspection problem, however it tripartitely agreed preferable avoid publicizing matter as long as situation remained fluid and there was possibility further discussions with Soviets.

Bruce

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-358. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, Moscow, and Heidelberg.

¹ Telegram 175, August 26, reported on a meeting of the Political Advisers on August 22 at which the British had proposed sending a letter to Zakharov that would point up the inaccuracy of the Soviet claim that the Western powers had agreed to inspection, and that further discussion of the question should be referred to Bonn. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/8-2658)

19. Operations Coordinating Board Report

Washington, September 3, 1958.

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON GERMANY (BERLIN)

(NSC 5803—Supplement I)

A. *Summary Evaluation*

1. This period brought no basic change in the situation in Berlin. The Western position was successfully maintained. The U.S.S.R., no doubt deterred by a clear realization that the city could be made untenable to the Western Powers only at the risk of major war, appeared disinclined to resort to drastic measures to bring Berlin within its area of control, preferring instead to try to effect a gradual erosion of the Western position and of Berlin's resistance. Chronic Communist harassment continued to be one of the prices of maintaining Berlin as an outpost of freedom. However, this harassment came in the main from Communist attempts to bolster the prestige of the GDR regime and the economy of the Soviet Zone rather than measures directed primarily at undermining the Western position in Berlin.

2. The continued advance in West Berlin's economic situation was best symbolized by the drop in unemployment to a postwar low, but the rate of economic recovery appeared to be levelling off. West Berlin's standard of living is now 98% of the Federal Republic average. The Berlin aid program is effectively demonstrating American support in tangible form.

3. A review of policy is not recommended.

B. *Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States*

4. *Communist Pressures.* The year was replete with rumors and threats of Communist action directed against Berlin, with particular emphasis on the elimination of the remaining contacts between Western Sectors and the Soviet Sector and Zone. Concern reached a critical period in October and November 1957, following the currency reform in the Soviet Zone. The only threatened measure which has materialized to date was the rerouting of through rapid transit (S-Bahn) passenger traffic from the Soviet Zone to the Soviet Sector to bypass the Western

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, NSC 5803 Series. Secret. A parenthetical note on the report indicates that it covered July 17, 1957–September 3, 1958. Reports on the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic of the same date are printed in vol. IX, Documents 246 and 279.

Sectors. However, there are still indications that the Communists are attempting to find ways to stop the flight of refugees to West Berlin, to prevent East Germans from working in West Berlin, to prevent purchases by East Germans in West Berlin, to hamper anti-Communist propaganda activities directed from West Berlin, and in general to eliminate, insofar as possible without incurring grave risks, the adverse influence which Free Berlin exerts on their attempts to communize East Germany.

5. *Access to Berlin.*

a. Berlin's geographic isolation continued to be its weakest point, and the maintenance of free access to the city continued to be the most urgent problem. In general, the movement of persons and goods between the Federal Republic and West Berlin proceeded on a larger scale and with less difficulties than at any time since the war, but minor harassments continued and the vulnerability of Berlin's line of communications was demonstrated anew. All German surface traffic was stopped by the GDR for one day in October 1957 to facilitate the East German currency conversion. At the same time the East Germans detained, examined, and in some cases confiscated, West German parcel post shipments. In May 1958 new tolls were arbitrarily imposed by the GDR on interzonal waterways traffic, ostensibly to obtain funds to cover expenses which would be incurred through the construction by the Federal Republic of a dam on the Elbe but in fact also as a means of pressuring the Federal Republic to enter high-level negotiations with the GDR. The waterway toll issue developed in the same unproductive fashion as had the Soviet Zone highway toll issue in 1955. The Soviets rejected the Western Powers' protest that the Paris Agreement of 1949¹ had been violated and insisted that the question was solely within the competence of the Germans, while the Federal Republic declined to give serious consideration to economic countermeasures and decided to reimburse the carriers to cover the toll increase.

b. After a year of threats, minor difficulties, and discussion, the Western Powers and the Soviets agreed on new documentation for Allied official travelers between Berlin and the Federal Republic effective December 1957. The Soviets thereupon shifted their attention to the documentation and nature of freight shipments via military trains and trucks. Although the Soviets are now shown documentation (e.g., the travel orders and identity documents of Allied travelers) which they had not seen before, there has been no significant change in the types or volume of Allied travel and goods shipments to and from Berlin.

¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1052-1065.

Occasional minor harassments continued, but on the whole Allied access problems are at the moment quiescent.

6. *Contingency Planning*. After three years of effort on our part to persuade them, the British explicitly and the French implicitly have not only refused to commit themselves in advance to the use of limited military force to maintain access to Berlin but have also refused to engage in further hypothetical contingency planning on this subject.

7. *Aviation Problems*. (See para. 21 of the Federal Republic Report dated September 3, 1958.)

a. Although the contingency does not now appear imminent, planning has been undertaken to deal with a situation in which the Soviets refuse to cooperate in the Berlin Air Safety Center, for example, by refusing to accept flight plans for Western Allied aircraft.

b. It appears likely that flights of East German aircraft in the air-space of the Berlin air corridors may occur in the future on an increasing scale, and planning to deal with this situation has been initiated.

d. The Soviets are attempting, in violation of quadripartite agreements, to limit the Western Powers' use of the Berlin air corridors to altitudes between 2,500 and 10,000 feet. Although these altitudes have generally been adequate to date, the introduction of new jet and turbo-prop aircraft will create an operational need for higher altitudes. The possibility of asserting Western rights to use high altitudes by having U.S. Air Force aircraft conduct test flights above 10,000 feet is under study.

[1 paragraph (9 lines of source text) not declassified]

Note: See latest National Intelligence Estimate, 11–3–56, dated 28 February 1956, "Probable Short-Term Communist Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Berlin".²

Annex A³

ADDITIONAL MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

8. *New Governing Mayor*. The election of Willy Brandt as Governing Mayor in October 1957 following the death of Otto Suhr infused new vigor into the administration of the city. Brandt has subsequently replaced Franz Neumann as the Chairman of Berlin's SPD and as a

² For text, see *ibid.*, 1955–1957, vol. V, pp. 414–423.

³ Secret.

member of the Executive Board of the national SPD, and he appears likely to play an increasingly important role in national politics. A visit to the United States by Brandt in February 1958⁴ confirmed the close ties which both Berlin and its Governing Mayor have with this country and also served to increase Brandt's stature within both Germany and the U.S.

9. *Assurances to Berlin.* The determination of the United States to maintain the status and security of Berlin was re-stated on appropriate occasions, notably by the President to Governing Mayor Brandt during the latter's visit and by the Secretary of State during a visit to Berlin in May 1958.⁵

10. *Aid Program.*

a. The continuing program of aid to Berlin is proving a very effective means of demonstrating in tangible form American support for all that free Berlin has come to represent in opposition to Soviet imperialism. In Fiscal Year 1958, the "impact projects" selected for U.S. assistance included student housing for the Ernst Reuter Foundation and the Technical University, both of which have been endorsed by an ICA housing survey team. U.S. assistance will be given in the construction of a modern hospital to operate in conjunction with the Free University Medical School.

b. The Berlin aid appropriation finances also the special Soviet Zone projects designed to focus and intensify Western influences on the population of the Soviet Zone.

11. *Congress Hall.* The Benjamin Franklin Congress Hall, turned over to the City of Berlin in April 1958, was the outstanding feature of the 1957 International Building Exposition and has become the most strikingly effective symbol of American support for Berlin. Together with the Hilton and other hotels now under construction, the Congress Hall is expected to be of key importance in the City's drive to exploit its tourist potential.

12. *Relations with the Federal Republic.* The increasingly close relationship between Berlin and the Federal Republic was exemplified by the election of the Governing Mayor of Berlin, in turn among the Minister-Presidents of the States of the Federal Republic, as President of the Bundesrat. In this capacity Governing Mayor Brandt served as acting Federal President during President Heuss' visits abroad. The Third Bundestag held its constituent session in Berlin in October 1957.

13. *Violation of Steinstuecken Border.* Members of the East German police (the exact number involved is not clear) entered the tiny U.S.

⁴ See Documents 7-10.

⁵ See Document 11.

Sector exclave of Steinstuecken on August 7, 1958 to apprehend a defector. In reply to an American protest, the Soviets denied in effect that the border violation had occurred. The West German and West Berlin press, apparently inspired in part by exaggerated accounts of the incident and confused by a lack of understanding of the isolation of and situation in the exclave, not only violently denounced the Soviets but also sharply criticized the U.S. authorities for not taking more effective action. Concern about the situation was also expressed by the Berlin Senat and the Federal German Foreign Office. Means of preventing a recurrence of such violations or coping with them more effectively are now being studied. The key problem is how to get West Berlin police or American troops across the 1000 yards of well-guarded Soviet Zone territory which separate the U.S. Sector proper from the Steinstuecken exclave.

20. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Quarles

Washington, September 12, 1958.

SUBJECT

USCINCEUR Air Contingency Plan Berlin

1. Reference is made to a memorandum forwarded to you together with a copy of a memorandum to USCINCEUR, subject "Guidance Concerning Air Access to Berlin", dated 7 May 1958.¹

2. In response to guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff USCINCEUR submitted a U.S. Air Contingency Plan Berlin which has been reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, USCINCEUR has requested additional guidance in the following areas:

a. Recommendations for supplemental planning and implementation of subject plan including plan implementation date.

b. Latitude afforded commanders to effect immediate and aggressive protective and countermeasures, including if necessary and feasible Hot Pursuit, in view of the proviso contained in subparagraph 4 (a), page 2, NSC 5604, dated 23 April 1956.²

Source: Department of State, JCS Files. Top Secret.

¹ A copy of the memorandum to USCINCEUR, SM-330-58, May 7, is attached to the two-paragraph memorandum to Secretary Quarles, *ibid.*

² *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, pp. 300-301.

c. Degree and order of magnitude of U.S. limited military force (air) action authorized to counter Soviet and/or German Democratic Republic (GDR) restrictions on U.S. air access to Berlin.

3. In view of the implications concerning U.S. national security involved in the implementation of USCINCEUR's Air Contingency Plan, it is considered that the guidance to be provided USCINCEUR should be a final U.S. position.

4. In developing the final U.S. position, it is recommended that the Department of State be consulted. The following considerations and recommendations concerning implementing guidance are furnished:

a. Implementation of the testing of intentions phase of USCINCEUR's Air Contingency Plan will be made at an appropriate date which is advantageous to the United States in achieving its cold war objectives. An early date is recommended due to the recent advent of the C-130 aircraft into the European theater and the fact that any delay in the initiation of the proposed flights above 10,000 feet would only tend to weaken our position.

b. Based upon the introduction of turboprop type aircraft (C-130) into USAFE, the USSR, through the Berlin Air Safety Center, will be notified of contemplated flights into the Berlin corridors in excess of altitudes normally flown by propeller type aircraft. This notification will be made with sufficient advanced warning to provide the Soviets/GDR an opportunity to revise their communications and air control procedures. The exact date of the initial flight would not be given, but they will be notified that after a specified date it is the intention of the United States to conduct flights within the Berlin air corridors as set forth above. However, the initial flights will be conducted under Visual Flight Rules. After initial visual flights, instrument flights above 10,000 feet will be initiated.

c. NSC 5604 provides appropriate policy guidance on U.S. actions in the event of unprovoked Communist attack against U.S. aircraft. The proviso contained in subparagraph 4 (a) of NSC 5604 is based on a situation in which a definite pattern of continued interference with or attacks on U.S. aircraft is encountered in areas outside Communist control. USCINCEUR should be governed by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the policy outlined in NSC 5604 until Soviet or GDR intentions have been disclosed and a pattern of substantial interference has been established.

d. The degree and order of magnitude of U.S. military air action in this situation is dependent upon the reaction of the Soviets and/or the German Democratic Republic. If the USSR and/or the GDR were to establish a complete air blockade of the Berlin Air Corridors, full use of their jet fighters, antiaircraft weapons, and electronic countermeasures might be required. Hostile acts of the magnitude required to establish a complete air blockade will indicate that general war is probably imminent and the action to be taken by USCINCEUR under such circumstances will be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. USCINCEUR should be delegated the authority to determine the air effort appropriate to cope with possible contingencies other than a complete air blockade of the Berlin air corridors.

f. Supplemental planning should cover antiaircraft artillery (AAA) firing by the Soviet or GDR on allied aircraft from positions

above ground located within or outside the corridor. It is considered that the Hot Pursuit policy contained in NSC 5604 should be extended to include retaliatory action by combat aircraft against the AAA units concerned.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that they be informed of the final U.S. position at an early date.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
N.F. Twining³
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

21. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, September 22, 1958, 6 p.m.

680. Department pass Defense. Reference Berlin's tel 156 to Department.¹ After further careful reflection exclave (i.e. Steinstuecken) situation Berlin, I remain firmly convinced for political and morale reasons it absolutely necessary we be in position take immediate action deal with any future Communist incursions and deliberate violations exclave borders.

To accomplish this, I do not think essential USCOB be given prior and unconditional authority undertake military action deal with any eventuality. On other hand, I feel strongly we must have specific contingency plan making possible USCOB take prompt and decisive action if faced with another Communist action against Steinstuecken.

I have read USCINCEUR's EC 9-4696 September 10² carefully but do not share view that background of present exclave situation

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-2258. Top Secret. Repeated to Berlin, Heidelberg, Paris, USAREUR and USCINCEUR.

¹ Telegram 156, August 19, reported that the United States was legally and morally responsible for Steinstuecken in the same manner as any other part of the U.S. sector of Berlin. Bruce reported further that General Hodes had suggested issuing an instruction to the Berlin Commandant authorizing him "to use such force as is necessary to preserve order in and protect" Steinstuecken. Bruce endorsed the proposal and stated that another incident like the one on August 7 would "be most destructive of U.S. prestige in Berlin and elsewhere." (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/8-1958)

² Not found.

constitutes "long established modus vivendi" and implication that (1) August 7 incident of limited importance; (2) more serious incidents future unlikely; and (3) it therefore unnecessary prepare deal possible future incidents.

As I see it, one constant factor is there really is no stable modus vivendi in Berlin. (This applies not only West Berlin itself but in equal measure West Berlin exclaves.) We are confronted by persistent Communist attempts undermine and erode our position there. Therefore think important we take firm position assure we cannot permit or facilitate by lack of preparation deliberate physical violation by Communists our positions whose [*in those*] parts West Berlin and West Berlin exclaves for which we responsible.

USCINCEUR says it cannot recommend change in policy which would authorize counteractions "only after fact" but would be "particularly pleased hear any proposals which would improve situation before fact."

Only proposal that might improve situation before fact would be to have it generally known that if incursion took place US armed force would be used to restore situation. Also we might assert our implicit right to overland access to exclave though this involves complex questions which no doubt Defense and State will wish to explore.

For all practical purposes our position Berlin is not such we can improve it fundamentally from military standpoint. Situation hardly conducive to that. However, we must do everything possible preserve our position by reacting promptly and effectively when it is jeopardized. Unless we are clearly prepared take prompt and effective actions, seems to me we inviting if not encouraging further Communist actions of increasingly serious character, especially since I think we must assume they are conscious of widespread doubts as to whether we have any settled policy regarding exercise of jurisdiction over exclaves.

With these considerations in mind I fully supported General Hodes' first recommendation (reftel). I therefore hope State and Defense will examine problem in this context.³

Bruce

³ In telegram 642, September 26, the Department replied to this telegram, stating that it intended to examine the problem in all its aspects but was awaiting the final views of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army in Europe. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-2258)

22. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 8, 1958.

SUBJECT

Comparison of Quemoy with Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Wilhelm C. Grewe, German Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. Frederick W. Jandrey—EUR
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

At his request Ambassador Grewe called on the Secretary today to discuss primarily the de Gaulle proposals (see separate memorandum of conversation).¹ However, Grewe thereafter also noted that he had been instructed to express German concern over comparisons being made between Quemoy and Berlin. He had already taken the occasion of his recent meeting with Mr. Murphy² to express this concern. What particularly bothered his Government was that, if there were to be any change in American plans involving, for example, withdrawal of forces from Quemoy, there might be unfavorable repercussions on our position in Berlin. Grewe said that he had been satisfied with the explanations given by Mr. Murphy, but would be glad to have the Secretary's views on this subject.

The Secretary commented that Quemoy and Matsu were militarily indefensible, which was likewise the case with Berlin. Nevertheless, we were prepared to defend them. Grewe commented that this was much appreciated in Berlin. The Secretary continued that he would not conceal from the German Ambassador that, if American policy were to be dominated by those who tried to find excuses for falling back, and this became the general mood, the same school of thought might find itself in the same frame of mind about Berlin. Such a mood was contagious. This was one reason why the German Government should back American policy. Many columnists and other critics of our policy were prepared to fall back and back until they were all the way back home. No one who has an area to be defended by us should favor our falling back in the Far East. This would only encourage the very forces that would ask "Why

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-858. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and initialed by Jandrey.

¹ No memorandum of this part of the conversation has been found; however, it was summarized in telegram 728 to Bonn, October 8. (*Ibid.*, 740.5/10-858) The de Gaulle memorandum, September 17, is printed in vol. VII, Part 2, Document 45.

² Murphy and Grewe last met on October 3; the telegraphic summary of that conversation contains no reference to Berlin. (Telegram 697 to Bonn, October 10; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/10-358)

should we risk war over Berlin?" We are willing to take such a risk wherever the Communists are trying to invoke force in order to obtain something which they did not have before. The Allies must stand together on this. The Secretary referred to the recent Spaak statement in Boston, to which he had alluded in his recent press conference,³ stressing the need to stand together. It was therefore important, if the United States were expected to carry out its commitments in Berlin, that it not be urged to give way elsewhere.

Grewe said he could assure the Secretary that the American position had German Government support. In response to a query from the Secretary as to whether this had been made clear, Grewe said he was not certain. The Secretary emphasized that it would be helpful if the German Government could make its support clear. We would like to have something we could point to. Many critics of American policy have claimed that we have no support elsewhere in the free world. Hence, this was important. Grewe said he would try to get something.

[Here follow five paragraphs on the Far Eastern situation.]

³ For a transcript of Dulles' press conference on September 30 and Spaak's address to the Atlantic Treaty Association in Boston on September 27, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 20, 1958, pp. 597-604 and 607-611.

23. Editorial Note

At his press conference on November 7, Secretary of State Dulles was asked the following question:

"Mr. Secretary, East German Communists have begun to say repeatedly that West Berlin belongs to East Germany and have begun to compare it to Quemoy. Do you see any potential danger in this kind of propagand campaign?"

Dulles replied:

"No. I see no danger in it, because, as I pointed out, we are most solemnly committed to hold West Berlin, if need be by military force. That is a very solemn and formal three-power commitment to which the United States stands bound. I think as long as we stand firm there, and the Communists know we will stand firm, that there is no danger to West Berlin."

For the transcript of this press conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 24, 1958, pages 809-814.

NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1958: U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET THREATS TO TRANSFER ITS FUNCTIONS IN BERLIN TO THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

WESTERN REACTION TO KHRUSHCHEV'S NOVEMBER 10 SPEECH

24. Editorial Note

On November 10 Soviet Premier and First Party Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev addressed a friendship meeting of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Poland at the Sports Palace in Moscow. During this address, he stated that because of their violations of the Potsdam Agreement, the Western Allies had forfeited their legal basis to remain in Berlin. The Premier declared that the time had come for the powers that signed the Potsdam Agreement to give up the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin, and to that end the Soviet Union would hand over to the German Democratic Republic those functions that the Soviet Government still exercised in Berlin. In concluding Khrushchev called upon the Western Allies to establish their own relations with East Germany if they were interested in questions connected with Berlin. An extract of Khrushchev's address is printed in *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pages 542–546.

The immediate response to this address was made by Department of State spokesman Lincoln White on the same day when he stated that none of the four powers could walk out on the occupation agreement on its own, and reiterated that the three Western powers were prepared to fight, if necessary, to defend West Berlin's freedom. A copy of White's statement is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11–1058.

25. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 11, 1958, 5 p.m.

1052. Following are my preliminary reactions to Khrushchev speech¹ on German question, which may wish modify after study East German document which I have not yet seen.²

Threat to end quadripartite status Berlin appears to have been deliberately stated in equivocal manner and may be only trial balloon. Difficult to see, however, how Soviets could simply let matter drop particularly in view coordinated action of East German note and memorandum. I therefore consider that speech represents a most dangerous move on part of Khrushchev. It is true that this is only one of a number of recent indications of hardening of Soviet policy which appears to be aiming at deliberate increase of tension and in that respect may be less serious than if German question alone were singled out for maximum pressure.

It is probable that Khrushchev has several motives in pursuing this general hard line. One may be that having failed to secure summit meeting by soft approach he intends to force meeting by building up tension to almost intolerable pitch. If this is primary motive, however, German problem is ill chosen since this is the one of two problems Soviets refuse to discuss with US. I believe that more likely explanation of general Soviet policy is that Khrushchev has concluded that he cannot achieve his objectives by top level negotiations with present American administration and that he intends to see what effect strong pressure and heightened tension will have on cohesion of Western powers. We may expect that such pressure will as usual alternate with friendly gestures and declarations of sweet reasonableness.

A further reason for deliberate heightening of tension may be that Khrushchev considers this will serve his personal objectives at 21st Party Congress.³ German Ambassador thinks this is so but that Khrushchev fails realize that other members of Presidium are already

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1153. Secret; Priority. Received at 1:15 p.m. Repeated to London, Bonn, Paris, and Berlin.

¹ See Document 24.

² Reference is to an East German circular note and 20-page memorandum on the threat to peace represented by the armament policy of West Germany. A copy of the memorandum, which was also delivered to the Embassy in Prague, was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 221, November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.62B49/11-1358)

³ The 21st Party Congress met at Moscow, January 27-February 5, 1959.

worried by his tendency to take unnecessary risks in field foreign affairs. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

So far as the German question itself is concerned Khrushchev clearly is aiming at forcing our recognition in some form of the East German regime. I believe he sees that with the completion in the next few years of West German rearmament, including the stationing of atomic weapons there, the position of the East German regime will become even more precarious and he fears that West German intervention in an East German revolt under such circumstances might face the Soviet Union with the choice of almost certain world war or the loss of East Germany and subsequently of most or all of his satellite empire. Having failed to maneuver the West into at least tacit recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe through summit talks he feels compelled to resolve this issue now before West German rearmament is completed. An added factor is the failure of the East German regime to win any popular support and the dilemma the Soviets face in attempting to carry out a Stalinist policy in the rest of Eastern Europe, and in Poland in particular, so long as the East German situation is so unstable.

German Ambassador thinks that speech will undoubtedly change character of German note to Soviet Government⁴ but doubts that this was important consideration in Soviet action. His general conclusion is that we are moving from a diplomatic war of position into one of manoeuvre and he agrees with me that this faces us with an exceedingly dangerous situation.

I shall submit shortly comments on possible U.S. actions to counter latest Soviet moves.⁵

Thompson

⁴ For text of the West German note on the reunification of Germany as delivered on November 17, see *Moskau Bonn*, p. 459.

⁵ In telegram 1058 the following day, Thompson suggested that in the absence of a prompt tripartite reply to Khrushchev's speech on Berlin the United States should make its own response in the form of a statement by the President or Secretary of State making it unmistakably clear that the United States would defend its rights in Berlin. This should be coupled with a vigorous propaganda campaign against the German Democratic Republic. In any serious private conversations with the Soviet Union, however, the United States should recognize the problem that the Soviets had created for themselves by setting up the East German regime and stress its willingness to take this into account in a settlement of the German problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1258)

26. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, November 12, 1958, 5 p.m.

2603. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Responsible American journalist says he talked with three representatives Soviet Embassy including Fedorov (TASS representative) at Polish reception November 11. He got impression all were well briefed on line to follow about Khrushchev speech on German question. All "talked tough". When asked if Soviets intended to surrender control of communications to West Berlin to GDR they replied logical to assume so. When journalist asserted Western rights not dependent upon Potsdam, Fedorov said this was a quibble, West had violated Potsdam and so far as Soviets concerned it is non-existent. When journalist said Berlin especially sensitive subject in US and Khrushchev therefore creating a dangerous situation Fedorov replied "if there is going to be a war we had better have it now and get it over with".

Whitney

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1253. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

27. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 12, 1958, 6 p.m.

320. Bonn pass USAREUR and USAFE. Paris pass Topol. Following is mission reaction to Khrushchev speech:

Speech seems to aim at several objectives, but only Berlin situation appropriate for our comment. We see as most important point in this part of speech a warning directed primarily to US, UK and France to

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1258. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and also sent to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

recognize GDR or face increasing pressure on access to Berlin. This theme is not new, but when Khrushchev says it, presumably Soviets have moved close to, and if not all the way to, a decision to implement it.

Soviet objectives in trying to force allied recognition GDR well known. There is objective in connection their German reunification policy. There is also fact that if allies can be forced into even de facto recognition GDR, basis on which allies occupy Berlin would be seriously undermined. Furthermore de facto recognition would give Communists improved stranglehold on allied access and place them in better position try to force eventual allied de jure recognition GDR position. De jure recognition tantamount to official signing away our rights to occupy Berlin.

We think a key sentence re Berlin situation is that which reads: "For its part, Soviet Union will transfer to sovereign GDR those functions in Berlin which are now handled by Soviet organs." We interpret "will" to mean "are going to, whether other three powers do or not" rather than "would if other three powers will." From other passages in speech we conclude that "Berlin" is intended to include access thereto. Soviets have already in theory abolished occupation in Soviet zone, except for allied access which is under administrative controls of Berlin Kommandatura.

We have every reason believe Soviets take very seriously our security guarantee Berlin. We anticipate that turn over to GDR would be implemented gradually, and though GDR pressure would be applied in stages, avoid any action which Communists think would bring into force our security guarantee. Gradual implementation would also presumably offer advantage of enabling Communists to test us from time to time to determine how much more pressure they think would be needed to force us to come to terms with GDR.

It appears to us, therefore, that in foreseeable future East Germans may appear in place of Soviets at the several access checkpoints—more likely on surface routes at first than at Berlin air safety center. Also, at first, East Germans may pass allied official travellers with same documentation and formalities as Soviets do now. Our standing instructions are to accept this arrangement under protest.

As time goes on, however, we think screws will be tightened. Perhaps next step would be GDR effort try to stamp GDR visa on allied travel documents. Under our standing instructions, we refuse accept GDR visa. Should we at this point decide not impose on ourselves a surface blockade, we would in final analysis have to be prepared reopen access at gunpoint.

If we do permit GDR visas to be stamped on allied travel documents, next Communist step might be to require that allied official

travellers obtain their GDR visas in advance of travel at GDR Foreign Office. This would put Communists in position to deny transit travel when they chose. And so on.

It hard for us believe that after experience of 1948-49 Communists would not try to interfere with air traffic, although here we are better situated to contend with interference. Most likely first step in this direction appears to us to be substitution East Germans for Soviet controller BASC. Our standing instructions are to usher East Germans out. We continue to fly without Communist "flight safety guarantee" and onus is on them to fire first shot if they are in earnest in trying to stop us.

Mission is not in position to judge how far Communists might go in employing force to implement access harassment. We would observe, however, that in the air they would be the aggressors and the security guarantees should give them pause before they employ force to try to stop flights. On surface access they might maneuver us into a seemingly "aggressor" position, but even the Communists must be aware that dialections [*sic*] of this sort are not going to affect our decision to implement the security guarantee if we think such action necessary. Since it would be the GDR rather than the Soviet Union which would be faced with implementation of access harassment by force, failure to do so would presumably not involve the same prestige considerations for Communist world as would be case were Soviet forces directly involved. And the Communists might feel resultant loss of prestige to GDR could to some extent be offset by propaganda blasts to effect that three Western powers have committed armed aggression against small but sovereign GDR all because they would not accept a visa.

Until Soviets do take action there is opportunity for solemn warning to Soviets at high levels of the serious consequences that would ensue were they to implement Khrushchev's threat. We feel that contact with Karlshorst on this matter would be waste of time and possibly counter-productive.

We believe status US military liaison mission Potsdam will continue to be decided in future as it has presumably been decided in past—i.e., on considerations having nothing to do with allied position Berlin, such as benefits Soviets consider they derive from having Soviet MLM in Frankfurt.

Above comments based on German text Khrushchev speech *Neues Deutschland*. We are conscious of inherent defects in any translation and will be happy if our reading of speech to effect Soviets have probably decided to turn over access control to GDR is shown to be wrong.

Burns

28. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 12, 1958.

SUBJECT

Khrushchev Statement on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Wilhelm C. Grewe, German Embassy

Acting Secretary Herter

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick—EUR

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

At his request Ambassador Grewe called on the Acting Secretary today to discuss the Khrushchev statement on Berlin made in Moscow on November 10. Dr. Grewe said that he was carrying out instructions received from his Foreign Office on Monday to approach the Department at the highest possible level to express the deep concern of the Federal Government at the implications of the Khrushchev statement.¹ That he should do this was not surprising; far more surprising would have been his failure to do this. He would appreciate an expression of the Acting Secretary's views.

The Acting Secretary said that we understood the reasons for German concern, and referred Dr. Grewe to the statement made late on November 10 by the Press Officer of the Department.² We were considering what might be the best way to reaffirm our position, and would, of course, keep in close touch with the German Embassy as the situation developed. In response to the Acting Secretary's query, Dr. Grewe said he had no specific points to make at this stage as to the views of his Government. Mr. Elbrick asked what had been the reaction in the Federal Republic to our press statement. Dr. Grewe stated that it had caused great satisfaction and added his personal view that the Khrushchev speech was in line with the Soviet policy of probing and creating tension around the world.

The Acting Secretary concluded the conversation by suggesting that Mr. Elbrick might inform Dr. Grewe in some detail of the views of our Ambassador in Moscow.³

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1258. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on November 13 and initialed by Elbrick.

¹ Late on November 10 German Counselor Pauls informed the Department of State that Grewe had been instructed by the Foreign Ministry to express "at high level" the Federal Republic's concern over Khrushchev's speech. Grewe sent Pauls instead, who was informed that there was no need for panic, and that the Embassy would be informed as the situation developed. (Telegram 964 to Bonn, November 11; *ibid.*, 762.00/11-1158)

² See Document 24.

³ See Document 29.

29. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 12, 1958.

SUBJECT

Khrushchev Statement on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Wilhelm C. Grewe, German Embassy

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick—EUR

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

After his conversation with the Acting Secretary (covered in a separate memorandum of conversation),¹ Dr. Grewe went with Mr. Elbrick to the latter's office to continue the discussion of the Khrushchev statement on Berlin made in Moscow on November 10. Mr. Elbrick stated that, as the Acting Secretary had mentioned, we were considering the possibility of further action by the Western three powers, and also whether it might not be desirable to have some later confirmatory action by all the NATO countries at the December ministerial meeting in Paris.

Dr. Grewe commented that this would be in line with the parallel action taken by the NATO countries after the tripartite statement on Berlin issued at the London Conference in 1954.²

Mr. Elbrick then reviewed in some detail the views of our Ambassador in Moscow contained in the Embassy's telegram No. 1052 of November 11.³ He added that we agree this is potentially a dangerous situation but it would be even more dangerous if we did not all show a firm and united front in face of the threat. Hence the desirability of considering some form of tripartite action to be confirmed by NATO in December. A ringing treatment of the subject in a communiqué would be one way of doing this.

In response to Mr. Elbrick's question as to the reactions of other NATO countries, Dr. Grewe said he did not expect there would be much deviation from the common position. Mr. Elbrick commented that under normal circumstances they might be expected to favor such common action, but the present circumstances were not normal and we were accordingly interested in how they might be expected to react. Dr.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1258. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on November 13.

¹ See Document 28.

² For text of the tripartite declaration, see section V of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1352-1354.

³ Document 25.

Grewe noted that failure to mention Berlin in the NATO communiqué might lead to misunderstanding. He had received no word from his Government as to what it anticipated might happen next, but he could conceive that the Soviets might turn over their remaining functions in East Berlin to the GDR, or turn over to GDR officials their functions at the border checkpoints. Mr. Elbrick commented that there were, of course, tripartite plans to meet various possible contingencies. Dr. Grewe indicated that he was not too familiar with how much the German Government might be informed of Allied planning in Bonn in this connection.

Dr. Grewe then went on to make the point that the Soviet contention the Allies were in Berlin on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement should be rejected. Mr. Elbrick said we were giving thought to the possibility of a statement on this subject.⁴

CBE

⁴ Elbrick also talked with Alphand about the Berlin situation along these lines on November 12. A summary of their conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 1739, November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1158)

30. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 13, 1958, 8 p.m.

323. From Trimble. Accompanied by Burns and Muller I called on Mayors Brandt and Amrehn this morning. I said Khrushchev presumably had several objectives in mind in making statement re Germany: raise stature GDR, enhance world tension, probe allied determination re Berlin, weaken Western cohesion, etc. In circumstances it essential West should not be alarmed or permit any weakening its unity. Our power posture greater than that of Sovs and latter aware this.

Mayor Brandt expressed his gratitude for my assurances. He especially pleased Secretary's Nov 7 and press officer White's Nov 11 statements.¹ He analyzed situation from two points of view: (1) as far as GDR

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1358. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

¹ Regarding White's statement, see Document 24; regarding Secretary Dulles' press conference on November 7, see Document 23.

concerned, East Germans have impression they were driving force behind Khrushchev's move. Reportedly, senior GDR officials had conferred with Sov Ambassador Pervukhin and were assured of Sov support in campaign against West Berlin. East German initiative designed (a) provoke shock in zone to reduce number of refugees by dramatizing instability Berlin position casting doubt on ability of refugees escape via West Berlin because prospect Commies would force cessation commercial flights; (b) shake economic stability of West Berlin to reduce investments and bring about cancellation industry orders; (c) possible belief that SED vote might be increased by capitalizing on desire of people to "reinsure" themselves.

(2) As far as Sov motives concerned Brandt said Khrushchev probably wanted determine whether Berlin was soft spot in Western front and may have underrated strength and promptness Western reaction. Brandt said yesterday's Grotewohl statement² was significant since he referred to Khrushchev "proposal" rather than "announcement." He nevertheless felt situation re access Western powers was serious in event replacement Sov control personnel at autobahn by East Germans in which case Western powers presumably have to accept GDR control or embark on self-blockade unless they were prepared use force which Brandt doubted.

He also stated that East Germans had capability of severing connections between two parts of city but such action would not seriously interfere with economic life West Berlin as long as transport goods continued. A much greater danger was likelihood East Germans would start with minor steps none of which would seem worth a strong reaction but cumulative effect of which would be strangulation.

Brandt then suggested (1) approach by three Western powers in Moscow as outlined by Amrehn (ourtel 269 to Bonn, 316 Dept)³ and (2) consideration be given to advisability of sending several Americans of national stature to Berlin not unduly to dramatize situation but rather as proof continuing interest U.S. Govt and people in Berlin. In response

² At his press conference on November 12, Minister President Otto Grotewohl stated that Khrushchev's speech was designed to serve as a basis for further discussion and that both the GDR and Soviet Union were ready to examine the agreement under which Soviet troops were stationed in East Germany. The Mission in Berlin commented that the tone of the statement was "reasonable" and "cautious" and that it appeared Grotewohl had been ordered to "damp down" the reaction to the speech. (Telegram 319, November 12; Department of State, Central Files, 862B.00/11-1258)

³ Telegram 316, November 11, reported on a meeting of the three Western Deputy Commandants with Amrehn at which the latter proposed two possible steps with regard to Berlin: (1) joint call by the three Western Ambassadors on Pervukhin to reaffirm the four-power status of Berlin, or (2) joint Western *démarche* in Moscow stating that the Allies would not tolerate any changes that would affect their position in West Berlin. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11-1158)

to my question whom Brandt had in mind he replied leading representatives both parties such as Messrs. Rockefeller and Stevenson.

I assured Brandt that his first suggestion had already been forwarded to Dept and that we would bring second its attention.

I opened meeting with Amrehn with same remarks as made to Brandt. Amrehn said he especially gratified with U.S. statement which headlined by West Berlin press today that 600 planes ready for another airlift; he felt this all that could be asked by way of clarification our position to population West Berlin and to Kremlin. Amrehn felt entire East offensive against Berlin well planned strategy and that motives internal politics, such as Khrushchev's desire fortify his position prior 21st CP USSR Congress, secondary. He emphasized Khrushchev had not spoken of "decisions" and that therefore there was time take steps against implementation his threats.

Amrehn also raised problem West rail and road access and said there was no indication that Sovs might propose using GDR personnel as their agents at control points but that Khrushchev speech pointed to direct transfer these functions to GDR as sovereign state. Remarking that previous GDR measures such as imposition autobahn and waterway tolls should not have been tolerated, Amrehn emphasized he felt Allies should accept no Vopo control of traffic to West Berlin garrisons. Decision might have to be taken by Allies to proceed without submitting East German controls.

Amrehn then suggested time might be ripe consider new stockpile discussions, and resumption contacts with Berlin officials on this matter.

Amrehn informed his suggestion re Berlin conference three Ambassadors considered but in view already existing plans myself and British Ambassador come to Berlin independently, it felt that same purpose could be accomplished individual Rathaus calls on our part. If shortly after this three chiefs of mission were to revisit Berlin together, psychological effect might be counter-productive. Amrehn agreed.

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

Burns

31. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, November 13, 1958, 7:25 p.m.

622. Khrushchev stated November 10 that USSR "will hand over to sovereign GDR those functions in Berlin which are still reserved for Soviet organs" and will consider an "attack on the GDR as an attack on the Soviet Union." This intimation of Soviet withdrawal from Berlin is accompanied by sharp and extensive attacks on West German "militarization" and aggressive intentions in Khrushchev and Gomulka speeches and Soviet-Polish communiqué and Grotewohl press conference November 12,¹ at which lengthy memorandum and White Book distributed. These pronouncements and publications may presage broad Soviet diplomatic and propaganda offensive on German problem but hint of Soviet action is cautiously advanced and Soviet intentions are not yet clear.

USSR may be pursuing one or more of following objectives:

1. Testing resolve and unity of will of US, UK and France to maintain their position in Berlin;
2. Forcing Western Powers into de facto recognition of East German regime through creation of situations on Allied access routes to Berlin calculated compel Western Powers deal with GDR officials;
3. Inhibiting emergence of West Germany as nuclear-capable power with strong influence in NATO;
4. Bringing about withdrawal of Western troops from Western Germany;
5. Bringing pressure for Four-Power talks on German peace treaty and talks between "two German states" on reunification;
6. In line with Communist pattern of behavior re Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, representing Western occupation of Berlin, special regime of Western Powers' access to Berlin, and influence exerted by Berlin on GDR as unjustified interference with internal German affairs;
7. Generating intensive and continuous pressures throughout world in order divide Western Powers.

Following furnished for information and as background for replying questions about Khrushchev's statements.

In discussing subject addressees should not convey impression excitement or undue anxiety. Should point out Communist threats against

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1358. Official Use Only. Drafted by Armitage and McKiernan; cleared with Hillenbrand, Freers, Kretzmann in P, and Timmons; and approved by Elbrick. Sent to all posts except Bonn, Paris Topol, London, Moscow, and Berlin, to which it was repeated.

¹The text of the joint Soviet-Polish declaration of November 12, 1958, is printed in *Pravda*, November 12, 1958. Regarding Grotewohl's press conference, see footnote 2, Document 30.

Berlin frequently made but not often implemented and whether and how latest threat will be implemented will depend greatly on firmness of Western reaction.

Khrushchev's basic argumentation re Berlin is not new and is essentially repetition line Soviets took as early as 1948. Most significant aspect is more explicit statement by highest Soviet official of threat Soviets have occasionally made by implication earlier, namely to relinquish and thus in effect cede to GDR remaining responsibilities re Berlin which Soviets continue exercise on basis quadripartite agreements and arrangements.

No doubt Soviets desire withdrawal of Western Powers from Berlin and incorporation of all Berlin into Communist-controlled area. However they have been deterred from attempting accomplish this objective forcibly by experience of 1948–49 blockade, by realization world opinion would be adverse, and by explicit guarantee of Western Powers to maintain Berlin's status and security at all costs. Though we do not discount threat implicit in Khrushchev speech and are fully prepared take all necessary action counter implementation of this threat, we regard speech at least in part as probing attempt in war of nerves and as propaganda statement. Following considerations may help explain why Khrushchev made this threat at this time.

Soviets continue thwart any progress towards German reunification and establishment peace and security in Europe. Majority of world opinion undoubtedly blames them for lack of solutions. German problem too pressing for Soviets to ignore it and they are therefore seeking becloud real issues and disguise own intransigence with distortions, threats, and invective. Misrepresentation of situations in Federal Republic and West Berlin are no doubt part of attempt to divert attention from Soviet responsibility re German problem and from situation in Soviet Zone as well as attempt find pretexts for further repression in Zone and excuses for shortcomings of Soviet Zone regime.

Statements by Khrushchev and East German Communists probably also occasioned in part by so-called "Volkskammer elections" to take place in Soviet Zone November 16. On this day unwilling and hostile population will be disciplined and humiliated by being obliged, with over 99 per cent majority, cast ballots in support of regime in parody of democratic process. Objective is to demonstrate to population it must not only accept regime but must willy-nilly approve it. Such occasion naturally calls for vigorous beating of propaganda drums. One is inevitably reminded of Nazi election tactics.

West Berlin elections scheduled December 7 may also have been taken into consideration in Communist statements. Communists are participating in these genuinely democratic elections. At time last elections in 1954 Communists subjected Berlin population to many psycho-

logical pressures to increase Communist vote but obtained only little over 2 per cent of vote cast. Similar pressures may be expected in connection this year's election, but repudiation of Communism by electorate also expected to be similarly emphatic.

Commentaries on Khrushchev's remarks indicate it would be appropriate clarify basis of Allied presence in Berlin. Western Powers' right remain in Berlin and have free access to Berlin do not derive from Potsdam Protocol. Western Powers are in Berlin as military occupiers, with right of occupation based on defeat of Nazi Germany. Areas of occupation were fixed by Protocol of European Advisory Commission concluded London 1944.² Status of Berlin as area under joint occupation and separate from other occupation zones was formally reiterated in statement issued by Four Governments June 5, 1945.³ Right of access derives from right of occupation and is confirmed by numerous quadripartite agreements and arrangements. Rights of Western Powers were challenged by Soviets in 1948, but Soviets were forced to back down after failure of blockade. Rights of Western Powers confirmed not only by New York agreement of May 4, 1949 and Paris communiqué of June 20, 1949⁴ which restored status quo ante blockade but also by continuous practice since.

Postwar history of Germany replete with charges and countercharges about violation of Potsdam agreements, but it is clear that accomplishment of essential purpose of occupation, creation of united democratic Germany, has been frustrated by actions of Soviets themselves. Communist statements attempt obscure historic facts. Soviet imperialism is responsible for insecurity in Europe which has led free European nations, including Federal Republic, to strengthen military defense and to request continued presence of American forces. Soviet attempts establish new totalitarian regime, with same disregard of human dignity and the values of civilization shown by the Nazi regime, are mockery of original purposes of occupation and constant obstacle to building firm foundation for peace in Europe.

Western position re Soviet attempts frustrate establishment democracy in Germany and reunification Germany in peace and freedom is well known. Western Powers have consistently maintained Soviets cannot unilaterally divest selves of responsibilities undertaken in quadripartite agreements, for example, by asserting problems come within jurisdiction of so-called German Democratic Republic. Following so-

² For the Protocol of the European Advisory Commission, signed September 12, 1944, at London, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 118-121.

³ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 10, 1945, p. 1052.

⁴ For texts of the May 4 and June 20, 1949 agreements, see *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. III, pp. 751 and 1062-1065.

called USSR–GDR agreements of September 20, 1955,⁵ which purported to give “sovereignty” to GDR, Western Powers informed USSR “These agreements cannot affect in any respect and in any way obligations or responsibilities of USSR under agreements and arrangements on subject of Germany, including Berlin, previously concluded between France, US, UK and USSR,” and that, in particular, agreements “cannot have effect of discharging USSR from responsibilities which it has assumed in matters concerning transportation and communications between the different parts of Germany, including Berlin”.

Seriousness with which Western Powers would view any attempt force them from Berlin is reflected in October 3, 1954 declaration of Foreign Ministers of US, UK, and France, which has been frequently reaffirmed (most recently by Secretary Dulles in Berlin May 8, 1958)⁶ which reads:

“Security and welfare of Berlin and maintenance of position of Three Powers there are regarded by Three Powers as essential elements of peace of free world in present international situation. Accordingly, they will maintain armed forces within territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as attack upon their forces and themselves.”

For USRO: You are authorized draw on foregoing in any discussion this subject with Spaak and other Permanent Representatives.

Herter

⁵ For text of the treaty signed at Moscow on September 20, 1955, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 458–460.

⁶ See Document 11.

32. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

Washington, November 13, 1958.

SUBJECT

Status Report on Berlin in the Light of the Khrushchev Statement of November 10

In response to your request for information regarding the present Berlin situation resulting from the Khrushchev speech of November 10, I enclose a status report on this subject.

Christian A. Herter

[Enclosure]¹

A STATUS REPORT ON BERLIN IN THE LIGHT OF THE KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 10

The Khrushchev statement on Berlin has naturally caused concern in Berlin and West Germany. Newspapers carried the story in banner headlines. Editorial reactions were, however, generally moderate and cool-headed; they expressed confidence in Western guarantees to Berlin and interpreted the Khrushchev statement as a move in the war of nerves, possibly connected with the coming East German and Berlin elections, rather than as a prelude to the actual withdrawal of U.S.S.R. authorities from Berlin or to drastic harassment of the city. The Berlin population has so far reacted in a similar unhysterical fashion. Berlin officials have called upon the Three Powers to demonstrate as effectively as possible the determination of the Three Powers to honor their Berlin commitments.

Although we have heard the reactions of one working-level Foreign Office official we do not yet know the views of Foreign Secretary Brentano or Chancellor Adenauer. Ambassador Grewe called on the Under Secretary on November 12² to express the deep concern of the Federal Government at the implications of the Khrushchev statement.

Although there are a variety of speculations regarding Soviet motivation this action seems clearly related to a long-standing Soviet desire to force the Western Powers into de facto recognition of an East German regime through the creation of situations on allied access routes to Berlin calculated to compel the Western Powers to deal with East German officials.

The Department in public statements is emphasizing our quadripartite responsibilities in Berlin and the unacceptability of Soviet unilateral abrogation of specific quadrilateral agreements on Berlin (other than the Potsdam Agreement which is not pertinent to our position in Berlin).

Consideration is being given to the desirability of some tripartite reaffirmation of the Western position on Berlin. There is, however, some difference of view as to whether this would be useful at the present time. The British and Germans at the working level believe it would demonstrate our nervousness more than our determination and we think it advisable to wait at least a few days to see how the situation develops before issuing a tripartite statement. This is in line with our belief that

¹ Secret.

² See Document 28.

our wisest course is to avoid actions which might over-dramatize the present situation.

We are reviewing our contingency planning on Berlin in case the Soviet Union carries out Khrushchev's threat to our position in Berlin.

33. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 14, 1958, 4 p.m.

1080. In meeting with British and French Ambassadors this morning re Khrushchev's speech we agreed as follows. We consider most likely reason for Khrushchev action was concern over weakening internal situation in East Germany together with strengthening particularly in military field of West Germany. We disagree with German Ambassador's estimate that motive was Khrushchev's desire to strengthen his position at 21st Party Congress.¹ We do not see that he has need for such tactics nor likelihood that this action would in fact strengthen his position. (Kroll agrees with latter point but thinks Khrushchev has miscalculated.) We are all three baffled by what Khrushchev may expect to accomplish by this maneuver. There is possibility that he may have so misjudged Western reaction that he thinks he can get away with it. We are more inclined to think he has some subsequent step in mind after having built up tension to very dangerous point. We think one possibility may be that he has changed his estimate that a settlement of German problem could be put off indefinitely and that he is aiming at a summit meeting, possibly without an agenda other than to deal with threat to peace. I suggested this approach might enable him to get around commitment which he has undoubtedly made to East Germans not to discuss German problem on four power basis.

We were generally agreed that a firm warning to Soviet Govt is necessary and that this should probably be made on a confidential basis. I expressed personal opinion that the problem was whether or not we should make clear that we would be prepared to use force to maintain

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1458. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London and Paris.

¹ Regarding Kroll's views, see Document 25.

land, particularly road, communications. I said I deplored talk of resumption airlift since appeared to me that if Soviets thought we would settle on such a basis they would be encouraged to push ahead. We would then be saddled with airlift indefinitely and East Germans would then be in position to take measures to weaken or at least bring strong pressure on West Berlin. Believe my colleagues were impressed by this argument.

We also agreed that would be advisable to reiterate our willingness to discuss German question on four power basis. I suggest this offer be made publicly possibly in connection with publication German note. Appears to me that Khrushchev's speech makes it all the more important that German note be a firm one.²

Thompson

² See footnote 4, Document 25.

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, November 14, 1958, 8 p.m.

1037. Reference Deptel 987.¹ After meeting this morning with British and French Counselors we met this afternoon with their Ambassadors at French request.²

Regarding possible tripartite declaration or démarche Moscow, British strongly opposed both. They consider that statements already made have amply shown firmness our position, that things now calmed down somewhat, that Grotewohl speech³ indicated slight retreat, and

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1458. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹ Telegram 987, November 13, reported that the Department was considering reiterating the tripartite declaration of 1954 on Berlin and asked that this idea be discussed in the quadripartite meetings at Bonn. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/11-1358)

² Ambassador Bruce left Bonn November 6 for consultations in Washington; he returned to Germany November 21.

³ Reference is to Grotewohl's press statement of November 12; see footnote 2, Document 30.

that in any event *démarche* Moscow might prove tactical error by evoking reply “formalizing” statements in Khrushchev speech. French Ambassador, although instructed by Paris discuss possibility of *démarche*, agreed with British it better leave things where they are pending further developments. We also inclined agree.

Other points French instructed discuss were (1) exact nature difficulties Soviets may create and (2) possible Western retaliations. On (1) it agreed that foreseeable eventualities already pretty well covered in tripartite paper on surface access to Berlin (Embdesp 1075 December 18, 1957)⁴ and in tripartite instructions to BASC (Berlin’s 315 to Department⁵—British and French comments on these instructions in separate telegram⁶).

British expressed view that any moves were apt to be against Allied access to Berlin rather than German. If Allied surface travel cut off and even if commercial air travel also stopped, they suggested, it should be possible for three powers to mount almost immediately “little airlift” to supply Berlin garrisons and provide transport for at least official travel. They thought cost and effort of this would not be great and that it would put Soviets and GDR in disadvantageous position. We suggested “little airlift” might have to be expanded to cover at least some civilian travel also if commercial airlines unable fly. It was agreed ask governments consider idea and what if any advance planning necessary.

On possible retaliations, it agreed essential press Germans join in economic countermeasures, especially re steel deliveries. British also reverted to idea put forward their paper on countermeasures (Embdesp 1865 April 14),⁷ about refusing visas to Soviets, and suggested that if three powers and Federal Republic, as well perhaps as all NATO countries, agreed such refusal, it would have strong impact. In reply question whether UK really likely be willing do this, British Ambassador said he believed so since idea had emanated from Foreign Office.

⁴ Despatch 1075 transmitted the “Policy on Travel In and Through Soviet Zone of Germany (GDR) Including Travel To and From Berlin.” (Department of State, Central Files, 862B.181/12–1857)

⁵ Telegram 315, November 11, reported that the three Western powers had agreed not to allow East German controllers into BASC, and in the event that the Soviets withdrew from participation in it, to continue to file flight plans in the normal manner. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11–1158)

⁶ Not found in Department of State files.

⁷ This eight-paragraph report suggested countermeasures that could be taken inside and out of Germany, stressed that they must be taken by all the NATO powers as well, and explored how they might be introduced. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/4–1458)

Desirability of discussing practically all of foregoing with Germans on confidential basis was agreed and meeting now set with Northe tomorrow (Saturday) morning.⁸

Trimble

⁸ At 5 p.m. on November 14 the Embassy in London also reported that the British opposed either reiteration of the 1954 declaration on Berlin or a private *démarche* in Moscow. Ambassador Whitney added that the British opposed any quadripartite meeting with the West Germans until the tripartite (United States, United Kingdom, and France) position had been "firmed up." (Telegram 2659; *ibid.*, 762.00/11-1458)

Despite British opposition, the three Western powers met with the West Germans on November 15 and in a conversation characterized as "somewhat confused" and "inconclusive" it was agreed to propose that the North Atlantic Council discuss the desirability of some tripartite declaration. (Telegram 1041 from Bonn, November 15; *ibid.*, 762.00/11-1558)

35. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, November 14, 1958, 9:25 p.m.

1002. Paris pass USRO. Despatch 1075, December 18, 1957;¹ your 1027,² Berlin's 315, 316.³ Agree essential that GFR and Berlin authorities understand basis for tripartitely agreed contingency plans in event GDR officials replace Soviets at check points. Possible widespread dismay might be caused among Germans if we automatically apply agreed formula dating back to 1954 without informing them fully.

Accordingly, Section I of Policy Paper enclosed with reference despatch should (with tripartite concurrence) be discussed at appropriate

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1458. Secret. Drafted by McFarland; cleared with Eleanor Dulles, Kohler, and Fessenden; and approved by Hillenbrand. Repeated to Berlin, Rome, Moscow, London, and Paris.

¹ See footnote 4, Document 34.

² Telegram 1027, November 13, reported that the Federal Republic would appreciate being informed about the moves that were contemplated if the Soviet Union relinquished control of access to the East Germans. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1358)

³ Regarding telegram 315, see footnote 5, Document 34. Regarding telegram 316, see footnote 3, Document 30.

ately high level with GER soonest, with strong caution concerning sensitivity of information. Berlin follow same procedure to inform Brandt. Stress should be placed on fact that these contingency plans, drawn up under High Commission and kept under review since, represent realistic attempt to adjust to possible new situations, on basis implied agency function of GDR officials but stop short of action recognizing GDR controls as sovereign right.

We are also concerned that NATO countries might misunderstand application agreed formula. However, security considerations probably make undesirable volunteer any discussion of subject in NAC unless raised by others or until it becomes apparent contingency planning will be put in effect. Hence propose mention contingency planning only in response to specific inquiries such as made by Italian Ambassador Brosio to Elbrick November 13.⁴ During general discussion Berlin situation (memorandum of conversation being pouched all addressee posts) Brosio asked how far we prepared to go in contact with GDR officials. It was explained that there has been considerable Allied contingency planning to meet various theoretical situations which might arise on Allied access routes. We would continue insist on ultimate Soviet responsibility, regarding GDR officials as essentially agents of Soviets. Obviously difficult problems involved in determining how far we can go in any given situation.

Concept of GDR officials acting as agents of Soviets was spelled out in earlier versions of contingency plans. We have noted failure to make specific reference to agency concept in latest Policy Paper but assume changed wording did not derive from abandonment of usefulness of concept for public purposes.

Embassy Bonn should immediately work out tripartitely agreed statement for release to press and NATO at moment it becomes necessary put contingency plans into operation.

Dulles

⁴ A memorandum of Elbrick's conversation with Brosio is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1358.

36. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, November 15, 1958, 4 p.m.

1794. Re Deptel 1743; Embtel 1787.¹

1. As indicated Embtel 1787 Daridan has told us Fr prepared issue strong joint statement on Berlin situation, subject to Ger acquiescence. Working level at FonOff, however (Laloy, Jurgensen), continues feel that, from tactical point of view, public tripartite statement would probably be inadvisable at present juncture. They note all three capitals have already taken firm public position on Khrushchev's threats and they are inclined believe that tripartite statement would appear repetitious as well as needlessly provocative at moment when crisis atmosphere appears have receded somewhat. Jurgensen expressed to us yesterday view that, if joint action to be taken vis-à-vis Sovs, it would be preferable do so through confidential, concerted approaches by Ambs in Moscow. He also thought idea of public tripartite statement could be held in abeyance for possible use at later time.

2. With regard to possible statement by Secy or President concerning Berlin, Jurgensen felt this would be excellent, but stated emphatically Fr would appreciate being consulted in advance re such statement. Jurgensen pointed out that de Gaulle's interest in tripartite consultation obviously made such action advisable.²

3. Re possibility of Berlin airlift, Jurgensen said Fr recently received revised plans for Allied airlift, which at first glance seemed satisfactory to FonOff. He noted "pressure now on" to obtain official Fr Govt approval these plans. Jurgensen said that, although would be difficult for Fr to find very many transport planes for Berlin (bulk of Fr aircraft being tied up in Algeria), Fr would wish participate in greater measure than in 1948 if new airlift becomes necessary.

4. FonOff has shown us instruction to Fr PermRep NAC for discussion in NAC Nov 17 on Berlin. Instructions not yet approved by Couve but are expected be cleared without difficulty. Instructions recapitulate Fr views outlined in FonOff background statement (Embtel 1750)³ re basis of Fr presence in Berlin, and stress desirability of strong-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1558. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, and Bonn.

¹ Telegram 1743 is the same as telegram 987 to Bonn, see footnote 1, Document 34. In telegram 1787, November 14, Lyon reported French views on Berlin along the lines indicated in the following paragraphs. (Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/11-1458)

² Documentation on de Gaulle's interest in tripartite (U.S.-U.K.-France) consultations on world problems is in volume VII, Part 1.

³ Telegram 1750, November 12, described a French background statement on Berlin, issued November 11, which noted that Khrushchev's threats, if implemented, would cause a very serious crisis, and that the Soviet Premier did not seem correctly informed on the Berlin question. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1258)

est possible unity on Berlin, not only among three powers directly concerned but on part all NATO members. Fr expect that Gers and US will take lead in NAC discussion, but Fr Rep is instructed give them strong support.

5. Working level officials have expressed view, also reflected in instructions to Fr NAC Rep, that there is "division of labor" between Sovs and GDR re Berlin and Ger situation. Sovs, according this theory, are to concentrate on Berlin and quadripartite status, etc., while GDR reps will concentrate on overall question, peace treaty, and so on.

Fr believe this may be explanation of alleged "discrepancy" between Khrushchev's tough line on Berlin and failure of Grotewohl to press Berlin question.

Lyon

37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Washington, November 15, 1958, 2:52 p.m.

Topol 1669. Khrushchev's speech of November 10 launching idea of Western evacuation Berlin was clearly made in the face of full knowledge of basic agreements relating to status of Berlin and of clear tripartite commitment to defend Berlin. It was thus in itself a menace of aggression against a known position. When it provoked the reaction in Western capitals which had to be forthcoming Khrushchev in his second speech of November 14¹ followed the Soviet tactic of developing the position that Western resistance to change in Berlin would be "aggressive." This parallels current Soviet revolutionary theory expressed by Suslov² at 20th Congress CPSU as follows:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1558. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Kohler.

¹ For text of Khrushchev's speech on November 14, in which he stated that the Soviet Government would prepare an appropriate document on the status of Berlin, see *Pravda*, November 15, 1958, pp. 1-2.

² Mikhail Andreevich Suslov, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

. . . ³ Communists and the working class naturally prefer more painless forms of transition from one social system to another. The form of transition however, as has been shown here by Comrade Khrushchev, depends on concrete historical circumstances. Moreover, the question of whether the methods are more peaceful or more violent depends not so much on the working class as on the degree of resistance offered by the exploiting classes in the process of being overthrown, unwilling voluntarily to part with big property, political power, and other privileges in their hands."

In other words, if sheep resist being eaten by wolves this constitutes aggression by sheep. It may be useful to make this point in NAC discussion November 17.

Dulles

³ Ellipsis in the source text.

38. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 15, 1958, 6 p.m.

337. Bonn pass PolAd USAREUR 93. Paris pass Topol. Gen. Hamlett (with concurrence British and French Commandants) called on Governing Mayor Brandt this morning and as result being received alone had free frank discussion with Mayor. Gen. Hamlett explained he calling as Kommandatura Chairman to assure Mayor of solid backing to West Berlin of three Commandants and of constant readiness exchange ideas with him.

Gen. Hamlett informed Brandt in general terms of last night's incident of Sov detention three U.S. soldiers and trucks and stated we felt Sovs had been forced to back down on this issue.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1558. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

¹ At 1 p.m. Berlin time on November 14, three covered U.S. Army vehicles were detained at the Babelsberg checkpoint for refusing to allow inspection by Soviet officials. Despite repeated protests by the convoy commander the vehicles were neither allowed to proceed to West Germany nor return to Berlin unless they were inspected. At 8:45 p.m. General Hamlett alerted the Berlin garrison, moved a platoon of tanks up to the border, and asked General Hodes for permission to rescue the convoy. At about the same time he instructed Burns to protest the detention of the convoy to Soviet authorities at Karlshorst and to inform them of the preparations he had made to resolve the situation. Soviet authorities proved difficult to find at Karlshorst, but Burns reiterated the U.S. position on inspection and relayed Hamlett's message, and the convoy was released, returning to the city at 10:30 p.m. Shortly after its release, Hodes informed Hamlett that he could not give him authority to rescue the convoy. The Mission at Berlin transmitted a detailed chronology of the incident in telegram 353, November 17. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11-1758) An account by General Hamlett is included in his oral history interview at the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Mayor then read excerpts from yesterday's Khrushchev statement.² Mayor felt these remarks constituted backdown by Sovs.

Brandt brought up subject possible East German takeover Sov surface checkpoints. Gen. Hamlett stated we had no information such move impending. In reply to Brandt question as to what we would do in event such takeover, Gen. Hamlett stated one could see three alternative courses: 1) complete refusal accept East Germans at checkpoints and use of force to maintain surface access; 2) refusal transit East German checkpoints which would result in "self-imposed blockade"; 3) accept under protest controls by East Germans making clear we do so only because they agents of Sovs in whom ultimate authority continues to reside. Mayor felt first course most dangerous of the three (Gen. Hamlett agreed) and would probably at least lead to blockade of traffic between FedRep and Berlin and strangulation of city. Although "self-imposed blockade" feasible because, as Gen. Hamlett observed, garrisons could be supplied by air, Mayor felt this step offered at best prospect GDR demand for vastly increased documentation and control measures to obtain surface access for garrisons. Although recognizing that acceptance East Germans as agents definite step in wrong direction, Brandt felt on balance this was best of the three courses of action.

Gravest danger present situation, according Brandt, is throttling of Berlin economy and Mayor stated he had confidential information from high East German source who preparing to defect that this was real Communist target. In reply to query by Gen. Hamlett, Brandt stated that some Berlin industrialists already worried, that Senate had been watching economic indices but had noted only moderate private stockpiling staple commodities, some movement family valuables and documents to FedRep, and no significant bank withdrawals. Thus, Brandt felt local economic reaction not alarming.

Gen. Hamlett noted that there had been considerable speculation concerning further statements that might be made by U.S., British and French to reaffirm joint Berlin security guarantee. Gen. Hamlett said he felt enough statements already made and that reiteration might weaken value of guarantee by casting doubt on previous assertions. Brandt stated that in his opinion enough has been said concerning Berlin guarantee and he thoroughly agreed further affirmation inadvisable at this time.

Throughout visit it apparent that Brandt greatly pleased by Gen. Hamlett's call and evidence solidarity it represented.

Burns

²See footnote 1, Document 37.

39. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 15, 1958, 8 p.m.

339. Bonn pass prity USPOLAD USAREUR 94. Paris pass USRO and Thurston. From Trimble. It view Brandt with which Gen Hamlett, Burns, and I agree that procedure Soviets intend to follow in transferring controls to GDR will be gradual. They will seek avoid any steps which in itself might be regarded as Rubicon and thus provide basis to rally West public opinion in support vigorous counter-measures. Rather Soviets apparently hope by slow but steady turning of screw to bring about situation in which position West powers Berlin will eventually become untenable. They will presumably follow probing tactics and when they meet firm resistance at one point will recoil and then press at another.

Soviet will also, in opinion Hamlett, Burns, myself, use East Germans as cloak rather than employ their own forces. Indication this found last night's incident when platoon Vopo's surrounded vehicles while only usual small Soviet detachment at checkpoint.¹

In our view stoppage convoy was carefully planned in advance and constituted most serious probe our intentions in recent times. Reply our telephonic protest made with unusual speed and unusual activity noted Karlshorst for so late in evening. Also this first time Soviet refused permit trucks return unless inspected. Although they modified position, fact remains that trucks did not get through to FedRep and incident provided Soviet opportunity to state categorically that they would hereafter exercise their "right inspect convoys."

Consider it likely next move will be directed to air or rail access, probably latter. Re former consider essential commercial traffic be continued without interruption. GDR inspired rumor now circulating among Berliners that next move will be aimed commercial carriers. Their morale would suffer severely if service is suspended even temporarily. Therefore suggest arrangements be made with operators for requisitioning aircraft in such contingency and planes flown by Air Force crews, or similar measures which would ensure continuation service.

Realize that to turn trains back rather than accept GDR control under protest would mean self-imposed blockade. Therefore do not

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1558. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 38.

suggest we seek to alter present tripartite agreement. It will however be difficult to convince Berliners that we regard GDR as exercising controls solely as agents Soviets.

In addition attempts interfere Allied access Berlin we consider it quite possible Soviet will take measures to weaken Berlin economy. They will as we see it, seek through propaganda methods to inspire flight of capital and a transfer of plants from Berlin to FedRep. Also they will presumably endeavor reduce flow industrial raw materials to Berlin. For example, tax on trucks or barges could be further increased, surface traffic impeded by "repairs" to roads, canals, etc. Resultant stagnation Berlin economy and unemployment would gravely affect morale here. In 1948 Berliners poor and had relatively little to lose. Today they reasonably prosperous.

While Soviet has power cripple Berlin's economy, that of Soviet Zone also vulnerable to retaliation. Therefore suggest that if and when Soviet initiate measures along above lines, FedRep in turn introduce prompt counter-measures re exports to GDR. Realize this two-edged sword and FedRep has been most reluctant employ this weapon in past. Nevertheless in our opinion it type of move which Communists would respect and occasion modification their tactics.

Burns

40. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 16, 1958, 10 p.m.

346. Refs: (1) USBER tel 286 to Bonn, 333 to Dept.¹ (2) USCOB tel unnn Nov 15 to DA (pass State), info Bonn.² (3) USAREUR tel SX 7679

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1658. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn.

¹ Telegram 286, November 15, reported that the convoy had been released to return to Berlin. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11-1558)

² This telegram reviewed the course of the incident and stated that it was obvious that it had been planned to check the reaction of the United States. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, Headquarters Department of the Army, Communications Center Files)

Nov 15 to DA (pass State), info Bonn.³ (4) USBER tel 292 to Bonn, 339 to Dept.⁴ (5) USAREUR top secret tel SX 7691 Nov 15 to USCINCEUR, info Bonn. (6) USCINCEUR top secret tel EC 9-6071 Nov 16 to Defense, info Bonn.⁵

My analysis of incident Nov 14 and our actions for future follow:

We have reported in reference (4) that incident of Nov 14 constituted most serious probe in recent times of our intentions and test of our willingness to stand firm. That Sovs chose Nov 14th for this test could conceivably have been done to determine our likely future reaction in event Sovs do try to implement threats contained Khrushchev's speech Nov 10. However I do not see incident Nov 14 as either beginning of a blockade or actual implementation by Sovs of Khrushchev's Nov 10 threats, especially in light his Nov 14 speech and local manifestations "dampening down" (USBER tel 285 to Bonn, 332 to Dept).⁶

Type of action more likely to signal beginning of implementation Khrushchev's threats could be abolition Sov Kommandatura Berlin or turn-over one or more access controls to GDR.

Inspection issue has been with us in increasingly acute form since early this summer but our access not significantly impaired as result Sov inspection demand and our non-compliance. Most U.S. supplies transported by trains and most supplies traveling on autobahn sent in open or partially covered vehicles which experience little trouble in transiting SovZone. Since interior these vehicles at least partially visible, Sovs have apparently satisfied themselves re their inspection criteria.

Incident which occurred Nov 14 was unexpected, since we did not think Sovs would go so far as to hold three American soldiers and three trucks at Nowawes (Babelsberg) checkpoint. Finding ourselves in situation we did, Gen Hamlett was prepared use armed force to extricate his

³ Telegram SX 7679, November 15, transmitted text of a letter from Hodes to Zakharov, following the release of the convoy, protesting its detention, stating that he had not and would not agree to Soviet inspection of convoys, and demanding that Zakharov inform his checkpoints to clear properly documented U.S. Army vehicles without inspection or detention. (*Ibid.*)

⁴ Document 39.

⁵ EC 9-6071 transmitted the text of SX 7691, which discussed further steps that might be taken in light of the detention of the convoy on November 14. In particular it stated: "In view of the strong protest today ref B [SX 7679] and the necessity for allowing reaction time, we have deferred sending this operational convoy back today. However, unless we are willing to accept a voluntary blockade, accede to inspection or undergo a period of detention with unacceptable political and military consequences, the Soviet intentions must be tested. When tested, if detention occurs, we should be prepared to recover our men and equipment by force." (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1658)

⁶ Telegram 332, November 14, summarized press and official East German statements that indicated efforts to "dampen down" reaction following Khrushchev's speech. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11-1458)

men and vehicles. In this proposed action Trimble, who was in Berlin, and I concurred.

Since Sovs finally released vehicles night of Nov 14 without inspection despite previous assertions that evening, it almost certain Sovs will demand to exercise right of inspection with next U.S. covered vehicle we dispatch. (Acting Sov PolAd Shilov was very specific to me night of 14 Nov on point that in future Sovs will "continue to exercise right of inspection.") I would expect Sovs to hold next covered vehicle(s) and U.S. soldier driver(s) at Nowawes as they did on 14 Nov. This time Sovs might feel they could not afford back down in response to even strongest protest and in end we might have to go in and get men and vehicles out with U.S. armed forces. Should this be necessary and even if we got away with it without firing a shot, such action would certainly contribute to a serious heightening of tensions here and might provoke reprisals such as possible action against Steinstuecken.

There are other courses Sovs might follow with next covered vehicles dispatched from Berlin, such as letting them through checkpoint Nowawes and detaining them at Helmstedt—or even midway along autobahn.

Yesterday afternoon AFN Berlin broadcast that U.S. military authorities planning send convoy down autobahn "to test Russian intentions." Today, AFN Berlin carried newscast stating: "President Eisenhower and American Ambassador to West Germany are to meet Monday discuss Berlin situation. Meeting follows army decision send another convoy down Berlin autobahn." (We informed material for both newscasts came from Frankfurt.)

If such action is taken with convoy which contains one or more covered vehicles (as proposed references 5 and 6 for Tuesday or soonest thereafter) and should it result in armed incident or even publicity resulting from probable detention U.S. soldiers, it would be difficult to explain to our public and that of our Allies why we make such an issue over a "peep under the canvas." (There are of course sound reasons for absolutely refusing to let Sovs inspect our vehicles. Dept is aware of reasons and I concur wholeheartedly with them.)

I do not feel that now is the time in Berlin for us to probe Sov intentions in this manner unless there are overriding considerations for doing so not apparent here. Our correct posture in Berlin at this time, it seems to me, is to remain steadfast, react firmly to any Communist effort to push us around, but not knowingly go out and seek trouble. After events of the night of Nov 14 our local position vis-à-vis Sovs in Berlin is strong enough not to require that for present we take offensive unnecessarily.

Burns

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, November 17, 1958, 1 p.m.

1045. Reference Berlin's 346¹ to Department and Department's 1007.²

1. I tend agree view expressed USAREUR'S unnl tel November 15³ that truck incident deliberately planned by Soviets as test firmness our position in light Khrushchev speech. I nevertheless concur final paragraph Berlin's 346 that our prompt and strong reaction to November 14 incident amply demonstrated that we do not intend yield to Soviets on inspection issue. I moreover fully endorse Berlin's view that at least for time being there more to be gained by remaining steadfast and reacting firmly to any Soviet or GDR pressures as they may develop than by seeking to probe their intentions by actions such as that proposed USCINCEUR's EC 9-6071.⁴

2. If any such action envisaged I believe it should be coordinated with British and French and consideration given to "test" being made next by British or French truck instead of US, particularly in view Shilov allegation (USCINCEUR's EC 9-6071) that only difficulties are with US, none with British or French. In any event, although I fully agree we should continue attempt sending covered trucks, it seems to me preferable for time being send only open or partially covered trucks which apparently go through without difficulty.

[1 paragraph (12-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Trimble

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1758. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Berlin.

¹ Document 40.

² Telegram 1007, November 17, approved briefing the North Atlantic Council on the November 14 incident, but stated that military action with regard to rescuing a convoy required "careful consideration and consultation" with the British and French. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1758)

³ See footnote 2, Document 40.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 40.

42. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 17, 1958.

SUBJECT

Berlin Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Wilhelm C. Grewe, German Embassy
The Secretary
Ambassador David K.E. Bruce
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

At his request and under instructions from his Government, Ambassador Grewe called on the Secretary today to discuss the Berlin situation. He began by saying that the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister had authorized him to express the gratitude of the Federal Republic for the prompt and very clear position taken by the American Government after the first Khrushchev statement in Moscow on November 10. He noted that the Federal Government did not believe this to be an improvised step, but one prepared for a long time. There had been articles and statements for nearly a year in the East German press and various GDR scientific publications presaging the language and argumentation which Khrushchev used. The Federal Government believes, therefore, that the situation has to be taken seriously, and that inevitable concrete developments will follow the Khrushchev statement. The Federal Government had noted that, if the Soviets denounced the Potsdam Agreement (which it was realized was not the basis of the Allies' right to be in Berlin) this would also have some effect on the German unification problem. For example, there is reference in the Potsdam Agreement to a peace settlement with one German Government.

The Federal Government recognized that there was a dangerous possibility that the Pankow representatives would have to be dealt with on routine matters if there were no Soviet authorities available. As the Secretary was aware, Ambassador Grewe continued, the Federal Republic has current technical contacts with the GDR. These might have to be intensified in a dangerous way. The Federal Government feels that the Three Powers may be forced to deal with GDR representatives at the check points if there are no other means to maintain the flow of traffic. It foresaw special dangers in the field of air access. His Government was not certain what the consequences would be if the Soviets withdrew

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1758. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand. For Grewe's account of this conversation, see *Rückblenden*, pp. 364–365.

from the Berlin Air Safety Center, but it seemed likely that civil traffic would end if there were to be any real difficulties. This would, of course, affect the flow of tourists and private passengers who would be afraid to travel to Berlin. Ambassador Grewe requested American views regarding possible counter-measures, adding that he had already been told during the recent conversation with Mr. Elbrick¹ that there were tripartite plans in existence for handling different possible situations. As to a tripartite or NATO statement on Berlin, the German Government did not feel that this was an urgent requirement, at least for the next few days, but believed that one should be prepared for possible emergency use.

The Secretary noted that there were two aspects to the problem: the effort by the Soviet Union to turn over its responsibilities to the East Germans, and harassment by the Soviets of our transit movements, for example, as in the recent incident involving military truck traffic. The Secretary said that he assumed the Ambassador's queries related more to the first rather than to the second type of problem. However, our people in Europe, especially the military, took a serious view of the recent incident on the Autobahn. Ambassador Grewe commented that he had no information regarding this incident from the Foreign Office, and he did not have the impression that it had been taken very seriously there.

The Secretary said that we are having some discussions with the British and French as to the position to be taken relative to Soviet efforts to pass their responsibilities on to the GDR to compel recognition of the latter. He added that we would, of course, be very anxious to learn what the Federal Government thinks our position ought to be, since this is obviously a matter of great concern to it. Sometimes the United States has the impression that we are inclined to react more strongly to such situations than the British, French, or the Germans. Last May, the Secretary continued, when he was in Berlin² and the question of tariffs and canal tolls was being discussed, he noted a certain complacency on the part of the Federal Republic and an unwillingness to take counter-measures of any kind. He did not necessarily question the decisions finally taken, but could not help but note the fact that there was this reluctance to take counter-measures which would disturb economic relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR. However, the Secretary had noted the Chancellor's statement of last week³ indicating that he might be considering the possibility of counter-measures in the present situation.

¹ See Document 29.

² See Document 11.

³ Not further identified.

Ambassador Grewe said that, in his own experience, which involved participation in governmental groups studying the possibility of counter-measures, it was difficult to find such measures which would really have a permanent effect on the GDR. The Secretary's impressions regarding the waterways issue were correct, but he believed the present attitude of the Federal Republic to be more decisive and to involve stronger feelings about the threat to Berlin.

The Secretary stated that, as far as having certain practical dealings with people purporting to be GDR officials were concerned, he personally did not feel too strongly one way or the other. One could treat them as agents of the Soviet Union or just deal with them. After all, we deal with the Chinese Communists when necessary in certain practical situations. We do not recognize them politically, but do recognize them as a force to be dealt with, as for example, at the time of the Korean Armistice negotiations, the negotiations over Indo-China in Geneva, and in our efforts to get civilian prisoners released. The Secretary referred to the kidnapper analogy used at the time of the helicopter case.⁴ He said that when someone kidnapped your child, you deal with the kidnappers to get the child released. Such dealings need not have any political implications. The Secretary added that his remarks should not be interpreted as representing any definitive view, since we had not yet had any complete exchange with the British and French on the subject. If the Federal Republic has strong views on the matter they would of course have to be taken into consideration.

Ambassador Grewe said he had noted the *New York Times* report of yesterday indicating that, under certain limited circumstances, the United States might be prepared to deal with GDR officials holding them as agents for the Soviets. Apparently Bonn was not too happy about that. The feeling there was that the GDR would soon begin to formulate their documents so as to make it impossible to regard their checkpoint officials merely as Soviet agents. As to the idea of direct negotiations similar to those in the Red Chinese case, Ambassador Grewe personally felt this was a possible course of action, but he recognized that in Bonn it would create great psychological difficulties. For many years people had been taught that, if you deal with the GDR it means recognition; now they would have to be told that it does not really mean this.

The Secretary said we have a theory, as in the Red Chinese case, that you can have dealings with these people without implying recognition. The situation was obviously one where the considered views of the Federal Republic should be carefully weighed in the scales.

⁴ Reference is to the crash of a U.S. helicopter in East Germany on June 7.

The Secretary went on to say that we must think through the entire problem to see if we are prepared to accept the consequences. We apparently are prepared to accept more serious consequences than the British or French. The Secretary, himself, believed in the principle that where the Soviets probed to find weaknesses, there we should show strength. This policy had been fairly successful, for example, in the Far and Middle East. He had always assumed that Berlin was a logical place for a probe by the Soviets. The problem is what can be done in specific cases. The United States is not alone here. The British, French, and also the Federal Republic are involved, and we will not come to any final decisions without ascertaining the views of the Federal Republic as to contemplated courses of action. The Secretary added that he, himself, doubted the practicability of total non-recognition of the existence of something which is a fact. He felt that, if something is a fact, we have to recognize this fact even if we don't like it. In time of war we recognize the existence of the enemy as a fact. To pretend the enemy does not exist is not a very realistic or practical policy. However, the United States will be found to be prepared to be as tough as anyone else in this situation, but not alone.

The Secretary continued that we are also concerned with interference to our trucks and whether to make a major issue of it or not. We will need to take account of French, British, and Federal Republic views in this matter. We should perhaps give more weight than in the past to the views of the Federal Republic, and the Federal Republic should perhaps assume more responsibility in these matters.

The Secretary said we had no clear view as to whether the subject should be discussed in NATO. It would be in line with our policy of encouraging political consultation to do so. If Quemoy and Matsu were proper subjects for discussion in NATO, then the Berlin situation certainly seemed to be also. One could not say that NATO is not interested in this problem. There must probably be some discussion in NATO but the final responsibility for decisions must rest with the Three Powers that had juridical responsibility. This responsibility could be shared perhaps with the Federal Republic.

Ambassador Grewe said he felt that Berlin should be mentioned in the NATO communiqué to be issued at the December Ministerial Meeting. It was mentioned last year, and also in the 1954 communiqué on the Paris Agreements.⁵ He would like to suggest that the existing Quadripartite Committee in Bonn deal with the question of counter-measures

⁵For texts of the NATO communiqué, December 19, 1957, and the Paris communiqué, October 23, 1954, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 6, 1958, pp. 12-15 and November 15, 1954, p. 732.

and the related problems. He felt that this was an adequate body for such consultation.

Before leaving, Ambassador Grewe indicated he had one further short question to ask. He said his Government had, of course, followed with close attention the recent statement of Defense Secretary McElroy and the subsequent statement issued by the State Department.⁶ He noted there might be some fear that American forces would be weakened in the Federal Republic under the McElroy scheme. The Secretary said he did not think there would be any substantial repercussions. We are, of course, constantly re-examining our forces here and in Asia to meet changed requirements, but no change in policy so far as Europe was concerned was intended.

⁶ For texts of Secretary McElroy's statement on U.S. global military strategy including a reduction in U.S. military manpower, November 13, and the Department of State statement on it, November 14, see McElroy, *Statements*, vol. IV, pp. 1742–1761.

43. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, November 17, 1958, 5 p.m.

Polto 1325. At private NAC meeting today on Berlin, NAC heard evaluations by Germany, U.S., U.K. and France and discussed German report note to Soviets on 4-power consultation delivered today.

Meeting being reported in full.¹ Following are highlights:

1. There was strong pressure from all members and chairman for fullest use of consultative process in North Atlantic Council on all matters connected with Berlin situation and broader context of other related Soviet moves connected with Central European area, e.g., New Rapacki Plan.² [3 lines of source text not declassified] While special role of three

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1758. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, and London.

¹ Polto 1333 from Paris, November 17. (*Ibid.*)

² The Rapacki Plan, first proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in a speech at the U.N. General Assembly on October 2, 1957, and subsequently renewed through diplomatic channels, called for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany. See vol. X, Part 1, Document 12.

Western powers recognized, strongly expressed consensus was that this was no substitute for NATO consultation. Stikker³ made key point that other NATO members have associated themselves with position of three powers in Berlin and are thus directly interested.

2. Sense of meeting was that West should stand firm against Soviet moves but should use utmost wisdom and soundest deliberation to avoid provocation of incidents which Soviet seems to be seeking to have West "initiate." In our judgment this discussion bears on handling of Babelsberg incident which was simply reported factually.

Burgess

³ Dirk U. Stikker, Dutch Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

44. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of Defense McElroy

Washington, November 17, 1958, 2:13 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO SEC MCELROY

The Sec said we are sending people over to talk to the JCS in a few minutes.¹ Our feeling is until there has been a further exchange of views with the British, French and Germans we should not take a line which might lead to shooting and he thinks that is indicated by the NSC paper² on the subject. We, said M, would not be opposed to completion of consultation. M thinks their feeling is we should not fail to send the same group through at some early future date to indicate we wanted it to go through in the first instance and since it did not we want it to go through now. The Sec read a ticker about something getting through.³ M said they did not understand how that could be in view of Norstad's cable⁴ though it may refer to something else. The Sec said this is today and N's cable was yesterday. They agreed the time element is perplexing.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Phyllis D. Bernau.

¹ No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

² Presumably a reference to NSC 5803, Supplement 1, February 7; see Document 5.

³ On November 17 an uncovered convoy had passed through to Berlin without delay, but on the following day the JCS ordered the suspension of all convoys.

⁴ Regarding EC 9-6071, November 16, to which McElroy is presumably referring, see footnote 6, Document 40.

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, November 17, 1958, 7:45 p.m.

1012. Paris for Embassy and USRO. British Embassy has given Department memorandum¹ setting forth Foreign Office views on current Berlin situation and has asked whether Department agrees with analysis. Following is substance of memorandum.

We should proceed on assumption Soviets will sooner or later "hand over to sovereign GDR those functions in Berlin which are still maintained by Soviet organs" as Khrushchev threatened in November 10 speech.

Among Soviet motives are (1) desire create atmosphere of crisis which could produce climate of opinion in West favorable to high-level discussions of future of Germany, in which Soviets would support revised Rapacki Plan as measure to deny nuclear capability to Bundeswehr (Khrushchev considers that Americans are on point of supplying West German forces with nuclear weapons and it may not be too late to prevent this) and (2) desire force Western Powers ultimately to recognize GDR, in order to consolidate satellite empire and imprison Poland within status quo.

We cannot prevent Khrushchev from carrying out his threat; main question is decide how react when he does it.

We must proceed from assumption we would resort to force, with all risks that entails, rather than submit to Berlin's being starved out. But immediate issue is whether submit to dealing with GDR representatives on practical matters relating to transport and communications on same basis we have hitherto dealt with Soviets.

It is clearly in our interest agree in practice we should deal with representatives of GDR rather than refuse do so and thus precipitate new blockade of Berlin which in last resort might have to be broken by force. It would therefore seem worthwhile work out set of rules for our authorities which would enable them when time came to deal with GDR authorities without implying this action constituted recognition of GDR Government and while maintaining theory Soviets remain responsible.

But such modus vivendi would not be allowed operate for very long, if at all. We would soon find ourselves faced with further choice of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1758. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McKiernan; cleared by Hillenbrand, Fessenden, EE, and BNA; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to London, Berlin, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ A copy of the full text of the British memorandum was transmitted to Bonn in instruction CA-4536, November 20. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/11-2058)

recognizing GDR or exposing Berlin to blockade which would in last resort have to be broken by force. Khrushchev, who has been for long time in position oblige us make this choice, has probably calculated we would prefer recognize GDR. "So far as UK concerned, he would be right." Nobody in West would believe avoiding recognition of GDR is worth a war.

In short, we may have to choose between:

- (a) abandoning Berlin;
- (b) resorting to force;
- (c) staying in Berlin but dealing with and, if necessary, ultimately recognizing GDR.

"Course (a) is out of the question and course (c) is greatly to be preferred to course (b)."

Our decision re dealing with GDR must depend partly on our ability stage a successful airlift and continue it indefinitely, which Foreign Office believes may be impossible. Airlift difficulties are such that it is unlikely blockade could be resisted for longer than about fifteen months. Would seem prudent accept this estimate for political planning purposes.

Foreign Office is instructing British Embassy Bonn (1) push on with negotiations with Federal Republic regarding facilities which would be required from latter in event of airlift (financial aspect of airlift and appropriate Federal Republic contribution will also require consideration and (2) concert with US and French Embassies estimates of requirements of "miniature airlift" which would take care of Allied official and military traffic only.

Full text follows by pouch.

British Embassy Paris has handed same memorandum to French Foreign Office.

Addressees' comments urgently invited.²

Dulles

² In telegram 1065, November 18, 8 p.m., Trimble replied that the British memorandum was "defeatist" and based on the assumption that the West had no effective reaction to Soviet moves in Berlin, an assumption that he did not share as long as the Soviet Union was not prepared to risk war. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11-1858) On November 19 and 20 the Embassies in London and Paris replied. The former reported that the paper was hastily drawn up and uncharacteristic of Macmillan's thinking, and noted that it agreed with the substance of telegram 1065 from Bonn. (Telegram 2737; *ibid.*, 762.0221/11-1958) The Embassy in Paris reported that the French Foreign Ministry was "very disturbed at weakness shown in British memo", but that Couve considered it an intelligent statement of the case. (Telegram 1862; *ibid.*, 762.00/11-1958)

46. Notes of the Secretary's Staff Meeting

SMN-688

Washington, November 18, 1958, 9:15 a.m.

[Here follow paragraphs 1–17 on unrelated subjects.]

Berlin Situation

18. The Secretary welcomed Ambassador Burgess to the meeting. The Ambassador reported that yesterday's meeting of the North Atlantic Council had indicated keen interest in the Berlin situation and a desire by all members for full consultation.¹ The Germans had been given a pretty good working-over on their draft reply to the Soviet note of September 18.²

The Secretary said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been concerned by General Norstad's recommendation for direct action to keep open the land routes to Berlin.³ Ambassador Burgess thought that Norstad had moved too quickly, but stated that Soviet probing would probably soon bring us to a position where we would have to decide how firm to be. The Secretary declared that we must be firm but we should try to carry the British, French and German Governments with us.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret.

¹ See Document 43.

² For texts of these two notes, see *Moskau Bonn*, pp. 432–434 and 459.

³ Presumably this was discussed at the meeting referred to by Dulles in his telephone conversation with McElroy on November 17; see Document 44.

47. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, November 18, 1958, 10:45 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

2. I reported on the Berlin situation and that it had eased somewhat. I said that the rather extreme views advocated yesterday and the day before by General Norstad and the JCS had been moderated by better understanding with the British, the French and the Germans before we took a position that might lead to shooting.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private.

The President reviewed at some length his recollection of the history of the Berlin arrangements; his feeling that we perhaps should not have committed ourselves as deeply as we had to Berlin, where he said the situation was basically untenable, as in the case of Quemoy and Matsu. However, he recognized that we were where we were and had to stand firm. The President emphasized, however, that we needed to have understanding with the British, the French and the Germans on this matter.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

JFD

48. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of Defense McElroy

Washington, November 18, 1958, 1:23 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO SEC MCELROY

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

The Sec said he gathers Berlin is under control for the time being. M thinks so. He referred to the procedure of getting more facts. The Sec thinks there was misunderstanding on the part of the JCS—there was a difference in degree of trouble but not quality. M still is confused on what Norstad did yesterday after asking for authority to send in trucks—he supposes he tested on uncovered trucks. The Sec referred to Burgess' report on the NAC meeting¹ and the strong feeling it should be coordinated quite a bit and thinks we should keep in touch with the Br, Fr and Germans before taking action. M said that is good with him.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Bernau.

¹See Document 46.

49. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, November 19, 1958, 5 p.m.

2752. Reference: Embtel 2737.¹ As were leaving a small dinner at Gray's Inn last night I mentioned quite casually to Selwyn Lloyd that I wondered whether we were not getting off our joint track re Berlin. It was immediately apparent that I had struck a nerve and he asked me if I would upon leaving the party come with him to his house. There we discussed UK memo² which I told him we had seen and which had bothered me considerably since it seemed to imply that the preferred British position involved the recognition of the East German Government. He had not seen, he said, the whole message when it was sent and it did not have his specific approval. However, it was quite apparent that it had a lot of his thinking in it. At the end of our discussion during which it was clear to me that he was fearful that his office had loosed off a premature rocket he asked that I not report our talk immediately but that we meet again "with as many people as you want to bring" at noon the following morning. After meeting with Lloyd at Foreign Office this morning, I believe we have obtained some clarification of British views and may eliminate certain misunderstandings occasioned by original FonOff memorandum.

Lloyd said that memorandum should certainly not be regarded as more than stimulus for discussion, since he had checked with none of his colleagues in government. He said that he was anxious we should remain on "same wavelength" re Berlin problem, but apparently we had received impression that British Government way out ahead re question recognition of GDR. Reading text of Bonn's 1065 to Department,¹ he said that he could agree with everything stated in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7. Paragraph 5 based on misunderstanding of British point, and real point of difference between us that discussed in paragraph 3.³ Lloyd said that no disagreement about our being on "slippery slope" when we begin to make de facto arrangements with GDR, but in British view bottom of slope would be reached by recognition of GDR, and they saw no reason why this should lead to our ejection from Berlin. We sug-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1958. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 45.

² See Document 45.

³ Paragraph 5 of telegram 1065 discussed how much the Western powers could deal directly with the East Germans without recognizing them.

gested that slope might not end there, and it would in any event involve major revision of our policy against partition of Germany. We doubted that it would be acceptable to Adenauer.

Lloyd said that everything of course depended upon acceptability to Federal Republic. British first choice was that there be no change in existing arrangement, and if Soviets or GDR interfered with access to Berlin we should respond vigorously in first place. He did not agree with his staff on ineffectiveness of air lift, feeling that if it could be maintained twelve months, that was as good as indefinitely. However, air lift would be a nuisance and would involve large expenses which Germans could afford much better than British. Lloyd felt that it would be absurd of West Germans to refuse to deal with East Germans, if we made it clear that we intended to stay in Berlin. Main point of British suggestion, which had possibly been misunderstood, was that if West Germans were to decide to make arrangements with GDR rather than bear cost of provisioning Berlin, and such arrangements led or amounted to West German recognition of GDR, certainly British for their part would have no objection, no need to be more royal than the King. It all depended on what West Germans willing to do.

We suggested that our presence in Berlin and position vis-à-vis Soviets involved more than merely German considerations (i.e. what West Germans willing to accept). It seemed to us of significance for NATO and whole East-West position over and beyond West Germans and Berliners.

Lloyd summed up by saying that there was not much difference between us. It was clear we could not go against wishes of Federal Republic, provided they realized that we might have to submit to some de facto arrangements. This would create danger of slide toward recognition, and there was something in point that it might confirm partition of Germany, which Lloyd would be against. However, we were not quite in agreement that recognition of GDR would lead to further slide toward our physical removal from Berlin. Agreed that at latter point issue of force would be raised. Lloyd was worried lest British memorandum gave impression that UK "almost welcomed" recognition, and hoped that Germans would not receive wrong impression. Couve de Murville had agreed with him that merely implied recognition of GDR was better than risk of war. Lloyd felt that purpose of memorandum would be served if it led to further study of problem, before Berlin situation became acute.

I informed him that no instructions had been received from Department, but I had wished to obtain his considered views for Department's information.

As our meeting broke up, I asked Lloyd what he thought Adenauer's attitude would be about recognition of GDR if this became

issue. He replied that question will not arise in such clear cut way, but there will be a de facto process which would lead step by step towards recognition.⁴

Whitney

⁴In telegram 2753 from London, November 17 at 5 p.m., Whitney reported a further discussion of the memorandum between an Embassy officer and a Foreign Office official during which the latter indicated that the British could never go to war over the question of recognition of the German Democratic Republic. The official stressed further that the British were uncertain of the strength of the Federal Republic on the issue and would not incur risks over Berlin if the West Germans were reluctant to make sacrifices on the question. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1958)

50. Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 19, 1958, midnight.

360. Paris also pass Topol. Re Deptel 236.¹ Mission interprets UK position as based on assumption "we cannot prevent Khrushchev from carrying out his threat" and proceeding to acceptance inevitable recognition GDR.

We consider British unrealistic in assumption contained "course C" their memo that recognition GDR would permit continued Allied occupation Berlin. Once recognition accorded GDR, four-power status officially ended and continued Allied occupation city stripped of legal basis.

While compromises possible which could prolong Allied "occupation" in one form or another, stated objective of Communists is to get Allies out and continued pressures, harassments and threats would, we believe, force us ultimately either abandon city or resort to force. Meanwhile, with "writing on wall," there little expectation city could survive economically with industry depending on GDR acquiescence for imports-exports and Allied position on wane.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1958. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

¹Printed as telegram 1012 to Bonn, Document 45.

British suggestion of GDR recognition appears ignore fact that all of Berlin is claimed as capital GDR. It also overlooks effect such recognition on East German population and on stability GDR which could embark on harder Stalinist program internally and appreciably step up pressure on FedRep. UK proposal appears ignore fact that Berlin policy is but one segment of our German policy. Ramifications of our recognizing GDR would be manifold. One clear result would be to discredit our firmest German friends who support Western European integration policy and encourage disenchantment US leadership, with probable consequent boosting of stock of German neutralists. British, it seems to us, have failed to recognize that Sovs deal with Berlin as part of world power balance.

For foregoing reasons, mission has viewed askance any steps in direction acceptance GDR control of access routes even allowing GDR "agents" place date stamp on surface travel orders as tripartite policy now envisages should GDR take over controls (Berlin tel 298 to Bonn, rptd Dept 345).² In mission view, basic decision needed on whether:

1. Allies play for time allowing GDR to nibble away until Allied position untenable, thus postponing day of decision re use force or abandoning city. Berlin's economic position likely suffer severely meanwhile.

2. We take forthright stand now by refusing accept GDR controls in any form and making clear our determination remain Berlin.

On basic assumption of British that we cannot prevent Khrushchev from carrying out threat, we leave it to the appropriate world capitals to determine whether this assumption is correct. We hope it is not. We believe that trap Soviets are laying for us could result in such serious consequences that every effort should be made to stop them.

We venture one suggestion:

Khrushchev statements on Berlin beginning Nov 10 have implied willingness negotiate question and at least some Soviet and Sov Bloc interpretations of that speech seem to have placed Khrushchev declaration within framework all-German settlement. Important factor now would seem to be to insure that possible four-power negotiations not begin under Soviet preconditions. Allies might therefore consider proposing immediate four-power conference with sufficiently vague and limited preconditions to permit Soviet acceptance without loss of face. Idea would be to take advantage of what may be short-lived opportu-

²Telegram 298, November 16, reported that at a meeting on November 14 the three Western Political Advisers had reached agreement on tripartite positions on air access to Berlin and procedures to be followed if the Soviet Union transferred its remaining occupation responsibilities to the East Germans. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1658)

nity deal with Soviets on equal basis before we find ourselves faced with a Sov fait accompli.

In short, choice appears be resist now, using opportunity seize initiative with Soviets, or face having to resist Soviets together with stabilized and strengthened GDR in a weakened Berlin later.

Burns

51. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 20, 1958, 4 p.m.

362. Bonn pass prity POLAD USAREUR 107. Paris pass prity Topol. This telegram describes trap mission believes is being laid for Allied occupation powers through Sov proposed action to "abolish" their remaining occupation responsibilities and transfer them to "sovereign" GDR (ourtel 313 to Bonn, 360 to Dept).¹ Purpose of trap is to force Allied occupation powers recognize GDR. Spring of trap is turnover to GDR of control Allied access to Berlin.

On surface access Allies will, if trap sprung, be faced with three choices: (1) refuse to accept GDR control and employ force; (2) accept GDR control; (3) impose self-blockade.

First course of action might involve a considerable military operation and mission not in position to judge its feasibility. Even if first convoy gets through, it probable succeeding convoys will be faced with destroyed bridges, road blocks, mines, etc, thus rendering operation impossible short of stationing troops along entire length of autobahn and/or railroad (slightly over 100 miles each).

If second course of action adopted Allies will, mission believes, be faced with a series of crises, each more serious than the last, and at each step of the way the Communists will be in ever more advantageous position to apply pressure. Possible pattern of this series of crises given ourtel 273 to Bonn, 320 to Dept.²

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2058. Secret; Niact. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

¹ Document 50.

² Document 27.

It is possible, of course, to draw the line at technical contact with GDR. However, mission sees following difficulties:

(A) Even technical contact with GDR would tarnish our prestige with West Berliners and West Germans and would lessen their resolve to stand firm;

(B) Mission judges, in light of Deptel 236 to Berlin, 1012 to Bonn,³ that it would be very difficult to persuade British to draw a line once they go so far as to have technical contacts;

(C) If we should be successful in persuading British to draw the line at technical contacts, mission believes it unlikely GDR would be willing to accept such a line. Communists would surely put heavy pressure on Allies to yield on the line, and allied refusal would leave us with choice of courses of action (1) and (3).

If we do not adopt course of action (1), then we will have to adopt course of action (3). Under these circumstances, therefore, mission believes strongly that wisest course would be to adopt course of action (3) at the outset, and do so firmly and with forthrightness.

If decision in connection with course of action (1) that ultimately we would choose self-imposed blockade, then to impose this blockade on ourselves from the very beginning offers two distinct advantages:

(1) We do not compromise ourselves in German eyes, East or West, as would be the case were we to have technical contacts with GDR, and then later have to impose self-blockade.

(2) If there is any chance of shaking Communist resolve by local action once control of surface access is turned over to GDR, best chance of success lies in Allies making unmistakably clear from the beginning that they cannot be blackmailed into recognizing GDR (for this reason we earnestly recommend tripartite adoption in Bonn of suggestion that Allied travellers not release travel documents to GDR—ourtel 298 to Bonn, 345 to Dept).⁴

With Allied self-imposed blockade, Communists might not at first interfere with German surface transit between FedRep and Berlin. Self-imposed blockade might therefore at first require only small airlift to take care of Allied garrisons. Most supplies could be purchased locally in West Berlin. If we are vouchsafed such a "breather" we are afforded a last opportunity—through diplomatic channels and if need be by some more naked form of pressure at points where we have the advantage of position—to persuade the Communists to back down on Berlin.

If we should be unsuccessful at this point in forcing Communists to back down on Berlin we can assume that their next step would be total land blockade. This would require Allies to supply all West Berlin by airlift.

³ Document 45.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 50.

In mission's opinion, Communist interference with air corridors to be effective would require them to initiate action by force against our planes. Mission believes it most unlikely Communists would go this far in view of our security guarantee. If they do, mission feels we will just have to be prepared to counter force with force in air corridors.

Mission believes, therefore, that probable ultimate price we would have to pay locally to counter threatened Sov move against Berlin is full-scale airlift. Airlift will be expensive, and it may have to go on for months. Sooner Communists realize they may be [open?] to countermeasures which the West may have to take elsewhere in the world to force the Communists give up their designs against Berlin.

As far as local action is concerned, mission believes that anything short of Allied willingness to go the limit on airlift entails dangerous risk of ultimate degeneration Allied position in Berlin to point where it will be untenable.

Mission is aware of Herculean effort involved in selling this thesis to British, possibly to French, and to our own citizens. It will be difficult to explain why we may have to support an airlift, to say nothing of other countermeasures which may be necessary, because we are unwilling to accept visas from GDR. Sovs too must know how difficult this is to explain. That is what they may be counting on.

Gen Hamlett is in complete agreement with this message, including recommendations, and will follow with his own message.⁵

Burns

⁵ Document 52.

52. Telegram From the Commander in Berlin (Hamlett) to the Department of the Army

Berlin, November 20, 1958, 4:30 p.m.

COB 133. DA pass to Defense and State. Sgd Hamlett.

1. References: A. Bonn's 288 to Berlin, 19 Nov, 1071 to State Dept NOTAL.¹ B. Berlin's 362 to Sec State, 20 Nov, 314 to Bonn, 46 to Paris, 107 to USAREUR.²

2. I wish to state without equivocation that it is my firm opinion that our current plan with respect to acceptance of GDR officials as agents of the Soviets will be the first step in the wrong direction and place us in a completely untenable position.

3. When the Soviets carry out Khrushchev's announced intentions and turn over their remaining occupation authority, the myth of GDR officials acting as their agents will be too obvious to find support in any quarter. Reference 1B above, with which I concur completely, fully supports this position, and gives the reasons therefor.

4. We cannot show weakness in this issue. Berlin is in the eyes of the entire world. If we are not ready for the eventual show down, at least a self imposed blockade will be a far stronger action than de facto recognition of the GDR through the "agent" fallacy.

5. I cannot recommend too strongly that we accept a self-imposed blockade rather than the "agent" plan.

Source: Department of State, JCS Files. Secret. Also sent to USCINCEUR and CIN-USAREUR and repeated to Bonn.

¹Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 862.0221/11-1958)

²Document 51.

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, November 20, 1958, 9 p.m.

1080. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Re Embtel 1072, November 20.¹ Von Brentano called British Ambassador, French Chargé and me

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2058. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹Telegram 1072 reported that Trimble and the British and French Ambassadors had just been called to see Brentano at 5 p.m., presumably to be briefed on the substance of Adenauer's meeting with Smirnov. (*Ibid.*, 661.62A/11-2058)

Foreign Office to give us summary talk between Adenauer–Smirnov this morning at which Brentano also present.²

Reading from prepared statement Smirnov said Soviet Government attaches importance to informing Federal Government that in very near future it will notify US, UK and France it going to abolish “occupation statute” for Berlin. (Smirnov did not refer to four power agreements on Berlin, nor did he say that responsibilities incurred under such agreements would be transferred to GDR.) It belief Sov that all governments including FedRep would welcome abolition occupation statute as contributing to relaxation of tension. Smirnov ignored Brentano’s comment that there no “occupation statute” but rather four power agreement and continued that abolition of statute necessary as it no longer corresponds to present situation Berlin, has already been violated by Western powers and is not compatible with sovereignty GDR.

Adenauer then stated emphatically that action proposed by Soviets would not contribute to relaxation of tension, but on contrary heighten it. He asked Smirnov tell Sov Govt that to take step at very moment when Geneva talks³ in progress would be “very dangerous”. He also felt reaction three Western powers would be negative, move would be adversely received Ger public, and would undoubtedly lead to further deterioration Ger-Sov relations. Smirnov did not reply directly Adenauer comments other than admit Sov-Ger relations had not developed as satisfactorily as Russians had hoped. This due to various factors he said, in particular armament of Bundeswehr.

Brentano called attention to fact that Ger-Sov trade agreement recently signed and due for ratification in near future, and cultural agreement nearing completion. Smirnov answered this true but still Fed Rep engaged atomic re-armament. Adenauer replied that such armament has not yet started. Interview ended that note. (Smirnov left no papers.)

Discussion among Brentano and representatives three powers which followed Brentano’s report Smirnov meeting reported in Embtel 1083.⁴

Trimble

² For two other accounts of this meeting, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 453–458 and *Moskau Bonn*, pp. 460–461.

³ Reference is to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, October 31–December 19.

⁴ Document 54.

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, November 20, 1958, 9 p.m.

1083. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Re Embtel 1080, November 20.¹ After informing British Ambassador and French and U.S. Chargés of Smirnov-Adenauer conversation this morning, von Brentano said he assumed Soviet Govt will shortly notify other governments its intention to abolish Berlin "occupation statute", and follow this up by public declaration on subject. While there is of course no occupation statute Soviet will say so for propaganda purposes. Next Soviet will presumably assert that as four power control no longer in effect, GDR will exercise authority hitherto held by Soviets, not as agent but in own right as sovereign state. Thesis will then be advanced that while part of "Germany" Berlin is situated in GDR. Therefore anything affecting Berlin must be discussed with GDR. For example, in two or three weeks Soviets may well state that as all traffic to and from Berlin passes through GDR territory, latter naturally has right control it.

In Brentano's view Soviets will proceed by slow and cautious steps, thus making it difficult to arouse West public opinion against any one of them. Unlike situation 1948 Soviets will not resort to "brutal" measures but rather seek by gradual moves to force West to negotiate with GDR. Brentano felt Berlin becoming a test of Western policy and first talk West powers have with GDR will be end of policy we have been following. He greatly concerned and personally regards situation as very dangerous. We have reached end of chapter, and we must never forget that attitude three West powers display toward Berlin constitutes yardstick by which their steadfastness measured generally. Unilateral action of Soviet in abolishing Four Power Agreement cannot be accepted. Any willingness on part of West to deal with GDR would mean surrender to Soviet and be interpreted as such in world opinion. (Brentano avoided specific reference to tripartite démarche (Embtel 1071, Nov. 19)² but it seemed quite obvious from his comments that he had been informed thereof and disliked steps envisaged.)

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2058. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹ Document 53.

² Telegram 1071 reported that on November 19 the three Western Embassies had informed the German Foreign Ministry about Western contingency plans for a Soviet transfer of responsibilities to East Germany. Among them was a tripartite protest to the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1958) A similar briefing was given to Brandt and Amrehn on November 20. (Telegram 363 from Berlin, November 20; *ibid.*, 762.0221/11-2058)

At this point U.K. Ambassador handed FonMin copy British memorandum summarized Deptel 1012.³ Brentano read it carefully and visibly found it most distasteful. I said that I had already seen summary of paper and with due deference my British colleague disagreed with various points in it and in particular with assumption on which it appeared based that every move Soviets might take would be successful and West powerless. For example, paper seems to ignore value economic countermeasures against GDR and I urged FedRep give serious consideration their use.

Steele said British memorandum merely put forth discussion purposes and agreed with me as did Brentano and French Chargé economic retaliation by Fed Rep might well serve useful purpose.

As example strength German feeling Berlin issue, Brentano said that Bundestag President Gerstenmaier at recent CDU faction meeting advocated break diplomatic relations in event Sov transfer authority to GDR.

Fon Min stated he ordering home for consultation Ger Ambassadors Washington, London and Paris. He added that "if something should happen in Berlin", he would propose immediate meeting three West Foreign Ministers and himself in London, Paris or Washington.

Brentano concluded conversation by reiterating that any concession to GDR would be very dangerous. Berlin will be a test case and any weakness "would eventually lead to catastrophe for West".

Trimble

³ Document 45.

55. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 21, 1958, 2 p.m.

1128. Pass Bonn 124 Berlin 60 from Moscow.

1. Would appear that Soviets plan two steps 1) transfer their functions re Berlin to GDR and 2) a notification and perhaps justification to Western powers of their refusal continue recognize special status for Berlin. Not clear which of these actions would come first or whether simultaneous action contemplated.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2158. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Paris.

2. While I believe Soviets would refrain from any action which they were convinced would cause us to use force, once they have turned functions over to GDR they would go very far and take great risks rather than back down in face of our counteraction. Almost only way out for them in such circumstances would be demand for immediate top level meeting from which they could hope obtain sufficient concessions from Western side to save face. In these circumstances believe worst policy of all on our part is one in which there is any uncertainty or doubt as to what we will do. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. [3 lines of source text not declassified] British [1 line of source text not declassified] must know that acceptance their position¹ including recognition GDR and latter's control our access would have most serious effect on German and particularly Berlin population and govt and that minimum which would satisfy GDR would be effective control of Berlin escape route for refugees. I see no reason why Soviets, having disengaged from responsibility, should not allow airlift to go on indefinitely unless West German and Western counter blockade imposed sufficiently heavy burden on them to maintain East German economy. Even so wonder if gradual strangulation West Berlin would not become unbearable first. In dealing with British memorandum suggest we start by trying to get agreed valuation on what Soviet objectives are and then try to get from them commitment as to how and under what circumstances they would agree to use of force to maintain our position in Berlin. Believe such examination will show that we will never have better opportunity of taking stand than we do at present time.

4. My recommendation is that we attempt to reach agreement with British and French that we will be prepared use force to maintain road and air communications with Berlin and that we so inform Soviets and West Germans promptly but confidentially. (I assume it is impracticable to maintain rail communications by force.) If this position were adopted I believe it would be wise to show Soviets we mean business by taking at least some steps to move tanks and engineering units into position near East Zone frontier along autobahn routes. At same time believe we should indicate to Soviets our willingness negotiate on this problem.

5. Should Soviets act before agreement reached on foregoing policy believe we should show travel documents to East German officials but announce publicly that we do so on same basis as we accept normal traffic regulations so long as they are not abused but that we will use force rather than accept interference with our access to Berlin.

¹ See Document 45.

6. If agreement cannot be reached on policy in foregoing para believe we should resort to self-imposed blockade but should at least keep some flexibility in our position by announcing that we reserve our right to use force to maintain our position.

Thompson

56. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 21, 1958, 6 p.m.

1132. Eyes only Secretary. Am inclined believe Soviets will move soon on Berlin situation. Unless it is believed we could obtain British support for strong stand before Soviets take action suggest we might consider attempting secure prompt British and French agreement to bluff based on recommendation either para 4 or 5 mytel 1128.¹ We would agree secretly with British and French that if bluff called on either of these lines of action in lieu of actual use of force we would call for top level meeting with Soviets at which we would salvage what we could from the situation. Realize extremely dangerous to attempt bluff Soviets but I cannot see that we would have much more to lose than we will if present weak British position is accepted. To be successful decision would have to be extremely closely held by all governments concerned and dressed up with all appropriate moves including meeting of NSC at which decision to use force would actually be taken.

Thompson

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2158. Top Secret; Priority.

¹ Document 55.

57. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting

Washington, November 21, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

PRESENT¹

Defense

General Twining, USAF
General Lemnitzer, USA
General LeMay, USAF

ISA

Mr. John N. Irwin

State

Mr. Robert Murphy
Mr. Martin Hillenbrand

1. *Berlin*

General Twining opened the meeting with general remarks to the effect that the JCS were concerned that the U.S. would have to make a move very soon in connection with the Soviet intentions concerning Berlin. They did not want to be unprepared. With this in mind, they had prepared *draft instructions to CINCUSAREUR*² proposing the use of minimum force necessary to extricate any U.S. military truck convoy which might be detained by the Russians (General Twining had discussed the proposed instructions with Mr. Murphy the previous day and had indicated that Secretary McElroy would not approve such instructions at this time).

Mr. Murphy discussed the political situation in general terms. He indicated that the Department had some concern about German attitudes, citing as an example the so-called trade agreement between East Germany and the Federal Republic. However, he believed that Chancellor Adenauer was firm in his views, as indicated in his reaction to Ambassador Smirnov's pronouncement concerning the turning over of Soviet occupation rights to the GDR.³ He said that it was perhaps too early to jump to conclusions on probable Soviet actions concerning Berlin but that the State Department view is that we should not give in on any substantial point. The question is one of means and tactics in countering or anticipating the Russian actions.

Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, vol. VI. Top Secret. Prepared by the Department of State and not cleared with the Department of Defense. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. A less-detailed memorandum for the record of this meeting is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 092 Germany.

¹ In addition to the officials listed below, 11 other military officers, 8 representatives from the Department of State, and 6 officials from CIA, NSC, JSSC, and ISA were present.

² Not further identified.

³ See Document 53.

Mr. Murphy then referred to press items and other loose conversation regarding an airlift for Berlin, pointing out that evidence to date does not indicate that the USSR is thinking in terms of an immediate blockade of the civilian population of West Berlin. On the contrary, this would appear to be a more limited proposition designed to harass the Allied forces in Berlin with the ultimate intention of dislocating them from the city. There has been over-emphasis on the political reporting and press coverage on the question of the Russian intent to blockade the city. There does not appear to be a parallel with the 1948 blockade operation. However, the U.S. should remain flexible on the matter of an airlift which might conceivably be required by later developments, and no arbitrary decision should be taken now to exclude the possibility of an airlift.

General Twining expressed concern that all the conjecture with reference to an airlift, which was receiving wide publicity, might lead the Russians into a miscalculation that we intended to start an airlift as a response to their new Berlin moves. He said an airlift should be a "last resort" measure. Mr. Murphy agreed. General Twining quoted previous statements of the President as stating that an airlift means war. He stated that the British were openly discussing airlift possibilities and that we should do everything possible to stop public consideration of this possibility. Mr. Murphy agreed, but suggested that such speculation and public discussion were not easily stopped. He further pointed out in response to General Twining's remarks that it had been General Clay's and his position in 1948 that an airlift was a wrong solution for the Berlin situation; that we should then have stood for a solution on the ground as distinguished from the air.

With reference to the *detention of convoys*, Mr. Murphy indicated that the Department would like to explore at this meeting a *different approach* than that proposed in the JCS instructions to USAREUR. Instead of considering extricating a detained convoy with "minimum force necessary", which appeared to be a negative approach, we would like to consider the possibility of providing a convoy with enough force to enable it to push through to its destination. There followed a general discussion in which Mr. Irwin pointed out that General Hodes' proposal (endorsed by General Norstad) to extricate a convoy came about in consideration of the recent specific case in which for the first time the Soviets had held U.S. personnel and material at the check-point.⁴ The proposal had been considered in the context of past experience in Berlin; it involved the security of U.S. forces; it was not addressed to the willingness of the U.S. Government to consider a policy of utilizing force to

⁴ See footnote 1, Document 38.

push through an inspection point. Such a course of action goes far beyond, and encompasses a larger problem, than the rescue of detained American personnel. He also posed the question of the substitution of GDR personnel at the check-points in place of Russians, and the necessity for U.S. proposed courses of action to contemplate this contingency.

Mr. Murphy indicated that the Department felt that the proposal to extricate personnel was not an adequate answer to the basic problem. He proposed for consideration, in elaboration of his earlier remarks, that we inform the USSR in advance of our intention to take precautionary measures and to insure adequate security for our convoys. This would be done on the basis of our right of ingress which we intended to enforce. This warning would be given in advance of any use of force. He requested the JCS estimate of the military risks involved in such a course of action.

General Lemnitzer discussed the factual situation and the *military risks* involved in pushing across 100 miles of hostile territory. He pointed out that our Berlin forces consist of two small battle groups opposed to 25 top-notch Russian divisions. He stated that the military facts of life in that situation are hard. He pointed out the ease with which bridges could be blown up and road-blocks established. Mr. Murphy indicated he was fully aware of these problems and risks as well as the Soviet military strength on the spot. Our military posture is, of course, unsatisfactory when viewed exclusively in those terms and we have faced this problem for a long time. There is much more involved, of course, in that the Russians are aware that an attack against our small force would bring into play a vastly different power situation. The question is whether we can or should take the risk involved in pushing through a convoy with force. General LeMay expressed the view that the Soviets would back off. Mr. Murphy indicated that he felt they would also have backed off in 1948 but the Joint Chiefs at that time thought the risk was too great. We are up against the same problem today and he felt that the current JCS proposals represented an inadequate reaction. General Twining said that the "new approach" was in his opinion better and the Joint Chiefs would consider it. Mr. Murphy pointed out at this time that we are initiating an *ad hoc working group* to consider the Berlin situation and to recommend contingency measures and that we are already in touch with ISA and the Joint Staff to secure their representation on the group.⁵

⁵The Ad Hoc working group on Berlin, chaired by Kohler and including Defense, JCS, and for the first meeting British and French representatives, held its first meeting at 3 p.m. on November 21 with the aim of coordinating and expediting actions with respect to the Berlin crisis. Memoranda for the record of its meetings on November 21, 22, and 24-26 are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 092 Germany.

Mr. Irwin commented that he was personally in sympathy with this approach. From the overall viewpoint of the Department of Defense, Mr. McElroy would feel that the *position of strength* we have gained through the Lebanon and Quemoy operations should not be dissipated by weakness over Berlin. He raised the question, assuming U.S. acceptance of such a firm policy, as to what degree of support we would secure from NATO (particularly the UK, France and Germany) and what pressures we would apply on them to secure their support. Would we be willing to act without them? Mr. Murphy concurred with the point of view on Lebanon and Quemoy. He felt that the Soviets have two objectives: (1) to secure from the Berlin situation a restoration of their prestige adversely affected as a result of Lebanon and the Taiwan Straits (he felt their prestige particularly had suffered in the Middle East) and (2) to move toward the accomplishment of their objectives in Germany. Berlin has been on the Soviet mind throughout the years and he had expected a serious Berlin crisis sooner than this. It may be that the Soviets have arrived at a decision to force the issue but we will have to find out as we go along and as their intentions and proposed courses of action become more clear. We had hoped that the working group could conduct a study of this problem as well as that stemming from their work we would be able to reach decisions which would, of course, have ultimately to be approved by the Secretary of State and the President. The next stop after agreement on the U.S. position would be discussions with the British, French and West Germans, as well as in NATO. Perhaps the talks should be held both here and in Bonn. We are disturbed at the British attitude which, at first glance, appears to be soft, although Mr. Macmillan has spoken firmly.

General Lemniter returned to the question of the State Department views on *Russian intentions* and asked why it was believed that the Russians did not intend to blockade the civilian population in Berlin. He asked what would happen if either the Russians or the East Germans began stopping train traffic and taking related measures to deny access to the city. Mr. Murphy indicated that such action would appear to be inconsistent with the present Soviet line. Their hope is to obtain a closer relationship between East and West Germany on their terms. A blockade would nullify their efforts to secure this objective and would stiffen West German resistance. It should not be overlooked also that there is an appealing aspect to some Germans to an end to the occupation of Berlin and the withdrawal of all occupation forces. To get the Allies out of Berlin would be in the Russian thinking a first step towards reunification of Germany. This would have an effect on the sentiments of a segment of German public opinion. Mr. Hillenbrand commented that in his opinion it would appear unlikely that there would be an immediate blockade of the civilian traffic, since the "squeeze" is now on the occupation powers.

Such a blockade could come later if the Soviets calculated that it was necessary to put the "squeeze" on us through actions against the German population.

Mr. Murphy agreed that we could speak of Russian intentions only as a maneuver of the moment.

The agenda item concluded with a brief discussion of the *Berlin air safety center* in which it was pointed out that our present plans envisage not accepting East Germans as a substitute for the Russian personnel now manning the center. General Twining and Mr. Murphy then agreed that consideration of the Berlin problem should now be taken up by the ad hoc working group and that a report from the group should be received and considered as soon as possible.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

58. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, November 21, 1958, 9 p.m.

1096. Since Chancellor away Munich today Tyler and I saw von Brentano this afternoon,¹ and asked him for his views Berlin. He gave me account Smirnov talk with Chancellor which already reported (Embtel 1080).² He emphasized that Smirnov had not referred to transfer power to GDR or to what measures would be taken with regard Berlin, but had said that "occupation statute" would be abolished.

Von Brentano then expressed himself in vein utmost seriousness about possible future developments. He said present situation could not be compared with 1948 as this time there would be no open blockade. After Soviet Union had denounced Four Power Agreements Berlin and had declared GDR sovereign, latter would proceed with great caution,

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2158. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Moscow, and Berlin, and USAREUR and USCINCEUR by other means. According to an outgoing copy of this telegram in the Bruce Diaries (*ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) it was drafted by Tyler and transmitted at 10 p.m.

¹ Bruce returned to Bonn November 21 and, accompanied by Tyler, called on Brentano at 5:30 p.m.

² Document 53.

would take no steps at first, and would exercise controls in just same way Soviets, "possibly even more smoothly". Perhaps 6 weeks later, GDR would say that all Germans travelling to or from Berlin must obtain GDR approval. This would have effect [in] practice sealing off Berlin from FedRep and choking it economically and politically to point collapse.

Brentano stressed his opinion if Western powers do not react to first step with utmost firmness and determination, avalanche will be let loose which nothing will be able stop, with catastrophic consequences for Europe and free world. "The West would then have lost the first bloodless blow of third world war".

Brentano stressed repeatedly "in full awareness responsibilities he was assuming" his conviction that firm stand now would cause Soviets back down. In this connection he had been horrified ("konsterniert") by paper which British Ambassador had given him last night (Embtel 1080), in particular by the 3 alternatives of which last accepts de facto recognition GDR. [2 lines of source text not declassified] At this point, I said that we had also received this paper which is being studied, that we had not passed on it, and that I personally had grave doubts that we would subscribe to it, although I had as yet received no instructions on the subject. I also said that we had not been consulted on its preparation.

Brentano said he was leaving immediately after our talk for Berlin and would see Brandt, Amrehn, and Senat. He would be back Monday and would meet Tuesday with German Ambassadors from Paris, Washington, Rome, Moscow and London, who have been called to Bonn.

He said Chancellor had yesterday sent off letter to Secretary³ expressing his concern, and would like see me soon. He said Chancellor is returning tomorrow night from Munich and I plan see him Sunday if possible.⁴

Brentano said he thought that after Soviet Union had issued statement, which was probably imminent, might be good idea hold conference between three Western Governments and FedRep. Whatever course was taken, he added, should be taken in complete unity.

³ See Document 60.

⁴ Bruce called on Adenauer at 5:30 p.m. on Sunday, November 22. The Chancellor stated that it would not be useful to speculate on the Berlin situation until the Soviet communication on it had been received, and Bruce briefed him on the Western plans for proceeding in the event that the Soviets turned over their responsibilities to the East Germans. Adenauer commented further that his discussion with Smirnov (see Document 53) had been both unpleasant and unproductive. (Telegram 1103 from Bonn, November 22; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2258)

Brentano said FonMin Couve de Murville had himself suggested that Berlin be on agenda de Gaulle talk with Chancellor next Wednesday.⁵

I asked Brentano what approach he personally thought might be taken on assumption Soviet statement would denounce four power status. Brentano stressed we should above all absolutely reject any such statement, on grounds no state has right withdraw from commitment and hand over its responsibilities to another party. Said would be as though FedRep were to withdraw from NATO and name Austria as its substitute. He thought this approach might have some effect Soviet Union which had shown itself sensitive to charges breaking contractual obligations.

I asked Brentano his views with regard GDR checkpoint officials being considered agents of Soviets. He said this misleading because Soviets not handing over responsibilities to East German police but to Pankow. Said agent concept could only be sustained if East German officials acting on instructions from Soviet Union but this would not be in fact case, since they would be acting on instructions GDR. He said Perukhin would not accept protest this basis and would simply refer us to Pankow.

I asked Brentano how he thought German political and public opinion would react to firm Western measures which might be interpreted as possibly leading to war. He replied without hesitation that vast majority Germans consider Berlin test case, particularly after numerous repeated declarations which have led them expect strong reaction.

Referred to Mayor Brandt's recent statements and to Gerstenmaier mention possibility breaking off relations with Moscow as evidence undoubted solid German support for firm reaction.

Bruce

⁵ Regarding Adenauer's meeting with de Gaulle on November 26, see Document 75 and footnote 3 thereto.

59. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 21, 1958.

SUBJECT

Berlin¹

PARTICIPANTS

The German Ambassador—Mr. Grewe

EUR—Mr. Merchant

GER—Mr. Lampson

Ambassador Grewe told Mr. Merchant that he was leaving for Bonn on Monday afternoon to attend a meeting at the Foreign Office called for noon Tuesday.

His first task this afternoon was to deliver a personal message from Chancellor Adenauer to Mr. Dulles.² He drew special attention to the last sentence in which Adenauer said that it was desirable, even necessary, for the Four Governments (i.e. the United States, United Kingdom, French and German Governments) to meet when the Soviet Union announced its measures against Berlin. The time and place could be agreed through Ambassadors.

Mr. Merchant asked what level of meeting the Chancellor had in mind. Grewe replied that he had no clear instructions on this point and thought that perhaps this had purposely been left "a little open" for discussion. Mr. Merchant assured the Ambassador that the letter would be shown to the Acting Secretary at once. The Secretary was expected back in the Department on Monday afternoon.³

The Ambassador then said that he had instructions to stress the gravity of the situation which we faced. Although he did not wish to overdramatize, great firmness was required. The German Foreign Office feels that it would be dangerous to give in on the question of negotiations with Pankow. Although it does not feel that it would be decisive whether the West entered into certain types of technical contacts with the GDR, technical contacts on questions which would involve our

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2158. Secret. Drafted by Lampson on November 24. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn on November 24 in telegram 1078. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11-2458)

¹ Merchant also discussed Berlin with Alphand and Caccia on November 21, during which Alphand agreed that the United States and France had the same conception of the threat to Berlin and that the British memorandum seemed to show uncertainty of purpose. Caccia felt that Bonn should be the locus for discussions on Berlin. (Memorandum of conversation, November 21; *ibid.*, 762.00/11-2158)

² Document 60.

³ Secretary Dulles vacationed on Duck Island in the St. Lawrence Seaway, November 18-24.

quadripartite status and would have a bearing on our relations with the Soviet Union would seriously involve the prestige of the West in its dealings with the Soviet Union. Both the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister believe that if the West should enter precipitously into some sort of an arrangement which looked like giving in to Soviet pressure this could have a very demoralizing effect on many people in Germany and elsewhere. The morale of many Europeans would be impaired. The policy of non-recognition would be seriously jeopardized by dealing with the East Germans. This would encourage direct Pankow-Bonn talks and would be dangerous. The Chancellor and the Foreign Minister recommend a very decided and strong position in the whole situation.

The German Ambassador went on to discuss several other points. He referred to the news reports that a new Interzonal Trade Agreement had been concluded. He explained that a clause was included in the agreement providing for traffic between West Germany and Berlin. Grewe stressed that the agreement was a routine matter and that it merely represented at most a legalization of the status quo. No new arrangements were provided for. Technical contacts concerning interzonal trade had been in existence for many years and this interzonal trade agreement was a renegotiation of an agreement of long standing. If there was in fact a new clause on trade between Berlin and the West the Ambassador was sure that it had not been inserted in the last few days as a result of the Berlin crisis. Negotiations had been going on for a long time. Grewe stressed these points because he was afraid that U.S. newspapermen might distort the situation in reporting on this matter and attempt to connect it with the current crisis.

Grewe then discussed at some length the thinking of the German Embassy on the Berlin situation. Their analysis ran along the following lines:

There were several courses of action theoretically open. The first of these was to reject any sort of GDR control over the access routes to Berlin whatsoever. In such a situation the Western Powers might react in one of a number of possible ways to GDR interference. If the GDR insisted on controlling Allied trains and trucks, the trains or convoys could return to the crossing point and the Three Powers could rely on an airlift to supply their garrisons in Berlin. Alternatively they could attempt to push the trucks and trains through to Berlin by force. Grewe raised the question of what the train or convoy would do if the GDR blew up the railroad or highway bridges.

Grewe then raised the question of what would be done in case an airlift was mounted if the Soviets withdraw from the Berlin Air Safety Center. Mr. Merchant said that it was his understanding that the BASC was not the focal point for navigational guidance for allied planes but that it was limited to the filing of flight plans. Although the withdrawal

of the Soviet representative on BASC might create problems as to rights of way in the corridors it would not affect the actual navigational controls normally in operation.

The German Ambassador then mentioned a third possible course of action. The Allies could call for negotiations with the USSR either in advance of a Soviet note on Berlin or in response to it. This possibility, he said, had been discussed in the Foreign Office. Grewe said that it was a weakness of the West that it always seemed to be on the defensive and the courses of action he had discussed so far had all been defensive responses to Soviet moves. He saw a psychological advantage to the West taking the offensive and demanding something. He suggested as an offensive move that we propose the negotiation of an extra-territorial status for road and rail communications with Berlin. He also suggested that consideration might be given to stating that we would be willing to deal with the GDR as agents of the Soviet Union in return for a guarantee to us that the extent and frequency of traffic would be maintained at the present level. He said it would be useful to have a fuller discussion of these ideas and problems. [First Secretary Osterheld of the German Embassy on the following day discussed this last idea with GER—Mr. Vigerdman. He pointed out the difficulty of arousing world opinion over such technical questions as the stamping of travel papers. He thought that the above suggestion would have the virtue of focusing blame on the Soviet Union if they refused to accept what seemed like a plausible Western proposal and their rejection of the proposal would place the West in a much better position vis-à-vis Western opinion to take rigorous measures to maintain our access to Berlin without dealing with GDR officials.]⁴

Mr. Merchant then said he would like the Ambassador's views on certain questions. Did he think that the Soviet Union and the GDR would only move against military traffic or against all traffic, civilian and military alike? Would there be another full blockade of Berlin or only a limited blockade directed against the Western garrisons? This question had a crucial bearing on the magnitude of the actions which the West would have to undertake. For example, it directly affected the scale of our airlift planning.

Ambassador Grewe replied that one could not exclude from one's calculations the possibility that a blockade would be extended to all civilian traffic. The legal basis for civilian traffic was not altogether clear, especially in the air. (Mr. Lampson asked whether the new clause in the interzonal trade agreement would have any bearing on this question. Mr. Grewe replied that it might.)

⁴ Brackets in the source text.

Mr. Merchant then asked for the Ambassador's views on economic retaliation. Was Bonn studying the matter? What economic weapons are there in our arsenal which could be used effectively? Mr. Merchant said that he recalled that one of the elements in this field—and it might be a substantial factor—was the dependence of the Federal Republic on brown coal from East Germany.

The Ambassador replied that the general results of the studies which had been made in Bonn had not been very encouraging. The Federal Government had often tried to find measures of retaliation and the only field where there seemed to be any prospects was that of interzonal trade. Even here the Germans felt there were no countermeasures which would be effective over the long run. The Soviet Zone was in the position to find alternate sources of supply for practically all of the goods which the Federal Republic could deny them. Moreover, the Soviet Zone could retaliate on its own part in the economic field by shutting off shipments of brown coal. If this were done, the supply of brown coal for Berlin would be seriously endangered.

Mr. Merchant asked whether civilian traffic to Berlin was inspected by GDR personnel. The Ambassador replied that it was.

In concluding his remarks on economic countermeasures the Ambassador commented that it was in the nature of the Communist system to put a greater weight on political than economic factors. If they were embarking on a course of action for an important political objective they would not be deterred by economic counter-measures. They would be willing to force their populations to accept economic deprivations.

Mr. Merchant and the Ambassador agreed to keep in very close touch. Mr. Merchant assured the Ambassador that we viewed the Soviet moves against Berlin very seriously. In our opinion this was not a limited action but represented the opening of a major political offensive over a broad front. He said that we were not going to let ourselves be pushed around. It was very important that the Western allies move in unison.

Mr. Merchant set up a meeting for the Ambassador with Mr. Murphy at 10:30 on Monday morning.⁵

⁵In their meeting on November 24, Grewe and Murphy reviewed the terms of the trade agreement between East and West Germany signed on November 20, discussed the possibility of a tripartite démarche to the Soviet Union (see Document 63), and reviewed the Western position on dealing with East German officials instead of Soviet representatives. Grewe also gave Murphy a seven-page memorandum summarizing the legal and political opinions of the Federal Republic on the status of Berlin. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2458)

60. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary of State Dulles

Bonn, November 20, 1958.

MY DEAR FRIEND MR. DULLES: This morning Mr. Smirnov, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, called on me to inform me officially that the Government of the Soviet Union intends in the next few days to denounce the "Occupation Statute" for the city of Berlin. The reason given for this is known to you from the statements of the Soviet Russian Prime Minister, Mr. Khrushchev, and from the statements in the Soviet Russian press, especially *Pravda*.

Ambassador Grewe, acting on my instruction, has already conferred with you about the consequences of the announced actions. I have his report on his conversation with you.¹

Herr von Brentano received the British Ambassador, Minister Trimble, and Minister Leduc this afternoon and informed them about the conversation with Mr. Smirnov.²

The close and friendly relations which link us together prompt me to tell you in all frankness about the grave anxieties that I feel on account of this impending development. The status of the free sector of the city of Berlin is of such decisive importance that I am certainly not putting it too strongly when I say that termination of the occupation of Berlin could not but have incalculable political consequences. I need not tell you in so many words how gratefully the entire German nation has noted the repeated statements by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France to the effect that the preservation and protection of the freedom of Berlin is one of the imperative tasks of these three countries. The political actions announced by the Soviet Union are obviously designed to test the firmness and trustworthiness of the joint policy of the free world. I say *the free world* advisedly, for in the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the deliberations of the chiefs of government of NATO last December all the member states of the Atlantic Community without exception committed themselves to this obligation.³

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials, 1958/59. Confidential. The source text is a Department of State translation. Attached were a brief transmittal note of November 21 from Grewe to Dulles and a German-language copy of the text. Grewe handed the message to Merchant during their conversation on November 21 (see Document 59) for delivery to Dulles.

¹ See Document 42.

² See Document 53.

³ For text of the NATO communiqué, December 19, 1957, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 6, 1958, pp. 12–15.

I am fully aware that we will all be taking a political risk if in the face of the impending decision of the Soviet Union we commit ourselves to this task without wavering, and are determined to act accordingly. However, I make no secret of my anxiety lest we impair the faith in this joint policy and the solidarity of the free world if the Soviet Union succeeds, possibly by roundabout ways or by stages, in undermining this policy. I am convinced that the Soviet Union will proceed astutely and warily. It will to begin with pretend that the transfer of the rights under the Four Power Agreement to the government of the so-called DDR will not in any way alter the present status. And it will, I believe, instruct the authorities of the DDR to keep up this pretense for the time being. If we acquiesce in this, a second step will follow. The DDR will, for example, take the position that free civilian traffic by air is no longer permissible but requires the consent of the authorities of the DDR. This would make it impossible for hundreds of thousands of people to find their way to freedom via the city of Berlin. At first the DDR will probably not cause any difficulties for the representatives of the three Western Powers and the troops stationed in Berlin; it will restrict the freedom of traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic and finally halt it, on the alleged grounds of its sovereignty.

The political, economic and in particular the psychological reactions in Berlin and in Germany are incalculable. But in other parts of the world as well, including the members of the Atlantic Community, the fear will arise that an initial concession will not be the last. In the historic world-wide conflict between communism and the free world the Soviet Union would thus easily win the first and perhaps decisive battle.

I consider it urgently necessary that we face these dangers with all frankness and seriousness. I am also writing to the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, to the same effect.⁴ As you know, I am meeting with the French Premier, General de Gaulle, this coming Wednesday; we have already placed this question on the agenda of the conversation. Furthermore, I consider it highly desirable, even necessary, that we come together immediately in a meeting of the four Governments when the Soviet Union announces its action. We can then quickly agree on the time and place of such a discussion through our Ambassadors.

With sincere greetings,

As ever,

Yours,

Adenauer⁵

⁴ Regarding Adenauer's message to Macmillan, see Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, pp. 571-572.

⁵ Printed from the English translation that indicates that Adenauer signed the original German-language copy.

61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, November 22, 1958, 1:04 p.m.

1058. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Following are working level comments on British memorandum on Berlin made November 21 to British and French.¹

There are many motives, all sound from Soviet viewpoint, which could lead Soviets to exploit difficulties implicit in West's commitment to freedom of city 100 miles inside Communist territory. We can only speculate why Soviets chose this particular moment to launch course of action which could have been undertaken at any moment for years past. Developments since Khrushchev November 10 speech leave no doubt firm Soviet intention to hand over to GDR responsibility for functions concerning Berlin now performed by Soviet organs. Exact timing and diplomatic cover to be thrown over action by Soviets not yet clear.

We consider immediate target is Allied communications with Berlin, rather than a blockade of inhabitants of Berlin.

We read memorandum as agreeing with us that under no circumstances could we permit creation of situation in which freedom of West Berlin compromised by starvation or otherwise. At appropriate point we would resort to force to make good on our commitment.

Our fundamental difficulty with UK memorandum is that alternative chosen (unrestrained dealing with GDR up to and including recognition if necessary) does not solve basic problem. It only postpones for a longer or shorter period point at which choice again becomes use of force or further yielding to pressure to save the city for the West. For it is our conviction that any arrangements with GDR can only be temporary however ironclad they may seem. Berlin will still be isolated from rest of free world. Arguing from the intolerability of a foreign enclave within its territory, GDR, backed by Soviets, can hardly be expected to exercise self-restraint necessary for stabilization of Berlin situation for very long.

Thus, following British line, you arrive at best at temporary point of stabilization. Since reunification (only real long-term solution Berlin problem) not envisaged within period temporary East-West truce over Berlin, dealing with GDR hardly justified as measure to gain time.

Moreover, UK estimate and ours of damage done to Western position by unrestrained dealing with GDR must be quite different. For the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2258. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Vigderman on November 21, cleared with Hillenbrand, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, London, and Berlin.

¹ Regarding the conversation with Alphand, see footnote 1, Document 59.

sake of a temporary period of stabilization (the effective duration of which is still left fundamentally to Soviets and GDR) we will have compromised position on dealing with GDR with all that this implies in connection Allied-German relations and Allied prestige in rest of world. Recognition of GDR (and it would have to come to this ultimately, we think, however hard we resisted it) would accomplish a fundamental change in Soviet-Satellite relationships of inestimable advantage to Soviets and corresponding detriment to West. While Three Powers would no doubt be lauded in some quarters for having taken up "realistic" position in order avoid use of force, with all its implication in nuclear age, a staggering blow would have been dealt to confidence reposed by our Allies and rest of Free World in our firmness in face of threats, in a situation in which our legal right to insist on status quo was fairly precise.

Goal of German reunification on any terms suitable to West would have been practically surrendered. Soviets would have proved their thesis that reunification was a task for the two Germanies, each sovereign and able to take its place at negotiating table as equals.

Herter

62. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Acting Secretary of State Herter

Washington, November 22, 1958, 6:30 p.m.

On Saturday, November 22, at 6:30 p.m., I called the President to get his approval to a suggested note to the Russians, copy attached,¹ which we hoped to coordinate with the British and French so that similar notes from the three powers could be delivered in Moscow on Monday morning, November 24.

I explained to the President that there had been numerous press speculations in regard to a split among the three powers. In addition, Chancellor Adenauer had written a letter to De Gaulle and to Macmillan and to the Secretary of State² which outlined, though in reasonably

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/11-2258. Secret. Drafted by Herter.

¹ Not found, but see Document 63.

² Document 60.

moderate terms, his own anxiety in regard to the situation and which, in the case of Macmillan, asked the latter to send a personal message to Khrushchev requesting him to hold off on his proposed unilateral action in Berlin.

I read to the President the message which Macmillan had sent to Khrushchev³ and explained that this had been sent without consultation because Macmillan felt that the time element was important, and that I also felt this had been done with the possible view of counteracting the impression that the British were somewhat wobbly in the whole situation as reflected in a lower level statement of British views which had been circulated to the three powers and Germany.⁴

I then told the President that neither we nor our Allies had received any message from the Russians and that our knowledge of projected acts came entirely from press reports and Adenauer's conference with the Russian Ambassador in Bonn.⁵ For that reason, it occurred to us that we might take the initiative both in showing solidarity and in getting our views with respect to Russian responsibility with regard to the Quadripartite Agreements affecting Berlin out publicly before any Russian note was received by us. I then read him the text of the suggested note, and he approved it with the understanding that we would plan to coordinate it at once with the British and French.

His final comment with respect to the Berlin situation was that he had been thinking about it for the last few days and that his instinct was to make a very simple statement to the effect that if the Russians want war over the Berlin issue, they can have it. However, in a lighter vein, he said he would certainly hold off any such statement awaiting further developments.

C.A.H.

³ For text of this message, in which Macmillan expressed his anxiety over Khrushchev's statements on Berlin, see Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, p. 572.

⁴ See Document 45.

⁵ See Document 53.

63. Editorial Note

Following Acting Secretary of State Herter's telephone conversation with the President (see Document 62), the Department of State transmitted to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin the text of a six-paragraph note to the Soviet Government stating that the Western powers would continue to hold the Soviet Union responsible for its obligations in Berlin and that it was "impossible to reconcile the Soviet Government's protestations of a desire to relax international tensions with a threat of unilateral actions which cannot fail to increase tension in a highly sensitive area." (Telegram 1067, November 22 at 8:52 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2258)

The following day, the Embassy in London reported Foreign Office support for the *démarche* (telegram 2843; *ibid.*, 762.00/11-2358), but the Embassy in Paris reported that the Foreign Ministry believed the note was premature until definite Soviet proposals had been received. (Telegram 1921; *ibid.*) Further representations by the United States in Washington and by the British and U.S. Ambassadors in Paris failed to change the French position, and on November 24 the Department of State proposed to Ambassador Alphanth that the note be delivered to the Federal Republic of Germany in order to get the Western position formally on the record. (Telegram 1072 to Bonn, November 24; *ibid.*, 762.0221/11-2458) This proposal was also rejected by the French. (Telegram 1956 from Paris, November 25; *ibid.*, 762.00/11-2558)

Lacking tripartite agreement on the proposed note, the U.S. Government dropped the idea.

**64. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(Norstad), to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Twining)**

Paris, November 23, 1958, 12:52 p.m.

EC 9-6265. For Twining from Norstad.

REFERENCES

- A. JCS 951312 dtd 26 [21] Nov 58
- B. Bonn-AmConGen Bremen 26 dtd 18 Nov 58
- C. COB 141 dtd 22 Nov 58
- D. EC 9-6071 dtd 16 Nov 58

E. Berlin–Bonn 268 dtd 11 Nov 58

F. Paris–State 1911 dtd 21 Nov 58¹

1. In reference A you request my views and comments with reference to the prospect that Soviets will shortly turn over to GDR all Soviet control functions in Berlin and East Germany and that GDR will not feel bound by any existing quadripartite agreements. The problems stated of course are far broader than that of access to Berlin.

2. In my view it is essential to inform the Soviet immediately and preferably without public announcement that we do not intend to recognize or deal with GDR; that we will not allow the GDR to impede the exercise of any right we presently hold; that we will not accept any control by the GDR over our movements to and from Berlin; and that we will use force if necessary to enforce our rights.

3. But at the same time, we should try to seize the initiative while we have the chance and broaden the base of allied support by proposing a four-power conference on Germany (I repeat on Germany not solely on Berlin). See message to State, reference F.

4. Obviously it is of the highest importance that France and Britain take the same unequivocal line. A major break between allies on this subject could lead to worse disaster than the loss of Berlin itself.

5. Unless we are willing to begin a humiliating process of yielding step by step to the GDR, we must draw the line now and the Russians must understand we will use force to support this position if necessary. As for the tactics to be employed regarding access to Berlin: First, I suggest that the instructions which Embassy Bonn issued to cover individual travel to Berlin by Autobahn (reference B), and their instructions covering train travel (reference C) be applied on the broadest basis possible; second, we should continue to operate US military convoys as in the past so long as the checkpoints are under Soviet control, to the extent of even one Soviet representative being present on whom the responsibility can be placed. While we must maintain our rights, we should not now seek to force a test of Soviet control, in light of the larger problem which is developing. Third, if the checkpoints have been turned over completely to GDR control, we should choose a time and place to force the issue promptly by dispatching a test convoy supported by appropri-

¹JCS 951312, November 21, requested Norstad's views on the Berlin situation. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 26 from Bonn to Bremen, repeated to Washington as 1055, transmitted detailed instructions for travel to Berlin on the autobahn. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1858) COB 141 transmitted the current instructions for action to be taken if East Germans replaced Soviet officials at the checkpoints on the autobahn and railroads. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, Headquarters Department of the Army, Communications Center Files) Regarding EC 9-6071, see footnote 5, Document 40. Regarding telegram 268, repeated to Washington as 315, see footnote 5, Document 34. Telegram 1911 is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2158)

ate force. It is not a question of the US forces in Berlin being able to defeat any force that could be brought against it, but of forcing into the open the fact that the GDR, backed by the Soviet, is using violence to deprive the US of its established rights.²

6. If an attempt is made to replace Soviet personnel with GDR personnel in BASC, the East Germans will be asked to leave and if need be, escorted out; and flight information on Western aircraft continue to be made available (reference E). The problems which may be anticipated incident to continued air travel between West Berlin and Germany include refusal of civil aircraft to enter into Berlin, with possible manning by US military crews, interference with radar and navigational aid, saturation of corridors by GDR and Soviet aircraft, attempts to force aircraft to land and even interference with aircraft in flights.

7. The more I study this question the more I become convinced that we must take a very firm position in support of our rights and obligations in Berlin, and that this position be made known to the Russians. We may hope, as we do, that a show of determination may ease the situation but we cannot expect it to solve the problem. Therefore, we must balance our over-all position, we must make an effort to gain the initiative by more fundamental, longer range action as well. With all its apparent pitfalls and dangers, the idea of conference as suggested in reference F gains weight as we consider the consequences, the strengths and weaknesses of other courses of action. Finally, whatever we decide to do must be done quickly if it is to have any chance of success.³

² On November 25 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following reply to Norstad:

"The JCS concur that we should continue to operate U.S. military convoys as in the past so long as the checkpoints are under Soviet control to the extent of even one Soviet representative being present on whom the responsibility can be placed, and that although we must maintain our rights we should not now seek to force a test of Soviet control in light of the larger problem developing. Accordingly, on this basis you are authorized to resume normal military motor convoys between West Berlin and West Germany at your discretion. State concurs." (JCS Master Cable Files)

³ On November 26, Macmillan discussed the Berlin situation with Norstad who was in London for the dedication ceremony at St. Paul's. Norstad reiterated the views expressed in EC 9-6265 and the Prime Minister "showed considerable interest, said he had been thinking of possible 'summit meeting' on German problem, and indicated he would probably be discussing matter with President and Secretary in near future." (Telegram 1983 from Paris, November 27; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2758)

65. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

November 24, 1958, 4:24 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT IN AUGUSTA

The Pres returned the call and after exchanging amenities, the Sec said they were talking about Berlin and he referred to Adenauer's letter.¹ The Sec is rather disposed to answer it to the effect that while as far as we see it we would not perhaps see any great obstacles in dealing on a de facto basis with GDR lower officials, nevertheless if from the Chancellor's and FedRep's standpoint that would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and they want us to adopt a stronger line, we will. The Pres said the trouble with his scheme is—you say it but what do you do? The Sec said we would have to be prepared to send something through. The Pres mentioned his getting too rigid in his attitude that this actually constitutes recognition—he does not try to take them over by force—in his country there is a status quo rebellion. The Sec said he agreed not to use force to reunify Germany. The Pres said he wonders rather than doing it on an either-or basis if the Russians go out we deal with the lower levels on a de facto basis but that is that. We take no recognition action. They may say we will block—then we have to do something. The Sec compared it with Quemoy—one thing is reasonable but you have a psychological problem which is if doing that breaks the morale of one of your strong dependencies you have to take that into account. The Sec hates to run out on him. The Pres does not think he should. We recognize him but the only way to get back his Germany is for a peaceful agreement with the authorities there and so the Pres thinks he is a bit illogical. They are governing that area. The Sec said we have agreements with the Russians to get through. The Pres can see a place where we have to say we have to go through. The Sec thinks we should get some expression of our views to him before he sees de Gaulle Wednesday.² The Pres thinks so too. The Sec will draw something up and will call about 6.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Bernau.

¹ Document 60.

² See Document 75 and footnote 3 thereto.

66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

November 24, 1958, 6:14 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT IN AUGUSTA

The Sec read the proposed letter to Adenauer.¹ The Pres thinks it is very guarded—at the same time letting him know the mere fact the Russians pull out—if their retreat from their obligations puts us in a hole—what they do by omission makes us to by commission. . . .² He went on and suggested saying but of course if the Russians abandon their responsibilities then I suppose in this kind of low level business we would have to go along if we were going to keep things straightened out—the Pres then said he does not know if the Sec should say it—as long as he understands if that is done peaceably we have not really a cause. . . . They agreed it is implied in the letter as is. The Pres suggested Bruce might say something like this to show there is both a juridical and ethical position as well as a practical one.

The Sec said everyone is stirred up—the JCS want to do something fast and quick and Norstad wants us to fight our way through—the Pres thinks it is true but if the others go out and the East Germans try to stop convoys we say we can't have that—if they want to do normal checking and searching for contrabands etc. . . .

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Bernau. Secretary Dulles was in Washington.

¹ No draft of this letter has been found; see Document 67.

² All ellipses are in the source text.

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, November 24, 1958, 10:24 p.m.

1084. Deliver Ambassador by 9:00 a.m. Nov 25. Following reply from Secretary should be delivered to Chancellor Tuesday morning.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2458. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dulles on November 24.

Begin text.

“My Dear Friend:

On my returning this morning to Washington, I find your letter of November 20.¹ It deals with problems of the utmost gravity which, as you know, have been receiving the consideration of the President and myself as well as of the officers of the government. The presence here of Ambassador Bruce a few days ago gave us the opportunity to talk over the Berlin problem.

Of course, the situation that we face is still hypothetical. The Soviets have given some indications as to their intentions but have not yet made these intentions precise or operative.

I am sure that our two Governments start from a common premise, often reiterated, that the abandonment of the free part of the city of Berlin is totally unacceptable, and this includes the rights of transit to and from the Federal Republic to Western Berlin. Our rights were won in the war, they are reflected in the Protocol of September 12, 1944² and were reexpressed by the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in Paris in June 1949. It was there agreed that ‘as regards the movement of persons and goods and communications between the Eastern and the Western Zones and between the Zones in Berlin and also in regard to transit, the occupation authorities, each in his own zone, will have an obligation to take the measures necessary’³ etc. Surely such an obligation, jointly agreed to, cannot be terminated by unilateral action.

I also recall that the directive agreed to at the Geneva Summit meeting of 1955⁴ stipulated that ‘the Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question’ etc. Surely the question of Berlin is part of this ‘German question’, for which there is an agreed ‘common responsibility’ on the part of the four powers. This again is something from which the Soviet Union cannot unilaterally disengage itself.

I would myself have thought that it might be possible to hold the Soviet Union to its obligations and at the same time deal on a *de facto* basis with minor functionaries of the GDR, so long as they merely carried out perfunctorily the present arrangements. That, in our opinion, would not and should not involve any diplomatic recognition of the GDR or any waiver of our rights *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. I believe that

¹ Document 60.

² *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 118.

³ For text of the communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting, see *ibid.*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1955–1957, vol. V, pp. 527–528.

the Federal Republic, itself, without this implying diplomatic recognition, deals in a number of respects with minor functionaries of the GDR.

On the other hand, we recognize that there are psychological as well as purely juridical factors to be taken into account. Certainly we should not allow anyone to get the impression that there is any lack of firmness and dependability in the policies of the Western allies. Your views as to how best to display that firmness will carry great weight with us. The President and I have full confidence in your steadfastness and your judgment and your dedication to the cause of freedom.

So far, as we both recognize, the Soviet has not made known precisely what measures it will take. You consider it necessary that without delay there be a meeting of the four Governments when the Soviet Union makes its measures known. The United States would be glad to participate in such a meeting, although I cannot say in advance of knowing the date, at what level we could participate with the necessary promptness. But whoever speaks for us will have the full confidence and authority of the President and myself, if indeed I do not personally participate, which would be my preference if the timing permits.

With best regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

Foster Dulles"

End text.

Dulles

68. Record of Secretary of State Dulles' Press Conference

Washington, November 26, 1958, 11 a.m.

Secretary Dulles: I am ready to receive your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany agreed on plans to meet any contingency which may arise in East Germany and Berlin?

A. The basic position of the three Western powers and, indeed, of the NATO powers is pretty well defined by prior decisions and declarations.

You ask whether we have plans to meet any contingency. Of course, I can't anticipate all the contingencies that there are, but I think that it is fair to say that there is basic agreement, and I do not anticipate any event that could arise which would give rise to disagreement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the position of the United States and the other powers on the question of dealing with any East German official who might be in a position previously held by a Soviet official?

A. The position of the United States, and I think I can fairly say of the United Kingdom and of France, is that there is an obligation, an explicit obligation, on the part of the Soviet Union to assure to the United States and to the other allied powers and, indeed, to the world generally, normal access to and egress from Berlin. And that is the responsibility of the Soviet Union. It was expressed explicitly at the time of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting held in Paris in June of 1949,¹ following, you will recall, the end of the Berlin blockade and the consequent airlift. At that time the Four Powers exchanged what were formally called "obligations" to assure these rights. We do not accept the view that the Soviet Union can disengage itself from that responsibility. And, indeed, that responsibility was in essence reaffirmed at the time of the summit meeting of July 1955, when the Four Powers recognized their "responsibility" for the German question.² That phrase, "the German question," has always been held to include the question of Berlin. And so, again, you had a reaffirmation by the Soviet Union of its responsibility in the matter. We do not accept any substitute responsibility, in that situation, for that of the Soviet Union.

Question of Dealing With East German Authorities

Q. Mr. Secretary, what if, despite this responsibility, the Soviets go ahead and turn over to the East German authorities the check points on the autobahn and control to the land, sea, and air routes? Now the question would arise: Would we deal with the East German officials who would man the check points, for example, even as—

A. Well, we would certainly not deal with them in any way which involved our acceptance of the East German regime as a substitute for the Soviet Union in discharging the obligation of the Soviet Union and the responsibility of the Soviet Union.

¹ For background, see *Bulletin* of July 4, 1949, p. 857. [Footnote in the source text. The text of the final communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.]

² For text of the Directive to Foreign Ministers, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176. [Footnote in the source text. The text of the Directive to the Foreign Ministers is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. V, pp. 527–528.]

Q. Does that mean that we might deal with them as agents of the Soviet Union?

A. We might, yes. There are certain respects now in which minor functionaries of the so-called G.D.R. [German Democratic Republic]³ are being dealt with by both the Western powers, the three allied powers, and also by the Federal Republic of Germany. It all depends upon the details of just how they act and how they function. You can't exclude that to a minor degree because it is going on at the present time and has been. On the other hand, if the character of the activity is such as to indicate that to accept this would involve acceptance of a substitution of the G.D.R. for the present obligation and responsibility of the Soviet Union, then that, I take it, we would not do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you deal with them in such a way as to make a distinction between dealing with them as agents of the Soviet Union and dealing with them in such a way as to imply a kind of de facto recognition of their existence?

A. I think that that certainly could be done. We often deal with people that we do not recognize diplomatically, deal with them on a practical basis. Of course, we do that with the Chinese Communists in a number of respects. And, as I pointed out, both the Federal Republic of Germany and the rest of us have, in certain practical matters, for many months been dealing with minor functionaries of the G.D.R. with respect to what might be called perfunctory, routine matters.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you say we might deal with the East Germans as agents of the Soviet Union. Is that a matter of agreed policy between the three Western powers and the Federal Republic or only something that is possible?

A. I think that it is agreed between us that we *might*. But, as I say, the question of whether we would or would not would have to depend upon the precise circumstances which surrounded the action, and that can't be anticipated in advance of knowing what, if anything, the Soviet Union is going to do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, supposedly authoritative dispatches from Bonn in the last few days have reflected a concern on the part of Chancellor Adenauer's government that the Western Big Three would not "hang on tough," so to speak, in Berlin. On the other hand, it has been widely speculated in dispatches that many Western officials want more de facto recognition of the East German regime, and as an evidence of this has been cited the renewal of the trade agreement that has just been signed this week. Can you clarify that situation a little bit?

A. I doubt if I can clarify it very much. There have been, as you point out, dealings on a de facto basis, particularly on an economic basis and

³ Brackets in the source text.

in terms of transit back and forth between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. There has been an appreciable degree of de facto dealing with the G.D.R., and there is this trade agreement, whereby the Federal Republic gets particularly brown coal and things of that sort from the eastern part of Germany in exchange for certain manufactured goods. As to any differences within the Federal Republic about that, I am not in a position to throw light upon it. I am not aware of any differences which are of sufficient magnitude so that they have come to my attention.

Communist Probes To Be Expected

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us your view of why the Berlin crisis was reactivated at this time? I mean the Berlin situation between the East and the West. Do you have any idea of what the Communists had in mind?

A. I was not surprised by it at all. I think that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists—what Khrushchev calls “the international Communist movement”—is disposed periodically to try to probe in different areas of the world to develop, if possible, weak spots—to develop, if possible, differences. I think that the probing that took place in the Taiwan area was one such effort. Now it is going on in Berlin and could go on at other places. The effort is, I think, periodically to try to find out whether they are up against firmness and strength and unity. If they find that, then I think the probing will cease. But we have got to expect these probes coming from time to time. As I say, I was not surprised that this Berlin probe took place. Indeed, I thought it probably would take place.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to draw a limit beyond which we would not go in dealing with the East Germans even as agents of the Soviet Union. Could I ask whether we would refuse, for example, to accept an East German demand that special credentials would be required from the East German Foreign Office in order to allow the traffic to continue?

A. I think it would be unwise for me to try to give categorical answers to very particular illustrations, because, obviously, this is a situation to be dealt with upon a tripartite or quadripartite basis. I think I had better just stand on the proposition that in my opinion it is the combined judgment of all four of us that nothing should be done which would seem to give the G.D.R. an authority and responsibility to deal with the matters as to which the Soviet Union has explicitly assumed an obligation to us and a responsibility to us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Mayor of West Berlin said today that this crisis might provide an opportunity for a new discussion with the Soviets on German and European security questions. Sir, do you see any possibility of renewing that discussion in view of the past deadlock, and are there any new thoughts here

on tying the Russian idea of negotiating a peace treaty with German unification?

A. I would hardly think that the present mood of the Soviet Union makes this a propitious time for such a negotiation. Actually, of course, we would in these matters be largely guided by the views of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is primarily concerned and which has a government with which we have the closest relations and in which we have the greatest confidence. Their views in these matters would carry weight with us. I have had no intimation of this kind from the Government of the Federal Republic.

[Here follow questions and answers on unrelated subjects.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, to return to the Berlin question for a moment, there have been a number of reports while you were away that the United States and the allies, rather than accept dealing with the East Germans, might resort to another airlift to supply the city. Is this being considered, or is our policy essentially one of keeping the ground communications open, come what may?

A. Well, we have at the present time flights and facilities which we are using which involve various media. There is the air, which is used; there is the autobahn, which is used; there is a railroad, which is used; to some extent canals which are used. We do not intend to abandon any of our rights as regards any of these particular ways. Now, in just what proportions they would be used, that I can't say. Indeed, I don't know today in just what proportions the four different ways are being used. But I would think you can say that we would not abandon any of the rights which were explicitly reaffirmed in the agreement of June 1949.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the beginning Poland identified herself with the Soviet Union's position on this Berlin matter. However, Poland wants more aid from us, and she has a vested interest in her western frontiers. Do you figure there is any possibility that Warsaw has given this position a second look, and, if so, is it remotely possible that this may be a partial explanation for Moscow's delay in executing it?

A. Yes, that is possible, because, if the Soviet Union takes the position that the Potsdam agreement is nonexistent, the consequences of that would be not to destroy our rights in Berlin, because they don't rest upon the Potsdam agreement at all, but it might greatly compromise the territorial claims of Poland, which do rest upon the Potsdam agreement primarily.

[Here follow questions and answers on unrelated subjects.]

Means of Access to Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it right to infer from what you said to Mr. [Chalmers]⁴ Roberts [Washington Post and Times Herald] about not abandoning any of these means of attempts to get into Berlin that we would use these means, all of them, even if the East Germans or the Russians might try to block us?

A. Yes, I think we would use all of them. Let me say, however, that nothing that has been said recently indicates that there is any intention or desire on the part of either the Soviet Union itself or the puppet regime, the G.D.R., to stop access to and from Berlin. The only issue that seems to have been raised is whether or not the Soviet Union can itself dispose of its responsibilities in the matter and turn them over to the G.D.R. But there has not been any intimation of any kind that the result of that would be a stoppage. It would be a shift of responsibility and authority.

Now, you will recall that at the time when we recognized the Federal Republic we reserved, in order to be able to carry out our obligations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as regards access to and from, we reserved out of the sovereignty which was restored to the Federal Republic the rights which we had as regards Germany as a whole and as regards Berlin, so that we did not disenable ourselves from carrying out the undertaking which had been expressed in the June 1949 agreement. And when the Soviet Union recognized the G.D.R., it made a somewhat comparable reservation so as to keep itself in the position to carry out its obligations under the June 1949 agreement.

And really the issue now is whether the Soviet Union can, by restoring all of these rights to what it recognizes as the government of East Germany, disenable itself from carrying out its obligations to us. And I think that, at least so far as it is exposed, the motivation at the present time would be not a purpose to drive us out of Berlin or to obstruct access to Berlin but to try to compel an increased recognition and the according of increased stature to the G.D.R.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the last time this issue was up, without giving up any of our rights we did restrain ourselves from going forward on the ground, even though General Clay at that time favored such a policy. And am I right in understanding you are now saying that we would go forward on the ground if we were blocked?

A. I'd rather put it this way, that nothing that has been said or intimated indicates that that issue will arise. We do not intend to waive, either in fact or in law, any of the rights which we have. But I prefer not to speak in terms of a military threat, you might say, in relation to a situation which we have no reason to believe will occur.

⁴ All brackets in this paragraph are in the source text.

Q. Mr. Secretary, supposing that the question of a blockade did not come up but the East Germans insisted upon being dealt with as an independent nation rather than as agents of the Soviet Union, would we still insist upon using the three routes?

A. I really think that I have clarified our position on these matters as far as it is useful for me to try to do it at this time, bearing in mind this is a tripartite or quadripartite matter. While I can state and have stated the common principles that are held and upon which we stand, I don't think it's wise for me to try, just on behalf of one of the four countries involved, to be more particular.

Q. Can I ask the question, Mr. Secretary, have we ruled out the possibility of using force to back up our right to unimpeded access to Berlin should the East Germans seek to stop us?

A. We have not ruled out any of our rights at all. All I have said is that nothing that was said, which Khrushchev or anybody else in recent weeks has said, suggests that there is now any purpose on the part of either the Soviet Union or the G.D.R. to impede or obstruct our access by the various media that are available to us to and from Berlin. Therefore it seems to me that the question as to whether, if they did it, we would use force is an academic proposition because, as I say, nothing has happened to indicate that there is any present intention on their part to do that.

Q. Thank you, sir.

69. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)

Bonn, November 26, 1958.¹

John Haskell left after lunch.

We spent most of the day talking about Berlin. In the Embassy we are unanimous, as are General Hamlett and members of the Berlin Mission, in favor of cancellation of existing contingency instructions for travel in case Soviet personnel is replaced by GDR officials at checkpoints. We have recommended replacing existing orders by a new set,

Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.

¹ Presumably the entry was written in Bonn.

part of which would provide for an immediate turn-back of trains or vehicles if any documents should be demanded of their conductors by GDR personnel.

Ambassador Grewe came to see me this afternoon. He said nothing interesting had transpired at the German Ambassador's meeting yesterday. Today the Foreign Office is quiet for the Chancellor, von Brentano and others are with General de Gaulle and his troupe at Bad Kreuznach.

Just before he left Washington, Grewe talked to Bob Murphy² and gained from him the impression we did not wish to resort to an airlift but would like to preserve our rights to surface access to Berlin, by force if necessary. I know there is considerable sentiment in this sense in high quarters of the Pentagon. The same idea is attributed to the President himself, although we have not been told here what may be contemplated in this regard. Obviously, the resources of our Berlin garrison are entirely insufficient for such a purpose if they were to be seriously challenged.

About 7 o'clock tonight a storm broke out over remarks attributed to the Secretary at his press conference in Washington this morning.³ Our first information on the subject came from UPI and indicated Dulles said the Four Western Powers were in agreement on dealing with GDR officials as agents of the Soviet Government if the Soviets wanted to turn over their existing responsibilities to the East Germans. Brandt and others in Berlin were seriously alarmed⁴ and there will be a big play tomorrow about this in the German papers.

Before the AP and Department Wireless Bulletin became available, I telephoned Livie Merchant to tell him how seriously we view the consequences of such a statement if indeed it had actually been made. He said he had read the transcript, and the UPI story as related by me was based on a serious misinterpretation of what had actually been said. He will shortly send us the authentic text.

Later in the evening I received the exact transcript. As regards its effect on German public opinion, I am thoroughly dissatisfied with it. The Secretary displayed his usual ability to state the alternatives clearly, but in recognizing the possibility of regarding GDR officials as agents of the Soviets he is certain to alarm governmental and private circles here

² See footnote 5, Document 59.

³ See Document 68.

⁴ On November 27 the mission in Berlin reported that Brandt was shocked and dismayed by the news reports on the press conference. (Telegram 412; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2758) In reporting press reaction, the mission stated that it ranged from "disbelief to dismay and downright anger." (Telegram 416, November 27, 9 p.m.; *ibid.*) An account of General Hamlett's recollection of the reaction to the press conference is included in his oral history interview at the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

to a high degree. In fact the excitement in Berlin is such that one of the Senators is flying down tonight to talk to Rebecca Wellington⁵ about it.

This is another instance of what has always seemed to me to be the folly of discussing publicly diplomatic crises and negotiations when, as almost any reputable newspaper correspondent will admit, an answer from an official that a response would not be in the public interest would be accepted. Moreover, if the Soviet proposal has not already been prepared, it might have some influence on its content. In a lesser degree, the Secretary's utterances some time ago comparing Quemoy and Matsu to Berlin had disturbing repercussions.⁶

⁵ First Secretary at Bonn.

⁶ Not further identified.

70. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, November 26, 1958, 9 p.m.

Polto 1461. NAC meeting November 26—Berlin. Inconclusive discussion Berlin situation marked by Spaak's effort to spark thinking concerning allied reaction to de facto situation likely be created by Soviets and general consensus not advisable attempt lay down precise plans for dealing hypothetical contingencies but NAC should be informed promptly when plans completed or situation otherwise requires.

Germany summarized Adenauer-Smirnov talk of 20 November along line Bonn 1080,¹ but omitting Smirnov's reference German rearmament.

In response Spaak's request for information regarding press stories of 3-power agreement on plans, US indicated there is no single definite agreed plan as reported press since three powers awaiting more precise indications Soviet intentions. Then conveyed substance Topol 1803,²

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2658. Secret. Repeated to Moscow, Berlin, Bonn, and London.

¹ Document 53.

² Topol 1803, November 25, transmitted a briefing for Burgess from which he might speak at the NAC session on Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2558)

stressing President's, Vice-President's and Secretary's statements³ as evidence US firmness, close consultation among three powers and fact Soviet hesitation may indicate they finding difficulty in implementing their plans. Said US would welcome suggestions. France supported US and indicated would be inopportune convey tentative 3-power thinking. Stressed need avoid any sign disunity or hesitation while awaiting Soviet moves. Noting Soviet moving more hesitantly than anticipated, UK endorsed US-French statements.

Canada, later strongly supported by Norway, noted intimate relationship Berlin crisis to alliance and, while fully appreciating need await further Soviet moves, stated all members wish be kept fully and promptly informed. Spaak strongly supported Norway, allies must be consulted whenever major decisions arise on issue forces.

Expressing understanding position taken by three powers and noting general reluctance discuss specific reactions to possible Soviet moves Spaak nevertheless asked consideration be given to most advantageous ways countering likely Soviet moves. Recalling German memo (Polto 1412)⁴ on status Berlin, he urged allies not base position wholly on legal considerations which Soviets will ignore. Stressed need allies find concept understandable to our public opinion pointing out awkwardness appearing take position Soviets should stay in Berlin while public opinion hoping they will leave Eastern Europe. Problem is to find practical way for 3 powers remain Berlin after Russian withdrawal has removed quadripartite basis occupation. Asked German representative what was meant by being firm vis-à-vis GDR.

German representative on personal basis noted Smirnov had not said Soviets would withdraw but that they wanted abolish occupation status Berlin. Problem not so much how deal with GDR but how to react to likely Soviet contention 3-power occupation no longer valid. Spaak suggested GFR could ask three powers remain, to which German representative replied Berlin not part either GFR or GDR and in any event that would not solve problem GFR access to Berlin through GDR-controlled territory.

Italy speculated Soviets may assert their withdrawal renders Berlin terra nullius and they may propose some form of internationalization for city. Latter concept if suggested should be studied carefully by West.

³ Presumably references to Dulles' statement on November 24 on Western solidarity on Berlin (Topol 1794 to Paris, November 25; *ibid.*) and Vice President Nixon's address to the Pilgrims in London on November 25 in which he reiterated that the United States would resist aggression in Berlin (for extracts from the address, see *The Times*, November 26, 1958, p. 6). The Presidential statement has not been identified further.

⁴ Polto 1412, November 23, transmitted a summary of the German memorandum cited in footnote 5, Document 59.

Spaak argued Soviet withdrawal could not affect rights three powers and suggested Soviets not likely request consideration new status for Berlin for fear West will propose discussion whole German problem. This may account for their hesitation.

As example practical issues likely arise, US recalled convoy incident discussed last week.⁵ Regardless whether obstacles to traffic created by Soviet or GDR personnel, question is do we retreat, use force or find other ways maintain our rights. Stressed importance not giving press any reason believe we are divided or hesitant.

Spaak concluded by noting general agreement NAC could not do more now but must be kept aware of all important decisions.

Burgess

⁵ See Document 43.

71. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, November 26, 1958, 8 p.m.

1972. Foreign Office has shown us copy of cable sent today with de Gaulle's approval to major capitals outlining French position on Berlin. Cable states French reject moves leading to recognition of GDR, and recapitulates procedures worked out tripartitely in Bonn for dealing with contingencies which may arise in event GDR personnel appear at rail or autobahn control points. Concept of airlift, limited initially to supply of military garrisons in Berlin, is supported, with acknowledgement this may lead to real test of force, which West must be prepared to face.

French suggest that, after Soviets communicate their intentions to US officially, tripartite démarche by three Ambassadors should be effected in Moscow with purpose of re-affirming Western will to defend position in Berlin. Ambassadors would also point to fact that Soviets refused to discuss German problems as proposed by West last May.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2658. Secret. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London and Moscow.

¹ On May 28 the Western powers had transmitted to the Soviet Union a draft agenda for a summit conference that included reunification of Germany as a topic. (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 803-808) The inclusion of Germany as a topic was rejected by the Soviet Union on June 11 in a letter from Khrushchev to Eisenhower. (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 21, 1958, pp. 96-101)

After test of force in Berlin, French message states West should be prepared to take up question of negotiations with Soviets on entire German question. Allied position in such negotiations should be reviewed.

French Embassies Washington, Bonn, London are instructed communicate substance this cable to Department and Foreign Offices, and French in Washington are to use it as guide in tripartite discussions on Berlin.

French are studying recommendations of Deputy Commandants in Berlin (Berlin's 400 to Department).² Working level is sympathetic but points out it may be difficult get top-level approval in French Government of these modifications of tripartite plans already approved in Bonn. French also have some fear that public opinion might consider Berlin's recommendations overly rigid.

Houghton

² Telegram 400, November 25, reported that the Deputy Commandants and Political Advisers had unanimously agreed that current contingency plans for surface access to Berlin should immediately be changed to provide that Allied personnel traveling by train or motor vehicle would turn back if challenged by East German officials who might replace Soviet representatives at the checkpoints. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2558)

THE SOVIET NOTE OF NOVEMBER 27 AND THE WESTERN REPLIES OF DECEMBER 31

72. Editorial Note

At 11 a.m. on November 27 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko handed Ambassador Thompson a 28-page note on the Berlin question. In this note the Soviet Government proposed that West Berlin be turned into a demilitarized free city with its own government. Following this transformation the four former occupation powers would guarantee the new status of the city in a manner similar to that done in Austria following the ratification of the Austrian State Treaty. Since some time would be necessary to work out the terms for the free city, the Soviet Union proposed not to introduce any changes in the existing system of military access to and from West Berlin, but if after 6 months Berlin had not become a free city, then the Soviet Union would transfer its responsibilities in Berlin to the German Democratic Republic.

The Embassy in Moscow transmitted its translation of the note in telegram 1173, November 27 at 3 p.m., received by the Department of State at 12:12 p.m. the same day. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2758) For text of the note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 19, 1959, pages 81-89; *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pages 552-559; or *Documents RIIA*, 1958, pages 146-164. For the Russian text, see *Pravda*, November 28, 1958. The Russian-language text handed to Thompson was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 299 from Moscow, November 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2858)

On the evening of November 27 the Department of State released a statement on the Soviet note that had been approved by President Eisenhower during a telephone conversation with Secretary Dulles at 5:30 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) The statement summarized the Soviet proposals and stated that the United States was committed to the security of the Western sectors of Berlin and would not enter into any agreement with the Soviet Union that resulted in abandoning the people of West Berlin. Furthermore, the United States would not acquiesce in a unilateral repudiation of its rights and obligations in Berlin by the Soviet Union. For text of this statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 15, 1958, page 948.

73. Editorial Note

According to President Eisenhower, who was vacationing at Augusta, Georgia, Major John Eisenhower arrived there the morning of November 27 to give him an extensive summary of Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and military reports on the Berlin situation. Major Eisenhower reviewed the positions of the four Western powers, summarized the British paper of November 17, and reviewed various responses to it. The President then telephoned Secretary of State Dulles who reported that Macmillan had repudiated the British paper and informed the President of the receipt of the Soviet note. President Eisenhower said he would be willing to study the idea of a free city of Berlin only if it applied to all of the city. For the President's account of these events, see *Waging Peace*, pages 332–334. For Major Eisenhower's account, see *Strictly Personal*, pages 212–213. A copy of the briefing paper covering Berlin related events, November 18–25, is in Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, DDE Diaries.

74. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, November 28, 1958, 1 p.m.

2918. No sign whatever of any weakness or wavering in Foreign Office working level reaction to Khrushchev Berlin proposal.¹

On the record press guidance confined to saying text not yet officially received. News agency text being studied and consultations with Allies will be next step.

Off the record guidance as follows: (1) note is based on premise that quadripartite obligations about Berlin have ceased to be valid and this we do not accept. (2) Whatever Khrushchev is offering to us, i.e. access to Berlin and quadripartite consultations about Berlin, he is offering as act of grace with six months time limit. These are rights which we enjoy

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11–2858. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow.

¹ See Document 72.

absolutely. (3) He seems to assume that West Berliners will be delighted at prospect of demilitarized "free city". West Berliners will themselves no doubt express their views on this alternative to existing regime. (4) Khrushchev says that natural solution is for whole of Berlin to become part of "state" whose land surrounds it. We think that natural solution for Berlin is that it should be capital of reunited Germany. (5) Soviet Union cannot unilaterally renounce its Four Power obligations. If it chooses to give up its rights then in theory these rights revert to other three powers with whom agreements were made and not to G.D.R. Government.

[1 paragraph (6-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

FonOff official's personal comment was that Allies cannot talk to Soviets on basis latest proposal and since cannot refuse to talk at all must propose some preferable basis which presumably must be along lines reunification of Germany and European security, perhaps in terms of implementation of 1955 Geneva Summit Agreement.² But he said did not see how such conference could avoid deadlock. Soviets would insist on inclusion discussion latest Berlin proposal and he doubted they could back down.

Lloyd last evening sent another and more urgent instruction to UK Embassies Washington and Paris about immediate necessity of instructions to permit ambassadorial level consultations in Bonn. This followed a second report from Steel that US and French Ambassadors appeared to be without adequate instructions and were "in doubt as to their attitude" about consultations in Bonn. One reason for FonOff's strong preference for Bonn as site of discussions is that they have experts there whereas few UK experts in Washington and Hood obviously could not carry entire burden himself. Whenever this subject discussed FonOff official has always emphasized strong UK respect for Bruce's pre-eminent qualifications.³

Report from Steel arrived during conversation with FonOff official saying summoned by Adenauer at 16:15 Bonn time. Steel proposed to lay special emphasis on need for full and immediate quadripartite consultations in Bonn and importance "unequivocal verdict" from people of West Berlin in impending elections.

Whitney

² For text of the Heads of Government Directive to their Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. V, pp. 527-528.

³ The question of where discussion of the Soviet note should take place occupied the three Western powers and the West Germans for nearly 2 weeks before they could agree that these talks should take place at Paris before the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, December 16-18. Documentation on the several proposals advanced by each government is in Department of State, Central Files 762.00 and 762.0221.

75. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, November 28, 1958, 6 p.m.

1137. Paris pass USRO, USCINCEUR, Thurston and West. Saw Chancellor this morning. He said he had just told Brentano that the Foreign Ministers of U.S., U.K., France and FedRep should get together one afternoon during December Paris NATO meeting and discuss Soviet note¹ and Berlin problem. This would be better procedure than any special conference and would not attract much public attention. He added it would be very desirable if Secretary Dulles could so arrange his schedule in Paris² to make such a meeting possible.

He expressed himself as very pleased with de Gaulle visit to Bad Kreuznach.³ Relationship between General and himself had been most cordial. He had talked privately for two hours with General on world politics and had found their views generally in accord.

In that part of meeting attended by respective advisers, two chief topics were reviewed: (1) Common Market and free trade area; (2) Berlin.

As to (1) General and he had decided to seek approval of the four members Common Market at forthcoming ministerial meeting and refer matter to Common Market commission under chairmanship of Hallstein, in attempt reach workable arrangement. I asked whether I was at liberty to mention this except to my own government, and he answered no, for Franco-German decision was still in course of being conveyed to other four members. He is seeing British Amb Steel this afternoon and no doubt will communicate same to him.

(2) Adenauer said he had not had chance to study in detail various Russian notes on subject Berlin. He thinks they must be viewed against background of January Soviet Party Congress in Moscow and we should await conclusion that conference before fixing any definite Western decision. He does not want to have Khrushchev in position to boast during session Congress that he had sent a note and forced the four heads of Western governments to have meeting.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2858. Secret; Niact. According to another copy of this telegram, it was drafted by Bruce. (*Ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹ See Document 72.

² Secretary Dulles was scheduled to attend the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting at Paris, December 16-18.

³ For de Gaulle's record of this meeting on November 26, see *Mémoires*, pp. 190-191. De Gaulle wrote that he assured the Chancellor that France would oppose any change in the status of Berlin.

Gen. de Gaulle had agreed with him that since NATO founding Soviets have made no advances in Europe, and that Berlin must continue to be garrisoned by Allied troops, since its loss would give Soviets almost fatal advantage over West.

Moreover, he said he had not made up his mind whether or when it would be necessary for four heads to convene. This could be discussed by FonMins in Paris, but at any rate time for any such meeting was "not yet."

Chancellor going to Berlin to spend Thursday and Friday next week and will make several speeches there. He is very calm and expects present excitement in German press to subside.

Bruce

76. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 28, 1958.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

M. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. R.H. McBride—WE
Mr. D. Brown—WE

The Ambassador reported on the deGaulle-Adenauer discussion of Berlin during which von Brentano had said that it is not possible to accept the transfer of power from the Soviets to the GDR even tacitly, including the idea of GDR officials acting as agents.¹

The Secretary noted that we have contingency planning on this subject. He had tried to play this down in his press conference² but the press had, nevertheless, blown it up.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2858. Secret. Drafted by Brown. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 1131, November 28. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11-2858)

¹ See Document 75.

² See Document 68.

The Ambassador said that deGaulle believed we must not separate on this issue but rather have firm positions. These we should take after we study the Soviet note. DeGaulle, he said, does not believe the Soviets will push to the ultimate end. Their aggression, additionally, will be lessened if we remain firm and united. This, of course, must include German resolutions.

The Secretary said that the Soviet note³ was vicious and unacceptable.

The Ambassador asked where we should center our discussions.

The Secretary said that he would be absent for a week.⁴ He expected that we should have views on his return and there could be an exchange thereafter. There is not much time before the NATO Ministerial meeting. We should probably take advantage of the NATO meeting to discuss Berlin on a tripartite basis.

³ See Document 72.

⁴ Dulles was in Mexico City for the Presidential inauguration November 30–December 2 and on the West Coast until December 5 on vacation.

77. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 28, 1958, 8 p.m.

426. Paris also pass USCINCEUR Thurston and West. Senator Hickenlooper and I called today on Governing Mayor Brandt who received us in presence Mayor Amrehn and other Berlin officials and presented him with freedom bell. After exchange of pleasantries, and in response to Mayor Brandt's opening remarks about serious affairs, Senator said that he concerned at local press interpretation of Secretary's Nov 26 remarks.¹ Senator stated that he would not criticize interpretation of remarks since they, or at least press reports of them, might give room to incorrect interpretation put upon them.² Senator stated that his experi-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2858. Also sent to Bonn and POLAD USAREUR and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

¹ See Document 68.

² Hickenlooper, who had arrived in Berlin on November 27, cabled Dulles earlier in the day that his press conference had caused "alarm and consternation" because of the reference to "agency". He went on to say that any acceptance of an "agency principle" would and already had had a "catastrophic" effect on the U.S. position and prestige in Berlin and all of Germany. (Telegram 419 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2858)

ence Foreign Relations Committee, and particularly his close relationship with Secretary, enable him reassure Berlin officials that in his opinion Secretary had not implied U.S. considering any "general theory of agency." Senator emphasized that press had failed sufficiently stress positive parts of Secretary's remarks, namely that we hold and will continue hold Soviets fully to their occupation responsibilities.

Brandt thanked Senator for reassurance and expressed opinion that main source of misinterpretation was unfortunate comparison made between technical contacts between East and West Germans and Allied contacts with East Germans. Amrehn interjected that it true Soviets had transferred certain functions involving Germany to East German officials (even before establishment GDR) but that it was another kind of thing for Soviets.

Transfer occupation rights vis-à-vis Allies to East Germans. Brandt agreed forcefully with Amrehn's opinion that Allied acceptance "agency theory" would qualitatively change Allied legal and actual position in Berlin. Brandt noted it perhaps fortunate that recent Russian note has thrust speculation concerning Secretary's remarks into background. As result initial nervousness over these remarks on part some Berliners, Brandt noted parenthetically he had been criticized for not immediately telephoning Secretary or flying to the U.S. to talk to him as Brandt's critics assert Mayor Reuter would have done.

Senator and Brandt then discussed general economic situation in a Soviet Zone and West Berlin. Governing Mayor expressed particular concern at fearfulness re Berlin's future status and ability to perform contracts on part some Western businessmen and threat this attitude posed to continuing economic development West Berlin. In this connection Brandt stressed a most important task was to counteract such dangerous uncertainty.

In general discussion refugee situation Brandt remarked that Ulbricht in *Daily Mail* interview indicated communist intention turn West Berlin sector border into state border with accompanying intensified controls.

In conclusion Brandt told Senator, "Despite minor misunderstandings Berliners rely on their friends abroad and even though the pressure is intensified our friends abroad can rely on the Berliners. The spirit that carried the Berlin population through the blockade is still present." The Senator noted that he had come to Berlin on this, his sixth or seventh, trip because of the current increased tension and that while here he also wished to assure the Governing Mayor that the recent American elections had not in any way changed U.S. basic policy. Senator referred with approval to Senator Humphrey's recent statement concerning

Berlin³ and to Senator Lyndon Johnson's UN speech⁴ as designed show Russians and world that U.S. foreign policy was genuinely bipartisan. Senator further informed Brandt he would say in press conference this afternoon that, in his conviction, American policy firm and unchanged re Berlin. Brandt thanked Senator for his thoughtfulness.

Senator's visit has assisted greatly in reassuring top Berlin officials of firm U.S. support.

Gufler

³ Senator Humphrey had visited Berlin for 6 hours on November 23 and been briefed on the situation by Brandt, Burns, and Hamlett; toured West Berlin; and held a joint press conference with the Mayor at which he reiterated the U.S. position on Berlin. A brief report on his visit was transmitted in despatch 397 from Berlin, December 4. (*Ibid.*, 762A.00/12-458) A more detailed account of the visit is included in General Hamlett's oral history interview at the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

⁴ For text of Senator Johnson's speech to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, November 17, on the peaceful uses of outer space, see *Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, First Committee*, p. 208.

78. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Senator Hickenlooper

Washington, November 28, 1958.

DEAR BOURKE: I have your telegram from Berlin.¹ You are, I think, quite right in assuming that my press conference statement in answer to a question was grossly misinterpreted. If you will read the full press conference, of which I enclose a copy,² I think you will come to the same conclusion. What happened was that the wire services quickly sent out a "flash" in an effort to get something sensational.

I could hardly have said that we would not under any circumstances deal with the GDR as agents of the Soviet Union because in fact that is the basis upon which we are now dealing with them in some

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2858. Personal and Confidential.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 77.

² Not found attached; see Document 68.

respects. Also, and this is for your confidential information, there has been in existence for several years a contingency paper agreed to by the British, French and ourselves calling for precisely such a handling of the situation. You will note that I said that "if the character of the activity is such as to indicate that to accept this would involve acceptance of a substitution of the GDR for the present obligation and responsibility of the Soviet Union, then that, I take it, we would not do."

My press conference is replete with the strongest possible statements as to holding the Soviet Union to its responsibilities. It is really shocking what a false impression can be given on so little evidence. I would have thought that my reputation established over the years of being "tough" would have led to skepticism that in fact all of a sudden I was turning "soft."

I am leaving for Mexico for the Inauguration on Sunday morning and then to San Francisco for a speech, so that I will not be back here until the latter part of next week. Meanwhile, I thank you for your telegram and confirm your confidence that I am strong for the maintenance of a firm position in Berlin. I think the statement that I gave out yesterday, of which I also enclose a copy,³ bears this out.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles⁴

³Not found attached; see Document 72.

⁴Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

79. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, November 28, 1958, 9 p.m.

2004. Daridan asked Lyon to call this afternoon to give him French first reactions to Soviet note on Berlin.

Daridan said French find it "very bad and see no good in it." They believe there should be no yielding on Berlin under Soviet threats.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2858. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, and Moscow.

French find "take it or leave it approach," that it is this solution within six months to Berlin problem or nothing else, totally unacceptable.

Daridan suggests there are three alternatives for handling Soviet proposal:

1. Refuse it out of hand.
2. Try and seek a limited solution for Berlin itself. This would probably prove ruinous for Berlin.
3. Try and seek a broader all German solution which would probably be ruinous for Germany and would raise subj Rapacki plan,¹ etc., which would be totally unacceptable to NATO Alliance.

French believe note requires much study and thorough exchange of views between UK, France and ourselves and urge that we refrain from taking any public position on it until these have occurred.

Houghton

¹ Regarding the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free-zone in central Europe, see footnote 2, Document 43.

80. Memorandum of Conversation With President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

Augusta, Georgia, November 30, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. Milton Eisenhower
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Greene

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

2. I referred to the Soviet note of November 27 on Germany and Berlin and suggested that despite its hostile tone we need be in no hurry to reply. I thought that the occasion called for a thorough review of our whole policy on German reunification, and that in our reply to this

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Prepared by Dulles.

Soviet note we should not only reject it but also advance some constructive proposals of our own. The President agreed.

I referred to the importance of Berlin as an outpost and showplace of freedom. The President agreed but expressed unhappiness that here is another instance in which our political posture requires us to assume military positions that are wholly illogical.

I said that there is in prospect a meeting in Paris on December 15 of the Foreign Ministers of the US, Britain, France and the Federal Republic. It has been suggested that this might be followed by a meeting of the Heads of the same Governments thereafter. I thought this would have little point, although it might develop that at a later stage a meeting with the Russians at Head of Government level would be desirable. I said that I would in any event try to submit to the President new constructive proposals about Germany prior to the December 15 meeting.¹

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

JFD

¹ For text of Secretary Dulles' statement following his conversation with the President, which included a reaffirmation of the U.S. position on Berlin, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 22, 1958, p. 994.

81. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 30, 1958, 6 p.m.

429. Paris: USCINCEUR, USRO Thurston and West. From Bruce. I had talk with Willy Brandt this afternoon.¹ His thoughts summarized as follows:

1. Allies should deal not with problem of Berlin alone but rather of whole of Germany.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-3058. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

¹ Bruce visited Berlin November 30-December 1, largely to participate in the dedication of the new Hilton Hotel in the city; see Document 83.

Thinks Soviets have not presented a minimum but maximum program. Believes it not probable Soviets would go to war at this time. Might even agree to closer relationship between West Berlin and West Zone if they had a quid pro quo, especially in way of shutting off flow of refugees, and stopping freedom of movement of secret agents. Best solution from Soviet standpoint would be to take over Berlin, but this is not politically realistic. Soviets can already stop refugee movement if they apply their energies and facilities to it. Therefore, will probably institute strictly controlled boundary line in Berlin. Refugee question and that of underground activities is not their only motivating force, for prestige is also involved.

2. Re agency relationship between Ger and Soviet Govt. Berliners astonished as they would not have been a week previously, because von Brentano who was here preceding week had expressed himself as thinking such a concept quite impossible. As result of this, and conversations between Klein and van Scherpenberg, Berlin authorities had concluded whole idea had been given up and Allies would resort to airlift, or even maintenance of surface access by force. Theoretically, de facto recognition even on an ad hoc basis would not have been so alarming to Berlin authorities, if there were not a psychological aspect as well. Consequently, the acceptance by Allies of any assertion of GDR authority at check points as agents of Soviets would now be disastrous. This matter, however, had been at least momentarily obscured by Soviet note, but the feeling just expressed still remained. This would be regarded as first step on slippery slope.

3. Maintenance of US garrison in Berlin is most important single thing US can do. Brandt would prefer it to be strengthened in sense of seeming to have been even if substantially little military weight were added. Showing of new units in streets would be useful.

4. Berliners would like FedRep to be prepared to break off diplomatic relations with Soviets, but would not expect other nations to do it. However, cannot suggest such move at this time, in view standstill nature of Soviet note. This action should be reserved for possible future use.

5. Berliners do not want repetition of guarantees; US at appropriate time should again refer to them, but they should be taken for granted.

6. There should be a statement by Allies that Soviet proposal is under study and an answer will be forthcoming. The eventual reply should present Western case even if not directly responsive to substance of Soviet note. Believes no immediate response or acknowledgement of Soviet note is required but there should be a preliminary answer in early January.

7. One matter is of overriding importance. Namely Soviet understanding that effective interference, especially on air routes, with Allied military communications between West Germany and Berlin will entail US war directly against Soviet Union.

8. Brandt thinks he should be invited to attend Paris meeting of four Foreign Ministers during that part of it devoted to Berlin problem. He intends taking this up with Chancellor next week.

9. He does not intend to make visit now to United States. He had been invited to do so some time ago by NBC but is inclined to postpone acceptance until next year. I advised him to stick to this decision.

Bruce

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, December 2, 1958, 7 p.m.

1160. Paris pass USRO, USCINCEUR, Thurston and West. Immediate objective Soviet note seems clear. The Four Power Agreements on Berlin have been denounced and Soviet action will follow in 6 months or less, as specified in the note. Since the West is unanimous in rejecting a "free demilitarized city of Berlin", there is no alternative to our taking the position that we will maintain our garrisons in Berlin. We cannot long maintain garrisons as Soviet note suggests by dealing with GDR. Therefore, we must make clear (a) we will not deal with GDR, (b) we will maintain our garrisons, (c) our readiness to use force against any interference our access to Berlin. If we are not prepared to deal with the GDR, our surface access routes will probably be denied to us. Whether we can maintain our air access will depend on (a) the extent to which the Soviets and the GDR are prepared to interfere with our planes, and (b) the extent to which we are prepared to resort to force in order to overcome such interference. These are the immediate practical politico-military aspects of the Soviet note. However, the note has broader implications than those relating to Berlin, and these concern the future of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12-258. Secret; Priority; Noform. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, USAFE, and USAREUR. According to Bruce's Diary (*ibid.*: Lot 64 D 327) it was drafted by Tyler and Bruce after a day of conferences with the political section of the Embassy.

Germany and of the Western Alliance itself. The note is a move, couched in diplomatic form, but in reality directed to, and operating on, public opinion in Germany and the West in general. By the act of its publication, the note unleashes powerful pressures on German opinion in the direction of reaching some kind of accommodation with the Soviet Union through negotiation.

In the last year, the idea of disengagement has been repeatedly brought to the fore by the different versions of the Rapacki plan, by the public utterances of supporters of this general concept, e.g., George Kennan.¹ While there has been no wavering in the official Western reaction, the ground beneath the principal members of the Alliance is [of] varying degrees of hardness. In the case of the British it may be said to be definitely soft. The significance of the note is that it greatly encourages those elements in Germany and in the rest of the West who are in favor of reaching some kind of accommodation in Central Europe which will, in their view, appease the Soviets.

The six months deadline is perhaps less important in relation to the Berlin question, than in its effect on Western opinion and attitudes. It might be called, from the Soviet viewpoint, a period of "incubation" during which pressures will be generated which may compel the Western governments to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a basis which will place them at a disadvantage.

Therefore it would appear that the task at the December 15² Foreign Ministers meeting should be (1) to reach agreement on a common interpretation of the objectives of the Soviet Union as revealed by their note; (2) to make recommendations on what should be done with regard to Berlin (the Germans should be encouraged to come up with ideas); (3) to make recommendations on the substance and timing of a reply to the Soviet note.

If we intend to maintain our garrisons in Berlin beyond the expiration of the Soviet deadline, the Soviets should be put on notice of such determination and we should say nothing which might lead them to infer that we would not use force to maintain our land and air access.³

Bruce

¹ In 1957 Kennan delivered a series of lectures over the BBC on international relations. Texts of the six talks are printed in George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom, and the West*, London, 1958. Extracts from the talks and the reaction to them is in George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950–1963*, Boston, 1972, pp. 229 ff.

² At this time tentative agreement had been reached for a Western four-power Foreign Ministers meeting at Paris on December 15.

³ In telegram 2993 from London, December 3, Ambassador Whitney expressed his agreement with Bruce's analysis and recommendations, but also proposed that a program building up Berlin's stocks of coal and nonperishables should be initiated at once to show Western determination to remain in the city. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–358)

83. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, December 2, 1958, 7 p.m.

1161. Paris pass USRO, USCINCEUR, Thurston and West. During two day visit to Berlin I talked with many German political leaders, American military and civilian officials and journalists.

A few impressions are clear:

1. As long as Allied garrisons, especially United States, remain in West Berlin, the morale of its citizens will be at least moderately satisfactory, on the assumption the presence of such garrisons means that under certain circumstances the United States would be ready to go to war with the Soviet Union in order to defend its rights in Berlin.

2. At present the factor most adversely affecting morale is the fear that the United States might be prepared to deal at some level, even though it might be on minor points, with GDR official representatives. This sentiment is expressed most immediately in connection with the possible turnover of checkpoint controls by the Soviets to the GDR. An acceptance by the Allies of an agency or other relationship in this respect would be almost unanimously condemned. In spite of the six month waiting period specified in the Soviet note, there are some Berliners who believe Soviets may soon face us with checkpoint controls delegated to GDR personnel. Suggest speedy revision existing Tripartite Agreement to conform to recommendations USBER 400 to Department¹ be made, and favorable United States Government decision thereon be pressed for adoption by our Allies. Until this is done, I fear leak of current instructions may occur, and consequences would be extremely dangerous and certainly shattering to our prestige.

3. Although generally believing an attack upon our garrison would result in United States-Soviet war, there is doubt whether we would use force if required to maintain access to Berlin. Again opinion is almost unanimous we should be prepared to fight for preservation access rights, and Soviets and East Germans should be convinced such is our determination.

Scepticism over our ability militarily to force our way through by train or autobahn is widely prevalent. However, even if such scepticism proved justified, Berliners feel strongly we should nevertheless continue to assert our right to resume interrupted traffic and our intention to do so by force, if the occasion warrants.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12-253. Secret; Noform. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, USAFE, and USAREUR.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 71.

As to access by air, there is confidence in our ability to maintain our access, provided we intend, and orders are issued, to protect this traffic by appropriate force even at risk of war. Please refer to Embtel 1334, October 27, 1957,² written for somewhat different circumstances but in principle applicable.

4. Many see in Soviet note opportunity for West to take hard line in refusing Berlin proposals while making counter propositions that would bring under discussion problems affecting whole of Germany.

I talked only to one German journalist, publisher Axel Springer. He has recently been stout in demanding firm stand by Berliners and Allies against turnover to GDR, is in close contact with Mayor Brandt, and after long lapse again received by Chancellor. He confirmed, in the expression of his own views, the reactions I have before referred to.

Bruce

²In telegram 1334 Bruce reported that the passage of East German aircraft through Allied air corridors to Berlin was a question of "capital importance" about which the United States should make no concessions. Refusal of GDR use of these corridors should be backed by employment of fighter aircraft to intercept GDR aircraft to show the Soviets that the United States would be neither bluffed nor intimidated. (Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/10-2757)

84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, December 3, 1958, 2 p.m.

1208. Because of importance subject sending verbatim memorandum dictated by Senator Humphrey on his conversation with Khrushchev¹ with respect to Berlin question. Senator is convinced that chief purpose in Khrushchev's mind in holding this long conference was to impress him with Soviet position on Berlin and to convey his words and thoughts to President.

"On Berlin. I may be very sketchy on this because it was talked about so often and interrupted by other thoughts.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-358. Confidential. Transmitted in two sections.

¹The meeting was held on December 1. For Humphrey's published version, see *Life*, January 12, 1959, pp. 80–91.

"The Berlin question was opened by myself after a hint or two from Khrushchev. At least three times during conversation I told him my views must not be interpreted as as even views of Democratic party, much less those of government. I was speaking simply as a Senator having an informal talk with leader of a great country. Khrushchev had mentioned Berlin as being thorn in relationships of four powers. He called it a cancer. I told him that I hoped USSR understands seriousness of our purpose in Berlin and that our position is firm and fully supported by both political parties and by our people. He knew of my visit to Berlin and what I had said.² He said, 'I understand this but you must demonstrate some understanding of the real situation.' He referred to Potsdam Agreement and US violations. In view of violations, he felt there was no reason to keep agreement of Four Powers on Berlin. This was his excuse. He said he has long been concerned over Berlin. That it is of no use to West militarily. That the 25,000 troops in Berlin surely can't have any military significance unless we seek to wage an aggressive war. That Berlin to him meant nothing when the Soviet Bloc had 900 million people in it already. He said he had given many months of thought to Berlin situation and had finally come up with his proposal of a so-called free city. He said, 'I don't want to do anything detrimental to the other three countries.' He said he felt his proposals were reasonable but if anyone had anything else to suggest he would be very happy to consider it. In fact he wanted suggestions. 'But if you try to talk about German reunification the answer is no. There are two German states and they will have to settle reunification by themselves.' He will never agree to liquidation of socialist system in East Germany nor would West agree to liquidation of Federal German Republic and its system, so why should Four Powers use city of Berlin as bargaining point. Berlin ought to stand alone, separate from reunification. He stands for establishment of a free city. He volunteered that he would support observers from UN to guarantee non-interference and fulfillment of commitments. He talked at length about Austrian question and said Soviets had suggested withdrawal of troops and neutrality. He told me at length how Molotov had opposed this and he had responded to Council of Ministers and to Molotov that Russian troops in Austria were only worthwhile if Russia intended to expand westward and he didn't want to do that. He wanted peace, not war, so why troops in Austria? A neutral Austria was established and a source of conflict was removed. His proposals on Berlin have similarity, except that Berlin is surrounded by East German Republic and that best proposal was free city with no troops because troops represented source of conflict, as he put it, and always offered element of danger. He said, 'Now the three powers want to maintain

² See footnote 3, Document 77.

troops in Berlin, but why? 25,000 troops in Berlin are of no importance unless you want to make war. Why do you maintain this thorn? A free city, a free Berlin, could lead to the breaking of the ice between USSR and USA.' At this point he became very firm and his voice rose. 'Some of your military men have made stupid statements lately—statements to effect that US will break through with tanks if East German Republic tries to get in the way. Soviets have tanks too, lots of them, and I warn you we will use them. We have rockets, too, and we don't even have to fire them from East Germany. We can send them from USSR. So don't threaten me by talking about breaking through with tanks. Might does not make right. Right makes might. Military argument is no answer. Our troops remain there (speaking of Berlin and East German Republic both) not to play cards. We mean business. Unless there is an agreement Soviets will carry through as suggested. This is territory of German Democratic Republic.' I reminded him that it was not, that it was a separate arrangement and he reminded me that it was in heart of German Democratic Republic and obviously should belong to German Democratic Republic, but he was not proposing this, in fact he was preparing to give Soviet guarantees of its complete independence. 'We are not suggesting anything offensive to US. You constantly talk of assuring freedom of two million Berliners. This is mere pretense for you to keep your troops there. I warn you this is very serious. Give us a counter proposal. We want to do away with this thorn of troops in the area and the Soviet is very suspicious that West Germany is being armed with these weapons to make war on East Germany. I know that you do not decide these affairs, but you will play a part. You are a member of the Democratic majority and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.' I asked, if Berlin is to be a free city, what will Soviets do to guarantee access to Berlin, to guarantee freedom in fact, and to prevent it from being starved out. Khrushchev said 'We are prepared to accept anything reasonable, what do you suggest?' I repeated my question, 'What will you do to guarantee freedom of city—by this I mean access. We remember blockade of 1948 and airlift, and we don't want to see the city strangled.' Khrushchev said we could enter into an agreement to guarantee access registered with UN. He is ready to sign treaty with US, France and UK. He repeated he thought it would be good to have permanent UN observers there. 'We want to cut this knot which spoils relations between the four powers.' I asked, 'Did I understand you to say that German reunification could only come as a result of an agreement between what you call the two Germanys?' Khrushchev said, 'Absolutely.' He would not take part in any discussion relating to German reunification. He seeks a peace treaty on the question of Germany. There are two Germanys for time being. He mentioned phrase 'for time being' four times. 'Any other settlement but an agreement between the two Germanys will

come only through force. An attack on GDR is war and we will support our partner in that war.' I asked, 'Do you see any hope for German reunification in the future?' Khrushchev replied 'Yes. A kind of confederation with an all-German government.' By that he meant a government that included both East and West Germany. He said then, 'There ought to be a withdrawal of foreign troops, maybe slowly.' I asked, 'Does this mean that West Germany would have to be out of NATO?' He said, 'I don't attach much importance to this.' Then he made a snide comment that NATO would disappear anyhow. I said 'How about the Warsaw Pact, will it disappear?' He said 'Yes, any time now.' Then he went on to give me an example of how plans go wrong—how plans for defense or attack sometimes have no relationship to real situation. This was effort on his part to show that NATO had outlived any usefulness it ever had from his point of view, and that while we were putting our faith in NATO Soviets were winning the economic war in the underdeveloped areas. He mentioned again that Soviet Union would not make war on Western Europe. 'Why should we? We are waging economic competition.' He went on to point out that Western Europe was realistic and when they saw Soviet economic progress in underdeveloped areas they would want to do business with Soviet Union. He didn't develop this much more. I gathered his inference was that Western Europe looked too good to be destroyed. He would rather pick it up through economic attrition or by control over markets and raw materials, thereby forcing Western European economies to bend toward Soviet Union. That is just my personal analysis of what he was talking about. His reference to NATO being outmoded or the wrong kind of defense related to his participation in defense of Kharkov, where Russians had prepared series of defense lines against forthcoming German attack, but Germans didn't attack where defense lines were, in fact, they went in completely different direction and took defense lines with hardly a shot. 'We will advance with our economy, so with your NATO maybe you have prepared for the wrong attack. We will fight you economically and you should welcome it.' All during entire conference he went on about economic competition.

"Khrushchev said that if we settle this question of Berlin everything will be better. 'It is a bone in my throat.' Again he went back to Austria and to visit of Chancellor Raab.³ He said if Berlin is settled he could assure me that relations with all NATO countries would improve. I assured him that we were reasonable but that we had promised Berlin freedom and we wanted no political strangulation and would not lend ourselves to any deal that would result in such strangulation. Khrushchev said, 'We are prepared to cooperate with you. It would mean

³ Austrian Chancellor Raab visited the Soviet Union July 21–28.

much to the socialist countries for them to keep their word. A good reputation is important.' Then he went on to say about Soviet Union, 'Our firm is a good one and we want a good reputation. It would weaken us if we violated our word or if we let others do so.' (I imagine referring to East Germany because I had told Khrushchev we were of opinion his word would be final so far as East Germany was concerned and we wanted to negotiate with Russians and not with East Germans.) 'It would be important for us to prove that we would not strangle the city—that we would keep our word to guarantee equal access to West Berlin of all countries.' He asked me to tell President Eisenhower about this and again became very serious and said Berlin situation had to be settled—he was not going to back down. He again asked me, 'What are your counter proposals, what do your Secretary of State and your President suggest?' He repeated several times 'Don't threaten me.' I told him I would be happy to talk this over with Secretary Dulles and the President and asked him if I might repeat conversation in detail, and he said 'Of course.' At this point he showed sentimentality. 'I have the deepest respect for President Eisenhower. I like President Eisenhower. We want no evil to the US or to free Berlin. You must assure the President of this.' He said, 'You must remember that many of your friends, the English and French, do not really want a reunited Germany. They are afraid of German reunification. USSR is not afraid. Situation isn't like it was before war. US and Soviets need have no fear of a reunited Germany.' Then he said, 'Let's test our mutual strength by economic competition. If USSR and USA are on same side on this Berlin issue or any other there will be no war—only madman or fool would think of such a thing.'"

Senator made clear that in foregoing when Khrushchev used word Berlin he was referring to West Berlin.

Thompson

85. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, December 5, 1958, noon.

1226. In my opinion both Soviet note and Khrushchev's remarks to Senator Humphrey¹ tend to confirm that principal immediate explanation of Soviet action is desire to remove an impediment to further development of Communism in East Germany (and possibly Poland). The Soviets have never shown themselves capable of tolerating any deviation within their system and emphasis of past year in entire Communist Bloc has been toward orthodoxy and away from revisionism. I believe most important element for Soviets is the escape route for refugees. The flight of doctors and intellectuals has shown the difficulties of bringing East Germany into line so long as the Berlin escape route is open.

Khrushchev's long range objective is also clear, that is to absorb Berlin into GDR. Khrushchev has himself stated that our troops in Berlin serve no military purpose and he obviously would like to remove the guarantee they constitute of the continued freedom of West Berlin. I think it fair to state, however, that Khrushchev is also probably genuinely concerned at the threat to peace which could arise over the Berlin problem once Western Germany is fully armed.

While I think it would be possible to devise a solution to the Berlin problem which would be acceptable to us and reduce the current dangers in this situation, I do not see any solution likely to be acceptable to the Soviets which did not cut off the escape route and this I presume we could never accept. It is, of course, possible that if we show sufficient determination and unity, Khrushchev would accept some solution not fully satisfactory to him as a way of backing down from the dangerous situation in which he has placed himself. In any event I suggest we should be prepared to put forward counter proposals if only to strengthen our position in the event of a showdown and to increase unity among the Western powers. As a first step, however, believe we should make strong refutation distortions and lies in Soviet note and firm statement our intention maintain our rights by force if necessary. Reply should offer discuss the problem provided we have reasonable counter proposals to put forward.

Thompson

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-558. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

¹ See Document 84.

86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, December 5, 1958, 7:08 p.m.

5420. London's 2993 to Dept.¹ Decisions with regard to action if any on stockpile exceedingly complex and in short run mainly psychological and political. They relate to Soviet assessment Western position and German view likely prospective course of action.

Stocks now in Berlin satisfy requirements of current policy. Dept had considered possibility of augmenting stockpile, queried Bonn which opposed. On balance, therefore, Dept believes action should not be taken this time, but funds available kept on reserve to meet future contingencies.

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-358. Secret. Drafted by Eleanor Dulles, cleared by Kohler, and approved by Hillenbrand. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, Moscow, and Paris.

¹ See footnote 3, Document 82.

87. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, December 8, 1958, 1 p.m.

1232. Deptel 927.¹ Question of reason for East Berlin's exclusion from "free city" plan was put informally by Western diplomats to Gromyko on November 28 and Mikoyan and Gromyko on November 29. Points made in their replies were that unification of two parts of city

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-858. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Belgrade, Bonn, and Berlin.

¹ Telegram 927, December 6, reported that Austrian and German diplomats were told by Soviet officials that the Soviet Union would agree to include the Eastern sector of Berlin in a city to be placed under U.N. protection, and asked if the Embassy in Moscow had heard similar reports. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/12-658)

with different social systems would be as unrealistic as reunification Germany, that GDR capital and government were actually in East Berlin, that East sector was closely tied to GDR in economic matters, and that future moves toward "confederation" required each German state to have own territory and capital.

To these typically Soviet arguments might be added Moscow's desire to preserve control of all territory now effectively in its orbit and Kremlin unwillingness to let citizens of Communist area vote overwhelmingly for non-Communist parties (as East Berliners probably would if given chance).

Nevertheless, we should by no means exclude possibility that Soviets not only have various fallback positions on Berlin for possible eventual use, but also have number of further moves planned for next six months to keep their initiative on question and to keep West off balance. Such moves need not be limited to pressure tactics but could include political devices to make Khrushchev proposal less unattractive.

In this context, Soviet offer to include East Berlin is conceivable, and would undoubtedly be appealing to many because for first time since Berlin crisis started, East would also appear to be offering tangible concession to "reasonableness". No doubt Soviets are genuinely reluctant to try this approach on above-noted grounds, and it is logical for them to be sounding out "third parties" and dropping hints to test reactions of West. If Western governments seem to reject it firmly, this might increase Soviet willingness to make offer (on theory that it is unlikely to be accepted), but they might still do it even though they expected to be called on to implement proposal.

Only specific rumor I have heard here is that reported Embtel 1193.² Since Presidium discussions of this importance do not leak accidentally this must be either purely speculative rumor or else deliberate plant.

Thompson

² Telegram 1193, December 2, reported that Ambassador Kroll heard that the Presidium had discussed the possibility of including East Berlin in a free city, but had rejected the proposal as a step backward. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/12-258)

88. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, December 8, 1958, 8 p.m.

1205. Paris pass USRO, USCINCEUR, Thurston and West. Von Brentano, van Scherpenberg and Duckwitz met with British, French Ambassadors and myself this afternoon and gave us paper posing various questions connected with Berlin problem, translation whereof forwarded immediately preceding telegram.¹

FonMin made certain comments but said not necessary to answer at this session except as we individually wished.

His chief observations were:

1. Does not think definitive answer to Soviet note can be produced at or immediately after Paris meeting, since answer should be complete and leave no false Soviet statement uncontradicted. Personally favors a preliminary answer for delivery early January. Replies would be made by individual governments, would contain same substance but variations in form.

Steel thought preliminary reply should be sent around Christmas. Seydoux expressed view NATO communiqué might serve as preliminary response and would take place of proposed note. I remarked I thought decision this point could well await FonMins Paris conference.

2. FonMin said, now that Senat and other officials Berlin, as well as many people FedRep and elsewhere generally familiar with content standing orders traffic to and from Berlin, Allied intention regard substitution Soviet by GDR officials certain to be increasingly criticized in Berlin where it is already hot issue. He feels in any event since receipt of Soviet note GDR officials cannot plausibly be treated as Soviet agents. Therefore, in opinion FedRep Govt, standing orders should be re-examined immediately and, it hopes, changed.

Steel observed present orders were still satisfactory but he will report request for re-examination to his govt. His govt has no intention recognizing GDR but this question standing orders is relatively unimportant compared with the larger problems needing consideration. (It has long been evident Steel favors continuance present system.) Seydoux said he would seek instructions from his govt. I said US Govt

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-858. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, and USAREUR Heidelberg.

¹Telegram 1204 from Bonn, November 8, transmitted the paper, which stated that four topics should be clarified before the meetings in Paris took place: 1) the form of the answer to the Soviet note, 2) its contents, 3) revision of contingency plans, and 4) what the Foreign Ministers meeting at Paris should do. (*Ibid.*)

internally was already in process of re-examining orders but had not yet consulted with other FonOffices concerned about possibility changes. Brentano declared himself content to have us report this to respective govts.

3. FonMin thinks most practicable place for a working party to deal with answer to Soviet note and other matters arising out of it would be Bonn.

Seydoux said this question should be put to FonMins in Paris; I agreed. Steel strongly favors Bonn.

4. FonMin believes important at Paris meeting determine (a) what report should be made to NATO re deliberations four FonMins; (b) degree to which PermReps should consult on Berlin question. Seydoux suggested perhaps there should be two statements made after Paris meeting, one by the United States, United Kingdom and French Ministers, another by the four.

5. FonMin said questions presented were in working paper form. He would welcome any questions our govts might have to ask, and would appreciate, if possible, having preliminary replies to his inquiries that might be discussed in Bonn before Paris meeting.

6. Having disposed of paper, FonMin said Chancellor had been ill, but not seriously, yesterday from cold and fever contracted in Berlin,⁴ but was better today.

7. Additionally, he wished to ask one more question: should Mayor Brandt come to Paris at time of meeting? I answered I had no instructions from my govt this regard, but expressed personal view this was affair to be settled between FedRep Govt and Brandt. It seemed to me inadvisable, indeed impossible, for him to be present in any capacity that could be construed as making him a fifth minister, but that I saw no personal objection to his going as a member of the German delegation and be available for expert advice. Steel associated himself with this view. Seydoux said he would consult his govt. Brentano said he was most anxious have soonest possible any comments from our respective govts this connection. It was evident he attaches much importance to this point and strongly favors Brandt going Paris. For many reasons it would be wise to have him there as member German delegation.

Bruce

² Adenauer visited Berlin December 4-6.

89. Memorandum From George A. Morgan of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)

Washington, December 8, 1958.

SUBJECT

Thoughts on Berlin

Khrushchev probably has some flexibility in his position—he invited us through Senator Humphrey to make counter-proposals, and it would in any case be very un-Russian of him not to begin a maneuver with maximum demands. But a number of signs indicate that Khrushchev may be prepared to push his case to a really dangerous extreme, and therefore that his degree of flexibility is at present gravely short of any point to which contemplated proposals would reach from our side. We therefore seem to face a period in which risk of world war will rise to a very high point, perhaps higher than any so far.

The key question is, can we influence Khrushchev's flexibility sufficiently to bridge the dangerous gap between his position and ours, and if so how?

Essential components of such influence appear to be: getting Khrushchev to understand the Western position and the reasons for it more accurately, and showing him that we understand his problems better than he evidently thinks we do, and are prepared to deal with him on a frank and realistic basis with regard to problems on both sides.

Our basic estimate remains that Khrushchev wants to pursue his aims without war. The inference is that he is crowding us on the Berlin issue partly because he does not fully grasp the importance of West Berlin to the West, and therefore does not believe that when the chips are down the West will go over the brink if necessary. For example, he spoke to Humphrey in terms of West Berlin's military unimportance to us. He has evidently noted that we have recently been prepared to accept demilitarization of the offshore islands, and thinks we can reasonably accept an analogous solution for West Berlin.

The chief additional factor in his attitude seems to be his intense impatience with having West Berlin stuck inside the GDR like a "bone in his throat". This impatience probably derives from a number of sources—his temperament, the need to consolidate shaky spots in his empire, his feeling that the relative power position of the Bloc has grown

Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany. Secret. Also sent to the other members of the Policy Planning Staff.

and that changes to reflect this fact in international relations are overdue, and the frustration of his efforts to obtain summit talks on his terms.

Khrushchev is by far the most "open" character yet to rule the USSR. Communication is more possible with him—on a thoroughly wary basis, of course. Moreover, he continues to show eager interest in communication—giving Humphrey eight hours of his time, for example, and again hinting that he would like to visit the U.S. Conversely, he reacts very negatively to indirect methods of persuasion or pressure, such as our summitry tactics or gestures of military threat—"Don't threaten me," he told Humphrey.

The conclusion to be drawn is that by far our best chance of avoiding war through some kind of acceptable *modus vivendi* is frank, direct talk with Khrushchev, by the President. Formal talks would hardly serve the purpose, and the effort to plan them would get bogged down in summitry anyway. The best device would be simply to invite Khrushchev over to see America.

90. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, December 9, 1958, 7 p.m.

3101. Bonn pass priority information USAREUR unnumbered. Paris for Embassy USRO USCINCEUR Thurston and West. Bonn's 1204 to Department.¹ In separate conversations today with two Foreign Office officials (both Department head level) both stated belief German paper (reftel) omits most important question on which answers to all others depends, namely, "what do we do on May 27" (when six months expires).

One of Foreign Office officials went on to elaborate his thinking as follows: If this fundamental decision is not taken now situation likely to continue for remainder of six months in which both sides saying they do not want war and Western public, at least, assuming that therefore there

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-958. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noform. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 88.

will not be war. He doubted if this was sound logic. He thought if fundamental decision is not taken in adequate time Soviets sure to know this fact and to be emboldened thereby. Moreover as time runs out existing enormous pressures not to take fundamental decision until last minute will be increased and last minute decisions as they are taken will create hasty reactions from other side greatly enhancing danger of chain reaction and slide into war without either side having expected or intended it. He defined fundamental question as two-fold (a) military—what do we do May 27 (or possibly sooner, depending on Soviet actions) and (b) political—what are likely consequences of failing to take fundamental decisions in adequate time. He thought if decision is not taken to go to war rather than allow Ger interference with access to Berlin (he did not go into distinction if any between issue of access and issue of “recognition”) and that decision made known to Soviets, all Western thinking and preparations will be on assumption war will not happen and risks of situation leading straight to war or Western climb down will be greatly increased. After first saying he did not see how Soviets could climb down without loss of face, he agreed they could ostensibly turn over responsibilities to GDR and then do nothing about it and leave all existing procedures unaltered.

The other Foreign Office official agreed about nature fundamental decision that must be taken but added that it included decision on what terms issue of war should be met, e.g., having embarked on negotiations or not.

One Foreign Office official thought Lloyd agreed that this fundamental decision must be taken first. The other expressed great pessimism and thought it would be impossible to get HMG to decide in December what it would do in May on so great and difficult an issue. He saw no sign that any serious thinking had taken place in any Western government on this issue.²

Whitney

²Next to this sentence on the source text McFarland wrote: “Only too true”.

91. Letter From Acting Secretary of Defense Quarles to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, December 9, 1958.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The study drafted by the State-Defense ad hoc working group on Berlin¹ has been reviewed by the Department of Defense in the light of the Soviet note of 27 November 1958. Although the announced Soviet "half year" delay in withdrawing from quadripartite obligations in Berlin presents new considerations, it does not preclude the Soviets from initiating the necessary steps in a surprise move at almost any time they wish to establish a pretext. Accordingly, the Department of Defense considers that positive action on the Berlin situation should be taken without delay in the following respects:

a. The United States should recommend to the U.K. and France the immediate revision of tripartite contingency plans for travel to and from Berlin to eliminate all dealing with GDR officials at highway and railway checkpoints.

b. The United States should instruct its official personnel traveling to and from Berlin not to accept control of their movements by East German personnel acting in functions previously performed by Soviet personnel. If any such attempts at control occur, U.S. personnel should return to point of departure.

c. Presidential approval should be obtained which will authorize action to test GDR and Soviet intentions and force the issue promptly by dispatching a convoy supported by appropriate force, if and when the checkpoints are turned over completely to GDR control.

d. As part of an early note to the USSR Government, preferably without public announcement, and with British, French and West German agreement, the Soviet Government should be informed simultaneously by the Western Allies that we do not intend to deal with the GDR in those functions involving the quadripartite occupation obligations of the USSR, that we will not allow the GDR to impede the exercise of any right we presently hold, that we will not accept any control by the GDR over our movements to and from Berlin, and that we will use force if necessary to enforce our rights.

The Department of Defense recognizes the possibility that the military garrisons in Berlin may have to be supplied by air in the event that it is not possible to maintain access over surface routes. However, the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-958. Top Secret. The source text indicates that the Secretary saw this letter on December 10.

¹ Not further identified. The ad hoc working group on Berlin continued to meet on December 1, 5, and 9 and generated at least 13 position papers, which were designated with the series indicator BER, including a preliminary draft of telegram 1236 (Document 98), and the aide-mémoire given to the British and French on December 11 (see footnote 5, Document 98). Scattered records of the group are in Department of State, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany.

Department of Defense considers that this method of resupply should be undertaken only as a last resort, after all efforts to open ground access have failed. It is understood that contingency planning on the maintenance of access to Berlin through the air corridors and for air supply of military garrisons in Berlin is currently in progress in Europe.

Lastly, let me say that the Department of Defense is hopeful that the U.S. can early seize the initiative in the present situation. While we have supported the view that a four-power conference should be proposed at an early date on the entire German question, it is recognized that this is primarily a political matter and that you have alternative proposals under intensive study in the Department of State.

It is requested that the Department of Defense be advised of your reaction to the recommendations listed above.²

Sincerely yours,

Donald A. Quarles

² On December 19 Acting Secretary of State Herter replied that Quarles' letter had been overtaken by events (see Documents 97 and 98), but that the Department of State agreed with him that the United States should seize the diplomatic initiative in its reply to the Soviet note. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/12-958)

92. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, December 10, 1958, 1 p.m.

1247. I believe Khrushchev's long conversation with Humphrey on Berlin question indicates realization on his part of dangers involved and concern over outcome. He and other Presidium members have shown great interest in Western reaction and among others have questioned my Swedish, Austrian and Indian colleagues. While it is clear that neither Khrushchev nor Soviet Government as a whole wishes to run real risk of war, they will be very reluctant to back down if issue is posed in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1058. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

such a way as to involve great loss of prestige for Soviet Union. If in such circumstances we should use force to maintain access to Berlin they are capable, in my judgment, of allowing East Germans to respond with force. It therefore seems important that in handling the situation we leave open some way for Khrushchev to retreat and save face.

Difficulty of devising any counter proposals on Berlin are obvious but would appear to me there are elements for a bargain which would leave neither side materially worse off and which Soviets might be brought to accept if West is firmly united in opposition to current Soviet proposals and prepared in last resort to use force. As to concessions on our part there is a wide range of possibilities running from radical to relatively minor window dressing actions. For example, we could consider such actions as 1) withdrawal our troops and their substitution by West German forces and incorporation of West Berlin into West Germany; 2) some steps toward de facto recognition of GDR; 3) turning over full responsibility for administration West Berlin to Germans, although keeping our troops there; 4) termination of overt Western activities in Berlin such as operation radio station, etc.

As against concessions of this nature principal concession from Soviet side would presumably be related to problem of access. We might obtain recognition right of commercial air access, some type of corridor under West German control, etc. It might also be possible to devise scheme involving creation free city including East Berlin. This does not, however, appear to me to be profitable line of approach since Soviets unlikely make concession on this point and at same time agree to satisfactory arrangements to ensure access.

I do not believe Soviet action on Berlin was designed to lead to discussion of German problem as a whole nor do I believe they would formally agree to a meeting for this purpose. Nevertheless I think that at a meeting on the Berlin question it might be possible to draw them into such a discussion particularly if approached from the point of view of European security.

Thompson

93. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, December 10, 1958, 8 p.m.

Polto 1631. We have been discussing with Embassy, US Element SHAPE, and among ourselves possible formulations of a NATO position concerning Berlin. Ray Thurston has come up with following brief formulation which strikes us as excellent, and could possibly serve as core of NATO communiqué on this subject:

"The Western position in Berlin is not only a symbol but also a concrete assurance that the West will persist in its efforts to obtain a peaceful and just settlement of the entire German question. Until progress is made toward this objective, unilateral efforts to change the situation in Berlin can only be regarded as prejudicial to the peace and security of Europe and, therefore, cannot be accepted."

We think a formulation of this kind could be a standard to which all NATO countries could repair while discussions continue on desirability of one kind or another of initiative on German problem. Believe also this kind of formulation, if stated early in discussion, would tend to pull together various differences of emphasis and nuances among NATO countries which could, in course of expected lengthy discussions, get out of proportion. Houghton and Norstad concur.

Burgess

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1058. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bonn and London.

94. Letter From John J. McCloy to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

New York, December 10, 1958.

DEAR LIVIE: I have your letter of the 8th¹ and naturally I am distressed to learn that the Secretary is ill. I understand that he is going to

Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany. No classification marking. McCloy was U.S. High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952.

¹ Not found in Department of State files.

the NATO meeting in any event and certainly I would be only too happy to do anything I could to give guidance to the Secretary in regard to the very difficult problem of Berlin.

On receipt of your letter I got in touch with General Clay and Jim Conant, both of whom had received similar inquiries, as you know. I talked to Lucius Clay last night and then again to Jim Conant this morning. Jim, I believe, is sending you a separate statement² of his views and I will attempt to set out General Clay's and mine herewith.

We all recognize how difficult it is to give any helpful advice on the situation when we are so far removed from all communications and the general play of forces which now are centering about the problems of Berlin. In the abstract, however, we probably can state some principles while [*which?*], if they are not helpful, at least represent some of our thinking.

Clay's ideas run something along this line. In the first place we should make up our minds whether or not we are prepared to make any interference with our access to Berlin, including civilian traffic as well as our military, a *casus belli*. Not only must we make this determination, but we have to state it clearly and at the outset so that the Russians and the world understand it. This is a *sine qua non* of any attempt to negotiate a satisfactory solution to the Berlin problem. Clay feels very strongly that the Russians will not go to war over Berlin but unless it is made clear that we would, there is no base from which we can negotiate. If this is not our position, he could see no satisfactory intermediate ground we could hold.

Secondly, after the foregoing was made clear he would very shortly take some steps which would be preliminary to the incorporation of West Berlin into the West German State. He has felt it was an error not to have done this long ago. He is aware that there were objections on the part of West Germans themselves in the past, but he feels they were largely political in nature and that they should now be cast aside in view of the emergency and the heavy stakes Germany and Europe have in Berlin's future. This incorporation could be undertaken under a gradual but none the less definite program. He would be disposed at a given time to reduce our garrisons to one-half of their present size and that half replenished with West German troops. He would not make any reference, of course, in the pending communication to the Russians of our willingness to negotiate with the East Germans, but he does feel that in the long run we should urge the West Germans to accept a program of negotiations for unification of all Germany with the East Germans. He said we should emphasize the fact that West Berlin has precisely the

² Document 95.

same status as West Germany so far as our rights are concerned. What rights we had there came from conquest and they cannot be impaired. We pulled out of Saxony and they moved in, and they pulled out of West Berlin and we moved in. Since the rights came from the same source, West Berlin must be defended in precisely the same manner in which we would defend West Germany. The incorporation of the city into the West German Republic would, of course, automatically incorporate West Berlin into the NATO defense system.

At a certain point, Clay feels that it is more a matter of semantics than reality for the West Germans to refuse to deal with the East Germans, although no indication at this time should be given that we would countenance this. West Germany is already dealing with the East Germans on a low level *de facto* basis and he is inclined to feel that in dealing with East German Communists there may be advantages to be gained through them rather than the Russians.

As for my own views, I am clear that we should give a resounding "no" to Khrushchev's proposals. We should make clear the history which led up to our arrangements in respect to West Germany and Berlin, pointing out the gross distortions of Khrushchev's account, bearing down again on the fact of the German-Russian alliance which Khrushchev ignores in his survey of past history. I would also emphasize that we exchanged a very large part of East Germany for the part we occupy in Berlin. This last point is very strong, I think. We have a right to ask them to withdraw from that part of East Germany which we occupied if they are asking us to withdraw from Berlin.

I am clear that we should give no indication that we would be prepared to deal with the East German puppet regime. I would be in favor of stating that we are quite prepared to deal with East Germans who are freely elected as representatives to deal with the West Germans. I know the Russians would not accept this but it strikes a note always worth repeating. We should write Khrushchev that we agree the Germans should now be given the opportunity of determining their own destiny and immediately the future status of Berlin, but this cannot be an imposed will on the part of the Germans, but their own freely expressed one. "We are prepared to chance it, why aren't you?"

I would certainly wish to make it clear to the Russians and to the world that we would consider it an act of aggression if any attempt were made to constrict in any way the present access of civilians and the military to Berlin and I would make it clear that we would be compelled to use force to remove any obstacles to our free access to the city. I think I would not talk about going to war, even though this may be involved. We must have public opinion on our side both in Europe and here. I do not think Clay would disagree with this. The important thing is that we make it clear that we must use force if the blockade is reimposed. Both

Clay and I feel, and I believe Jim agrees, that the reinstatement of the air lift would be a defeat for us and an act of appeasement rather than an act of defiance.

I am not clear in my mind about the wisdom of incorporating West Berlin into West Germany. I do believe the matter should be carefully studied and thought out. It has some advantages but I believe it may have some disadvantages as well. Conant, I believe, feels that such incorporation might destroy our access throughout the entire city of Berlin that we made such an effort to maintain. Without giving consideration to all its implications, my instinct would be to agree that Clay's proposal has merit.

I think that another effort should be made to pressure the Chancellor and the SPD into a unified position on Berlin. It is most unfortunate that there is a division in West Germany and apparently between the SPD in West Germany and Willy Brandt in Berlin. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] I think if the Secretary really put the pressure on for a unified attitude in Germany, it would make our situation a whole lot better. It is very difficult to be critical of the lack of unity among the Allies if there is a lack of it in Germany. If any situation needed a bipartisan foreign policy, this one does.

One thing is perfectly clear. However reasonable and rational a solution may appear, if it does not at the same time appear that we have taken a strong position vis-à-vis Berlin and have solidly maintained it, the merit of the particular solution will be lost in the over-all effect that would follow from any impression of weakness or appeasement.

I think Clay feels, as I have already pointed out, that at some time we ought to be prepared to face a negotiated settlement between the East Germans and the West Germans on unification. I am clear that this could not be done on a "de facto" basis on as crucial an issue as this or as crucial an issue as the future status of Berlin. This would be real recognition and it ought to be faced as such.

It may be going rather far afield to bring up another point Clay and I talked about last night, but on a number of occasions now Khrushchev has indicated a desire to trade with the United States. Humphrey just brought back another statement of his in this regard. Perhaps as a means of bargaining it might be well at this time to give an indication to Khrushchev that we are prepared to sit down and talk to him about trade, provided we have a satisfactory settlement in regard to Berlin.

There may have been a time when the restrictions on trade had a good bit to do with what we thought was our security position, but I believe everyone agrees that the Russians have a sufficient stockpile of nuclear weapons and other military equipment to damage us about as heavily as we could damage them, so what is the use of now blocking

trade. It is a strong argument that it would not be of any effect in any event. There is also an argument that to open up trade with them would accelerate their economic development and increase their standard of living more rapidly, and this would be used as a great propaganda factor in their attempt to gain the favor of other underdeveloped countries.

Both Clay and I think that the increase in the Russian industrial potential is sufficiently spectacular as it is in regard to the impression on underdeveloped countries and a very good argument can be made that the higher the standard of living is increased, the more likely the Russians are to prefer a condition of peace in order to enjoy it. We do think that the whole economic and military effect of embargo as an effective weapon in the present state of the world needs to be substantially re-examined. We know this would raise great political discussions in this country, but I am not sure that you would not find very substantial public opinion in favor of trade relations, it now having been made so clear that the embargo would not interfere with Russia's being able to amass a massive and modern military machine.

These are rather random thoughts and we have not had a chance to polish them up in view of the shortness of time available. Please convey to the Secretary our wishes for his rapid recovery and a very successful meeting, and also our profound admiration for his stamina. He went to Quemoy and Matsu³ and came home with the bacon, and we are not at all sure that this may not be an easier job that he has to face now. He certainly has public opinion more solidly behind him over the Berlin issue than anything in regard to the Formosa Straits.

Sincerely,⁴

³ Dulles visited Taiwan October 20–23.

⁴ Printed from an unsigned copy.

95. Letter From James B. Conant to Secretary of State Dulles

New York, December 10, 1958.

DEAR FOSTER: I have just received a letter from Livie Merchant in which he stated that you would like to have me write you at once about

Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany. No classification marking. Conant was U.S. High Commissioner for Germany from 1953 to 1955 and Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1955 to 1957.

the Berlin situation.¹ I appreciate the invitation and am happy to give you my views for what they may be worth. Needless to say, the premises of my thinking reflect my experiences of two years ago. I am, of course, not up-to-date on any developments of a confidential nature.

I assume that the position which is finally reached would be a joint U.S.-British-French-German position. I wish that the SPD leaders in Germany might be brought into the picture in some way. I suggest that the Chancellor be urged to have another talk with Ollenhauer to see if some approach to a bipartisan foreign policy could be made. Perhaps you or one of the other Foreign Ministers might see Ollenhauer together with the Chancellor if the latter would agree.

I am still firmly of the opinion that no negotiation of any sort should be opened with the German Democratic Republic. And I hope the first public statement of the Western position will make it plain that we will use force if necessary to insure that West Berlin remains under the control of the present freely elected government, and that likewise we will use force if necessary to insure that the city is supplied *as at present*. In private communication to the Soviets, I would suggest spelling out in detail what this statement means. I would favor stating that the day Khrushchev carries out his threat and declares that his government has no further responsibility in the Zone or in Berlin, we would be prepared to occupy with our troops as much of his Zone as would be necessary to insure free passage of goods to Berlin by rail and autobahn. We would consider that his abdication of authority over the East Germans leaves us no choice but to exert our authority of [over] as much of Germany as is necessary for us to fulfill our commitment to free Berlin.

If it comes to a showdown the first step the East regime will probably take would involve interfering with the flow of supplies to the civilian population. (In a sense they did take this step when they raised the autobahn tolls in 1955.) I do not imagine that we would take aggressive military action against the Soviet troops in retaliation for the East German soldiers stopping civilian trucks. But, I believe it would be proper for us to react at once to such stoppage (after Khrushchev has declared the Soviet's authority is at an end) by a disposal of our troops to insure communication between the Federal Republic and free Berlin. The East Germans would have to be the first to shoot under the conditions. I doubt if they would, and if they did public opinion in the U.S. and in the free world would be on our side.

If the East regime did not stop all traffic but only annoyed us by intermittent stoppages because of broken rails and bridges, I think the West Germans should reply by embargoing all exports to the Soviet

¹ Not found in Department of State files.

Zone. Such action was discussed in 1955, and I was then convinced that in an economic battle we had better weapons than the East. The Federal Republic did not agree as they were worried about the supply of brown coal. The possibility of an economic offensive against the East Germans might well be reexamined.

Finally, I venture to suggest a possible new twist to our policy on reunification. I have in mind the possible need of meeting the British Labor Party's demand for a "new look" at this issue. I should be against any attempt to bring together representatives of the Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic. As a counter-proposal with propaganda value, we might offer to try and arrange elections in each of the states in the Federal Republic if the Soviets would do the same in the six states of their Zone. The voters would choose representatives to meet in an all-German council, which would have no administrative powers but which would be concerned solely with exploring a basis for reunification. Neither the Federal Republic nor the Democratic Republic would be represented on the council. I should not insist on supervised elections. Of course, the result would be six Communist members of the council, but since the council would be only for purposes of talk, this would not be dangerous.²

I suppose the Russians would reject the offer, but our having made it might be a good move particularly with reference to the attitude of the British Labor Party. (Gaitskell and I debated German reunification in an issue of *Western World* last Spring.)³ If the Russians were to accept the proposal, clearly the Berlin situation would be frozen in the present status until this all-German council could meet and proceed with their deliberations. These deliberations might take forever. Yet such a delay-action, it seems to me, is on our side.

I have no idea whether the Chancellor or the opposition leaders would consider such a proposal of any value. Of course, it could not be put forward unless there were agreement at least with the Chancellor. But if the idea seemed to have merit to the West, it might be pushed vigorously with the Germans, as I am afraid the Chancellor's first reactions to any new ideas of this sort are apt to be over-conservative. It might be pointed out to him that this action would be by the four occupying powers and would simply be used as a mechanism for getting together representatives from separate German states for a preliminary negotiation, looking forward to a proposal for an all-German government.

²In a note attached to the source text and dated December 22, Leon Fuller and George Morgan of the Policy Planning Staff noted that this suggestion was interesting and might have some value as a gimmick in dealing with the Soviet Union.

³For texts of Conant's "Against the Neutralization of a United Germany" and Gaitskell's "Such a Policy Might Pay," see *Western World*, Spring 1958, pp. 36–44.

I hardly need say that I realize that many, if not all, of my ideas may be of no value because of conditions which are unknown to me. Thank you for the opportunity of replying.

With my best wishes,
Sincerely,⁴

⁴Printed from an unsigned copy.

96. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)

Bonn, December 10, 1958.¹

Fought as usual today for firmness in Berlin. I see no way for the U.S. Government to avoid a decision, to be made known privately to the Soviets, that we are ready to preserve our rights in Berlin by force. This means an ultimate recourse to war, not waged in Berlin but between the US and the USSR. It would be difficult to persuade our allies to adopt such a course, but unless we have the firm intention, if driven to it, to employ force no matter what the risks, we will never in my opinion reach a satisfactory arrangement with the Soviet Government. However we should decide, there should be no publicity or use of threats, but our stand should be conveyed privately to Khrushchev so that at least he would make no miscalculations.²

Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.

¹ Presumably the entry was written in Bonn.

² The following day Bruce attended Trimble's staff meeting and reiterated these views. (*Ibid.*)

97. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, December 11, 1958, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President Nixon
Secretary Herter
Secretary Anderson
Secretary Quarles
General Taylor
Mr. Allen Dulles
Mr. Gordon Gray
Asst. Secretary Merchant
Mr. Lay
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

The President called this meeting as the result of learning that the contingency plans currently in effect covering a possible closing of the corridors to Berlin are not adequate. He began the meeting by announcing that we are here to consider the attitude that we will take in the face of the current Berlin situation.

Secretary Herter presented the basic State Department position by stating that we have now discovered that our initial position (that the GDR may be considered as agents of the Soviets) no longer applies. This conclusion he has reached because of: (a) the Soviet note of November twenty-seventh, which was received after the formulation of the U.S. position, and (b) the violence of the reaction of Chancellor Adenauer. Thus, since we do not recognize the GDR as agents of the Soviets, if GDR officials attempt to stamp or examine our papers, the question is what do we do?

Mr. Herter went on to explain that the draft message under consideration, which is designed for transmittal to the U.S. Embassy in Bonn,¹ is to be used as a paper for tabling at an Ambassadorial level talk to our allies in Bonn.

This contingency plan message, and the four-power discussions with relation to it, should not be confused with the four-power discus-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by John S.D. Eisenhower on December 17. The meeting was held in the President's office immediately following the 390th Meeting of the National Security Council. For the President's account of this meeting, see *Waging Peace*, pp. 337–339; for Major Eisenhower's account, see *Strictly Personal*, pp. 213–216. Another record of this meeting is in Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Executive Secretary Subject Files, Berlin Contingency Planning. Lay also made a record; see footnote 7 below.

¹ State Dept. Telegram Amembassy Bonn Niact 1236. [Footnote in the source text; telegram 1236 is printed as Document 98.]

sions which are soon to take place at the Ministerial level during the NATO meeting in Paris. This Ministerial level meeting is designed to formulate an official answer to the Soviet note of November twenty-seventh. It had been recommended that this matter be considered in NATO rather than in Bonn because of the rigid attitude of the British Ambassador in Bonn. The decision had emanated from the recommendation of Ambassador Bruce in Bonn.

The President agreed that this message would be all right for discussion purposes with our allies. He then went on to explain some of the difficulties which he visualizes. First of all, the U.S. now finds itself in a different situation from that in which the present agreements were formulated. These agreements came about at a time when all four powers were occupiers, which we no longer are. In the President's view, the U.S. made an error in attempting to control Germany from Berlin, so far behind the Russian lines. But he also recognizes that we now have pledges in the form of two million Germans in West Berlin, and we must stay there for their protection if nothing else. Since the present agreements were formulated, we have recognized West Germany and the Soviets have recognized East Germany. Since we refuse to recognize East Germany, our position with respect to Berlin can best be described as a "can of worms."

The President then referred to a conversation which he had recently with Secretary Dulles.² At this time the two had agreed that negotiation with the Chinese Communists and the GDR to leave our prisoners in their hands has not in itself resulted in recognition. The problem is, where do we go from here? We are in a position of using an obsolete agreement with a former occupying power as a basis on which to force our way into Berlin. In conclusion, the President stated that this paper is acceptable to table for discussion purposes with our allies, with recognition of the magnitude of the problem facing us.

The President then turned to another aspect of the problem, to wit, the definition of the term "token force." Mr. Quarles suggested that the key to the "token force" idea is to avoid letting the situation slip to the point that the force must become a major invasion. Our position must be to meet the first indications resolutely.

The President, in general agreement with this idea, questioned whether we shouldn't make it clear to the Russians that we consider this no minor affair. In order to avoid beginning with the white chips and working up to the blue, we should place them on notice that our whole stack is in this play.

²Not further identified although it might be that recorded in Document 80.

Mr. Herter then shifted the conversation to a British paper received the other day (State Department Daily Summary, December 11)³ in which the focus was thrown on the issue of interference with our rights of access, and the matter of recognition downgraded. On this matter, the President stated that in some of the reports he had seen, Brandt has complicated the issue by taking a softer attitude toward the prospect of a free city (including all zones) than does Adenauer. On this, Mr. Dulles, seconded by Mr. Herter, stated that Brandt has made one statement to that effect but that his position is not quite clear.

The President then gave a review of the actual events that transpired in 1945 with regard to selection of Berlin as a site from which to govern Germany. (He referred to the press conference of December 10.)⁴ He stated that he had been in favor of a cantonment type of combined headquarters located at the juncture of the zones. In contrast to this situation, we are now confronted with a group of hostages in the hands of the Soviets.

Mr. Herter then mentioned the problem of timing of a reply to Khrushchev. The French are in no hurry to reply to the Soviet note. Mr. Herter considers that how we approach the USSR on this matter is most important. On this, the President stated that we must give a reply after the Ministerial meeting of NATO. This reply should specify that we stand to guarantee the safety of West Germany.

Here Mr. Herter pointed out that Mr. Merchant is preparing a communiqué similar to that issued after the Berlin airlift in 1948.

The President now questioned the State Department as to their views on the efficacy of token force. Mr. Merchant's answer to this was that the key issue is a willingness to use limited force to maintain our rights. The attitude of the Germans if we let the GDR officials stamp our papers would be bad. If we accept any signs of jurisdiction by the GDR in the first instance, we have no firm line on which to stand if later provocations follow. He repeated that we must use limited force at the first instance, and that will be the greatest deterrent.

General Taylor proceeded to outline the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to wit, that it is difficult to tell how far we will go ultimately in our use of force. The important thing, in the view of the JCS, is to verify that we have been stopped, not by our own backing down, but by actual use of force on the part of the Soviets. From there we may have to pro-

³ A copy of the Daily Summary is in Department of State, Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 64 D 187. Copies of the British paper on Soviet intentions in Berlin, dated December 10, were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1432 from London, December 18. (*Ibid.*, Central Files 762.00/12-1858)

⁴ For a record of President Eisenhower's press conference on December 10, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 851-860.

ceed to an airlift as the next step; but this is the least desirable course of action and is regarded as a form of defeat. In short, an attempt on the part of an armed convoy may be regarded as a "reconnaissance in force." Its failure would leave us facing two choices: the use of more force, or the use of an airlift.

The Vice President then posed the question of what Khrushchev is after. Mr. Nixon considers it improbable that Khrushchev is seeking a fight but believes that Khrushchev may be seeking a conference.

On this, Mr. Dulles ventured that Khrushchev is probably looking for a way out at this time. His first motive had been to point up Europe since things in the world had been going rather well for the U.S. (Lebanon and Quemoy).

Mr. Nixon pointed out the parallel between this situation and the Quemoy situation in that the Soviets had stirred up trouble as a device to lure us into a conference. He then asked if the U.S. is willing at this time to have a conference.

Mr. Herter, still referring to the question of Khrushchev's motives, stated the view that Khrushchev had felt a need to bolster East Germany. Many people were making their escape from East Germany through Berlin. A high percentage of these people comprised intellectuals. Mr. Dulles agreed with Mr. Herter, stating that if a free election were held in East Germany, only 10% would vote Communist.

The President referred back to the joint message to be formulated at Paris as an answer to Khrushchev. In this message, the President feels we should use a tone which establishes that we are not seeking war and that we realize that the USSR is likewise not seeking war. This message should, after establishing our peaceful intentions, proceed to say that, "When you deny us our rights then we must reassess the situation." This message should be sent by the U.S. and our associates should send parallel messages. These messages should be sent soon after the NATO meeting. Once again the President reiterated that the messages should be in a friendly tone. To these thoughts, Mr. Herter added a final view that the theme of the messages should emphasize the regrettability of unilateral repudiation of obligation on the part of the USSR.

Mr. Merchant now brought up a new problem: the orders which are currently in effect directing personnel in the field to deal with GDR officials as agents of the USSR. Mr. Merchant feels that this must change. General Taylor agreed, pointing out that the orders are the result of Ambassadorial agreements. Mr. Merchant added they had been in effect since 1954.

This fact came somewhat as a surprise to the President, who stated that he believed he detected a correlation between this fact and the actions of Khrushchev. In the President's view, Khrushchev has probably

been counting on this to be our policy. He directed Mr. Herter to get the message off immediately to the Ambassador at Bonn to initiate Ambassadorial meetings with a view to revision of these instructions.

Mr. Gray now brought up the question of immediate action in the event of interference with convoys. Primarily, the question is one of timing. In the event a convoy is held up, do we pull back and consider the next move or is a limited use of force automatic? (The President observed that every convoy in a way is a probe.)

Mr. Gray continued with the thesis that our major problem is how to make the USSR use force first. Obviously, interference with airlift requires the USSR to be the first to use force. Mr. Gray questioned whether our policy in this regard has changed. General Taylor specified one point: when a ground convoy is stopped it does not remain at the detention point but departs the scene. In this connection, Mr. Herter pointed up the weakness of railroad traffic, which is that the Communists can blow a bridge and interdict the railroad without the direct use of force. General Taylor again reiterated his former point that he dislikes to retreat to the use of airlift.

Mr. Quarles now brought up the subject of a tack to be used in our approach to the Soviets. He feels that we should emphasize the rights of the two million people of West Berlin rather than the military rights of the occupying powers. To this the President agreed, specifying that a proper vehicle for emphasizing this point would be the talk which the Secretary of State might make when he leaves the hospital.⁵

In regard to the text of a reply to Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Merchant expressed the view that we must reject the Soviet unilateral action and propose a talk on the status of all Germany. The President interposed that Khrushchev had refused to consider a talk on all Germany. Mr. Merchant recommended that we not accept this stand of Khrushchev's. As to timing, Mr. Merchant agreed that we should have a draft completed after the NATO Ministerial meeting. However, he pointed out that the British will oppose the principle of use of limited force.

In view of possible difficulties with the British, the President then directed that we get our views in front of the British right now to allow them maximum time for consideration. In particular, if our policy is to be that our tack is to force the East Germans to use force, this point should be established early. However, the President specified that our main task should be to reach Khrushchev, ascertain what he wants, and proceed from there.

As a finale to the meeting, the President illustrated the complexity of these questions by describing a recent meeting he had had with a lady

⁵Dulles was in Walter Reed Hospital December 5-12 for various tests.

(Queen Frederika).⁶ She had urged that he take steps to ease world tensions by making a generous offer to the Soviets, so generous that the Soviets and the world would recognize it as such—but it must be short of surrender. This, the President stated, would be the trick of the week.⁷

John S. D. Eisenhower

⁶ President Eisenhower had lunch with Queen Frederika of Greece on October 23 during her visit to the United States.

⁷ According to another record of this conference drafted by Executive Secretary Lay, Herter, Merchant, Quarles, Taylor, Gray, Goodpaster, Major Eisenhower, Lay, and the President met in the Cabinet Room immediately after this conference in the President's office, but at Acting Secretary Herter's urging no record was kept of their conversation. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, December 11, 1958, 1:16 p.m.

1236. Paris pass USCINCEUR, Thurston, West, and USRO. Joint State-Defense message re contingency plans. Berlin's 400, 422;¹ USAREUR's SX 7922;² Bonn's 1111, 1161.³ It has been agreed contingency plans as revised (Embdes 1075, December 18, 1957)⁴ not applica-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McFarland December 5-8; cleared by Secretary Quarles, General Taylor, the President, Kohler, Merchant, Murphy, Calhoun, and officers from the Legal Adviser's Office; and approved by Herter. Also sent to Berlin and repeated to USAREUR, Paris, London, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 400 is not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 71. Telegram 422, November 28, transmitted a contingency plan similar to that proposed in SX 7922, which had been drafted before receipt of that cable. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2858)

² Telegram SX 7922, November 27, authorized the U.S. Commandant at Berlin to draft with his British and French colleagues a contingency plan for rail and road access to Berlin providing that military vehicles would turn back if access was denied by East German personnel, while train commanders would radio ahead for instructions in similar cases. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, Headquarters Department of the Army, Communications Center Files)

³ Telegram 1111, November 25, transmitted an agreed tripartite garrison airlift plan based on a U.S. draft. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2558) Telegram 1161 is printed as Document 83.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 34.

ble to present situation. Rationale no longer convincing in light position taken by Soviets in their note of November 27. Agency theory, which at best could only have provided interim solution, breaks down when both principal (USSR) and "agent" (GDR) deny such relationship and Soviet Union simply attempting to abandon its responsibilities.

By unilateral withdrawal from position as Occupying Power, USSR will create vacuum in Occupation arrangements. If no interference with our right of access, there no problem. However, in light present practice (in which GDR already controls West German traffic) and announced intentions, harassment may be expected but, at least initially, probably would not involve total blockade as in 1948–49 but could be limited to Allied traffic only. If there is actual or threatened harassment or interference would appear general principles applicable to joint operations would apply. When one party drops out, remaining parties entitled fill vacuum at least to extent necessary protect their rights. Under these circumstances, 3 Powers justified assert their rights take over control Autobahn and railroad and control air traffic between Federal Republic and Berlin to extent necessary ensure their unrestricted access Berlin.

In no event would GDR become beneficiary of attempted relinquishment by USSR of its rights and obligations or attempted voiding by USSR of Occupation rights of Western Powers in Berlin, without consent Western Powers. Further, latter cannot be divested of right as Occupying Powers without their consent, which presumably would be given only in connection with final settlement in form peace treaty.

In 1954, when agency theory considered feasible, it was assumed Soviets would only partially and gradually relinquish their controls. If consistent in asserting agency relationship did exist between GDR and USSR, we should have no basis refusing deal with GDR on any other matter involving Soviet responsibility in Germany.

Evident Berlin (Bonn's 1161), Soviet Zone and Federal Republic populace regard any dealing with GDR checkpoint officials as first step, however tentative, toward recognition GDR regime. Federal Republic and Berlin officials would inevitably draw conclusions from such action highly unfavorable to present Allied position on German question and Allied-German relationships. Far greater difficulty likely in mobilizing public opinion for firm stand at some later stage when already part way down "slippery slope" than at moment first GDR officials appear at checkpoints. Finally, recognition GDR by Allies would make Allied access to Berlin more vulnerable with end result our position would become untenable.

Embassy Bonn should raise urgently with British and French reconsideration existing contingency plans with view to eliminating all proposals for dealing with GDR officials at Autobahn and railway

checkpoints. After tripartite agreement reached Germans should be fully informed of details.

In place of present plans approved U.S. course of action should be presented to British and French, as follows:

A. Three Ambassadors in Moscow should inform Soviet Government at appropriate time (1) that 3 Powers continue hold USSR fully responsible under quadripartite agreements and arrangements concerning Berlin; (2) that 3 Powers have noted Soviet statements to effect that USSR will withdraw from its remaining Occupation functions with respect to Berlin. That they assume this means Soviets intend withdraw Soviet personnel from interzonal Autobahn and railway checkpoints and from BASC; (3) that 3 Powers' right unrestricted access would remain unaffected by Soviet withdrawal; (4) that 3 Powers will not tolerate attempt on part of so-called GDR to assert any control over or to interfere with their traffic to and from Berlin via quadripartitely established routes, and would take all measures necessary to protect their rights in this connection; (5) that, if Soviets withdraw, Western Powers will act on assumption (a) that USSR has decided to abolish unnecessary administrative procedures at interzonal borders, and (b) that USSR can and will, without benefit of exchange of flight information in BASC, maintain absolute separation of Soviet aircraft and all other aircraft flying in Soviet Zone from aircraft of 3 Powers flying in Berlin corridors and control zone; (6) that Western Powers will expect their traffic to move freely without any presentation of documents or other formalities at interzonal borders and will assume Soviets have given blanket assurance of safety of all 3 Power aircraft in Berlin corridors and control zone.

B. That if Soviet personnel are then withdrawn from checkpoints, we continue to dispatch military trains and military motor convoys on normal schedule and that we instruct commanders as indicated in para C below to refuse present any documentation to GDR checkpoint control officials or comply with any formalities suggested or instructions given by latter.

C. If GDR checkpoint personnel refuse to permit passage our trains and convoys on this basis, procedure in Berlin's 422 and USAREUR's SX 7922 would apply at once.

D. At this stage and before considering resort to airlift, attempt to reopen access through use limited military force will be made in order demonstrate our determination maintain surface access. In any case, Soviets and East Germans should not be allowed entertain doubts as to our determination to do so if need be. Even if force not resorted to at once we should continue assert our rights to resume interrupted traffic and our intention to do so by force if necessary. FYI. Purpose of resort to limited force proposed above, is, beyond that stated, to test Soviet intentions. If

British and French refuse to consider the limited use of force, matter will be referred to Washington for consideration of possible unilateral action in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. End FYI.

E. As concomitant to above course of action, we should consider whether 3 Powers should not take some additional step to guarantee their unrestricted air access to Berlin, which would be essential to maintaining status and security of city. Three Powers might, for example, reformulate and restate their Berlin guarantee, modifying it to add that they will regard any interference with their right and practice of unrestricted access to Berlin by air, including operation of their civil air carriers, as attack upon their forces and upon themselves. Here issue of flight in corridors over 10,000 feet might be solved by simple Three Power agreement to fly at altitude appropriate to efficient operation of individual aircraft. Communist harassment of our air access, which would be possible only through patent application of force, would be clear evidence of provocative intent. If it occurred we could then take such military/political/economic counteraction as necessary to maintain Berlin with fair assurance such action would have support of American, French, British and German public opinion.⁵

Herter

⁵ Later on December 11 Kohler handed representatives of the British and French Embassies identic aides-mémoire reflecting the position taken in this telegram. A memorandum of his conversation on this occasion with attached aide-mémoire is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1158.

99. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary of State Dulles

Bonn, December 11, 1958.

MR. SECRETARY, DEAR FRIEND: I have just heard with pleasure that you have already gotten over your illness and will be able to participate in the meeting of foreign ministers and the NATO consultations. Your presence at these meetings will be very reassuring to me.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. The source text is a translation by the Division of Language Services of the Department of State, February 13, 1981. The German-language text is *ibid.*, German Officials, 1958/1959. A very rough translation of the letter was transmitted in telegram 1245 from Bonn, December 11. (*Ibid.*)

Since I am convinced that the consultations among the foreign ministers in Paris will be of decisive importance for Europe and the future of the Atlantic Alliance, I consider it advisable to acquaint you with my thoughts on this first phase of our policy. As you know, I recently spent a few days in Berlin.¹ It was reassuring for me to note that neither the population of Berlin, nor the City's Senate are showing any signs of nervousness or weakness, and that there is unanimity between Berlin and the Federal Republic in all foreign policy questions. In the meantime, there has been an election in Berlin.² The result of this election is clear proof of this firm attitude towards the leaders of the so-called GDR and the Soviet Union. In comparison with the 1954 elections, the communist SED lost almost half of its votes. It received only 1.9% of the votes. This shows that the population of Berlin is determined to resist any Soviet threat. I am sure that this attitude of the Berlin population will not change even if the crisis should become worse, as long as the Western Powers unconditionally stand by their guarantee of the freedom of the Western part of the city, and the Federal Republic and the United States continue their economic support of the city. But I am equally sure that any hesitation or vacillation by the three guarantor powers must result in grave concern—if not panic—in Berlin. Since the 1948 blockade, the situation of Berlin has changed fundamentally. Due to American aid and the constant support by the Federal Republic, the city's economy is flourishing considerably, and while in 1948 the citizens of Berlin were more or less all equally poor, there are now large parts of the population that have something to lose once more, and have to fear for their hard-earned property and their personal liberty. What is more, the population is now much more alert, and it is clear to any thinking person that an airlift would not nearly be able to maintain the present standard of living of West Berlin. Finally, at the time of the blockade, no one was able to leave Berlin anyway, while now anyone can. I believe that it is of decisive importance for the development of West Berlin and the Federal Republic, to which any disturbance or panic in Berlin would spread, as well as Western Europe and the Free World, that not the least doubt should arise as to the guarantor powers and NATO standing by their commitments even in the most serious contingency.

If everything goes as planned, the consultations of the foreign ministers on Berlin will be relatively short. It is therefore very important that the communiqué be very clear and unambiguous, because the attention of the world will be focused on the wording of the communiqué. I have just explained what the effect of somewhat unclear and ambiguous for-

¹ Adenauer visited Berlin December 4-6.

² December 7.

mulations would be on Berlin. Moreover, I believe that if the Soviets found even a small indication in the communiqué that we might be disposed to consider a limitation of the rights of the three Western Powers in Berlin, a genuine danger to world peace could arise from this misconception.

As you know, I share your oft-expressed and confirmed opinion that any retreat before the use of force and infringement of our rights by the Soviet Union would have incalculable consequences for the future of the free West. I also believe that among all the efforts of the Kremlin to undermine the unity of the West, the case of Berlin is the most dangerous. Even a partial Russian success, by striking a blow at the confidence in contractual agreements and commitments undertaken, which is the necessary basis of this unity, would shake the entire carefully built-up structure of Western unity vis-à-vis communism.

In recent days, there have been public debates in almost all countries on whether it would be a good idea to answer the Soviet threat to the freedom of Berlin with an offer to the Soviet government to discuss the German problem as a whole. There is no doubt that such a discussion is necessary, at the right time, and after careful preparation. But I do not believe that such negotiations can and should be undertaken under the temporal and material pressure of a Russian ultimatum. It is unthinkable that in a period of six months even the basic points of an agreement with the Russians could be found, not least because the points of departure the Russians have created for such negotiations would be the worst imaginable for the West. The six-month deadline imposed by the Russians would hang over all negotiations like a sword of Damocles. For this reason, I am of the opinion that the Berlin question and the larger problem, i.e. that of German reunification, must be treated separately. A linkage of these two questions would either endanger the freedom of Berlin, or set the solution of the general German problem on a track which would have to lead to a more or less veiled capitulation before the Soviet demands. Furthermore, a departure from the repeatedly expressed guarantees for Berlin by the Western powers—allow me to repeat this once more—would ruin the credibility of all Western guarantees. To you of all people, Mr. Dulles, who in past years have done so immeasurably much for the cohesion among the countries of the free Western World vis-à-vis the constant communist threat, thanks to your clear conception and the firmness of your convictions and your will power, I need not explain what would be the consequences of even a slightly ambiguous attitude on the entire part of the world that is still free today. I am furthermore of the opinion that the Soviet Union will not resort to force against Berlin if the Western powers show an unmistakably firm attitude.

These arguments must not be understood to mean that I do not consider it possible that after the Russian attempt with regard to Berlin has been clearly rejected, the time may be ripe, or even favorable, for dealing with other questions which would serve a general relaxation of tensions—compare the Geneva talks—and for taking up the German question in its totality with the Soviets. After the lifting of the blockade, too, negotiations were begun, which, however, did not bring any results at the time. It might be advisable to give an indication that we might be disposed to negotiate, but only after the Kremlin has been made to understand that existing or future agreements with the Soviet Union lose all their value if Moscow insists on the method of unilateral cancellation of existing agreements.

I am writing you these thoughts of mine because there is no possibility of discussing these serious questions with you directly. I believe, as I have already stated in the beginning, that the tone and content of the Paris communiqué will be decisive in the further course of events, for never before in the postwar period was the Western World as dependent on the support of public opinion in all free nations as it is today. It will therefore require a special propaganda effort to enlighten even the neutrally inclined nations on the true character of the Soviet offensive.

I sent the same message today to Prime Minister Macmillan³ and President de Gaulle.

Please accept my best wishes for a complete recovery. I hope to see you soon.

Adenauer⁴

³ A translation of this message, which is the same in substance as that sent to Dulles, was transmitted in telegram 3155 from London, December 12. (Department, of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1258) For extracts from the message, see Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, pp. 578-580.

⁴ Printed from the English translation that indicates that Adenauer signed the original German-language copy.

100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, December 11, 1958, 7:39 p.m.

1243. Paris pass USRO, USCINCEUR, Thurston and West. Your 1204.¹ While we recognize answers to questions raised by Brentano can only be developed in course of forthcoming consultations, we believe following summary of our preliminary views about reply to Soviet notes on Berlin may be helpful.

A. We believe indispensable element of our reply is restatement of our basic position re Germany, including our position re Berlin. Therefore essential reply should contain:

1. Restatement of our determination to maintain our rights and position in Berlin and to uphold existing security and freedom of city.

2. Brief refutation of historical interpretation upon which Soviets attempt base repudiation of Four Power agreements. (We would prefer leave detailed correction of Soviet distortions of history to separate "white papers" which would be given maximum distribution.)

3. Restatement of our legal argument that USSR cannot unilaterally abrogate occupation rights of three Western Powers or Four Power agreements and that we shall continue to hold USSR responsible under these agreements.

4. Rejection of Soviet proposal for "free city" of West Berlin together with explanation of reasons for rejection which will make issues clear.

5. Statement that it is threats of USSR and East German puppet regime which have created existing difficulties in Berlin and have made Berlin focus of international tension and danger for world peace.

6. Statement that problem of Berlin is part of problem of Germany as a whole and that there can be no genuine or lasting solution outside context of German reunification.

7. Reference to notes of September 30, 1958,² to which USSR has not replied, and statement of our readiness to resume at any time discussions of German problem broken off after Geneva Conference.³

B. While above represents minimum which reply must contain, we believe reply should also take constructive tone and not be limited

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-858. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Hillenbrand, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, USAREUR, and Berlin.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 88.

² For text of this note, which agreed to the establishment of a four-power working group to prepare joint proposals for a solution of the German problem, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 20, 1958, pp. 615–616.

³ Documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting, October 27–November 16, 1955, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, volume V.

to mere restatement of our position and rejection of Soviet position. In addition making underlying issues and our position clear, we believe our reply should recognize interrelation of problems of Berlin, German reunification, European security, and disarmament and should seize opportunity for new diplomatic offensive on this complex of questions. We further believe our reply should be formulated to offset influence which Soviet note may have had on those elements of world opinion which are unfamiliar or unconcerned about Berlin situation and may thus think Western position is unduly rigid. Therefore believe it desirable our reply contain some or all of following:

1. Proposal for conference of Four Foreign Ministers at stated time and place to discuss problem of Germany and/or security of Berlin within framework of European security and disarmament problems.

2. Indication of some superficial, if not substantial, modification of our previous position re German reunification.

3. Following reiteration of our position re responsibility of Four Powers for Berlin, statement of our willingness discuss with Soviets ways and means of reducing tension in Berlin and improving conditions for Berlin population.

4. Summary of real problems of Berlin which, if Soviets wished make positive contribution, could properly be made subjects for Four Power discussions. Summary should stress maintenance of Berlin's unity, freedom, and security; freedom of Berlin's transport and communications; and free determination by population of Berlin both of political and economic regime within city and of city's political relationships with other parts of Germany.

5. After statement that we recognize achievement of reunification may be long and difficult, proposal that Ambassadors of Four Powers in Germany, assisted by German experts, meet regularly to consider interim measures to minimize hardships which prolonged division of country imposes on population, e.g. to study possibility of assuring freedom of movement from one part of Germany to another, possibility of improving interzonal transport facilities, etc.

6. Statement of our readiness to submit legal dispute with USSR over status of Berlin to International Court of Justice for adjudication.

C. If joint decision meanwhile reached to revise our contingency planning to avoid dealing with GDR officials, our reply might also, after appropriate reference to six-month deadline set in Soviet note, convey to USSR warning of our intentions as set forth in para A of alternative course of action proposed in Deptel 1236 to Bonn.⁴

Herter

⁴ Document 98.

101. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, December 11, 1958, 9 p.m.

Polto 1651. Department pass Defense. Reference: Polto 1633.¹ Spaak led off NAC Berlin discussion afternoon December 10 by stressing necessity giving other nations chance to express views before those of four powers firmed up.

Italy noted present NAC discussion could only be preliminary and real consultation should take place in ministerial meeting. Thought West should be firm against Russian blackmail, should not take solely negative stand but should offer constructive proposal. Thought IS paper (Polto 1599)² was good starting point.

Greece agreed and added West must outline briefly legal position. Main point that Berliners cannot be abandoned. Belgium noted three points for consideration: (1) must be immediate reaction to Soviet note stating (a) agreements cannot be unilaterally changed, (b) Russians playing with dangerous fire, (c) NATO firm in resisting Soviet demands; (2) if USSR takes action as threatened in note, what happens? Can we avoid contact with GDR? (3) What is final answer? Suggested proposing all Berlin be free city with access to West guaranteed and noted rumors Soviets would accept such proposal. Asked if Germans regarded Berlin situation as insoluble apart from solution whole German problem.

Germany, after noting usefulness of NAC discussion, assured NAC questions raised, especially those by Belgium, very much on mind of Germans. Special four power group considering problem but too early to give their views. Certain that reply will not be merely negative. On government instructions assured NAC Chancellor in recent statement had not meant Berlin problem should be settled outside general solution but intended merely point out there was 6 month deadline for some settlement on Berlin.

France thought three types problem involved, i.e., procedural, basic (should reply be negative or positive and cover Berlin alone or

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–1158. Confidential. Repeated to London and Bonn.

¹ Polto 1633, December 10, reported that the discussion of Berlin by the North Atlantic Council on December 10 had been full and satisfactory, but that no new major points had emerged. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/12–1058)

² Polto 1599, December 8, transmitted the text of PO/58/1548, "The Berlin Question," drafted by the International Staff, which reviewed the objectives that the Council should have in mind in considering the question. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/12–858)

Germany as a whole), and immediate (what if GDR replaces Soviets at check points? What about airlift? replenishment of stocks?). Did not think ministerial meeting would produce final reply. Welcomed IS document. Thought Berlin question should be dealt with in NATO communiqué. There should neither be a counterproposal nor a flat refusal which might induce Soviets to increase pressure and step up timetable of action.

UK agreed with France ministerial meeting unlikely to produce final position. Said (1) Soviet proposals unacceptable; (2) Soviet position wrong juridically; (3) West cannot abandon Berlin. Felt this serious Soviet move in which Khrushchev personally involved. Agreed West must be firm but also develop positive approach. This easy to say but difficult develop. Foreign Office felt reply should meet five tests: (1) should not put us in disadvantageous military position if Soviets accept; (2) should appeal to public opinion of Germans and Berliners; (3) should also appeal to NATO public opinion; (4) should be difficult for Soviets to refuse to discuss; (5) should contain element of novelty. Re IS paper thought first four paragraphs good but had doubts on fifth paragraph. Felt there should be no interim reply since this would encourage further communication from Soviets.

US welcomed NATO discussion and agreed with UK that first 4 paragraphs of IS paper good. Agreed no final reply could be drafted by time of NATO ministerial meeting. Expressed some doubt re advisability. Thought ministerial meeting should result in firm yet constructive statement of principle on Berlin. Then read summary Khrushchev-Humphrey conversations (Topol 1952)³ to very attentive Council.

Denmark agreed Soviet proposals unacceptable and thought would be wiser not have firm reply drafted by ministerial meeting. Suggested there be statement by three powers who had rights in Berlin, supported by NATO.

Canada welcomed this type discussion in NAC. Hoped four powers would make no statement before ministerial meeting and that formula would be found to say four powers concerned would continue to consult other nine countries.

Spaak concluded discussion by stressing all NATO countries had political responsibility in this matter, though the responsibility of four is a special one. Communiqué will be difficult but must make clear to West and Soviets line beyond which we cannot go, thus meeting essential need to leave line of retreat for Russians. Very important that Western

³ Topol 1952, December 8, transmitted a summary of the Khrushchev-Humphrey conversation on Berlin (see Document 84) for use in the Council discussion on December 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-HU/12-858)

public opinion must understand if we abandon Berlin and its 2 and a half million people, it will be beginning piecemeal advance by Soviet power akin to way Hitler operated. Stressed that comparison between similarity of Soviet operations and those of Hitler would appeal particularly to Western opinion. We must be clear in what we mean by being firm but must not get in position of making war to prevent Russians from leaving Berlin. Thought we would be faced eventually with problem dealing in some manner with GDR. Thought if Soviets suggested settling Berlin question alone we should tell them they can't expect us abandon Berlin except in context settlement German problem as whole.

Burgess

102. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 11, 1958.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe, German Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant—EUR
Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman—GER

Ambassador Grewe called at his request to learn the Department's latest ideas on the Berlin problem as he was taking off for the Experts' Meeting on Saturday, December 13, and would be seeing his Foreign Minister that evening.

Mr. Merchant said he thought the Paris meetings came at a good time, before positions were frozen. As he saw it now we would deal with the problem roughly as follows:

1. We would reject the Soviet proposal;
2. We would reassert our rights in Berlin;
3. We would place the Berlin question in the framework of the larger question of Germany; and

4. We would express a willingness to negotiate with the Soviets in the broad frame of German reunification and European security.

Mr. Merchant then turned to the question of the German position on a zone of force and arms limitations, pointing out that if we were to negotiate with the Soviets we would have to have a united position on European security. The Germans had recently indicated their withdrawal from previously agreed positions on the zone of force and arms limitations.

The Ambassador commented that he had been surprised by his Government's attitude. He did not believe his Government had really withdrawn from its former position and that in any case it could probably return to the old position—there was no big obstacle to overcome. Internal discussions in Bonn have not yet really resulted in firm conclusions. It was true, however, that the Chancellor was worried about too narrow a zone of force and arms limitations.

Mr. Merchant expressed himself as reassured with what the Ambassador had said and then remarked that the Ambassador would not find the U.S. position in Paris either weak or wobbly. Any concept of "agency" in treating with the GDR had collapsed. The problem in being firm, however, was the problem of finding the place to make a stand.

The Ambassador went on to describe the Chancellor's position on Berlin. The West, according to the Chancellor, must have a common position. It cannot negotiate under threat. The elements of ultimatum in the Soviet note must be eliminated. Berlin had to be separated from any other questions about which we might negotiate with the Soviets.

The Ambassador then referred to a *New York Times* article by Sulzberger¹ in which it had been suggested that West Berlin could be integrated into the Federal Republic and the Western garrisons replaced by Bundeswehr contingents. Ambassador Grewe went on to say it was his personal feeling that this proposal on the one hand would be unacceptable to the Soviets, and on the other hand was very dangerous. The presence of Bundeswehr units could not be equated to the presence of the allied forces for obvious psychological and political reasons. Moreover, the Sulzberger suggestion overlooks the very important question of free access to Berlin. Moreover, said Ambassador Grewe, the people of Berlin do not mind their occupation status. In part the West Berlin election was testimony to this fact.

The Ambassador then adverted to the idea attributed to Mayor Brandt involving the internationalization of communication lines between West Germany and West Berlin, with UN forces assuring the freedom of Berlin. The Ambassador then asked rhetorically which UN

¹ *The New York Times*, December 12, 1958, p. 38.

members were ready to participate and accept such a responsibility. Mayor Brandt was impairing the present legal position with this proposal. It would plainly be difficult to cope with public opinion in opposing a proposal involving the creation of a four-sector free city guaranteed by the UN. It had to be remembered that if such a proposal were to be accepted and a new blockade imposed the West would then have the problem of taking care of the people who live in East Berlin as well as those in West Berlin so that the burden of countering a blockade was increased by the needs of one and one-half million people.

Mr. Merchant and the Ambassador agreed that there may be superficially attractive alternatives but none so far proposed were really acceptable.

The conversation then turned to the possibility of taking the Berlin problem to the International Court of Justice. Mr. Merchant thought such a move might have considerable merit at a later stage, after we made our position crystal-clear. It is a useful secondary operation, not to be undertaken until a Western reply had been registered. Ambassador Grewe agreed that it would be useful to provide the Soviets with this kind of possibility of retreat if the Soviets had in fact decided to retreat. The Ambassador remarked semi-seriously that before the Berlin problem was allowed to go before the International Court, a careful canvass ought to be made of the makeup of the present Bench in order to have some idea of how the matter was likely to be received by the Court.

103. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, December 12, 1958, 4 p.m.

2193. Embassy telegram 2166 to Department.¹ Couve de Murville made following comments to me this morning which modify or supple-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1258. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 2166, December 10, transmitted French views on the paper that Brentano had given to the Western Ambassadors on December 8 (see Document 88). The French believed the reply should be made quickly with a firm rejection of the Soviet proposals, the present contingency plans were adequate, and a four-power working group should be established, but not at Bonn. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1058)

ment French view on Western response to Soviet note on Berlin, as outlined referenced telegram.

He definitely favors sending Western reply as soon as possible, preferably before Christmas. He suggested it might be desirable in interests of speed for quadripartite drafting group to stay on in Paris after NATO Ministerial meeting to work on reply. Although expressing complete agreement to participation Federal Republic in drafting Western response, he reiterated French objections to Bonn as location for drafting group. In addition reasons previously cited and reported by Embassy for this French position, he said drafting in Bonn might be provocative as far as Soviets are concerned.

Couve said he feels Western replies should be separate, with substance the same but not identical in wording.

Minister confirmed that French do not believe it would be advisable to make counter-proposals on Berlin itself or advance new proposals on German reunification which would represent any change in basic Western position adopted Geneva 1955. However, he thinks Western powers should reiterate willingness discuss with Soviets questions of German reunification, European security and peace treaty.

On possible revision in contingency planning re access to Berlin, Couve said he was not familiar with details this problem, which should be put to experts in first instance. (Embassy has previously reported Foreign Office working level view that present plan is about as far as we should go.)²

Couve agrees there must be mention of Berlin in NATO communiqué, but he feels statement should not be too detailed. He believes it will be more effective if main lines of Western position are left to be formulated in replies of US, UK and France to Soviet note.

Although Couve spoke firmly of unacceptability of Soviet proposals, he said it is clear that biggest and most immediate problem before us relates to use of forces to protect allied rights in Berlin. Should we use force? If so, at what stage, to what extent, and where? Couve indicated that he had come to no firm conclusions himself on these questions, which he expects will be thrashed out in Foreign Ministry talks over weekend.

Houghton

²See footnote 1 above.

104. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, December 12, 1958, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
Secretary Herter
Mr. Greene
Mr. Hagerty
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

The discussion then turned to a message which Secretary Dulles had received from Chancellor Adenauer earlier in the day.¹ (The letter had been summarized in the Daily Staff Summary,² and the President was familiar with it.) As regards this letter, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that our best argument against the USSR is that the USSR has served notice that in six months they will unilaterally repudiate a four-power agreement, a thing which they have no right to do. In the light of the threatening nature of the November 27 Soviet note, Secretary Dulles does not recommend negotiations under these conditions. We can meet later, but in the meantime, the status quo must stand and be recognized.

The President stated, with respect to the Adenauer letter, only that he agreed on the separation of the subjects of Berlin and unification of Germany. He agrees that the issues are separate and distinct. Some discussion then transpired as to the situation in the British foreign office, with an effort to explain recent inconsistencies. The President was of the opinion that the British government is, at the moment, confused.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Major John Eisenhower on December 15.

¹ Document 99.

² A copy of the State Department Daily Summary for December 12 is in Department of State, Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 64 D 187.

105. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/7

Paris, December 13, 1958, 6:20 p.m.

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris, France, December 16-18, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Burgess
Ambassador Bruce
Ambassador Houghton
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Greene
Mr. Timmons
Mr. Smith
Mr. Becker
Mr. Hillenbrand

Defense

Mr. McElroy
General Twining
General Norstad
General Guthrie
Admiral Boone
Mr. Irwin
Mr. Haskell

Treasury

Mr. Scribner

SUBJECT

Berlin

The Secretary began by noting that the Germans were anxious to have a strong substantive communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers after their meeting on December 14. Spaak was opposed to this, and there was some reason for his opposition. However, the Secretary observed, it seems likely that the Foreign Ministers will have to say something. Spaak had already prepared a draft communiqué which might be issued by the NATO Council.

The Secretary said that his own disposition was to be rather tough in responding to the Soviets. Their proposal struck him as outrageous both in tone and substance. We had made an arrangement with them giving up Saxony and Thuringia in exchange for entry into the three Western sectors of Berlin. They had consolidated their position in the area which we had relinquished; now they want us to move out of Berlin. The Soviets talk of negotiating new agreements in the same breath as they denounce the old agreements. What is the point of arriving at agreements if they are going to be subject to unilateral denunciation when they no longer serve the purpose of one of the parties?

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on December 15. The meeting was held at the Embassy residence.

The Secretary noted that there was some difference of view as to whether or not a proposal for general negotiations should be included in the same document replying to the Soviet note. The Germans were apparently opposed to this, particularly Adenauer. Ambassador Bruce said that it was necessary to distinguish between the position of the Chancellor now, and the position which he might take a little later. He thought that the Chancellor would eventually accept, under pressure of public and party opinion in Germany, the idea of a proposal for negotiations. We would know this a little more clearly when the Germans stated their views on December 14.

The Secretary commented that the difficult thing is to find the point at which physically there would be a break with the Soviets. If our new contingency paper were to be accepted, that would establish the point, but it was doubtful that it would be accepted. The Secretary said he was convinced that the Soviets did not want general war with us and will not consciously get into one. The problem is to make the issue sufficiently clear-cut. Otherwise, a little shooting might grow into big shooting. The issue in this instance is elusive, and it is not clear how it will be posed.

Ambassador Bruce said that we must be prepared to be tough from the beginning, assuming the analysis of the Soviet intentions made by the Secretary were correct. If we do not have a firm position on our part, we will not get even a comparatively firm position from our Allies. The Secretary said that this was true enough, but did not really meet the basic problem he had just mentioned. We are prepared to be strong and tough, but how does this work out in specific terms? He referred to the case of a convoyed truck and the decision which would have to be made to shoot or not, but that would not accomplish much. Ambassador Bruce said that, if we told the Soviets we are going to maintain our access by surface and where, there may be incidents and we might be faced by a crisis, but we will never know this unless we take such a stand. The British are inclined to temporize and to accept *facto* recognition of the GDR [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. However, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the British, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] are prepared to be relatively tough on Berlin. The West Germans know that the U.S. Government is determined and ready to employ force if necessary to maintain our access to Berlin. But the problem of how to deal with the other Allies who want to take a weaker position faces them.

Mr. Merchant said that the decision which we may be faced with next week is whether, if the British and French refuse to accept our proposals for revision of contingency plans, we are prepared to go it alone. If such a decision is taken, the sooner we tell the Russians this, the less possibility there would be of incidents. He was opposed to changing the point at which we would be prepared to use force.

General Norstad said that, if we took a strong position on Berlin, we should also propose a conference related to this firm position to give the Soviets a way out. Such a simultaneous proposal of a conference might also make it easier for the British and French to take a firm position. Going it alone would cost the West a great deal. Ambassador Bruce commented that, as soon as Adenauer is certain of the firmness of our own position, he will agree to anything. He would also therefore accept the idea of a meeting.

Mr. Smith said he thought that the time when we should plan to resort to force would be that point where it would be credible to the Soviets that we would do so. This point did not seem to be that where GDR officials would require credentials of our official travelers. A better point would be the clear blockage of our rights. The Secretary commented that there would not be any such clear blockage of our rights. Rather there would be a slow process of strangulation. The principles are elusive. The GDR officials will say that certainly they will let us go through if we comply. Ambassador Bruce noted that, in the air, there may be incidents of a real war-like nature.

General Twining said that we certainly have to stop this somewhere. We must ignore the fear of general war. It is coming anyway. Therefore we should force the issue on a point we think is right and stand on it. Khrushchev is trying to scare people. If he succeeds, we are through.

Ambassador Bruce mentioned a dinner given recently by the President of the Bundestag, Dr. Gerstenmaier, at which political leaders of all parties were present. They were unanimous in stressing that the U.S. must, if necessary, use force to maintain its position in Germany, even when illogically the same leaders were opposed to arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons. This was true also of German trade union leaders with whom the Ambassador had recently met in Dusseldorf.

The Secretary said that there was no doubt in anybody's mind that, if we give way, it would be a disaster, and that we would face the same threat later under even worse conditions. We all know what the problem is, but grappling with it in specific terms is difficult.

Mr. McElroy said that, as he saw it, it was difficult to find the point where force could be applied. Berlin was isolated and some better way of securing our access thereto should be our limited objective in the present exercise. Therefore, there should be a conference on this subject. There was no doubt in the Defense Department about the necessity of taking a firm position.

The Secretary mentioned that the 1949 Paris Conference reached agreement on access to Berlin, but that had not stuck. Ambassador Bruce noted that nothing would really satisfy the Berliners except the

continuance of the American guarantee. If we get over the present situation, the same problem will still be with us.

**106. Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council
Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State**

Paris, December 14, 1958, 1 a.m.

Secto 4. Quadripartite working level group met morning and afternoon today, Dec. 13, at FonOff to consider questions of procedure and substance in connection with handling of Soviet note on Berlin. Delegations of France, Germany, UK, US headed respectively by Laloy, Grewe, Rumboldt, Hillenbrand. Ambassadors to Bonn of France, UK, US joined group in afternoon.

Working group attempted to provide answers to questions posed in questionnaire prepared by French along lines of FedRep questionnaire given to three Ambassadors in Bonn last week by Brentano.¹ Group decided that following points should be left for consideration by four FonMins Dec. 14:

1. Should communiqué to be issued after quadripartite FonMin meeting Dec. 14 be substantive or non-committal? Germans are pressing for firm, substantive language in communiqué.

2. Can Western replies to Soviet note of Nov. 27 suggest counter-proposals or should we refuse to suggest any counter-proposals until Soviets withdraw ultimative character of their note? Grewe indicated Germans preferred latter.

3. Group agreed that, if counter-proposals made, they should not be limited to Berlin directly but should refer to German problem as whole. There was no discussion of substance of possible counter-proposals, however.²

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1458. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, and London.

¹ The French questionnaire had three parts: 1) procedure in responding to the Soviet note, 2) substance of the response, and 3) substantive questions about Berlin that would not be dealt with in the reply. A copy of the French text of the questionnaire is attached to a memorandum of conversation, dated December 11. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/12-1158) An annotated English translation is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1174. Regarding the German questionnaire, see Document 88.

² Following the discussions reported in this telegram Dulles, Bruce, McElroy, Twinning, Norstad, Merchant, and other U.S. officials met at the Embassy residence where they "all announced for a firm stand on Berlin." (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

107. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/5

Paris, December 14, 1958, 11:45 a.m.

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris, France, December 16-18, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Asst. Secretary Merchant
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. W.R. Tyler

Germany

Foreign Minister von Brentano
State Secretary Van Scherpenberg
Ambassador Grewe
Ambassador Blankenhorn
Ambassador Duckwitz
Herr Weber (interpreter)

SUBJECT

Berlin

Von Brentano said he had just been to see Spaak about this afternoon's Foreign Ministers meeting, and its relationship to the NATO Council meeting. The question was whether the draft communiqué prepared by the working group yesterday could form a basis for discussion this afternoon.¹

Mr. Merchant said that he thought it could be a basis of discussion. He did not think the Secretary was likely to accept it entirely in its present form, our inclination was to keep the substantive content to a minimum, reserving a more detailed declaration for a communiqué to be published by the NATO Council. This draft, he thought, should be somewhat more factual and less declaratory.

Von Brentano said Spaak had pointed out that we should be aware of the fact that since 1954, NATO had assumed its own commitments with regard to Berlin, which had been renewed in December, 1957.² Von Brentano said he agreed with Spaak's point and that we should avoid giving the impression that in today's meeting, the Foreign Ministers had in any way prejudiced the Council's position or decision. Von Brentano

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169. Drafted by Tyler. The meeting was held at the Hotel Bristol.

¹ Not found, but see Document 106.

² For text of the NATO Heads of Government communiqué, December 19, 1957, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 6, 1958, pp. 12-15.

went on to say that, while he understood Spaak's views, German and world opinion would react in an unfavorable manner if no strong or convincing public declaration were made by the Foreign Ministers today. There would not be much point merely in saying that they were united. The press would interpret this as meaning that the reason why they had confined themselves to speaking about unity was precisely because they were not united.

Mr. Merchant said the Secretary feels the Four should state they agree that the Soviet proposals should be rejected as being totally unacceptable. It was desirable to eliminate from the communiqué anything which would have an adverse effect, in view of the sensitivity of NATO members.

Von Brentano went on to say that he was adopting this course with some hesitation. He said he thought there was a danger that, because of the different views and attitudes of various members of NATO, the NATO communiqué would represent the lowest common denominator of these views, just as the speed of a convoy is that of the slowest ship. He said he thought there were two decisions to be taken today: First, an internal decision among the Four with regard to their common position, which would remain "in the desk drawer" until Tuesday; second, a decision on the declaration to be published today, in which it would be stated that the Foreign Ministers would report to the Council on Tuesday.

At this point Ambassador Blankenhorn intervened to say that Spaak had insisted that, in order to preserve NATO unity, a final communiqué must on no account be published today. He summarized Spaak's ideas on what should be said today as follows: "The Three (or the Four) Foreign Ministers are agreed that their legal position in Berlin should be upheld. There is no legal reason to accept the Soviet proposal. However, the Soviet note carries with it certain political implications which should be discussed within NATO, because it has assumed certain obligations with regard to Berlin in 1954 which have been renewed in 1957."

Mr. Merchant said he hoped that this afternoon's communiqué would essentially meet Spaak's concern but would make it clear that the Soviet proposal was unacceptable.

There followed some confused and confusing comments by Von Brentano, Blankenhorn and Van Scherpenberg on how many papers needed to be prepared. Out of this confusion Mr. Merchant clarified the situation as follows: He said he did not think we needed to envisage more than two papers. What was required was (1) today's Foreign Ministers' communiqué, which should not go into too much detail, and should protect NATO's legitimate interests in the subject; (2) during the NATO discussion of the Berlin item, one, or perhaps even all four Minis-

ters, would present an oral report along commonly agreed lines. This report would end by saying that the essential points of the position agreed on by the Four had been summarized in a paper which would then be handed to Spaak for incorporation in the NATO communiqué as the part on Berlin.

Blankenhorn said there was, nevertheless, a danger that the paper which NATO might draw up would be weaker than the position taken by the Four.

Mr. Merchant said, speaking personally, he felt the Four should reserve the right to publish their own statement independently of the NATO communiqué, in the event that the other members of the Council should insist on watering their position down too much.

Von Brentano said he hoped that the other members would go along with the position taken by the Four.

Blankenhorn expressed himself as not being entirely sanguine on this point, and referred to the possible effect of yesterday's Soviet note to all the members of NATO.³

Von Brentano said he had talked with Prime Minister Hansen of Denmark on December 12, and that the latter's position at that time was perfectly clear and sound.

Mr. Merchant observed that the Soviet note to the members of NATO was practically standard operational procedure immediately preceding meetings of the Western powers.

Blankenhorn said Spaak had suggested that the discussion on Berlin take place in secret session first thing in the morning session on December 16, in order that the whole day should be available for this purpose.

Von Brentano said he agreed with Spaak that the Berlin question should become Point I on Tuesday. It was desirable that any differences that may exist should be smoked out at once and not be allowed to subsist undiscussed.

Mr. Merchant agreed and said he would make recommendations to the Secretary along these lines. He observed that the longer discussion was postponed and a public position taken, the more the press would speculate. He thought it might be a good thing to issue a special communiqué on Berlin by Tuesday evening.

Grewe said he thought the working group communiqué could stand some shortening, but that, essentially, it meets Spaak's concern.

³ A translation of this December 13 note was transmitted in telegram 1262 from Moscow, December 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1358) The Russian-language text was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 341 from Moscow, December 15. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-PA/12-1558)

Mr. Merchant agreed that it pretty well met the criteria just discussed.

At this point Blankenhorn made some comments suggesting that he did not agree with this, and that he was in favor of cutting the present draft down and reserving the substantive part for the NATO communiqué.

Von Brentano raised some procedural questions with regard to this afternoon, and Mr. Merchant said he thought it might be a good idea to start the meeting by discussing the working group communiqué.

In conclusion it was agreed that the German Delegation would draft a preliminary text of a communiqué for discussion in NATO, and would have it ready in time for the 4:30 meeting this afternoon.

**108. Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council
Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State**

Paris, December 15, 1958, 1 a.m.

Secto 10. French Chairman opened meeting French, U.K. and U.S. Foreign Ministers after tripartite lunch at Quai d'Orsay at 1440 hours today.

Secretary began by noting might be useful to consider at early stage, and before arrival of Germans, question of revision existing contingency plans which we had raised with British and French.¹ American initiative had been approved at highest level of government, and in essence we would like to revise instructions for Allied personnel on military trains and autobahn. Couve queried whether Secretary envisaged doing something in this field before replies sent to Soviet notes of November 27. Secretary said we wanted to change contingency plans now. We could not rely on six months waiting period stipulated by Soviets before changes to be made. If GDR officials appeared at check point tomorrow our people would operate on basis of agency theory which no longer valid.

Couve queried why there was no mention of air access in American proposals. He had impression air communications were most important

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1558. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

¹ See Document 98 and footnote 5 thereto.

to Allied position in Berlin, and he had thought that solution, as in 1948, would be to maintain communications of Berlin garrisons by air. Secretary responded that U.S. proposal did not deal with all contingencies, but was meant to eliminate present authority to treat GDR representatives as agents of Soviets. It dealt with aspect of problem which had aroused considerable emotional response in Federal Republic.

Lloyd said British could accept points A to C set forth in Deptel 1236 to Bonn, 327 to Berlin, 2147 to Paris, 559 to London and 945 to Moscow.² Point D however, involving question of using military action to try force way through, he considered to be in different category. He agreed we should make our position clear to Soviets and instruct our people accordingly, but contemplated military action was not part of same exercise. This would have to be considered separately. As to point E he was not quite clear as to whether this was consistent with A B and C, but in any case paragraph D involved a completely different range of discussion.

Couve said he had same opinion as Lloyd, and could approve proposed changes only up to and including point C. It was obvious that we could not accept idea that GDR officials are just agents of Soviets if it said in advance that Soviets are giving up all their rights to GDR. However, would have to think further about point D.

Secretary stated that point D contemplated show of force in order to test whether there would be resistance by force. If it agreeable to colleagues to accept A to C point D could be reserved for further consideration.

Couve added that he thought point A re informing Soviet Government would be largely taken care of by replies to November 27 Soviet note. Secretary agreed. Couve added that Foreign Ministers should accordingly instruct their representatives in Bonn to reconsider their instructions. In summary, Secretary stated agreement reached that instead of accepting GDR processing at check points, Allied officials would be instructed to turn back.

After further discussion in which Foreign Ministers summarized their understanding of agreement along lines indicated by Secretary above, in response to query by Lloyd, Secretary agreed that point E did not need to be considered at this juncture. Lloyd commented that our juridical case is that we have agreements with Soviets which we cannot allow them to renounce. Foreign Ministers agreed that Germans would be told that we would not treat GDR officials as agents of Soviets or substitutes for Soviets.

² Document 98.

There was further discussion re agency theory. Steel noted that we could refuse GDR officials right to stamp our passports, but whole Allied moral position was that GDR officials were merely stooges of Soviets. This was concept to which we must continue to adhere. Lloyd added that stooge idea was essential, and therefore public treatment of new approach would present special problems. Secretary pointed out this was a particular case. Stooge theory was fine but when GDR officials purport to act as independent people then we could not accept their processing. We must, of course, be careful in any general pronouncements not to imply that they are independent. Lloyd said that, if GDR officials put themselves forward as Soviet agents we would, of course, accept this. What we must reject was their putting themselves forward as principals. Secretary noted that our position should be put primarily in terms of not accepting responsibility of GDR as substitute for Soviets.

Discussion moved to subject of communiqué. Secretary noted that Germans wanted substantive communiqué and that Spaak seemed concerned about this. Merchant had seen von Brentano at noon.³ As a result he thought it would be agreeable to Germans if communiqué were brief indicating that Soviet note unacceptable in form and substance and that views of four powers would be laid before NATO meeting, after which more detailed statement would be made. Merchant noted that position of von Brentano was that it desirable to have firm four-power communiqué but not one giving impression four Ministers had agreed on all details and were presenting NATO Council with *fait accompli*. Von Brentano also felt consideration should be given to more detailed and precise statement to be issued by NATO Ministerial Council on Tuesday, either as part of communiqué dealing with Tuesday discussion, or as separate release after Council discussion on Berlin.

During discussion of possible contents of four-power communiqué, Secretary said he thought it should mention exchange of views by Ministers, that they found Soviet note unacceptable in form and substance, that views of four powers were harmonious and would be laid before NATO Ministerial Council, after which more complete and detailed declaration would be made. Lloyd said he felt communiqué should contain three points: (a) attitude of Ministers that Soviet demands unacceptable, (b) that instructions being sent to Ambassadors in Bonn to make clear that we would not accept substitution of GDR officials, and (c) discussion of Soviet notes by Foreign Ministers reflected wide agreement preparatory to NATO meeting.

³ See Document 107.

Small drafting party formed to prepare tripartite version of communiqué which, it was agreed, French Chairman should present to four-power meeting as his own draft.

Dulles

**109. Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council
Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State**

Paris, December 15, 1958, 1 a.m.

Secto 9. After opening remarks by French Chairman, quadripartite ministerial meeting, which began 16:45 hours today, got underway with long introductory statement by von Brentano. He said maintenance of Berlin as free city depended on continuing willingness of three governments to defend their position there. Ultimatum like demands of Soviet Union raised grave issues. Soviets did not propose negotiations to improve situation in Berlin, but at most were willing to elaborate their demands for basic revision Western position. Proposal for free city of West Berlin meant that present dual division of Germany would become triple division, and solution of German reunification problem would become ever more difficult as GDR moved towards complete recognition. Free portion of Berlin would have to sever ties with Federal Republic and its further development would be completely dependent on benevolence of Soviet Zone. So-called international status of West Berlin would be illusion and Soviets would find occasion to intervene. If link to Federal Republic severed, Berlin economy would quickly collapse. Mood of Berliners was still good, but could change overnight if they thought Western support not firm. Foreign Ministers should therefore show their determination, and NATO Council should subsequently reaffirm association with Berlin guarantees. Berliners would regard what happened in next few days as test of Western steadfastness. If West failed on this issue, other countries of free world would begin to doubt firmness of purpose and would look for new ways to protect themselves through direct talks with Soviets. West must therefore respond firmly to

Soviet demands or else surrender to force. Consideration should also be given to accompanying display firm resolution by appeal to Soviet Union and entire world to rally forces interested in saving peace. He was convinced that Soviet Union would not carry through its plans if faced by determined resistance of free world. Soviet Union was intensifying war of nerves and if we were not firm, we would all go down together.

At this point, Governing Mayor Brandt of Berlin entered room and was welcomed by Couve who asked him to make statement on behalf of Berlin. After expression gratitude for help of Western countries which had assisted in reconstruction of Berlin during past decade, he emphasized all this was now threatened by new Soviet move. Berliners had much self confidence as well as confidence in their Allied friends as evidenced by elections of December 7 in which Communist Unity Party obtained only 1.9 percent of total vote. He felt that this election had been a real plebiscite in rejection of Soviet proposals. Soviet proposal only superficial solution with ultimate aim really complete absorption of Berlin into Soviet controlled area. Some damage had already been done to economic life of city, but people were prepared for difficulties. It was not appropriate for him to give advice to Foreign Ministers, but he wished to make appeal in accordance with feeling of population of Berlin that fight must be continued for freedom of city. After expression of sympathy and support by Couve, Brandt left room.

Discussion then moved to four-power communiqué. French circulated draft which had been prepared before meeting by tripartite working group.¹ Von Brentano said he also had draft to submit.² After brief discussion, another drafting group was set up to refine German draft as basis for four-power communiqué.

Using map for illustrative purposes, Secretary said he would like to make a point often forgotten. He noted that 1944–45 agreements which Soviets now proposed to repudiate had been relied on by us in falling back from Saxony and Thuringia which we had occupied by end of war. Modest quid pro quo which we received was entry into three Western sectors of Berlin which at that time was little more than pile of rubble. He had noted no suggestion from Soviets that they should give up this area which we had left, whereas they were asking us to surrender our sectors of Berlin. Secretary thought it might be worthwhile to make this point to NATO Council, since people tend to forget historical basis of agreements. Couve said point should be made publicly, and Lloyd added it

¹ The draft under reference has not been found, but see Document 108.

² A copy of the German draft communiqué is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1174.

would also be very good to include in reply to Soviets. Brentano nodded assent.

Ministers then spent considerable time examining draft submitted by von Brentano of suggested communiqué or declaration to be issued by NATO Ministerial Council. Secretary objected to final paragraph as unnecessary at this stage since it pre-supposes that replies would contain counter-proposals. We did not yet know whether they would or not. At present point, we were confronted with Soviet note purporting unilaterally to repudiate obligations. They had given us six months ultimatum. Whether under these conditions we would want to make proposals not clear. It was not good practice to negotiate under threat of an ultimatum, and perhaps first thing to do was to get ultimatum withdrawn. In any event, we would be reluctant to see question foreclosed by having language included in communiqué expressing hope that proposals be set forth in Western replies to Soviet notes.

Foreign Ministers agreed that last paragraph should be stricken. Couve made point that document issued by NATO Council should not, in effect, summarize future reply of Western powers to Soviet Union. This could only be finally determined when replies drafted. It was agreed that expert group would be set up to draft suggested communiqué for issuance by NATO Ministerial Council. This was not to be presented in advance, but slipped in towards end of Berlin discussion, although it might be shown previously to Spaak who also had submitted possible text of NATO communiqué to Four Foreign Ministers.³

Discussion then considered series of questions and answers prepared by quadripartite working group which had met twice December 13.⁴ Ministers accepted recommendation that portion of Soviet note containing specific proposals ought to be subject of identical replies, but that other portions of replies dealing with refutation of propaganda arguments need only be coordinated. It was understood that reply of Federal Republic would necessarily differ in form from other replies in view of its different juridical position, but that in substance FedRep reply would be on same lines.

Re timing of reply, Couve pressed for as early a date as possible, perhaps even before Christmas. Lloyd was reluctant to move ahead so fast and pointed out that NATO consultative processes required some time. Von Brentano and Secretary both supported moving ahead with reply as rapidly as feasible. Secretary pointed out we would be subject

³ Neither of the drafts under reference here has been found. The expert group comprised Bruce, Daridan, Steel, Grewe, and their advisers. (*Ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

⁴ See Document 106.

to criticism if we seem to fritter away time. Accordingly, it agreed that special quadripartite drafting party would begin work in effort to achieve replies along lines indicated above as soon as possible.

Further discussion of whether notes should be short or long, or include historical references in text (as desired by British and Germans) or in annex (as preferred by French), led to conclusion that this really a matter to be decided in terms of needs each country. Lloyd made point that it was easier for Soviets to suppress annex than a single unified text. Hence, British favored putting historical arguments in body of note, which might have some chance of being published in Soviet Union.

It agreed that there should be no provisional reply to Soviet notes, and that further meeting of Foreign Ministers to approve work of experts not required. There was also agreement that NATO Ministerial meeting should reaffirm action taken re Berlin in 1954, and that Couve would make report to Ministerial Council re four-power meeting today. Decision was deferred as to whether quadripartite working group similar to that which met in 1957 and 1958 should be established to draw up proposals for procedure and further action re Berlin crisis. Experts had pointed out that such meeting would be necessary if reply were to envisage possibility of discussion of German problem as a whole. Ministers also agreed that propaganda measures to be taken to counter Soviet proposals should be handled by individual action of four governments.

On question of substance, Couve mentioned that French draft which already prepared made no reference to counter-proposals, although it implies that discussion on German problem as a whole was always possible. Couve said he hesitated to qualify Soviet proposal as ultimatum in Western replies. He would rather ask Soviets if they had intended to issue ultimatum, and tell them, if this were case, that it was not acceptable. Secretary agreed, remarking that it was important to leave Soviets a way out. Lloyd concurred.

Lloyd mentioned that, in talks earlier today, it agreed that agency argument as applied to GDR officials needed careful handling.⁵ Western powers say that GDR officials are stooges of Russians, but agree that they will not permit substitution of such officials for Soviets. If GDR representatives were to say they are acting as Soviet agents, that would be acceptable, but as they say they are acting for themselves, Western position must be one of refusing to deal with them. Von Brentano pointed out that agency theory no longer pertinent in view of assertion of GDR sovereignty. It would only be possible to maintain theory if Soviets were using GDR officials as agents to carry out their obligations, but note of November 27 states Soviets no longer have such obligations. Lloyd said

⁵ See Document 108.

there was no disagreement on this point. All he meant was that if GDR officials were to claim they were acting as Soviet agents we would have no reason to object. Von Brentano agreed.

Secretary queried whether Spaak should be asked to modify agenda for Ministerial meeting so that Berlin could be discussed on Tuesday morning. Von Brentano indicated that Spaak had already said this would be acceptable.

Ministers reworked at some length text of four-power communiqué as prepared by drafting group (sent separate message).⁶

Before meeting terminated, Couve asked what should be said to press. Lloyd suggested journalists might be told that Ministers had been discussing replies to Soviet notes. Von Brentano argued strongly against any statements going beyond communiqué on ground that different answers to various questions which might be posed would cause speculation about possible differences of views. It agreed Ministers would make no statements on meeting except generalities to effect that it had been profitable and harmonious, and that subject would again be discussed in NATO Ministerial Council.

Dulles

⁶In Secto 6 from Paris, December 14, 11 p.m. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560) For text of this communiqué, which reaffirmed the determination of the three Western powers to maintain their rights and position in Berlin and stated that unilateral repudiation by the Soviet Union of its obligations in Berlin was unacceptable, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 29, 1958, pp. 1041-1042.

110. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)

Washington, December 15, 1958.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1558. Secret. 2-1/2 pages of source text not declassified.]

111. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/8

Paris, December 15, 1958, 12:10 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169. Top Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

112. Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 17, 1958, 1 a.m.

Polto 1718. From: US Del. Subject: Berlin discussion at NATO Ministerial meeting.¹ French FonMin began discussion on Berlin in restricted Ministerial session this morning by reporting to Council results of quadripartite meeting Dec. 14.² He made point that earlier meeting not intended to reach decisions, but to have preliminary exchange of views between the three responsible powers in Berlin and FedRep. As Foreign Ministers aware, Couve continued, communiqué published after meeting³ reminded world of agreement of three powers to maintain their rights in Berlin, including that of access, and that they would wish to consult their NATO allies. Four Foreign Ministers shared view these rights could not be ended unilaterally by Soviets and that withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin could take place only as result of freely negotiated treaty. Couve added that idea of free city of West Berlin was unacceptable to Foreign Ministers. It would prevent reunification of Germany. On reply to Soviet note of Nov. 27, Foreign Ministers had agreed that in drafting text they must consider need for support of public opinion. In view of six months period stipulated by Soviets, several exchanges of notes with them must be expected. One point Ministers had concluded must be stressed was that Berlin not an isolated problem. It is part of larger German problem, and Western powers must indicate that they are not unwilling to negotiate on German reunification and are always ready to do so. Foreign Ministers had reached firm agreement on principles, but had not shut door on negotiations if Soviets were willing to exclude threat of ultimatum.

In light of today's discussion, Couve stated, drafting would quickly get under way in order to enable replies to be sent to Moscow as quickly as possible. Replies would be coordinated as far as practicable, especially in their essential portions. Reply of Federal Republic would vary somewhat on form because of different juridical situation and differ-

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1176. Drafted by Hillenbrand and cleared and approved by Reinhardt. Transmitted in five sections and repeated to Bonn, Berlin, London, and Moscow.

¹ Further documentation on the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting at Paris, December 16–18, is presented in volume VII, Part 1.

² The verbatim, C–VR(58)61, and summary, C–R(58)61, records of this December 16 session, both dated December 16, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1168. A two-page summary of the meeting and drafting session that followed is *ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Regarding the quadripartite meeting on December 14, see Document 109.

³ For text of this communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 29, 1958, pp. 1041–1042.

ences in note received by it from Soviets.⁴ In any case, four powers would further consult in NATO before sending replies to obtain advice re proposed texts.

Next speaker was German Foreign Minister who fully supported report just made by Couve. He stressed importance of Council's issuing statement on Berlin today, since people of city were awaiting results of Paris meetings. For more than ten years, Berlin had been concern of entire free world which had shown its solidarity with city. Soviet notes would deprive Berlin of all protection and put it at mercy of Communists. Von Brentano said that as free city under Soviet proposal, Berlin would cease to be symbol it now is as refugee flow from East dried up and freedom of city could be abolished at any time. He hoped Ministerial Council could adopt as its own, statement of December 14. Council was aware of role of Berlin in East-West struggle. It should remind world of this in official communiqué.

Only solution to Berlin problem, von Brentano continued, is to make Berlin capital of free and united Germany. Until this achieved, there could only be regime of Western troops remaining under rights of occupation. FedRep does not want to be provocative. Negotiations with Soviets are indispensable. It would be unwise to push latter into unwise decisions, but threats are not point of departure for constructive negotiations. If West adopted firm attitude, he believed Soviets would give some. If on other hand, West failed to show unity, evidencing premature willingness to negotiate, it would lose ground gradually and capitulate in long run.

Italian Foreign Minister stated that communiqué issued after Dec. 14 meeting and report just given by Couve had very well stressed position of firmness that must characterize Western world in face of Soviet initiative. Soviets had tried to put Berlin problem in forefront. Appropriate answer to Soviet note must reaffirm respect for Berlin status, but must also combat propaganda efforts of Soviets. Atlantic Alliance was founded to protect peace, but positions of members were not always coordinated by broader action in political field. We find ourselves in position where Soviets pretend this initiative intended make contribution to peace. West should respond quickly to Soviet note with immediate coordinated position to contain momentum of Soviet proposals.

Secretary, who spoke next, began by noting that bold Soviet acts in early post-war period, such as seizure of Czechoslovakia and Berlin

⁴ For text of the Soviet note to the West German Government, November 27, see *Moskau Bonn*, pp. 464-470.

blockade, had largely led to creation of NATO.⁵ Since organization in being, Western countries were able to congratulate themselves that no comparable threats had arisen in Europe, although they had occurred in Far East and Mid-East. Now for first time in nearly decade, NATO countries were faced with threat in Europe of grave character. In considering how we deal with this threat, Secretary continued, it would be well to take account of personality of Khrushchev, who is different from coldly calculating Molotov or Stalin. He is a person who is easily buoyed up by success, impulsive, with certain characteristics of gambler. He reminded one of figures of the past who, having had initial successes, went on and on, and eventually brought disaster to the world. It is therefore essential to the peace of the world that he not have success, even partial success, in this instance. If he does, it will lead to a series of events culminating in disaster for us all.

Present stroke aimed at Berlin, probably because it an isolated and militarily indefensible city. Perhaps Soviets saw opportunity for creating dissension between Allies. In that respect, Soviet action was similar to probings elsewhere. They want to get rid of free-world position in Berlin. It provides unbearable contrast with surrounding satellite areas. Soviet rulers talk glibly of co-existence, but here where there is example of such co-existence, West Berlin's demonstration of freedom is so much more impressive that Soviets find it unbearable. Secretary said he did not know how many of Foreign Ministers present had recently been in Berlin. He had been there in May after Copenhagen Conference⁶ and was impressed by sense of vibrant and creative life there which demonstrated freedom in way which it easy to understand Communists could not like. If we allowed this to be blotted out, it would be a disastrous blow to freedom and ultimately to world peace.

Secretary said he wished to refer briefly to Soviet note of Nov. 27 which started out with gross and insulting distortion of history. To justify their proposed action re Berlin, Soviets had re-written history to pretend World War II was caused by Western Allies, especially British and French, who incited Hitler to attack Soviets. Suggestion was history now being repeated. Because memories are short, some may have forgotten how gross a distortion this is. Secretary at this point quoted from text of speech made by Molotov to Supreme Soviet on Oct. 31, 1938⁷ expounding Soviet policy at that time. Statements of then Soviet Foreign Minister

⁵ A copy of Dulles' remarks is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1176.

⁶ Documentation on the Copenhagen meeting of the North Atlantic Council, May 5–7, is presented in volume VII, Part 1. Regarding Dulles' visit to Berlin on May 8, see Document 11.

⁷ For a summary of this speech, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939*, pp. 786–790.

were better history than distortions in Soviet note. Everyone knows that post-war policy of FedRep in cooperation with NATO allies is to bring about such integration, military, political and economic, with countries of Europe that never again would there be possibility of Germany pursuing such course as under Hitler. This was great statesmanlike policy, above all reflected in views of Adenauer.

As to substance of note, Secretary continued, it unilaterally asserted that agreements re Germany of 1944-45 are null and void. These were agreements entered into re respective zones of occupation in Germany when war ended. They were greatly in interest of Soviet Union. At time of end of hostilities, British and American troops occupied considerable areas which were turned over to Soviets as we fell back in reliance on these agreements (Secretary used map as at four-power meeting on Dec. 14 to illustrate graphically extent of area involved). In return Allies received few square miles of rubble in largely destroyed city of Berlin. Soviets have now consolidated their position in East Germany, and agreements are declared null and void, as far as advantages Western powers obtained concerned. Soviet Union does not propose to disgorge advantages it obtained under same agreements.

Note goes on to state, Secretary added, Soviets will turn over to GDR control of our air, water, and land space around Berlin and give it responsibility hitherto exercised by Soviets over allied transit movements to and from Berlin. Such action would violate not only agreements of 1944-45, but also more recent agreements, for example that reached in Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris in June 1949⁸ wherein Soviets assumed obligation for transit traffic to and from Berlin. It now purports unilaterally to divest itself of obligation formally assumed and not part of wartime agreements. Secretary also recalled final directive of Summit Meeting of July 1955⁹ in which four powers agreed they had responsibility for solution of German question, a matter always deemed to include problem of Berlin.

In effect, Soviets have said that unless we accept and implement their decision in six months, they will unilaterally carry it out. We are faced with what can only be interpreted as an ultimatum in that respect. U.S. is of opinion that any compromise on this issue would be serious indeed, and it is almost grotesque to suggest that new agreements be negotiated on wreckage of unilateral denunciation by Soviets of whole series of prior agreements. If Soviets can denounce agreements whenever their purpose is served, what is value of new agreements? It would

⁸ For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, June 20, 1949, see *ibid.*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062-1065.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1955-1957, vol. V, pp. 527-528.

be of utmost importance therefore that Soviets be given opportunity to qualify reported denunciation of agreements and apparent ultimatum aspect of note as condition precedent to new agreements. We need not put matter in a way difficult for Soviets in this respect, but it does seem that willingness to continue negotiations should be related to explanation by Soviet Union that it not intended unilaterally to denounce this series of existing agreements or place Western powers under threat of ultimatum. Of course, willingness of Western powers to negotiate on subject has been made manifest time and again. Note of Sept. 30¹⁰ has not yet received reply. It constitutes invitation to negotiate which still outstanding. Secretary said he did not suggest that offers should be withdrawn, or that there should be refusal by Allies to negotiate on reunification of Germany which is heart of any change in Berlin status.

Secretary said he had no doubt that, before issue resolved, we would be subjected to very severe war of nerves which had already begun. Soviet note of Dec. 13¹¹ contained violent threat that all Europe could be wiped out. This perhaps so, equally so Soviet Union could be wiped out by the U.S. if that attempted. Soviet Union knows this, and since it a fact, he did not think we need worry about these threats. There exists in U.S. a deterrent power which is very great indeed, perhaps greater than it has been or may be, because Soviets are short of long-range bombers and do not yet have in production and in place means adequate to accomplish great results. American military advisers are confident Soviets will not risk war about Berlin, and threat to devastate Europe if West firm on Berlin is an empty one which ought not to frighten anyone. Therefore, we can proceed with confidence and refrain from encouraging bold and reckless Soviet move which, if successful, would only encourage further moves of same kind. Secretary recalled Hitler who initially, probably contrary to military advice, acted recklessly, got away with it, and became more and more reckless until the world was plunged into World War II. In U.S. opinion, Khrushchev now faces the world with comparable test. We hope it will be dealt with in a manner which will not encourage further irresponsible moves by Soviets. Peaceful co-existence presupposes sanctity of international agreements. Willingness to proceed with new agreements on basis denunciation of existing agreements would be great weakness and mistake on part of free world.

¹⁰For text of this note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 20, 1958, pp. 613–614.

¹¹See footnote 3, Document 107.

Canadian Foreign Minister said that, although Canada not directly responsible in Berlin, it, like other NATO countries, was affected by what happened there and saw situation from viewpoint of country which in 1954 had associated itself with tripartite reaffirmation of Berlin guarantee. He agreed Soviet proposals on Berlin were unacceptable, and hoped that NATO meeting would say so publicly—as clearly as four Foreign Ministers had on Dec. 14. Only satisfactory solution for Berlin is to make it capital of free and united Germany. Soviet proposals were not only offensive in language, but they were bad history. Nevertheless, he wished to ask question whether this ruled out possibility of some interim arrangement for city as first step to reunification. Were there any counter-proposals re Berlin itself which could be advanced? He hoped four powers would examine possibility in course of deliberations. At some point negotiation with Soviets re German problem and European security was necessary. He hoped this would be reflected in NATO communiqué and in replies of four powers to Soviet notes.

Smith said he had no formula to suggest, but felt Western powers should begin with re-evaluation of Western reunification policies. Were there any alternatives? He hoped willingness to negotiate would be preserved and that a tolerable *modus vivendi* would be sought. Said he was gratified by British FonMin's statement of Dec. 4¹² affirming British readiness to negotiate with Soviets on German problems as well as similar expression of readiness by Secretary. He referred with approval to Lloyd's view that if freely elected Government of reunified Germany chose to join NATO, no strategic advantage would be taken of Eastern Germany and forces would not be moved forward. Chancellor Adenauer has several times made same point, Smith continued. This would involve some risk, but risk would not be greater than in present situation. Flexibility shown by these statements must be preserved if West is to regain initiative on Berlin.

Danish FonMin agreed with main lines of envisaged reply to Soviet proposals. Danes appreciated intentions of three powers to reject Soviet legal position as unfounded while restating Western legal position and making it clear that they were going to maintain it. This, however, Krag continued, did not alter earnest Danish desire and hopes for summit meeting at suitable time to deal with outstanding problems, perhaps including that of European security. He felt any communiqué should reflect this point.

¹²For text of Lloyd's statement on Europe in the House of Commons, see 596 House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, cols. 1368–1382.

Belgian FonMin made rather lengthy analysis of situation which was partly repetitive of points previously made. He noted that once again Soviets had taken initiative at time and place of their own choosing. This gave them advantage. Western reply must accordingly not merely be repudiation, but also involve taking initiative. Western legal position was strong, but de facto situation in Berlin difficult. Berlin was an isolated city and if Soviets carried out their intentions after six months, Western powers would be faced with concrete situation. On other hand, if they were to leave Berlin, it would quickly be absorbed by GDR. Western powers should adapt their reply to these two facts. They should not make any concessions to Soviet threat, but it would be unwise to refuse negotiations with Soviets simply because we did not believe in their good faith. Public opinion would not accept this. Hence, a strong imaginative effort was necessary that would embarrass Soviets.

Wigny suggested that two possibilities presented themselves—separate treatment of Berlin, or treatment of Berlin problem as part of German problem as whole. He suggested that Soviet proposal of free city might be turned around to their embarrassment by saying that we too are for a free city including all four sectors, to be established on basis free elections accompanied by provisions for firm attachment to that portion of world to which population preferred to remain attached.

Soviets always have advantage because they make proposals in advance they know we will refuse, Wigny continued. We must not simply renew old line, but add to it giving impression of imagination. We might respond that a demilitarized free city should not be within reach of cannons of Soviets, hence, there should be a demilitarization of East Germany, at least beyond Berlin and perhaps including Poland.

Wigny expressed gratification at consultation with NATO countries and Couve's assurance of future consultation. NATO countries were in this together. It would be preferable that positive reply be sent long before end of six-month period since time must be left for negotiations. West must have firm position right from start of these negotiations. Soviets would attempt to turn tables by making West responsible for aggression by claiming aggression was being committed against East Germany police to whom they had turned over responsibility. It would be better for West to say at beginning of negotiations that any act on part of Soviets or anyone else re Allied corridor to Berlin would be considered an extremely grave act.

Greek FonMin stated his support of firm reply, and said he agreed with Fanfani that reply should take up propaganda threat and try to embarrass Soviets. Greek Govt had impression Soviet objective re Berlin did not involve readiness to go to war, but was intended to cover up dangerous maneuvers elsewhere. Infiltration was going on in other large areas of world and periodic crises were created to make Western

countries lose sight of these developments elsewhere. West should be firm on Berlin, but not forget this basic fact. Soviets were clever in their tactics. By repeating threats and making excessive demands, they made Western public opinion willing to accept with relief solution which conceded something to Soviets. We are asked for one thousand, Averoff said. Public opinion gets frightened and if we agree to one hundred, there is great relief.

Netherlands FonMin made strong statement. He said he agreed Soviet proposals were unacceptable and West must be resolved to remain in Berlin and protect its population. It should be made clear that if Soviets put proposed measures into effect this may lead to military measures necessary to supply Allied garrisons. Should also make clear that unilateral action not acceptable and that change can only be made by negotiation, but such negotiations could not be on basis of present Soviet proposals. Soviets were trying to put Western determination to test.

Position of West, Luns continued, would however be improved if we declared willingness to discuss whole German question. Such a conference perhaps in March might provide occasion for informal discussions on most urgent problem of how to avoid incidents if Soviets withdraw. He recognized that Soviets had said they would not discuss problem of German unification with other three powers. If they continue to refuse, blame can clearly be put on them. Soviet tactics are aimed not at reaching agreement, but at exhibiting weaknesses in Western public opinion forcing Governments to press for dangerous concessions such as formal recognition of GDR. He referred to "disengagement virus," and said establishment of neutral zones would only create more political danger and more possibility of miscalculation. It should therefore be made clear to public opinion that Soviet Berlin initiative forms part of effort to neutralize West Germany, to confederate West and East Germany, to spread Communism in West Europe, and to demolish Western defensive system.

British FonMin said that Soviet action was part of pattern of attack on Western positions everywhere. Concessions do not make us safer, and West must be firm. He welcomed U.S. Government statement that U.S. Government makes it absolutely clear that full force of nuclear deterrent would be used if Soviets attempted to alter status quo by force. Most people know the chances of survival for a free city of Berlin were nil. Lloyd was glad to find unity which existed among NATO countries for firm refutation of Soviet proposals. He hoped that from this unity they might gain strength to deal with other matters where disagreement still existed.

With firmness must be linked constructive approach to German problem as a whole. Berlin should be capital of a free and united Germany. This point must be repeated. Another attempt must be made to

convince people that these proposals offer a sound basis for European security and they must be re-examined to see if they could not be better put. People are a little tired of our old proposals. There must be flexibility in tactics but absolute firmness on principles in dealing with Soviets. Khrushchev was a skilled tactician and manipulator of public opinion. West needed to strengthen its position before public opinion. He thought one of strongest points for West to make was that Soviets were repudiating their pledged word and to stress what effect this would have on other negotiations with Soviet Union. We might do this more in sorrow than in anger. Even Khrushchev might be susceptible to argument that Soviets are unreliable and do not keep their pledged word.

Norwegian FonMin also supported rejection of unilateral denunciation of international agreements. Re formulation of replies to Soviet notes by four powers, Lange agreed that views should be presented in such a way as to convince public opinion. 1955 proposals were reasonable, but it must be frankly admitted that success had not been achieved in having them accepted by public. Consideration should accordingly be given to possible revision of certain of these proposals. It was not possible to wait until expiration of six-months period before efforts were made to influence public opinion on this serious matter.

Turkish FonMin said this was obviously fresh Soviet attempt to strain Atlantic Alliance, dissolution of which principal goal since it is primary obstacle to world domination which Soviets seek. Re Western reaction, Zorlu continued, stress should be laid on importance of all-German factors in settlement of Berlin problem. Goals of unification of Germany and security of Europe were basis of NATO policy and no solution was acceptable which ran counter to these objectives. West must avoid anything which weakens Alliance. Task of West was to face up to problem with solidarity.

Secretary-General Spaak, in Chair, asked Foreign Ministers whether attempt should be made to draft communiqué to be issued same evening. Agreement was general that effort should be made. Agreement also reached that verbatim record of meeting should be circulated by International Staff.

After noting that Ministers had evidenced large measure of agreement not only in principle but even in details, Spaak reviewed in some detail points arising out of Council discussion which he considered should be reflected in communiqué. Special working group made up of UK, France, U.S., FedRep, Italy, Canada, chaired by Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, met shortly after end of morning session to prepare draft.

At 17:30 hours, Ministers examined product of drafting group, and after reworking for some two hours agreed on text at 19:30 hours for immediate release (text in separate message).¹³

¹³Polto 1717 from Paris, December 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12-1758) For text of the NATO declaration on Berlin, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1959, p. 4.

113. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Paris, December 16, 1958, 11 p.m.

Dulte 4. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President:

We have just finished our first day of formal NATO meetings, morning and afternoon. These were devoted almost exclusively to Berlin. The atmosphere on the whole was good. I made a statement which seems to have been well received.¹ I emphasized with a map the area which the forces under your command gave up to the Soviets in order to comply with the 1944 agreement which the Soviets now denounce. Most of the statements made were strong and vigorous, the only exception being the Canadians who were rather soft. Most of the afternoon session was devoted to drawing up a communiqué on Berlin.² You can well imagine that this was a rather harrowing experience with each one of the fifteen foreign ministers doing an editing job. The result is, I think, effective although anyone alone could have done it better. Tonight Couve de Murville is giving a dinner for the foreign ministers which I am foregoing in the interest of my digestion. Unfortunately, McElroy has been knocked out all day, but my doctor is caring for him and expects him to be in shape tomorrow when his statement will be due.

Faithfully yours, Foster

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1179. Confidential. Drafted by Dulles.

¹ See footnote 5, Document 112.

² For text of the NATO declaration on Berlin, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1959, p. 4.

114. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/20

Paris, December 17, 1958, 9:30 a.m.

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris, France, December 16–18, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Houghton
Mr. Merchant
Mr. McBride

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand

SUBJECT

Berlin

The French Foreign Minister said that we should now proceed to the drafting of our reply to the Soviets. The Secretary said that he had a draft now based on the French draft which had been expanded to add certain material regarding the historical events of 1939.¹ Mr. Merchant noted that the Working Group was meeting this afternoon. It was proposed to work until December 24 and then recess for about a week, and have a draft the first week in January. The Secretary said he had no objection to proceeding sooner. He added there was some difference of opinion as to whether the reply should be delivered before or after the Communist Party meeting in January. He personally believed that to wait until the latter part of January to deliver our reply would give the impression of vacillation on our part. Couve de Murville said French public opinion would not understand a long delay in replying, and he thought the Germans felt the same way. He thought we should make known our firm position promptly. The Secretary agreed and said he thought we should go ahead, and have a draft by the end of the year.

M. Couve de Murville referred to the discussions of last Sunday,² and asked for a further explanation of our ideas with regard to access to Berlin. The Secretary explained that at present our road convoys normally go through without armor. If GDR agents were to take over and

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169. Confidential. Drafted by McBride. The meeting was held at the Embassy residence.

¹ Neither draft has been further identified.

² December 14; see Documents 108 and 109.

were to stop these convoys, our thought was to have them go back, and then attempt to go through again with a certain amount of armor. They would not attempt at this point to force their way through as we don't have sufficient [armor] for that, but would serve to test the Soviets fully. If convoys were stopped under these circumstances, we would then consult again and reconsider courses of action such as adding additional armor, an air lift, etc. The purpose of our Point D³ was to make a show of force to see if the Soviets were prepared to meet force with force. We would not initially establish a self-blockade which might prove to be unnecessary. An air lift was not automatically the answer either.

Couve said he presumed that if GDR agents replaced the Soviets in the BASC, our civilian aircraft would ignore them and fly in anyway. Under these conditions, these planes would probably be interfered with. In that case we could supply them with military escort and force the Soviets to take the first overt action. The Secretary said we of course wished to maneuver the Soviets into shooting first. Our Point D was intended to test the Soviet intentions and not lead to fighting.

Couve asked what percentage of our Berlin traffic involved road transport, since virtually all of the French traffic was by rail. Mr. Merchant said we used both rail and road while the British used virtually all road traffic. The test of the Soviets' intentions would of course come through our utilization of road traffic and not rail.

The Secretary said that he was convinced these actions will not lead to war, since the Soviets do not wish a war. They are in a period of relative weakness, and are between the bomber phase and the missile phase. They have economized and Khrushchev recently stated they had ceased bomber production while they had an inadequate supply of missiles at present. The Secretary added that, if we made a show of force, we would probably get through. He did not want to have a self-imposed blockade unless the Soviets resisted a show of force, in which case we would want to consider the situation again.

Couve asked if discussions on these points would be held in Bonn. Mr. Merchant said that we thought discussions on Point D should be held in Washington, to which Couve expressed no objection. Since Points B and C were agreed, the detailed implementing instructions could now be sent to Bonn. Couve said he personally had not previously known about the contingency planning for Berlin. The Secretary said this had been agreed in 1954 and confirmed in 1957 but that he personally had not previously been involved in this subject either.

³See Document 98.

115. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)

Bonn, December 19, 1958.¹

[Here follows a description of other activities.]

Looking back on this past week in Paris, I consider it a great success. At the tripartite meeting,² the United States, France and the U.K. agreed to revise the contingency orders to avoid any recognition of the GDR. This resulted from a position taken in Washington with the approval of the National Security Council and President Eisenhower. At the same meeting, it was agreed that the question of the military reaction to any Soviet or East German move regarding Berlin would be further discussed between the Governments. The Ambassadors in Bonn of the three powers were instructed together with their military advisers to work out new access procedures. The feeling was unanimous not to accept the substitution for Soviet authority of that asserted by the GDR.

At the Council meeting,³ Dulles's pronouncement of American readiness, if necessary, to resort to a general war in the face of aggression, had a tremendous effect. We can now continue our policy toward Berlin with the unanimous backing of our European allies.

Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.

¹ Presumably the entry was written in Bonn.

² See Document 108.

³ See Document 112.

116. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, December 23, 1958, 5 p.m.

511. Bonn pass routine POLAD USAREUR 160. Paris pass Thurston and West. On Dec 20 AP correspondent Topping called by appointment

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6162B/12-2358. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

on East Berlin SovEmb Second Sec Sutulov to discuss rumor that Khrushchev would visit East Berlin in Jan. (Topping considers Sutulov to be Sov official in Berlin responsible for contact with West press and for conveyance, when Sovs desire, of their point of view to Allied officials through West correspondents.) On Sutulov's initiative, Topping and Sutulov repaired to local cafe so that discussion could be held in relaxed and private atmosphere.

Sutulov stated Khrushchev would be so busy preparing for Party Congress to be held Moscow end of Jan that in absence of urgency now unforeseen Khrushchev not expected visit East Berlin in Jan.

Sutulov then raised Mikoyan's forthcoming visit to U.S.¹ (Topping received definite impression this subject was principal matter Sutulov wished to discuss with him.)

Sutulov said Mikoyan would be prepared to discuss whole range of subjects, not just economic matters. He said specific information not available to him as to just what subjects Mikoyan would be prepared to discuss, but SovEmb understood Mikoyan would be prepared to discuss Berlin question if Pres Eisenhower or SecState were to raise subject with Mikoyan and "show positive interest." Sutulov added that Sov Gov attaches highest importance to Mikoyan visit. (Topping filed AP story evening Dec 20 on Mikoyan visit.) Topping saw Sutulov again on Dec 22. Sutulov indicated that Berlin is Mikoyan's principal reason for going to Washington.

Without prompting Sutulov also brought up Zakharov's statement (ourtel 445 to Bonn, 501 to Dept)² in apparent effort to determine Topping's reaction. Topping replied he could not understand why Zakharov chose to make such a statement when situation already so tense.

Sutulov replied that Zakharov's statement was in reply to Gen Hodes' statement made in Berlin on Nov 30 (ourtel 381 to Bonn, 432 to Dept).³ Sutulov said it was one thing for political figures, even including Eisenhower, to make statement such as Hodes had made—Sovs expect this sort of thing—but "when a senior and responsible US military

¹ Documentation on Mikoyan's visit to the United States, January 4–20, 1959, is presented in volume X. Regarding his discussions with U.S. officials on Berlin, see Documents 121 and 135–137.

² Telegram 445, December 20, reported that in an interview with the East German wire service General Zakharov had attacked the Western response to the Soviet proposals on Berlin, stating that Western military leaders, and General Hodes in particular, had attempted to create a war psychosis out of the Berlin question. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–2058)

³ Telegram 381, December 1, transmitted a summary of the Berlin press coverage for November 30 and December 1 including Dulles' meeting with Eisenhower at Augusta, Georgia, and Hodes' press conference in Berlin on November 30. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/12–158)

person who holds the weapons in his hands makes such a statement it becomes matter of great concern and danger to us”.

Topping replied that Hodes had made no belligerent statements. Hodes had told press he had come to Berlin to make no statement but to make routine visit and attend football game. He met with press only at latter's insistence.

Sutulov said that of course Sovs had to rely on West Berlin press accounts of Hodes' interview, wherein it stated that Hodes had secret plans re Berlin. (*USBer comment*: Hodes answered press questions in calm and circumspect manner. Certain correspondents including some from West Berlin press chose to report certain remarks out of context—as they have on other occasions. Immediately preceding telegram gives text of typical West Berlin press account.)⁴Topping replied that Hodes had been asked the question “Do you have plans for contingencies?” and Gen Hodes had replied “Yes, as a general it is my job to have plans for every conceivable contingency”. This, Topping observed to Sutulov, was only reply Hodes could give.

Sutulov next raised the NATO statement and said that Sovs were incensed because of its negative nature, failure to make counterproposal, issuance before Allied replies to Sov note, and because Berlin was none of NATO's business anyway.

Topping has following impressions as result of talk with Sutulov:

- “(1) Sovs genuinely concerned over our possible use of force;
- (2) Sovs becoming very nervous over Berlin situation because both sides have gone so far there is little room for maneuver politically. Sutulov several times stated it ‘inconceivable’ world could be brought to war because of Berlin;
- (3) Sovs would welcome any counterproposal in Allied replies to Sov note which could conceivably serve as point of departure for East-West discussion of Berlin—that Sovs may be looking for a way out.”⁵

Gufler

⁴ Telegram 507 from Berlin, December 22, summarized the local press for December 21 and 22. (*Ibid.*, 962A.61/12–2258)

⁵ The following day Topping saw Sutulov again at the latter's “insistent” request. At this meeting Sutulov referred to Western press reports that the reply to the Soviet note would be delivered at the end of the month and stated that it would be a “bad thing” to deliver the reply before Mikoyan went to Washington. Sutulov reiterated that the Soviet note was not an ultimatum, and further discussion revealed his “obvious concern” that the Allies might use force. (Telegram 520 from Berlin, December 24; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–2458)

117. **Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)**

Berlin, December 27, 1958.¹

Arrived in Berlin. Rainy day. Office almost deserted. Had talk there with Hamlett—he and I see eye to eye on the local problems, and on what U.S. policy ought to be—and we hope is—in respect to them.

Rebecca Wellington and I motored over to the East Sector—“flying the flag” it is called. Why American Ambassadors sport two flags, a national and a diplomatic one, is unknown to me. So far as I have observed, this is not done by Ambassadors from other countries, and it seems a bit pretentious. East Berlin looked as dreary as ever, and the banal Stalinallee buildings dull as ditchwater. The people are, we are told, healthy and well-fed, but they must be unspeakably bored with their drab lives.

Back on glowing Kurfurstendamm, we stopped at the Hilton to sample the bar, then to lunch at home. Most of the houses in West Berlin are decked out with wreaths, and Christmas trees abound—in the East one saw nothing of the sort.

This afternoon, Cort Schuyler and Ham² came to see me. We talked of how to defend our position in Berlin, without engaging in general war except as a last resort. SHAPE has certain ideas, and Cort wants me to talk to Norstad about them. Ham and I are not in favor of mere probing operations on the ground, as has been sometimes suggested. A few rails pulled on the tracks, a couple of bridges blown on the autobahn, would immobilize our military trains and convoys, and make us ridiculous, unless we were prepared to keep the routes open by the employment of substantial forces. Ham and I think, if the Soviets turn over checkpoint control to the GDR, we ought at once to move a souped-up division to Helmstedt, to show we really mean business. As always, one must reckon with the British and the French, who are much less inclined to a tough policy than ourselves, though they have gone along nicely on the change in standing orders. Under certain circumstances, we might have to act unilaterally, in view of our much larger capabilities and the far greater expectations entertained of us by Berliners and West Germans, but I fervently hope we will not have to do so.

Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.

¹ Presumably the entry was written in Berlin.

² General Cortlandt Van Rennselaer Schuyler, Chief of Staff, SHAPE, and General Hamlett.

118. Editorial Note

The quadripartite working group began discussion of the draft reply to the Soviet note of November 27 at the Quai d'Orsay on December 17 with Loftus E. Becker, Legal Adviser of the Department of State; Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director of the Office of German Affairs; and Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., representing the United States. The following day drafts of each country's reply had been prepared and were referred to the four countries for consideration. A variety of changes were made in the individual drafts, and on December 29 they were all discussed by the North Atlantic Council. Following a few last minute revisions the three Western replies were delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry the afternoon of December 31. The West German reply was delivered 5 days later on January 5, 1959.

For text of the U.S. note, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pages 573–576, or Department of State *Bulletin*, January 19, 1959, pages 79–81; for text of the British note, see *Documents RIIA*, 1958, pages 166–172; for text of the French note, see *La Documentation Française, Articles et Documents*, No. 750, January 15, 1959; for text of the West German note, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pages 577–585, or *Moskau Bonn*, pages 480–488. Documentation on the drafting and revision of the various texts is in Department of State, Central Files 762.00/12–1758 through 12–3158.

While the quadripartite working group considered the texts of draft replies to the Soviet note of November 27, the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, prepared a memorandum on the legal aspects of the Berlin situation, dated December 19. For text of this memorandum, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1959, pages 5–13.

JANUARY-MARCH 1959: FURTHER EXCHANGES OF NOTES LEADING TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON BERLIN

THE SOVIET NOTE OF JANUARY 10 AND THE WESTERN REPLIES OF FEBRUARY 16

119. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 2, 1959.

SUBJECT

Berlin Contingency Plans¹

PARTICIPANTS

The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. R.W. Jackling, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant—EUR
Mr. Foy D. Kohler—EUR
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

The British Minister, Lord Hood, called today at his request to ascertain, as he said, whether we had any thoughts as to where we go next on Point D of the American proposals for the revision of Berlin contingency plans.² He noted that he had a preview of the British position and it was not the same as that of the United States. Military advisers were on their way from Germany by air and would be arriving in Washington tonight. This raised the question of whether British and American representatives should get together again tomorrow bilaterally before the talks on Monday with the French begin. If so, it would be probably advisable to include some representatives from the Pentagon.

He went on to say that the British feel doubts about Point D on two grounds. As Mr. Merchant has told the British Ambassador the other

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-259. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and initialed by Merchant and Kohler.

¹ Admiral Denny discussed Berlin contingency planning with U.S. military representatives on December 24 and 29 on a preliminary basis. Memoranda for the record of these conversations are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330: FRC 62 A 1698, Germany. On December 30 Merchant held brief conversations with Ambassadors Alphan and Caccia as well. (Memoranda of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-3058)

² Reference is to point D of Document 98.

night, the British understood that the United States preferred a land demonstration because it brought the issue to a head in a fashion that "could not be fudged", i.e., in a way that would really test Soviet intentions. London on the other hand, felt it to be a mistake in the cold war type of exercise involved to put your opponent immediately up to the stark choice of war or surrender, and it would be a surrender if the Soviets permitted United States tanks to go through. London preferred not to bring the issue to a head at such an early stage.

Mr. Merchant commented that the only alternative to not bringing it to a head at this stage was either to impose a blockade on oneself or to accept GDR substitution for the Soviets at the check points, which the Allies agreed they would not do. To delay only ran the risk of bringing on a total blockade of the City. It was more or less accepted that an airlift covering the needs of the entire City was not possible now, as it had been in 1948. Hence, a blockade would quickly bring economic strangulation and panic to Berlin. We may realistically assume that the Soviets will probably be aware, at least in general, of the contingency instructions issued to our people in Berlin. Any impression that we are soft would merely encourage them to take the action which we must avoid. He, Mr. Merchant, was convinced that the best way to avoid the risk of war is to determine in advance that we are prepared to accept it. Mr. Kohler added that unless we are prepared to do this at the first test the risk of war would, in his opinion, be enhanced a great deal.

Lord Hood said that we obviously must think this through. It was not in London's mind to accept a blockade. We could resort to an airlift and suspend land operations temporarily. This would give time to see what would develop and what should be our best move. After all, our objective in any event is to get the Soviets to a conference and to have some negotiations on Germany as a whole. If five tanks were to get through that would not prove anything. We would be faced with the same problem every day.

Mr. Merchant commented that we envisaged that a conference would come precisely out of this situation. We would welcome such a conference which would give the Soviets a chance privately to get off the hook. He was troubled by what the British were saying.

Lord Hood then added that the second British objection to Point D was that the Western Powers should not embark on a land probe unless prepared to push it through to its logical consequences. We could not simply draw back. As the American military people had explained to Admiral Denny, the first test would be made say by five tanks. If this failed, then a tank battalion would take over. If this were stopped, then the Allies must issue what amounted to an ultimatum. This would require the taking of many preliminary measures before the action could go ahead. He noted that the American military were in a higher state of

readiness than the British. Moreover, all of the NATO Allies were involved, and the British wondered whether they would be willing to go to these lengths.

Mr. Kohler added that there seemed to be some confusion about the time element. We were talking about what would happen if a conference with the Soviets failed. Our position in Point D was implicit in what had been agreed in Paris. We had given much thought to this situation at first when the details of our own position were still unformulated. We had arrived at the conclusion that this decision was inevitable once peaceful settlement procedures had been exhausted. Mr. Jackling said the American position seemed to assume that no solutions would be available once the Soviets had turned over their controls at the check points to GDR representatives.

Mr. Merchant commented that we were over the cliff already if we could not get tripartite agreement to react when the Soviets applied force to get us out of Berlin. The sooner we knew we could not reach such a decision the better. Lord Hood said he did not know the processes of reasoning which had led London to come to its conclusions, if they could be called conclusions. Mr. Merchant said that he had had an opportunity in Paris to talk to the British Foreign Minister,³ who expressed concern over it being clearly established who fired the first shot on the confused situation on the Autobahn. He had made the point that, if an unarmed transport were shot down in the air corridor, the whole world would know who was the aggressor. Mr. Kohler said that, if we reviewed the statements already made, one would have to come to the conclusion that a public announcement had been made of a decision not completely taken. Mr. Merchant added that it was implicit in our entire posture to say that we would fight to stay in Berlin. Lord Hood commented that we were really not faced by this problem at the present time since the garrisons could be supplied by air. Mr. Jackling said that it appeared the only real difference between us and the British was that they felt we could still negotiate if we once got to the point where the GDR took over, whereas the United States seemed to feel that the negotiating possibilities would then be exhausted. Mr. Merchant said that if, in five months, we were unsuccessful in getting the Soviets to change their position how could negotiations at this point have any chance of being successful. Lord Hood agreed this was cogent, but asked what it was hoped to accomplish then. Did we really believe the American convoy would be permitted to pass through? Mr. Merchant said that we hoped and sincerely expected that, if our firmness was communicated to the Soviets privately, they would never turn their controls over to the GDR. The

³ Not further identified.

more confused and divided we were on this point the greater the danger every single day.

Lord Hood asked whether we were really not in the same position if we supplied ourselves by air. Mr. Merchant said we would have surrendered a right, and an extension of the blockade to the civil population would probably be inevitable. Mr. Kohler added that, at that point, we would still have to come back to the same decision under the most painful of circumstances. Lord Hood said the difficulty is in finding a method of challenge to the Soviets which is likely to produce the desired result of changing their position.

Mr. Jackling raised the possibility that the Soviets might not wait five months, but turn over to the GDR within the next two or three weeks. In that event the land operation would not be preceded by talks with the Soviets. To this Mr. Merchant responded that one must assume the Soviets are generally familiar with the nature of present instructions in Germany. If they were aware of what was said on the subject in Paris they would actually have an increased incentive to enter into negotiations. Agreement on Point D was therefore an essential first step in getting to negotiations. If we are to leave this issue undecided until April or May, the risk would greatly be increased. If war comes, he was convinced, it would involve a miscalculation, not a deliberate choice. Mr. Kohler added that we must make a decision now so that the chance of negotiations would be increased. We really could not effectively deal with the situation unless a decision were made first.

Lord Hood said this was obviously a big decision with grave consequences. The Soviets undoubtedly hoped for a disunited Western response. Mr. Kohler noted that the Paris meetings with their firm display of resolution were probably a surprise to the Soviets. It was agreed that a further discussion of Point D with the British would take place on January 3 with military representatives present on both sides.

120. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 3, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS

The Viscount Hood, British Minister
Admiral Sir Michael Denny, British Standing Group Representative
Mr. R. W. Jackling, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. W. Barker, Counselor, British Embassy
Four British military representatives including Brigadier Carver

Mr. John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Major General Douglas V. Johnson, J-5
Col. Edward Harris, OSD/ISA

Mr. Foy D. Kohler, EUR
Mr. Martin Hillenbrand, GER
Mr. Thomas D. McKiernan, GPA

Viscount Hood opened the meeting by stating that the British wished to "probe our thinking" regarding paragraph D of the aide-mémoire of December 11, 1958,¹ which deals with the use of limited military force in connection with Berlin access. He said that the British saw the situation as follows: The starting point is our intention, as reflected in Allied declarations, to maintain our position in Berlin and our access to Berlin. Khrushchev has resorted to "brinkmanship" on Berlin, and our only response can be to stand firm. Firmness means that all our NATO Allies must see eye-to-eye on the problem, and an important aspect of the Soviet action was probably the attempt to sow mistrust within the Western alliance. The need for solidarity among the NATO powers plus considerations of public opinion in our own countries require that our policy avoid giving the impression that we, rather than the Soviets, are provoking trouble. "The Russians must fire the first shot." The British follow American thinking on paragraphs A, B, and C of the aide-mémoire, but they would like to know how the U.S. contemplates events will develop under circumstances in which we would invoke paragraph D and resort to the use of limited military force.

In reply, Mr. Kohler summarized the American position as follows: In reviewing our Berlin contingency planning, we soon realized that we had to demonstrate our readiness to fight in the last resort to maintain

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-359. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan and initialed by Kohler.

¹ See Document 98 and footnote 5 thereto.

our access to Berlin by road and that we could not intelligently develop a tactical response to the Soviet threat unless we faced up to this question. We wish to bring the USSR to negotiations and we wish to exhaust all peaceful remedies. But we are in a better position if we can say, for example to Mikoyan, that the Soviets are challenging a vital American interest which we are prepared, if necessary, to maintain by force. We wish to leave no room for the Soviets to misunderstand our intentions. Unless we are prepared to do so, we have in effect publicly announced a policy with respect to Berlin, e.g. in the Berlin declarations, without actually having adopted such a policy.

Mr. Irwin added that the basic decision we must take is to face up to the problem "at the first turn of the screw". We should try to avoid "firing the first shot", but there will be a point at which we shall have to take action.

In response to the question what specific steps were envisaged, Mr. Irwin mentioned the possibility of using force to extricate a convoy which was not allowed to proceed because the commander refused to show documentation to GDR officials. General Johnson added that the questions how one uses force and how much force is needed were a matter for the determination of the field commander. It might, however, be necessary to have a series of tests of Soviet intentions, depending on Soviet reactions to varying actions on our part. We might ultimately have to be prepared to increase our effort, always trying, if possible, to avoid shooting or at least to avoid firing the first shot. In response to Viscount Hood's question whether we would be prepared ultimately to take over complete control of the Autobahn, Mr. Irwin said that he hoped this would not be necessary. He also thought that there was a point at which the Soviets would prevent us from ensuring our ability to pass, but that the first convoy might get through.

Mr. Kohler explained that the American position was that we should probably not reach the point where we have to take additional military action. Our proposed course of action involves the readiness ultimately to go to war, but we would have a few months in which to try to find a way to permit the Soviets to back down.

Viscount Hood said that two questions arose from the foregoing discussion. First, how do we put the matter to the Soviets; and second, what measures of preparedness should we take. Mr. Irwin replied that we contemplated "non-provocative" military preparedness measures, and General Johnson amplified this statement by saying that General Norstad is preparing a list of steps which might be taken to improve our readiness. General Johnson speculated that we might wish to take such measures as cancelling announced force reductions, increasing draft

calls, increasing the flow of replacements to Europe, evacuating dependents, and stopping tourist travel.

Admiral Denny expressed the view that "non-provocative" steps take time to have effect, and said that we would need to take other measures if we want "firm action at the first turn of the screw". He mentioned the possibility of a NATO "general alert", but Mr. Irwin replied that a "general alert" would be too precipitate an action and might create greater risks. Mr. Irwin expressed a preference for lesser steps which would put us in a better posture for a "general alert" at a later juncture. Viscount Hood inquired whether it was contemplated that there would be a series of preparedness measures (e.g. evacuation of dependents) in advance of any military operation, however limited, but this question remained unanswered. It was agreed that NATO-wide coordination would be required in any case.

Viscount Hood said that the British were of the opinion that there were other means of probing Soviet intentions, for example by setting up a "garrison airlift" rather than making use of limited military force on the road. He thought a "garrison airlift" would be an equally effective demonstration of our intention to maintain access to Berlin.

Mr. Kohler responded that a "garrison airlift" might seem to be only an evasion of the real problem and that the result would be that we should eventually have to face the test of force in worse circumstances. Mr. Irwin also expressed opposition to an airlift.

Admiral Denny declared that an airlift offered additional advantages as a test of Soviet intentions. First, an airlift would give us time to get physically ready for a test of force; and second, an airlift would make it necessary for the Soviets to precipitate the crisis by making the initial use of force.

Mr. Kohler replied that a Soviet "attack" to which we would have to reply would not necessarily involve shooting. The Soviets would, in effect, "pull the trigger" by withdrawing from their obligations regarding our surface access. General Johnson added that an airlift amounted to "accepting the blockade" and that the Soviets would not take our determination to maintain our access seriously.

Viscount Hood expressed a preference for a "garrison airlift" as a "first gambit", because it would maintain access but would at the same time be a peaceful action. Admiral Denny added that the air route would also be a much more certain route for supplying the Berlin forces, for the road could not be held open by force. Furthermore, in Admiral Denny's opinion, a "garrison airlift" had the advantage that it would not be interrupted, as could surface access, by "passive force" on the part of the Soviets. Viscount Hood reiterated his belief that one could not

establish surface access by using armed convoys and that a "garrison airlift" was preferable.

Mr. Kohler reiterated the view that an airlift would be a "measure of surrender" and said that, since we would have to face a show-down some day, the only solution would come from being willing to face it now.

In reply to Mr. Irwin's question whether the British looked upon the "garrison airlift" as postponing a crisis or as providing a *casus belli* in the event of Soviet interference, Viscount Hood said the British had both factors in mind. The shooting down of an airplane could, he thought, be regarded as a clear *casus belli*. Mr. Barker stressed the point that the Soviets might not have to resort to force to stop an armed convoy and that they could create a situation in which we might use force in a manner which would have a bad effect on public opinion. In reply to Mr. Irwin's question what measures the British contemplated if an airlift proved not to be feasible, Viscount Hood said that he didn't know and that the problem did not present itself since it has been concluded that a garrison airlift was practicable.

Viscount Hood then stressed the importance of military readiness measures. He said that he hoped the coming discussions would lead to concrete agreements on the preparatory measures to be taken before resorting to limited force, for we must be in a position to see a test of strength.

Mr. Kohler replied that what would be involved would be a "test of will", not a "test of strength", for we know that it is not militarily feasible to maintain Berlin or access to Berlin by force. General Johnson added that a test could in any case be deferred, for the Berlin garrisons could hold out for three months without any airlift. One might wait a week or a month.

Our planning, Mr. Kohler explained, was based on the assumption we would not have to resort to a test of force if we are ready for one. We assume that the Soviets do not want war. The way out is to put an "escape hatch" in our notes to the Soviets, but they will not look for this "escape hatch" unless we force them to.

Admiral Denny summarized by saying that we must persuade the Soviets of our intentions not only by our statements but also by our physical military posture.

Viscount Hood concluded that the basic issue was whether a probe of Soviet intentions was to be made on land or in the air.

121. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 5, 1959, 12:03–1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Anastas I. Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the USSR
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State
Oleg A. Troyanovski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to Moscow
Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

[Here follow 1-1/2 pages of introductory remarks.]

With regard to Germany, the Secretary continued, we recognize that it is a serious problem. We have been twice at war with Germany and although they had not been as costly to us as to the Soviet Union, these wars had been costly and unpleasant affairs for us. We understand quite well the desire of the Soviet Union that Germany should not again become a military menace and share its feelings on the question as what to do to prevent it from becoming that. The danger in the situation arises from the fact that the Soviet Union has one solution and we have another.¹ Out of our differences, there may emerge another dangerous Germany. These are the kind of things that might be useful to arrange for another talk of perhaps several hours duration while Mr. Mikoyan is here.

Mikoyan said that he was available, if the Secretary were so disposed, and that further conversation could be held either now or at a later date. In answer to the Secretary's question as to whether or not he were leaving town tomorrow, Mikoyan said that he was a man on holiday and that it would be easy for him to adjust his plans for the Secretary's convenience. He could talk tomorrow all day, or some other day. The Secretary said that it would be better to plan further talks when Mr. Mikoyan came back from his trip. He said that the President would like to talk to Mr. Mikoyan as well.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Freers and initialed by Greene. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The time and location of the meeting are from Dulles' Daily Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 1407, January 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-759) For other conversations with Mikoyan regarding Berlin, see Documents 135-137. For the portions of this memorandum not printed here, see vol. X, Part 1, Document 60.

¹ At this point in the source text the sentence, "Neither will work." was crossed out.

[Here follows a paragraph discussing international communism.]

Mikoyan turned to the German problem, which he agreed was a very serious one. He said there was no point in analyzing how the problem began or who was to blame. This would lead to no useful purpose. The Soviet Government thought that the United States had acted wrongly in arming Germany and in bringing it into NATO. The United States perhaps thought the same thing about Soviet action in East Germany. He said that we should leave the past to history and deal with the situation in Germany as it is. There is a West German state and an East German state and a Berlin occupied by the Allies. The Soviets recognized all these facts, the United States only part of them. The latter denied the fact of the existence of the German Democratic Republic. This attitude of the United States did not interfere with the fact. It might even be a source of strength for the GDR. The East Germans had been behind in their living standards but these were now improving and there was a great consolidation of social forces taking place in East Germany. It was not only the Communists who supported the GDR but also Christian Democrats and Liberals. Mikoyan said that American views of the situation were wrong and they led to errors in policy. The Soviet Union could not demand the liquidation of Adenauer and the GFR. On the contrary, it recognized them. But Adenauer demanded, and the United States supported this demand, that the GDR should not be recognized, but, on the contrary, that it should be engulfed by West Germany. Adenauer wanted no other kind of unity but engulfment. That was the problem. The important thing was that there was a strong GDR and also that Soviet troops were there. The Secretary asked him to repeat this latter remark, which he did. The Soviet Union was allied with the GDR, he said, through the Warsaw Pact, as the United States was with West Germany in NATO. Due to the Adenauer policy, the reunification of Germany has been postponed for an indefinite period. The Soviets thought that it was necessary to recognize the facts and take them into account. The Soviet view was that a peace treaty should be signed and if it were, the danger of war would be diminished. What had happened? The Czechs and the Poles had been our allies in the last war but today the Adenauer government did not even recognize them. Adenauer may not like Ulbricht or East Germany but what right does he have not to recognize Czechoslovakia or Poland? Mikoyan said he had told Adenauer this in a frank talk with him.²

Mikoyan said he told Adenauer that it was not in German interests to have no relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Adenauer had told him that he was thinking of recognizing the government of these

² Presumably this talk took place during Mikoyan's state visit to Bonn April 23–26, 1958.

countries, but that he was afraid that the Russians would be opposed. Mikoyan replied to him that they only welcomed this. Adenauer said that he would do it. Mikoyan said that Foreign Minister Brentano kept silent during the course of this conversation, but that Adenauer had been firm about taking this step. However, following the talk, Adenauer had made a statement about the frontier. It was true that Adenauer had said that any change in the frontier should occur through peaceful processes, but still he had called for a change. He should understand that he cannot change the frontier by peaceful means. It should be clear that the Poles and the Czechs (*sic*) would never agree to any change. Any talk about changing the frontier would lead to dangerous consequences. It alarmed the Poles and the Czechs, rallied them together and increased anti-American feeling. If a peace treaty were concluded, it would fix the frontier and no one would dare to talk about change. A peace treaty would weaken these disruptive influences.

The Secretary asked whether it should be understood that Mikoyan was talking about a peace treaty with two Germanies, without any preliminary union.

Mikoyan replied affirmatively, saying that he believed there could be a peace treaty without reunification, although it would be preferable to have prior reunification. The leaders of West Germany, he went on, say that there should either be full unity or none. Full unity was unrealistic. Union on the basis of confederation was realistic. He said that while the Secretary knew the history of the United States better than he did, it was his impression that there had been a time when unity of government had been achieved on the basis of confederation. The same had been the case in the USSR. From 1919 to 1924 the relations between the various republics had been based on confederation. Any simple merger in Germany raised the question as to what would happen to the two differing social systems. The German workers in East Germany would defend the socialist system. Also the workers of West Germany stand for nationalization. In any such merger there would be great complications. While the establishment of a confederation would make possible the retention of the social systems existing in the two parts, there would be certain common functions. These common functions would grow and develop a feeling of confidence. Now there not only was no confidence but not even any relations between the two parts of Germany.

Mikoyan said that just before he left Moscow, the Soviet Government had been discussing the question of proposing to the other allies the drafting of a peace treaty for Germany. It intended to suggest the calling of a peace conference in two months and would present a draft treaty. It would be glad to have proposals from the United States or any amendments to its proposals. The Soviet Government would seek with all the means at its disposal to move ahead on this. It regarded it as a

peaceful step and would be very persistent. The time had come to put an end to the remnants of war. If we waited on reunification which would be a drawn-out business, we would have to wait to put an end to the consequences of war. The Soviet Government regarded the provisions of the draft treaty proposed by it as being normal and acceptable. There was nothing communistic about this. The Soviet Government regarded as a very important point the question as to what was to be done with the foreign troops in Germany after the peace treaty. It favored withdrawal in a short time. If it were not being realistic about the matter and the United States were not prepared for this, it was the Soviet desire to reach a common policy and it would be prepared to seek alternative solutions. One of these might be to have one-third of the foreign troops withdrawn within six months after the conclusion of a peace treaty and to leave the question of full withdrawal and the dates concerned for decision in the future. Mikoyan said that he had an aide-mémoire on the question which he would be glad to leave with the Secretary.³

Mikoyan then suggested that the Secretary might be interested in the question of Berlin. Mikoyan said that before his departure from Moscow, the US note on Berlin⁴ had been received. It would be discussed by the Soviet Government and a reply sent. His first impression was that the United States either did not understand the Soviet position or for the benefit of Adenauer or someone else it had presented this position in a distorted manner. The positive side of the note is what the Soviets understand as our desire to have negotiations. As to the distortion of the Soviet position, it would seem from the note that it was the United States that was fighting for the rights of the citizens of West Berlin and the Soviet Union that wanted to suppress them. This was fundamentally wrong. The Soviet Union did not want to extract an advantage from the situation. It did not want to be in a new unequal position, nor did it want to undermine the position of the United States, Britain and France. All the talk about any lack of face which might result from this had no foundation. The Soviet Union wanted the freedom of West Ber-

³ Not printed. The aide-mémoire contained the outline of a treaty of peace with Germany and a reiteration of the Soviet proposal for making Berlin into a free city. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material) On January 7 the Soviet Ambassador in France presented de Gaulle with a copy of the aide-mémoire. (Telegram 2467 from Paris, January 8; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-859) Presumably the British received a copy from the Soviet Ambassador in London. The substance of the document was conveyed to the North Atlantic Council at a special private meeting on January 8. (Polto 1887 from Paris, January 8; *ibid.*, 033.6111/1-859) For text of the draft German peace treaty, dated January 10 and released to the press by the Soviet Union that day, incorporating the ideas presented in the aide-mémoire, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 9, 1959, pp. 333–343.

⁴ For text of the U.S. note on Berlin, December 31, 1958, see *ibid.*, January 19, 1959, pp. 79–81, or *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 573–576.

lin guaranteed not by the bayonets of occupation forces but by the Four Powers, by the two German States, and by the UN. It wanted all countries to have free access to Berlin. Mikoyan repeated that the USSR wanted the guarantee of freedom to be assured by the Four Powers, by the two Germanies, and by other countries and that it was prepared to have the UN participate. Mikoyan said that he wanted to add something that had not been in the other note (the Soviet note of November 27 ?).⁵ The Soviet Union proposed the establishment of a permanent commission composed of the United States, the USSR and others, to guarantee noninterference in the affairs of Berlin.

There had been talk of how West Berlin would survive economically. It would flourish. It would get orders from the United States and the Soviet Union. Everyone would be interested in having West Berlin develop. We could cooperate in protecting West Berlin as a unity not as occupying forces, but on a genuine basis. There had been talk about the Soviet proposal to the effect that it is an ultimatum or a threat. Mikoyan did not see the basis for this. The Soviet Union had not threatened military action of any sort. On the contrary, it had proposed negotiations. There had been certain generals who had made threats about tanks being used to break through to Berlin. It was clear that the tanks of one side would be met by the tanks of the other side. Neither side should threaten the other. The Soviet Union did not want war and did not think that the United States wanted war. If we could sit down and discuss the matter calmly, we could make West Berlin a model city with no interference in its internal affairs. What surprised the Soviet Union was that, while it continued to advance positive and constructive proposals, it had met nothing new from the United States. The latter had not even said how long the occupation would last. The fact that the Soviet Union talked about six months—which was long enough for any negotiations on the matter—did not mean that this was an ultimatum or a threat. It was quite natural that the state on whose territory Berlin was situated should carry out such functions.

The Secretary said that he was very glad to have the assurance of Mr. Mikoyan that the Soviet note was not designed as a threat or ultimatum, otherwise any negotiation would be impossible. With regard to what Mikoyan called the occupation of Berlin, the latter's picture was not accurate. The fact was that the people of West Berlin looked upon the British, French and US forces as the guarantee of their freedom and independence and not as unfriendly occupation forces. If these troops left, there would surely be serious panic in West Berlin. Mikoyan spoke of making West Berlin a model city. It already was one. Mikoyan inter-

⁵ See Document 72.

rupted to say "But it is occupied". The Secretary rejoined that you could call it occupied or defended. He had been in West Berlin in May.⁶ He had been impressed by the vigorous vitality of the city, the apartment buildings, and so forth. It was a very fine city today. It was hard to avoid the suspicion that West Berlin was, in fact, too vigorous and prosperous not to invite invidious comparison with its environment. The heart of the matter was that we had agreements which entitled us to maintain certain forces. We would not accept any unilateral determination regarding any withdrawal of forces. No doubt should be left on this score. We were prepared, as our note indicated, to renew discussions on the German question. If agreement seemed possible regarding Germany as a whole, the problem of Berlin would assume a different perspective. We were thus prepared to negotiate about Germany; but the isolated withdrawal of our forces from Berlin was not going to happen. We did not want war over Berlin, nor for that matter, over anything; but we were not prepared to avoid war by retreating wherever we were under pressure.

Mikoyan said that no one was asking for withdrawal. The Soviets were proposing the termination of the occupation, not the withdrawal of forces. Secretary Dulles apparently preferred a "tough line" policy and appeared to be trying to inspire himself to resist. The Soviet Government was not asking anyone to withdraw, it was asking for the problem to be settled by negotiation. With regard to unilateral action and terms of agreement, Mikoyan said that he knew the American juridical arguments, but could not agree with them. After all, the Soviet Union had not been asked about the termination of the American occupation in West Germany. On the other hand, it itself was suggesting negotiations before taking any action, which testified to good will on its part.

The Secretary stated that the greatest single obstacle in the present situation was the great doubt that existed in the United States regarding the dependability of Soviet promises. It was difficult to build a better world unless there existed confidence in each other's promises. He would not expect Mikoyan to agree with us regarding the dependability of Soviet promises but he would ask Mikoyan to agree on the fact that there was a strong feeling about this question in the United States. If there were a real desire on the part of the Soviet Union to develop peaceful relations and what it calls peaceful coexistence, it would be extremely necessary for the Soviet Union to avoid any actions which would lend credence to the suspicions in this country about the unreliability of its promises. Such topics were not pleasant to raise, but if the

⁶See Document 11.

exchange of views were to be beneficial we should treat frankly with the matters that were on our minds.

Mikoyan nodded, and then said that it was wrong to cast any suspicion on the dependability of Soviet adherence to the agreements it undertakes. The Soviets were realistic and knew the value of good will. There was, however, no use in arguing this point. He was certain that he could find more instances for complaint by their side about nonfulfillment of promises than we could for complaint by us. The best thing was to find one point on which to test dependability, then go on to another, and so forth. Berlin could be taken, as an example. American troops were in West Germany, Soviet troops in East Germany. There could be an international commission set up to test the dependability of an agreement on the Berlin problem. The Soviets realized that if promises were broken here, it would be dangerous, because of the presence of their troops and ours. If there were an international commission, there would be a means for determining this. If, on the other hand, no positive steps were taken, the situation of distrust would continue.

Mikoyan then pointedly asked the Secretary whether he thought the Soviet Union wanted war. The Secretary said no. Then he asked Mikoyan whether he thought the United States wanted war. Mikoyan said that he did not think the United States wanted war now, but the United States had set up bases around the Soviet Union and this gave ground for suspicion as to what might happen in the future. These bases were not there to play football. The Secretary said that Mikoyan had raised a matter which touched upon the major question of collective security. There could be a talk about this at some other time.

After checking his calendar, the Secretary said that he would make the full day of January 19th available for talks with Mikoyan and possibly some time on January 20th. The President of Argentina would arrive on the latter day for a State Visit and thus there was a question of whether any time would be available in the course of that day. The Secretary said he would have to go over his schedule to see whether any time could be arranged for that day as well. During the conversations on January 19, arrangements could be made for Mikoyan's call on the President. The Secretary remarked that the talk today had been very useful in helping to prepare our minds for more extensive and substantial talks later on.⁷

[Here follows discussion on disarmament.]

⁷ On January 6 Mikoyan discussed U.S.-Soviet relations with Vice President Nixon and with former Presidential Assistant Harold Stassen. In both cases he reiterated the Soviet position on Berlin as developed in his conversation with Secretary Dulles. A memorandum of his conversation with Nixon is printed in vol. X, Part 1, Document 61. Stassen described his meeting with Mikoyan in a letter to President Eisenhower on January 7. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series)

122. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 5, 1959, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list¹

(This meeting was held in pursuance of the agreement of the Three Foreign Ministers in Paris on December 15 [14], 1958² that paragraph D of the U.S. aide-mémoire of December 11, 1958³ should be discussed tripartitely in Washington. Paragraph D reads as follows:

“At this stage of developments [i.e. when Allied surface traffic between Berlin and West Germany is not allowed to transit the Soviet Zone without dealing with East German personnel]⁴ and before considering resort to an airlift, an attempt to reopen access through the use of limited military force should be made in order to demonstrate our determination to maintain surface access. In any case, the Soviets and East Germans should not be allowed to entertain doubts as to our determination to do so if need be. Even if force is not resorted to at once we should continue to assert our rights to resume interrupted traffic and our intention to do so by force.”)

Mr. Murphy opened the discussion by asking the British and French how they thought the matter should be handled. Mr. Alphand replied that he was still without instructions, but that he expected instructions soon. Viscount Hood replied that he would like to hear the United States views on the subject.

After reading and commenting on paragraph D, which he said was quite clear, Mr. Murphy explained that we did not want to make the same mistake we had made at the time of the 1948 blockade. The 1948–49 airlift was, to be sure, a technical success, but it had been very expensive. More important, the airlift had been an evasion of the issue in the face of a Soviet challenge. It had not sufficed to prevent the Korean War, which cost us many casualties.

Mr. Alphand inquired whether it was contemplated that we should use force in the first instance or whether we should only answer force

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–559. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan and initialed by Kohler and Murphy.

¹ Not printed.

² See Document 108.

³ See Document 98 and footnote 5 thereto.

⁴ Brackets in the source text.

with force. Viscount Hood asked what force we contemplated using in the first instance and what force would be held in reserve.

Mr. Irwin replied that it is difficult to pin down specifically what we would do. The military field commanders must take such decisions in the light of the circumstances obtaining at the time. If we show determination to resist the first attempt to impede our access, the issue may not arise. The extent of force which would be required would depend on what the Soviets did. What we want to do, Mr. Irwin said, is to take the basic decision here; the implementation can be left to the military in the field.

Mr. Murphy added that we simply wanted to state the general principle on which we would operate. We would, he said, be glad to set up a working group for a detailed study of various contingencies, but such a study would take a lot of time.

Viscount Hood referred to the "six months' notice" which the Soviets have given us and asked what we intended to do in this period, i.e., what action we contemplated first, what action we contemplated on June 1, and what action we contemplated after that. Mr. Alphand asked whether we would consider the turning back of trains and road traffic as force which had to be countered by force.

Mr. Murphy referred to various actions which could be taken to impede our access and stated that we would use such force as we determine to be necessary to prosecute our right of access to Berlin.

Mr. Alphand posed the question whether we really need a "statement of principle" as proposed by the United States or whether we could wait for a further clarification of Soviet intentions. Mr. Murphy replied that the earlier we took the decision the better, and Mr. Kohler added that we have no assurance that the Soviets will not act in less than six months.

In response to Viscount Hood's observation that the matter affected all the NATO countries, Mr. Kohler stated that we proposed to consult in NATO when our plans are revised but that the tripartite communiqué of December 14⁵ and the NATO communiqué of December 16⁶ implicitly authorize us to undertake such planning. We are in a way only implementing a decision already taken, for our public declarations on Berlin imply our readiness to use force if necessary.

⁵ For text of this communiqué, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, p. 600; *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, p. 559; or *Department of State Bulletin*, December 29, 1958, pp. 1041-1042.

⁶ For text of the NATO declaration on Berlin, see *ibid.*, January 5, 1959, p. 4; *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 602-603; or *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, p. 560.

Viscount Hood expressed the view that we must take further preparatory steps if we wish to show the Soviets that our declarations are not empty words. We must, he said, exhaust all peaceful courses and make it clear that any war which might result would not be of our making. Thus we must make the Soviets face the real alternatives of allowing us to pass or of using force to prevent our passage. The British do not think that the Soviets want war, but if war seems to threaten, popular opinion must not have the impression that the Western Powers have done the provoking. Thus we must explore what is involved in the way of preparations, both psychological and military. First, we must show the Soviets our determination. This could be best accomplished by a general mobilization or by what is comparable, i.e., a NATO general alert. Mr. Murphy objected that it would be impossible to make a stand if one described the "horrors of the ultimate" to the people.

Viscount Hood admitted that it was difficult to draw a balance. The basic objective is to maintain access to Berlin, and this, in his opinion, could be done by a variety of methods including a garrison airlift.

Mr. Irwin offered a definition of "force" as contemplated in paragraph D. This would, he said, be such force as is necessary to counter active or "passive" force denying us access. There is an unending series of possibilities. If we are determined to use force, Mr. Irwin continued, we will create two situations. First, the Soviets will not make it necessary for us to use it. Second, if the Soviets oppose us, there would result a situation which could lead to war. If the Soviets oppose our first attempt to pass, both sides will build up their forces and will look toward a resolution of the problem by general war if necessary. Mr. Irwin concurred with Viscount Hood that we must prepare for all eventualities before embarking on the use of force but added that we need a decision on principle before undertaking a discussion of details.

Mr. Irwin further defined the United States position by saying that, if our access were challenged in the air, we would respond by the use of limited force in the air. He assumed, however, that the first challenge would come on the ground. In this case it would be preferable to have our road rather than our rail traffic challenged, because it would be easier to respond on the road. The important thing, Mr. Irwin concluded, was to test the first challenge of our access.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the principle was now clear, and, if so, whether the British and French would be prepared to explore means of implementing this principle. Viscount Hood stated that he accepted the principle but that we need not necessarily respond on the ground. He also observed that the action proposed by the United States involved great risks for which we are not yet prepared.

Mr. Irwin replied that an airlift would only amount to a postponement. We will never be in an ideal position for general war, he said, but

we faced this possibility in the Lebanon and Quemoy crises⁷ and our NATO position is no less good at this time. While we should make preparations, we do not require a specific degree of preparedness for the test contemplated in paragraph D. Mr. Murphy added that our Berlin stockpiles would permit us to wait as long as three months before making our test.

Mr. Murphy then went into the subject of the motivation of the recent Soviet threat against Berlin. The United States, he said, evaluates this threat as just another in a series of probes and believes that the Soviets are not prepared to risk a war. It is, therefore, important for us to show initially that we will not evade the issue. The Soviets have left themselves some elbowroom. They have a dozen pretexts for a general war if they wish one; they did not have to provoke a crisis over Berlin. If the Soviets are convinced we are just as determined as they, Mr. Murphy said, they have until May to find a way out of the problem they have created for themselves. In 1948 we had to resort to an airlift because we were completely unprepared for war; we are in a better position today.

Viscount Hood said that he would like to have the answers to three questions before assenting to any land operation: how does one define "limited military force;" second, what defense preparations would have to be made in advance to put us in a proper posture for a use of force; and third, what sort of timetable would be followed?

Mr. Murphy replied that a study of these questions could take weeks, and Mr. Irwin added that USAREUR and USCOB would have to be consulted. General Johnson offered purely illustrative comments on the type of military preparedness steps which might be taken in conjunction with a use of limited military force. General Norstad might, he thought, consider recommending a speed-up in the procurement of equipment, reinforcement to bring units up to strength, an increase in the size of our forces of [by] an increase in the draft, the stopping of movement of dependents to Europe, and the stopping of tourist travel. General Johnson was not, however, aware that General Norstad had already taken any measures of this sort.

With reference to the "timetable," Mr. Kohler said that we viewed agreement on paragraph D as a "subdecision" implementing our public pronouncements which we would send to the field to "staff out" and that the study prepared in the field would come back to Washington for approval. Mr. Alphand concurred that the political decision had to be taken first. Mr. Murphy warned of the psychological pressures which

⁷ Documentation on the landing of U.S. troops in Lebanon on July 15, 1958, is in volume XI. Documentation on the bombing of Quemoy in the late summer and fall of 1958 is in volume XIX.

we would face if we deferred a decision until the six months' period fixed by the Soviets was nearing its end.

Viscount Hood stated that where the British and the Americans diverged was conceivably on method. The British wished to have military plans approved by this political-military group now meeting in Washington. Mr. Alphand agreed that details should be requested from the field commanders and should be given further study in Washington.

Mr. Irwin suggested, and the British and French agreed, that each group should ascertain its own national plans and meet again to co-ordinate them later in the week or early in the following week. It was agreed that it would be useful to know what paragraph D meant in military terms.

Viscount Hood referred to the "political exercise" and asked how we convey our ideas to the Soviets. Mr. Murphy suggested that we could take advantage of Mr. Mikoyan's visit.

Mr. Murphy, Mr. Irwin, and Mr. Kohler reiterated the view that an airlift would not be a suitable response to a stoppage of surface traffic. Mr. Murphy said that the talk about an airlift which had already taken place had had a bad psychological effect, for the Soviets will take a tougher position on ground access if they believe we are ready to resort to an airlift. On the other hand, they will backtrack if we stand firm. In any case, Mr. Murphy said, we have no intention to mount a new airlift, and even a "garrison airlift" would be a start in this direction.

Admiral Denny said that it was important to work out a timetable of actions which we would take to demonstrate to the Soviets that we mean business and are ready. Mr. Irwin commented that the state of readiness of our forces in Europe was not all. One had to consider SAC and our over-all deterrent in persuading the Soviets.

Mr. Murphy, after consultation with the Department of Defense, said, in reply to a suggestion of Admiral Denny that a joint working party be set immediately, that we would prefer to study this first ourselves.

In conclusion, it was agreed that another meeting would be held as soon as Mr. Alphand received his instructions, which he expected before the middle of the following week.⁸

⁸ In light of the discussion at this meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a statement of the military preparations, courses of action, and their method and timing that might be necessary to meet the Berlin situation. Copies of this paper, JCSM-16-59 with appendices, were transmitted to the Secretary of Defense on January 13 and to Dulles 2 days later. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Germany)

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, January 9, 1959, 7:49 p.m.

1448. Murphy called in Grewe today in endeavor to stimulate German thinking re Berlin situation and related problems.¹ After explaining issues involved in current tripartite discussions on Point D proposed revision Contingency Plans,² former invited German views. In this connection Murphy noted that prevailing American thinking is that large scale airlift to supply entire civil population of Berlin not practicable under present circumstances. Grewe said response from Bonn would probably be in form of questions intended to elicit further information re relevant military facts. Murphy commented that essential point was to achieve adoption of basic principle to prosecute our right of land access by means at our disposal. If all details had to be decided in advance indefinite delay would result.

Murphy also raised hypothetical question of how Ambassador would respond to query from outsider as to why FedRep opposed to recognition East German regime. Grewe said that traditional answer his Government was that recognition of GDR would in effect legalize partition of Germany and thus create heavy political obstacle to reunification. If there were two recognized German states, only negotiation between two Governments with each exercising veto could provide road to reunification. As far as confederation idea concerned, Grewe added, it necessarily involved veto right on both sides and breakdown of effective government would be assured as long as regimes basically hostile to each other. Therefore in practice confederation would mean replacing Four Power responsibility with entity which could not operate effectively.

Murphy noted that overwhelming percentage of population East Germany would like to be consolidated with West on friendly not hostile basis. If this true, if there were only some way of getting two together, Soviets would inevitably be maneuvered out. Question was whether we were using enough imagination to achieve basic West German objective of consolidating Germany and at same time preserving general Western objectives. Western Governments should have a hard look to see if they were not missing a trick or two. Murphy said we were not clear as to Chancellor's and Foreign Office's thinking re possibility

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Jandrey, and approved by Murphy.

¹No other record of this conversation has been found.

²Regarding point D, see Document 98.

of working out mutually acceptable solution. We would be interested their views if possible before return of Mikoyan. Grewe said this of course raised basic issues. He was glad to note feeling that at least some re-appraisal of policy served useful purpose. He did not know whether anything would come out at end, but it was good to instigate Governments to do some thinking.

Grewe said he would pass Department basic study of traditional Germany policy towards GDR. There was some discussion of motives behind Grotewohl trip to Cairo at this time, and agreement that non-recognition policy at times tended to provide easy mechanism for use by Soviets in frustrating broader Western objectives.

Re Mikoyan aide-mémoire³ Grewe said that it appeared to indicate more clearly than ever that in Soviet opinion peace treaty would have to be signed by two Germanies. It gave impression Soviets desire discussion of peace treaty alone using Berlin as means of pressure in this direction. If crisis became more difficult it would be hard to oppose clamor of public opinion for such conference. Murphy commented that peace conference idea might be useful in giving Soviets way out of extreme Berlin demands.

Agreed talks would continue after Grewe had received word from Bonn.

Dulles

³ See footnote 3, Document 121.

124. Editorial Note

On January 10 Foreign Minister Gromyko summoned Chargé Davis to the Foreign Ministry and handed him a note transmitting a draft peace with Germany and answering the U.S. note of December 31, 1958. (See Document 118.) The Soviet note reiterated the points made in its November 27, 1958, note (see Document 72) and called for a conference to draft the final peace treaty on Germany. The Embassy in Moscow transmitted the Soviet note to the Department in telegram 1405, January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 662.001/1–1059) Copies of this note were also given to the other NATO countries with Ambassadors in Moscow and to various Soviet bloc members. The Russian-language text was printed in the Soviet press on January 11. For text of the note with the attached draft peace treaty, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 9, 1959, pages 333–343.

125. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 12, 1959, 5 p.m.

1409. Text of Soviet draft peace treaty for Germany published January 11 only confirms London's excellent analysis of its pitfalls (London's 3559 to Dept)¹ and adds additional ones which, as under Soviet definitions of "hostile activity" (Article 18), of "war propaganda" (Article 20) as well as trade (Article 39), etc., would require revolutionary change in West Germany's domestic order as well as in its foreign policy.

Moscow is obviously trying keep West thoroughly off balance. Soviets have had advantage of being initiators of Berlin crisis, and it is not improbable that Soviets have additional proposals in reserve to keep West on run in hope that as public opinion becomes even more jittery while deadline nears without solution, governments will be forced more and more to consider compromises.

In fact, Soviets have now broadened their original offer to talk about Berlin to include German peace treaty and also, perhaps, European security (since negative response to this item is not in firm language and may well be changeable in guise of great Soviet "concession"). Can be recalled that during abortive exchanges of US, UK, and French Ambassadors with Gromyko last spring to arrange summit meeting, West made known to Soviets that it might agree to general agenda formulation on Germany within which each side could raise subjects in which it was interested. Relying on this, on Bundestag wavering in recent months on "new approach" to Soviets involving peace treaty discussions, and on still considerable Western (especially British) sentiment for negotiation, Soviets may well conceive of their latest proposal as lure which finally gets Western states into some sort of high-level conference where public pressures will be at maximum on them achieve positive result.

Obviously, Soviets will not now negotiate on reunification, and Moscow knows that West will not sign peace treaty. However, if they once have all powers assembled in some forum, they are capable of introducing new variations of previous proposals and of pulling out all propaganda stops. There is also curious provision in Soviet draft treaty (Article 45) that if all Allied powers do not ratify treaty, then Germany

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662.001/1-1259. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

¹ Telegram 3559, January 9, reported that the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty had become more novel and sophisticated, but less constructive. (*Ibid.*, 033.6111/1-959)

(presumably meaning GDR or FRG) can agree to accept treaty with those powers which wish to ratify (more or less as US did on Japanese Treaty). This may be hint of Soviet plans to announce readiness to sign separate treaty with GDR (and perhaps FRG too) at some stage of proceedings.

Latest Soviet proposals also intended to give new impetus to drive to get GDR recognized by West. Moscow may well believe that weakest link in armor of Western governments is failure of large part of public to understand why dealing with GDR would be so fatal. Although we see no reason to give up conclusion that real Soviet object is to get Allies out of Berlin and eventually to incorporate West Berlin into GDR (which maximum demands of November 27 note² made clear), first step on which Moscow might be willing temporarily to agree could involve continued Allied presence in Berlin, but at sufferance of GDR which Allies would recognize. This would fit in more closely with Khrushchev's original speech on November 10³ and would seem to be confirmed by Winzer's answer January 9 to Western journalist's question (Berlin's 567 to Department).⁴

Should be noted that only *Izvestia* January 11 published Western notes of December 31⁵ and that Soviet reply when attempting to justify unilateral denunciation of agreements on Berlin conspicuously fails refer to 1949 Paris Agreements.⁶

Although too early in any case to expect any real modification of Soviet position on Berlin in direction of retreat or compromise, most indications still are that Soviets are not now thinking in those terms. Latest note is firm; Soviets have advantage of being able unilaterally to turn their Berlin functions over to GDR at any time; and, as Mikoyan said in US on Berlin crisis, "one does not change good positions".

Davis

² See Document 72.

³ See Document 24.

⁴ Telegram 567, January 10, reported on a press conference on January 9 at which GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer released a 13-page note on the Berlin situation and stated that the GDR would negotiate with the Western Allies on access to the city only if GDR sovereignty were recognized. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1059)

⁵ See Document 118.

⁶ For text of the Paris agreements, June 20, 1949, which ended the Berlin blockade, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.

126. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, January 13, 1959, 9:18 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE PRESIDENT

The Pres asked if we would be against the establishment of a free city if it were all inclusive—East and West Germany. If that were agreeable to the Germans he supposes we would not object. The Sec said if it were agreeable but he is sure West Germany would not agree to anything that would take our troops out. That is the only thing that keeps it from being engulfed. Once they go the paper agreements are no good. The Pres would say that would be a new problem.¹ The Sec said to be careful about implying anything about taking our troops out of Berlin. They agreed they are more rigid than we are.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Bernau.

¹ Apparently the President was anticipating that he would be asked questions on Berlin at his press conference on January 14, but none was raised.

127. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 13, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list¹

(This meeting continued the tripartite discussion of paragraph D of the United States aide-mémoire of December 11, 1958 which had begun on January 5, 1959 and which, it was agreed at that time, would be resumed when the French Ambassador received instructions.)²

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1359. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan and initialed by Murphy and Kohler. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegrams 2477 and 2478, January 14. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/1-1459)

¹ Not printed.

² See Document 122.

Ambassador Alphand reported that he had received the views of the French Government.³ The French endorsed the principle that we must take all necessary measures to prevent the Soviets or East Germans from interfering with our access to Berlin, whether by land or by air. Our common determination to do so must be made clear to the Soviets. General de Gaulle had in fact expressed this determination to Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov.⁴ However, the French did not believe that a decision can be taken at this moment regarding the precise manner in which the Allied right of access was to be reaffirmed. The French were in agreement that a military study of all contingencies and all possible courses of action should be made without delay. They could not, however, take a final decision on a hypothetical basis. It was possible that the eventual decision might be to follow the course of action suggested in paragraph D, but before a course of action could be decided upon there must be further political consultation in the light of the actions which were taken to impede access and of the other circumstances obtaining at the time. Until the present, the French had believed that the use of limited military force to demonstrate our intention to maintain access to Berlin could best be made in the air. If surface access should be blocked, they would, however, be prepared to re-examine the question.

Ambassador Caccia expressed general agreement with Ambassador Alphand's views. The principle on which we must act was laid down for us in the Foreign Ministers' communiqué of December 14 and the NATO communiqué of December 16.⁵ The British views on the implementation of this principle were similar to those of the French. Certainly all means of doing so should be actively studied. The use of limited force in connection with rail and waterways access was probably not feasible. The best way to start asserting our right of access by limited force was probably in the air, but the British were ready to look at military plans for doing so on the ground. In any case a final decision would have to be taken by the Cabinet, and Parliamentary approval would probably be necessary.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that the issue was whether the British and French accepted paragraph D, i.e., whether they were in agreement that a blocking of ground access should be met, if necessary, with limited force on the ground. It was necessary to have agreement on this principle, he said, in order to know where we went from here.

³ Alphand received his instructions on January 12. For his view of the Berlin question, a summary of the instructions, and his account of the meeting with Hood and Murphy, see *L'Etonnement*, pp. 295–298.

⁴ Presumably the meeting on January 7 at which the Soviet Ambassador presented the aide-mémoire of January 5; see footnote 3, Document 121.

⁵ See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 122.

Ambassador Caccia said that the British agreed to study the possibility of using limited force in connection with ground access but that they regarded paragraph D, insofar as it meant that a challenge to ground access must be met by the use of limited force on the ground, as an operational plan rather than as a statement of principle. The appropriate use of force would not necessarily be on the ground, and the British therefore could not accept the specific wording of paragraph D.

Mr. Murphy replied that Ambassador Caccia's comments gave the impression that the British did not mean to use force and would resort to an airlift instead.

Mr. Irwin defined the principle on which the United States sought agreement as an expression of willingness to use force to defend whatever means of access was threatened; that is that force would be used on the ground if ground access was threatened and in the air if air access was threatened. Viscount Hood observed that this procedure would require the use of force in connection with rail and waterways access.

Ambassador Caccia said that the British "feared" the United States approach to the problem because it provided for an advance commitment to one specific plan, which meant putting the cart before the horse. What was needed first was data about various plans.

Mr. Irwin, referring to the examples of Lebanon and Quemoy, commented that examining possible tactical plans would be useful but that what deterred the Soviets was not tactical operations but the realization of the free world's nuclear deterrent capabilities. Only firm action on our part could prevent war.

Ambassador Caccia said that the discussion appeared to be going around in circles. We had a fundamental decision; the more ready we were to implement it, the better. Berlin is not an isolated affair, and the Soviets, in their latest note,⁶ have shown a readiness to talk. Therefore we should show no weakness and should demonstrate that we are, if necessary, prepared to fight a general war. However, the United States wants in addition to get agreement that there is one specific way to approach the problem, and this the British cannot accept.

Mr. Murphy explained that the United States does not want to plan an airlift at this stage. The Soviets would inevitably learn of such planning, would think that we were taking a weak position and evading the issue, and would be encouraged to take a firmer stand with respect to our ground access. We wished to avoid giving the Soviets the impression we were backing away as we had in 1948. He said that United States opinion was strong on this point; we wanted no one to have the illusion that there will be another airlift.

⁶See Document 124.

Ambassador Caccia replied that he understood Mr. Murphy's argument but could not agree with it. As far as an airlift was concerned, only a small "garrison" airlift would be involved. The British wished to keep some flexibility. If the object was to avoid giving the Soviets a false impression, this could be done in other ways.

Ambassador Alphand then suggested language which, he thought, might be agreed on in lieu of the language of paragraph D (see final paragraph below).

Mr. Murphy observed that the meaning of the language suggested by the French did not seem to be greatly different but stressed that the United States desired the British and French to face up to the issue involved in paragraph D.

Mr. Irwin raised the question how a garrison airlift would provide an effective assertion of our right of access on the ground. If the Soviets did not interfere with the airlift for a while, the issue would become increasingly unclear. If they managed to stop the airlift later, we would be at a psychological disadvantage. Berlin stockpiles made it unnecessary to mount an airlift immediately in any case. In short, an airlift would be no solution, would involve great expense, and would amount to an abandonment of ground access.

Ambassador Caccia replied that this was a strong argument. The British asked only to have a look at the plans. They might agree. There was agreement on the principle involved. The United States had presented a strong argument as to how we should proceed to implement this principle. However, the British could not commit themselves here and now without examining the method of procedure in detail.

Mr. Irwin pointed out the difficulty of planning to meet every degree of Soviet resistance. Access could not be maintained if Soviet forces were determined to block it, and an effort to maintain it under such circumstances would result in general war.

Ambassador Caccia expressed the view that the use of even limited military force might distort NATO's defense posture.

Ambassador Caccia then suggested that the language suggested by the French be studied unilaterally and that, if agreement could be reached on wording, the precise action to be taken then be considered.

It was agreed that another meeting would be held later in the week or early in the following week and that the language suggested by Ambassador Alphand would be studied in the interim.

The language suggested by Ambassador Alphand was the following:

"1. The three Governments affirm their determination to maintain by all means of their choice their rights to free access to Berlin whether by land or air and with regard either to Soviet authorities or to East Ger-

man authorities. This determination will be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government by means to be decided in common.

"2. The military authorities concerned are forthwith instructed to consider the various contingencies and the practical measures to be taken.

"3. The final decision to implement the principle set forth in paragraph 1 above will be taken by common accord at the appropriate time taking into account all the circumstances."

128. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, January 13, 1959, 6 p.m.

1467. After conversation this morning (Embtel 1464)¹ on military subjects, Chancellor said he wanted talk Brentano, Strauss, myself about political matters.

1. He believes three occupying powers Berlin must use force if necessary including against GDR police to maintain position Berlin. If this not done U.S. will have lost game. Highly unlikely Soviets would risk hot war, but if European faith in U.S. pledges and determination were shaken it would be fatal blow to Europe and NATO.

2. In recent talk with Hallstein, latter informed Chancellor economic potential six nation community is as 17 to U.S. 20. If Soviets through cold war acquire this 17 they would have vast superiority over us and dislocate U.S. economy which would result in political catastrophe. It is equally in European and U.S. interest to have faith in U.S. remain intact.

3. Above reflections prompted by his reading recent Grewe-Murphy and Grewe-Hillenbrand exchanges.² Asked Brentano and Strauss for comments.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1359. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 1464, January 13, reported on a discussion of placing IRBMs in Germany. (*Ibid.*, 711.56362A/1-1359)

² Regarding Grewe's conversation with Murphy on January 9, see Document 123. In a second conversation that day with Hillenbrand, Grewe reviewed the same points because he had failed to take notes during the first conversation. (Telegram 1497 to Bonn, January 14; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1359)

4. Brentano emphasized necessity not weakening on Dec 14 and Dec 16 Paris communiqués.³ Thinks risk of general war reduced by maintaining firm stand agreed Paris.

5. Strauss expressed opinion Soviets will not start hot war, but will adopt series slow strangulation measures regard Berlin. If Western powers firm Soviets will not allow interference access immediately. Addressing himself to me, he asked I convey his request that when military plans re Berlin are discussed, FedRep be permitted share in deliberations, or, failing that, be informed of substance Allied intentions.

6. Chancellor resumed commentary. Thinks Soviet objective not to destroy world but to rule it. Soviets have missionary fervor. U.S. only obstacle to realization world domination. Believes damage to U.S. economy their chief present tactic. However, their representations concerning their production achievements are a “swindle”.

7. Adenauer said he had not informed me yesterday, since I was in Heidelberg, of his action in sending Dittmann to Washington and letter to Secretary to explain misgivings over appointment granted Mikoyan to see President Eisenhower.⁴ We would be foolish to indulge in any optimism over Mikoyan visit; aide-mémoire on Berlin⁵ was as rough and tough as ever; and the proposed peace treaty draft was outrageous. President should not receive Mikoyan, who would play up meeting at forthcoming Party Congress as having been successful and preliminary to summit conference.

8. Next he talked, rather foolishly I thought, about Khrushchev's position being imperilled by the restoration of Molotov and Bulganin to favor and likelihood Khrushchev losing office. Brentano and Strauss looked bewildered.

9. I told Chancellor I totally disbelieved there had been any weakening or would be of U.S. determination on Berlin or other German problems. I had not seen report of Grewe–Hillenbrand interview, but was familiar with content Grewe–Murphy conversation. Seemed to me request by U.S. for FedRep views in connection possible negotiations with Soviets was utterly reasonable and necessary, and there could be no harm or evidence of weakening on Berlin if our two governments were to discuss in mutual confidence various tactics and matters of

³ See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 122.

⁴ In his January 12 letter Adenauer wrote that in view of the uncompromising Soviet position on Berlin it would not be right for the President to see Mikoyan and noted that he was sending Dittmann to Washington to help Grewe present the German position. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) The letter was received after the White House had announced that the President would see Mikoyan. For text of the letter, see Grewe, *Rückblenden*, pp. 373–374.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 121.

substance that were certain to come up. I was sure he was entirely mistaken in displaying doubts in this regard.

10. Adenauer replied that he had not intended to question the propriety of the talks between his Ambassador and Department officials, but that U.S. must not succumb to Soviet blandishments. I assured him that such an error was not in question.

11. Chancellor looked tired. He has had slight bronchial trouble for weeks. He talked further and at great length about Mikoyan's unreliability, and how mistaken it was for the American public to have received him so enthusiastically, etc. I told him not to worry over this, Mikoyan was a visiting curiosity.

12. Suggest after meeting with Mikoyan, Adenauer be informed soonest possible what transpired.

Bruce

129. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

Berlin and the German Problem

PARTICIPANTS

Herbert Dittmann, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, German Foreign Office

Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador

Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, EUR

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, GER

Mr. Dittmann opened by saying he regarded the meeting as very private and informal and consequently he would speak frankly. He had learned only yesterday that he was to go to Washington. The Chancellor has been suffering from a cold for three weeks and is only in his office sporadically. The Chancellor's first idea had been to ask Grewe to return to Bonn but since it was important for Grewe to remain in Washington during this period he decided to send Dittmann.

Dittmann mentioned the letter from the Chancellor suggesting that the President ought not to receive Mikoyan.¹ The situation had changed

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1359. Secret. Drafted by Vigderman and initialed by Merchant. According to a summary of this conversation transmitted in telegram 1488 to Bonn, January 14, the meeting was held during the evening of January 13. (*Ibid.*, 662.001/1-1459)

¹ See footnote 4, Document 128.

since the letter was sent and Dittmann did not yet know whether he was officially to deliver the letter to the Secretary. Mr. Merchant noted that the Secretary had sent the letter forward to the President for information.

Dittmann said that the Chancellor had been shocked by the latest Russian note and draft peace treaty.² Even the Chancellor had not expected such a dreadful draft. The Russians formerly talked of concluding a peace treaty with a unified Germany. Their latest proposal suggests the peace treaty would be concluded with the two Germanies. Such a proposal obviously involves the perpetuation of the division of Germany. We should give the Russians a flat refusal of their proposal, but at the same time we should press hard for negotiations. A Study Group in Bonn is examining the whole problem. This exercise should take between ten and fourteen days. Then the Germans want to come forward with their proposals on German reunification and European security. The Chancellor ardently desires the closest relationships with the United States in developing policy.

Dittmann went on to say that the Four Power Working Group which the British proposed be reconstituted should meet in Washington, not in Paris, and thereafter the four Western Foreign Ministers should confer in Washington in order to agree to the answer to give to the Russians. We need a real basis for negotiations, stating our maximum demands. When a draft is worked out the Chancellor wishes to discuss it first with the United States in order to be sure that there is no difference of opinion.

Mr. Merchant described his personal and immediate reaction as follows: There are dangers in stating our position in its maximum terms, thereby matching the extreme positions taken by the Soviets. Our public position should not be more extreme than the one we would be willing ultimately to agree on. A public statement engages our prestige. Any retreat would be interpreted as weakness. It is important to get the Russians to the conference table and one does not advance that prospect by confronting the world with unacceptable proposals on both sides, thereby creating a general impression of the hopelessness of negotiations. There are two reasons why we should get the Russians to the conference table. The first is to provide them with an escape route from the reckless position they have taken on Berlin. The second is that if the Russians are not ready to retreat, an early and vigorous effort to negotiate is essential to show that we were ready to exhaust all possibilities before we were confronted with a very serious situation. Mr. Merchant reviewed the notes thus far exchanged, pointing out that from them one can conclude

² See Document 124.

that the West has an opportunity to involve the Soviets in a negotiation in which they will have to talk about the reunification of Germany.

Mr. Hillenbrand pointed to that part of the Soviet note expressing agreement to Four Power talks in advance of the peace treaty conference. If the problem of an agenda, and a formula for participation of the two Germanies could be worked out it should be possible to move forward to a conference.

At this point Ambassador Grewe emphasized that it was not really the German intention to propose extreme positions.

Mr. Dittmann said he couldn't tell yet how far the Germans were ready to depart from the proposals made at Geneva in 1955,³ but that it would help the Germans a lot to know where "your ideas are going". Mr. Merchant replied that the Geneva proposals were good, but the problem was to know how to modify them in order to improve our negotiating position, and we looked to the German Government to provide us with new ideas.

Mr. Dittmann agreed that the initiative was really with the Germans.

Reverting to the Four Power talks, Mr. Merchant said that while the subject would have to be discussed further it was his tentative view that we could agree to Four Power talks in Washington. He understood from Ambassador Alphand that the French were ready to work out a reply to the Soviet note in Washington. He thought that Foreign Ministers were so busy it would be better if their time could be saved. Conceivably a high-level working group could get the job done without bringing Foreign Ministers together.

Mr. Dittmann then said he thought the British were ready to meet in Washington. The question had been put to Ambassador Steel in Bonn, who seemed to agree. Mr. Dittmann said the Germans were thinking of the middle of February as a target date for a reply to the Soviet note.

Ambassador Grewe then raised the question of the Secretary's press conference of the day before.⁴ Mr. Merchant explained that when the Secretary said that he could conceive of German reunification by methods other than free elections, the Secretary meant that free elections are the obvious and natural way to reunification. Logically, however, it is not the only way. The example could be adduced of the thirteen original states of the United States which had come together without

³ For documentation on the Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers meetings at Geneva in 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. V, pp. 119 ff.

⁴ For a transcript of Dulles' press conference on January 13, much of which was devoted to Germany, see *Department of State Bulletin*, February 2, 1959, pp. 156-162. This sentence suggests that Vigderman drafted the memorandum of conversation on January 14.

elections. Ambassador Grewe said that he understood, but he was sure the Secretary's statement would have its repercussions in Bonn, and perhaps a State Department spokesman should say something on the subject.

130. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, January 14, 1959, 4 p.m.

1477. Eyes only for Secretary from Bruce. Adenauer sent for me this morning.¹ FonMin also present. He said had just held Cabinet meeting, and discussion largely confined to discussion text your press conference yesterday.

I verified fact he had correct transcript.

He concentrated remarks on that portion concerning free elections not being an absolutely exclusive method.

He said repercussions in Germany would be momentous, and destructive of his long established policy that reunification could only be achieved through free elections. Already most SPD and FDP leaders had favored conversations with Pankow. This was for him inadmissible, since whole East Germany was in effect only an extension of Soviet Union, and idea confederation in any form totally unacceptable. Now those naive people ready negotiate with Pankow would be encouraged by interpretation they would give in their own interests to your having opened door to other possible methods bring about reunification.

I would characterize his and Brentano's expressions as being little short of violent. I tried to assuage their alarm by placing the matter in proper perspective but to little avail.

Adenauer asked me to communicate to you urgently his preoccupation, and to inquire whether you could not, in response to a planted

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/1-1459. Secret; Niact.

¹ According to his diary Bruce met with Adenauer and Brentano at noon. The Chancellor "was disturbed to an uncommon degree" by the report of the Secretary's press conference (see footnote 4, Document 129). Bruce commented further that he wished the Secretary "would stop dropping tinder into powder kegs by being over-frank in press conferences." (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

question, enter into explanation as to why your response in this regard was theoretical, and did not indicate any intention of considering departure from long established policy. When I sought constructive thought as to substance, they were unproductive.

They anticipate shortly violent campaign against govt based on assumption U.S. ready to consider alternative to free elections, including assent negotiations between FedRep and Pankow.

If it be practicable and advisable to try to comply with Chancellor's request, suggest you might consider some such language as follows:

"There are various theoretical possibilities for bringing about reunification of divided portions of a formerly united country. But, in the case of Germany, since Soviets have invariably denied citizens of so-called GDR right to express their wishes in a democratic manner, no negotiations could satisfactorily result unless they had as a premise the acceptance of free election procedures in both parts of Germany."

Chancellor said he was more concerned than ever about outcome conversions with Mikoyan. Any communiqué following them should be drafted with utmost clarity so that Mikoyan and Khrushchev could not distort contents to serve their own purposes.

I am following this immediately with another telegram for limited distribution, expressing certain general thoughts on German problems.²

Bruce

²Telegram 1486 from Bonn, January 14, commented on Adenauer's impact on the German political scene. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/1-1459)

131. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting

Washington, January 14, 1959, 11 a.m.

[Here follows a list of participants.]

1. Berlin

Mr. Murphy opened the meeting by referring to the tripartite talks which had been held with the British and French on the question of Paragraph D of the paper on Berlin contingency planning. He quoted Paragraph D of the U.S. aide-mémoire of December 11, 1958, as follows:

Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was drafted in the Department of State and not cleared with the Department of Defense. The meeting was held at the Pentagon.

“At this stage of developments [i.e., when Allied surface traffic between Berlin and West Germany are not allowed to transit the Soviet Zone without dealing with East German personnel]¹ and before considering resort to an airlift, an attempt to reopen access through the use of limited military force should be made in order to demonstrate our determination to maintain surface access. In any case, the Soviets and East Germans should not be allowed to entertain doubts as to our determination to do so if need be. Even if force is not resorted to at once we should continue to assert our rights to resume interrupted traffic and our intention to do so by force.”

He mentioned that Mr. Irwin and General Johnson had been participating in the talks and that he assumed the JCS was currently informed.

Mr. Murphy discussed the British position which appeared to be to evade the essential point of making a determination whether or not to respond with military force in the event of denial of allied land access rights to Berlin. The U.S. position is that the principle should be decided upon and agreed by the three powers before detailed military planning is entered into. The British wish a joint planning operation which will examine all of the military aspects of the problem—apparently before the decision is rendered on the basic principle. He said that the purpose of the meeting was to arrive at a coordinated U.S. point of view and to assure that the military judgment of the JCS was in consonance with the political judgment of the Department on this matter.

General Twining indicated that the Joint Chiefs had approved on January 13 a planning paper on the military preparations for action in the Berlin situation as required by Paragraph D.² The paper is now before the Secretary of Defense, who has expressed his desire to give it further consideration and perhaps to make some amendments but it represents the basic JCS thinking on the matter. The paper is for U.S. use only (copies of the draft JCS paper were provided to Mr. Murphy for the Department's study and information on the understanding that it would not be considered a final document until cleared by the Secretary of Defense). General Twining went on to describe the paper as the Joint Chiefs idea of all the steps that must be taken to prepare for possible action in the Berlin situation. He felt that it was important the Department understand what the military requirements of the situation are.

General White then intervened to inquire if the Department had taken a firm political decision to press for the action envisioned in Paragraph D. Mr. Murphy replied that the decision was taken in principle by the Department to take all possible measures to secure our right of land access to Berlin and at the same time to make sure that a posture which

¹ Brackets in the source text.

² See footnote 8, Document 122.

indicated that we were contemplating an airlift solution be avoided. He felt that if the USSR could be sure that the allies plan to react by instituting an airlift they would know we were "walking away" from Berlin. This evidence of weakness would be extremely important to the Soviets in planning their subsequent moves. He referred in passing to the parallel situation in 1948 and his belief that a firm response on the ground at that time to the blockade would have been successful and would have had a basic influence on subsequent Russian tests of our intentions as in Korea. In response to a further question from General White asking clarification of our policy, Mr. Murphy stated specifically that the Department was supporting the language of Paragraph D. Paragraph D must, of course, be considered in the context of the entire paper on contingency planning, including the later section which discusses the possibility of an airlift. He then quoted the last paragraph, Section E, as follows:

"As concomitant to the above course of action, we should consider whether the Three Powers should not take some additional step to guarantee their unrestricted air access to Berlin, which would be essential to maintaining the status and security of the city. The Three Powers might, for example, reformulate and restate their Berlin guarantee, modifying it to add that they will regard any interference with their right and practice of unrestricted access to Berlin by air, including operation of their civil air carriers, as an attack upon their forces and upon themselves. Here the issue of flight in the corridors over 10,000 feet might be solved by a simple Three Power agreement to fly at an altitude appropriate to efficient operation of individual aircraft. Communist harassment of our air access, which would be possible only through patent application of force, would be clear evidence of provocative intent. If it occurred, we could then take such military/political/economic counteraction as necessary to maintain Berlin with assurance that such action would have the support of American, French, British and German public opinion."

He pointed out that we were not excluding the possibility of an airlift or indeed any other possibility but that we felt that the psychological effect of the action proposed under Section D was essential.

Admiral Burke indicated his full concurrence with the Department's position. He pointed out that the decision involved not only planning but the taking of many preparatory steps ahead of the time of action. If we sent an armed force into East Germany, we must be prepared to follow through. It should only be a matter of minutes before reinforcements were sent in if the probing force were halted. General White then asked again if the State Department was prepared to support the statement in Paragraph D. Mr. Murphy answered yes but pointed out the purpose of the meeting was to be sure that "he whose ox may be gored" is also in agreement.

There was a general discussion of the JCS paper in which it was pointed out that the planners had attempted to take every possibility

into consideration. General Twining pointed out that the concept was summarized in Appendix B of the paper and that this was the most sensitive part. Mr. Murphy asked if a part of the proposal involved notifying the USSR in advance of our intentions. General Taylor responded that such notification was implicit but that the JCS paper represented a "military scenario" and that a "political scenario" was needed as a companion piece. Mr. Murphy responded that we had recently been encouraged by evidence that the Russians desire to negotiate and that this would indicate the desirability of signalling our intentions in advance.

Mr. Murphy then asked if his assumption is correct that the JCS did not wish at this point to engage in joint military planning with the British and French. The consensus of response appeared to be that detailed planning should be conducted in Europe instead of the U.S. and that General Norstad should be in overall charge. In response to Mr. Murphy's question General Taylor indicated that General Norstad's views had already been requested and would be incorporated in the final revision of plans which would be transmitted to Norstad after approval at the governmental level.

Mr. Murphy then commented on the French point of view. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Ambassador Alphanh attempted to provide new language for Paragraph D which would bridge the gap between U.S. and UK thinking but without success. Mr. Murphy pointed out that recent reports from Paris indicate that General DeGaulle has been highly critical of U.S. policies and actions except as regards Berlin but this support of our firm stand in Berlin does not appear to be reflected in Ambassador Alphanh's attitude here.

With regard to the British position, Ambassador Caccia has rigid instructions. Ambassador Whitney has recently reported³ [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the British attitude which he thinks may stem from the influence of Lord Mountbatten, who has been reported as saying that Britain cannot afford the risk of annihilation over the Berlin issue. Admiral Burke suggested that he might write Mountbatten on the matter and Mr. Murphy agreed it would be useful if Admiral Burke could point out the U.S. view that if every test of strength with the Russians is viewed in terms of the risk of total destruction, there can be no agreement on a firm response in any situation.⁴

³Not further identified.

⁴On January 14 Admiral Burke wrote Admiral Mountbatten, apparently along the lines taken by the discussion at this meeting. No copy of his letter has been found, but it is referred to in Mountbatten's reply, dated January 23, in which he agreed on the necessity for taking a firm decision on Berlin. Mountbatten stressed, however, the need to take NATO along with the three Western Allies, and the British believed this could not be done until every possibility of negotiation had been exhausted. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2659)

Mr. Murphy then discussed the West German attitude and indicated that this must be explored further. One of the problems is Adenauer's detachment as a result of his illness last month. He has just sent Herr Dittmann of the Foreign Office to the U.S. to discuss matters with the Department and we are in active consultation with Ambassador Grewe to whom we have put several leading questions designed to stimulate German thinking on possible solutions to the Berlin and German problems. We do not yet know the German reaction on such questions as those posed by the proposals for the U.S. response to closure of ground access to Berlin. How far would West Germany like to see us go in our response to the closing off of access to Berlin? The German attitude has been that the U.S. should stand firm. The question is what will they do in support of such a stand and what risks will they be willing to take. Will they furnish West German troops if this is considered desirable?

General Twining asked if there were any State Department objections to placing General Norstad in charge. Mr. Murphy asked if Norstad's role involved both planning and command of actual operations. He indicated that he could not respond to the question without further study since larger issues were involved but that his initial reaction was that there were no other operational commanders who could be assigned to the job. General Taylor indicated that General Hodes (USAREUR) could be given command but that in principle it should be Norstad. It was agreed that the Department would express its views on this matter. Mr. Reinhardt added that the lack of enthusiasm in NATO would create a lot of problems and Mr. Murphy added that it might be best to have planning conducted on a strictly U.S. basis under Norstad's direction as CINCEUR.

General Twining commented on the conversation with the President on January 13⁵ at which the President had expressed doubts as to our legal status in Berlin as the basis for military action to reopen ground access. The President mentioned that General Clay was not fully satisfied with the arrangements he was able to make on this matter while in Berlin. Mr. Murphy referred to the Department's recent publication on this point which makes a good case.⁶ He pointed out that our legal rights are based not only on the Clay-Zhukov talks but on the European Advisory Commission agreements in London in 1944 and on the Paris communiqué of 1949⁷ following the end of the Berlin airlift. He added that our primary rights are those of conquest and stem as well from the quid

⁵No record of this conversation has been found.

⁶For text of the memorandum on the legal aspects of the Berlin situation, December 19, 1958, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1959, pp. 5-13.

⁷For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062-1065.

pro quo established by U.S. withdrawal from the area which became the Soviet zone in exchange for our position in Berlin.

General Twining requested the Department's views on how we should react if the Soviet authorities pulled out of East Germany and turned over their responsibilities to GDR officials, i.e., documentation, travel control, etc. Mr. Murphy indicated that we proposed to refuse to deal with the GDR officials. He felt that the GDR authorities might continue to let us have access to Berlin without recognition of their authority. If they did not do so they would be faced with the difficult decision of attacking us or establishing a blockade. He then discussed the "agency theory" to which Mr. Dulles had earlier referred⁸ and which elicited a violent negative reaction from West Germany which the Secretary thought was unjustified. The West Germans are now dealing on a de facto basis with the East Germans in many activities. Despite this they refuse to consider the possibility that we might deal with the East Germans as "agents" of the USSR. Mr. Kohler added that the Secretary's public mention of the "agency theory" was based on the earlier contingency plan for Berlin and that the situation today makes it clear that the USSR has rejected the agency concept but instead proposes to substitute East German for Soviet personnel.

General Taylor then stressed the necessity for "domestic education" to prepare the American public for our proposed Berlin plans. Mr. Murphy felt that there has been to date a good emotional reaction in the U.S. as evidenced by the bi-partisan applause in Congress at the mention of Berlin in the State of the Union message.⁹ He agreed, however, that the actual issues have not been explained so that there would be clear public understanding and that further education will indeed be necessary. General Twining commented that it would be more difficult if we "go it alone" without support of our allies. Mr. Murphy agreed and pointed out that this was what was so disappointing about the British attitude. He felt that the President would have to intercede with Prime Minister Macmillan if we are unable to make progress at the lower levels. Reference was made to Prime Minister Macmillan's recent letter to Secretary Dulles on this subject and to the Secretary's response which was planned for despatch today.¹⁰

⁸ Regarding the "agency theory," see Document 68.

⁹ For text of the State of the Union message, January 9, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 5–18.

¹⁰ Macmillan's letter, transmitted under cover of a note from Hood to Dulles, January 8, suggested that the Western Allies should study the implications of all military plans regarding Berlin without necessarily deciding on any of them and recommended that the United States and the United Kingdom seek to achieve a Soviet retreat on Berlin and force the Soviets to accept responsibility for Western access even if they turned over their obligations to the East Germans. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan Correspondence)

Mr. Murphy indicated in response to General Twining's question that the Mikoyan discussion with the Secretary on Friday will bear heavily on the problem of Berlin. Mr. Murphy pointed out that Secretary Dulles feels strongly that we must be prepared to meet the Russian challenge.

The discussion on Berlin closed with a strong expression of the JCS view by General Twining that an airlift will not settle the Berlin issue and should be avoided if at all possible.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

132. Editorial Note

In hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 14 and 16, Secretary of State Dulles and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Twining discussed the Berlin situation. The Secretary of State described to the Committee the discussions with the British, French, and West Germans on contingency planning and outlined the U.S. view on reunification of Germany. At the end of the sessions he approved the text of a bipartisan resolution that fully endorsed the position of the United States on Berlin as set forth in the NATO declaration of December 16, 1958 (see footnote 6, Document 122). For text of the bipartisan resolution and Dulles' testimony to the Committee, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, volume XI, Washington, 1982, pages 5-14.

In brief testimony on the military aspects of the Berlin situation Twining stated that the United States felt it "must hold Berlin at all costs, even to general war," and informed the Committee that the Joint Chiefs were at that very moment working on plans regarding Berlin. For text of his testimony, see *ibid.*, page 41.

133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, January 15, 1959, 8:43 p.m.

1517. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Dittmann and Grewe called on Secretary afternoon January 14.¹ Dittmann said he had come to United States with two tasks: to hand over letter to Secretary from Chancellor² and to transmit preliminary views of Chancellor on recent Soviet note and draft peace treaty. As to letter which suggests President not receive Mikoyan, it had been written on January 12 before White House announcement made of intended Mikoyan call on President January 17. Cable from Bonn this morning instructed him not to hand over signed copy of letter and to request that Secretary consider advance copy already in his possession as void. Dittmann's presentation of views of Chancellor along same lines as reported Deptel 1488 to Bonn, 2464 to Paris, 6403 to London and 1074 to Moscow.³

Secretary said he was not surprised that Soviets had not retreated or weakened substantive position regarding Berlin or Germany as whole. However, they have indicated primarily through Mikoyan that November 27 note not to be treated as ultimatum. Soviets may be expected to press their demands until they establish whether or not we are prepared to fight over Berlin. Secretary stated we must show we are prepared to fight as at Quemoy-Matsu, or Soviets will push us from retreat to retreat. Here we were in somewhat different position in having Allies directly involved with whom we must consult and work out common position.

Application this principle of firmness in Berlin situation, Secretary continued, presents difficulties. Soviets have us in position where they can perhaps make us shoot first. They could by blowing up bridges and erecting road blocks isolate Berlin and maneuver us into having to use force initially to maintain land access. To obtain support public opinion our Allies and in US involves some real problems.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662.001/1–1559. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Merchant and Calhoun, and signed by Dulles. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹No memorandum of this conversation, which was held from 3:41 to 4:34 p.m. according to Dulles' Daily Appointment Book, has been found. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) For Grewe's account of the meeting and the controversy sparked by Dulles' comments at his January 13 press conference (see footnote 4 below), see Grewe, *Rückblenden*, pp. 374–377. See also Document 130.

²See footnote 4, Document 128.

³See the source note, Document 129.

For Soviets to start compromising at this relatively early stage, Secretary noted, would be contrary their normal techniques. After we have satisfied them they cannot gain their objectives without fighting, we may have to provide them with discussions as a means to save face. US has been having talks with Communist China since 1955. These are not very promising but their existence tends to provide protective coloration under which fighting can be suspended. Secretary thought it might perhaps be useful to have talks with Soviets regarding Germany and meeting of Foreign Ministers but without agenda limited in such a way we would only be discussing what Soviets want to discuss. Their draft peace treaty was obviously unacceptable. General talks regarding Germany might provide cover at least for suspension planned Soviet measures regarding Berlin.

Secretary said he felt there could with advantage be greater flexibility in FedRep thinking on reunification. FedRep had tremendous assets in fact overwhelming percentage East German population opposed to present Government and would like to join in free institutions of West Germany. Secretary had impression that aloofness which exists to some extent plays into hands of Soviet and Pankow authorities by making it impossible for FedRep to utilize these favorable assets in East Germany. This was only a general observation which might be difficult to express in concrete proposals. Secretary felt that if FedRep came up with proposals involving more contacts with people of East Germany without interposition of Pankow regime East German officials would be very frightened.

Secretary thought we should therefore explore possibility of meeting with Soviets about Germany with dual purpose of resolving Berlin situation and perhaps coming out with some advantage. It was perhaps remote prospect but Soviets sometimes made sudden and unpredictable moves as in case of Austrian Treaty. Soviets might after unknown period of time come to conclusion situation deteriorating in East Germany and they may want to find a way out. We must keep pressing as we did for eight years on Austrian Treaty.

Regarding suggested Working Group discussions among four Western Powers, it was noted that Washington as locus which desired by FedRep acceptable to US and we understood probably also to British and French at least insofar as drafting reply to January 10 note was concerned. Meeting of four Western Foreign Ministers might not be necessary if progress in Working Group satisfactory.

Grewe said he had received instructions to express concern as to interpretation and effect of Secretary's statements at press conference

January 13⁴ regarding relationship free elections to German reunification. FedRep Government afraid would be interpreted as support for idea of confederation as first step towards German reunification, and that opposition would take advantage of situation. Feared position of Government would be endangered unless some clarification made. Coming at time of Mikoyan visit press would inevitably interpret as marking change US policy.

Secretary noted press can be troublesome when leading questions asked, answers to which are then misinterpreted or exaggerated. Referring to specific three comments on free elections which he had made during press conference, Secretary asked what could be answer to query "Do we say, no free elections, no reunification." One obviously could not take position that reunification without free elections would not be accepted, as for example in case of successful revolt in East Germany. Unification of US not achieved via free elections but by legislative action of different states, nor was reunification in 1865 so achieved. If reunification came in Germany it might well be by some other method than free elections. To seek free elections is our policy and we see no better method now to achieve reunification. However, Soviets rightly fear reunification might be forced by people East Germany and we have no desire to allay their fears in this respect. When they agree to reunification it will be because their hand forced by situation in GDR.

Secretary said that confederation as proposed by Soviets obviously did not mean reunification but consolidation division of Germany. Any idea confederation of this kind acceptable to US was wrong. However, Secretary could conceive of confederation on terms that might enable FedRep to capitalize on feeling East German people and get rid of Communist Government. If confederation gave opportunity for free expression of views by East Germans regarding form of government, not likely Soviets would be pleased.

As to Mikoyan visit, Secretary commented that talks would not lead to any change US policy, which would be reaffirmed. Mikoyan has been treated very well by American people, but latter would not basically be fooled. Communiqué was not envisaged after Mikoyan meeting with either Secretary or President. We will undoubtedly have to give some sort of background briefing to press so as to make it more difficult for Soviets to falsify. When Mikoyan saw Secretary,⁵ latter said he assumed Mikoyan not here to negotiate and we were not planning to negotiate with him. Mikoyan had apparently acquiesced though

⁴ For a transcript of Secretary Dulles' press conference on January 13, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 2, 1959, pp. 156–162.

⁵ See Document 121.

unenthusiastically. We would make efforts to minimize misconceptions which Soviets might try to create regarding talks.

Dulles

134. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McElroy to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, January 15, 1959.

SUBJECT

Berlin Situation

1. Forwarded herewith are comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on actions which might be taken in preparation to meet Soviet or GDR interference with our right of access to Berlin.¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I recognize that for political, budgetary and other reasons, many of the actions listed in the J.C.S. paper, while militarily desirable, cannot be taken on the timetable suggested, and some of the actions cannot be taken short of an actual challenge by the Soviets or the GDR of our right of access to Berlin.

2. The list of desirable military actions which has been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not be interpreted as essential preconditions which have to be met prior to making a firm political decision, in concert with our allies, to use whatever degree of force is necessary to protect our right of surface and air access to Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement with my judgment that a firm political decision is an essential first step which should precede detailed military planning and that this political decision should embody the following principles:

- a. That we will meet a challenge to surface access to Berlin by necessary military action on the ground;
- b. That we will not evade the issue by reacting to a surface blockade by the establishment of an airlift;

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. The source text was initialed by the President and seen by Dulles.

¹JCSM-16-59, January 13, was not attached to the source text, but see footnote 8, Document 122.

c. That we will meet the challenge where it occurs—either in the air or on the ground or both;

d. That we will be prepared to follow-up initial actions with increasing measures of military force, if required, and will accept the risk of general war.

3. In order that achievement of this fundamental agreement with our allies may not be confused with military detail, it is requested that the listing of possible actions in Appendixes "A" and "B" of the J.C.S. study not be provided to the British and the French. This listing of possible actions is forwarded for your information only as an indication of military measures which might be taken on a selective case-by-case basis.

4. I also agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that US CINCEUR/SACEUR should be responsible for planning and implementing such military actions as would be taken in Europe.

Neil McElroy

135. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 16, 1959, 10:30 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Anastas I. Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the USSR
Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador
Oleg A. Troyanovski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR
Aleksandr Alekseevich Soldatov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to Moscow
Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters; see volume X, Part 1, Document 62.]

The Secretary said if a different party came to power Mikoyan could be sure its viewpoint would be the same. The Secretary said he did

not think it would change as long as present conditions prevailed. He recalled that at the time of the Berlin blockade and airlift, when Governor Dewey had just been nominated and was expected to win the forthcoming elections, the first action taken by the Governor was to associate Senator Vandenberg and Secretary Dulles with him in a statement of complete support for the Democratic administration's position on Berlin. The Minister would be under a great illusion if he felt that the present attitude concerning Berlin would change with a change in administration. Mikoyan declared that the Soviets openly expressed the view that they saw no difference between the Democratic and Republican Parties, but he thought the position required a change from a rigid to a more flexible attitude.

The Secretary pointed out that he had been under constant criticism from our Allies about inflexibility. Mikoyan said he had noted this and had noted that this criticism had had some influence on the Secretary. The Secretary said that this related perhaps to the formula for the reunification of Germany through free elections, approved by the Summit Conference in July 1955.¹ He wanted to say that we did not alter an agreed policy unilaterally. Mikoyan asked whether we did not, however, change policies by agreement.

The Secretary made the point that no policy was permanently unchangeable. We did not alter an agreed policy unilaterally but were always capable of changing it if it were reasonable to do so. He wanted to make clear that no formula about Berlin would be acceptable if the Soviets had in mind attempting, by working through the East German regime, to impose its viewpoint. This could only lead to serious consequences.

Mikoyan said that what the Soviets had suggested was a six-month period for negotiating the problem. He wanted to make it very clear that the Soviet Union wanted to obtain no privileges in the situation—either for itself or the German Democratic Republic—nor did it want to deprive the United States of anything. It wanted West Berlin to be neutralized and demilitarized under guarantees by the Great Powers or, if necessary, by the UN. If we were agreeable, a permanent commission could be established to guarantee non-interference and freedom of access from all the sides. It welcomed other proposals that were based on non-interference. If nothing happened in six months, the Soviets would turn over their powers to the GDR—a state that has existed for seven years and on whose territory the lines of communication lie. The Soviet Union did not seek changes in the internal system of West Berlin. It had

¹For documentation on the discussion of German reunification at the Geneva Summit Conference, July 18–23, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 361 ff.

no illusions that it could be changed. The population could live under capitalism if it desired. Berlin (*sic*) could become a testing ground for cooperation between us instead of a hot-bed of aggression. It could be a meeting spot for countries to come together.

The Secretary stressed that we were prepared to negotiate but not only about Berlin and about a peace treaty, but about all the questions involved. By other questions he meant steps to bring about reunification. The Soviet peace treaty draft was a call to perpetuate the division of Germany. The German problem should be discussed without any diktat as to subjects. Interrelated with all this—Berlin, peace treaty and East Germany—was the problem of European security. This close link was recognized at the Geneva Summit meeting and the problem of European security should be discussed too.

The Secretary said the United States understood the Soviet preoccupations about Germany. If we could agree on reunification or a peace treaty, necessarily considered in the context of Europe as a whole, the Soviet Union could and should be given assurances against the rebirth of German militarism. The United States wanted no political or strategic advantage from the situation.

The Secretary said the German problem was becoming more difficult to solve and any repetition of the June 1953 outbreak which might take place would be occurring in much more dangerous circumstances. We recognized there were good and bad Germans and that the situation that evolved after World War I might evolve again.

Mikoyan said he saw no reflection of our sympathetic attitude toward the Soviet Union in our proposals. In fact, the Soviet leaders interpreted them in just the opposite way. They believed that lack of a peace treaty contributed to the perpetual division of Germany. Their draft did not assure reunification by itself but would bring conditions which would help rather than hinder reunification. Soviet objection to discussing reunification was not based on a position of diktat. Reunification was something to be brought about in the first instance by the two Germanies. They could be assisted but not replaced. The Federal Republic has refused to talk and has been supported in this by the United States. To put Adenauer's position crudely, he wanted to try to annex the GDR; liquidate its socialist regime; remain in NATO; continue atomic rearmament; and bring about conditions which would allow German revanchists to become active when they would be strong enough to do so. The GDR would not want to liquidate the socialist regime, but would resist. And, it was a Soviet ally in the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets believed that the aim in raising the problem as we raised it was to set our countries at loggerheads.

Mikoyan said he had had many talks with Adenauer² who showed no haste for reunification since he realized his approach to it was unreal and he could not accept any other approach. He preferred to wait until West Germany became stronger and when with the help of the United States, he could speak in a different tone. Mikoyan asked whether the United States position was that it did, in fact, want German reunification through annexation of the GDR to West Germany and did want the latter to remain armed and in NATO while the GDR withdrew from the Warsaw Pact—and in that event was ready to reassure the Soviets by a type of pact which it now rejected.

The Secretary said that he had tried to indicate in his press conference³ our complete philosophy about dealing with the German problem. We had to take into account the special position of countries lying next door to Germany and could not press any solution. But he wanted Mikoyan to have a chance to read carefully what the President and he had said. While he did not expect the Soviet Union to accept this to any extent now he would welcome the chance to expound fully on it. He repeated that any reunification of Germany should be accompanied by security arrangements, treaties, or the like, which would bring us together, along with Germany. He did not think West Germany objected to this and he referred to the treaty we had proposed in 1946.

Mikoyan replied that we had had much in common in the 1945–46 period and our proposals had been more dramatic then than now. He asked whether the Secretary had anything more specific or positive to say than what had been said at the press conference. The direction of the latter had been interesting but he did not know where it led. He did not like the President's statement that we believed in Adenauer and that what had taken place in 1914 could not be the basis of our present policy.⁴

Mikoyan said, reverting to an earlier topic, that the events of June 1953 could not occur again not because the West would not attempt to repeat them but because East Germany was now different. Errors in administration had been made but great changes had taken place in the past five years. Methods of administration and government had improved. There was one socialist party but other parties as well. Unofficially, he could say that they had had to take reparations from East Germany because they did not get them from West Germany. Thus the economic situation had been bad in 1953. The main thing was that the

² Mikoyan made a state visit to Bonn April 23–26, 1958.

³ For a transcript of Dulles' press conference on January 13, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 2, 1959, pp. 156–162.

⁴ Not further identified.

economic situation had improved. This was due to the fact that the Soviets had stopped taking reparations in 1953 and were now paying for all goods from East Germany and covering all occupation expenses. Adenauer had taken a more aggressive tone by holding the Bundestag meeting in West Berlin⁵ because he saw the situation improving in East Germany and felt he might lose any possibility of influencing it. The SED decided at last year's party congress to match West German living standards by 1963. The socialist regime was strong in East Germany.

The Secretary referred to Mikoyan's remarks about alleged Western attempts to incite turmoil in East Germany. He said that Mikoyan was quite wrong about this. The United States not only did not desire such trouble, it would not like to see it happen. This would be dangerous for all of us.

Mikoyan said the danger lay in our position and that there might be elements in West Germany taking a different view from ours. These could bring about a deterioration in US-Soviet relations in spite of ourselves.

Mikoyan said that free elections were no cure-all. The Soviet Union was not against them in principle but they were not the means of uniting Germany at present. Two German States could not be eliminated by vote—an interim stage was necessary.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters; see volume X, Part 1, Document 62.]

⁵The Bundestag met in Berlin on October 1, 1958.

136. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 16, 1959, 4–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Anastas I. Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the USSR
Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador
Oleg A. Troyanovski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Freers.

Aleksandr Alekseevich Soldatov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to Moscow
Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters; see volume X, Part 1, Document 63.]

The Secretary said that as a final point he felt he should not leave the Minister under any doubt about the Berlin situation. The Western Powers would not acquiesce in any Soviet turnover of responsibilities in the Eastern zone to the GDR. We had no way of physically compelling the Soviet Union to discharge what was referred to in the agreement of 1949 as the occupation, but our side could not be compelled to recognize the GDR as a substitute for the USSR.

Mikoyan said that the Soviets had, first of all, proposed a free city. If the proposal were accepted, with any observations and amendments suggested by us and with guarantees, this question would not arise. If the proposal did not lead anywhere they would have to carry through with their announced turnover. The Secretary said that, in this case, we would have to follow through with our announced intentions.

Mikoyan said he hoped that all this would not arise. The complications in the situation, however, depended upon us. If we prejudged the situation in advance and if nothing had changed about Berlin, the Soviets would be compelled to fulfill their commitment. They wanted no aggravation of the situation. They suggested that we consider corrections and amendments to their proposals. Adenauer apparently complicated matters as far as we were concerned and perhaps he could consider such corrections and amendments as well.

The Secretary said that he had been authorized by the United Kingdom and France to state that the United States attitude expressed by him was fully supported by them.

Mikoyan said this could all be reconsidered, but not here and now. He thought that the Secretary's reference to the authorization of our Allies might have stemmed from some apprehension on the Secretary's part that he had been leading them forward and that they had been hanging on his coattails.

137. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 17, 1959, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

Mikoyan's Call on the President

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Secretary of State
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union
First Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Troyanovski

The President said he had heard from the Secretary of State about his conversation with Mr. Mikoyan and could say that the Secretary of State had reflected accurately the views of the United States Government concerning Berlin, the Far East and other matters covered. It was understood by both sides that these were conversations and not negotiations. The purpose was for each to explore the mind of the other to see if it were possible to find a better basis for understanding. If these had been negotiations they would have had to have been on a more formal basis with experts present (the Secretary of State added "and allies", to which the President agreed). The President recalled his previous visit to Moscow in 1945 and said that he thought that was the only time he had met Mr. Mikoyan before. He also recalled meeting Mr. Khrushchev in Geneva. The conversations there had been sterile so far as any material advance was concerned but they had nevertheless been useful. The President was convinced that the Soviet people, as the people of the United States, wanted peace and to remove the anxieties that existed on both sides. It was the function of governments and statesmen to find programs that could be agreed upon and a path which could be followed by both countries that could lead to better feeling between our peoples. It was not our purpose to condemn communism or the Russian people. That would be wrong and the Russian people should have whatever government they wanted, but there was no reason why we could not find a path which could lead to better relations between us. In

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson and approved by the White House on January 26. The meeting was held at the White House. The time and location of the meeting are from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) Prior to this conversation Dulles gave the President a half-hour briefing on the substance of his talks with Mikoyan on January 5 and 16. (Eisenhower Library, President's Appointment Book)

all aspects in our foreign policy where we have a firm position such as that concerning Berlin, we try nevertheless to be conciliatory and we seek to find a way for our two peoples to raise their standards of living and find a better life.

Mikoyan said he had instructions from Khrushchev to convey his cordial greetings and his wishes for the good health of the President. He had also asked him to say that, knowing the President as he did, he hoped the President would make use of his second term to improve relations between the two countries. It was necessary to make a start and while the first agreement might not be important it was possible for it to snowball and lead to a great improvement. He said Khrushchev had remarked that if he had been permitted to vote in the United States he would have voted for the President. He had had prolonged talks in the United States and he thought the Secretary of State could confirm that they had been useful. The Secretary of State had made several statements that had been gratifying to him. He had said that it was not the policy of the United States to act against the Soviet Union and that the United States had no desire for violent action with respect to East Germany. The question of European security had also been discussed. What the President had just said was gratifying and he hoped it would find reflection in the practical steps to be taken. Although the Secretary of State had made some specific remarks about atomic tests cessation and about surprise attack, Mikoyan did not feel that on some other matters any practical steps were contemplated. He thought that the conclusion of the German peace treaty would have a great importance and that they could find common ground on this matter. There were forces however which opposed this and in this connection he drew attention to Chancellor Adenauer's statement of January 12.¹ Adenauer apparently desired to influence the U.S. position on the question of a peace treaty by hastily expressing his own view. It seems strange that the representative of the defeated country should be the first to come out against a possible peace treaty. Perhaps Adenauer believes that by delaying a peace treaty he might become stronger, exploit the differences between us and base his position upon force. He was ignoring the existence of a second German state and was conducting subversive activities in an attempt to overthrow it. If such a policy were followed, the German Democratic Republic might attempt to bring about changes in the Federal German Republic. Such a line of policy was fraught with danger. Soviet Union thought that if a peace treaty were concluded, perhaps with the two German states, this might open up the road for reunification. The U.S. Secre-

¹ At a press conference following a meeting of the CDU Parliamentary Party Group in Bonn on January 12, Adenauer had stated that the proposed Soviet draft German peace treaty was unacceptable.

tary of State kept his eye on what Adenauer thought but so far as a peace treaty was concerned there was also Great Britain and France. The Soviets attach great importance to the peace treaty question. The peace treaty could of course not settle the question of reunification but it could prepare the ground. The Soviets would be persistent in pressing for a peace treaty. If the United States supported Adenauer's position on this matter, then the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries would have to find their own independent way to a solution of that question. He hoped the peace treaty would serve to bring the Soviet Union and the United States together. We were both faced with many problems nowadays and we should try to solve some of them. He realized that these were not negotiations and there was some advantage in the fact that they were merely conversations since it was possible to speak more frankly. He wished to express the hope that the President and the U.S. Government would examine the outstanding points between us and find a way to resolve them. He wished to assure the President that all of their steps in foreign affairs were designed to consolidate peace and to prevent war although some of the steps they had taken had been described as leading to new aggravations.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters; see volume X, Part 1, Document 64.]

Mr. Mikoyan observed that the President had covered many subjects and he had been much pleased with what the President had said. With regard to Germany the Soviet Union had no desire to seek revenge or to place Germany in a subjugated position. The Soviet Union had good relations with East Germany and would like to have good relations with the Germans in West Germany. About a year ago he had gone to Bonn and had talked with Adenauer as well as with German business leaders and others, and he thought the Germans did want peace because they know what a new war would mean. There were however groups in West Germany that were revenge-minded and wished to bring about changes by forceful means. Although he did not know him well it seemed that Mr. Strauss was like a sponge who concentrated in himself these feelings. Chancellor Adenauer knew how to talk and they had had an interesting conversation in which Adenauer had made some reassuring statements. However, the Chancellor was not constant in his policies. Perhaps these zigzags were deliberate. As an example he had asked Adenauer if he considered it right that West Germany did not recognize Poland and Czechoslovakia. Adenauer had replied that he was personally favorable to the establishment of relations but thought that the Soviet Union would have objections. When Mikoyan had said the Soviet Union thought the contrary, Adenauer said he would establish relations. It is true that Brentano was present and had said nothing in assent to this position. Nothing however had been done despite Adenauer's

remark and two months later he made inadmissible statements concerning Germany's eastern frontiers, stating that they should be changed although it is true that he said only peaceful methods should be used. Adenauer knows that Poland and Czechoslovakia would not give up territory. Statements of this kind encourage those in Western Germany who seek revenge. The Soviet Union does however desire to improve its relations with West Germany. From the information at the disposal of the Soviet Union the limitations that had been established for West Germany had been practically brought to nought and they might be done away with altogether. It appeared that they were being given rockets. Mikoyan said that he had raised the question of the law passed by the German Bundestag concerning missiles and that Adenauer had tried to reassure him that this was only a theoretical step and had no practical significance. Recently Strauss had spoken of introducing these arms in Germany more quickly. Despite reassurances, the Soviet Union had misgivings that Germany was getting more arms than were needed for defense purposes. The Soviet Union had no objection to German possession of defensive armaments.

With regard to elections there was a time back in 1946 when the United States and Soviet positions were close on such questions as elections, demilitarization, etc. He had no intention in engaging in polemics but the fact remains that to date there were two German states with practically no relations between them and West Germany did not even want to talk. Even armies at war found means to talk to each other through third parties. Under these conditions how could free elections settle the problem. The time might come when free elections would be possible but in the present situation they were no cure-all. Therefore the Soviet Union thought that intermediate steps and forms should be evolved. A coalition government should be formed and no matter how weak it was such a situation would be better than the present total lack of relations. A peace treaty, far from preventing the reunification of Germany, would assist in achieving this goal.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter; see volume X, Part 1, Document 64.]

Mikoyan pointed out that the President had indicated that if Germany had no military obligations it would have an economic advantage. There was a way to avoid this. They could revert to the old position and ask for some reparations from Germany and thus deprive her of any advantage. There were also other ways of preventing danger.

The President intervened to say that he had said this would be an opportunity for the Germans.

Mikoyan continued that arrangements could be made for the Germans to help the underdeveloped countries.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter; see volume X, Part 1, Document 64.]

The President said Mikoyan was familiar with our form of Government and if Congress exaggerated our need for arms as he sometimes thought they tended to do, it was because the Congress represented the sum of the fears of our people. It was clear that we had different views on Germany and Berlin. If those problems were difficult to resolve now let us leave them aside and tackle them later when they could be resolved. We now center our attention on this problem because it is the most important and difficult. The President said that our people have definite views and debate them sharply but in a few things they are closely united and there should be no doubt in His Excellency's mind about our unity on the question of Berlin and Germany. The President therefore suggested we tackle other problems and perhaps by solving them we could develop a better climate and more mutual trust.

Mikoyan suggested we should end the cold war. This was the reason for the military appropriations by the Congress and the Soviet Union did not consider that it was to blame for the cold war. There was no basis for the suspicion that they would commit aggression. As for Berlin there had been no exchange of views. In the time before us he hoped that we would advance some views instead of taking a purely negative line. He realized the desire to seek a settlement of easier problems. Some such problems had been resolved but that did not seem to help in improving our relations.

The President said that in several meetings between the Soviet Union and the West during and at the end of the war we had undertaken certain responsibilities. He had been there at that time and his own forces had withdrawn to the agreed line. Part of this agreement was that Berlin would be handled as it is today and he did not think it fair to call it negative when we insisted upon discharging our responsibilities there.

Mikoyan said that as far as the earlier part was concerned he had no complaints. However the occupation had been terminated in East and in West Germany. Only Berlin had occupation forces. They did not ask that Berlin be turned over to East Germany or that Soviet troops replace ours. After such a long period after the war the occupation should be ended. Berlin should be demilitarized and turned into a free city with no loss or gain on either side. He hoped the President would consider the matter again and that a settlement could be found which would involve no risk.

Secretary Dulles said one of the difficulties is that it is believed in Germany and elsewhere that the government in East Germany was not a Government of Germans but one that was wholly imposed upon them and hated by the Germans. It was a form of masked occupation as long as the government was not responsive to the will of the people. The

United States had proposed free elections but on that question the Soviet Union was persistently negative.

Mikoyan said that this view was spread from abroad and did not correspond to the facts. The Government of East Germany was supported by Socialists, Liberals and Social Democrats in East Germany. The people in the East German Government did not spring to power by accident. They were people who are well known there. Many personalities in the government had been in the Bundestag in the time of the Kaiser. One, Grotewohl, was a Social Democrat leader and had never been a Communist. The head of the Parliament, Dikmann, had never been a Communist but was once Secretary to Stresemann. If one compared the composition of the governments in East and West Germany it would be found that the government in East Germany was more authoritative. Recently elections had been held by secret ballot in East Germany and the people overwhelmingly supported the government. It should be easy to get true information about the situation there. Neither the Soviet Government nor Soviet forces interfered in East Germany. The East Germans were allies just as we had relations with Adenauer. We were allied to one part of Germany and the Soviet Union to the other. This was a bad situation and it would be better if the Soviet Union and the United States were allied.

Mikoyan hoped that this exchange of views had been useful. He would report to his Government and would take great pleasure in conveying the President's greetings to Khrushchev.

The President said he was glad Mikoyan had taken the trouble to come to the United States.

Mikoyan expressed his thanks for the help he had had from the authorities in this country and the reception he had received from the people and the business world. The President said we would be glad to compete in hospitality.

138. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France**

Washington, January 17, 1959, 2:33 p.m.

2532. Deptel 2478,¹ Embtel 2598.² Essential point is that while we are trying to get firm political decision in principle now, using language of para D, French formulation seems to defer decision until some indefinite date in the future. British and possibly French appear prefer garrison airlift as "non-provocative" means maintaining Berlin access. It is US view that airlift is not suitable response to stoppage surface traffic. Talk about airlift may have bad psychological effect tending to lead Soviets to take tougher position on ground access.

If Soviets did not interfere with garrison airlift at first, issue would become increasingly clouded. If they later managed to stop airlift West would be at psychological disadvantage. Berlin stockpiles obviate necessity for immediate airlift. Therefore, airlift no solution in principle, and amounts to abandonment of ground access.

US seeks agreement on principle that we are willing use force to defend whatever means of access is threatened; i.e., force would be used on ground if ground access challenged and in air if air access threatened. Until fundamental agreement in principle attained discussion should not be allowed bog down in confusion of detailed planning.

Embassy should also explain foregoing to Boegner. Might also ask Boegner what is meant by point covered last sentence Embtel 2607.³

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1659. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McFarland; cleared by Brown, Murphy, and Hillenbrand; and approved by Kohler.

¹ See the source note, Document 127.

² Telegram 2598, January 16, suggested that the best way to attempt to get the French to reconcile their views on access with the United States was for Bruce to approach Couve de Murville directly. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1659)

³ Telegram 2607, January 16, reported that the French position on the use of force in Berlin had not changed, but that Boegner saw it more as a tactical problem than one of broad strategic contingency planning. (*Ibid.*, 700.5611/1-1659)

139. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

Berlin and German Problems

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Roger Jackling, Minister, British Embassy

Mr. Kohler,—EUR

Mr. Lampson—EUR: GER: GPA

Mr. Jackling opened the conversation by asking what press line we were planning to take on the Alsop article of Jan. 19 on Berlin.¹ He said he was worried by it and foresaw a half dozen parliamentary questions which would put the Government in an embarrassing position. He had no idea exactly how the Government would answer such questions and he had told the press people in the British Embassy to tell the press they should make no comments on the article except to refer to the Four Foreign Ministers' Communiqué of December 14 and the NAC Communiqué of December 16² which represents the western position. They were told not to amplify on this.

Mr. Kohler replied that he had not had a chance to talk about this with Mr. Murphy who was at the Secretary's morning staff meeting. He thought, however, that it might be possible to go a step further and say that it was well known that we were in regular and constant consultation with our allies on the Berlin situation created by the Soviet note. Mr. Jackling raised the objection that this language might carry the implication of confirming the substance of the article. Mr. Kohler then suggested broadening the language since it was well known that we have kept our allies informed about the Mikoyan visit. Why not speak of regular consultations on all aspects of the situation not only in respect to Berlin but to Germany as a whole created by the Soviet notes and by the Mikoyan talks? Mr. Jackling said he thought that this would be all right.

Mr. Jackling then said he has been asked by his ambassador to clarify three questions.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1959. Secret. Drafted by Lampson on January 19 and initialed by Kohler.

¹ For text of this column, in which Alsop stated that the three Western Allies were now committed to use force to keep access to Berlin open, see *The Washington Post*, January 19, 1959, p. A-43.

² See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 122.

1. What did the U.S. think of the formula which the British and the French had agreed on?³ In this connection, he referred to his previous impression from Mr. Kohler that the U.S. thought this language would serve only to get us over the talks with Mikoyan. Mr. Kohler confirmed this was still our position and that we did not consider this language met the need for a prompt decision in principle as represented by the specific language of paragraph D of the contingency guidance.

Mr. Jackling then asked about a further meeting. Mr. Kohler thought Mr. Murphy would soon have some specific observations to make on the French formula. He inquired whether the British had completed their general study of the military aspects of the problem. Jackling replied that the Director of Plans of the War Office had consulted with the British Chiefs of Staff and was back in Washington again.

Mr. Kohler then said we thought that the question whether we should assert our right of land access by force was a much broader question than the military problems of how we should implement this decision of principle. We did not think that we should get into any detailed military analysis before broad guidelines had been set.

Mr. Jackling asked whether we had gotten replies to the questions which he understood we had put to our European Command. He wondered when we would be ready to go into tripartite discussions on the basis of these replies. Mr. Kohler replied that he thought we would be ready shortly but would have to ask Mr. Murphy. He thought he could give him some word as to another meeting in the next twenty-four hours. He then returned to the French proposal, saying that we did not find this an acceptable substitute of the position represented in Paragraph D.

Mr. Jackling then asked whether we accepted the military studies proposed in paragraph 2 of the French draft. Mr. Kohler pointed out that Mr. Murphy was afraid that if we entered into theoretical discussions of the possibility of an airlift the Soviets would get the impression that we were thinking in terms of an airlift and were not prepared to insist upon our land rights.

Returning to the Alsop article, Mr. Jackling expressed his fear that the Foreign Minister would be asked in Parliament what commitments had been made about enforcing land access rights. He thought this might precipitate trouble in the U.K. Mr. Kohler asked whether this wasn't the type of question to which the Foreign Minister could reply by

³ See Document 127. On January 15 Alphand told Murphy that he had been instructed to propose three minor changes in this draft, but Murphy said that the United States would have to study them since they seemed to delay reaching agreement on the principle of responding with force. (Memorandum of conversation, January 15; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1559) The language was still being studied when Jackling and Kohler talked.

stating our public position and adding that he could not discuss the details of military operations. Jackling said the Minister would surely be asked whether we were committed to a land operation. Mr. Kohler pointed out that in any event a military operation would be involved and that whether we responded in the air or on the ground military operations were implicit which no one could expect us to divulge in advance. If the Foreign Minister should indicate that we are not decided to respond on the ground we might as well start moving out of Berlin right now.

2. Mr. Jackling then recalled the tripartite agreement that nothing would be said to the Germans on these questions until we had an agreed tripartite position. He wondered whether this was still our position and asked in particular whether the subject had been touched upon in the conversations with German State Secretary Dittmann.

Mr. Kohler said it was his impression that the discussions with Dittmann had been general and questions of this kind had not been mentioned in any detail. He then briefed Mr. Jackling on the basis of Deptels to Bonn no. 1488 and 1517,⁴ which confirmed his recollection on this point.

3. Mr. Jackling then asked what was the status of the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Dulles and the British Aide-Mémoire of January 13.⁵ Mr. Kohler said the Secretary had a draft reply⁶ which had been sent to him on Friday. He was still mulling it over. He thought an answer would be going forward shortly and that this would help to bring things into focus.

The conversation closed with a brief discussion of the Mikoyan visit. Mr. Jackling said he thought that it was not to be expected that Mikoyan would make any concessions during his visit. He had thought that he had come to take the temperature of the water and return to report. Mr. Kohler said this had been our original estimate, which had proven correct. He commented, however, that he had thought that in private conversation Mikoyan might have been a little more reassuring on the ultimatum aspect. When finally pinned down on the question, Mikoyan had made it clear the Soviets had not withdrawn their ultimatum.

⁴ See the source note, Document 129, and Document 133.

⁵ Regarding Macmillan's letter, see footnote 10, Document 131. In the aide-mémoire the British noted that the Soviet note of January 10 (see Document 124) seemed to present some flexibility on Berlin and that this avenue should be explored. In concluding, however, the British stated that the Western Allies should show no weakness on Berlin and make it plain that they were prepared to risk general war in support of their rights in the city. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1359)

⁶ Not further identified.

Mr. Jackling assumed that the Secretary had on his part made the Western position as firmly as could be. Mr. Kohler replied that he had, but he had also gone to great pains to make it clear that we understood the Soviet concern about Germany, that we had exercised restraint in East Germany and that we did not expect the Soviets to accept a settlement which would put them in a position of military disadvantage.

140. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, January 20, 1959, 8 p.m.

2651. Deptel 2532.¹ In discussion with Couve today he sees no difference in principle between our governments that free access to Berlin should be maintained as required on land or in air. Only difference is that they do not believe wise to agree in advance on method of implementation under unknown situation that may appear and which may be dependent on unforeseeable factors. It is his opinion that their position comes out substantially to same point as ours in that quick consultation should take place in any event before final action.

He emphasizes further that three governments should study various contingencies and practical measures to be taken. No indication that airlift is necessarily preferable. He did volunteer that in his judgment situation was even more grave than before Mikoyan visit United States.

Simultaneously Boegner reaffirmed to EmbOff above position. He reiterated that General was determined not to give way in face of Soviet threats.²

Inasmuch as French position is so close to ours, and it would seem about as far as man such as de Gaulle responsible for security of his country will go, it is our opinion further pressure would be fruitless and we would recommend on basis of our knowledge that we refrain from further attempts at persuasion.

Houghton

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-2059. Secret; Priority.

¹ Document 138.

² A more detailed account of Boegner's statement was transmitted in telegram 2652 from Paris, January 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-2059)

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, January 21, 1959, noon.

1542. Paris pass USRO, USCINCEUR, Thurston and West. I had long private conversation last night with Pres. Heuss. He is excellent man, intellectually independent, morally superior. He said he was not free (because of his constitutional status) to express himself publicly, but held certain views on of German foreign policy which were not fundamentally at variance with those of Chancellor.

After querying me on Mikoyan visit, he observed:

1. There must be no negotiation with Soviets on Berlin question except in larger framework, and we must continue convince them of our firmness in face of their unacceptable proposals. Could not himself now envisage suitable alternative to our present position.

2. We should be ready to talk to Soviets ad infinitum on any and all subjects, excepting Berlin in isolation, regardless of any expectation of constructive results.

3. A summit conference should not be held unless preliminary preparations indicated successful conclusions.

4. He did not think we should depart from current policies because accused of intransigence. In personal life, if one is opposed to murder, arson, stealing, one does not alter ethics when charged with being old-fashioned, or when change might seem momentarily opportune or tempting.

5. However, he thought Western Powers would make mistake in not welcoming, even initiating, conference with Soviets, and taking their chances in regard adverse propaganda. But would be unrealistic of them to enter upon such parleys with expectation of achieving propaganda victory.

6. Exchanges of notes, the language of which bored people, were more unfavorable to us than whatever might come from the confrontation and debate of Foreign Ministers.

In this connection, my new Norwegian colleague lately told me he thought Westerners vastly exaggerated our inferiority to Soviets in propaganda field. He considered public opinion should be assessed in terms of political reactions. In that respect, in his own country, in France, Italy, and elsewhere in Western Europe, the power of indigenous

Communist parties had been steadily on wane. This constituted refutation of strident allegations that Western statesmen could not hold their own against Soviet diplomats.

Bruce

142. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, January 23, 1959, 4 p.m.

3820. Paris for Embassy USRO and Thurston. *Manchester Guardian* carried article January 22 by diplomatic correspondent concerning assertions by Joseph Alsop¹ that UK has joined with U.S. and France in commitment to use force if necessary to keep open access to Berlin and that Western powers have rejected possibility of countering land blockade by airlift. *Guardian* noted no attempt made either Washington or London to deny Alsop claims and UK spokesman in fact has firmly refused comment on Alsop story. *Guardian* said Soviets have not threatened land blockade but have only announced intention to turn over supervision access to Berlin to East Germans. Article concluded "it is hard to believe that British Government has already committed itself to sending its tanks and mechanized forces to hold 100-mile long line of communications between Berlin and West rather than proceed peacefully with consent of East German authorities."

During press briefing today FonOff spokesman was pressed hard by reporters on status Allied planning with respect Berlin. He replied that subject under consideration but as yet no agreement has been reached thus in effect contradicting Alsop report.

Barbour

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2359. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

¹See footnote 1, Document 139.

143. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Director for Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, January 23, 1959, 4:25 p.m.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. 1-1/2 pages of source text not declassified.]

144. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, January 26, 1959, 1 p.m.

3843. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Though we have not recently discussed with FonOff problem of para D Berlin contingency plan, it appears certain that Don Cook's Jan 22 *Herald Tribune* story¹ based on deliberate "leak" from some Brit official, presumably following Alsop story from Washington and extreme British annoyance thereover (Paris 2694 to Dept and Embtel 3786).² Would also be our judgment that Cook story in fact very well summarizes present FonOff thinking on problem. Alsop and Cook stories already showing signs of generating attention and speculation British press and may even lead to questions in House of Commons, where Labour opposition seeking use every possible issue to needle govt in pre-election atmosphere now prevailing. Thus quite apart from question of useful information already given Soviets by Alsop and Cook stories, Labour may try and force HMG take public stand re surface use of force.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2659. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

¹ Cook's article in the European edition of the *New York Herald Tribune*, January 22, reviewed the differences between the United States and the United Kingdom on the use of ground force in Berlin.

² Both dated January 22. Telegram 2694 reported that French Foreign Ministry officials deplored press speculation on Berlin. Telegram 3786 stated that the Foreign Office believed the Alsop story (see footnote 1, Document 139) was an "inspired leak," a view that was shared by Macmillan, who "was not amused." (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2259)

Dilemma U.S. faces re this problem also becoming increasingly clear. We agree fully with Dept's view that most important to avoid having Soviets get impression or information (intelligence) that West would under anticipated circumstances immediately resort to airlift rather than try force issue on ground. [5 lines of source text not declassified] At same time, we doubt that British or French Govts (or also Germans when they are brought into discussions) are likely give us (or any other ally of theirs) advance commitment now to take specific course of action some months hence which might lead to world war III. Believe Brits likely continue insist on at least spelling out major lines of possible operational alternatives and having these vetted by military before considering giving advance commitment.

Further difficulty seems to be in presentation issue as clear cut "stoppage surface traffic" as suggested Deptel 2532 to Paris.³ Unless various Sov moves such as confronting us with different officials (GDR instead of Soviet), examining documents and other measures control overland passage to Berlin are recognized as stoppage, British seriously question whether their public opinion, or for that matter general Western European opinion can be brought to support "provocative" use of force by U.S. on ground, especially if Soviets set stage so we would have to shoot first. We would judge this British apprehension probably well founded, at least in terms public opinion as it seems at present. Question looms important what if anything can be done to educate and prepare opinion meanwhile re importance taking strong stand over "dealing with GDR", something which even many Tory MP's in Britain do not appear comprehend as yet.

Will appreciate any arguments Dept can send us to use re above points. Also trust that as soon as possible our military experts will be considering with British and French (and presumably Germans as well) not only specific details and implications of use of force on ground, but also airlift problems (including technical matter of possible Soviet interference with radar controls, and effort to persuade British that Berlin people would in fact be prepared tighten belts once again in case of crisis, on which latter point British officials here seem skeptical).

Do not believe present British reluctance over Berlin contingency planning should be taken as indication basic weakness or softness. For when chips down, we believe British Govt and people would show determination and firmness. But as we see it, what Macmillan govt now concerned about is their fear that we may be heading into situation where U.S. would be urging use force with public opinion split and possibly largely negative.

³ Document 138.

Above drafted prior receipt Deptel 6742,⁴ which will be helpful to us here. We anticipate that while British may concur point made reftel (re importance of impact on Sovs of evidence of our intention prosecute our rights of surface access), they will probably still raise other points mentioned above.

Barbour

⁴Telegram 6742, January 23, informed the Embassy in London that the Department of State was transmitting summaries of the tripartite discussions on contingency planning. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2359)

**145. Memorandum of Conversation Between President
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles**

Washington, January 26, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

2. We then turned to the matter of the British thinking on the Berlin situation. The President went over with me the draft of my "thinking-out-loud" piece.¹ He had made a number of verbal suggestions, all of which I told him I thought improved the paper.

The President asked whether it would be useful for him to get into the act at this point. I said I was inclined to think it might be better to await the more precise formulation of our views in the light of the recommendations of the JCS.² I said our own position was not yet clarified in practical detail.

I referred to the desirability of my having a talk with Macmillan, Adenauer and possibly De Gaulle or Couve de Murville in the near future. I thought it particularly desirable that this immediately follow the formation of our position and precede Macmillan's proposed trip to Moscow.³

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Conversations. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

¹The draft has not been identified further; for the final paper, see Document 146.

²See footnote 8, Document 122.

³Macmillan was scheduled to visit the Soviet Union February 21-March 3.

The President heartily concurred. He suggested that I should take the *Columbine* and go over for the weekend. I told him I had to give a speech in New York on Saturday night. He then suggested leaving after my speech for London.

I thanked him for the offer of the *Columbine* and said we would promptly explore the useful dates which would require sounding out of our Embassies.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

146. Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, undated.

THINKING OUT LOUD BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES

I am particularly concerned at the diagnosis of Western European public opinion. It indicates that this public opinion would not permit the governments to risk launching a land operation merely to keep open the Western access to Berlin.

Perhaps access as of right, rather than at GDR sufferance, seems a "minor" difference. But it is always possible for the Soviet Union to stage its demands and its probing so that each step seems a relatively little step and one for which it is not worthwhile to risk war. That of course means that the very great Soviet gains could be made merely by making them in stages and by degrees.

I wonder whether, if opinion is as represented, Western Europe is really defensible at all.

The present suggestion relates to the abdication by the Soviet Union of its agreed responsibilities and substituting the GDR under conditions

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles. On January 23 British Minister Hood transmitted to Dulles a 5-page paper entitled "Thinking Aloud by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd," in which Lloyd stated that the Western powers could not give in to force on Berlin, but that British public opinion could not be mobilized in favor of war simply to insist that the Soviet Union remain in occupation in Germany. He also reviewed other aspects of the Berlin situation and the question of reunification and discussed a visit by Prime Minister Macmillan to the Soviet Union, February 21–March 3, and the benefits that would result. (*Ibid.*, UK Officials with Dulles/Herter) This paper is Dulles' response to Lloyd's paper.

which would compel us, if we acquiesce, to deal with the GDR as a government. (I am not now speaking of possibly dealing with GDR officials as agents of the Soviet Union which would be quite a different matter.) Such acceptance of the GDR would greatly enhance its prestige and shore up the uncertain structure of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. It would dismay and dishearten the population of Berlin and, I would assume, the large majority of the people of the Federal Republic. It would expose the lack of willpower in the Western alliance and encourage further pressures.

I do not believe that this can be treated as a relatively minor gain for the Soviet Union and only a minor loss to the Western world.

In my opinion the risk of war developing is minimized if the Soviet Union realizes that we are prepared to be strong and to exercise our rights. I am convinced that the striking power of the United States constitutes a genuine and effective deterrent unless the Soviets would finally calculate that there is not the moral courage to use it when necessary. Another deterring consideration is that the Soviets would not want to stir up the situation in Eastern Europe, where disloyalty and disaffection are rampant.

Of course, no amount of power operates as a deterrent unless there is the will to use it when so compelled by the violation of our rights. So far as we are concerned, the will is present. If so far as Western Europe is concerned, the will is lacking, then I fear our entire NATO concept and US participation in it will require drastic review.

I would of course agree that there should be an avoidance of preliminary measures which might inaugurate a panic. On the other hand, if it is not possible in a serious situation to take reasonable preliminary measures without a panic starting, then we are in a bad position.

I note the suggestion that there is a tendency in Europe to think that the United States would like to see a "showdown" in Europe, from the hazards of which the United States would be immune. I also note that Mr. Lloyd is "not criticizing such a view if it has been expressed". Of course the fact is, as Mr. Lloyd admits, that in the foreseeable future no aggressive despot is going to allow himself to become involved in a difficult and dangerous struggle in Europe while the power and resources of the United States remain intact. The Kaiser and Hitler did this, and paid the price. The obvious lesson has now been learned, and if the Soviets started a general European war, the United States would be hit first and hardest.

If a contrary view prevails in Europe, and if the Western European Governments are compelled to act on the assumption the United States wants to get them into a war on the theory that this country would be relatively immune, that again reveals a situation which gravely affects

all our common thinking and planning for the security of Western Europe.

I would hope that in these matters the governments which know better would be able to give leadership, rather than be led by the people who you suggest hold false ideas. And, although I would not set my judgment against Mr. Lloyd's, I am not sure that the view is widely held in Europe that the United States is trying to provoke European war.

The United States has sent to Europe and maintained there a large part of its own military force, approximately 6 divisions, to say nothing of naval, air and logistic formations. The theory was to make it apparent to all, and not least of all to the people of Western Europe, that this time there could not be a European war without the United States being fully involved from the beginning. If our presence there does not serve that purpose, that again raises some questions for the future.

It seems to me that what the United States did with the United Kingdom in the Near East, and what the United States did in the Far East (Formosa), has served to demonstrate to all the world that the United States is not trying to assure that if war comes it will come in Europe, leaving us relatively immune. We are dedicated to peace, and to the conviction that there must be a steady and openly understood determination that as against the designs of International Communism and Soviet imperialism, only a display of strength and firmness of will can possibly maintain the peace.

In the United Kingdom Embassy Aide-Mémoire delivered on January 13,¹ there appears the following: "For it to be possible for this line of policy to be successfully pursued, it is, of course, essential that we should show absolutely no weakness in our determination to uphold our rights in relation to Berlin and to make it plain to the Russians that we would if necessary be prepared to risk a general war in support of these rights." This seems to me to be eminently sound.

¹ See footnote 5, Document 139.

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Washington, January 26, 1959, 7:42 p.m.

Topol 2462. Polto 2016.¹

1. Department recognizes necessity eventual NATO consultation on Berlin contingency planning and desirability informing NAC at least in general terms as soon as Three Powers, in consultation with Federal Republic, have reached clear understanding on subject. Discussion in NATO at this time, however, would not only be premature but might also have effect of tending reduce Western position on use of force maintain access to Berlin to lowest common denominator of determination.

2. If in interim you believe it necessary make some comment to satisfy legitimate NATO interest in question, you might wish take following line:

A. Basic political decisions have been taken that we will maintain our access to Berlin and will not permit substitution of GDR personnel to perform functions Soviets have exercised re this access.

B. Contingency planning now proceeding should be regarded as implementation of these decisions.

C. Discussions among Three Powers at present turn on question of what measures can most effectively maintain access, both on surface and in air, against GDR efforts assert controls over access.

D. Security considerations naturally prevent anything but most restricted discussion of detailed military plans. However, Three Powers fully aware of NATO interest and will give NATO substance of planning after plans more fully developed.

E. Should be borne in mind that military planning for various contingencies must be worked out well in advance and that completion of such planning does not signify plans will automatically be carried out without recourse to appropriate diplomatic measures.

3. Re para 3 reftel, language suggested by French would seem make further consultation, probably including NATO consultation, inevitable before decision taken to use force to maintain surface access.

4. Re para 4 reftel we believe it essential Soviets have clear understanding our surface access to Berlin can be blocked only at risk of war. If paragraph D adopted leak of fact West had adopted firmest possible

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2059. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Merchant and Hillenbrand, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹ Dated January 20. (*Ibid.*)

position could thus do us no harm. On either [other?] hand leaks to effect Western Powers not fully agreed on this or to effect British and French do not entirely share US views can give Soviets impression we may be prepared evade issue and thus induce them implement their threats against our access rather than accepting some face-saving way out of crisis. For this reason we have been concerned about recent press speculation which obviously inspired by leaks from various sources.

5. Any statement in NAC should of course be coordinated with British, French and Germans.

Dulles

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, January 29, 1959, 1:03 p.m.

1646. Please arrange deliver following letter from Secretary to Chancellor as soon as possible:

"January 29, 1959

My dear Friend:

You have, I know, received reports from your Ambassador here of the various conversations which Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan had with the President and myself during his visit to the United States.¹ I need not tell you, therefore, that at his departure the Berlin situation stood just where it did at his arrival. Mr. Mikoyan took some pains to convey by his manner an apparent willingness to be conciliatory. His actual words, however, showed no significant deviation from the Soviet position expressed orally by Premier Khrushchev and in the Soviet notes of November 27 and January 10.² It is true that he said the Soviet demands were not intended as an ultimatum. Nevertheless,

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/1-2959. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Merchant and Hillenbrand on January 28 and cleared by Calhoun and Murphy. Bruce received the telegram the morning of January 30 and delivered the letter to the Chancellor before lunch that day. (*Ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

¹ See Documents 121 and 135–137.

² See Documents 72 and 124.

at no point did he hint that, failing agreement with the Western Powers by May 27, the Soviets would be deterred from turning over their responsibilities to the Pankow regime. He repeatedly asked for counter proposals on Berlin from us, but he made no new proposals of his own, nor of course did we have any to make. On our part, both the President and I impressed on Mikoyan our flat intention to maintain our rights in Berlin.

The fact that nothing of great significance emerged from the talks with Mr. Mikoyan has undoubtedly disappointed many who, before his arrival, had speculated that he would bring a new and more acceptable offer from the Soviets. I cannot say that I was myself greatly surprised. As I told Dr. Dittmann and Ambassador Grewe on January 14,³ it would have been contrary to the normal techniques employed by the Soviets to compromise or retreat at this early stage. They may be expected to press their demands until they have satisfied themselves that we are prepared to fight over Berlin.

I am inclined to believe that the Soviets have been taken somewhat aback by the firmness and unity of purpose on Berlin shown by the NATO countries during their December meeting in Paris.⁴ It is probable that, among his purposes, Mikoyan came to the United States to assess the strength of our determination on this issue as well as the general fiber of the country. I believe that he must have returned to Moscow with no illusions on either score. The time of testing for the West, however, is still ahead. We shall need our unity and firmness over the months to come. This is the indispensable prerequisite for dispelling the crisis over Berlin which the Soviets have precipitated.

We are still far from fully developing a tactical position which offers some prospect for such a solution. We are also, like yourself, engaged in a review of our common position on substance to see if we can find a form of presentation more persuasive than our Geneva efforts of 1955. I think we must realistically admit that the Soviet initiative has added a new psychological element in terms of expectancies, as well as underlining the delicately poised post-war equilibrium in Central Europe. By pressing on the West's militarily exposed nerve in Berlin, the Soviets have in fact raised in urgent form the closely related, more general problems of a European settlement. Without the reunification of Germany in freedom no such settlement nor any real solution of West Berlin can be found. I doubt that the Soviets are yet ready for any such general settlement on terms the West can accept. I am notwithstanding

³ See Document 133.

⁴ See Document 112.

convinced that we must make another effort in this direction as part of the process of dealing with the Berlin situation.

This, I think, means moving towards a conference with the Soviets. Providing the firmness of the Western allies remains evident, such a conference would provide the Soviets with a certain protective coloration under which they might withdraw from the dangerous position Khrushchev has taken on West Berlin. I believe you will concur that it is unlikely the Soviets will postpone their announced plans in Berlin unless provided with some such face-saving camouflage. If on the other hand the Soviets will not withdraw then a conference will demonstrate to our own peoples how faithfully we sought a peaceful solution before facing the grave risk of a resort to force to maintain our position in West Berlin.

I agree with you, of course, that the draft of a so-called peace treaty attached to the Soviet note of January 10 is not acceptable. Incidentally, one fairly clear impression we did receive from Mikoyan was that, if we did not get involved in some sort of discussion, the Soviets and their satellites would proceed with the signing of a peace treaty with the Pankov regime.

This is another factor which makes clear that we cannot merely reject the Soviet proposal and expect them to come up with a more acceptable one. I do not think this would be either realistic or tactically sound. We would wish to avoid too much delay in getting the Soviets around a table.

Under these circumstances, flexibility as to the agenda of such a conference would be to our advantage. We might simply say to the Soviets that it would be fruitless for either side to attempt to dictate the agenda for discussions on a subject as broad as Germany. Accordingly we might suggest that the Foreign Ministers of the four powers meet at Geneva in mid-April to discuss 'the question of Germany'. We might further suggest something along the lines of the arrangements made at Geneva for consultation with other interested parties. In all the preparation of our position we naturally want to work closely with your representatives. However, we do not have much time, and we have welcomed the general willingness to arrange the early assembly of a four power working group in Washington to serve as focal point for an exchange of views on both tactics and substance. Its first task I suggest should be to prepare a draft reply to the Soviet note of January 10. I would visualize this reply as confined essentially to the procedural proposal which I have suggested above.

We have been in touch with your Foreign Office, as well as with the British and French, to suggest that such a four power working group

meet in Washington at the beginning of February and I would hope our reply to the Soviet note could go forward before the middle of February.

As to the content of the Western position, I am persuaded that the West would have much to gain if we could in some fashion take advantage of the great asset which the Federal Republic has in the fact that political ideals and conditions of freedom in the West attract an overwhelming percentage of the population of the Soviet Zone. We have, as you know, urged that your Government give some thought as to how we might take advantage of this fact in any discussions with the Soviets, and we are attempting to come up with some ideas on our part. If it is convenient, I would be willing, perhaps next week, to visit you in Bonn, and away from the pressure of other problems, discuss these questions with you and Herr von Brentano in the light of the developing situation. I would probably stop briefly at London and Paris en route.

I suspect you will not be surprised that Mikoyan was less than complimentary in some of his references, publicly and privately, to you personally and some of your colleagues. One of his efforts—and a spectacularly unsuccessful one—was to seek to drive a wedge between us.

Faithfully yours,
Foster Dulles"

Dulles

149. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, January 29, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
Under Secretary Herter
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
Assistant Secretary Merchant
Secretary McElroy

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted on January 30. For two other accounts of this meeting, see Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 340–342, and Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, pp. 218–221.

Deputy Secretary Quarles
General Twining
Mr. Gordon Gray
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

Secretary Dulles opened the meeting by defining the problem as twofold; first, we must decide our own policy with regard to meeting the Soviet threat to Berlin which will mature as of May 27, 1959 (the date on which the USSR turns over control of access to Berlin to the GDR), and second, we must determine what can be sold to our allies as a course of action on an international basis.

Timewise, the first problem we must face is whether we acquiesce in the turnover of control of access from the USSR to the GDR. (Here the President confirmed with Secretary Dulles that the quadripartite control council for Berlin no longer exists.) The position of the Foreign Ministers at the NATO Council meeting in December was that we should not accept this substitution. Such acceptance would enhance the GDR's prestige. As the result, the GDR would soon stiffen up the requirements levied upon allied forces for access to Berlin and would apply pressure gradually, without creating a situation nearly so dramatic as the initial action. We have a strong case against this turnover in that the USSR has responsibility to us in this matter and there is no reason why we should have to accept the substitution of a dummy government, the GDR. It is therefore recommended that we not accept this substitution. This recommendation is backed up by the public position which we have taken. It is only fair, however, to note that the British are wobbling in this matter.

The President then brought up the question of degree of provocation versus degree of response. For example, if the Soviet official at a check point is replaced by an official from the GDR, and this GDR official requires the mere showing of a card, then this happening appears so slight that it would not, in the eyes of the world, be cause for drastic action on our part. Some way must be found to make this small action look "tremendous." To this Secretary Dulles agreed that if a GDR official appears at a check point, and merely waves traffic through, our vehicles should not turn back. The line should be drawn, he feels, at the point where the official attempts to stamp the papers or search the trucks.

Mr. Quarles then brought up a refinement of this point. It is his understanding that a GDR man is present at each border check point at this time, and he is responsible as a traffic officer for all commercial traffic. It is not apparent how you can avoid accepting this man as a traffic officer in order to validate the fact that any given vehicle is under military jurisdiction. On this point the President, although recognizing that we must uphold our rights as conquerors, approved the principle that U.S. traf-

fic going through check points manned by GDR personnel may show identification to establish that this traffic is in fact military. U.S. drivers will *not* permit GDR personnel to stamp identification papers or to search trucks.

The Secretary of State then continued outlining his approach. He feels that we should begin, in the near future, to effect some military preparations, which may be detected by Soviet intelligence but which are not sufficient to create public alarm. Such measures would include increasing military traffic patrols and guards on trains, etc. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency plan (Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated January 13, 1959, subject: Berlin Situation)¹ was recognized by Secretary McElroy and General Twining as an all-inclusive document, covering more measures than could in practicality be implemented. Once the substitution of a GDR official for a Soviet official has been completed, on May 27, we should then send a small armored unit to ascertain whether or not the Soviets will obstruct. If this armored unit is obstructed by some means, it should, without firing unless fired upon, return to its point of departure. We should then suspend our transit effort and mobilize world opinion against this action on the part of the Communists. Actions to do so would include bringing the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations and, in the event of Soviet use of the veto, to the General Assembly. We should also at this time proceed with further military preparedness. (This dual approach the Secretary of State refers to as the "double-barreled" approach.)

At this time a discussion as to the nature of this probing unit ensued, with Secretary Dulles answering the President's query as to the necessity for armor in a non-resistance situation, by stating that scout cars only are anticipated and their use is contemplated primarily as protection against miscalculation. The President checked with General Twining on the presence of visible armament on our convoys as of today. General Twining pointed out that we do not send vehicles with visible armament, or even covered trucks, through check points today. Our trained guards are present and could be augmented, but no tactical units, even of squad size, ride the trains.

At this time Secretary Dulles defined the difference between his approach and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS have recommended preparation for a large-scale use of force on May 27, to include meeting resistance with a large force, rebuilding of bridges, obstructions, etc. This force can comprise strength up to a division. Secretary Dulles would prefer to execute this operation in two stages, allowing a lapse of

¹ See footnote 8, Document 122.

time between the first probe and the use of appreciable force. To this Secretary McElroy agreed.

General Twining then spoke up in defense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff point of view. They recommend that we make up our minds now as to our sequence of action rather than attempt to address the problem only after we are stopped. (The President recognized that the wait-and-see approach was also the de Gaulle approach.)

As a final measure, Secretary Dulles pointed out the necessity for starting talks on the whole German problem as of the middle of April in order to allow the Soviets the opportunity to withdraw without loss of face. The President agreed enthusiastically.

The President then checked on the supply levels in Berlin. Mr. Murphy pointed out that the military in Berlin have a ninety-day level of supply. In answer to the President's question on the civilian levels, Mr. Quarles estimated this to be six months. Mr. Quarles further pointed out that in no categories do the stocks fall below the two-months level. This satisfied the President. He then reviewed the sequence of action which involved: 1) the initial probe, which should return without resistance followed by 2) a time space in which we show more concern accompanying military preparations with action in the United Nations. He asked Secretary Dulles in this regard whether our allies will go along with this procedure. The reply was affirmative, with the Secretary stressing the stake that the Soviets have in their position before the world as a peace-loving nation. He stressed again his position that the decision to use force must not be automatic.

The President then turned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency plan with a criticism of the size of force recommended in that plan. In the President's view one division has insufficient capability to do an acceptable job. In the event we resort to force, we will have to conquer the entire German zone. On this matter, Secretary Dulles expressed his agreement that we are risking defeat and humiliation by the use of one division. Mr. Quarles remarked that we are risking the same thing with an unsuccessful small convoy.

At this point General Twining forcefully injected the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fear that the United States will go half way and then quit. They feel that if we do not carry through with our resolution to risk general war we might as well get out of Europe. To this viewpoint the President pointed out the weakness of taking unilateral action. Without our allies we have no lines of communication and no support. In the President's view, Secretary Dulles' plan is designed to carry our allies with us, demonstrating that the Soviets are primarily at fault. The President feels that even Adenauer might not go along with a "Berlin or bust" action. Secretary Dulles reaffirmed his own history of willingness to risk war when necessary. He stressed, how-

ever, that in a situation of this type it is essential to give peace forces a chance to work. The first obstruction, in his view, is insufficient reason to precipitate a war. For this reason he regards extensive military preparations as the "second barrel." There is plenty of time in his view to send a division after due contemplation.

A discussion then followed regarding our ground capabilities vis-à-vis those of the Soviets in Europe. General Twining pointed out that our policies forbid a limited war in Europe, that we cannot fight the USSR on the ground conventionally, and that if we make up our minds to go through we must be prepared to fight a general nuclear war. To this the President expressed the view that the Soviets will not interfere with direct use of force. They will, instead, use obstructions. He agrees that we do not have sufficient forces in Europe, that six equivalent divisions are not enough to do this job conventionally. Our policy must be to force the Soviets to use military force, after which we are in a position to issue an ultimatum prior to initiation of general war.

At Secretary McElroy's initiation, the problem of ambiguous, piecemeal tightening of restrictions was again introduced. It was reiterated at this point that we refuse to deal with GDR officials at the point at which they stamp papers or search trucks. At this time, we implement Secretary Dulles' "double barrel." Our position is then strong enough to take the matter to the Security Council. During this discussion Mr. Quarles introduced the proposal that allied guards, probably British, be prepared to step into the present Soviet check points and take over at such time as the Soviet officials are first removed. Allied convoys would then present identification to these guards rather than the GDR officials on post. The Secretary of State replied that this idea had already been considered, but admitted that it is worthy of further consideration. The President agreed that there is some merit in this proposal.

The President then outlined his concern over our position with relation to public opinion. He pointed out that we must realize that we have in many ways already recognized two Germanies. He and Secretary Dulles agreed that the public opinion for firm action is at this moment solid, but he is concerned about the "nibbling" problem, in which the man in the street is likely to question why we worry about the shape of the helmet of the official to whom we present credentials. He and Secretary Dulles agreed on the cleverness of the Soviets in their facility in working the West into a state of tension, only to release the pressure for a period of about thirty days. The President pointed out that the United States would *like* to think that public opinion *pushes* us into war. Under circumstances which might be created he is not so sure they would even *follow* us into war. To set the climate of public opinion right, we must preach 1) the rights of the occupying powers, and 2) our responsibility to two million Berliners.

Mr. Gray then brought up the timing of evacuation of dependents from Berlin. In Secretary Dulles' view, this should be done at some stage after the initial effort—i.e. in the "double barrel" stage. In answer to the President's question as to the number of dependents in Berlin, Mr. McElroy estimated that there are approximately twelve thousand. Although there are only four thousand military personnel, there are a great number of civilians who are not actually dependents. Secretary McElroy assumes that we will evacuate all noncombatants.

The President then inquired regarding the ability of Templehof Airfield to take our largest jets. (General Twining said he would check.) The President expressed a view that sending in about ten B-58s on a normal routine training flight properly announced would have a salutary effect psychologically. Secretary Dulles stated doubt in this matter as to the permissibility of jets in the Berlin corridor, primarily because of the ability of jets to stay in the landing pattern. In answer to Secretary Quarles' proposal that we send in Globemasters, Secretary Dulles voiced an objection that such action might give the impression that we are preparing for an airlift. Above all, he considers it essential to avoid this since Berlin cannot be kept going today, as in 1948, by an airlift. People could be fed but the economy would shrivel up and the city would lose its vitality. In this way the Soviet goals would be accomplished. With this, the President temporarily gave up his idea of sending B-58s into Berlin. He stated that they might fly along the border but then apparently overtook this idea with that of an air show (including 2.0 mach B-58s) over Washington on Lincoln's Birthday. He feels that the intense speed of these aircraft would make a great impression.

Secretary Dulles then brought up a matter related to feasibility of an airlift. On the advice of Mr. Murphy, he pointed out that thus far there has been no suggestion of a total blockade which would include civilian traffic, implying that Berlin might not shrivel up if only military needs were to be met by airlift. This revelation appeared to open a new viewpoint to the President. He stated that this now is obviously a direct challenge to the Big Three and such a differentiation between civilian and military traffic might be designed to split off Germany from the others.

By way of summary, the President stated that the scheme as set forth by Secretary Dulles is generally the best way to start. However, in developing this scheme, the Secretary of State will staff out for further consideration the proposal of Mr. Quarles with regard to substituting allied guards for Soviets when the substitution of GDR officials is attempted. In the meantime, it is essential to find out whether there is a possibility of discussing the entire German problem with the Soviets. (In this connection he mentioned the idea of Berlin as a location for the talks.) He instructed Secretary Dulles to start now to determine under which particular conditions our allies will go along with this. (Secretary

Dulles assured the President that his program would be satisfactory to the French; indeed, it was based on a French paper.) In the event that the Soviets carry through with their threats, we will utilize gradual steps to allow for the breakdown. We will withdraw our Ambassador, then break relations and, if necessary, resort to major armed force. He desires to be logical and moderate in our approach, to build up a cover when the time comes, and to make maximum utilization of a show of military force to indicate to the Soviets our seriousness in this matter.

As the meeting closed, Secretary Dulles pointed out that Mayor Willy Brandt of Berlin will be here soon and that all efforts will be made by way of a hero's welcome to indicate the solidarity of U.S. opinion, and, therefore, our seriousness in the situation.² This idea brought forth considerable enthusiasm from the President, who desires that we explore the possibilities of utilizing Brandt's visit to show off our new equipment. One means might be the provision of a fighter escort of B-58s for Brandt's air trip between Washington and New York.

John S.D. Eisenhower³

² See Document 169.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

150. Memorandum Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, January 29, 1959.

CONCLUSIONS OF WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE RE BERLIN

1. We do not acquiesce in the substitution of GDR for Soviet officials as regards the Western occupying powers' movements to and from West Berlin.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles following the conference reported in Document 149. Greene transmitted a copy of this memorandum to Goodpaster on January 29 and asked if it coincided with his record of the meeting. No record of Goodpaster's comments has been found, but John S.D. Eisenhower prepared a 1-page 5-point comment adding certain details and suggesting some rearrangement of the paragraphs. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2959)

If GDR officials merely demand identification of the vehicles as those of one of the Western occupying powers, such identification will be provided. However, no stamping of papers or inspection will be acquiesced in.

2. Begin promptly quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures in West Germany and Berlin of a kind that would be detectable by Soviet intelligence but which would not create public alarm.

3. After the attempted or announced substitution of GDR for USSR, the next unit to go through would be a truck or trucks accompanied by a scout car or some other vehicle with a capability for shooting. This unit, subject to the conditions mentioned in 1 above, would attempt to make the transit from Berlin. If the GDR or the Soviets interposed physical obstructions, then the effort would be discontinued and in no event would the armament be used unless it were fired upon, in which case it would take whatever defensive action seemed necessary.

4. After the physical obstruction occurred, transit would be suspended for the time being and parallel efforts would be made along the following lines:

a) Seek to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet Union as a violator of agreements, a user of force and a threat to the peace. The situation could be taken to the Security Council and, in the event of veto there, to a special session of the General Assembly;

b) Military preparations would be intensified and at this point could include measures which would be observable, as, for example, the evacuation of dependents from West Berlin, and possibly from Germany.

5. The decision to use additional force would be subject to governmental decision in the event that the double barreled effort mentioned above was not successful.

(Consideration would be given to the possibility of the stationing of Western allied inspectors in lieu of the withdrawn Soviet inspectors at the check points.)

6. Concurrently with the development of the foregoing program an effort would be made to bring about around the middle of April a Foreign Ministers' meeting with the Soviet Union on the various aspects of the German question. These talks might provide a cover which would facilitate the indefinite postponement or modification by the Soviet Union of their present ultimatum as regards Berlin.

(It is assumed that allied agreement would be obtainable along these lines. If not the question of U.S. action would have to be considered in the light of the allied position.)

151. Memorandum From Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary of State Dulles

Bonn, January 30, 1959.

The present situation is characterized by the fact that the Soviet Union, now as before, aims at dominating the world by means of communism under the leadership of the Soviet Union. In official Soviet speeches the term "socialist world system" has recently been substituted for the term "socialist camp". The Soviets regard the United States as their only significant opponent. Germany is not regarded by them as an opponent of importance. This was explicitly stated to Lippmann by Khrushchev in his well-known interview of 24 October 1958.¹

2. Therefore in taking any action in respect of the Soviet Union, including any proposals that might be made shortly concerning pending questions, that objective of Soviet Russian policy must be taken into account. The free world has constantly underestimated the systematic and far-sighted quality of Soviet Russian policy. Ever since the second World War, the Government of the Soviet Union has pursued a policy deliberately aiming at world domination. After the collapse of Germany the Soviet Union was the only country which instead of disarming continuously increased its armed strength. The offer made by the United States in 1946 and subsequent years to subject all nuclear weapons to international control was sabotaged by the Soviet Union although the latter at the time did not possess any nuclear weapons. Since 1945 the Soviets have incorporated into their orbit of power the present satellite countries. After that they initiated political and economic actions of the most different kinds in numerous parts of the world. All these measures accorded with each other, and all of them pursued one and the same objective, namely, to expand the power of communism. Indeed, the Soviets and, in particular, Khrushchev have unambiguously stated again and again that communism would supersede the so-called capitalist States.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Attached to a letter from Adenauer to Dulles, January 30, in which he attempted to write down his thoughts on the present world situation for Dulles' attention only. The letter and memorandum were delivered to Dulles on February 2 by German Minister Krapf. A memorandum of their conversation, which included a brief exploration of the access question and the reply to the Soviet note of January 10 (see Document 124) is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Dulles sent a copy of the translation to President Eisenhower on February 3 and the copy of it in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File, was initialed by Eisenhower. A full text is in Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 467-472.

¹ See Walter Lippmann, *The Communist World and Ours*, Boston, 1959, pp. 11-31.

To judge the situation now brought about by the Soviets only under the aspect of the partition of Germany, as is done in Britain and particularly in the United States, is incorrect and therefore leads to erroneous conclusions. The partition of Germany is not the cause but the consequence of the tension which originated between the Soviet Union and the United States before that partition. Even if Germany unity were restored in complete freedom, a state of tension between East and West would continue to exist. Germany's independence from East and West would even be bound to intensify the tension. In view of Germany's geographical position, both sides would have to make every effort in order to prevent her manpower and her production capacity from coming under the influence of the other side.

[Here follows unrelated material.]

4. In my view the raising of the German problem at this juncture is an attempt by the Soviet Union, to be taken very seriously, to initiate successfully the economic usurpation of Western Europe by first detaching the Federal Republic economically from the European Economic Community and later integrating it into the economic area controlled by the Soviets. The Soviet draft of a so-called peace treaty therefore logically contains provisions to the effect

- a) that the Soviet-dominated so-called German Democratic Republic should be recognized as a German State enjoying full sovereignty, and that its territory should be guaranteed;
- b) that the Federal Republic should enter into a confederation with that structure built on communist principles; and
- c) that the Federal Republic should be forced to renounce any aspirations towards integration with the West.

The intention to detach the Federal Republic from the treaty system of the free nations is clearly borne out by

the prohibition to participate in military alliances, which would mean leaving NATO;

the provisions concerning the recognition of "the full sovereignty of the German people over Germany", which prohibit the transfer of sovereign rights to European organizations; and

more particularly the clauses concerning most favoured nation treatment to be granted to the Soviet Union, which would preclude the further participation of the Federal Republic in the European Economic Community, the OEEC and the GATT.

The same conditions are to apply later to a reunited Germany.

Ulbricht as well as Grotewohl have clearly and unequivocally stated that it is the purpose of the proposed confederation to establish the rule of communism throughout Germany. In his report during the Fourth Session of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, Ulbricht said that the time has come "for the workers of West Germany

to take into their own hands the cause of peace and of the struggle against German militarism". On 25 January Grotewohl stated in Peking that "the red flag of the working class would one day fly over the whole of Germany".

5. It results from the above that it is impossible to agree to any proposal, irrespective of where it comes from, which brings the Soviets nearer to their objective of becoming the world's paramount economic Power. From this follows

a) that the spread of communism in the Federal Republic must not under any circumstances be facilitated;

b) that the present connexion of the Federal Republic with the West must not be weakened in any way under any circumstances. The withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO, or from the European Communities, the abandonment of Berlin or the implementation of isolated disengagement plans would decisively weaken NATO and thus be bound to result in upsetting the military and political equilibrium in favour of the Soviet Union.

[Here follows unrelated material.]

10. It seems to me necessary to resume, within the framework of the United Nations, the disarmament negotiations which at the time almost reached a conclusion in the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission at London, and to link them up with the Soviet Russian move concerning Berlin and Germany.

11. In characterizing the partition of Germany as the most dangerous fact of our time one deflects public attention from the real threat, namely, the expansive urge of the Soviet Union. The activities of all the free nations should, however, be first and foremost directed towards preventing the expansion of communism in the world and more particularly the expansion of the economic and political power of the Soviet Union.

Once the Soviet Union realizes that she can make no further advance in her attempt at world domination, once her fear of being attacked is allayed by controlled disarmament in the field of nuclear and conventional weapons and by simultaneously pointing out to her the prospects of an undisturbed economic development in her own country, facilitated by extensive disarmament, a relaxation of tension is likely to occur throughout the world. In an atmosphere of relaxation other questions, for instance the reunification of Germany, could be negotiated about with some prospect of success. The constant arguments with the "Group of Traitors" gathering round Malenkov, Bulganin, Molotov etc. as well as the discussions of the so-called reform of the school system show that communism, too, is faced with internal problems. A relaxation of tension might promote these quarrels.

In constantly characterizing the reunification of Germany as the most important problem one conjures up the danger of a movement being launched in certain countries to the effect that the world should not be imperilled for the sake of reuniting Germany. Such a movement would be ominous.

Since the time has not yet come to solve this question, the West runs the risk of being defeated in pursuing such a policy. It exposes itself to the danger of suffering a severe loss of prestige and conversely contributes to raising the prestige of the Soviet Union throughout the world.

12. In declarations, correspondence, etc. of the Western allies mention is frequently made of "European security". Today's armaments technology, e.g., rockets, as well as the political ties which are becoming ever closer, particularly between the communist countries and Soviet Russia, no longer admit of an isolated European security; there is only *one security*, namely, the joint security of all the free nations.

13. There will have to be negotiations. In the course of such negotiations consideration might at the suggestion of the United States be given to the establishment of diplomatic relations by the Federal Republic of Germany with Poland and Czechoslovakia, provided that the Berlin question is solved properly. Consideration might also be given to the issue of a carefully formulated statement concerning the Oder-Neisse line, as previously, which might contain such points as the renunciation of the use of force, the maintenance of the right of people to their homeland, and perhaps economic cooperation.

The possibility might also be considered of negotiating an agreement on the maintenance of the status quo of Berlin for a certain period, simultaneously providing that the conditions in the Soviet Zone be improved by means of an agreed form of international control or influence. This might perhaps also benefit the negotiations concerning controlled disarmament.

[Here follows unrelated material.]

152. Editorial Note

At 12:30 a.m. (7:30 a.m. in Washington) on February 2 a U.S. military convoy of four trucks from Berlin was detained at the Marienborn checkpoint by Soviet officials for refusing to submit to inspection. Protests to the Soviet Commandant's office at Karlshorst and to the Soviet Military Mission at Frankfurt failed to elicit any positive response. On the evening of February 3 the Department of State transmitted

to the Embassy in Moscow a note protesting the "unwarranted and inadmissible" detention of the convoy. (Telegram 1182; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-359) Since the convoy had not been released by the following day, the note was delivered to the Foreign Ministry at 4:30 p.m. (10:30 a.m. in Washington). At the time that the note was delivered President Eisenhower, who had been kept advised of the situation, reviewed the U.S. position on convoy inspection at a press conference. For text of the protest note and the President's statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pages 609-611.

Markushin finally agreed to meet U.S. Political Adviser Burns at Marienborn at 4:30 p.m. (7:30 a.m. in Washington) on February 4 to discuss a resolution of the problem. During a 2-1/2-hour meeting Markushin agreed to release the convoy, but only as a personal favor to Burns. The Mission at Berlin transmitted a summary report of the meeting in telegram 667, February 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-559) Additional documentation on this incident is *ibid.*, 762.00 and 762.0221.

153. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 3, 1959, 11:33 a.m.-noon.

SUBJECT

Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS

M. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Matthew J. Looram, WE

The French Ambassador stated that he had seen General de Gaulle last week and had found him absolutely firm on the Berlin issue. De

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-359. Secret. Drafted by Looram and approved by Greene on February 11. The time of the meeting is from Dulles Daily Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 2785, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-359) Alphand had just returned from a 5-day visit to Paris, January 28-February 2, for consultations. For his brief account of the visit and his conversation with Dulles on February 3, see *L'Étonnement*, pp. 300-301.

Gaule believed that the Western powers should use every means necessary—not excluding force—to maintain free access to Berlin and that this position should be made known to the Soviets. De Gaulle felt that if the GDR authorities were to insist on our presenting documents at control points, we should refuse to comply and continue on through to Berlin. Similarly if obstacles were erected, they should be removed and we should proceed to Berlin. General de Gaulle felt, however, that we should not be provocative or be the first to use force.

M. Alphand stated he thought it would be useful for the Secretary when in Paris to explain to de Gaulle his views regarding an air lift. He felt that if an air lift were considered no more than a tentative possibility, de Gaulle would understand.

Regarding a foreign ministers conference, the Ambassador stated that General de Gaulle felt very strongly that we should not propose a specific date in our reply to the Soviets and certainly not a date prior to May 27. To do so, de Gaulle felt, would be a sign of weakness and an indication that we were desperately seeking a compromise solution. Despite the foregoing, de Gaulle was disposed to having talks with the Soviets and in fact hoped that there would be a conference on the overall issues affecting Germany. De Gaulle did not believe that we should consider recognizing the GDR, but he thought it might prove feasible to arrive at a *modus vivendi* which would involve *de facto* relations between the Federal Republic and the Western powers on the one hand and the GDR on the other.

M. Alphand stated that the French realized that the official U.S. position on Germany was absolutely firm, but at the same time they regretted the current press speculation to the effect that the U.S. position was flexible and that discussions with Congressional leaders had indicated a willingness on the part of the U.S. Government to accept alternative solutions for Germany including something along the lines of the Rapacki plan. The French felt that these rumors gave an unfortunate impression of hesitation and disunity on the part of the West. For this reason the French welcomed all the more the Secretary's imminent visit to London, Paris and Bonn.

The Secretary stated he did not think there was any disposition in the country to be anything but firm on Berlin; however, it was more difficult when it came to the precise actions to be taken. He felt there was a danger that the Western position might be "nibbled away" by reluctance on our part to stand firm on apparently minor points that might not appear worth making an issue of. He believed, however, that we had a sound position, which could be dramatized, in maintaining that for one of the German victors, namely the Soviet Union, to turn over to the defeated element controls affecting the other victors was intolerable. Technically there was still a state of war with Germany. We should

accordingly not accept substitution of the GDR authorities for the Soviet authorities on control of access to Berlin. We would be willing to identify ourselves at control points, but we would not accept control or inspection by the GDR authorities. Details as to the precise actions that might be necessary would require further study.

Regarding the date for a possible foreign ministers conference, the Secretary said that it has not been our opinion that suggesting a date prior to May 27 might be interpreted as a sign of weakness, particularly in view of the fact that as of last September 30,¹ we had already suggested a conference with the Soviets on German reunification and European security. Moreover, irrespective of the Soviet proposals, we would not be disposed to limit the agenda solely to discussion of the Berlin issue. Nevertheless, the Secretary stated in our reply to the Soviets it might be preferable to propose holding a conference "at a mutually satisfactory time and place".

The French Ambassador stated this was the wording in the French draft reply.² Moreover, de Gaulle had told him that if the Soviets came back with a subsequent reply suggesting a date prior to May 27, he would then have no objection to accepting such a date.

The Secretary mentioned the likelihood that as a result of our proposing a conference on Germany and European security, the Soviets might raise the issue of composition at such a conference. He added that he had just received a letter from Chancellor Adenauer³ saying he thought it would be undesirable to focus the conference on the issue of German reunification. Adenauer thought if we did this, public pressures would mount for settling this question, even on unfavorable terms, under the illusion that this would resolve all outstanding East-West issues. Adenauer accordingly preferred that the principal subject for a conference be disarmament.

The French Ambassador thought that taking such a line would be unrealistic. The Secretary said he was inclined to agree, particularly in view of the fact that the current nuclear test suspension conference in Geneva was on the verge of collapse. In this connection, the Secretary stated, he thought the Soviet position insisting on unanimity for the control commission was ludicrous. It tended to confirm his earlier impression that the Soviets would be unwilling to accept genuine controls.

¹ For text of the Western notes of September 30, 1958, proposing the establishment of a four-power working group to draft a solution to the German problem, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 584-587.

² This draft was delivered to the Department on January 28 and transmitted to the Embassy in Paris in telegram 2683 the same day. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2859)

³ See Document 151.

In conclusion the Secretary stated that he thought the French and U.S. positions were close together and agreement should be able to be reached between them on these matters. M. Alphand concurred, but stated he thought the British position was less firm. The Secretary agreed and mentioned that he had heard a news broadcast to the effect that Prime Minister Macmillan might visit Moscow.

154. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Dulles left Washington at 3:30 p.m. on February 3 for meetings in London, Paris, and Bonn on Berlin and Germany. He arrived in London at 12:30 p.m. the following day and proceeded to the Embassy Residence for talks with General Norstad at 3 p.m. At 5 p.m., he discussed Berlin and various bilateral subjects with Foreign Secretary Lloyd at the Foreign Office, and at 9 p.m. he met with Prime Minister Macmillan at 10 Downing Street for further discussions on Berlin and the Prime Minister's upcoming trip to the Soviet Union. Records of these three meetings are printed here.

On February 5 Dulles returned to the Foreign Office for a meeting with Lloyd at 11 a.m., and then went to 10 Downing Street for another session with the Prime Minister. Only the records of their discussions on Berlin and Germany are printed here. At 3 p.m. the Secretary of State departed from London, arriving at Orly Field, Paris, at 5 p.m.

On February 6 the Secretary of State held meetings with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville at 10 a.m. and with President de Gaulle at 11:30 a.m. to discuss Berlin and bilateral U.S.-French questions. At 4 p.m. he discussed the German problem with NATO Secretary General Spaak, and at 6 p.m. Assistant Secretary of State Merchant discussed air access to Berlin with Couve de Murville. Only the reports on the discussions at these meetings that deal with Berlin are presented here.

Following a brief discussion with Couve de Murville, Secretary Dulles left Paris at 10:30 a.m. on February 7 and arrived at Wahn Airport at 12:05, where he was met by Chancellor Adenauer. A private meeting with Adenauer at 4 p.m., followed by a larger meeting including several advisers at 4:30, completed the day's discussions. The following day the Secretary of State and the Chancellor again met privately before meeting with a larger circle of their advisers at 11:15 a.m. In the afternoon the Chancellor accompanied Secretary Dulles to the airport during which

time they discussed the German coal situation, Iran, and the Secretary of State's illness. Dulles departed Wahn Airport at 3:30 p.m. and arrived back in Washington at 8 a.m. on February 9.

Documentation on Dulles' trip including briefing papers, memoranda of conversations, daily chronologies, and telegrams to and from the delegation are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560. For texts of Dulles' statements on departing for Europe on February 3 and on his return on February 9, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 2, 1959, pages 296-297.

155. Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-2

London, February 4, 1959, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conclusions to White House Conference re Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles	Minister Barbour
General Norstad	Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Jr.
Ambassador Whitney	Mr. Raymond Thurston
Mr. Livingston Merchant	Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

After reading the "Memorandum of Conclusions to White House Conference Re Berlin"¹ General Norstad said he thought the UK and France could accept the plan of action proposed. He believed that the Western powers had to be firm but deliberate. All possibility of misconception should be avoided by letting the Soviets know precisely what we were thinking. His concern about the old paragraph 4D² had been that it contemplated taking the ultimate action too fast.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1201. Top Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand. The meeting was held at the Embassy Residence. In SVE/MC-3 through 8 Hillenbrand recorded Dulles' conversation with Norstad on tripartitism; the French naval command question; NATO integrated air defense; French atomic questions; IRBMs for Germany; and IRBMs for Greece and Turkey. (*Ibid.*)

¹ Document 150.

² See Document 98.

In response to Mr. Thurston's question as to whether the first convoy, assuming it got through, should be followed by others, the Secretary said it would seem a good idea to continue sending through convoys until some sort of a pattern were established, perhaps for a period of two weeks or so.³

[1 paragraph (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

The Secretary mentioned that a new paper had been received yesterday from the JCS,⁴ filling in some of the paragraphs in the Memorandum of Conclusions.

³In reviewing the day's events in a message to President Eisenhower, Dulles stated that Norstad believed this approach was "intelligent and practical." (Dulte 2 from London, February 4; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1197)

⁴Reference is to CM-289-59, February 2, which outlined measures that could be taken with regard to Berlin that would be detectable through intelligence channels, but would not create public alarm. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/2-259)

156. Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-9

London, February 4, 1959, 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
General Norstad
Ambassador Whitney
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Barbour
Mr. Greene
Mr. Thurston
Mr. Hillenbrand

The discussion of this subject started with a reference to the American convoy which was being held at the Marienborn checkpoint.¹

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1201. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand. The meeting was held at the Embassy Residence.

¹See Document 152.

General Norstad remarked that there was some reason for believing that a local Soviet interpretation of the inspection procedure was involved. The Secretary said that another interpretation might be that the Soviets wanted to stiffen up their position to create a precedent before turning over to the GDR. General Norstad said this would be more likely if it had occurred at the Berlin end of the autobahn. [8 lines of source text not declassified]

157. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, February 5, 1959, 2 a.m.

Secto 4. During meeting late this afternoon at FonOff Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd discussed principally Berlin and related problems. Lloyd said it seemed Western powers were in state of disarray in development their positions. However van Scherpenberg on Thursday¹ had given British impression that Federal Republic prepared to show some flexibility on such issues as frontiers and areas of limited armament. Lloyd noted that he opposed agreement on latter point if it involved discrimination against foreign troops, but thought that concept area of controlled limitation had merit.

FonSec outlined British view that meeting with Soviets should take place late April or early May, that note to Soviets should suggest specific time and place, and that further meeting 4 Foreign Ministers (presumably at time NATO meeting) would be necessary before Western substantive position formulated.

Secretary said problem seemed to fall into two parts: (a) Berlin and what Western powers should do if Soviets proceeded to hand control of access over to GDR; (b) what Western powers did about possible negotiations with Soviets and how and when they should try to bring these about. Re date of meeting he indicated it desirable to start before May 27. French, however, did not share this view. In conversation yesterday Secretary with Ambassador Alphand,² latter reiterated point

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-559. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Moscow, Bonn, Paris, and Berlin. The meeting was held at 5 p.m. on February 4 at the Foreign Office. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers; Dulles Daily Appointment Book)

¹ January 29.

² See Document 153.

that asking for meeting before May 27 would be sign of weakness. Secretary said he had agreed to accept either naming of date in note to Soviets, or merely saying that date and place should be mutually agreed, leaving specific arrangements to Ambassadors. Advantage of meeting with Soviets before May 27, Secretary continued, was that it might provide Soviets with way out of their extreme Berlin position if they wanted to find it. If meeting were held Western powers would face many problems, both substantive and procedural.

Re substance, Secretary said he thought Western position might be basically same as that of November 1955,³ though it could be embellished to some extent. Actually Western powers had never been able to get across merits their position. Molotov had clearly put them on defensive by misrepresenting proposals at outset. US was prepared to consider thinning out of forces, giving considerable weight to military views as to desirability, but agreed there should be no discrimination either as to foreign troops or as to country covered. Our thesis is that no nation today is strong enough to protect its own security; countries must help each other. If we admit that foreign troops in Germany are per se evil, then the whole concept would be undermined. Thinning out could therefore be considered, but not elimination of foreign forces. In general if discriminatory provisions were applied to Germany in any settlement, we would again reap consequences similar to those of Versailles. Some formulation which still kept portion of our forces in Germany and which was broader than Germany in application, preferably broader than Poland and Czechoslovakia as well, might be considered.

After Lloyd had stated that one of basic questions was whether Germans really wanted reunification or not, Secretary referred to letter he had just received from Adenauer.⁴ He described it as essentially devoted to lengthy argument as to why Western powers should not concentrate on reunification.

Secretary noted that reasoning was quite fallacious. Point emphasized that partition of Germany was not cause but effect of present tensions. It was scarcely necessary to emphasize this to Western powers. However Chancellor drew conclusion that because they allegedly held this view they were under great pressure to pay too big price for German reunification which theoretically would solve all world problems. Lloyd commented that, out of loyalty to Adenauer, Western powers had been saying, somewhat tongue in cheek, that division of Germany is basic cause of tensions. Secretary noted that Adenauer took position that we should almost drop German question and concentrate on disarma-

³ Documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting, October 27–November 16, 1955, is in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 632 ff.

⁴ Document 151.

ment. After our two recent experiences at Geneva we do not feel that this is a particularly fruitful field at present time. Attempt to shift entire attention to disarmament field would be futile. We could not get away from problem which Soviets were posing, making Germany and Berlin focal point.

Lloyd commented that this consonant with what Scherpenberg said. Latter said re reunification that all that was needed was a little light at end of long tunnel. However any neutralization formula was unacceptable, and most Germans saw this.

After Lloyd had noted that Scherpenberg had indicated some UN interest in Berlin might be useful Secretary said he believed that once troops of three Western powers left Berlin game would be up. At least people of West Berlin felt that way. He mentioned that Brandt was arriving in US next week, and would undoubtedly have effect on American opinion. Secretary said that talk about UN involved resort to vague formula. It was not corporate body with forces of its own. If agreement could be reached that UN would designate three Western powers to act for it in Berlin, that would be satisfactory, but Soviets could hardly accept. He added that one could conceivably find UN troops to replace Western forces. This would be difficult to arrange. Berliners might have sufficient confidence if these forces had adequate strength with clear mandate, but experience proved UN forces tended to disintegrate.

Lloyd said he regarded UN aspect as essentially move in game. He could not see it as effective, but idea that whole of Berlin might be under UN tutelage with guarantee of access had appeal. Soviets probably could not accept. During discussion possibility UN guarantee, Secretary noted that UN as such could not give guarantee.

Jebb who also present noted that under Article 51 of Charter members would be in position to take such action as deemed desirable. Secretary reiterated that he did not see any real practical substitute to having our troops in Berlin. Mikoyan had emphasized that East Berlin belonged to GDR and could not be included in any plan. Best to hope for was that Soviets would allow their Berlin proposals to lapse.

Lloyd then asked to hear latest thinking re contingency plans. He noted that in case Quemoy-Matsu British were able to help by focusing on issue improper use of force by Red Chinese. In recent instance problem was to make certain issue selected was one public would support.

Secretary noted that there had been some differences in US Government as to how to deal with problem. Some wanted to start right away with military preparations of far-reaching character. He was inclined to doubt wisdom of these, but would go along, if European Allies desired them. However paper threat to do this, especially if negotiations envisaged, would not work. He doubted that military measures should be

taken before May 27 which would disturb public, such as evacuation of dependents, partial mobilization in US, etc. This seemed premature until there had been some overt Soviet act. Secretary was inclined to think that Western powers might take some preliminary measures Soviet intelligence could pick up but which did not attract public attention.

Secretary stressed his belief that we should not accept substitution GDR officials for Soviets at check points. Such acceptance would constitute crossing Rubicon. Once we had done this, a whittling down process would begin moving inevitably towards acceptance authority of GDR. We must adhere to position that we are in Berlin as victors. If GDR allowed to exercise controls over us it would substantially undermine foundation our position.

Secretary noted that, under American concept, if it developed that Western attempt to send military truck through accompanied by scout car or by MPs were prevented, either by shooting or by obstruction then effort would be dropped at that point and we would move into second double-barrelled phase of political offensive and military preparation.

Lloyd said British had not yet made up their minds, but stressed that they could not see how Allies could have expanding military action without taking certain military preparatory measures. If you did not do latter Soviets would know West was bluffing. He felt air lift should be kept in reserve. If plane were shot down this would present clear issue.

Secretary said we did not like airlift concept. When Lloyd queried whether this applied to garrison air lift, Secretary noted that garrison had ample stocks for provisional period. If civil traffic were stopped, that would be another matter. Complete blockade would raise new issues. Situation in Berlin was different than in 1948, apart from Soviet jamming capabilities.

Lloyd said Scherpenberg expressed belief GDR would not want to stop Allied traffic initially, but would gradually convert into attempt to impose controls.

Secretary said it was important to see purpose behind Soviet moves. They wished minimize psychological effect of free Berlin. He had been impressed on visit last May with dynamic nature West sectors. This was contrast with unpopular regime in East Germany. Discussion Berlin ended with remark by Hoyer Millar who also present that one concession West might make would be to cut down propaganda and related activities in West Berlin.

Dulles

158. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

London, February 5, 1959, 2 a.m.

Dulte 3. Secretary, Macmillan and Lloyd, accompanied by small number advisers, discussed Berlin and Germany this evening. On short-term aspects there was agreement on many details. Macmillan, however, seemed more preoccupied with what he called long-term possibilities in Europe. On this Lloyd noted that his thinking was far ahead of that of Foreign Office. Re short-term, Secretary repeated views he had expressed earlier in day to Lloyd (Secto 4)¹ on drawing issue with Soviets at attempted substitution GDR for Soviet control over Allied access to Berlin, and successive military and political steps to be taken if GDR attempts physical obstruction of access. British did not disagree. There was casual reference to possibility "agent theory"² might one day be accepted if Soviets acknowledged it. Secretary expressed his conviction the Soviets do not want to go to war over Berlin issue but we must be careful not to put them into a position where they feel they have to.

Considerable discussion of timing and substance of conference with Soviets reflected agreement that there should be one, that it should be in session on May 27 and therefore should probably not start until early May, and that it should be preceded by conference of Western Four at Foreign Minister or even Heads of Government level at least as to UK, France and Germany. Macmillan felt this latter conference in turn should be preceded by his visiting Washington to meet President after his visits to Moscow, Bonn and Paris; middle March was a suggestion. Agreed April NATO meeting Foreign Ministers might provide opportunity for concerting position.

On substance, Macmillan felt that, although sweeping new proposals might not be ready before conferences envisaged, we should attempt to provide long-term context for our own thinking. His premises were that West Germans are not so keen on reunification as our present policy subsumes; [5 lines of source text not declassified]. Although, in the Macmillan thesis, the status quo in Europe may suit US and the West Germans and the Soviets, we should consider whether an inspected "thinning

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Secret. The meeting was held at 9 p.m. on February 4 at 10 Downing Street. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers, Dulles Daily Appointment Book) For another account of the meeting, see Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, pp. 587-588.

¹ Document 157.

² See Document 68.

out" of forces in Europe might not be an advantageous proposal, as long as it involved no discrimination nationality or force wise. He thought that if the area in Europe encompassed in such a scheme was large enough it might eventually lead to the sort of reunification of Germany with which we could live, especially if it would get the Red Army back into the Soviet Union. Macmillan argued further that his idea would, if it worked, be a major gain in detaching the Communist claws from a significant area, a detachment which in his view would have important political and ideological reverberance to the disadvantage of Moscow.

Secretary expressed skepticism that the military and political risks involved in these proposals would be acceptable. He and Merchant weighed the risks of attempting a "thinning out" based on the status quo and of acquiescing in the long-term division of Germany. There was no agreed conclusion on these "long-term" matters.

Dulles

**159. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State
Dulles and Prime Minister Macmillan**

SVE/MC-12

London, February 5, 1959.

At the suggestion of the Ambassador, I referred to stories indicating that the Prime Minister's projected trip to Moscow had been discussed in advance with me and approved by me. I said I thought that it was undesirable that his statement to the House should contain such implications since, as he knew, I had considerable reservations about the wisdom of the trip at this time. Also it would create embarrassments with our other allies. The Prime Minister said that he would merely state that we, with others, had been informed in advance and not indicate that we had been earlier informed in advance.¹

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1201. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles. The conversation was held at 10 Downing Street.

¹For text of Macmillan's statement to the House of Commons, February 5, see 599 House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, cols. 577–578.

With reference to the Berlin situation, I indicated that the program of contingency reaction which I had outlined represented in my opinion the most moderate program that the United States would find acceptable. I pointed out that it fell considerably short of what the Defense Department and the JCS had recommended. I said that if American public opinion got the impression that the Soviet Union had gained a considerable victory in Berlin as a result of pressures upon us by our allies, I thought the reaction on our European policy would be serious and it might affect our NATO posture.

John Foster Dulles²

²Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

160. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Paris, February 5, 1959, 9 p.m.

Dulte 4. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.
Dear Mr. President:

I have just arrived in Paris having concluded the London phase of my trip. Jock, Livie and I spent last evening with Macmillan and Lloyd and one or two of their advisers.¹ Then this morning I spent an hour at the Foreign Office at a meeting which included Ormsby-Gore, the UK head negotiator at the suspension of testing talks at Geneva.² The Government had called him back to London for this purpose.

Then we went over to 10 Downing Street and the Prime Minister joined our talks for an hour.³

The Prime Minister indicated that our Presidentially approved program for dealing with a Soviet turn-over of Berlin authority to the GDR

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1202. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

¹See Document 158.

²Dulles reported on the meeting at the Foreign Office in Sectos 8, 9, 10, and 11 from London, February 5. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1203)

³A more detailed report on the meeting at 10 Downing Street was transmitted in Secto 13 from Paris, February 5. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/2-559)

was generally acceptable. It was, however, easy to detect a disposition on their part to be prepared to recognize or deal with the GDR in this matter. Their general attitude in this whole affair is by our standards "softer".

Last night the Prime Minister talked in a rather rambling way about a possible program which would involve semi-permanent acceptance of the partition of Germany and then a thinning out of forces in the general Central European area.⁴

[Here follow two paragraphs on the suspension of nuclear testing.]

With respect to Harold's "solitary pilgrimage" to Moscow some of the London papers have been giving the impression that we had been consulted and had approved of this trip and there were indications that Macmillan might so indicate in his statement this afternoon to the House. I asked him not to do this pointing out that we had of course had considerable reservations about the wisdom and timeliness of the trip. Also that it would be embarrassing in our relations with the French and Germans to indicate that we had had a special rank in consultation ahead of them. So the Prime Minister promised he would merely state that we among others had been informed in advance.⁵

In general I found this talk with Harold less satisfactory than our usual talks. He seemed to be preoccupied with other matters, perhaps the electoral situation, and he was vague and rambling and indecisive.

Tomorrow I shall be meeting with the great General and probably encounter plenty of decisiveness, although perhaps not precisely the kind we would like.

Faithfully yours,
Foster

Dulles

⁴ See Document 158.

⁵ See Document 159.

161. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Paris, February 6, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 14. Discussion this morning at FonOff between Secretary and Couve de Murville devoted largely to Berlin and related problems. Secretary noted that preliminary exchange of views at this time would be useful to prevent hardening of Allied positions in different directions. He felt gravity of move by Soviet Union as threat to security of German Government and free world should not be minimized. He had impression that thinking of Western Powers was running along parallel lines but wanted to confirm this. Perhaps there was some difference in approach by UK and FedRep.

Secretary analyzed problem facing Western powers along lines para 3 Secto 4 from London.¹ Couve said he agreed West should not underestimate gravity of issues faced. He pointed out that public opinion tended to expect that somehow arrangements would be made and that problem would dissolve in air. This was dangerous state of mind. He did not know why Soviets had raised Berlin problem as they had, but saw nothing since end of November indicating any basic change in intention to turn responsibilities over to GDR.

Re contingency plans, Couve said Western powers must start from principle they cannot accept interference their communications to Berlin either by air or land. This should be affirmed clearly. When May 27 arrived they would have to see what best course of action would be, whether it better to resort to airlift or to insistence on land access. However, decision must be taken to do whatever necessary to maintain Western communications. Secretary then outlined in detail US views (along lines reported Secto 4) on dealing with problem presented by Soviets' handing over control of access to GDR.

Couve said that in general French agreed with US approach. Secretary noted he had discussed with Macmillan and Lloyd.² They likewise had agreed in general but appeared more disposed than US to accept substitution GDR officials for Soviets. Secretary stressed his belief that acceptance such substitution would be tantamount to abandoning basic principle that our victor's rights in Berlin cannot be handed over by

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-659. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Berlin, and Geneva. The meeting was held at 10 a.m. at the Quai d'Orsay with Dulles, Houghton, Lyon, Merchant, Hillenbrand, and Greene participating on the U.S. side. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers, Dulles Daily Appointment Book)

¹ Document 157.

² See Documents 157 and 158.

Soviets to vanquished. Western powers do not allow either GDR or FedRep to exercise controls over their rights re Berlin. At time of Paris Agreements, when certain aspects of sovereignty restored to FedRep, three powers reserved their rights re Berlin. This was important question of principle. Once we conceded that Soviets could turn over their obligations to GDR, we could not prevent creeping imposition of controls.

Couve agreed it was essential Western powers retain rights deriving from German surrender. Integral part of these rights in Berlin was freedom of communications with city. We cannot concede that Soviets could give up their responsibilities. Whether they could be "adapted" was another problem. Secretary commented that if Soviets wanted to specify GDR officials as their agents that could be discussed and Couve agreed. Secretary stressed his belief that Western powers could exert real pressure on Soviet Union by bringing matter to Security Council or special session of General Assembly. Soviets now had considerable investment in respectability. Placing them in position where it clearly demonstrable they had violated agreements could have considerable impact.

As to precise conduct at checkpoints if GDR officials present, Secretary explained we proposed only to take sufficient action to prove identity of vehicles as Allied and not German. In response to query, Secretary indicated British were in agreement but would probably again raise question of permitting extensions by GDR officials such as allowing placing of time stamp on movement orders. Secretary noted that at end of conversation with Macmillan he had asked whether there was agreement on course of action, so that he could confidently discuss along the same lines with French and FedRep. Prime Minister had said yes, but Secretary could not be sure there would not be some subsequent slippage.

Re Macmillan visit to Moscow, Secretary said Prime Minister had not discussed with him in any respect what he would do there other than, as already publicly stated, to attempt reconnaissance but not conduct of negotiations. Couve commented that Macmillan probably had no plan which he was going to propose to Soviets. Secretary said he doubted whether British had thought position through but that Macmillan visit would make British public opinion happy.

Couve raised point German preoccupation with inclusion of disarmament on agenda of possible conference with Soviets. He recalled that December 31 note³ had said meeting should discuss German problems. Couve doubted wisdom inclusion disarmament since if meeting not

³ See Document 118.

limited specifically to German question Soviets would contend there was no reason why it should be four power meeting and would certainly demand parity. Moreover, discussion of disarmament might be embarrassing to West which not in full agreement re Geneva test suspension talks. Secretary noted that considerable portion of talks in London had been devoted to status of Geneva Conference on nuclear tests. He explained US position on veto along lines Secto 9 from London.⁴

Secretary referred to message he had had from Adenauer, describing it in same general terms as to Lloyd (reported Secto 4). Secretary added that if certain problems re Germany had to be discussed in context of disarmament, conference on surprise attack could be reconvened to provide that context.⁵ He agreed that if a meeting of Foreign Ministers were to discuss disarmament, serious problems re composition would be raised.

Couve agreed with Secretary's analysis of Adenauer position on disarmament. He said Chancellor's belief that agreement on disarmament would lead to world détente within framework of which solution to all other problems could be found was not realistic. Secretary stated that, in his opinion, we could not make much headway in disarmament field until at least some political problems had been solved. As long as these remained unsolved, continuance of tensions would require maintenance of armaments.

Secretary referred to discussion London re possibility meeting of four Foreign Ministers in Paris March 15-19 to agree on substance of Western position for conference with Soviets. Secretary noted dates in question acceptable to US. Couve said such meeting could be envisaged, but frankly question of whether three or four Foreign Ministers should meet created difficulty for French. He believed it was good to stick to idea that basic responsibility for Berlin was that of three powers. Secretary suggested that perhaps procedure could be followed as during December⁶ meeting with tripartite meeting perhaps on March 15 followed by quadripartite meeting following day. Couve said he believed this could be worked out.

In response to query by Secretary as to whether French had any thought on substance of Western position which they wished to divulge, Couve said French had no precise ideas as yet. Arriving at substantive position would be hardest task Western powers faced. Secretary commented that he supposed we should start with November 1955 pro-

⁴ Secto 9, February 5, reported in detail on Dulles' conversation with the British on nuclear test negotiations. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1203)

⁵ Documentation on the surprise attack conference, November 10-December 18, 1958, is scheduled for publication in the compilation on disarmament in volume III.

⁶ See Documents 105-109.

posals. These had been presented as rather complicated package,⁷ in fact so complicated nobody had really ever understood them. However, there was much good in these proposals which now needed to be polished up and given a new look. Perhaps they could be supplemented in some respects. Couve said that presumably both sides would start from previous positions, with Soviets insisting that reunification was matter solely for discussion between two German states and favoring some sort of disengagement. It was unlikely that either side would change much. Obviously, no agreement with Soviets would be attainable under these circumstances. If no such agreement on general solution were possible, Couve continued, then Western powers must find some sort of *modus vivendi*. If reunification impossible to achieve at present time, then solution must be sought which would enable us to get through next few years.

Secretary said he did not think we were going to bring about reunification of Germany at conference. He was not sure, despite considerable talk on subject, that there was much real eagerness for reunification. Even in Germany there were factors such as possibility of an increased socialist strength which reduced enthusiasm. Secretary and Couve ended with agreement on note that FedRep should be less fearful of arrangements which would permit exercise of its influence over East Germany, and that there was no need for inferiority complex vis-à-vis GDR.

Discussion re specific issues raised Tosec 15 being reported separate cable.⁸

Dulles

⁷ For documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 537 ff.

⁸ Tosec 15, February 5, transmitted the draft text of a reply to the Soviet note of January 10 that had been agreed to by the Four-Power Working Group at Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 662.001/2–559) Secto 19, February 6, noted that Dulles and Couve de Murville had briefly discussed and transmitted several suggestions for revising the text. (*Ibid.*, 110.11–DU/2–659)

162. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Paris, February 6, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 17. Secretary's talk with President de Gaulle, at which President was accompanied by Prime Minister Debre, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, Joxe and de Courcel, opened with suggestion by Secretary that Couve de Murville might wish to inform de Gaulle of matters discussed at meeting terminated one-half hour previously at Foreign Office.¹

Foreign Ministers outlined agreements reached on contingency planning, possible conference with Soviets and preparatory meetings which would have to be held before conference, and possible agenda for meeting with Soviets.

With reference to Berlin contingency planning, de Gaulle indicated he was entirely in agreement that we could not permit Soviets to turn over to vanquished (GDR Germans) rights which we had obtained as victors in Germany and that we should meet any attempt to interfere with our communications with Berlin with force.

Secretary went into more detail in this connection indicating that if Allied convoy was stopped by GDR it should be prepared to identify itself but go no farther in complying with GDR request. If GDR then attempted impede our access with roadblocks, blown bridges, or by other forceful means, we should take matter to UN.

At this point both de Gaulle and Prime Minister seriously questioned advisability of taking matter to UN before a) either resorting to force ourselves or b) mounting small air lift.

Debre made strong point that we should immediately go into air operation since it would be psychologically easier to do this at early juncture than later.

Secretary explained his fear that such a step might whittle away our determination to force our way on land, since public opinion might reach conclusion that as we were carrying along satisfactorily by air lift there would be no need to resort to force.

De Gaulle said matter is as simple as this: once Allied convoy in question had established identification to GDR it should brook no

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/2-659. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections. Dulles was accompanied by Houghton, Merchant, and Lyon. President de Gaulle and Dulles also discussed French naval forces in the Mediterranean and tripartite consultations. (Sectos 16 and 26, February 6 and 8; *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1203)

¹ See Document 161.

hindrance. He asked whether we would be prepared to permit GDR to stamp identification documents on pretext perhaps that this necessary for clearance through next security check point.

Secretary said we would not accept that. De Gaulle concurred, commenting that time stamp not necessary since notice could be telephoned to next checkpoint.

De Gaulle indicated that we must be clear on these little details for they could lead to considerable trouble later.

President de Gaulle did not appear to take to idea of having to wait while matter was taken through Security Council and possibly General Assembly, believing that UN would probably appoint commission, send Hammarskjold to investigate on spot, authorize Hammarskjold to assume responsibility for supplying and administering Berlin. Thus we would be faced with question of Allied rights in Berlin being substituted by UN.

Secretary explained that we could take temperature of how matter likely be received in GA and if it appeared it would go as President de Gaulle feared then Secretary would not be prepared to take matter to GA.

Secretary also explained that one reason for not forcing issue of passage immediately was that our military need to make certain preparations for such an operation. They would like to begin making preparations even now, but on political level we do not consider this advisable, therefore a certain time will be required from moment when we have ascertained that GDR prepared to employ force to hinder our passage until we are ready ourselves to use effective counter-force.

Secretary also indicated that such delay would enable us to build up public opinion and demonstrate clearly to UN and world at large, etc. that our rights were being interfered with and we were merely taking only justifiable measures.

Debre pointed out his view that it would be difficult to obtain 2/3 majority in Assembly approving Allies maintaining position in Berlin by force. He emphasized danger of position of our communication with our garrisons in Berlin becoming frozen unless some sort of air supply were quickly established.

Secretary pointed out that situation quite different from 1948 since our Berlin garrisons now have adequate supplies for six months and blockade would presumably apply only to our garrisons and not as in 1948 to Berlin as whole.

Secretary emphasized his belief that we might succeed in obtaining very strong vote our favor in GA, such as we did with respect to Hungary.

Debre countered this by saying situation quite different from Hungary for now Soviets have maneuvered themselves into position of appearing to be offering something to East Germans.

Secretary said he was quite prepared thoroughly to review policy of taking matter to Assembly if it appeared there would be an adverse vote, as he did not believe that our clearly established rights should be permitted to be dependent on UN approval.

Secretary added that at beginning of his talk with Macmillan,² British had seemed inclined to willingness provide GDR officials more than identification of vehicles and were perhaps slightly soft about getting into a position which could be interpreted as de facto recognition of GDR

Debre insisted that we should obtain very clear agreement on this primary principle with British.

Secretary felt that by end of his discussions with Macmillan, British were prepared to accept Secretary's contentions and had so indicated. Secretary did not feel however that Macmillan was so solid that there might not be some slippage in future.

Foreign Minister pointed out that customary air traffic would be in operation even though there was not an airlift.

Subject of possible conference with Soviets next discussed and agreement reached that in our notes to Moscow we would not propose date prior to May 27, but that if Soviets suggested meeting before that date we were quite prepared to go along.

Foreign Minister said he feared that Macmillan, who anxious for early meeting, would discuss matter of dates on his forthcoming trip to Moscow.

Agenda for possible conference discussed next and Secretary indicated that prior to his departure from Washington he had received a letter from Adenauer³ suggesting that subject disarmament should be included.

Foreign Minister indicated that FRG [Fr?] opposed to this for reasons outlined in earlier conversation, to wit Soviets would probably drag China in and also Western Allies did not have agreed position on disarmament.

De Gaulle said one must admit that introduction of disarmament would cause trouble, but at same time if we hoped to accomplish anything with conference it would be necessary to touch on this subject. De

² See Document 158.

³ Document 151.

Gaulle then inquired whether Secretary had any suggestions as to how something constructive might be accomplished in meeting with Soviets.

Secretary explained that he was not opposed to disarmament entirely for reasons outlined here by Foreign Minister, but more because as Foreign Minister had explained in earlier conversation it would remove conference from jurisdiction of four nations having responsibility for Germany. He added however that he did not exclude possibility that in such a conference we would have to give consideration to various suggestions such as thinning out of forces, Rapacki Plan,⁴ disarmament in Eastern Europe, etc., all of which was quite different from general disarmament.

At this point Debre interjected that we should bear in mind that Soviets' primary objective was to get Allies out of Berlin.

Secretary agreed, emphasizing that people of Berlin would feel lost if we removed our troops and he questioned in any event value of UN guarantees.

In answer to de Gaulle's inquiry as to how far Secretary thought Soviets were prepared to go, Secretary indicated that he thought Soviets were not genuinely desirous of solving Berlin and German question. They created difficulty in Berlin, they merely wished to try to force us to recognize GDR and to stir up trouble for their own advantage.

Secretary indicated however he felt that we should have to hold a conference to show to the world that we were reasonable people and prepared to discuss these problems, but he did not feel that we would at this juncture settle the German problem. Secretary continued that he thought point of departure could for such a meeting be revision of our proposals at the Geneva Conference of 1955 which were in themselves good proposals, but were too complicated to be understood by public, had been twisted by Molotov, etc. However, they had much merit and would have to be put in simpler form in which their merits would be more apparent to public.

President de Gaulle was particularly anxious to know whether Secretary had any formula which went beyond merely satisfying public and contained possibility of approaching solution to German problem.

Secretary explained that he had not at this juncture and that while most people paid lip service to unification, he was not certain how many really wanted it, including Federal Republic itself. Secretary indicated that when he had met President de Gaulle in 1947⁵ President had not been strong advocate for German reunification.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 43.

⁵ For a report on Dulles' conversation with de Gaulle on December 6, 1947, see *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. II, pp. 793–794.

De Gaulle said that this was the case in 1947 and it was so today, first because of the situation in France, and second because of the fear which would be created among all people, not governments, people of Eastern Europe, Poles, Czechs, etc., at unified Germany.

Secretary indicated that he did think Federal Republic, which was more vigorous and had greater attraction for German people as flow of refugees from East indicated, could establish contacts with GDR and take other steps which would generally render GDR more healthy place, but that Federal Republic had for one reason or another acted rather stuffily in this matter.

President de Gaulle concurred and thought that it might be possible to push forward in matters of transport, post, telegraph, railroads, canals, etc. which would bring about slight changes and closer rapprochement between East and West Germany. He next inquired what the Secretary's views were on the Oder-Neisse frontier.

Secretary indicated that in Adenauer letter referred to above, Chancellor had indicated that he was prepared to make statement on that subject, though he did not know precisely what the Chancellor had in mind.

When Foreign Minister raised question of March preparatory meeting of Foreign Ministers taking place to prepare for conference, President de Gaulle indicated he would welcome such meeting here and counseled that it should not be a hurried meeting; plenty of time should be allowed for deliberation and even if it were necessary to interrupt it, it should be renewed and the subjects should be studied in calmness and without pressure.

Debre proposed that prior meeting be held between US, UK and France and that Germans should be invited following that to consult. This would in his opinion make our position stronger as the nations responsible for Germany in the public mind.

Secretary indicated he accepted this procedure, particularly on matters dealing with Berlin inasmuch as we had reserved our rights on Berlin matters when we had transferred to Federal Republic other attributes of sovereignty.

Ambassador Whitney authorized in his discretion to convey appropriate portions of foregoing to Lloyd.

Dulles

163. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Paris, February 6, 1959, 9 p.m.

Dulte 8. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President:

We had a surprisingly good day here with the French. We first met with Couve de Murville at the Quai d'Orsay.¹ I outlined our general thinking about handling the Berlin situation and my views seemed to coincide largely with those of the French. Then we went to the Elysee and met with General de Gaulle, Prime Minister Debre and Couve.² With only Debre, Couve and Joxe, we were four on the side and sat around informally in chairs in the living-room instead of sitting across a table. The atmosphere was relaxed and the General seemed to be in good spirits. We developed again our German thesis and found acceptance. The French, unlike the U.K., seemed quite specific that we could not accept a substitution of the GDR for the Soviet Union in the exercise of our reserved rights in Berlin as victors in the war. I emphasized that we could not permit roles to be reversed and the vanquished in effect rule the victors. This appealed to the General and was strongly reinforced by Couve. The French would, I think, be willing immediately on May 27th or as soon as Soviet turnover is an accomplished fact to attempt use force to go through. I doubt whether they have thought this out and realize all the implications. In any event they accepted my view that though we should at that time begin military preparations we should not actually move until we had made a final effort to mobilize world opinion against the Soviets on the basis of not mere threats but such actual deeds as blowing up bridges, creating roadblocks and the like. There was a slight difference of opinion as to the desirability at this juncture of going to the United Nations. The French are pretty gun shy about the United Nations. I said of course we would not advocate going unless we felt confident that we could get a solid vote to support our position. De Gaulle is fearful that the General Assembly would be in a mood to compromise and might, for example, call on Hammarskjold to negotiate a settlement. I think there is no doubt but what there is ground for apprehension on this score and we would have to make a careful count of votes before going to the General Assembly.

[Here follow two paragraphs on the French fleet and tripartitism; see volume VII, Part 2, Document 95.]

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1202. Secret.

¹ See Document 161.

² See Document 162.

This afternoon I had a meeting with Spaak.³ I brought him pretty well up to date as to our thinking. He himself has been doing quite a lot of thinking, particularly about the German problem as a whole. He has not come up with anything very new or brilliant but I urged him to continue studying the matter as we needed his kind of mind applied to this problem and he had some advantages over governments.

Spaak had been thinking in terms of our accepting a substitution of the GDR for the Soviet Union and only react if thereafter they imposed more severe restrictions. However, when I explained to him the theory of our position, he said that he had not thought of this and was inclined to agree.

Tomorrow morning I go on to Bonn. There seems to be agreement both in London and in Paris that the Chancellor is pretty much out of touch with his advisers and with current developments, and both the British and the French and Spaak are hopeful that I may be able to bring him to see possibilities in the situation to which he is now blind. However, these possibilities are not so brilliant that I feel confident that they have much penetrating power. As Spaak said, a great deal is to be said in favor of the status quo. Almost any change would be a change for the worse and would open up serious problems. I do not think, however, nor does he, that that is a position which we can take publicly and command the support of public opinion.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

Dulles

³ A memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Spaak, SVE/MC-13, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1198.

164. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)

Bonn, February 7, 1959.

The Chief of Protocol, von Braun, came to fetch us, and we arrived at the Palais Schaumburg at four o'clock. Foster, Livie¹ and myself went into the Chancellor's office for a private meeting with von Brentano and himself, Weber acting as interpreter. The Chancellor started immediately on the proposed Macmillan trip to Moscow, saying it had, of course, to be accepted as a *fait accompli*, but he had serious apprehensions as to its consequences. He referred to notes covering a conversation with Kit Steel at the time the latter delivered Macmillan's letter on the subject. Steel had, in effect, remarked on the ultimate necessity of negotiations between the GDR and Federal Republic and recognition of the GDR. Since Adenauer considered Steel a thoroughly trained and loyal diplomat, he could not but think he was faithfully expressing views held by his Foreign Office. The Chancellor thought he would write to Macmillan and ask for an explanation.

Dulles told him that President Eisenhower and himself both were skeptical over the potential usefulness of Macmillan's visit to the Soviet Union, and fearful of even his most carefully guarded comments being misconstrued. However, there was nothing to be done about it, and one must hope for the best. The Chancellor thought the primary motive of the trip was to gather prestige for domestic election application in England.

Foster outlined the substance of his talks in London and Paris where he had emphasized the firmness of the American position on Berlin.

[Here follows unrelated material.]

Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. For another account of this meeting and the one that followed, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 475–481. A German memorandum of this meeting, 115–12/59, prepared by Weber, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1199.

¹ Livingston Merchant.

165. Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-20

Bonn, February 7, 1959, 4:30-6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
 Ambassador Bruce
 Mr. Merchant
 Mr. Berding
 Mr. Hillenbrand
 Mr. Tyler
 Mr. Klein

Germany

Chancellor Adenauer
 For. Min. von Brentano
 State Secretary Globke
 State Secretary van Scherpenberg
 State Secretary von Eckardt
 Dep. State Secretary Dittmann
 Dr. Ruete
 Herr Weber

The Chancellor thanked the Secretary for coming to see him and said now that the Secretary had been to London and Paris he would like to get his overall impression of the situation.

The Secretary said that in London and Paris the discussions followed two principal lines—the technical problems to meet the Soviet threat to Berlin, and the possibility of having discussions with the Soviet Union on the broader German problem, including reunification and European Security.

In his talks in London and Paris, the Secretary said he had expressed the view that we could not accept the substitution of the GDR for the Soviet Union in clearing our military traffic to and from Berlin. The French accepted this view. The British did so haltingly. M. Spaak apparently had not been thinking along these lines, but after his talk with the Secretary seemed convinced of the correctness of this view. The Secretary had pointed out that as far as the East Germans were concerned our relationship to them in Berlin was as victors who had won certain rights and it would be intolerable to permit defeated East Germans, with whom we have no treaty relations and do not recognize, to exercise control over our troops who are in Berlin by virtue of rights we won in the war.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1199. Drafted by Klein and approved by Greene on February 26. The meeting was held at Schaumburg Palace. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 24 from Bonn, February 8. (*Ibid.*, CF 1203) For another account of this conversation and the private meeting that preceded it, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 475-481. A briefing paper, drafted by Merchant on February 7, from which Secretary Dulles spoke, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1199)

The Secretary said it was his view that while we might be prepared to identify our traffic to the East Germans, we would not permit them to stamp our documents or exercise the right of inspection over our traffic. However, if any effort were made to prevent our passage either by destroying bridges, erecting road blocks or using force, that would create a grave situation which would justify serious military preparations. In such an event, we might take the matter to the United Nations, but only if we were certain of overwhelming support for our position in the United Nations, and provided that such an approach would not bog down the measures we intended to take.

Insofar as a meeting with the Soviet Union was concerned, the Secretary said he found differences between the British and the French concerning the date for such a meeting. Prime Minister Macmillan was extremely anxious to have such a meeting in advance of May 27 to insure that we would be conferring on that date. The French, however, felt that if the West proposed that such a meeting take place prior to May 27, the Soviets would interpret this as a sign of weakness and assume we were prepared to make concessions to forestall the threatened Soviet measures.

The Secretary said the British and French accepted his compromise proposal that such a meeting take place at a time and place mutually acceptable to the Four Powers. This would force the Soviet Union to share with us the responsibility for setting the date for the meeting and obviate the danger envisaged by the French.

Turning to the question of the substantive matters to be discussed at a meeting with the Soviet Union, the Secretary said it was generally assumed that the subject for such a meeting would be Germany. However, there probably would not be a specific agenda so that all sides would be free to introduce any aspect of the problem. With reference to specific proposals which the West might make, the Secretary said he found general agreement in London and Paris that these should be based on those which we tabled at the November 1955 Conference. These proposals were sound then; they are sound now. The difficulty then was that they were too complicated and never adequately presented. They now needed a new setting, perhaps with a greater emphasis on the aspects of a German peace treaty, and less exclusive concern with the problem of reunification.

The Secretary went on to say there sometimes is a tendency on the part of the Western Powers to minimize or not adequately appraise the achievements obtained in West Germany since the end of the war, particularly under the leadership of Chancellor Adenauer. Actually these achievements have been tremendous. For the first time in history, Germany has genuinely friendly relations with France. Great progress has been made in European military, economic and even to some degree,

political integration, i.e., NATO, WEU, Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, Common Market. These represent immense gains and are precisely what the Soviet Union wants destroyed. It is therefore important not to give the Soviet Union or public opinion the impression that we are prepared to buy reunification at a price requiring the sacrifice of these gains, which would result in leaving Germany alone in Central Europe in a position to play the East against the West. The Secretary added he thought we could and should show at a conference that these gains can be preserved with a reunified Germany without endangering the Soviet Union. In fact, as the United States sees it, this would be one of the principal purposes of our meeting with the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said he himself did not expect the Soviet Union to agree to any measures which did not involve as a probable and necessary consequence the collapse of the structure of European integration. But the task of the Western Powers, he said, was to make clear to the world that the Soviet Union was responsible for the failure to reach agreement and that the Western Powers are prepared to pursue a sound and constructive course that carries no threat to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the Federal Republic would contribute to that presentation along the lines suggested in the Chancellor's recent message to the Secretary¹ (i.e., establishment of German relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and a statement on the Oder-Neisse problem) and by expanding de facto relations with the GDR to make the attractive influence of the Federal Republic felt in the Soviet Zone.

The Secretary stressed that although these ideas had been generally accepted by the British, the French and M. Spaak, they were still tentative. He therefore thought it might be useful to hold a Western Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris, possibly in mid-March, to develop the Western position more concretely. To emphasize Four Power responsibility with the Soviet Union on the solution of the German question, he thought it might be desirable for the Three Foreign Ministers to meet once as such and have this followed by a Four Power Foreign Ministers' meeting, with the Federal Republic participating fully. To prepare for these meetings, the Secretary said he supposed a Four Power Working Group of technical experts would prepare a report for the Ministers to examine.

The Secretary cautioned that there was no reason to expect that the Soviet Union would accept a meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level for the purpose and at the time we are suggesting. There were some indications that the Soviet Union would rather have a meeting at the Heads of Government level. That position may in part reflect the fact that Mr.

¹ Document 151.

Gromyko does not have the same authority or discretion as Western Foreign Ministers. But this, he remarked, was only speculative. The Secretary said he expected Mr. Macmillan would probably make soundings on this question while in Moscow, although the Secretary emphasized that the United States had not authorized or encouraged Mr. Macmillan to do so.

The Chancellor expressed his gratitude for the Secretary's frank comments and said he had some observations of his own to make. Recently, he said, the German Ambassador in Moscow had two talks with Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Mikoyan which in themselves were not important. However, they did indicate that thus far there had been no softening in the Soviet position. (He said he would give Ambassador Bruce copies of Ambassador Kroll's reports for the Secretary's use.)²

The Chancellor then replied to the Secretary's earlier remark that in formulating the Western position it seemed desirable to follow the basic lines of November 1955 with some emphasis on the peace treaty question. If this were done, the Chancellor observed, the question would inevitably be raised with whom such a treaty would be concluded.

The Chancellor said he fully agreed with the Secretary that reunification should not be bought at the price of freedom and the national and international gains of the last decade. Moreover, he was certain this was the feeling of the overwhelming majority of the German people, including the majority of those who voted for the SPD in 1957.

The Chancellor then made several remarks about the views of George Kennan.³ He said he was astounded by the unrealistic proposals which Kennan was putting forth and surprised at the amount of public attention they seemed to command. (The Secretary remarked that they seemed to command greater attention in Germany than in the United States.)

The Chancellor then turned to the Secretary's suggestion concerning the possibility of expanding West Germany's *de facto* relations with the Soviet Zone. On this score, the Chancellor insisted, the Federal Republic had done as much as it could, but there was always the question of the barriers raised by the GDR. The Federal Government, for example, had always given the Evangelical and Catholic Churches in the Soviet Zone its fullest support since they represented the strongest bulwarks against Communism. But now the Churches' position in the

² Copies of the telegrams that summarized meetings on February 2 and 4 were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1242 from Bonn, February 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1359) Ambassador Thompson transmitted a summary of the February 2 conversation that Kroll had given him in telegram 1534 from Moscow, February 3. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/2-359)

³ See footnote 1, Document 82.

Zone had become so precarious it was no longer certain how much they could do. The Federal Government also tried to further personal contacts between the peoples of both parts of Germany, but the East Zone passport and travel regulations were making it impossible even for families to get together.

At this point, the Chancellor turned to the subject of security. He said that in the draft reply to the Soviet note of January 10 worked out by the Working Group in Washington,⁴ he noted references to "peace in Europe" and "peace in the world". The two concepts, he said, were inseparable, for there could be no peace in Europe without peace in the world. Unfortunately, however, the myriad regional security plans of the Rapacki type, which were being tossed about in many quarters, created considerable confusion and sight was lost of the more important considerations. The fact of the matter is, the Chancellor said, there can be no peace until there is nuclear disarmament. Therefore, it was essential for the West to make it clear that until disarmament was a distinct possibility, it would do nothing to weaken Germany's ties with the West or upset NATO and European integration.

The Chancellor then said he wanted to speak about the Soviet aims and objectives as he saw them. The Soviets, he said, still adhere to their old thesis that Capitalism is doomed and Communism, under Soviet leadership, will dominate the world. The only real obstacle to the Soviet Union's achieving this goal is the United States. Therefore, one had to expect that the Soviets would try to isolate and destroy the United States. The Chancellor brushed aside Khrushchev's claims of Soviet economic achievements as "grossly exaggerated". However, he added, it was his opinion that one of the principal reasons the Soviet Union wanted to undermine European integration and get control of Germany's economic potential was to strengthen its position in its economic war against the United States.

The Chancellor dismissed talk about Soviet fears of Germany and German rearmament as sheer nonsense. He said both Khrushchev and Mikoyan told him personally that there were only two real powers in the world today—the Soviet Union and the United States. But as long as the United States was as strong as the Soviet Union in the nuclear field, the Chancellor said he felt there probably would not be an all-out war. However, on the other hand, any indication of a breakdown in Western unity would be certain to encourage the Soviets to follow a more provocative policy. The Chancellor therefore hoped that in the future the Western Powers would do everything possible to present an unshakable united front.

⁴See Document 176.

At this point the Chancellor said Foreign Minister Brentano had some remarks to make, which he did along the following lines: He said he was in complete agreement with the Secretary on the nature of the tasks ahead. There was no harm in repeating sound proposals. They merely had to be pulled together, polished and presented in a more comprehensible form for the man in the street. The alleged Soviet initiatives were merely a repetition of unacceptable proposals. The Foreign Minister went on to say that he hoped the Western Powers would include their London disarmament proposal in the package they finally present.⁵

At this point the Chancellor interjected that he hoped the disarmament negotiations could be resumed soon but preferably "without the cooperation of Mr. Stassen".⁶ Brentano then continued. He said as far as the German Government was concerned, there were certain limits in negotiations beyond which it could not be expected to go. He said the Federal Government, for example, could not accept proposals requiring it to give up its ties with the West. Nor could it be expected to accept the Soviet Union's peace treaty proposals which would give the Soviet Union the right of intervention.

With regard to Berlin, the Foreign Minister wanted to make these observations: the Berlin problem cannot be solved in isolation. It had to be dealt with in a broader context. However, if a conference were arranged to discuss the broader German problem, an interim solution might possibly be found; but any solution to be acceptable would have to protect the basic rights of Berlin. It was admittedly too early to try to envisage how negotiations might develop. But, as the Secretary indicated, it was important to make clear to the Soviet Union that any attempt by it to tamper with Berlin on a unilateral basis would be met by the resistance of the free world.

Returning to the Chancellor's earlier question—with whom a German peace treaty would be signed—the Secretary said it would have to be a reunified Germany.

As far as Soviet policy was concerned, the Secretary remarked that the Chancellor's thesis was generally accepted in the United States. The Secretary said we recognize that the Soviet Union considers the United States its primary enemy and ultimate target. Its purpose is to encircle the United States, picking up one country after another, adding to its economic strength and military capability so that it would ultimately be in a position to strangle us. Therefore, West Germany with its great in-

⁵ Not further identified

⁶ Harold Stassen was President Eisenhower's special assistant for disarmament until February 1958.

dustrial potential is the great prize in Europe just as Japan is its target in Asia. It is because the United States realized this that it abandoned its traditional policy and made collective security arrangements with almost fifty countries.

Referring to the Chancellor's recent letter to him, the Secretary said the Chancellor had indicated that he was afraid some people in the United States and the United Kingdom felt that if reunification could be accomplished on Soviet terms, then the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union could be resolved. This, the Secretary said emphatically, was not the thinking of responsible people in the United States. Recalling his recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,⁷ the Secretary said the Soviets talk about ending the cold war but they make no concrete proposals. The only proposals they make are calculated to help them win the cold war. And the majority of American public agrees with this view.

The problem, the Secretary said, is not one of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union. That is difficult at this time. Our main problem is to keep the support of free world opinion, by indicating our willingness to do what is decent and fair and demonstrating that the reason the cold war continues is that the Soviets will not make or keep agreements unless these help them win the cold war. The nuclear test talks now going on in Geneva⁸ have demonstrated this. The Soviet Union has continually talked about wanting to help humanity by ending nuclear tests and has tried to create the impression that it is willing to accept the principle of controls. But when confronted with concrete proposals, this turned out to be nothing but sham.

The Secretary said he felt the handling of the Geneva meeting on nuclear testing had been sound. The outcome could have been foreseen. However, the Secretary added, it would have been unfortunate from a public opinion point of view to have refused to meet with the Soviet Union. Moreover, by negotiating with them, they have amply demonstrated their bad faith.

There was no question, the Secretary said, but that the West had a strong case to make. The principal job, however, was to marshal the case effectively.

The Chancellor agreed, and remarked that it was too bad NATO had not proved to be a more effective instrument for this purpose. The Secretary then commented the truth was that many governments did

⁷ For text of Dulles' statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 16, 1959, pp. 219-222.

⁸ Documentation on the three-power conference on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons' tests, which reassembled at Geneva on January 5, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

not want to say unkind things about the Soviet Union. That, however, was a weakness of which he, the Secretary, could not be accused—and the Chancellor added nor could he.

The meeting concluded on this note, and it was agreed that the Chancellor and the Secretary would meet again the following morning.

166. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Bonn, February 7, 1959, 10 p.m.

Dulte 9. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President:

We left Paris this morning. Couve de Murville was at the airport to see me off and we had a brief private talk.¹ He indicated that the only significant point of difference between us seemed to be in the fact that the French believed that if there was any interference with our access to Berlin, we should instantly move with military force rather than go through the preparatory stage which we envisage. Couve said he recalled 1936 and the failure then to react promptly when Hitler moved into the demilitarized area of Germany. He said then the military people had felt that they could not act without prior mobilization and like measures, but Couve said they had been wrong. So now the French are disposed to act at once but without any preliminary steps such as total or partial mobilization, evacuation of dependents, etc.

Perhaps their zeal is due to the fact that it is we rather than they who would have to make most of the military effort as, I understand, they have very little military potential left in Germany.

We arrived at the Wahn airport about noon and the Chancellor, von Brentano and others were there to meet me. The Chancellor and I drove back together to Bonn, and since it is a drive of about an hour, we had a good chance to have an initial really private talk, which is what the Chancellor likes. Then this afternoon we met at the Palais Schaumburg with the Chancellor and several members of the government, first having a semi-private talk with the Chancellor and von Brentano on the one

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-759. Secret; Priority.

¹ A two-paragraph memorandum of this conversation, SVE/MC-14, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1201.

side and David Bruce and me on the other.² The burden of this was the Chancellor's concern about the British in general, about Macmillan's trip to Moscow in particular and a recent statement made here by the British Ambassador that it would be inevitable to recognize the GDR.

Then we went into a larger meeting and I reported quite fully on my talks at London and at Paris with the French government and with Spaak,³ then the Chancellor and more briefly von Brentano expounded their views.

They seem to be satisfied with what I have told them about "contingency planning" in relation to Berlin. I did not however go into much detail. With respect to a conference on Germany, there seemed to be acquiescence, although chiefly discernible on the theory that "silence gives consent". I hope to develop their attitude more definitively tomorrow when we meet again.

Faithfully yours,

Foster Dulles

² See Document 164.

³ See Document 165.

167. Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-15

Bonn, February 8, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chancellor Adenauer
Dr. von Brentano, Foreign Minister
Dr. van Scherpenberg, Secretary of
State in the Foreign Office
Mr. Weber, Interpreter for the
Chancellor

The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Merchant

Prior to meeting with the larger group as planned, the Chancellor indicated that he would like to have a short discussion with the Secretary in the presence of only a few advisers. Ambassador Bruce will obtain from Mr. Weber and forward to the Department the verbatim

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1200. Top Secret. Drafted by Merchant. The meeting was held at Schaumburg Palace. For a brief account by the Chancellor, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, p. 481. Bruce recorded his impressions in his diary. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) A copy of Weber's verbatim record of the conversation is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1200.

record of the conversation which was kept by Mr. Weber as interpreter. The following is dictated from my own notes to provide an earlier though less complete record.

The Chancellor opened by saying that he desired to discuss further and in greater detail the critical situation of Berlin. He agreed that it was wise to bury the Berlin crisis under a layer of broader problems in a conference with the Russians. If the conference failed, however, then the Berlin crisis was likely to become more acute. In consequence he thought there might be need for an interim or provisional solution of the problem of Berlin. If force were used the crisis would indeed become acute. Hence his thought of the provisional solution. He said that he had no answer to the problem himself but could describe in negative terms the boundaries which any such solution should not transgress. First, he said he attached the utmost importance to the maintenance of Western unity. (Later questions of the Secretary indicated that he was thinking of the French, British and US [1 line of source text not declassified]. The Secretary agreed on the importance of maintaining unity and said that he believed that we had it but that it was equally important that the Federal Republic should act in full agreement with the three Western powers since it was obviously most intimately involved.) Secondly, the Chancellor said we should not advance to any position which would require later withdrawal because of the damage it would do to Western prestige. (Under a question from the Secretary he said that he meant retreat from any *physical* position.) Thirdly, the Chancellor said the situation should not be permitted to develop to any use of nuclear weapons.

In response the Secretary said that it was essential that we employ the necessary counter force if we found ourselves opposed by force. This required that we must face up to the possibility of a general nuclear war in which he noted the United States would prove to be the main target. He said that it would be disastrous for us to be committed to a conventional war in Europe. Surely this would please the Soviets with their great superiority in manpower and conventional weapons.

The Chancellor said that possibly he had been misunderstood. His nuclear point was addressed to the avoidance of using nonconventional weapons against the GDR alone.

The Secretary then reviewed in detail the program for dealing with a substitution of the GDR for the Soviets on May 27 or earlier. When he came to the later stages after physical obstructions had been encountered and we had concurrently launched a political, propaganda offensive against the Soviets and serious military preparations such as partial mobilization, he said we should, if this political offensive brought no change in the Soviet-GDR attitude and obstruction of our forces, send in an armored division to open up the land route. If this division encountered resistance then obviously a general war had started in which we

obviously would not forego the use of nuclear weapons. The Secretary concluded by saying that he was absolutely convinced that if we in the West were united and willing to take the risk of such general war then the Soviets will withdraw from their present position. We must, however, have the will (which he could assure the Chancellor the United States possessed) to use those elements of force in which we are superior. To fail to do so would be to invite defeat on a purely conventional battleground.

The Chancellor said that the unity of the British, French and United States was even more important than atomic bombs. (He did not elaborate his thought but I construed it as meaning that he considered such unity even more effective as a deterrent to the Soviets than our possession of nuclear weapons.) [6 lines of source text not declassified]

The Secretary then said that the prime purpose of his present trip was further to cement Western unity and that he believed it existed. He emphasized that it was equally necessary that the Federal Republic be with us. He said that if the Federal Republic was not willing to pursue as strong a policy as we proposed, now was the time that we should be so informed.

The Chancellor said that his government was prepared to follow the program which the Secretary had outlined but that he feared a world war over Berlin would not have behind it public support in France, the UK, Germany or the United States.

The Secretary said that he could assure the Chancellor that the policy he had outlined would have public support in the United States and that he was equally sure that the Governments of France and Great Britain were in favor of a strong stand. In fact he said the only difference among the three powers was that the French were inclined to be more truculent.

The Chancellor reiterated that he supported the two-stage contingency plan proposed by the Secretary. He thought it was correct and that his government would support it.

The Secretary then asked what the Chancellor had in mind when he spoke of a provisional solution for Berlin.

The Chancellor said that the best provisional solution, which he was not sure we could get, would be an indefinite deferral of the May 27 date when the Soviets had promised they would turn over their rights to the GDR. He said that he was concerned over the very real possibility of growing nervousness and even an exodus from West Berlin as the date approached.

The Chancellor then raised (as he had at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in 1957) the question of extending the life of the North Atlantic Treaty beyond the 20-year period which ended in 1968.

The Secretary reminded him that we had stated thereafter, responsive to his request, that we in the United States felt that the North Atlantic Treaty should be regarded as of indefinite duration.

The Chancellor thought this was not good enough.

The Secretary said that we would bear in mind this proposal and would not oppose an amendment to the Treaty extending it say for 20 years (as the Chancellor subsequently suggested) but that he felt strongly the present was not timely for any such action in light of de Gaulle's dissatisfaction with the terms and breadth of the Treaty. He feared that any opening up of the Treaty for extension would invite French amendments which would be undesirable. With the passage of time, however, de Gaulle would no doubt become more familiar with and fonder of NATO.

The Chancellor then suggested that they join the larger group which was waiting in the conference room.

168. Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-19

Bonn, February 8, 1959, 11:15 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Berding
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Klein

Germany

Chancellor Adenauer
For. Min. von Brentano
State Secretary Globke
State Secretary van Scherpenberg
State Secretary von Eckardt
Dep. State Secretary Dittmann
Dr. Ruete
Herr Weber

After a restricted meeting between the Secretary, the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister,¹ the larger meeting resumed.

Brentano said he would like to have the Secretary's impressions on procedures, particularly the arrangements for the meetings ahead. As he understood the Secretary yesterday,² the Working Group of techni-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-859. Secret. Drafted by Klein on February 9 and approved by Greene on February 24. The meeting was held at Schaumburg Palace.

¹ See Document 167.

² See Document 165.

cal experts would reassemble in Paris after the current Washington meeting³ to study the Western proposals made thus far and attempt to give them a new form and setting. This package would then be given to the Four Western Foreign Ministers for examination. In view of the scheduled NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Washington April 2-4, it occurred to him that it might be appropriate for the Three and then the Four Ministers to meet in Paris in the second half of March and in replying to the Soviet note of January 10⁴ seek as early a date as possible for the meeting with the Soviet Union, preferably mid-April. The Federal Government, he said, was of the opinion that the lapsed time between the NATO Conference and the Conference with the Soviet Union should be held to a minimum to forestall unnecessary talk and public speculation based on inevitable leaks.

As far as the question of presentation was concerned, Brentano thought that the German contribution at the conference outlined in the Chancellor's memorandum to the Secretary⁵ (i.e., the establishment of German diplomatic relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and the declaration on the Oder-Neisse) as a matter of tactics should be introduced during the course of negotiations rather than at the initial stage of the conference.

The Secretary said he would ask Mr. Merchant to answer the Foreign Minister's questions on procedure, but first he, the Secretary, had some comments of his own to make. He said Mr. Macmillan felt very strongly that the meeting with the Soviet Union should start as close to May 27 as possible, perhaps about May 10, so that a conference would still be in session at that time and not have collapsed before then. Envisaging a four to five week conference, such as that of November 1955, a meeting that began in April might have broken up by May 27, and thus deprive the Soviets of the pretext for postponing the threatened Berlin action.

On first reaction, the Secretary said he was inclined to agree with the Foreign Minister on the appropriate time for tabling the German proposals, particularly since the Federal Republic would not be a participant in a Four Power conference. The Secretary stressed, however, that all through the conference the United States would want to consult very intimately with the Germans on the initial program which the Western Powers would present, since our proposals might require indicating the desire of the Federal Government to establish certain types of interchanges with the GDR.

³ See Document 176.

⁴ See Document 124.

⁵ Document 151.

Referring to his remarks yesterday concerning the desirability for establishing freer communication and travel between the two parts of Germany, the Secretary said the West might want to suggest the establishment of common standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms in both parts of Germany. Proposals of this kind, he thought, would probably command a good deal of world support.

With reference to the question of procedure, Mr. Merchant said it was tentatively planned that the Working Group of technical experts would start meeting in Paris possibly before the end of this month to examine the substance of our positions and the form of presentation. He thought the Working Group now meeting in Washington could have some preliminary exchanges on these matters. Mr. Merchant said agreement now seems to have been reached in Washington on the texts of the Four Western replies to the Soviet note of January 10 and, allowing for adequate time for consultation with NATO, he thought they might be handed to the Soviets in a week or ten days.

On this basis, Mr. Merchant thought the Four Western Foreign Ministers might plan to meet in mid-March to consider the progress reports of the Working Group and give the necessary guidance and instruction for its further work. The next step, he said, might be for the Four Western Foreign Ministers to meet in Washington during the April NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting to give further policy guidance and concert their presentation to NATO.

Brentano said that although he still felt an early conference with the Soviets was desirable, this was not a fundamental problem and could be discussed further.

The Chancellor interjected to say that we would perhaps have a better idea of a possible date for a meeting with the Soviets after Mr. Macmillan returned from Moscow. Then the Chancellor asked rhetorically whether anyone knew the date of the coming British elections.

The Chancellor then changed the line of discussion and referred to certain ideas mentioned to him by Ambassador Bruce concerning the desirability of having a protracted meeting with the Soviets. The Chancellor, of course, was aware that Foreign Ministers always had calendars at their elbows and therefore cannot talk indefinitely. However, he wondered whether a conference with the Soviets could not be continued by the Deputy Foreign Ministers guided by the Foreign Ministers. This would remove artificial time limits normally set for Foreign Ministers' meetings and give all parties concerned an opportunity to know each other and even establish some measure of personal confidence. Moreover, the Russians like long conferences, long speeches and long discussions; it is in their nature.

At this point Mr. Dulles intervened to say that it was his impression that Gromyko probably had little else to do and therefore in this respect was probably expendable. This, however, did not apply to the Western Foreign Ministers. More seriously, the Secretary said he thought there was merit in having a continuing body study these problems. As a matter of fact experience has indicated that there seemed to be a useful purpose in merely having talks go on. He cited our talks with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw as a case in point. He said these talks in themselves were absolutely barren but the fact that our representatives were in touch with each other probably makes it more difficult for the Chinese Communists to launch attacks at this time. The Secretary thought it was particularly interesting that the Chinese Communists launched their attacks last August when our talks with them in Geneva were suspended following Ambassador Johnson's transfer from Prague. This may have been coincidental, the Secretary said, but it does seem that talking provides some measure of insurance for peace.

Returning to the Secretary's remarks on the establishment of common standards of rights and freedom in both parts of Germany, Brentano said he thought this an extremely good idea and that perhaps the United Nations might be given an enforcing role.

Bringing the discussions to a close, the Chancellor said he had one more point to make—that was that the West should make it absolutely clear that it will not make a single concession without obtaining a counter-concession. Concessions made without equivalent counter-concessions only served to make the Soviets more greedy and more intransigent. The Chancellor said he would like to have this precept brought to the attention of the press and particularly to those parliamentarians who seem to insist only upon a Western demonstration of flexibility.

In concluding his remarks, the Chancellor expressed his sincere gratitude to the Secretary for making this visit, and hoped the Secretary would have time to calmly reflect on the things he heard and discussed during the course of this trip.

The Secretary in turn said that although he was never happy when there were international crises, he did find one compensation—it afforded him the opportunity to meet with the Chancellor and Herr v. Brentano. He said there was a value that came out of comradeship of working together for peace and justice. He was always extremely satisfied when he met with the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister either in Bonn or elsewhere, and rejoiced in the common spirit and motives which bound the two countries. This series of meetings this weekend was still another example of this relationship at an important and perhaps crucial moment.

169. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 9, 1959, 4:02 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin and Related Problems

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State
Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of Berlin, Berlin, Germany¹
Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador
Mr. Martin Hillenbrand—GER
Mrs. Eleanor Lansing Dulles—GER

The Secretary greeted Mayor Brandt, recalling his conversations with him in Paris and stating that for him to come at this time added a personal note which means a great deal in the consideration of Berlin problems.

Mayor Brandt indicated that he was greatly heartened by the reception here and the strong reaction and support he had found to the importance of standing by Berlin.

The Secretary said he believed his own trip had been useful and even essential. While there are still specific details to be worked out, there was at this time agreement between the four powers which provides a firm basis for the development of detailed plans of action in the working group of experts. He felt an understanding as to what we would and would not do, between the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic and the United States was highly gratifying. He had also had a good conversation with Spaak.²

It is now recognized that we mean business, he added, and although the Soviets will keep the pressure on, there is a likelihood that they will withdraw at the last minute.

Brandt stated that he thought the situation very dangerous in the first few weeks for two reasons. First, the Soviets thought they could

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1059. Confidential. Drafted by Eleanor Dulles. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Daily Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

¹ Mayor Brandt made an unofficial visit to the United States, February 7–14, to enlist public and official support for Berlin and to participate in ceremonies at Springfield, Illinois, honoring the 150th anniversary of President Lincoln's birth. On February 11 he met with President Eisenhower from 8:45 to 9:11 a.m. No record of this meeting has been found, but in a February 9 briefing paper for the President Dillon suggested that the President tell Brandt how much he admired his firm leadership and courage in the months since the Soviet note had been received. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)

² See footnote 3, Document 163.

push the Western Allies out without great difficulty. Second, they expected to upset the economic stability of Berlin.

He said there had been no significant flight of capital. The initial outflow loss of bank deposits had been reversed.

He asked if a date had been set for a conference before May 27.

The Secretary answered that the French had objected to such a date on the grounds that it would indicate weakness. However, he had proposed a compromise that a conference be held at a time and place mutually agreeable. Thus the Soviets would share the responsibility for the date. He added that, of course, we do not know if the Soviets want a conference at the Foreign Ministers level or on Germany. They may insist on a meeting "at the Summit". If they wish a conference on European security, the matter becomes very complicated with countries other than the four involved, and the Soviets perhaps raising the question of parity.

Further, with regard to access, the Secretary emphasized that there would be no acceptance of substitution for the Soviets at the check points. Some of the planning involves decision on minute details. However, it was agreed there would be no inspection of vehicles and no stamping of documents, only the showing of evidence of identification of the persons and vehicles to officials of the GDR.

The Mayor remarked that this course of action might only postpone the difficulties since before too long they would start something.

The Secretary said that the only question raised so far was the right of Allied troops to remain in Berlin. He queried Brandt as to what he meant—the blowing up of a bridge, road blocks or other physical obstruction—

Ambassador Grewe said that the position outlined by the Secretary was a good one.

The Secretary, referring to his previous comment as to "no acceptance of substitutions," etc., asked "Is that what you want?" Brandt agreed.

Brandt referred then to the Paris (1949) agreement.³ He said that these dealt with land and not air access. Now the East German papers have said the commercial air traffic is a misuse of the agreements. He suggested that there might be "an enlargement of interference".

The Secretary agreed the Paris statements covered the "normal civilian access." He thought there would be no immediate trouble if and when the Soviets withdraw, but that "our situation changes." Now, the German *civilians* deal with the GDR and Soviets only control the *military*.

³ For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting, June 20, 1949, see *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. III, pp. 1062-1065.

Brandt countered that the Soviets were always there as supervisors of the GDR officials.

The Secretary warned that it would be a mistake to anticipate interference with civilian traffic since this might serve to stimulate the Soviets to such action. Now they want the occupying forces to get out.

In any case, the Mayor said, there is no real substitute for US troops. He did not think Egyptians or Mexicans could take their place.

Secretary Dulles said the United Nations was not like a government. It can act only for and through its members. There have been difficulties on this score in the Far East where the participants did not wish to bear the continuing burden of the UN Mission.

Ambassador Grewe recalled the failure of the guarantee of Danzig under circumstances more favorable than the proposals for Berlin.

The Secretary in concluding the interview said Soviet guarantees had never proved reliable but merely the first step to absorption. He recalled the guarantee to Poland and the way it was taken over with "one swift blow".

Mayor Brandt expressed his appreciation for all the Secretary had done.

170. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, February 9, 1959, 5 p.m.

1. The Secretary discussed privately with the President his letter of February 9¹ (copy attached), and some aspects of his talks during the preceding week in Europe. Mr. Hagerty and Mr. Greene joined the President and the Secretary and there was considerable discussion whether to release the Secretary's letter to the President at the latter's press conference the next morning. After discussion of the pros and cons of this course and of releasing the letter right away, the President and

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Conversation with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Greene.

¹Not printed; for text of this letter, in which Dulles asked for a few weeks' leave to recuperate and concentrate on the Berlin question, see *The New York Times*, February 10, 1959, pp. 1 and 3.

the Secretary decided to have Mr. Hagerty release it right away. On hearing that Mr. Macomber had requested delay in the release time to permit advance notification to key members of the Congress, the President expressed his willingness to have a brief delay and instructed Mr. Hagerty to hold up the release until 6:15 p.m. The President said he would open his press conference the next morning with a statement that he accepted and approved the Secretary's proposals in the letter.²

2. The Secretary reported fully on his talk Sunday morning with Adenauer relating the Chancellor's concern about the nuclear deterrent, and left with the President a copy of Ambassador Whitney's telegram # 4115,³ reporting Mr. Macmillan's comments to the Ambassador on the Secretary's trip.

Reverting to his talks with the Chancellor, the Secretary told the President that the Chancellor seemed agreeable to our putting forward new proposals in any meeting with the Soviets, so long as we did these one by one rather than all at once, so as to have an opportunity to judge at each step the Soviet reaction. The Secretary said the Chancellor does not want to be committed by proposals to the Soviets unless there is some indication at each step along the way that some counterpart commitment will be received.

The Secretary said that it is not certain that the Soviets will agree to meet with the West at the Foreign Minister level. He noted that there are indications that the Soviets want a meeting at the Heads of Government level; our own view of this possibility should take into account that Gromyko is not really in a position to negotiate for the Soviet Government. The Secretary speculated that events might develop so that a Heads of Government meeting could be envisaged. He and the President agreed that, insofar as the President was concerned, he might fly to Europe for the first two or three days of such a meeting, then turn over to the Secretary, with the possibility that, if the negotiations really got somewhere, the President could later return for the conclusion.

Adverting to his letter to the President, the Secretary said that one of his conclusions from his trip to London, Paris and Bonn was that there is some disarray as between the British, French, and Germans on how to deal with the Soviet threat in Germany, and even danger of head-on collisions between the Western Governments in the next few months.

The Secretary said he had the feeling that each of the Governments concerned would think of him, the Secretary, as being in a position to

² For a transcript of President Eisenhower's press conference on February 10, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 168-178.

³ Telegram 4115, February 9, reported that Macmillan was very enthusiastic about Dulles' visit and that it had been most helpful. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/2-959)

resolve the difficulties and avert the dangers. Hence, he thought, it would be most important that they not get the impression that the Secretary's illness would remove his influence from the scene. The President indicated his general agreement. The Secretary thought that the phraseology of his letter adequate to cover this point, and asked that Mr. Hagerty, in responding to questions, bear it in mind.

[Here follow two paragraphs on unrelated matters.]

JG

171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 12, 1959, 11:52 a.m.

1797. Paris pass USCINCEUR Thurston and West.

A. In course visits London, Paris and Bonn during past week Secretary discussed Berlin contingency planning with British, French and Germans and presented US views re action which should be taken in event GDR personnel substituted for Soviets at checkpoints. British, French, and Germans were receptive these views and, as Secretary stated publicly yesterday (February 9)¹ on return to Washington, we are in general agreement as to procedures we shall follow if physical means are invoked to interfere with our access rights.

B. FYI. US conception of action to be taken is as follows:

1. If Soviets withdraw from functions they have heretofore exercised in connection with movements of Western occupying powers to and from Berlin, Three Powers should not acquiesce in substitution of GDR officials in performance of these functions. No stamping of papers or inspection by GDR officials should be permitted. More identification of vehicles as those of one of Three Powers should be provided to GDR officials on demand, but such identification should not be construed as acquiescence in substitution of GDR for Soviet officials.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1259. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by McKiernan on February 10; cleared by Greene, Calhoun, Hillenbrand, Kohler, and Merchant; and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Berlin, London, and Paris, and pouched to Moscow.

¹ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 2, 1959, p. 297.

2. Between now and May 27, Three Powers should take quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which would not create public alarm but which would be detectable by Soviet intelligence.

3. The first movement (via the Autobahn) after the announced or attempted withdrawal of the Soviets should be one or more trucks from Berlin accompanied by scout car or other vehicle with shooting capability. This movement should attempt pass under conditions outlined paragraph 1 above. Effort should be discontinued if physically obstructed by GDR or Soviets. Movement would fire only if fired upon, in which case it should take whatever defensive action seems necessary.

4. If movement physically obstructed, consideration should be given to possibility of substituting personnel of Three Powers for Soviet personnel withdrawn from checkpoints. In any case traffic should be temporarily suspended and efforts should be made along following lines to increase pressure on both USSR and GDR:

a. Effort should be made to mobilize world opinion against USSR as violator of agreements, user of force and threat to peace. Situation could be taken to Security Council. If USSR vetoed, situation could be taken to special session of General Assembly. Consideration should also be given additional diplomatic pressure in other forms, including withdrawal of Three Powers ambassadors from Moscow.

b. Military preparations should be intensified and could at this juncture include observable measures, for example, evacuation of dependents from Berlin and possibly from Federal Republic as well.

5. If above-mentioned diplomatic measures and military preparations not successful in restoring free access, Governments of Three Powers should decide whether to apply further military pressures through use of additional force.

6. Concurrently with development foregoing, Three Powers should continue their efforts to bring about Foreign Ministers' meeting with USSR on the various aspects of German question by early May. These talks might provide cover which would facilitate modification or indefinite postponement by USSR of its "ultimatum" re Western Allied access to Berlin.

c. Re paragraph 1 above, Secretary also discussed without firm conclusion possibility of accepting GDR personnel as agents of Soviet Union if they specified as such by Soviet government.

d. Embassy will note necessity of reviewing provisional instructions already agreed upon to assure conformity with above. We shall send further instructions this point.

Dillon

172. Memorandum of Discussion at the 396th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, February 12, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1, and 2.]

3. *U.S. Policy Toward Germany* (NSC 5803;¹ NSC Actions Nos. 1858 and 1932²)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject by noting that continuing study of alternatives to existing policy on the unification of Germany was called for by NSC action. He expressed the hope that in the absence of Secretary Dulles, it would still be possible to have a report on Secretary Dulles' recent trip to London, Paris, and Bonn. He then called on Secretary Dillon who indicated that Assistant Secretary Merchant would provide the report.

Secretary Merchant stated that the purpose of Secretary Dulles's trip had been primarily to see whether our allies were thinking along the same lines as ourselves with respect to Berlin and the German problem generally. He added that Secretary Dulles had had long and intimate talks with the leaders of the U.K., France, and Germany during his visits to the capitals of these three countries. Secretary Dulles had expressed himself as completely satisfied with the results of his trip.

Secretary Merchant said that Secretary Dulles had found general agreement between himself and the leaders of the other three countries on proposals for dealing with the Soviets in the event of any attempt to impede allied military access to Berlin.

With regard to the problem of preparing for a possible meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K., France and the Soviet Union, Secretary Dulles had encountered few differences of opinion and even these were relatively minor and relatively easily adjusted. An agreed reply to the Soviet note of January 10 was now being considered by the NATO Council.³ Secretary Merchant briefly characterized what this note would probably contain.

Thereafter Secretary Merchant described briefly the agreement reached by Secretary Dulles on procedural preparations for a Foreign

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret.

¹ See Document 5.

² NSC Action No. 1858, February 6, 1958, adopted and implemented NSC 5803. NSC Action No. 1932, June 23, 1958, noted an oral report by the Secretary of State on NSC 5803. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

³ See Document 176.

Ministers' meeting. There had been discussion in all three capitals of the general problems of the Berlin situation, the unification of Germany, European security, and a German peace treaty. All had agreed that as the substantive basis for our position at such a meeting of Foreign Ministers, the President's proposal at the Geneva Conference of 1955 should be used. This did not mean that there could not be certain adjustments in form and manner of presentation which might make this basis more palatable to the Soviets and to public opinion. In all three capitals Secretary Dulles had encountered a willingness to examine all the elements of such a package proposal. There was also a willingness to try to make such a package more palatable from the point of view of public opinion. There was not much optimism, however, on its acceptability to the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Merchant then turned to the general atmosphere which the Secretary had encountered on his trip. In London he had found the Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd much preoccupied with domestic politics. While their position on Berlin was firm, it was not as truculent on this subject as had been the attitude in Paris. The British were open-minded in the matter of the review and presentation of the package proposal at a Foreign Ministers' Conference.

In Paris Secretary Dulles had noticed a great change in De Gaulle since his last meeting with him in December 1958.⁴ De Gaulle appeared much more friendly and much more relaxed.

In Bonn Chancellor Adenauer had appeared somewhat more flexible in his views than in the past with particular respect to the German contribution to the package proposal.

In conclusion Secretary Merchant said that he felt it desirable for him to state that despite Secretary Dulles' physical discomfort, he had never seen him so effective and so forceful as he had been in these meetings in London, Paris, and Bonn. Mr. Merchant repeated that Secretary Dulles was extremely satisfied with the progress that had been made.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

Noted an oral report by Assistant Secretary of State Merchant on the recent trip by the Secretary of State to London, Paris and Bonn, and his conversations with respect to the Berlin situation, German unification, European security and a German Peace Treaty.

S. Everett Gleason

⁴ Secretary Dulles met with General de Gaulle at 4:30 p.m. on December 15; a record of this conversation is printed in vol. VII; Part 2, Document 81.

⁵ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2048, approved by the President on February 12. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 16, 1959, 1 p.m.

1779. Paris pass USCINEUR, SHAPE. From Bruce.

1. Back here, after five days in Berlin,¹ have certain definite impressions. I think we must recognize Secretary's illness, if it results in any long inactivity, will have distinct impact FedRep foreign policy. Adenauer has felt that Dulles' thinking closely parallels his own. Importance he has attached to personal interchanges Secretary must not be underestimated. There have been occasional et tu Brute episodes, but all short-lived. If Secretary does not attend conferences, we must expect more hesitations than in past, but fundamental loyalties will remain, especially if President Eisenhower and Secretary from time to time send Chancellor reassuring personal messages.

2. Seems to me, United States policies regarding Berlin, and Germany generally, must be based on decision between two sharply conflicting schools of thought. One asserts Soviets are off balance because of fears uprisings, and other preoccupations relative to East Zone. Other believes Soviets, uninfluenced by humanitarian, moral or spiritual considerations, are determined to preserve present domination East Zone, and corollary advantages, strategical, political and economic. I subscribe to latter interpretation. Psychological handicap having vast majority East German population opposed to an undisputed though brutal foreign rule probably does not profoundly disconcert Soviets. Nor, I guess, are they deeply afraid of possible riots, revolution or other potential manifestations unrest. If outbreak occurs, they have physical means at their command to suppress it, as they did Hungary. They are likely be more apprehensive armament Bundeswehr with atomic weapons, [3 lines of source text not declassified].

Moreover, do Soviets need be overly solicitous pretentions East Zone political leaders to assert national sovereignty? Ulbricht, notably despised as he is by own compatriots, is faithful purveyor Kremlin doctrine. Better him, subservient to orders, than more independent nationalists capable creating schism and popular following. To increase his prestige by transferring controls would seem tactically acceptable, but to sacrifice him for larger purposes would not, I believe, offend Soviet conscience. They can regurgitate dogma without lasting indigestion.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1659. Secret; Limited Distribution; NoFORN. Transmitted in two sections and also sent to USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹ A record of Bruce's 5 days in Berlin is *ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327.

Therefore, our real adversary remains Soviet Union. If one adopts thesis its rulers in relationship to two Germanies, hold master cards as compared with our own, one must critically examine allegations West has failed diplomatically to achieve tolerable co-existence because of its own intransigence.

The Soviets have in East Germany a rich prize. Standard of living there is now probably higher than in Russia, and certainly superior to that in any other satellite country except maybe Czechoslovakia. Moreover, economic improvement East Germany can well continue to develop. Strategically, a portion of Europe, where troops by a mere about-turn can be poised to counter and subdue any adventure by reckless Poles or other satellites, must be considered a prime Soviet asset. Politically, if Soviets entertain genuine fears of a united Germany, its continued division must be welcomed by them, and I would surmise they would prefer for many reasons to have it permanent.

Various interpretations of Khrushchev's possible motivations are current. But fact remains it is almost incredible, unless there is something more unstable in his character and authority than it would be safe to rely upon, that he would lightly abandon advantages derived from complete control East Germany unless promised concessions the West could only make to own evident disadvantage. Truth is, we now enjoy almost minimal position of strength in Berlin in contrast Soviet posture.

Existence of island of West Berlin, surrounded by hostile territory, results from political determination many years ago more remarkable for naivete than long range judgement. There is no use wringing hands futilely over consequences, but let us not compound past error by repeating it through a hasty retreat from our remaining essential bastions. Exodus from West Berlin and concomitant chaos, if American garrison withdrawn, would under present conditions, dwarf any other historical migration.

Flexibility as an end in itself appears to me singularly dangerous; it is not a policy; it can be an escape, above all when one has little to surrender except at the expense of one's own security.

Is it really wise to jeopardize our national security through lacking the patience and wisdom to maintain our principles in foreign policy? In negotiating with the Soviets, can one expect quickly to arrive at formulae which will reconcile the most seemingly irreconcilable conflict of political philosophies the world has ever known? What losses have we suffered during the last decade in Western and Central Europe? It is customary to concede that we have been defeated in the propaganda field. What is the objective of propaganda? Is it not to create conditions where one gains a national or international advantage over opposing forces? Do transient polls, reflecting the natural desire in democracies for speedy and definitive resolutions of almost hopelessly complex ques-

tions, accurately reflect the ultimate national interest of the United States? I venture to doubt it.

3. During last ten years, what has actually occurred in Western and Central Europe? The firm stand taken by the democracies has at least arrested, without territorial losses, the threat of Soviet take-over of these sympathetic and valuable populations. In Norway, France and Italy, for example, the power of indigenous Communist Parties has sensibly diminished; the prestige, authority, efficiency and popularity of governments openly opposed to communism have increased. Does that not signify significant progress, more persuasive than criticism of the inefficiency of Western propaganda?

Let us admit that public opinion—always [an] undefinable, vague bogey—demands more flexibility in U.S. foreign policy in Europe. Must it be placated, at the expense of our fundamental interests, by yielding to demagogic appeals, and by embracing plans, often devised by amateur diplomatic architects, eager to build on ground they have not surveyed?

If we had much we could safely yield, our choices would be simpler. But in Germany, and above all in Berlin, we are on the defensive. It is not we who can probe, embarrass, irritate. Our position in Berlin represents the minimum we would desire. To give an inch might lead to surrendering all; Munich stares us in the face.

How can we resolutely cling to our principles, and yet not betray them by an appearance, at least, of flexibility?

Perhaps there is a method. We have often said that deeds and not words are the measure of good faith. In the past, we have sought agreement with Soviets on reasonable agenda for conferences. We have rejected their insatiable and dangerous demands for accords at the expense of our survival. We have countered their suggestions by careful exposure of their fallacious reasoning and demands. But still we suffer and strain over the accusation of being inflexible.

Can we emerge from this trap into which we are said to have fallen without leaving not only our tail feathers but some of our vital organs behind? Must we sacrifice our principles—to appease the unenlightened reproach that we have not shown ourselves ready to capitalize upon assumed Soviet weakness?

The manner of negotiating may be, in public reflection, almost as important as the substance. Can we not advocate, indeed invite, debates without fixed agenda, battles royal with the Soviets, at every level, amongst Foreign Ministers, deputies, technicians (excluding only summit meetings unless so prepared as to make their success almost certain) which will, if the Soviets match our stamina, continue for months, even years? No longer should we reply in detail to Soviet notes, and bind ourselves through written counterproposals. Instead we should expose

ourselves to the hazards of debate, ready to discuss any offers made by the other side, no matter how unreasonable.

At least by this process we might penetrate the mystery of Soviet political intentions, especially as they bear upon the fundamental decision "between two sharply conflicting schools of thought" referred to in paragraph 2. There is no other way, except the one more likely to be productive, namely bilateral conversations between our official representatives and those of the USSR.

4. Being power conscious, the Soviets have long made it manifest they would like to treat bilaterally with us. Faithful to our alliances, we have refused to do so. Prime Minister Macmillan has not been so scrupulous. Might we not, at some point, consider practicing the same technique? A trip, if practicable, by Secretary at an appropriate time to Moscow might yield interesting results.

If not, there still remains what I have already advocated; conferences without end, from which concord might finally evolve. If not, we would have lost little. The preparation of position papers has always absorbed more energy and talent than the shorter courses of international debate. And we could, if the presentation is adroit, lift ourselves out of the slough of inflexibility, and again struggle onto the high and defensible ground of principle.

Elaboration of some of the views expressed in this telegram, as well as additional comments to be read in conjunction with it, are contained in immediately following telegram² prepared by EmbOff.

Bruce

²Document 174.

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 16, 1959, 2 p.m.

1780. Paris pass USCINCEUR, USRO, SHAPE. While still on American soil, Mikoyan publicly attacked Adenauer and Strauss by name. He singled Adenauer out as major obstacle to peaceful settlement

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-1659. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and USAREUR Heidelberg.

between Soviet Union and West, in Europe. He identified him with inflexibility, with implacable hostility not merely to Soviet Union but to any agreement. In so doing he was also attacking Secretary Dulles and attempting create gulf between these two statesmen whose close personal relationship well known and peoples of America and Western Europe whose yearning for peace could be satisfied, were it not for sinister collusion.

Personal attack Strauss related to attack Adenauer, and conjures up image renascent German militarism, and "furor teutonicus", now barely held in check but liable emerge and break out again at any time and drag not merely Europe but whole humanity with it into apocalyptic holocaust.

Thus unholy association Dulles, Adenauer and Strauss, presented by Soviet leaders, not only prevents solution Europe's problems, but contains within itself seeds destruction in the future. This may be said constitute major theme current Soviet political warfare, background against which Soviets formulating their tactical moves in period negotiation into which we seem be entering.

We believe it utmost importance be aware appeal which such theme likely have in coming months, unless West finds way educate public opinion so that goal Soviet policy as clear to man in street as technique by which Moscow hopes to reach it.

One of major trends in Western thinking recent months is illustrated by the extent to which public opinion now disposed take at face value expressed Soviet fears with regard Germany. Important we clarify our own thinking on this subject.

Generally agreed that Germany's role in Soviet eyes is of different order from that any other foreign power. Recollections of last war, of formidable industrial and manpower potential German people, and of political processes by which inoffensive Weimar Republic was suddenly transformed into reality Hitler's war machine, lend color and plausibility to fears this may happen again, notwithstanding disapproval and lamentations Western governments whose failure prevent this event 30 years ago seems suggest that they would again be powerless comparable circumstances. In Soviet political calendar next two or three years are no longer and no safer than time which elapsed between 1930 and 1933.

Easy for Soviet Union harp on these historical facts and evoke in minds peoples Western Europe who have also recently suffered so much from German aggression sympathetic response to basic thesis that Germany fundamentally still potential aggressor, which might in altered circumstances abuse weapons intended only for her defense, and embark once again on mad adventure. Assurances by West, expressed

in most formal and binding international agreements, such as the North Atlantic Treaty, do not carry full conviction, because they relate only to present international situation. Such assurances provide no convincing guarantee that future course events will respect their present validity. With such arguments, Soviet Union can exert powerful influence on Western popular attitudes. In proportion as rearmament Germany passes from planning and training stage to physical completion, so fears and warnings for future uttered by Soviet Union gain in plausibility and in political effectiveness.

Would emphasize that we here concerned less with sincerity Soviet propaganda when it points signs "revanchist" Germany, than with degree plausibility which such accusations may achieve, and consequent effect Western popular thinking.

When we ask ourselves what Kremlin's real attitude is toward Germany, think we must accept fact that whether it sincerely believes in danger renewed German aggression or not, it will never renounce exploitation Western fears of militaristic resurgence Germany, for these fears are factor of great value to it in prosecution its long term policy: isolation and neutralization Germany, disintegration of Western defensive system, eviction US armed forces from European continent, and absorption Europe—in other words liquidation of the European front in world-wide Soviet campaign against United States.

This exploitation historical and emotional factors which militate in its favor takes specific form of warnings about consequences of the "nuclear rearming" Germany. Even though can be demonstrated that additional quota Western military strength represented by nuclear capability Western German NATO forces relatively marginal, Soviet Union can marshal powerful argument, which Khrushchev has already used, which is, in our opinion, far more difficult to counter: that such nuclear equipment "in German hands" vastly increases danger that if, one day, German policy rests in hands of a "revanchist" madman (i.e.: type of German in whose role Soviet Union has cast Strauss), Germany will be in position create incident, independently of will of Western Powers, which may prove uncontrollable and which will inevitably involve Soviet Union itself. In this hypothetical case, emphasis is laid on future irresponsibility and uncontrollability Germany, rather than on its role as an instrument of deliberate Western aggressiveness.

May be that this element in Soviet attitude toward the problem of Germany contains sufficient degree sincerity to justify most careful examination of possibility mutual concessions leading to stabilization situation Central Europe, so long as we adhere firmly to principle that our own security position must not be weakened as result any concessions we may make, and so long as we continue assume that even stabilization situation in Europe would not signify that Soviet Union had given up its

long-term goal of European domination, or the continuing exploitation of the means to reach it.

Vital importance adhering to basic principles our European policy underscores necessity our avoiding, particularly at this time, any course action, or posture, suggesting disposition compromise on these principles. This consideration prompts us express our concern at extent to which concept flexibility by West seems to be acquiring overtones willingness by United States to abandon some of premises on which our policy has hitherto been based.

It one thing retain our basic position and to cast about for ways presenting it more convincingly and attractively to public opinion in the West and elsewhere in the world. It quite another thing to hoist flag of flexibility as though it were kind of new rallying-point around which an entirely new strategy is to be planned. Flexibility in negotiating tactics, in willingness discuss all approaches to problem is desirable demonstration Western initiative. However we may already have reached point dangerously close to popular belief that West abandoning its former steadfastness, i.e.: its adherence to basic principles which have hitherto governed its policies in relation to Soviet Union and problem Europe. Widespread acceptance such belief would undermine Chancellor's authority Germany, and would represent substantial victory for Moscow.

If we enter conferences this spring against such background popular expectation, we may be later faced with unpleasant prospect disillusionment in our own camp, and possible generation pressures which might drive some of Western governments to dangerous compromise.

Maybe we shall have, so to speak, to institutionalize international conferences, to be prepared wage continuous war [of] negotiation in public forum, at every level, with or without agenda or preparation (short of summit meetings), and to outlast the Soviet Union at conference table.

Out of this process, at some stage when substance of discussion has been exhausted, possible there will emerge in West sense of necessity for bilateral discussions between ourselves and Soviet Union. Feel we should be prepared consider such an eventuality, for which the preceding trial by conference would have set the stage for us and our Allies.

Bruce

175. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

Germany

PARTICIPANTS

Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador
Mr. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
Mr. Luis Esteves Fernandes, Portuguese Ambassador
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
Mr. Paul Koht, Norwegian Ambassador
Mr. Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador
Mr. Ali S.H. Urguplu, Turkish Ambassador
Mr. Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador
Mr. Georges Heisbourg, Luxembourg Ambassador
Mr. A.E. Ritchie, Chargé d'Affaires, Canadian Embassy
Baron S.G.M. van Voorst tot Voorst, Chargé d'Affaires, Netherlands Embassy
Mr. Arne Bogh Andersen, Chargé d'Affaires, Danish Embassy
Mr. Aristide N. Pilavachi, Chargé d'Affaires, Greek Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary
Mr. B. L. Timmons, RA
Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE
Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, GER
Mr. Matthew J. Loram, WE
Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, BNA

Mr. Merchant said that he wished to take the occasion to review for the NATO Ambassadors residing in Washington the Secretary's recent trip to Europe and other current developments regarding the Berlin issue and Germany as a whole. Mr. Merchant stated that the Secretary felt that his trip had been very timely and most satisfying in that it had assured himself and the foreign governments concerned that our and their thinking on the German issue was proceeding along parallel lines.

Mr. Merchant said that in London the Secretary had talked with Messrs. Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd and also with General Norstad; in Paris, with General de Gaulle and Messrs. Debré and Couve de Murville and also M. Spaak; in Bonn, with the Chancellor and Mr. von Brentano. Part of these discussions, Mr. Merchant said, were devoted to procedural matters, such as our replies to the Soviet note on Berlin. The draft replies had in the meantime been circulated in NAC, and the finalized replies were delivered in Moscow today.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1659. Secret. Drafted by Loram and initialed by Merchant.

¹ See Document 176.

Mr. Merchant said that the Secretary's talks had also dealt with preparations for a possible Foreign Ministers meeting with the Soviets. We anticipated in this connection that the Working Group, which had been meeting here during the past two weeks, would resume its meetings in Paris in early March. At that time they would devote their work to the substantive preparations for such a conference. It was expected that the four Western Foreign Ministers would subsequently meet together on the occasion of the NATO Meeting here on April 2 in order to review the work of the Working Group. It was possible that the Ministers might also meet in the meantime, namely around the middle of March, depending on the progress of the Working Group's deliberations.

Mr. Merchant said that as the Ambassadors were aware, we considered that approximately May 10 would be the most convenient time for a meeting with the Soviets. There were, of course, no assurances that the Soviets would accept such a meeting: they might insist on a meeting of the Chiefs of Government or they might possibly object to the agenda, the composition, the location or the date. In any case, "the ball was now in the Soviet court", and necessary preparations were going forward on our side.

With regard to Berlin, Mr. Merchant said, there had been a reaffirmation by the Secretary and by those with whom he had talked during his trip of the December declaration maintaining our right to remain in Berlin, our right of access to Berlin and our refusal to accept a substitute of the GDR authorities for the Soviet authorities. While it was feasible to make arrangements between co-victors, it was not admissible for one of the victors, namely the Soviets, to transfer their rights and obligations to the East German regime.

Mr. Merchant added that there had been some discussion during the Secretary's talks regarding the basic Western position in preparation for any meeting with the Soviets. There had been general agreement by those concerned that the basic elements of the proposals put forward at the two Geneva Conferences in 1955 should continue to constitute the foundation of our negotiating position, namely, reunification of Germany by free elections, establishment of an all-German Government, the right of such a Government to have a free choice in participating in collective security arrangements, assurances to the Soviets reflecting their concerns resulting from the reunification of Germany, practical security measures and finally a German peace treaty. It had been generally felt that the positions we had taken in 1955 were still basically sound and served to meet our own security requirements as well as giving reasonable satisfaction to Soviet security concerns. It was admitted at the same time, however, that a great deal could be done to embellish and improve these proposals without affecting their basic elements in order to make

them more persuasive. Mr. Merchant stated that we had accordingly been re-examining our detailed positions and their presentation. This, of course, was only in the preliminary phase and the real work would be undertaken by the Working Group in Paris at the beginning of March. Paris had been chosen as the site for such deliberations in order to facilitate consultations with NAC, as had been done in the late spring of 1955. Mr. Merchant emphasized that it was our intention to keep NAC fully informed.

Mr. Merchant mentioned that we were most disturbed by the speculative stories that had appeared in the press in this country and abroad regarding the Secretary's trip and regarding developments in the Working Group's meetings. Unfortunately, there had been some element of truth to some of these stories. On the U.S. side, we were accordingly taking precautionary measures and we felt that the other NATO Governments would similarly wish to do everything possible to prevent any leaks, which would obviously be so damaging to the West in preparing for any negotiations with the Soviet Union. Mr. Merchant then opened the floor to questions.

Ambassador Brosio (Italy) asked whether the mid-March meeting of the Foreign Ministers would have to be postponed until the NATO meeting here in view of the Secretary's illness. Mr. Merchant replied that it had been originally planned that the four Foreign Ministers should meet in any case in Washington on the occasion of the NATO Ministerial Meeting on April 2. It had not been definitively decided to have an interim meeting of the four Foreign Ministers before that time and this would depend largely on the progress of the Working Group's deliberations.

Ambassador Urguplu (Turkey) asked what the State Department's views were regarding Senator Mansfield's recent speech on Germany.² Mr. Merchant replied that he would rather not comment on this matter. Our line was that we intended to give the most careful consideration to all thoughtful proposals. However, Senator Mansfield's proposals did not represent the Administration's policies and probably did not represent the views of the Democratic majority in the Congress.

Ambassador Grewe (Germany) asked whether any decision had been taken regarding the continuation of talks on contingency planning affecting Berlin. Mr. Merchant replied that he expected that these talks might go on here in Washington for one or more sessions and then would probably shift to Europe, where the people concerned were more familiar with the minutiae of the problems involved. Mr. Koht

² For text of this address on February 12, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 105, Part 2, pp. 2242-2321.

(Norway) asked whether NAC would be apprised of the results of the talks on contingency planning. Mr. Merchant replied in the negative, saying this was the responsibility of the three powers and it did not appear to be an appropriate subject for current reports to NAC. Ambassador Grewe (Germany) remarked that there had recently been a most unfortunate story in the *Chicago Sun Times* regarding these talks.³

Mr. Merchant stated that given the ability and imagination of certain correspondents to develop speculative stories, he thought that in general it would probably be a mistake to try to deny or comment on such stories. To do so might indicate to the Soviets what our exact position was. He accordingly thought it was preferable to reserve comment. For that reason he hoped the NATO Governments would take this position into account and not be concerned if we failed to deny stories that were obviously incorrect.

Ambassador Alphan (France) stated that the French Government had now given instructions that nobody in the French administration, at no matter what level, would be permitted to talk to members of the press with regard to the Berlin issue or the overall issue of Germany.

Ambassador Brosio (Italy) referred to Mr. Merchant's statement about maintaining the 1955 proposals. He stated that he had observed in this connection that various elements of public opinion both in this country and abroad were now questioning the opportunity of maintaining this "package". He added that the whole matter had been further complicated by the Berlin crisis. Whereas in 1955 there had been basically two issues—European security and German reunification; now there were the Berlin issue and the peace treaty, as well as European security and German reunification. The Ambassador accordingly wondered whether the same "package" proposals would be put forward again or would be subject to revision.

Mr. Merchant replied that the composition and presentation of the 1955 proposals would be subject to re-examination by the Working Group. Nevertheless, it was felt that the 1955 proposals constituted the foundation of the Western position and that the basic elements of these proposals would not be changed without agreement. Certainly the search for flexibility should not lead us to adopt a position that is not in our overall interest. It was difficult, Mr. Merchant said, to predict at this juncture what our final negotiating position would be, but he would be

³ Presumably a reference to the story in the *Chicago Sun Times*, February 15, Section 2, p. 5, which reported that the Allies would send a convoy to Berlin that would refuse to deal with East German representatives if they were present. The convoy would then return to its starting point, while the Allies sought U.N. intervention. A second convoy would then be sent with orders to shoot anyone who tried to interfere with it.

very much surprised if the basic elements of our 1955 proposals did not continue to constitute our negotiating position.

Mr. Merchant concluded by saying that the press might be curious as to why the NATO Ambassadors had been meeting in the Department and suggested that in reply to questions, it be explained that the purpose of the meeting was to participate in a briefing for the NATO Ambassadors regarding the Secretary's recent trip to Europe. It could be said that while a report had already been given to NAC, it had been felt that the Ambassadors of the NATO countries residing in Washington would be interested in getting a briefing firsthand.

Mr. Vigdeman briefed the Icelandic Ambassador on February 17 along the above lines.

176. Editorial Note

Drafting a reply to the Soviet note of January 10 (see Document 124) began at the end of January when first a French and then a U.S. draft reply were circulated in Washington. (Telegram 2683 to Paris, January 28, and telegram 6966 to London, February 1; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2859 and 2-159) On February 3 representatives from the British and French Embassies met with State Department officials to begin work on combining these drafts. The following day, with the addition of West German representatives, an ad hoc four-power working group began formal consideration of the Western reply. The working group produced an agreed text on February 5 that was submitted to the four governments for comment. Further discussions resulted in final agreement on the text by February 10, after which it was transmitted to the North Atlantic Council for information and consideration. The U.S. Representative on the Council reported on the discussions of the draft reply in Poltos 2279 and 3313 from Paris, February 11 and 13 (*ibid.*, 762.00/2-1159 and 2-1359) and noted that full approval had been given by the NATO members to the text.

The note, which briefly reviewed the evolution of the Berlin crisis and proposed a four-power Foreign Ministers meeting to discuss all aspects of the German problem, was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 16. For text of the United States reply, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 9, 1959, page 333; for text of the British reply, see *Cmd.* 670, page 19, for text of the German reply, see *Moskau Bonn*, pages

515-516; for text of the French reply, see *La Documentation Française, Articles et Documents*, No. 767, February 24, 1959.

On February 13, having completed its work on the draft reply, the working group began consideration of substantive questions that might be raised at a Foreign Ministers meeting. The discussions led to the drafting of a nine-page questionnaire on these topics. (Airgram G-137 to Paris, February 16; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1659) The working group recessed on February 16, after deciding to resume deliberations in Paris in March. Documentation on the meetings of working group is *ibid.*, 762.00.

**FEBRUARY 17–MARCH 30: SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE
WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING ON BERLIN**

177. Editorial Note

Shortly after 11 a.m. on February 17, Assistant Secretary of State Merchant briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the situation in Europe with particular attention to the Berlin question. After reviewing Secretary Dulles' trip to London, Bonn, and Paris and stating that he was "entirely satisfied" with the results, Merchant explained the positions of the British, French, and West Germans on Berlin and described the meetings of the working group in Washington. Merchant stated further:

"The Secretary feels very strongly that if the Soviets are convinced of the firmness of the allied position to maintain its rights and position in Berlin, and access thereto, then there will not be a physical challenge on the part of the Soviets or the GDR to the exercise of those rights."

For text of Merchant's briefing and the questions and answers which followed, see U.S. Senate, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1959*, volume XI, pages 158–175.

**178. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department
of State**

Bonn, February 17, 1959, 3 p.m.

1795. Heidelberg for USAREUR. Paris pass CINCEUR, USRO, SHAPE. From Bruce. Every day one or more new proposals for settling German and Berlin problems are outlined by concerned citizens of various countries. Most of them seem to assume some form of reunification presents most feasible solution, without much regard to what Western position might be after concessions to attain this end. I should like to comment on certain phases question.

Reunification in freedom has been slogan of FedRep Govt, supported by its Western Allies, for many years. Today, it seems as much of a will of wisp as ever. Now we are playing around with a variation on

theme of free elections in both Germanies being necessary prelude to reunification. It consists of saying there are other ways of bringing about unity, and free elections may follow rather than precede an agreement for the joinder of territorially separated parts of a formerly integrated country.

History affords examples to support argument that chronological relationship between free elections and unification need not require the first precede the second. But in most opposite precedents proofs of previous ill-faith were not present. Now, pledges given by Soviets for future performance should be judged in light past repudiation of equally solemn engagements. This would not preclude possibility of agreement to be implemented step by step, but should render us cautious over bartering away actual positions for future prospects.

Without entering upon analysis as to whether majority of West Germans, and especially their political leaders, really believe reunification soon achievable upon terms tolerable to them, position of West, including FedRep Govt, has to date been postulated on such assumption. This has resulted in frozen policy, responsive to what people hope rather than expect.

Re-examination is in order, and beneath official surface is taking place in FedRep. For a political figure of any prominence to abandon goal of reunification would be as dangerous as for him openly to advocate the most degraded immoral practices. He must either cling stubbornly to doctrine of reunification after free elections, or, if in opposition, assert only lack of imagination and of negotiating suppleness by executive has prevented this easy coalition.

However, increasingly, people and politicians of all parties here wonder whether unification, be it called confederation, is attainable on tolerable basis. Estimate of Soviet purposes confuses and divides them, according to individual views Soviet intentions.

Let us apply our attention to one preoccupation on which opinion is split. The Allies decided in 1945 to fragmentize Germany, despite apprehensions of the forces that might later seek to rejoin the severed members. Before long, both Soviets and ourselves mutually vied in protestations of will to reverse the process.

Meanwhile, two states with different constitutional and ideological institutions had come into being. One turned freely toward West, the other, through duress, was polarized toward East. Although vast majority of East German citizens are anti-Communist, their volition is frustrated by their inability to implement it. In a police state, dissidents can[not] indulge in seditious thoughts without shaking totalitarian mastery.

Nothing seems to justify assumption that Soviets will permit free elections as preliminary to reunification, in any form, of the two Germanies. Nor would promises of free elections, after some imperfect and partial constitutional framework had been erected, be trustworthy. But the Soviets have offered a scheme with which they hope to beguile the West: confederation, out of which credulous Westerners might hope would finally evolve, because of the supposed superior attractions of West for East, an entity strongly Atlantic and permitted by the Soviets to become such.

This is a dangerous illusion to cherish or accept. In such confederation, even if Soviet troops were withdrawn from German soil, and guarantees against re-entry were effective—an optimistic theory—the influence of the Kremlin over 17 million East Germans under a Communist, and not freely elected government, possessing juridical rights equivalent to those of 52 million West Germans, would be formidable. Yet, even if this were not the case, I suppose parties to such a confederation would already have renounced membership in the Warsaw or NATO Pacts. This would be coupled with or lead to neutralization. Regardless of the size of armies permitted the two Germanies, effective neutralization of the Federal Republic would sound the death-knell of Adenauer's policy of the incorporation of FedRep in the Western European complex.

Monnet invented the so-called European idea. Adenauer contributed to it the strongest and most consistent single support. Some accuse him, as is case with all successful politicians, of cynicism, lack of conviction in respect anything for which he would stake his political existence, without alluding to other instances in which he had demonstrated high political courage and deep moral sensibility, such as reparations to Israel. On one score I have never heard even his bitterest opponents question, even while criticizing, his sincerity; that is his passionate belief in the merit of encasing Germany in a veritable Western European strait-jacket.

To destroy, entirely apart from military implications, FedRep's new-found allegiance to the West would be to kill the most promising development in Europe for centuries. One consequence would be to accept the prospect of a vital people adrift in Central Europe, without anchor or moorings, repudiated by friends, wooed by enemies.

I do not propose off-hand rejection of countless plans for settlement of German problems, but do urge that in approaching any design for German unity we bear constantly in mind that neutralization of the Federal Republic, and/or its withdrawal from NATO would deprive us of our strongest ally in Europe, and turn Germany into a floating mine.

Bruce

179. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, February 18, 1959, 7 p.m.

679. Re: Berlin. In connection Department's consideration possible use UN as element in our policy in Berlin, I wish make following comments:

1. Action in UN prior to use of force would make such use more difficult and possibly prevent it subsequently, yet force may be only way keep our lines to Berlin open. Doubtful we can get votes for strong enough resolution to justify use of force later. Fear is too great among UN representatives of any action, however justified, which might bring clash between Soviet Union and US.

2. Bringing Berlin issue to UN will inevitably lead to attempts compromise. If we rebuff these attempts, reject compromise, and particularly if we use force to maintain right of access while UN processes going on, onus may shift to us and we appear be disturbers of peace rejecting UN procedures.

3. If we see possibility of compromise acceptable US, SC might provide good forum in which develop it prior use of force. However, as I understand it, our policy is to refuse any compromise on our rights of access and to use necessary force to maintain that right. In that case, from standpoint of UN action, we would be in better position if we use what force is necessary as soon as first GDR challenge comes. Simultaneously we should take issue to SC, stating our case and reporting what we have done.

4. In these circumstances SC action would have proceed from fact our temporary control of access to assure our rights.¹ We could focus SC attention on easing immediate crisis. We would thereby avoid UN attempt at compromise on overall Western and Russian positions in Berlin. We could, for example, introduce resolution calling for cease-fire and return to status quo ante of four power control and also for four power talks, possibly within SC framework.

5. As regards UN aspects, parallel is very close between present case and situation we faced last summer over Lebanon, although in case of Berlin we can base ourselves on acknowledged prior rights to which there was no counterpart in Lebanon. We would never have gotten UN authorization to send our troops to Lebanon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-1859. Secret; Limited Distribution.

¹Next to this sentence in the source text was written "Sic!".

6. Following such an appeal to SC we would take all possible steps avoid immediate emergency GA, for which strong pressure would develop, even within SC membership. In GA, pressures for almost any kind compromise could well become so overwhelming as to jeopardize US best interests.

7. We could stall off emergency GA in two ways. First, several proposals for UN action could be initiated by ourselves and others which SC would have consider consecutively, requiring several days, and thus giving us time consolidate situation in area before GA called. Second, we could continue within SC press for four power meeting.

8. Such initiatives in Council, especially calls for four power talks, would appear as effort shift dispute back onto diplomatic plane, in accord with overwhelming desire UN members prevent spread of conflict.

9. We could increase apparent flexibility our position and increase impact our proposal for four power conference if we were also willing suggest possibility heads of state meeting also within SC framework to follow successful Foreign Ministers conferences as we suggested last summer. This was a good formula which, if properly applied, would not have endangered our interests.

10. Thus, we would have initiative in seeking peaceful solution, while actually enforcing our right of access to Berlin. We would also have initiative on summit issue through procedure we could control.

11. From point of view of maintaining best public posture for possible UN action, I also agree with Berlin's 680² that we have clearer situation if no documents shown GDR officials at all. We must keep focus on main issue, namely whether or not Soviets unilaterally can transfer to GDR control of our access to Berlin in violation our rights and against our protests. We must stand directly on principle in such way that our actions cannot be misinterpreted as quibbling. We must not let Soviet entangle main issue in debate by making it appear "Western powers risking war over legal technicality of processing documents."

Lodge

² Telegram 680, February 10, discussed how vehicles and convoys to Berlin might be identified and noted that once some identity paper was shown to a GDR official at any checkpoint it would be very difficult to prevent him from stamping it in some way. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-1059)

180. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 19, 1959, 5 p.m.

1649. 1. Stimulated by Bonn telegrams 207 and 208¹ venture submit following reflections on German problem. Should Soviets accept our proposal for Foreign Ministers meeting, it is possible they would replace Gromyko with someone like Mikoyan, in which case we should be prepared for serious substantive negotiations on both Berlin and Germany as a whole. If they are represented by Gromyko, we should be prepared for what on general German question would be largely propaganda exercise, although there might be serious negotiations on Berlin problem. I suspect they will so play matter as to lead to impasse and call for summit meeting. If any major settlement is to be reached Khrushchev will certainly wish obtain full credit for it himself and I do not believe he will reveal through Gromyko concessions he might be willing make to settle German problem. I suggest therefore we should give serious consideration to a summit conference either in event Soviets reject our present proposal or following Foreign Ministers' meeting which bogs down.

If Soviets carry out their threat of concluding separate peace treaty with East Germany, and I am inclined think they will, we may not have another opportunity to have serious attempt to settle German problem with them by negotiation. Alternatively I suggest we should be prepared engage in bilateral talks (not negotiations) with objective of ascertaining whether summit meeting could successfully be held. Despite alarm this might cause our Allies I do not believe there is one of them who would not have done so already were they in our place and I believe that if properly explained they would not seriously oppose such a step. It appears to me there is less danger in such top-level talks without agenda than there is in lower-level meetings suggested in para 3 Bonn's 207, since danger of low-level meetings is that without carefully prepared and agreed positions one or more of our Allies are likely to make concessions and our position gradually be whittled away.

2. I personally attach more importance to our propaganda position than appears indicated by Bonn's reftels. In my opinion if we can put forward reasonable-appearing proposals it will be more difficult for Khrushchev to carry his associates with him on his present line of policy with real risk of war which this involves. Moreover such proposals,

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1959. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Bonn.

¹ Printed as telegrams 1779 and 1780, Documents 173 and 174.

since they would appeal to public opinion of our Allies, should assist us in holding our Allies together and in maintaining our unity in what threatens to be very severe test of nerves. I would quite agree with Bonn that we should not abandon sound positions for transient propaganda advantage and any proposals we put forward should be such as we could live with should they be accepted by other side. There would appear, however, to be proposals which would have little chance of acceptance by Soviets but which would greatly strengthened our position before world opinion.

Greatest weakness our present position in my opinion is that it is unrealistic for us to expect Soviets either now or in future to agree to reunification of Germany on basis prior free elections, since such elections would certainly result in resounding slap in face to them and would have repercussions in Communist Bloc, particularly in Poland, which we cannot expect them to accept. Even if Germans had completely free hand to reunite their country they would be obliged maintain for transitional period much of economic system prevailing in East Germany and some changes (such as division of large estates) would doubtless have to be accepted as permanent.

It seems to me, therefore, that our proposals could provide for a transitional period of from three to five years and perhaps for separate referendum in East Germany on question whether they desired an autonomous economic and social system in a united Germany. Mikoyan indicated Soviet belief that in two or three years they could raise living standards in East Germany to something approaching those of West Germany. While I doubt that even if they are successful in this they could make the present regime acceptable to many more of East German people, they probably believe they could strengthen position of Communist Party and possibility of socialist cooperation with it in an eventual reunited Germany and could in some such period of time reduce damaging effect which reunification would have on Communist Bloc.

3. Apart from chain reaction effect on Communist Bloc principal obstacle to Soviet acceptance of settlement German problem is strategic. Here again I question whether our present proposals are realistic or represent good propaganda position. While we state we do not seek military advantage from reunification, fact remains that if our proposals were accepted Communist Bloc would not only lose more than two hundred thousand East German troops but most of these would eventually be added to Western strength. Moreover they would be deprived of certainty of their access to East German industry for military not to speak of ordinary economic production and psychologically their prestige would have been greatly diminished.

While I confess it is extremely doubtful that we could devise settlement satisfactory to us which Soviets would accept at present time, there

is much that in theory at least we could offer which would be tempting to them. I am not in a position to judge what kind of solution US could accept with safety but wish to suggest what Soviets might buy. I do not believe Soviet military would now support Khrushchev in accepting settlement which would leave Germany member of NATO. We conceivably could put forward a step by step plan which would envisage Germany's eventual withdrawal from NATO provided we made it clear Germany would be free to participate in European integration organizations of economic, political or social nature such as Common Market and Coal and Steel Community. A provision against membership in military alliances and against foreign bases along lines of Austrian Treaty provision² would, I think, be acceptable to Soviets. Another proposal to which Soviets would attach importance would be settlement of German-Polish frontier problem.

They would also attach great importance to any proposals for thinning out or withdrawal of Allied troops from Germany and to prohibition on Germany's possession of atomic armaments. Any settlement that involved these factors and by a transitional period provided against a sudden shock to Communist Bloc would, I believe, have real chance of acceptance by Soviet Union. They would be prepared to accept similar atomic limitations on Poland and Czechoslovakia and be prepared to withdraw their troops from Germany to Soviet Union in step with our withdrawal. If these military steps were phased with steps leading to reunification of Germany I should think risks involved, when considered in relation to alternatives, might be acceptable to US. As to whether West Germans could be brought to agree and whether such proposals could even be suggested to Adenauer without shaking his confidence in us I have no opinion. Assume French would also be difficult.

4. With respect to Berlin question I believe that if we and our Allies can maintain firm and united front Khrushchev would accept any solution enabling him to claim to East Germans and his own people that something had been accomplished by his move. Great danger lies in possibility of misjudgment on his part as to what our intentions actually are. In this connection Macmillan visit will be particularly important. In considering various possible solutions I suggest we should have in mind present unsatisfactory legal basis for West German access to West Berlin.

5. If we expect Soviets to discuss seriously reunification of Germany, believe we should be prepared discuss German peace treaty. We might consider whether it would be worthwhile attempting at proposed

² For text of the Austrian State Treaty, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 6, 1955, pp. 916 ff.

conference to negotiate terms of peace treaty for Germany as a whole with thought this would influence terms of probable separate Soviet-East German treaty if conference fails. In any event, suggest we should go to conference prepared with text of peace treaty acceptable to us.

6. It is true that Khrushchev, merely by putting his Berlin proposal forward, appears to have succeeded in shaking our confidence in our position, and has gained at least a temporary advantage. On the other hand, I question whether that position, however just it may have been, was ever negotiable. Today when West may be faced with decision involving real risk of nuclear war, it does not seem to me we can go to conference offering as only alternative to Russian roulette in which Khrushchev threatens to engage us, a restatement of proposals which we know Soviets will almost certainly refuse. If we are sufficiently sure our Allies will stay with us and will make our position unmistakably clear to Soviets in advance, perhaps we can run risks of such a deadly game. If not and if we do not have realistic new proposals to put forward for settlement of German problem as whole, then I believe we should have ready a compromise solution for Berlin question. If we were able to advance clear and reasonable proposals for a settlement of the German problem, we would be in strong position to stand firm on Berlin issue.

Thompson

181. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 19, 1959, 7:45 p.m.

G-397. Paris pass USCINCEUR Thurston and West. Department's 1865 to Bonn.¹ Following is text memorandum on Berlin contingency planning handed British and French Ambassadors February 18. Slight corrections suggested by British and French as given in bracketed text are acceptable to us.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Murphy and Hillenbrand, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 1865, February 18, reported that at a meeting with the French and British Ambassadors that day agreement had been reached on a memorandum covering Berlin contingency planning. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/2-1859) No other record of this meeting has been found.

"The re-examination of Berlin contingency planning which has been undertaken on the basis of the United States aide-mémoire of December 11, 1958² would be facilitated by a more precise description of the measures which would be taken to deal with and to prepare for a situation in which the USSR attempted to withdraw from its present functions with respect to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin and in which officials of the so-called 'German Democratic Republic' (GDR) refused to allow the traffic of the Three Powers to pass without submitting to some form of control.

"Agreement should therefore be reached at this time on the more detailed plan of action outlined in paragraphs 1 through 5 below.

"1. Measures To Be Taken Immediately:

"(a) The Three Powers will continue their efforts to bring about a Foreign Ministers' meeting with the USSR on the various aspects of the German question by early May [French suggested 'as indicated in instructions to Ambassadors at Moscow' instead of 'by early May']³ bearing in mind that one of the purposes of such a meeting would be to provide the USSR with a cover which could facilitate the modification or the indefinite postponement of its 'ultimatum' that it will withdraw from its functions with relation to the Three Powers' access to Berlin after May 27.⁴

"(b) In view of the possibility that the USSR may nonetheless withdraw from these functions and in order to provide evidence of the Three Powers' determination to maintain their free access, the Three Powers will, in the period between now and May 27, take quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence. These measures will be planned and co-ordinated by the military headquarters of the Three Powers in Germany.

"2. Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions:

"After the announced or attempted withdrawal of Soviet personnel from the access checkpoints, the first Allied movement via the Autobahn will be one or more trucks from Berlin accompanied by a scout car or a comparable armed vehicle. If necessary, the vehicles will be identified to the GDR officials as vehicles of one of the Three Powers, but no stamping of papers or inspection by GDR officials will be allowed. The

² See footnote 5, Document 98.

³ All brackets in the source text.

⁴ In the Soviet note of November 27, 1958 (see Document 72), Khrushchev declared that if the Berlin question were not resolved in 6 months, the Soviet Union would sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

movement will proceed toward Helmstedt until its passage is physically obstructed. It will not fire unless fired upon, but if fired upon will take whatever defensive actions seem necessary.

"3. Possible Substitution of Allied for Soviet Personnel:

"At that juncture the Three Powers should consider the possibility of substituting their own personnel for the Soviet personnel withdrawn from the Nowawes and Marienborn checkpoints.

"4. Efforts To Increase Pressure on USSR and GDR:

"If the initial probe [French suggested adding 'or probes as'] described in paragraph 2 above is physically obstructed, the Three Powers will temporarily suspend surface traffic and will make parallel efforts along the following lines to increase pressure on the USSR and the GDR:

"(a) The Three Powers will seek to mobilize world opinion against the USSR as a violator of agreements, as a user of force, and as a threat to the peace. The situation could be taken to the United Nations Security Council and, in the event of a Soviet veto, to a special session of the General Assembly. Consideration would be given to further forms of diplomatic pressure, including the withdrawal of the Ambassadors of the Three Powers from Moscow.

"(b) The Three Powers will intensify their military preparations. At this point the preparations could include measures which would be readily observable, for example, the evacuation of dependents from Berlin, and possibly from the Federal Republic.

"5. Use of Additional Military Force:

"If the measures described in paragraph 4 above do not suffice to restore the free access of the Three Powers to Berlin, the Three Governments will decide [British suggested adding 'after appropriate consultation'] whether further military pressures should be applied by the use of additional force.

"The attitude of the Three Powers towards dealing with personnel at the Nowawes and Marienborn checkpoints should be also defined more precisely with respect to two points.

"The first of these relates to the so-called 'agency principle.' The Three Powers cannot deal with GDR personnel as Soviet agents if the USSR denies that such an agency relationship exists. If, however, the USSR should ultimately propose a compromise under which the USSR, as principal, would expressly authorize GDR personnel to function as Soviet agents in performing Soviet functions with relation to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin, the Three Powers should consider the possibility of accepting such a compromise solution, with appropriate safeguards for their own rights.

"The second point involves the practical problem of identifying the vehicles of the Three Powers at the Nowawes and Marienborn check-

points in order to establish that they constitute an Allied military movement enjoying the right of unrestricted passage between Berlin and West Germany. If Soviet personnel are withdrawn from the checkpoints, there would be no objection to providing mere identification of the vehicles of the Three Powers for the information of GDR personnel at the checkpoints. Such identification should not, however, include the stamping of papers or any other form of inspection or control, and it should not be construed as acquiescence in the substitution of GDR for Soviet personnel. The Three Embassies at Bonn, after consultation with the military headquarters of the Three Powers in Germany, should determine the appropriate procedure for identifying the vehicles of the Three Powers and incorporate this identification procedure in the detailed instructions which the Embassies are now developing for Autobahn travel by military convoys and vehicles and by the privately-owned vehicles of official personnel of the Three Powers."

Herter

182. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe (Hodes) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Heidelberg, February 19, 1959, 4:44 p.m.

EC 9-964. For your information, CINCUSAREUR has approved the following actions recommended by USCOB.

A. Develop Helmstedt into a communications base with limited operational capacity by increasing size of detachment with additional communications personnel and military police. (Already initiated.)

B. Increase number of personnel per vehicle. (Already initiated.)

C. Provide vehicular radio to accompany each convoy to assure communications with checkpoints during transit. (Already directed.)

D. Increase number of single military vehicles transiting autobahn. (Do not contemplate radios with single vehicles.)

E. Increase frequency of multiple (normal) vehicle convoys as well as composition.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-1959. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State.

F. Reintroduce military police patrols on autobahn.

G. Reintroduce transportation of personnel on autobahn armed with individual and crew-served weapons.

H. Increase number of selected military police at checkpoints and call attention to them by assigning additional duties, e.g., have MP's accompany convoys to Soviet checkpoints to assist in effecting clearance.

183. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower

Moscow, February 23, 1959.

I promised to send you a further message today giving you my impressions.¹ Although I have only been here 48 hours some of these are already quite clear. From the way in which Khrushchev talked to me throughout yesterday when we were out in the country it was borne in on me that in spite of their great new power and wealth the Russians are still obsessed by a sense of insecurity. The old bogey of encirclement has not yet been laid. Like a poor man who has suddenly made a fortune they feel uneasy in their new situation and they are resentful and nervous of their neighbours. Whenever Khrushchev mentioned the Germans it was possible to sense his hatred and distrust of them.

I believe that these feelings of apprehension are just as real as are their misconceptions about Western policy. Khrushchev treated me to a diatribe about mistakes which the West had made in the past and about evil intentions which it had nurtured towards Russia. He said that we had made a wrong assessment of the situation after Stalin's death. We had counted on internal difficulties to enable us to extract concessions. We had even thought "Liberalism" might appear in Russia. We had tried to impose conditions and had followed slogans of containment, roll-back and liberation. Such concessions could not be wrung out of the Soviet Union. He did not accuse us of actually wanting war but said we had created an atmosphere of war.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret.

¹ In a message delivered on February 22 Macmillan promised to give the President a report on his visit to Moscow following his first formal meeting with Khrushchev. (*Ibid.*) For Macmillan's account of his visit, see *Riding the Storm*, pp. 592-632.

On Germany and Berlin I detected no signs that there was any weakening in their purpose. Khrushchev said that there was no room for manoeuvre or retreat from the position they had put forward. He repeated all the usual logic-chopping arguments in support of his proposals for a free city and for a peace treaty with the two sides of Germany. He said that they insisted on this position "because they saw no other way out". Berlin, reunification, peace treaty, European security were different questions. Some were more ripe for settlement than others. But in our reply of January 10² we had tried to bring them all together. He distrusted our proposals which looked to him like an attempt to draw the Soviet Government into a labyrinth of negotiation which might last for 9 or 10 years. I tried to explain why it was impossible for us to accept their proposals. I said that if the Soviet position was altogether inflexible as Khrushchev had indicated the situation was very serious indeed.

For the next day or so I propose to leave it at that and to turn discussion to other topics. We have made a start on disarmament on which they seem ready to be a little more forthcoming. They are at least prepared to discuss in practical terms questions now at issue at a nuclear tests conference. Their attitude is dominated by their conviction that we shall exploit inspection for purposes of acquiring military intelligence; but even so they are open to argument on procedures of control.³

² Apparent reference to the Western response of February 16 (see Document 176); the Soviet note on Germany is dated January 10 (see Document 124).

³ Printed from an unsigned copy.

184. Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, February 24, 1959.

DEAR HAROLD: Thank you very much for the message giving your impressions after forty-eight hours in Moscow.¹ I have no doubt that the conclusions presented in your first paragraph are quite accurate.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Attached to a brief note from Herter to Hood asking him to transmit it to the Prime Minister.

¹ Document 183.

We are of course aware of Khrushchev's apparent rigidity with respect to the Soviet attitude toward Berlin and Germany. This morning, February twenty-fourth, we received cabled extracts from the statement that he made today in Moscow² that are seemingly even more belligerent and unyielding than those he has made in the past.³

Presumably the conversations which you and he are carrying on should be producing a better atmosphere in which the West and the East can negotiate. By Khrushchev's own words he had no apparent interest in such a development. For example, he is quoted this morning as saying that, if the West should attempt to maintain contact with Berlin either by ground or by air, such an attempt would be considered a "threat of war."

To attempt to draw any conclusion as to his basic purpose in such statements would be nothing more than an exercise in speculation. However, it seems that he is intensifying his efforts to create division within the Western group and thus to weaken our resolution. In effect he is saying, "We are destroying the Western rights in Germany and in Berlin, and if you make any attempt to defend those rights you are guilty of aggression and warlike acts."

Tomorrow morning I shall probably have some searching questions put to me by the press respecting the latest statement of Khrushchev, and the rigidity of the line he is taking.⁴ I shall say as little as possible, particularly during the duration of your visit. However, I believe I should reiterate that the West is a unit in its determination to defend its rights and to carry out its responsibilities respecting Berlin, and that, while we are completely ready to negotiate where there is any possible negotiable ground, we are not going to be divided or defeated by threats.

With warm regard,

As ever,

Ike

² For text of Khrushchev's speech to the workers of the Kalinin district of Moscow, February 24, in which he insisted on a summit conference to solve the German question, see *Pravda*, February 25, 1959.

³ In a draft attached to the source text the following paragraph appears at this point: "Moreover, at the very moment he is insisting that a Foreign Ministers meeting is out and that there should be a Heads of Government meeting, he tells you, as the Head of a major Western Government, that the Soviet position on these vital questions permits no room for maneuver. In effect he is saying that even a Heads of Government meeting would be completely useless except as it would give opportunity for a combined surrender by the West to the East."

⁴ For the transcript of President Eisenhower's press conference on February 25, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 208-218.

185. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, February 24, 1959, 7 p.m.

702. For Herter and Wilcox from Lodge. Reference: Berlin.

1. Pursuant Acting Secretary's authorization to acquaint SYG with gravity with which US Government regarded possible developments re Berlin, I saw Hammarskjöld yesterday noon.¹ Conversation turned out to be, on this subject, equally desired from Hammarskjöld's side.

2. After relating deep concern in highest civilian circles of US Government that Soviets might, from unobjective assessment of US opinion, miscalculate regarding basic unity of American people with regard to foreign policy in general and Berlin situation in particular, I expressed in strongest possible terms what I understood to be firm determination to stand on our rights in Berlin and, if necessary, to defend them even at risk of war.

3. Hammarskjöld, without batting an eyelash, expressed view that any hostilities in Western or Central Europe could not possibly be limited and would inevitably lead to outbreak of full-scale war. SYG said he did not for a moment himself misunderstand American opinion regarding Berlin. He said he had "become enough of an American" since being here to realize and discount domestic political game and not mistake it for basic cleavage in outlook where national interests were concerned.

4. SYG said his own desire to discuss this with us had come from his reading of two articles in *NY Times* Sunday and Monday² on Berlin situation. He noted in both articles an apparent intention to involve UN without, so far as he was aware, any explicit appreciation of what was possible. He said he saw UN's role in Berlin controversy in two categories: (a) as constructive forum or springboard for action such as four power talks or other negotiations which could lead to an end or easing of present crisis; or (b) as kind of cloak for action already determined on which could, as an abuse of UN, both mark beginning of end for UN itself and neither lessen present tension nor contribute to any real solution of problem. SYG was concerned that, at this stage, both Russians, in their off-hand references to UN role in Berlin, and West, as reflected in Washington and Bonn *NY Times* stories, seemed to be taking latter road.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2459. Secret; Limited Distribution.

¹ On February 21 Herter had authorized Lodge to inform Hammarskjöld of the extreme concern that the United States had about the Berlin situation. (*Ibid.*, UNA Files: Lot 61 D 91, Berlin)

² February 22 and 23.

He strongly hoped this was not case and urged we do everything possible avoid misusing UN in this fashion, or putting UN in what he called "false position". He stressed that using UN as cover and nothing more would produce adverse reaction in majority of members.

5. He felt nothing of clear nature could be known re Russian intentions before conclusion of Macmillan's visit to Moscow. In his opinion, "pipe and tweed approach" of Macmillan could not fail to produce something present attitude regarding Berlin. At another point he referred to conversations with Mayor Willy Brandt, who, he said, did not for moment doubt there were "back doors" in Soviet position.

6. Having given matter considerable thought, SYG's guess as to Soviet motivations was that East Germans have been "nagging" Soviets and are seeking to wring some concession, by way of increased status for their regime, from USSR. SYG further believes Soviets basically do not want to risk all-out war. Therefore, he surmises, problem as seen from Soviet eyes is how much of concession Moscow can make to East Germans without endangering their basic "no war" policy. SYG sees many shadings in possible concessions Russians might give to East Germans. Their action might be confined simply to turning over East Berlin to GDR, without any role for GDR in connection with access of Western Powers to Berlin. Next on scale could be grant of certain low-level functions to GDR at checkpoints without any real authority. Beyond such minor measures, Soviets could of course grant more extensive powers to East Germans. Hammarskjold inclined believe Russians will try to get away with minimum concessions necessary to keep East Germans happy.

7. SYG said he will undoubtedly be faced with considerable discussion of Berlin situation while he is in Moscow. In order to be of value in development of situation, he feels he ought to be acquainted as much as possible with thinking of Western Governments at latest possible moment before his arrival in Moscow on 24 March. Dixon (UK) has promised provide him with full report on Macmillan's visit. He hoped US might for its part be able to give him last minute assessment either in sealed written form through Swedish channels in Washington or by calling it to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow if time did not permit pouch delivery from Washington before his arrival. By then, he said, we would have been able to assess results of Macmillan visit as well as having taken into account any nuances detectable in further Soviet utterances this subject.

8. As far as UN role is concerned, he will for present continue to take, as he has so far, line that it is too premature to go into. He said he could not at present moment, given his present lack of information on

what is basically at stake, come up with any concrete suggestions as to any role UN might play in Berlin.

9. In closing this part of conversation, SYG reiterated his concern, as indicated above, that UN could be placed in "false position." Having emphasized this point so strongly, he seems to us to want to be kept fully in picture as our planning may progress on use of UN. He also seems genuinely concerned at possibility we would hide behind UN's skirts and then proceed to direct action, using as justification our having gone to UN and exhausted all possible remedies short of use of force.

Lodge

**186. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the
Department of State**

Moscow, February 25, 1959, 6 p.m.

1687. I find it difficult to judge what is maneuver in Khrushchev's speech¹ and what is his genuine and firmly held position. From toughness of his speech it would appear that he has judged Macmillan visit and such developments as Mansfield speech² as signs of weakness and he is evidently convinced he can exploit Macmillan visit to his advantage. There have been many indications that Khrushchev is so determined upon a summit meeting that he is deliberately building up tension with a view to bringing this about. Whether at such a meeting, if it took place, he would be willing to make genuine effort reach reasonable settlement is certainly open to question but I think it is quite clear that he will not reveal his hand on any lower level. In judging his speech suggest the following considerations should be taken into account.

I believe Khrushchev is genuinely convinced Foreign Ministers' meeting would not resolve any major problems and would be used by US to probe Soviet position and drag out negotiations interminably. I believe he is also convinced that if Germany remains tied to West and no

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/2-2559. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 184.

² See footnote 2, Document 175.

agreement is reached on prohibition atomic tests it will eventually obtain atomic weapons and be in position to threaten Soviet Satellites and possibly involve US and USSR in military conflict. Even though this may be true of West Germany alone he believes his possession of East Germany reduces threat and particularly threat to instability of Communist regime in Poland. As indicated by Mikoyan in US³ and by Kosygin to me yesterday,⁴ Soviets apparently believe that by raising standard of living in East Germany they can consolidate hold of Communist regime there in next few years particularly if Berlin problem can somehow be resolved. At any rate he doubtless considers that reunification at later date would be less damaging to Communist Bloc than now, as not only would they be able to show progress in East Germany and build up support for Communist Party, but also by that time Soviet Bloc will in his opinion have further successes and be better able to accept a retreat if this should become necessary. A further factor in Khrushchev's thinking in my opinion is that he is convinced that neither British, French nor West Germans genuinely desire German reunification and basing himself on this he assumes West will in the end accept continued division and settlement of Berlin question in manner which will consolidate this division. It would also appear that he has taken our willingness to have East Germans present in Foreign Ministers' meeting as further indication we are prepared accept continued division. As he puts it "if you accept a you must accept b."

French Ambassador informs me that in conversation with him last night Khrushchev confirmed main points his speech but with three additions. He mentioned that Poles and Czechs should participate but without "voix deliberative".⁵ He also said that if they did not succeed in obtaining our agreement to a peace treaty they would proceed to conclude one with East Germany just as we had done with Japan. He also indicated that Foreign Ministers' meeting could follow summit meeting.

Macmillan's conversations should throw further light on Soviet tactics and policies but before Soviets have made formal reply to our note it would seem advisable that if we express any reaction it should be strong one and it would be preferable for it to come first from Macmillan rather than from us. From what I have heard however this appears unlikely.

Thompson

³ See Documents 121 and 135-137.

⁴ Thompson discussed Khrushchev's speech and the Berlin question with Kosygin at a reception the night of February 24. (Telegram 1686 from Moscow, February 25; Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/2-2559)

⁵ "The right to speak and vote".

187. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower

Moscow, February 25, 1959.

DEAR FRIEND, Thank you very much for your message of February 24.¹ You have just about summed up what Khrushchev is in effect saying to us. In fact I used very much the same words when I was telling him today what I thought his attitude amounted to.

I think that I had a pretty useful conversation from our point of view and that it left him disappointed. I would not respond to his pleas that I should advance some fresh proposals for Germany and Berlin. I stuck to the point that nothing that he could do would extinguish our rights of access to Berlin and our determination to do our duty by staying there. I said that it was he who was threatening us with war and not the other way round and that this kind of thing did not square with his professed desire to settle our differences by negotiation. The two positions taken up by each side were not reconcilable. Since it was no use his thinking that he could force us to abandon our rights and our duties he must make up his mind to negotiate with us in a sensible way. As to the level and agenda of negotiations I was not going to argue about that with him in Moscow. He must answer our Note of February 16² and we would then consult with our allies.

Atmosphere has been very cool since his speech of yesterday. I have told him Doctor Adenauer whom he had insulted was my friend and that I hardly believed that he would think well of me if I did not stand by my friend. I said that precisely because the situation which lay ahead was so dangerous I must make it absolutely clear to him that the British Government would stand by and cooperate with their allies.

Almost the only point on which we found ourselves in agreement today is that the situation might in fact become extremely serious. I do not pretend that I have shaken his resolve any more than he has shaken ours. On the contrary all indications are that he means to go ahead with his plan for turning over approaches to Berlin to D.D.R. and for making a peace treaty with them. But at least I hope that my language may have had some good effect in making him realize the strength of our determination and what is involved.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. Transmitted to Herter by Ambassador Hood under a February 26 note for delivery to the President.

¹ Document 184.

² See Document 176.

It is on this rather dark note that I am now leaving for a four day journey around Russia. I thought that you would like to have my latest news before I set off.

With warm regards,
As ever,

Harold³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**188. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the
Department of State**

New York, February 26, 1959, 5 p.m.

711. Re: Berlin. I went to lunch which Sobolev¹ gave as SC President today. He greeted me at door and asked me how I was. Conversation paraphrased as follows:

Lodge: I am worried about the news from Moscow which seems to represent a dangerous state of mind. I am afraid of hazardous events taking place. I wonder whether the Soviet Government understands that Americans are both firm and undivided on the subject of Berlin. I am not worried about dangerous incidents if the Soviet Government proceeds on correct information, but I fear they misinterpret the informal and apparently casual character of domestic politics as indicating division.

Sobolev: I have not seen the text of Khrushchev's statement and could not comment on it, but I am sure that Khrushchev knows very well that there is no division in the United States on the subject of Berlin. I believe Mikoyan brought back to Moscow the thought that America is united on that subject. I agree that the Soviet Union should understand the true state of affairs in the United States. But the United States should understand the true state of affairs in the Soviet Union.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2659. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

¹ Arkady A. Sobolev, Soviet Representative to the U.N. Security Council.

Lodge: I am well aware of the Soviet Union's fear about Germany. I understand why the Soviet Union, having been devastated in World War I and again in World War II by the German Army should have these feelings.

Sobolev: If you really understand why we feel as we do about Germany, you would understand almost everything we do. I don't know what you are worrying about. We are not about to shoot.

Lodge: But are you not going to block roads and take steps of that type?

Sobolev: You must understand that we definitely intend to get out of Berlin. If there are no negotiations ahead of time there will be a very serious situation.

Lodge: Why then don't you have a Foreign Ministers' meeting to conduct such negotiations?

Sobolev: There should be a meeting at the summit. They can do more than a Foreign Ministers' meeting can do. In connection with the press report of the Khrushchev statement remember that the press exaggerates everything. There are 100 press people in Moscow who are there for the Macmillan visit. There are few news sources in Moscow and they simply make a lot of things up.

During lunch I talked to SYG about this conversation. He believed that the motivation for Khrushchev's statement was fact that he was being nagged unmercifully by East Germans. He thought Sobolev's insistence on summit meeting was due to fact that Khrushchev wanted to come to New York, saying that Khrushchev had childish streak in his nature and was resentful at not being taken seriously everywhere. He thought that after job which New York police did in protecting Mikoyan, there was no significant security risk in bringing Khrushchev here.

Lodge

189. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 28, 1959, 11 a.m.

1895. From Bruce. Van Scherpenberg sent for me last night at insistence Chancellor (home nursing cold without fever) and FonMin (home

with bad case influenza). Said they and himself, despite efforts comply with US request to advance ideas regarding solution German problems felt they had nothing novel to contribute. Whatever views they had in security field they were reluctant to put forward lest they seem to disregard what might be American security interests far more important than their own. I could develop nothing from this cryptic statement, which I personally feel reveals what already reported by Embassy: (1) difficulty obtaining constructive suggestions from FedRep; (2) dissatisfaction of Chancellor with Working Group papers, including German, thus far prepared.

State Secretary continued that, because of above situation, they would welcome a visit to Bonn before March 9 Paris meeting by some high level Dept officer, preferably Murphy or Merchant, with whom they could have frank and secret discussions. This could take place March 6, 7 or 8 and last only a day. He asked if I saw any objection. I answered I knew the officers named were even busier than usual, and could venture no guess as to availability. Second I thought, especially under prevailing circumstances, visit to Bonn would be misconstrued in other capitals and give rise to widespread speculation. He responded US officer could also go Paris and London.

I asked what, if anything, he wished me to do. He said if I had no objection, they would transmit request through Ambassador Grewe, and would I please support it. I told him I would report it, that nothing would please me more than to have Murphy or Merchant come here, such talks would indeed be useful, but Dept alone could decide as to availability or advisability.

My own reaction is that it has always been productive to have Secretary, or failing him, some high Washington official in whom Chancellor has confidence, see him, hear his latest comments on foreign policy and relate our own. Under such circumstances I believe he talks with greater freedom than he does to his own associates. At present, he is pre-occupied over his talks with de Gaulle on March 4, and those he will have later with Macmillan, as well as fear Working Groups Paris may develop undesirable plans. In addition, he is naturally very concerned over Berlin, reception Macmillan in Moscow, etc. However, in this instance, I think the timing is bad, and Soviets as well as others might construe and propagandize such meeting as showing uncertainty on part West.

Bruce

190. **Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State**

Paris, February 28, 1959, 6 p.m.

Polto 2445. Re: NAC meeting (private) February 28. *Summary:* Meeting called at UK request to present Macmillan's "preliminary impressions" Russian attitude. Macmillan found no signs weakening Russian intention turn over to East Germany May 27 control access to Berlin and sign peace treaty. Khrushchev did not give Macmillan prior notice Feb 24 speech but covered much of ground subsequently covered in speech. Re disarmament, Khrushchev showed no keenness resume surprise attack talks¹ but hoped heads of govt could reach agreement on security which would benefit both sides.

In discussion following UK report, Spaak stated now clear West would be faced with crisis May 27 and he worried re slowness development Western position and lack preparation Western public opinion for May 27 showdown. Discussion also brought out possibility there would be no four-power conference on Germany or Berlin. Need for full discussion in NAC emphasized. US stressed importance firm Western position in face situation likely to arise on May 27. *End summary.*

UK Perm Rep stated he had been asked by Macmillan give NAC impressions which not necessarily final views, at conclusion formal talks with Khrushchev. Unlikely further discussion scheduled for March 2 would add anything new. Felt Russians still obsessed by sense insecurity, bogey encirclement and apprehension re neighbors—this in spite of their new power. Soviet leaders convinced West putting pressure on them since Stalin's death in belief Soviet weakened internally.

Re Germany and Berlin, in addition to points noted above, Khrushchev claimed he distrusted Western proposals as putting too many questions together and designed draw Soviets into long inconclusive discussions. Russians insist on their proposals. Khrushchev apparently chose regard Macmillan's statement UK would stand firmly by Western Allies and uphold Western rights in Berlin as threat. Had reiterated intentions re turn over access to Berlin and signature peace treaty. Said "Soviet Govt would regard any subsequent violations of DDR as act of war".

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4161/2-2859. Secret. Transmitted in two sections; repeated to London, Bonn and Moscow; and pouched to all other NATO capitals.

¹ Documentation on the surprise attack talks at Geneva, November 10–December 18, 1958, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

On disarmament, Macmillan detected some slight give. Khrushchev skeptical of disarmament commission but thought Heads of Govt might find "mutual interest in some system of security of advantage to both sides". Was suspicious that inspection scheme merely device for espionage but concerned at possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by other powers.

Non-aggression pact not mentioned to Macmillan by Khrushchev.

In response to Spaak question, UK Perm Rep said Khrushchev had not indicated whether West would get formal replies to notes November [January] 10. In response Belgium question, said Khrushchev had not raised with Macmillan subject of summit talks. Khrushchev also told UK Delegation he intended trip to Berlin and Leipzig after conclusion UK visit.

US thought it very wholesome NAC considering new situation in such serious fashion, pointed to very thorough and serious consideration being given to problem by govts, and thorough public discussion. Recognized we had already advanced several concessions, as Belgian Perm Rep noted, which had had no response. Speaking personally thought there seemed evidence Soviets do not want conference and even if one held might not help Berlin situation. Therefore Alliance must face firmly what may happen on May 27. Thought major importance attached to insuring that Alliance strong and united enough to find way to deal with that situation.

Re preparing Western public opinion, admitted govts have not revealed positions but called attention to extensive public debates in Parliament, Congress and elsewhere which certainly focused public attention on problem. Thought four powers fully recognized importance of preparing Western public opinion.

Council agreed that response inevitable press enquiries re subject this hastily called NAC session, would be "no comment".

Canada agreed with Spaak's general remarks. Thought Canadian Govt would take line no question of procedure should stand in way of meeting with Soviets before May 27, or at least setting date for such meeting. Felt there was something to Khrushchev's remark that too many questions being put to him. Priority may have to be given negotiation of Berlin question. Concluded this may be last time West can discuss German problem in four-power context.

Spaak underlined importance Canadian statement and warned that at some point there will be great temptation place problem before UN. If this happens, UN can only work out compromise which not in

accord with Western position. Did not blame UN but it is its business to work out compromises.

Belgium noted West had hinted concessions re free elections and some degree recognition GDR. Asked why we could not make concession of giving Russians summit meeting they wanted. Emphasized Russians had already rejected four power meeting and wondered whether Khrushchev would not continue to insist on including Czechs and Poles.

Spaak, in addition to points noted in summary above, observed it was clear negotiations with Russians impossible. Soviet position legally inadmissible but difficulty was no court existed before which West could argue case. Must admit that when Khrushchev alleged there was nothing in Western reply of February 16 he was not entirely wrong for that note procedural only. Admitted NAC had been given ample time comment on Western reply but nobody had done so.

Lack of Soviet good faith makes difficulty for West in dealing with its public opinion. We must prepare this opinion for Soviet move May 27. Folly to face Western opinion with grave situation without preparation. Worried lest little progress in developing substantive position be made during working group sessions Paris and noted Ministers now not meeting until first part April.

UK thought on contrary working group would make considerable progress.

Burgess

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 28, 1959, 4:44 p.m.

1953. Paris pass USCINCEUR. Bonn pass USAREUR. Following is summary discussion today in which British and French Ambassadors presented their Governments' views on our February 18 Berlin contingency planning memorandum. (Department's G-397 to Bonn).¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2859. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Hillenbrand, and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, and Moscow. Paragraph 4 was transmitted to Lodge in New York on March 2 in telegram 722. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/3-259)

¹ Document 181.

1. After discussion Alphanth proposal that coordination should take place Washington of preparatory military measures contemplated para 1 (b) G-397 following language suggested as substitute for last sentence para 1 (b): "Recommendations for preparatory measures, regardless of origin, will be referred to national Chiefs-of-Staff and thereafter be coordinated tripartitely or NATO-wide as may be agreed, bearing in mind the availability of military advisers in Washington."

Caccia said he could accept this and Alphanth agreed refer to Paris. Consensus appeared be that measures affecting forces in Germany should be coordinated in first instance in Germany.

2. Caccia questioned whether direction of initial probe discussed para 2 G-397 should be from Berlin to Helmstedt or vice versa. Murphy agreed question of direction could be left open although on balance probe from Helmstedt to Berlin might be preferable.

3. Alphanth questioned practicality of substitution Allied for Soviet personnel discussed para 3 G-397. Murphy explained background this suggestion is legal concept Four Powers have joint tenancy of Auto-bahn and Three Powers would succeed to Soviet rights if latter withdraw. Caccia suggested we might raise this idea at some earlier point in discussions with Soviets, pointing out to latter we would have right to take over if they withdraw and seeing how they react. Was agreed words "at this juncture" should be omitted.

4. Alphanth expressed reservations about recourse to UN suggested para 4 (a) G-397, fearing that attempt use UN as means of mobilizing world opinion against Soviets might result in getting UN involved in substance of German problem, which would be very undesirable. Caccia took position UN representatives of Three Powers should urgently study feasibility using UN in manner proposed. Murphy pointed out recourse to UN to mobilize opinion suggested only as possibility, that tactics would have to be worked out, but that we considered it possible get favorable vote in Security Council. Was agreed feasibility and advisability of recourse to UN to mobilize opinion should be studied by three UN representatives on urgent basis. Was also agreed "or other" should be inserted after "diplomatic" para 4 (a) G-397.

5. Alphanth inquired whether military preparations discussed para 4 (b) G-397 excluded garrison airlift and stated garrison airlift should be instituted at this point even if land operation contemplated. Murphy replied we did not exclude such airlift as eventuality but did not believe it necessary make concrete preparations now and fear the psychological effect of leaks of information we are preparing for airlift. Caccia referred to problem of maintaining civil air traffic to Berlin and said air traffic problem may develop into passenger airlift problem.

Caccia added para E December 11 aide-mémoire² should now be made mandatory. Was agreed additional paragraph should be included in memorandum (text to be worked out later) instructing Embassies at Bonn to proceed with various aspects of air access contingency planning.

6. Alphanth suggested economic countermeasures might be used as pressures in addition to military pressures discussed para 5 G-397. Was agreed omit redundant words "by use of additional force" para 5 and add sentence "Supplementing military pressures, consideration might be given to possible economic measures."

7. Re agency question discussed penultimate para G-397 Caccia suggested we might adopt active rather than passive role and put matter to Soviets in following terms: "If you wish to divest yourselves of your rights and obligations, this must be done in the appropriate form. The rights are your affair, but in handing over to the DDR you also hand over the obligations towards ourselves. We are willing to accept a formal assignment to the DDR on condition that (a) we do not recognize the DDR as a Government but as the authority designated by you for this purpose, and (b) you yourselves, and the DDR as the authority designated by you, guarantee to us that the obligations which you have incurred will continue to be carried out."

8. Re identification procedures discussed last para G-397 Caccia said British might be prepared accept time-stamp, perhaps on separate piece of paper, as appropriate means of identifying Allied movements. Murphy reiterated US objection to any stamping of papers by GDR. Caccia added British acceptance language para 2 G-397 re initial probe was understanding words "stamping of papers or" omitted. Assume British will take this position when Three Embassies study identification procedures.

9. Alphanth inquired whether and when it was contemplated warning to Soviets per para A US December 11 aide-mémoire would be sent. Caccia said British did not want further communication to Soviets until latter reply to February 16 notes. Murphy indicated we had no firm opinion on what "appropriate time" for such communication would be and pointed out we had made our case to Soviets in part in our protest against recent delay in clearance of convoy at Helmstedt.

10. It was our understanding British and French Governments accepted memorandum subject to comments above.

Herter

²See footnote 5, Document 98.

192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 28, 1959, 9:19 p.m.

1954. For Bruce from Acting Secretary. Re urtel 1895.¹ German suggestion that Murphy or Merchant visit Bonn next week presents such serious difficulties that we doubt it would be feasible to arrange this. In these circumstances there seem to be two alternative responses to this request on which I would like to have your views urgently.

A) The first alternative is following letter from me to Chancellor, which you could deliver or which could be delivered to Grewe if he transmits the request mentioned in your tel:

"I have received a message from Ambassador Bruce which gives me the impression that you may be feeling uneasy about developments, particularly about the direction which a quadripartite review of our positions might take. The Ambassador indicated that you might like to see one of our senior officers whom you know, such as Bob Murphy or Livie Merchant. Much as I appreciate your concern, I think this would not be feasible in the present circumstances. In the Secretary's absence, both are carrying additional burdens, of course, and both are well enough known that some harmful speculation might result from a trip to Bonn.

"As you know from your talks with the Secretary and from the fact that he was our careful selection to place next to so esteemed a friend, the President and the Secretary have full confidence in the discretion and judgment of David Bruce. I hope that in these present circumstances you will feel confident that you can talk with him with complete freedom and frankness. We do need the benefits of your thoughts.

"I hope that this message will find you in the best of health."

B) The second alternative would be to reply orally, explaining difficulties noted in A about sending somebody to Bonn, expressing full confidence in you, and saying that we are prepared to call you home at once for consultations. You could thus bring with you any thoughts that the Chancellor particularly wants us to have and further receive from us our latest thinking, for you to communicate to him on your return. FYI. I envisage that under this alternative you might in addition to having useful substantive consultations here in Department, be able also to call on Secretary briefly and possibly on the President. While such calls cannot be assured in advance, perhaps if arranged they would serve to

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2859. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Greene and cleared by Herter and Merchant.

¹ Document 189.

strengthen the impression of close consultation between us and German Government, which seems to be latter's principal motive.

If any other way of dealing with this request commends itself to you I would, of course, welcome your suggestions.²

Herter

² On March 1 Bruce replied that alternative A should not be used and that an oral statement either by him or an official of the Department of State to Grewe was warranted only if the Germans requested it. (Telegram 1898 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–159) On March 2 Grewe discussed the question with Merchant who stated that it would be physically impossible to have a senior officer visit Bonn. But Merchant stated that Bruce would go to Paris for the second week of the working group meetings, then visit Washington before returning to Bonn to brief the Chancellor on the latest U.S. position. (Memorandum of conversation, March 2; *ibid.*, 762.00/3–259)

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, March 2, 1959, 1 p.m.

1899. Paris pass USCINCEUR, USRO, SHAPE. From Bruce. On basis assessment contained Moscow 210 Feb 19 to Dept¹ as to improbability German settlement being agreed by Soviets unless there were prospective withdrawal of FedRep from NATO, and other concessions to attainment reunification in freedom, I should like to make following observations.

I wonder if generally accepted theory that division of Germany constitutes immediate threat peace of world is sound. Partly because of belief in this theory, coupled with moral distaste for inhuman separation of kindred peoples, West has supported certain policies directed at achieving reunification.

But is this division really a primary source of dangerous tensions, or has it become mere symbol of underlying US–USSR power struggle, exploited by each side to influence public opinions? The conflict between free world and international communism is global; its manifestations in Germany are local expression of hostility between irreconcilable political philosophies.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–259. Secret; Priority; Noform; Limited Distribution. Transmitted in three sections and repeated to Berlin, Heidelberg, Moscow, Paris, and London.

¹ Printed as telegram 1649, Document 180.

The West is not under dire pressure, except in Berlin, to give up its present posture in Central Europe and consent to German unity on basis other than free elections. The attack is rather directed against its defensive commitments, alleged by Communists to be dangerous and aggressive while cloaked in garb of being defensive. As regards Berlin, undoubted peril exists that rejection of Soviet proposals might create conditions susceptible engendering global war.

Perhaps Soviets have welcomed and wish perpetuate contention over German unity, for opportunities it gives them denounce war-mongering Western planners, and "revanchist" designs FedRep leaders. Hoping ultimately to yoke both Germanies to Communist chariot, they try to exploit Western insistence reunification issue by dangling prospect realization this goal in return for far-reaching concessions.

What are concessions most attractive to Soviets? Certainly, those calculated further to advance their ambition to subvert FedRep, diminish and finally eliminate its dependence upon and affiliation with Atlantic Bloc. To accomplish this, I would judge they consider dominance over East Germany consolidates a major center of European operations, with strategy determined by and commands issued from Kremlin. Moreover, East Germany is that Soviet asset most likely to disrupt Western solidarity if adroitly and temptingly utilized.

If, as argued in recent telegrams (Embtels 1779, 1780, 1795)² Soviets, on balance, may be rather contented with actual control over Pankow, and unwilling relinquish existing position of strength and consequent capacity to confuse, frighten and embarrass West, except in return for detachment of FedRep from Western allegiance, concessions they would demand for any weakening their own position are likely to be greater than West, in its own interests, can afford to pay.

So long as Soviets may believe end our policy toward Germany is to bring about reunification, they will demand much and give little. People in East Zone, though unreconciled to Communist regime, have learned how to live with it, though unwillingly and under duress. Many of the most vigorous have fled (leaving a gap in resistance leadership), but the vast majority can not do so, and are progressively impelled to adjust themselves to their lot.

Soviets may wish to maintain truncated Germany for strategic, political, economic, security advantages. To allow unity two Germanies in freedom would strip them of such advantages, and increase whatever fears they entertain of German vitality. If they already apprehensive lest rearmed FedRep might, through military adventurism, draw them into

² Documents 173, 174, and 178.

world conflict, how much more might they fear potential of 17 million more Germans added to those already inimical?

For many reasons, would seem to me logical Soviets would prefer Germany divided, as permanently as possible, unless confederation on conditions dictated by them feasible. If so, one assumption heretofore made by some Western politicians and commentators requires re-examination, namely, that Soviets might be induced to make deal over future of Germany on terms sufficiently reasonable to satisfy West, because Soviets, to avoid continuing dangers German problems, would make sacrifices to have Germanies united rather than separated.

Unless Working Group preparing Western position reaches realistic estimate value to Soviets present control East Germany, I anticipate it may advocate dangerous compromises in illusory hope tempting Soviets some reunification plan.

It may be that negotiations with Soviets will bring out hard choice that may be confronting US; either retention FedRep in Atlantic complex, or German reunification on terms exposing FedRep to Communist domination by weakening Western security position. Unlikely Soviets would permit US shelter in half-way house. If such choice had to be made, I would unhesitatingly select former alternative, even though price paid for it might well be provisional renunciation of hope or expectation of a reunited Germany.

We should ground US policy on refusal to admit any impairment of attachment of FedRep to NATO and other Western institutions, and permit no diminution of its equal rights and obligations in relation thereto. For better or worse, FedRep must be treated by US with full confidence; to discriminate against it and reduce it to second-rate and limited partnership would be to invite later infidelity.

Monolithic Adenauer will, I believe, until dying breath, demand continued incorporation of his Republic in Atlantic Community, no matter what cost in frustration elsewhere. But in his own party, and to greater extent in the opposition, are many who, fearful, uneasy, might barter away present FedRep independence, as an equal amongst equals in Atlantic Community, for what might prove to be only temporary accommodation with Soviets. This is particularly true under present circumstances when they are agitated over what may result from Berlin crisis.

If above analysis is even half correct, we must be armed against surprises, and ready to establish our own minimum conditions in any interchanges with Soviets. I, for one, would concede them nothing in the way of retreating from our existing, and not unfavorable or untenable, status in Europe. If they undertake to dislodge us from it at risk of general war, I should rather accept that risk now than later. It may be West Germans

and other Allies will seek to undermine our determination, by advocating (though unlikely on part of FedRep while Adenauer lives) FedRep departure from NATO as a concession to Soviets on reunification.

As to European security proposals, we should be ready to debate them, but remain resolved to preserve at all costs FedRep's full association with the West. The only permissible exception might be limitations in military field if, after profound examination, we decide that such measures are fully consistent with the maintenance of a security position in Europe at least as favorable to us as present one, and if similar limitations apply to certain other NATO and Warsaw Pact powers, so that FedRep is not singled out for discrimination.

However, important bear in mind possible political repercussions agreement between Soviets and ourselves involving limitations on, or changes in disposition of, Western troops, particularly American. Any such agreement likely be publicized by Soviets, as well as Western press, as promising first step on road relaxation of tensions, thus encouraging Western public assume and expect corresponding progress political field. Unless even limited measures military agreement reflect at least some degree substantial progress toward solution political issues, they may unleash prematurely unjustified optimism and harmful diminution of will resistance Western peoples.

It is, I imagine, likely that our position in Berlin is such that best we can hope for there (and then only in light determination if necessary, to resort to nuclear war) is to maintain status quo, with constant threat of having Soviets or GDR persevere in their harassment. Our present position is one we may only be able sustain by unilateral action. For though General de Gaulle, a man of fixed principles, seems unyielding in his attitude, forces he can devote to world conflict are deficient in modern armaments and, as consequence of their actual deployment, unlikely to contribute to our strength. As for British, their diplomatic and national habits, their pragmatic approach to international problems, persuade them to deal with facts, not hypotheses, and often to make plans only after the event. However, once die were cast, if war ensued, they would, as always, be most dependable of allies.

So, if we go it alone, in the direction of nuclear war, we can certainly not count on full support until after our own forces are about to be committed. In case of West Germans, even so stout a friend as the Chancellor has revealed decided hesitation over awful prospect of recourse to total war.

If Khrushchev rejects our proposal for Foreign Ministers' conference, think we would find our Allies unwilling to avoid summit conference. In such case, would deem better to have such conference take form of meeting of Chiefs of State in New York, under auspices of Security Council, with opportunity afforded for private conversations between

President Eisenhower and Khrushchev (UN tels to Dept circular 998, 999, 1000).³

If this does not take place, or fails to establish agreement, and there is no bluff on either side, Soviet or American, the issue may be joined, not inadvertently, but because both sides have gone too far to beat retreat. At this point, last chance would be to have President Eisenhower, either by personal message to Khrushchev, or in hastily arranged meeting with him, emphasize shattering effects of failure to solve Berlin problem.

But how can Berlin problem be solved in any forum without sacrificing freedom of West Berliners, or, even graver in long run, leading to detachment of FedRep from West? The abandonment by US of Berliners would destroy confidence in our engagements everywhere, even in those uncommitted countries that presently criticize our announced intention to maintain our rights and protect those who rely on us.

I had hoped Berlin problem need not be treated in isolation, but could be dealt with in connection with consideration of larger affairs, in which it could be softened and absorbed. This may no longer be possible if Khrushchev holds to his recent utterances. Therefore, at least for planning purposes, we must prepare for situation where fate of Berlin will depend on understanding between USSR and ourselves being reached.

If any understanding be possible, what considerations should govern our conduct of negotiations? First of all, honor. We are pledged not to abandon people of West Berlin. But even if actual unsatisfactory status quo were continued, prospects for future are dim, for whether it be Soviets or GDR who give turn of the screw, we will still be vulnerable. Our position is minimal, we have nothing to trade except out of our flesh and blood. To yield little is to yield everything. It is most unlikely that the Soviets or GDR would regard, as has sometimes been suggested, the closing down of RIAS, or the curtailment of our intelligence operations, as really significant. What they want is the whole hog. And, in the absence of our unshaken will to plunge, if required, into a nuclear conflict, they are in position at worst to subject Western occupants of Berlin to almost unbearable strains or, at best, to drive them from it, denuded of honor and prestige, and expose US particularly as paper tiger.

³ Circular telegrams 998, 999, and 1000 transmitted to Bonn, Paris, London, Berlin, and Moscow the texts of telegrams 711, 710, and 716, February 27, from USUN. (Circular telegrams; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2759) Telegram 711 is printed as Document 188. Telegram 710, February 26, reported that the idea of a summit meeting at the U.N. Security Council had great merit. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2659) Telegram 716, February 26, transmitted Lodge's ideas on the merits of taking the Berlin question to the Security Council before the Soviet Union transferred its functions to the East Germans. (*Ibid.*)

How can we make successful sortie out of this beleaguered fortress? We must first consider psychology of West Berliners. They are almost blithely confident of our ability to protect and will to stand by them, and of faith in our guarantees to do so. No alternative solution would be satisfactory to them unless they felt it provided a degree of security equivalent to that represented by our present commitment, which implies our willingness to sacrifice perhaps tens of millions of American lives rather than give up Berlin.

Is there any such equivalent? Almost certainly not withdrawal of our garrison, and replacement of its functions and our guarantees by United Nations police force, and some vague supervision by UN of inviolability of the city. Nevertheless, study should be given to variants of UN presence and responsibility.

It would not be in interest of free world, as I have earlier argued, to give the quid of discarding FedRep as Western colleague for a doubtful quo which might not succeed in preserving actual status in Berlin. What then might be the basis for possible deal?

I repeat, we must be prepared and ready, if all else fails, to wage nuclear war against Soviets. But short of that, if they too would seek to avoid such catastrophe, is there common ground on which we could meet? Perhaps by removing Berlin entirely from the arena of political conflict, thus eliminating it as a prize, subject to conditions acceptable to its citizens and to German opinion. Of all schemes proposed, the Spaatz Plan,⁴ in this respect, appears to me the most appealing. Internationalize the area, preferably including also East Berlin, by making it seat of United Nations and converting it into United Nations territory. This may sound impracticable, but governments might do unexpected things, if alternative appeared to be destruction of most of human race.

If this were accomplished, West Berliners might feel secure. Presence of thousands of foreigners, derived from every country, might constitute an acceptable solution, if they were themselves convinced it provided a guarantee of their independence and freedom, at least equivalent to that represented by our present commitments. Indeed, to the skeptical, it might be more reassuring than dependence, year after year, decade after decade, on almost incredible resolution of their erstwhile Western enemies, whom they had so grievously wronged, to protect them indefinitely at such potential sacrifices.

Intelligence reports from Berlin seem indicate settled Soviet intention turn over their responsibilities to GDR. Since they can reverse their position overnight, it would be part of wisdom for us to anticipate this might happen at any time, even before the date of May 27.

Bruce

⁴Not further identified.

194. Editorial Note

At 10:30 a.m. (2:30 a.m. in Washington) on March 2, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko handed Ambassador Thompson the Soviet reply to the Western note of February 16. The note proposed a summit conference to consider a German peace treaty, Berlin, European security, and disarmament. If this proposal were not acceptable, the Soviet Union suggested a Foreign Ministers meeting in April to consider a German peace treaty and Berlin with the participation of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

For text of this note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 13, 1959, pages 508–511. The Embassy in Moscow transmitted its translation of the note in telegram 1724, March 2 (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/3–259) and the Russian text in despatch 505 the same day. (*Ibid.*)

195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, March 2, 1959, 6:31 p.m.

7805. Deliver following message from the President to Prime Minister Macmillan. Advise date time delivery. Info copy given Caccia today.
"March 2, 1959.

Dear Harold:

Following your return to London, I hasten to felicitate you on the firmness of your presentation respecting Western rights in the Berlin situation. At the very least you demonstrated to the world that strength does not depend upon discourtesy, a great contrast to the provocative attitude and statements of Khrushchev during your visit there. Thank you very much for the care you took to inform us on a day by day basis of your Russian experience.

I assume that you are now going to visit both Bonn and Paris. I assure you once again that you will be most welcome if you find it

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted in S/S; cleared by the President, Herter, and Merchant; and approved by Calhoun.

desirable to come to Washington. We could have a most informal meeting, without any social engagements, and should have a day or two of good talks while you are here. I am quite sure that nothing is so important as to have our ideas and plans concerted among the four of us and, so far as possible with the complete NATO group. Certain elements of the situation constantly change so it is extremely important that our agreements and our plans are in accord therewith.

Do let me know as soon as convenient whether you can come and approximate timing.

With warm regard,

As ever,

Ike

P.S. Just as I was finished dictating this note, I had yours that was written apparently the first thing Monday morning.¹ I was delighted to note the change in Khrushchev's tone and assure you that I will pay very great attention to the final paragraph of your message."

Observe Presidential Handling.

Herter

¹ In this one-page message, dated March 2, Macmillan noted that the atmosphere in Moscow had improved and that Gromyko had shown Lloyd an advance copy of the Soviet reply to the Western note of February 16 (see Document 194). Macmillan commented that there was "a lot of the usual tiresome stuff" in the note, but that the last paragraphs deserved careful study. He closed with: "I hope your people will study this note carefully, and if I may say so I hope too that you will ensure that they refrain from any hasty or too hostile reaction." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

196. Editorial Note

On March 3, Loftus Becker sent to Acting Secretary Herter a memorandum entitled "Questions Relating to Berlin Contingency Planning," which covered the legal aspects of planning for Berlin. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series)

197. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 4, 1959, 6 p.m.

1747. I hope shortly to submit further suggestions on substance German problem.¹ This message directed solely to procedure and handling of reply to Sov note.²

I believe situation has changed as result Macmillan visit. British are convinced that meaningful discussions can be held only with Khrushchev and I agree with this conclusion. I also believe British will stick with us on Berlin issue when chips are down but before doing so they will insist upon negotiations even if we have to accept unfavorable terms re agenda or composition in order bring this about. Lloyd indicated to me that British have in mind possibility suggesting some kind of more or less permanent commission to negotiate with Soviets. I very much doubt Soviets would buy any such plan. Would appear that both British and French are very weak on parity issue. I do not believe that Soviets will agree to Foreign Ministers agenda which implies any discussion of reunification. British officials on Macmillan delegation indicated they would be prepared to press further for acceptable agenda for Foreign Ministers meeting but were anxious that Sov note not be "flung back at them" or rejected outright in view of British feeling that Sov proposal for Foreign Ministers' meeting was concession made by Khrushchev as result Macmillan's conversations here.

In view foregoing I believe that if we are to insist upon Foreign Ministers meeting and if we are not prepared to yield on parity, our realistic alternatives are a Foreign Ministers meeting either without agenda or one confined to Berlin problem.

My own view is that we should adopt one of two alternatives, first, a summit conference limited to four powers with provision for German consultation and without agenda. This should enable us to satisfy British necessity for negotiations before risking war over Berlin issue and to find out what Khrushchev really has in mind. I believe he wants summit meeting badly enough that on this basis he would probably drop parity issue. Also believe he would in fact discuss reunification at such meeting but would not accept agenda which clearly implied commitment on

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-459. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

¹ Thompson transmitted a 13-page detailed study on Berlin and Germany on March 6 attempting to show how the Soviet Union saw each of these problems. (Telegram 1773; *ibid.*, 762.00/3-959)

² See Document 194.

his part to do so. I question argument that summit meeting would worsen situation by disappointing expectations of peoples of world if such conference failed. I do not believe Khrushchev would consider it to his interest to allow such conference to fail completely; believe that as minimum he would agree to instruct Foreign Ministers pursue some of problems that would be raised at such conference. Soviets have already indicated this in their last note.

Second alternative would be bilateral US-Soviet talks at top level, preferably in my opinion invitation to Khrushchev visit US. In talking to me Lloyd observed that democracies were greatly handicapped in dealing with Soviets since reaching agreement among big three and later in NATO was so difficult and consumed so much time that Soviets always appeared to have initiative. He said British had this in mind in making present visit. Clear implication these remarks was that British would not object to bilateral US-Soviet discussions along lines their own talks.

Greatest disadvantage of these two alternatives is that Khrushchev might take them as sign of weakness and harden his position but if I am correct in assumption that because of our Allies we will have to have meeting with Soviets before final showdown on Berlin then it seems to me that it would be better to propose such meeting now than later when Soviet threats will have become more immediate.

Thompson

198. Summary of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and His Special Assistant (Greene)

Washington, March 4, 1959.

The Secretary had read the Macmillan-Khrushchev communiqué.¹ It struck him that Macmillan has given in on the issue of a conference with the Soviets, to the extent that he, Macmillan, is now associated with the Soviet position on the agenda. The Secretary also noted that the ideas

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Chronology of Events. Secret; Personal and Private.

¹ For text of this communiqué, see *RIIA Documents on International Affairs, 1959*, pp. 11-13.

about a Central European “thinned out” zone, which Macmillan had discussed with the Secretary in London, also seemed to be reflected in the communiqué.

Referring to the announcement that the President has invited Macmillan over here, I said that this had been privately proposed for the coming weekend. This was because of the President’s commitments for the middle of March. I also noted that there is just getting under way with Adenauer’s visit to De Gaulle² a sort of round robin of visits. I thought there might be some advantage to having Macmillan come here at the beginning of that rather than at the end.

The Secretary indicated some unhappiness at the spectacle of Macmillan getting into the driver’s seat and at the likelihood that if Macmillan does come this next week end he, the Secretary, could not take any more than a scenic part in the discussions. I told him that Mr. Merchant had yesterday been thinking about this first point; moreover, as to the second, the timing of the visit was not yet firm, but the boys are rushing preparations and I would not wholly exclude the possibility that there might be time to get the Secretary prepared for a participation of at least some substance. I ventured the thought that this visit might provide the opportunity to stiffen Macmillan if it develops that the Secretary’s fears are borne out; the Secretary wondered whether, on the contrary, he might not soften us up.

The Secretary speculated that Macmillan would give in on the issue of substitution of the GDR for Soviet personnel controlling our access to Berlin. I commented that the British could not do that without us and the French going along. The Secretary asked if the French were all right on this issue and I said as far as I know from the reports I have seen, including the report of Mr. Murphy’s contingency planning meeting on February 28,³ they are.

Adverting to the matter of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the Secretary noted that he has often said that no matter what agenda is set, anyone can bring up anything they want.

JG

² Adenauer visited Paris on March 4.

³ See Document 191.

199. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

Washington, March 4, 1959.

SUBJECT

Berlin Contingency Planning

When Secretary Dulles and others discussed Berlin contingency planning with you on January 29,¹ the application of additional military force was reserved for governmental decision in the event that an initial probe followed by other measures proved unsuccessful.

Though decision is reserved, the need for advance planning is evident, and the Department of State has been examining alternative possibilities. Short of general war, these appear to be two. One is the use of substantial force to attempt to reopen passage to Berlin. The other, a pacific counter-blockade, supplemented perhaps by other forms of naval reprisal, seems on preliminary examination to merit careful study also. There is attached a memorandum on this subject prepared in the State Department.

Pacific blockade is considered an act of reprisal rather than an act of war. By applying this concept to Berlin situation, we might frame a strategy which would counter interference with Western access not by invading East Germany, where we would be at a disadvantage, but by action at sea where the USSR would be at a disadvantage. We might, for example, control Soviet and East German shipping at the entrances to the Baltic and the Black Sea. The control could assume various degrees of stringency, in case the USSR should use gradual tactics over Berlin. It could be extended to other principal ports in the North and Far East if desired, and it could be supplemented by seizing ships on the high seas.

While such a course of action, like its alternative, raises serious problems, it has such apparent advantages that I believe it worth very careful study. I therefore suggest that you direct that the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff report urgently on United States capabilities for naval reprisals, including counter-blockade, in connection with Berlin contingency planning.

Christian A. Herter

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. Initialed by the President with a notation to "hold." The memorandum and attachment were drafted by Morgan; concurred in by EUR, L, and C on March 3; and approved by Herter on March 4 for transmission to the White House. According to a March 12 note attached to another copy of the memorandum, the President was "cool to the idea of directing that a study be made" but had no objection to it.

¹See Document 149.

[Attachment]²

Paper Prepared by George A. Morgan of the Policy Planning Staff

Washington, March 3, 1959.

**BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING:
PACIFIC COUNTER-BLOCKADE**

Introduction

1. There are two basic issues which confront us in contingency planning for Berlin:

(a) at what stage and over what issue to threaten and, if necessary, use force;

(b) what type of force to use.

2. This memorandum addresses the second of these issues. It proposes in particular the study of a type of force which could be used as an alternative to substantial ground action in East Germany or immediate initiation of general war. It does not address the question of defining the point at which the proposed type of force should be used, but it does suggest that the threat to use it would decrease the likelihood of such a point being reached.

3. In challenging the West on Berlin, the USSR is relying on two circumstances in particular: first, the only way the West can maintain access is by crossing territory under effective communist control and, second, it is far easier to deny than to maintain such access by localized military action. It is thus clear that local use of force by Western powers cannot of itself be an effective counter to the proposed Soviet line of action, hence that its significance would consist wholly in the implied threat of imminent general war. Yet it is precisely the immense psychological gap between pinpoint Berlin situation and global reaction that has made it difficult to win Allied commitment to this step, makes Allied unanimity uncertain when faced with the ultimate decision, and therefore encourages Soviet intransigence.

4. We need accordingly to look beyond Berlin to see if there is not some other way in which we can more effectively deter or counter Soviet interference with Western access. One way might be the application of seapower which served us so well over Lebanon and Quemoy. In

²Top Secret.

seapower the balance of general military advantage is with us, not with the USSR, and by its use we should be able to pick situations where the balance of local advantage would also be in our favor.

The Concept of Graduated Pacific Counter-Blockade

5. Some form of counter-blockade would seem to be the most logical use of seapower in relation to Berlin, since what is threatened against us in Berlin amounts to a blockade. It should be considered a pacific counter-blockade since it would be intended as a reprisal rather than an act of war. As Soviet or East German interference with our access might begin gradually, it would be desirable to plan wide flexibility in both degree and scope. Suitable points at which to control shipping might be at the entrances to the Baltic and the Black Sea, and the degree of control might vary with the degree of interference with our access to Berlin. The blockade could be extended to the principal ports in the north and far east if desired. It might be applied to all Soviet and East German shipping, or to vessels to and from one or more specific ports. It could also be supplemented by seizing ships on the high seas by way of reprisal, or by other measures such as a trade embargo.

6. If in the end any new agreements or implicit understandings were reached concerning Berlin, the continuing possibility and perhaps explicit threat of pacific counter-blockade might provide useful insurance against further Soviet bad faith or East German nibbling at our position.

Advantages as a Deterrent

7. The USSR would know counter-blockade to be a course of action well within our capabilities, on terms relatively advantageous to us and therefore not suspect of bluffing. The recent incident when we boarded a Soviet trawler believed to have cut cables³ illustrates for their benefit the decisiveness of US action in this sphere.

8. A strategy of counter-blockade would be a rational and symmetrical response to wrongful use of force against us, thereby appealing to the popular sense of justice, and it would tend to place on the USSR the chief onus for extending the conflict into open hostilities if that occurred. It should therefore be more acceptable to NATO and to Western public opinion than using substantial force to try to open a passage to Berlin. It would be a course of action in which the French and British could fully participate, and their efforts could be supplemented by some or all other NATO powers as a token of solidarity. Moreover it would be capable of adoption at an early date, at least for purposes of planning and prepara-

³ On February 26 the U.S. Navy had boarded the Soviet trawler *Novorossisk* off Newfoundland during the course of an investigation of five breaks in transoceanic cables.

tion. To enhance its deterrent value we should probably wish to let the USSR know our intentions, privately if not publicly, well in advance. It should thus confront the USSR with the prospect of full and continuing Allied unanimity on a vital aspect of the question of using force over Berlin.

9. Counter-blockade would help to bridge the psychological gap between Berlin and our global deterrent. It would involve operations on an extensive scale, from which the transition to a global strike would be credible alike to friend and foe if it appeared to be in the US interest.

Advantages if Implemented

10. In addition to several advantages already mentioned, counter-blockade if implemented would inflict serious psychological and political damage on the USSR, and it could not be broken without grave risk of general war, for which the USSR would bear the main onus. It would therefore give the USSR substantial inducement to come to terms. The psychological and political inducement would be supplemented by significant economic losses, the probable amount of which should be the subject of further study.

11. Counter-blockade would afford time and a sound basis for further negotiations, rather than precipitating a rapid showdown. We would be under no compulsion to make concessions without counter-concessions. We would be in a relatively favorable position with world opinion, which would be drawn away from confusing details about Berlin traffic control and focussed on the big picture.

12. Counter-blockade would wear well in case of UN intervention. The UN could hardly ask one side to back down more than the other, and any foot-dragging by the USSR could be matched by us.

Possible Objections

13. While the present memorandum is only an initial not a definitive study, some objections which readily arise may be considered briefly.

14. Counter-blockade might be considered unduly provocative, especially since blockade is traditionally considered an act of war and the concept of pacific blockade is not familiar to the general public. But our actual interference with communist shipping would be proportionate to the interference with Western access to Berlin, hence a just response rather than a provocation. In any case in the light of Khrushchev's flat statements it would probably seem less provocative than invasion of East Germany—the only alternative resort to force so far proposed.

15. The communists might extend the Berlin blockade to civilian traffic, or even seize West Berlin. But we would have at our disposal appropriate counter-measures, including seizing all communist shipping

and extending our counter-blockade, or deciding this meant general war. If Western troops were captured and held as hostages, we could likewise imprison all personnel of ships we seized.

16. West Berlin could not hold out indefinitely, and the USSR might simply sit tight until Berlin collapsed. It is true that the USSR could physically stand our counter-blockade indefinitely. But whatever the economic losses involved, the USSR would doubtless find the situation very humiliating to its prestige. Meanwhile the pressure of world opinion, both direct and through the UN, would mount strongly in favor of a settlement. As for Berlin, the stockpiles should enable the city to hold out physically for some months, which should be adequate. The key question would be morale, but that also should respond on the whole favorably to a vigorous stand by the West like counter-blockade. Something might also be done about morale on the other side, as the tense situation could easily bring anti-communist feelings in East Germany to the boiling point.

17. The USSR might well react with mine sweeping if our blockade used mines, with submarine attacks on our shipping, or plane and submarine attacks on our blockading vessels, conduct mine warfare against them, or try to force the blockade by naval escort of merchant ships. But in that event they would bear the responsibility of taking additional military measures, and we would retain the option of fighting back in a type of hostilities which would be more advantageous to us than local ground fighting and less dangerous than immediate resort to general war.

Conclusion

The possibility of naval reprisals, particularly in the form of pacific counter-blockade, has enough apparent promise to justify careful study.

200. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, March 4, 1959, 7 p.m.

3196. Bonn's 1899 to Dept.¹ We have read with much interest Ambassador Bruce's stimulating and valuable observations on problems of Germany and Berlin. Embassy has following comments:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-459. Secret; Noform; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow.

¹ Document 193.

1. So far as French are concerned, believe they would agree with assessment in reftel to effect that retention of FedRep in NATO is far preferable to German reunification on terms endangering Western security position. French, including de Gaulle, are not keen on German reunification in any case, and they are apprehensive of concessions to Soviets on reunification or in security field which might have adverse effect on retention of US troops on European continent (Embdesp 1553).² We believe, therefore, that French are unlikely, in four power working group, to push for dangerous compromises in our position in order to tempt Soviets to accept reunification. (Footnote: FonOff officials such as Laloy and Jurgensen continue be attracted by idea of "special status" for reunified Germany in NATO. However, it appears that this concept, which may or may not turn out to be dangerous upon further study, has not been accepted by Couve or de Gaulle.) On security matters, we may find French will even oppose to troublesome extent such limited measures in security field as can be developed on our side without detriment to our position.

2. As caveat to above, we continue believe it is important, even if in our own minds we are prepared to accept provisional renunciation of reunified Germany, that we should not appear in our public posture, or in relationships with Germans, to give impression that we have forsaken our interest in German reunification. Nor should we ever appear to have agreed with Soviets in deal to act as "co-dividers" with them of Germany. To do so would constitute repudiation of one of major tenets our foreign policy. While this would risk damaging our reputation on world-wide basis, we would think (and here we would defer to Ambassador Bruce's judgment) that in FedRep particularly any hint on our part that we view with equanimity continued division of Germany would have most adverse repercussions. If this is true, it will be necessary for us to persist in our efforts to come forward, for public presentation, with suggestions for unified Germany which will appear "reasonable", while at same time guarding against advocacy of ideas dangerous to our security interests.

3. Reftel outlines frankly, and to our mind correctly, possibility that US may have to "go it alone" in order to defend Berlin by military force, including nuclear means. French attitude on this question is difficult to predict at this juncture. Although de Gaulle, Debre and government continue solid, we have impression that French people as a whole are not very interested in Berlin question nor have yet faced up to idea that Berlin crisis may bring hostilities; much less do they seem aware that general nuclear war could result from Berlin problem. If and when

² Dated February 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1859)

threat of nuclear war becomes acute, we are not optimistic that French, or, indeed, any of peoples in Allied countries, will be inclined to give strong support to their government in standing up to Soviets. Fear of nuclear holocaust runs deep, and recent opinion polls in Western Europe are not encouraging on this subject. However, so far as France is concerned, de Gaulle's tough-minded attitude in resisting Soviet threats, plus his authority, could be decisive factor in holding France steady with us in face of threat of nuclear war over Germany. Thus, although reftel's comments concerning deficiency of French military forces in context of Berlin crisis are undeniably true, we feel that de Gaulle's position could be of key importance in preserving French support if nuclear war threatens, and in influencing other European governments in this sense.

4. Although USUN and Moscow in better position comment on possibility suggested reftel of making UN headquarters in Berlin, and Soviet reaction thereto, it appears to us that while suggestion has dramatic appeal it would be unlikely to meet Soviet desire of eliminating Berlin as "cancer" harmful to Communist regime of GDR. UN headquarters in Berlin would seem only to compound difficulties for GDR regime as symbol of liberty contrasting with prison of surrounding Communist territory.

Lyon

201. Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, March 5, 1959.

IN ATTENDANCE

The President
The Vice President
The Acting Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting was held immediately following the regular NSC Meeting. A less-detailed memorandum of this meeting, drafted by John Eisenhower, is *ibid.*, DDE Diaries.

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, U.S. Information Agency
Assistant Secretary of State, Livingston Merchant
The Assistant to the President
The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House Staff Secretary
The Assistant White House Staff Secretary
The Executive Secretary, NSC

The President referred initially to various suggestions as to the use of the United Nations in connection with the Berlin situation. The President commented that the big problem was how to make it clear that the other side is the real aggressor, while what we wish to do is to go on with the peaceful supply of West Berlin. He said that the main purpose of this meeting was to find out how urgently planning is going on regarding what we may have to do in connection with the Berlin situation.

Secretary Herter said that, on the Three-Power contingency planning regarding the actions to be taken if access to Berlin is denied, our planning was generally along the lines discussed in the previous meeting (held on December 11, 1958).¹ The British, however, think that we should not risk world war because the East Germans insist on stamping papers for Allied access. Mr. Herter said this issue was still in dispute, as well as the question of the possible utility of the United Nations. On the latter question, the United Nations representatives have been asked to study it and make suggestions. Ambassador Lodge tentatively thinks that the U.N. should be used before the initiation of any provocative acts.

The President said that he would not object to possible use of the U.N. now. However, after our access to Berlin has been stopped, if we then put the issue in the U.N., the Soviets will be able simply to sit still, and then what would we do about Berlin?

The President also commented that the papers he had seen about a blockade left him rather cold.² He thought that the Soviets could stand a blockade for at least 12 months, whereas West Berlin might be choked off within 2 weeks. The President then commented that he understood that the Russians and one or two other countries recognize the East German regime. He asked what is the difference between West and East Germany as far as neutral countries are concerned. Mr. Allen pointed out that very few countries (one of which was Yugoslavia) recognize East Germany. The President then asked whether under international

¹ See Document 97.

² See the attachment to Document 199.

law there was not a great difference between East and West Germany. Secretary Herter pointed out that the Russians already have a peace treaty with East Germany. Therefore, when the Russians now talk about signing a peace treaty with East Germany, what they are really threatening is to relinquish to the East Germans rights regarding Berlin and the corridors thereto.

Secretary Herter commented that the report just received from Allen Dulles of Khrushchev's remarks in Leipzig indicating that May 27 was not an absolute deadline, was not very important. The President commented that Khrushchev would probably say something else tomorrow.

Mr. Gray then raised the question of a public announcement regarding this Special Meeting and read a proposed draft statement (attached hereto).³ The President said that he had called this meeting in order to keep it to the fewest possible people. He said that if he thought it would be announced publicly, he would have wished to tell the other people who were in the regular NSC Meeting. Secretary McElroy thought the public announcement might indicate over-anxiety regarding Berlin. The President remarked that Secretary Dulles thought that the public was not yet aware of the gravity of the situation. The problem was how not to get hysterical. In this connection, the President reiterated that there would be nothing worse than for us to mobilize, which would in effect constitute a victory for the Russians.

In answer to a question by General Persons regarding Congressional leaders, the President noted that we now have the problem of concerting our views in preparation for Mr. Macmillan's visit. The President expressed concern that Chancellor Adenauer may be weakening his views on the situation. The President said that since 1955 we have insisted that reunification of Germany can occur only through free elections. Until recently Adenauer has said that to bring up any different approach would in effect open a can of worms. However, the President understood that Adenauer now says that we might bring up other approaches during a course of negotiations with the Soviets.

Secretary Herter reported that the State Department had prepared a working paper on the elements of a U.S. position regarding negotiations with the Soviets.⁴ He said that this paper was now being

³ No draft statement was attached to the source text. A copy of the release is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany.

⁴ No copy of this paper has been found, but in a letter to Quarles on March 3 Herter described it as "the first cut at a position paper which draws heavily on work and positions of the past but which is designed to give a new look to the presentation of a Western proposal." Herter noted further that it had "no departmental, let alone governmental status" at the time. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1/3-359)

coordinated with Defense, in preparation for the International Working Group meetings with our Allies which will begin next Monday.⁵ The President referred to the British willingness to let East Germans stamp Allied papers. The President said that we have stood firmly behind Adenauer in resisting this procedure. There are indications now, however, that Adenauer might be willing to let the East Germans stamp Allied papers and inspect loads in open vehicles. If this is so, it is difficult to say where we stand now. The President believed that the decision as to the critical point is Adenauer's.

Mr. Merchant noted that Ambassador Bruce felt that Adenauer may have taken a weaker position in the recent conversations with Secretary Dulles⁶ in order to draw us out as to how firm we were. Mr. Merchant noted that Adenauer was firmer in the later meetings with Secretary Dulles.

The President again noted that it was very difficult to work out what constitutes the critical point in the denial of the access to Berlin, and what we would do next if that point had been reached.

Secretary Herter noted that Adenauer is not well. He has been vacillating recently, and has defections within his own party.

The Vice President commented that the President's objective has been to maintain firmness without being provocative. The Vice President noted, however, that there is a considerable segment of Congress and the Press who point up that the Administration is not going along with such steps as mobilization and, therefore, say that the President's determination is not strong. The Vice President thought that announcing this meeting to the Press would be consistent with the President's middle ground, and would help to counter such Congressional and Press criticism.

The President said that on balance he thought the announcement should be made, and requested Mr. Gray to call the people who had attended the regular NSC Meeting, but not this Special Meeting, and tell them that the President would have invited them if he had known that this meeting was to be made public. The President then authorized a Press announcement consisting of the first sentence of the draft proposed by Mr. Gray with some modifications.

The Vice President then expressed the belief that a meeting with Congressional leaders would be very good. He pointed out that some Members of the Congress have shown considerable restraint regarding Berlin, and that more will if they feel that they are in on the know. The President said that he planned to meet with Congressional leaders, but

⁵ See Document 242.

⁶ See Documents 165, 167, and 168.

did not want to have to change his position after meeting with Macmillan. The Vice President thought it would be helpful to meet with Congressional leaders both before and after the Macmillan visit. General Twining raised the point as to whether the public had been told the magnitude of the danger. The President commented that the difficulty is we would then be accused of threatening war with Russia.

After considerable discussion as to possible attendance, timing and nature of a meeting with the Congressional leaders, the President decided to have a meeting with the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate and the House on the next day, March 6, 1959, at 10:30 a.m.⁷

General Twining then gave a report on the small military actions being taken which Soviet intelligence might pick up.⁸ General Twining also reported that a Communications Plan in support of Berlin was being prepared. He also said that the Joint Chiefs felt that we can handle a garrison airlift to Berlin with only a small augmentation, even in the face of efforts to jam our communications. The President interjected that Khrushchev says that an effort on our part to supply Berlin after an effort has been made to deny us access would be an act of war.

General Twining then stated that General Norstad had asked that we discontinue the reduction of Army forces in Europe, and increase those forces by about 7,000 from the U.S. Strategic Reserve. General Twining said that the contemplated reduction of Army forces of Europe totalled 11,000, and that about 3,000 reduction was about to take place. The President commented that carrying out General Norstad's recommendations would have a psychological effect only since it would not constitute a significant increase in military strength.

Secretary McElroy thought that General Norstad's proposal was OK, but that it had better be announced publicly. Secretary McElroy also said that this would not change the plans for the overall size of the Army. The President approved General Norstad's recommendation, but stated that there should only be a routine announcement about it.

General Twining said that as regards Air Force and Navy plans, no decisions were needed now. However, if Norstad had to move large forces from southern to northern Europe, it might be necessary to supply up to 1 additional division from the United States. The President asked whether the JCS plan to conduct a large scale campaign to force access to Berlin. He understood that what we planned to do was to make the other fellow stop us by force. Secretary Herter said we planned to keep moving until the other side shoots at us.

⁷ See Document 205.

⁸ The paper outlining these actions is attached to an undated talking paper prepared for Twining in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material.

The President said that war would be certain if we tried to make a real campaign into Berlin with, for example, 3 or 4 corps. Secretary Herter remarked that this is the determination we have to make. The President thought that at that point we would then be retaliating, and that the next step would have to be against Moscow.

General Twining questioned whether we should not now stop additional dependents going into Berlin. The President agreed that this would be desirable.

The Vice President noted that Khrushchev says his objective is to eliminate the simmering kettle of Berlin. The Vice President thought we should get this situation out of the context of East German recognition and into the context of saving West Berlin. The President noted that Macmillan says we should not go to war if the East Germans want to stamp Allied cards. We say that this would not only approve the denial of Russian responsibility under treaty, but that it would constitute a recognition of the East Germans. The Vice President thought that we might have Mayor Brandt indicate forcefully that this would be the end of West Berlin. Secretary Herter said that Brandt is about halfway between Adenauer and *[in]* his opposition. The Vice President said that people cannot get excited over the recognition of East Germany, but that they will if it involves the freedom of 2 or 3 million Berliners.

The President thought that we should get the sentiment of the Berliners as to whether they are willing to be a free city. *[2 lines of source text not declassified]* Secretary Herter thought we would have to determine whether we would go to war without our Allies.

Secretary Anderson thought that the vacillation of our Allies suggested Congressional consultation before Macmillan arrives. Secretary Anderson thought the country was more concerned with the situation than we give it credit for.

Following further brief discussion regarding Congressional consultation, the President stated that he thought our military moves at this time should be seen but not talked about.

Secretary Herter said that the basic question is whether we are prepared to use all force necessary to reopen access to Berlin, even at the risk of general war.

The President commented that if the French and Germans are not with us he did not see how we could successfully use force in Germany to reopen access to Berlin. He did not agree with the theory that we could go it all alone with our Allies opposing us. He questioned whether we could move without support of the British, French and Germans. In fact, he thought that the NATO group must stand firm, or we cannot.

Secretary Herter said it might be necessary to postpone the decision until after the NATO meeting.

The President said that the only other solution if our access to Berlin is stopped would be to decide if we were going to put bombs on Moscow. On the other hand, if we say we are going to withdraw from Europe, that would be doing just what the Russians want.

Allen Dulles suggested that Macmillan's position would be considerably dependent upon the President's position.

The President thought that this was all that could be usefully discussed at this meeting, and the meeting adjourned.

202. Telegram Polto 2514 From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, March 5, 1959, 8 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4161/3-559. Secret; Priority. Extract—1-1/2 pages of source text not declassified.]

203. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, March 5, 1959, 8 p.m.

3216. Jansen, German Chargé, has just filled me in on de Gaulle-Adenauer conversations yesterday. Jansen very obviously delighted with results visit and said that the three interviews, Colombey-Les-Deux-Eglises, Bad Kreuznach,¹ and yesterday's had become progressively more successful, warm and friendly.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/3-559. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Moscow.

¹Regarding the meeting at Colombey-Les-Deux-Eglises, September 14, see de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, pp. 184-190 or Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 436-439; regarding the meeting at Bad Kreuznach, November 26, see Document 75.

De Gaulle appears to have been at his best, gracious, wise, calm, friendly, giving his aides plenty opportunity talk and on whole, according informant, seems to have charmed Adenauer and, very definitely, did Jansen.

Jansen also said Debre conducted himself extremely well throughout.

No reference was made to specific French or German matters and conversations were devoted entirely to "the big question," Berlin–Germany, USSR. No decisions were taken, but this subject was explored from all angles and Jansen states that note running through conversations was de Gaulle statement, "let us not fool ourselves, it is the Americans who count in this." (Jansen elaborated on this that it is United States which has the power, the decision, the leadership, etc.)

Both de Gaulle and Adenauer stressed gravity of situation, the most dangerous since end of war.

De Gaulle indicated his belief that Russians were playing for big stakes and Alliance must hold firm, strong, must be no concessions; "if we accept Russian diktat Western Alliance is finished," said de Gaulle.

De Gaulle said he hoped that Alliance would withstand and he thought it would.

Illustrating his own conviction that de Gaulle is a big man Jansen said de Gaulle was unhappy about Macmillan visit to Moscow but refrained from being critical [3 lines of source text not declassified].

I asked Jansen if any specific reference was made to Algeria or question of French Mediterranean fleet; on latter subject Jansen had briefed Adenauer prior to meeting.

Jansen again said no specific French matters were dealt with—unless perhaps during private conversation of several hours which de Gaulle and Adenauer had in afternoon at which only an interpreter was present. However Jansen does not think these matters were raised for no reference was made to them in summary of conversations which de Gaulle and Adenauer later gave their collaborators.

At dinner with Adenauer and French and German aides (Debre, Couve de Murville, Jansen, Boegner, etc.) de Gaulle paid generous tribute to Adenauer not only for what Adenauer had done for Germany but for Europe and the world and concluded by expressing regret that "this small house is inadequate for such a big man." Reference was of course to Lodge of Marly where conversations took place in an atmosphere which both statesmen prefer, away from telephones, pressure and general hubbub of capital.

Jansen also reported de Gaulle, after having stated that he believed Western Allies would hold together against Soviets, as saying (approximately) "but even if this should not come to pass our two countries

(Germany and France) must always remain united. Together we can be salvation of Europe. Perhaps this does not seem a great deal to you now since France is not very strong, but France is beginning to come back and in time two of us can work miracles."

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

Jansen reports Chancellor Adenauer contented with meetings and departed this morning in high good spirits.

Lyon

204. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Greene) to Acting Secretary of State Herter

Washington, March 6, 1959.

I passed on to the Secretary this morning what you had told me about the meeting with the President on Berlin yesterday¹ and the questions identified at that meeting for further study.

The Secretary commented that the basic philosophy of our current program is that if we show that we are prepared to use whatever force may be required to assure our rights in respect to Berlin, and if the Soviets are in doubt of this, then we will not in the event have to use that force.

The Secretary also commented that if our Allies shrink from putting this philosophy into practice with us, then there is serious question of the value of NATO.

JG

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.0221/3-659. Secret.

¹ See Document 201.

205. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 6, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President Nixon
Secretary Herter
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Allen Dulles
Senator Lyndon Johnson
Senator Everett Dirksen
Speaker Rayburn
Representative Halleck
General Persons
Major Eisenhower

The President opened the meeting by stating its purpose: to talk over the abnormal situation facing us in the Berlin situation and to assure that the Executive and Legislative Branches are thinking together. He did not desire the meeting to be so large as to necessitate undue publicity, and for this reason, he informed the members present that he planned to talk off the record with members of the Foreign Affairs Committees and others this evening.

The President reviewed briefly the policy of the U.S. Government on the Berlin issue. This policy is to warn the Soviets publicly that we will not be threatened or pushed out of Berlin and that we will not desert the 2.2 million free people in that city, but will, rather, execute our rights under existing agreements. At the same time, we will maintain an attitude of readiness to negotiate, to include discussion of a peace treaty. We do admit that other nations have interests in the Berlin crisis and we desire to explore the German situation in an atmosphere off the level of a crisis. There is no point at this time to discussing extreme measures such as mobilization. Mobilization of the entire nation's resources would be the most disastrous thing that could come about. Our situation in the world, vis-à-vis the Soviets, should be one with which we can live for many a year. Otherwise, we must go to a garrison state. Therefore, we are being alert; we are ready to take any decent opportunity to negotiate; and we stand with our allies.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Memoranda of similar conferences with Senators Wiley, Russell, Saltonstall, and Fulbright and Representatives Arends, Carnahan, Vinson, and Chiperfield at 5 p.m. on March 6 and with Representatives McCormack and Halleck at 5 p.m. on March 10, are *ibid.*, DDE Diaries and Miscellaneous Material. For the President's account of these meetings, see *Waging Peace*, pp. 347–349.

The President finished his opening statement by reiterating his desire to see if the Legislative and Executive are thinking along the same lines. He emphasized that he does not desire to require anybody to sign on the dotted line, but desires to get their views.

At this time the President introduced Mr. Allen Dulles.

Mr. Dulles then briefed the Members of Congress by use of a map of East Germany. This indicated Soviet and GDR armed forces. (See summary of Mr. Dulles' briefing, attached.)¹ At the end of this presentation there were brief questions. To Mr. Halleck's question regarding the reliability of GDR troops, Mr. Dulles gave the opinion that these troops are not overly reliable, but the Soviets would not depend on them in any serious action. From this Mr. Halleck concluded that any action of this type would, of necessity, involve participation by the Russians. Senator Dirksen, in confirmation of this point, asked whether the Soviets are patrolling in East Germany. The answer was affirmative. In this connection, the President mentioned that the Soviets are working on their jamming capability to interfere with aircraft as well as their capability to interfere with ground access.

Senator Dirksen questioned the distance from Berlin to Frankfurt, and clarified in his mind the fact that the city is well into the Soviet zone and that air corridors and ground accesses would be through their territory. Secretary Herter confirmed that the autobahn, the railroad, and the three air corridors are being maintained as an obligation of the Russians.

The group then reviewed the history of this current arrangement. This was of special interest to Senator Dirksen, who mentioned that there were two agreements, in February and in July of 1945, with the President pointing out that there had been no change since those dates regarding the status of the four powers in Berlin, but that following the Berlin airlift, the 1948 agreements on access routes had been renegotiated in 1949. He confirmed that these agreements had not specified a termination date.

At this time the President mentioned that he has a document which sets forth the legality of our position in Berlin and he would be willing to issue this document to the Members of Congress present.²

In answer to a question by Senator Dirksen, the President clarified the relationship between the Soviets and the GDR. If, as of May 27th, the Soviets have carried through their intention to pass their authority for control of access routes to the GDR, this will make us obey GDR

¹ Not attached to the source text. A copy of the two-page briefing, which mistakenly gives the date of the conference as March 7, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

² Presumably a reference to the memorandum cited in Document 196.

regulations for the transit, and we will be forced to go by their sufferance. It will likewise necessitate recognition of the GDR as a nation. We will not accept this eventuality.

Senator Dirksen then asked where the line will be drawn. He pointed out that Berlin is the capital of the GDR and when Khrushchev washes his hands of GDR control, Senator Dirksen presumes we will protest. Here we will undoubtedly have no luck and Khrushchev will then say, "Go ahead and negotiate if you can, but you still occupy the GDR capital." At this time, Senator Dirksen expects the Soviets will use force. This the President clarified by calling attention to the fact that the Soviets do not threaten to force us out of Berlin. They simply state that if we use force to maintain our rights, the Soviets will back up the GDR. Secretary Herter added the point that if we insist on our rights, in the Soviet view, this is an act of war. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the movements necessary to the Soviets to implement their turnover would be negligible. Their troop dispositions will remain the same.

Senator Dirksen then brought up a question of what could be done in the UN between now and May 27th. To this Secretary Herter pointed out the usefulness of the UN as an instrument of maintaining a status quo and added that we are now exchanging notes to set up foreign ministers' talks. If these talks do not bear fruit, then we probably will bring the matter to the UN. The President emphasized, however, that any use of the UN should be made while we are still exercising our rights. In other words, prior to May 27th, we may make use of the UN. After May 27th it will be necessary to make direct protests to the Soviets.

Senator Dirksen then inquired as to any new developments from Macmillan. The President informed him that Macmillan has accepted an invitation to arrive in Washington on March 19th after a visit to Paris and Bonn. He pointed out the difficulties in the schedule which would result from the conflict with the visit of President O'Kelly of Ireland. He also pointed out that he had requested Macmillan to come here after seeing the others and to allocate a couple of days for discussions.

The briefing being completed, the President gave the floor to the Members of Congress, emphasizing the importance to the Executive to know what Congress thinks on these matters. He took note of the firm statements that had been made by Members of Congress to "delineate" our position that we will not be thrown out of Berlin. Senator Dirksen pointed out quickly that Senator Johnson had been emphatic on this matter.

Mr. Rayburn then inquired as to the status of the proposals for a foreign ministers' meeting. He felt relieved on being advised that this meeting is expected to be held, stating that he would rather talk than fight. When the President pointed out that Khrushchev's message had been made public, in which he announced a willingness for a foreign

ministers' meeting,³ Mr. Rayburn inquired whether Khrushchev had not done some changing of position. The President answered in the affirmative. On arrival of Macmillan in Moscow, a friendly joint communiqué⁴ had been issued, followed by an extremely harsh speech by Khrushchev⁵ in some area outside of Moscow. Since then, Khrushchev has apparently changed his position and has shown evidence of being willing to talk. The President quoted Khrushchev's expression from his recent speech in which he said, "Don't count your chickens before autumn." The President gave a brief estimate of Khrushchev's character in which he described him as stupid in some ways and yet exceedingly shrewd, and most certainly ruthless.

The President then warned the group of the danger of talk outside of this meeting, particularly with regard to the effect that loose talk would have on our negotiating position with our allies. It is extremely necessary to have the good will of such persons as General de Gaulle, who occupies such a vital strategic geographical position.

The Vice President then pointed out one problem with regard to our acceptance of a foreign ministers' meeting. This problem is how far do we go in insisting on our own terms for the meeting, or how far we make concessions on accepting those of the Soviets. We must not appear to want a conference at any cost. Therefore, we should avoid too much glowing public talk of a conference.

The President continued an estimate of Khrushchev's position, pointing out that Khrushchev, by his recent statements, has left himself little or no room to maneuver on the Berlin issue itself. He has gotten out of this position by broadening the context of his demands and agreeing to address the entire German problem. The President pointed out one difficulty with a foreign ministers' meeting, which is the low status of Gromyko. In the President's view, Gromyko is worse than Vishinsky. He is incapable of negotiating; he merely sits and glowers until he receives his orders from Moscow. There is, therefore, little hope of real negotiation with Gromyko. However, foreign ministers' talks will have the great value of affording us time and of easing the tensions.

The President concluded by pointing out the vast investment we have in strengthening our relationships with Western Europe and the consequent requirement for conscientious negotiation.

Senator Dirksen then inquired as to our courses of action in the case of the worst situation. The President admitted that this decision will not be easy and that we must see what happens. However, the case will be

³ See Document 194.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 184.

negotiated to its fullest before we go to war. Fundamental in the President's view is that we have at stake 2.2 million free Germans who trust us and upon whom we may not turn our back.

Secretary McElroy, at the President's request, then pointed out some of the military actions which are being taken. He emphasized that much planning is being conducted, both in the Pentagon and in General Norstad's headquarters, on a contingency basis. He pointed out that any effort to bull our way into Berlin with ground forces alone requires more strength than we have available; therefore, no substantial reinforcement of our land forces in Europe is contemplated. For psychological reasons, however, some small reinforcements are being sent primarily to round out units and bring them up to strength. Secretary McElroy emphasized the improbability of moving into Germany without entailing hostilities directly with Russia. Therefore, since we cannot fight this battle on the ground, we are studying the matter of airlift as a fallback action. We are preparing our crews by way of familiarizing them with Tempelhof airfield and we are making electronic jamming studies. The Secretary emphasized that what we are making are normal preparations. He feels that the Congressmen present should know about them, but he requests that talk be avoided to enable us to bring our allies along with us. We are playing on the basis of "not much noise but carry a big stick." We must realize that the Russians will carry their threats "up to the line." We are therefore planning as if we will be required to carry out our contingency plans. We think, however, the country will be better served if we avoid saber rattling. Secretary Herter agreed in the light of coordination difficulties that we must not talk unilaterally.

Senator Johnson then expressed the view that this is an extremely important meeting from a coordination viewpoint. He admits the infeasibility of fighting this enemy on the ground, but stated that he is interested in knowing what other alternatives are available. He questioned the adequacy of our forces. While admitting that he would not desire to get into details, he requested the President's views. Looking at it from his own standpoint, Senator Johnson reiterated that his big desire is to be able to help. Senator Johnson went on to point out some of the difficulties he has in answering questions from constituents. As an example, he mentioned his difficulties in answering questions from constituents on the timing of a final decision on the future status of Secretary Dulles.

Senator Johnson then returned to his question of alternatives to ground action. He asked how Members of Congress can aid the Executive, and whether the forces are adequate. He pointed out the seeming inconsistency of the current force reductions with the crisis atmosphere prevailing with regard to Berlin. To this the President answered that we are placing much money in our defense forces and retaliatory power. He

emphasized that it is impossible for the United States to maintain manpower in service comparable to that of the Soviets, in the light of our own wage scale. He pointed out the possibility, therefore, that when we reach the acute crisis period, it will be necessary to engage in general war to protect our rights. He cited examples in the past of Communist tactics in which they have maintained a strong bluff to the last moment and then backed out. These examples included threats of general war with regard to Korea, Viet-Nam, Lebanon and the Taiwan Straits. In the President's view, the question is whether we have the nerve to push our chips into the pot. He is convinced that any appeasement means disaster. Senator Johnson hastily added that the Congress agrees that we shall have no appeasement.

The President admitted the possibility that this firm position could conceivably bring about a miscalculation and therefore general war; however, this is only a possibility. In the event we adopt a policy of appeasement, the President is absolutely certain that we are defeated. On the other hand, this does not mean that we will not negotiate. We will negotiate whenever we can and are making many efforts in that direction. All heartily agreed with this point.

Mr. Halleck then brought up the question of possible measures to condition the people of America to the eventuality that the "balloon may go up." To this the President asked whether Mr. Halleck was referring to a campaign to scare the population. Mr. Halleck continued by defining his question in terms of how to precipitate hostilities in the event the GDR stopped a convoy. He admits that things would be simpler if the enemy would fire the first shot; but his question is how to make the enemy fire the first shot on the ground. He pointed out the great possibilities of nonviolent obstruction, and in this connection, the merits of the air corridors. The President answered this question by pointing out that a crisis will be precipitated only in the event the GDR closes off the corridors. Many studies are being currently conducted as to how to precipitate this crisis in the event of the close-off. These studies include such matters as breaking off of diplomatic relations and cessation of trade.

The President, as a footnote to history, then gave a recast of his initial views with regard to occupation of Berlin when he was a military commander in 1945. He finds it somewhat ironic that he is now confronted with a crisis based on a decision against which he had recommended as a military commander.

The President went on to emphasize that studies are also being conducted on the means of applying counterpressures. He reiterated his conviction that if we stand firm on this issue and make our firmness obvious to the Soviets and the world, the Soviets will back down. Here

Senator Johnson interjected that the alternative is to "push the button." Mr. McElroy agreed that there is no other way.

The Vice President stated the necessity of being firm, while avoiding such provocative measures (which have been suggested) as placing forces on alert or mobilizing. These actions present the problem of provoking and frightening our allies. He continued that the position of the United States government is by far the strongest in the free world, when we consider the backing which the Executive is receiving. Other free governments are in a difficult position because of the fears of the population, due to their proximity to the difficulty. Mr. Nixon reiterated that once we make noise we may militate against allied support.

Senator Johnson pointed out that two or three Senators have been waving resolutions to express the "consensus of the Senate." He pointed out his objection to this type of action and expressed the view that this type of meeting represents a middle-of-the-road approach, and, therefore, derives great importance, primarily because it illustrates that we are not split along party lines. The President emphasized that he does not at this time desire a resolution in the Senate. When Mr. Rayburn called attention to the fact that the proponents point to the efficacy of the Taiwan Straits resolution, the President stated that this is a different type of matter. Mr. Rayburn stated that it will be easy to hold the House in control on this matter, but not the Senate. (Senator Johnson's volunteered statement that Senator Javits has proposed a resolution for a seven-man committee to tell our story to the Berliners brought an unpleasant reaction from the President.) They all reviewed again the importance of this meeting as a middle ground.

The President then stated his position as an advocate of peace and peace by negotiation. He repeated the necessity of being firm but not rigid when faced by an aggressor. We will not be served by ultimatum, since the ultimatum does not constitute negotiation—but we will not be truculent. Again Senator Johnson posed a question as to the adequacy of our forces in the event negotiations break down, and the President again said that he could see no material needs which we do not already possess.

The President then continued by describing his satisfaction with our military instrument. He stated that we do in fact suffer under a problem of an excess of power. If we dump our entire programmed loads, comprising many, many megatons, on Russia, there is some question as to what will happen. He called attention to the current concern over levels of strontium 90 resulting from only a few weapons being fired in tests. To Senator Johnson's repeated question as to whether the Congress is doing all they ought to give the Executive all it needs, the President answered in the affirmative. The Senator then mentioned that he would like to see the Joint Chiefs of Staff be likewise firm in their

support of this program when they testify, if they do in fact agree. The President pointed out that in the event of acute crisis, some forces might be called up if the Executive is warned some two or three days before the D-day of a general war. Under existing law, he could call up Reservists and National Guardsmen to supplement the police forces, largely to maintain order in the United States. He pointed out that Khrushchev does not desire war [any] more than we. He cited his own experience in war that the enemy is always as frightened as we are.

Senator Johnson then posed the question as to whether we are telling the public all we should. To this Mr. Rayburn answered immediately in the affirmative. In his view our people cannot understand the implications of this situation, and excessive warning on our part would cause undue alarm, not only to our own people, but to the Russians as well.

Mr. McElroy then mentioned that this particular crisis may not be the primary objective of the Soviets. In his view we may find that their true objective is a coup in Iran and that the Berlin crisis is only a diversion. This view appeared to be accepted by all.

The Vice President once more mentioned the great significance of this meeting, and the President suggested that a picture be taken. This was received most enthusiastically.

The Vice President then went on to voice his concern with talk that we are bluffing. He recommends that the leaders reinforce the view that the United States has sufficient strength to deal with this situation. He recommends that such words as "prepared for any eventuality" be used.

The group then paused to pay tribute to Mr. Rayburn in his designation as the "most experienced" man in the House of Representatives.

The tack to be taken by Members as they speak to the press was then discussed. Various approaches were offered and the subject reverted to the value of this meeting to all present. Mr. Halleck pointed out that he had learned much that is highly useful to him. Mr. Rayburn expressed the same view, and pointed out that some of his constituents had complained that he was not being kept sufficiently informed. To this the President quickly answered. He accepted the possibility that he may sometimes incorrectly assume that everybody has been informed. He assured all present that if any of them ever develop the feeling that they are being left out, they should call him immediately and they would then be invited to come over and discuss the issues at stake. (Mr. Hagerty entered at this point.)

Senator Johnson tended to stress the idea that planning and forces are adequate to meet any eventuality, whereas Mr. Rayburn tended to stress the idea that we will spare no efforts to solve this matter by

negotiation. In this connection, the Vice President pointed out that the Communists will attempt to becloud the issue of the Berlin accesses by emphasizing details. This they will attempt to do by making each additional restriction seem so minute as not to be worth our taking a stand. In all our statements we should point out that what is truly at stake is not detailed procedures, but the freedom of 2.2 million free people. To this the President added that our capability of sustaining the free world is also at stake.

At this point Mr. Dulles inserted an opinion regarding the importance of Berlin in the overall world picture. In his view Western Europe is strengthening. The Soviets would not feel safe in turning elsewhere in the world to points such as Iran while we are in Berlin and Europe remains strong. This brought a question from Senator Johnson as to whether the allies are as strong in their determination as are we. The President answered that they are not, but stated that their progress is heartening. He pointed up the British Labor Party as representing a particularly weak element. Some of the recent proposals of Hugh Gaitskell could be comparable to those of Chamberlain at Munich. The President added, as assurance to Senator Johnson, that matters of international consequence of this type have not been discussed in GOP leaders meetings. Matters of international implication have been reserved to bipartisan meetings.

This brought on a question from the Vice President regarding informing other Members of Congress. This question he addressed to Mr. Rayburn, requesting guidance on what procedures should be followed. Senator Johnson expressed satisfaction with the meetings being held with Secretary Herter, and stated that such is very helpful. He further expressed satisfaction at the President's statement that we are capable of handling any contingency. He feels that it is most important that the Joint Chiefs of Staff back up this point of view when they testify. There are some people in the Pentagon who feed information through the back door to the legislators. Mr. Rayburn agreed. The President remarked that the munitions makers have this habit as well as people from the Pentagon.

Senator Dirksen then reviewed his recommendations as to what points should be emphasized publicly. They are:

1. That we have explored the situation and we will maintain our rights and responsibilities to the people of Berlin.
 2. That we have agreed to stand firm but are willing to negotiate.
 3. The stand we should take on our actual military capabilities.
- The President thinks that this third point should be answered by stating that our capabilities are adequate for our particular position in the world.

We have maintained this position for some ten or eleven years and it is going well. Of course we cannot fight a 60- or 90-division war. We

should emphasize that we are looking for peaceful solutions with honor and stress that we will not walk away from honor. He feels that the Members of Congress should not answer questions. This Mr. Rayburn said is impossible. The newspaper reporters will follow the Members of Congress and dog their steps. It was therefore agreed that: (1) a picture would be taken, (2) no statement would be made by the President, and (3) the Members of Congress would meet the press in Mr. Hagerty's office immediately following the meeting and each would make a statement.

John S.D. Eisenhower

206. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Acting Secretary of State Herter

Washington, March 6, 1959, 12:40 p.m.

The Secretary telephoned from Walter Reed. Said he was feeling better than he had a little while ago; that he had just had a blood transfusion; that he has been feeling very weak; that the injections have all been pretty powerful, that he has lost a lot of weight quickly and has felt weak.

Secy said he understood the President may be coming out this afternoon and CAH said he knew the President hoped to come out around 4:00.¹ Secy asked what developed this morning. CAH said the meeting this morning lasted an hour and a half;² there was a good deal of probing of what we do under certain contingencies. CAH said the President convinced them of the fact that we cannot fight a ground battle around Berlin with the Germans and the Russians—that is out. President said if Soviets take it by force we have to then face up to the big decision but in the meanwhile we would do everything feasible to negotiate. CAH said it ended up on a very cheerful note; they went out and saw the press and took the line that it was an interesting session and that they are in complete agreement we would remain firm while continuing all fruitful negotiations. CAH said they were trying to get down to brass tacks and CAH said he thought it was good to convince them we will not fight a ground battle.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Marian S. Stilson.

¹No record of President Eisenhower's conversation with Dulles during the former's visit to Walter Reed Hospital from 3:59 to 4:32 p.m. has been found.

²See Document 205.

JFD said that is what he said to Adenauer; JFD told Adenauer it has to be a war we can win, not one we are bound to lose.

CAH said Lyndon Johnson kept trying to get President to make a categorical statement that we had enough strength if it came to war—obviously this was due in part to the political arguments on budget versus defense preparedness—and CAH said he thinks the President gave the feeling we are taking all preparations necessary; consulting with our allies in the free world; and confidence that if we had to meet this situation we could. CAH said it was interesting that on the Senate side both Lyndon Johnson and Dirksen were strong in coming up to the final decision and making it in favor of war. On the House side, both Rayburn and Halleck said we had to keep saying we would continue negotiations to settle this. CAH said there is another session this afternoon. JFD asked with who, and CAH said the President was meeting with Fulbright and ranking members in Senate and House of Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. JFD expressed some surprise and CAH said we were under tremendous pressures from the Hill. In that connection, CAH said Fulbright announced in the paper this morning he was calling CAH up to testify next Tuesday before the Foreign Relations Committee and CAH said he thought this was extremely bad. CAH said both he and President hope to discuss this with Fulbright this afternoon. CAH said this is not the way to conduct this business at the moment; that even if hearing is in Executive Session, there will most likely be leaks.

JFD said it must be realized that if the Soviets by threatening to do things by force do destroy our rights and force us to retreat and make concessions, it is just the beginning. JFD said if we are perfectly firm in our position he is personally convinced that there is not one chance in 1000 the Soviets will push it to the point of war.

CAH said he didn't like the British line in Selwyn Lloyd's message.³ CAH said he showed it to the President and showed him draft reply to Soviet note prepared by Merchant.⁴ CAH said he recommended to President we go ahead and shoot the draft to our allies instead of waiting until Macmillan comes here. JFD said Macmillan is trying to get all the domestic political mileage he can get and JFD said we are not unsympathetic to this since we don't want to see Bevan win the election, and JFD said within reason there is no objection to giving him an important role as far as the appearance of things is concerned but to JFD's

³ On March 5 Caccia sent Herter a letter that outlined a message from Lloyd. The Foreign Secretary believed that the reply to the Soviet note of March 2 should not be rushed; that it could be drafted following Macmillan's visits to Paris, Bonn, and Washington; and that it could be delivered after the NATO meeting in April. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

⁴ See Document 242.

mind this whole thing is very vital from the standpoint of our whole NATO posture and position. JFD said there is no point in having troops there—which are expensive to maintain—if those troops won't be used if need be.

CAH said the President made clear yesterday at NSC that regarding overflights, communications, etc., we can't go along by ourselves. We would have to pull out of NATO. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

CAH said on the Camp David idea, he was certain the President and Macmillan would not do this unless JFD could go there. CAH said the President felt the facilities there were more comfortable for JFD and he could be taken care of better and be able to rest as JFD felt need of it rather than have JFD travelling back and forth to the White House. CAH reiterated he was certain President and Macmillan would abandon this idea if it were not feasible from JFD's standpoint. JFD said it is a very awkward situation. JFD said he didn't want to hold on to the title if he couldn't do the job. CAH said the Secy should not worry about this; that all anybody wanted was for JFD to get back into harness. JFD said the doctor told him today there would probably be two weeks more of the X-ray, and said that is a very weakening process and that it will still be going on during the Macmillan visit, but JFD said treatment can be interrupted without serious impairment. JFD said he is really worried that Macmillan is going to be prepared to compromise on recognition of the GDR, etc., which would be a gain for the Soviet Union. JFD said he doesn't think they are entitled to get any net gain. Said what is wrong with the Berlin situation? Said we nearly had a war ten years ago and we reached a compromise; the only trouble is it has been going too good from the Communists' standpoint. JFD said this is just so much talk about competition between their system and ours; that when they are competing nearby, they can't stand the comparison. JFD said that is the only reason in the world for raising this problem. Said West Berlin doesn't want a change; they don't mind being occupied; their productivity, population, etc is increasing and conditions are good. JFD said what is all the reason for this excitement? Secy then said jokingly that CAH could see he had just had a blood transfusion.

JFD said he would like to see CAH over the weekend and CAH said he would be available whenever the Secy wanted him.

207. Memorandum of Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Herter and the Representative to the United Nations (Lodge)

Washington, March 6, 1959.

Cabot Lodge came to see me this afternoon with a message from the President. He had just talked to the President about the possible role of the United Nations in the Berlin crisis, and had suggested that, if a Summit meeting was desirable or perhaps inevitable in that connection, the Security Council of the United Nations, with the heads of governments present, should be the forum for such a meeting.¹

The President liked the idea and suggested that perhaps some reference to this idea might be incorporated in our draft reply to the Soviet note of March 2nd.

I told Cabot I was somewhat doubtful as to the wisdom of this since it seemed to me it would merely complicate the simple suggestion which our draft reply contained. I also told him it was my own view that the United Nations should be held in reserve for two contingencies:

(1) If, by an exchange of notes with the Soviet Government it appeared clear that no negotiations could be agreed upon before May 27th, then it would be desirable to have a United Nations Resolution urging the maintenance of the status quo and the initiation of negotiations.

(2) If negotiations should begin, and during the course of them the Soviet Government concluded a peace treaty with the East German Government and turned over to the latter all responsibility for the right of access to East Berlin, then a Security Council meeting with the heads of government present might head off precipitate action.

He told me he agreed in general with these two thoughts and that he would proceed at once to consulting with his British and French colleagues in accordance with the decision reached at the tripartite talks on Saturday last. Apparently Lodge felt he had had no specific instructions on this matter, and so the conversations had not been begun.

C.A.H.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers. Secret.

¹ Lodge met with the President from 12:15 to 12:30 p.m. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments Book)

**208. Memorandum of Discussion at the First Meeting of the
Berlin Contingency Planning Group**

Washington, March 9, 1959.

SUBJECT

Berlin Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS

State

Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary
Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
Livingston T. Merchant, Asst Secy—European Affairs
Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secy—Policy Planning

Defense

Neil McElroy, Secretary
Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary
John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secy for ISA
General N.F. Twining, Chairman, JCS

White House

Gordon Gray, Special Asst to President for National Security Affairs

Secretary McElroy expressed concern that the meeting with the President on Thursday, March 5, had not cleared up certain aspects of Berlin contingency planning.¹ He said that present military planning does not go beyond possible blockage of a Western probe after turn-over. Should the Department of Defense be thinking of a garrison air lift while the case was in the UN. The advantage of resorting to the air would be that the communists would have to shoot first if they wanted to stop this form of access. Secretary McElroy expressed concern that the "turn-over" might occur in a matter of a few weeks.

Secretary McElroy asked how "stiff-necked" we were regarding document examination. He felt that it would be hard to sell America on general war merely to avoid East German stamping of our documents—

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-959. Top Secret. Drafted by Smith.

¹ At 8:30 a.m. on March 9 Gray had discussed the Special NSC Meeting held on March 5 (see Document 201) with the President. Gray noted that that meeting "had not been too successful" and had accomplished less than he desired. He also stated that McElroy had called him following the meeting to voice his dissatisfaction as well. McElroy suggested that a small group be set up to "mature" the problem in preparation for another meeting with the President, and Eisenhower approved the procedure since he admitted "that he was still confused as to what we would do under certain contingencies." (Memorandum of discussion with the President, March 11; Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)

unless it was clear that stamping amounted to US recognition of the GDR. It was pointed out that the UK position seems to be one of agreement that we should submit to no East German inspection or control, but the UK apparently does not want to resort to force over the matter of East German stamping of documents. Secretary McElroy pointed out that the West Germans accept East German stamping in connection with civilian traffic.

Mr. Quarles supported Secretary McElroy's thesis that "stamping" was not a good point at which to resort to force. He felt that the West Germans were "leading us into a mouse trap".

Mr. Murphy pointed out that Secretary Dulles had felt strongly that we should not submit to stamping. This was not just a legal matter, but had significant political overtones. Mr. Murphy pointed out that under European practice acceptance of stamping connoted acceptance of the stamper's right of inspection. Secretary McElroy suggested that this matter be left, indicating that he thought we could reach agreement.

Secretary McElroy then said that, assuming a blockage had occurred, should the military be planning to fly a substantial number of planes into Berlin. Mr. Murphy pointed out that there would be no need for this in view of the adequate garrison supplies. Mr. Murphy felt that we should go to the UN before instituting an air lift. If supplies had to be flown in, the flights should not be designated as an "air lift".

Secretary McElroy asked if we should plan to mobilize as soon as our ground access was blocked. Mr. Murphy thought that we should not, but that a number of preparatory measures should be taken. Secretary McElroy indicated that this is what he had meant by the term "mobilization".

Mr. Merchant pointed out that after a blockage, it was likely that commercial flying into Berlin would cease and military planes would probably have to take up this load.

Governor Herter pointed out that presumably a UN meeting at this time would be the background for a "Summit" meeting. He added that a first indicator of Soviet movement would be the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR.

General Twining then read off a list of preparatory moves the military thought should be made.² The Chiefs would like to start such moves right away, but the President has reservations about the public impact.

There was general discussion about the desirability of beefing up the 7th Army in Germany and the effect which such an action would

² Although this list has not been identified with certainty, presumably it is the one referred to in footnote 8, Document 201.

have on the adequacy of our central reserve in the US to deal with possible crises in other parts of the world.

Secretary McElroy thought that the Soviets were not concerned about a possible ground force move by the West. Mr. Murphy disagreed, pointing out that the great mistake, in his judgment, of the 1948–49 blockade episode was our failure to move on the ground.

Mr. Merchant expressed the opinion that, if we continue on a “business as usual” basis, the Soviets may miscalculate our intentions. He also felt that our allies would tend to become timid and look at this problem in a black and white fashion—either give up Berlin or go to total nuclear war.

Governor Herter questioned the wisdom of beefing up the 7th Army at the same time that we were going ahead with the 30,000 place reduction in our over-all armed forces.

Mr. Gray suggested that another meeting with the President should be held since he felt that the President was not sufficiently current on contingency planning.

Governor Herter read parts of the “Agenda for Discussion of Berlin” which was prepared for this meeting (copy attached).³

Mr. Quarles expressed concern about our public posture in this matter. He felt that we should say to the Russians, in effect, that we are glad they propose to give up their occupancy of East Berlin, and that we should avoid any implication that we wanted them to stay on. He wondered if we should not go further and replace Soviet inspectors with our own people when the turn-over occurred.

Mr. Irwin expressed the opinion that a firm US position would be more effective now and for the next few months than in the fall or next year.

Mr. Smith expressed the opinion that we had not yet made clear what it was we wanted the Soviets to do. Mr. Murphy said we wanted “free access” to Berlin. Mr. Smith expressed the opinion that firm American popular support for our Berlin position was based on a belief that the Soviets themselves plan to blockade Berlin. He felt that, when it became clear that the Soviet threat was much more ambiguous, there was danger of confusion in American understanding. Therefore, we should make very clear what it was we wanted the Soviets to do and what we wanted them not to do.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that a speech was being prepared for the President on the subject of the adequacy of our military establish-

³ Not printed. Drafted by Morgan on March 9, this agenda listed minimum requirements, the “cut-off” point, countermeasures, preparatory measures, negotiating posture, and Allied solidarity as items for discussion.

ment and, perhaps, reference in this speech could be made to our Berlin thinking.

There was further discussion about the possibility of deploying an additional division from STRAC to replace a division which General Norstad may have to deploy to the north and to the east in connection with the Berlin crisis.

The discussion was concluded with an agreement that the Chiefs and the Department of Defense would prepare a list of military moves which they thought should be made, and State would prepare a list of political moves. These two lists would be meshed and would be presented to the President probably after next Thursday's NSC meeting.

209. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany

Berlin, March 9, 1959, 9 p.m.

694. Paris for Hillenbrand. During recent weeks some corrosion West Berlin in morale imperceptible in detail is beginning be discernible in cumulative effect (Berlin's despatches 620 and 621).¹ Apprehension re outcome Berlin crisis has increasingly pervaded thinking of politically articulate segments of population.

This concern engendered by: 1) Sov's show of self-assurance and aggressiveness compounded by unwillingness yield on any aspect their substantive demands while making only apparent concessions re procedural matters; 2) inclination some elements in West detect favorable omens in these "concessions"; 3) apparent lack Allied unity in dealing with Sov moves and inability (as reported in press) after three months' consultation arrive at plan of action; 4) worry that even some key Western policy and opinion makers may fail recognize deadly seriousness Sov challenge and may fail prepare materially and psychologically for real showdown with Sovs over what might seem to Western publics to

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-959. Confidential. Repeated to Paris and the Department as telegram 778, which is the source text.

¹ Both dated March 2. The former transmitted a report on the attitudes and morale of Berlin workers, and the latter transmitted a report on the attitudes and opinions of Berlin's political leaders on the situation in Berlin. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/3-259)

be minor "GDR control" issue; 5) fear if Sovs go to brink West might unwittingly make what appear be minor concessions with major implications placing city's freedom in serious jeopardy; 6) press reports re 2, 3, 4, especially speculative articles by columnists, which have greatly contributed to feeling uneasiness and have diminished beneficial effects recent reaffirmations Berlin guaranty; 7) Secretary's illness at crucial time in East-West relations.

Berlin leaders feel present impasse unlikely be solved by further statements. They convinced more physical evidence Western determination, such as build-up general military strength, may be required dissuade Sovs from carrying out their threats to take unilateral action. There no question in their minds such moves would meet with full approval Berlin population as sign of Western resolve (see Berlin's airgram G-324 to SecState, G-145 Bonn).²

Basically Berlin's leading elements remain admirably calm and brave despite inner concern and continue put faith in belief that, if their protectors stand firm, Soviets will ultimately not drive matter to armed conflict. Berliners naturally also hope that if there must be concessions they will be ones for which full price is paid by Soviets; that is, real compromises not Western surrenders.

Although responsible Berliners are usually careful not to criticize unfavorably British and French we have general impression that they consider France willing but weak because of Algerian situation, Britain momentarily irresolute though basically probably dependable, and look to USA to provide both initial strength and leadership necessary to put full resources free world in line against Soviet menace to its most exposed citizens.

Insofar as we can detect mass Berlin population not as apprehensive as politically informed elements. There are only scattered outward signs of disquiet. Berliners generally have adopted attitude watchful concern, closely scrutinizing all developments relating Berlin situation. Party leaders report questions asked at Party meetings indicate extraordinary awareness international situation. Outward calmness of population evidenced by absence increased buying or hoarding of non-perishables. Berlin leaders wish housewives would fill their larders in order make room in city's warehouses for further public stockpiling but don't quite know how to suggest such private stockpiling without causing panic.

Gufler

² Airgram G-324, March 4, transmitted a report on a meeting at the Berlin Press Club on March 2 at which the Commandants exchanged views with leading Berlin press editors. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/3-459)

210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, March 10, 1959, 8:20 p.m.

741. For Lodge. Re Berlin, Deptel 735.¹ Following are Department's suggestions re problems to be explored with British and French representatives in your preliminary discussions re UN role in Berlin situation:

(1) In event direct negotiations cannot be arranged or collapse, we believe there would be certain definite advantages in Western initiative in bringing Berlin matter to SC. We recognize very strong pressures will develop for UN action and also recognize usefulness UN mobilizing world opinion. We also recognize certain disadvantages SC action, particularly risk UN involvement in substance German problem. However, assuming desirability or necessity resort to SC at some stage, we believe US in better position to resist unsatisfactory substantive proposals and to attain positive benefits from SC action, if step can be taken prior to any Soviet action affecting status quo. Unless we move first, prospect is that others will bring matter to SC, or if circumstances appear desperate, may even seek special GA session. In general, Department favorably impressed by arguments your 716 and 729² for SC initiative prior to Soviet transfer calling upon governments and authorities concerned not to take any unilateral action interfering with access to Berlin and renewing offer to negotiate. This line of action automatically identifies USSR as party responsible for any subsequent change in situation that could upset delicate balance of peace.

(2) Contingency paper proposes that if initial probe physically obstructed, three Powers will temporarily suspend surface traffic and seek to mobilize opinion by variety means, in which case situation "could be taken" to SC and in event of Soviet veto, to special GA. While we believe action to be sought would at least include elements in para 1 above, which would mean in contingency context call for restoration of free-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1059. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted on March 9 by Sisco, Nunley, and Elizabeth Brown; cleared by Murphy, Merchant, Becker, Calhoun, and Gerard Smith; and approved by Herter. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 735, March 9, transmitted preliminary guidance for Lodge in discussing recourse to the United Nations with the British and French representatives. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/3–959)

² Telegram 716, February 26, noted the merits of transferring the Berlin question to the Security Council before the Soviet Union handed over its responsibilities to the East Germans since the United Nations tended to favor the side maintaining the status quo. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/2–2659) Telegram 729, March 3, reiterated this view after receiving the tripartite contingency plan. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/3–359)

dom of access and for resumption of negotiations, we recognize that if USSR takes negative attitude in SC, we may not be able press such proposal. We fully agree with your view that since under these circumstances change in status quo will already have occurred, we may be compelled consider other alternatives. We might be confronted with efforts to compromise basic principles in way that would tend obscure true issues and even equate Soviet and Western positions by seeking modus vivendi accepting Soviet transfer. If we go to SC, particularly at this late stage, we must be prepared deal with proposals on substance, as well as procedure. We must also take into account that our resort to SC in crisis might tend inhibit or delay Western Powers in taking direct action to assert rights or otherwise respond directly to unilateral Soviet action.

(3) We would be interested in having current British and French thinking re relative merits timing proposed by contingency paper and timing suggested your 716, as elaborated in para 1 above.

(4) In event Western Powers should at some stage decide accept Summit meeting, subject of course to conditions then prevailing, we would appreciate views UK and French whether we should make proposal similar to that of last summer for high level SC meeting or at least respond positively to proposals of this character made by others in SC. At this time, it is clearly premature to seek to reach any decisions this point since much will depend on evolution our discussions with USSR. We recognize SC framework has certain obvious drawbacks from Soviet standpoint and would be interested in having any comments from you as to steps that might be taken make SC framework more acceptable to USSR. In this connection we recall Soviet efforts last summer to bring Nehru into picture.

(5) In addition to foregoing, you should also explore desirability and feasibility special GA action in event SC impasse. It is clearly impossible now to reach any conclusions regarding special GA since immediate circumstances then prevailing will be determining. However, we believe important to consider now pros and cons re special GA in event SC stalemate. This would also involve consideration of means to avert special GA if judged not in our interest. Our estimate is that GA would be considerably more difficult to control than SC. To some extent we would wish to adjust our objectives in SC to our estimate desirability and feasibility, or reverse, of GA action. For example your suggestion that under certain circumstances it might be desirable not to press proposal in SC to veto might provide one way of confining action to SC. Would appreciate your views and those of UK and French Missions this point.

(6) It would be useful to have joint estimate of probable Soviet position and tactics in SC and best means of countering them. We must

expect USSR to seek to define basic issues in terms most favorable to its own position, such as Soviet right relinquish occupation and Soviet right terminate state of war with Germany or Soviet initiative for summit meeting. We should be fully prepared meet such Soviet contentions in manner calculated win support of world opinion. This will require most careful study since certain Soviet arguments may have considerable superficial attractiveness.

(7) Department also suggests exploration advantages and disadvantages Western initiative (as opposed to initiative by others) in convening SC in above circumstances. Our ability maintain maximum control and exercise greatest influence can best be assured by our keeping initiative so we are not placed generally on defensive. However, Dept wishes you consider whether there may be advantage in leaving initiative elsewhere. For example, there seems possibility Western initiative to involve UN might be interpreted by USSR as indication Western weakness or hesitation assume risks of direct action to preserve rights. Under certain circumstances, this might inspire dangerous miscalculation.

(8) It would also be useful obtain current British and French thinking, plus further ideas of USUN, regarding any other problems you may foresee.

(9) Department wishes emphasize importance conducting above exploratory discussion in manner which will minimize outside speculation re UN role in Berlin situation.

FYI. French Ambassador informed Murphy today of receipt governmental instructions authorizing French participation in tripartite discussions New York this subject.

(10) Department will study carefully comments your 746.³

Herter

³Telegram 746, March 9, reported that following receipt of preliminary guidance Lodge had consulted with his British and French colleagues who were either unprepared for or uninstructed about tripartite talks in New York on the possibility of taking the Berlin question to the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/3–959)

211. Testimony by the Chief of Staff of the Army (Taylor) Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

Washington, March 11, 1959.

[Here follow introductory remarks.]

General Taylor. The Berlin situation has, of course, been with us since Potsdam. It reached the critical point at the time of the Berlin Airlift, and recurrently since that time has been in mind as the allies, the United States, Britain and France have repeatedly been exposed to pressures placed upon their communications with the city of Berlin.

I had the privilege of commanding there two years immediately after the airlift, and have a very deep feeling of the importance of Berlin and the significance of the problem represented thereby. I cannot say that the events which have taken place in recent months have been a surprise to me. Even in '49 and '50 when I was in command we were predicting that next time pressure was applied upon the city of Berlin to any serious degree, that it would be done not by the USSR but by the East German Republic.

In other words, if we had another blockade that it would be done without a Russian in sight. So that Khrushchev's announcement late in the fall, in November, was perhaps surprising only as it came rather late, later than I would have predicted say five or six years ago. Since that time, of course, we have intensified our attention to the problem and found that the factors really haven't changed over the years. We still have the problem of maintaining communications, of maintaining the freedom of 2 and a half million West Berliners for whom we are responsible and for whose life, safety and fortunes we have pledged our honor. From the military point of view that problem is virtually insolvable if it is the intention of the USSR and its allies to use force against the allies in Berlin.

That is it is impossible as a single isolated solution.

Senator Johnson. Would you repeat that statement now?

General Taylor. Putting it in slightly different words, Berlin has always been untenable as a military position. In other words, it is over 100 miles inside the Iron Curtain. It is an island surrounded on all sides by superior forces. A surprise attack or an imminent attack with warning could never be resisted locally by military means. We have known that, we have accepted the fact. It is inevitable. On the other hand, we have

Source: Eisenhower Library, Harlow Records. Top Secret. General Taylor testified at morning and afternoon sessions on March 11.

thus far protected Berlin first by the evident resolution that we would not accept interference with our rights without making a very violent reaction.

We so reacted at the time of the airlift. I think that you will find that many of the leaders of the airlift, people like General Clay, General Hayes and others felt at the time that we should never have accepted the airlift, but rather should have used force on the highway, at least to verify what the Russian intent was.

Instead we accepted a challenge which may well have been a bluff. We will never know to what extent the USSR would have gone to maintain the blockade by force. We have foreseen that if the EGR, the Eastern German Republic replaced the USSR and by similar measures undertook to blockade Berlin that our problem would be greater in the sense that the affront and the loss of honor to accept the will of the conquered East Germans over the U.S. and its allies would be much greater, much more serious in international relations.

Hence when this challenge did come last November, as I say we knew very intensely our contemplation of all facets of the old problem and found that they really had not changed very much.

In military language, and I say in military language with diffidence because this is essentially a political problem, as I view the military side of the operation or the possible operation, they are directed more at strengthening our political power, at supplementing our position at the negotiation table rather than as a straightforward military planning which is much simpler than this complicated picture that we face.

But again as I started to say, in military terms what are we faced with? We are faced possibly with the use of limited force or indeterminate force on the part of the East Germans after May 27th to prevent our free access to Berlin.

That will mean that we will have to decide well in advance how to cope with that kind of situation. In my judgment it should call first for I would call it a reconnaissance of intention. This time we should never allow bluff to force us into a self-imposed blockade or anything resembling that kind of passive reaction.

I would say that we should certainly probe at once to find out will any force be used to prevent our free access on the ground to Berlin? And if that is the case, then to apply repeated force and in such strength as the situation may require to develop that in deed. This is a major effort to which the EGR and the Soviet Union are willing to engage in formal military operations and by that time we will reach the point of extremely serious decision, how far then will we go?

Will we indeed pass to general war? But I would sum up the formula which in my mind is clear as crystal, that we must be willing now

to make up our respective minds now that we will use all force necessary to secure the lives and safety of these two and a half million Germans to whom we are committed unalterably in language that cannot be compromised.

[Here follows unrelated discussion.]

Senator Engle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I only have two questions and perhaps you covered one of them.

As I listened to your testimony this morning, we can't win in Berlin, that is Berlin isolated by itself is not an area where we can fight successfully.

General Taylor. We probably could not win immediately in a military sense, but I don't suggest for a moment that Berlin is not defensible. It is defensible by our clear determination to go all out, if necessary, in any kind of a military operation if we are really threatened with a situation from Berlin.

It can be defended, and in my judgment must be defended.

Senator Engle. What I am thinking about is how do you get to fighting the kind of war you can win? Now we don't fight a war we can't win, so if we limit ourselves to Berlin, we are trying to take a city or hold a city sitting right out in the middle of the communist sea. We don't want to get the other end of the case where you have an all-out atomic and hydrogen war where everybody is throwing everything they have.

Now we don't want that because no one wins one of those wars.

General Taylor. That is right.

Senator Engle. So in between someplace, in other words if you have to fight, what size war are you going to fight? Are you going to spread out and take the whole of East Germany?

General Taylor. No, I would first think there has been perhaps a little, a fallacy injected into my testimony by my not having made clear that I would doubt that we will encounter Soviet forces in the kind of patrolling of the highway that I anticipate. I believe the Soviets would follow certainly initially, their favorite tactic of the cat's paw of war or military operation by proxy, and we would not necessarily see Soviet soldiers. There wouldn't be one in sight, although his potential presence would be a constant threat to our operation.

I think we ought to visualize the problem the Soviets have to contemplate in any kind of a military operation in East Germany. They are tremendously vulnerable in the satellite area and the consequences of starting any kind of a shooting operation to them must look very dangerous, indeed.

So I personally believe that a strong, determined, active reaction to any threat by the East Germans will eventually lead them to modify their position.

I can't prove that, but I have that feeling.

Senator Engle. Well, we start out by probing to determine what their real intentions are.

General Taylor. Yes, is it a bluff, or are they going to stop one truck? If we find a man there with a gun to stop the truck, let's send an armored detachment down and see if they stop that.

Senator Engle. Do we stop there or shoot?

General Taylor. I say we use the necessary force to go through or stop. How much further do we go?

Senator Engle. There is one on each side to determine if we have war, is that it?

General Taylor. No, I would say that the two sides at the outset will determine what our next move is going to be, whether we send forces in.

Senator Engle. After that is done, let's assume the [shooting?] starts and we project force against force and we move into Berlin and they desire to hold it and they have fire power enough to run us out of there. Then what do we do?

General Taylor. In that case, they have gone so far that indeed they are initiating World War III.

Their problem is tougher than ours at every step that we describe, and if we just see our difficulties and our figures and don't see the other fellow's I am afraid apathy is the only thing we have to offer.

Senator Engle. Let's go to the third step. We have gone to the point where the patrols meet. The patrol meets and we had to push our way in.

Now the third step is that we get into an all-out shooting, conventional war surrounding Berlin. Is that it?

General Taylor. I doubt that we get that far.

Senator Engle. Let's assume it, General. We just have to assume that is maybe what will happen and they are going to pour it on us because they think with conventional weapons they can run us out.

Is their assumption right?

General Taylor. If we limited ourselves to conventional weapons, we could not hold Berlin. It is too far inland—110 miles from West Germany.

Senator Engle. All right, then you mean we would have to go to atomic weapons of one size or another. Is that what you are talking about?

General Taylor. I think you are talking about it. I am not. You are posing a situation which I don't visualize as being reasonable.

It could happen. Virtually anything could happen, but I would visualize a stalemate on the Autobahn, five miles inside of Eastern

Germany and there is where you would decide is this stalemate acceptable or are we going to go by it?

Senator Engle. What I am trying to find out is whether or not we don't get down to this situation: Don't we get down to this situation where eventually we have to face the decision of using at least the small atomic weapons or be prepared to get run out?

General Taylor. I would go further and say from the very outset, before you start this, you must be resolved to use as much force as necessary to accomplish the mission.

Senator Engle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Johnson. General, the whole thesis of what you said is that we are determined to go to all out war against the Soviets, but we won't have to do that. Is that your opinion?

General Taylor. That is my opinion.

Senator Johnson. And is that the basis of your thinking? Would it be different if you came to the conclusion that the Soviets won't back down and we would have to go to a nuclear war?

General Taylor. It would be a tough decision, Senator, when we analyze the repercussions from the loss of Berlin to force, particularly if we didn't do our best.

Now I have always said, sir, and you may or may not agree, that it is better to try and to lose than not to try at all.

I am sure insofar as the world position is concerned, that fact is a fact. But, if we look at the results of losing West Berlin as I say, without trying our world position, our European position is so compromised that we are inevitably accepting Russian domination of the world and of our downgrading to a second or third class power.

With those stakes I would say that this is worth that, worth general war with the Soviets if we can see clearly that that is the alternative.

Senator Johnson. So then if all negotiations fail, our decision not to give an inch remains firm, even if they are not bluffing?

General Taylor. I would say we must verify that they are not bluffing.

Senator Johnson. And if they are not, then what?

General Taylor. If we verify that, that indeed they will use force to throw us out of Berlin, I say we must use all the necessary force to overcome it.

Senator Johnson. And that would be?

General Taylor. It would be general war.

[Here follows unrelated discussion.]

212. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McElroy

JCSM-82-59

Washington, March 11, 1959.

SUBJECT

United States Position on Berlin (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to express their concern over the need for a clear U.S. position on Berlin. They are impressed with the fact that the probable time of a showdown with the Soviets, May 27th, is rapidly approaching and much remains to be done in a political, military, and psychological sense to prepare for this emergency.

2. The present U.S. position on Berlin as known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is contained in Appendix "A" hereto. This document in its present form is, in their opinion, defective in two important aspects. First, it limits preparatory measures to "quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence". Second, the document does not face up to the vital need for decision now that the safety of Berlin is worth running the risk of a general war with the USSR.

3. With regard to the first point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that there exists a need to take at once those precautionary measures necessary to prepare for the outbreak of hostilities over Berlin at the time of the passage of USSR authority to the GDR. The military requirement for prompt action arises from consideration of the inevitable time lag needed to implement decisions affecting our military readiness.

4. Apart from the military need for taking these precautionary measures, there is a concomitant requirement to mobilize United States and Allied public opinion. While realizing that a delicate balance must be maintained between this need and the possibility of overexciting the nation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that our present course of action is failing to bring home to our people the potential seriousness of the Berlin situation and the importance of the stakes involved. They are also impressed with a need to convince the Soviets of our earnestness, thus hoping to deter them from adverse actions and decisions, due to miscalculation, from which it may later be most difficult to withdraw. They endorse the thought contained in paragraph 14, NIE 100-2-59,¹ that "the

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 63 A 1574, 381 Germany. Top Secret.

¹ Not printed. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

USSR would almost certainly back away from a full turnover of access controls if it were convinced that the Western Powers were determined to use whatever degree of force was necessary to maintain access to Berlin free of GDR controls, even if such use of force led to general war". They agree also that this conviction will be most difficult to establish in the Soviet mind without making manifest preparations for war. Hence, they recommend openly making such preparations.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the most serious omission in the policy paper on Berlin is the absence of an unqualified assertion of determination to fight for Berlin if all other measures fail. They consider that the loss of Berlin would be a political and military disaster. Of potentially equal danger are concessions which may lead to this loss. The Joint Chiefs of Staff join with Ambassador Bruce in feeling that "We must be prepared and ready, if all else fails, to wage nuclear war against the Soviets". However, they are of the opinion that the Soviet Union is unlikely to risk general war to evict the Allies from Berlin, particularly at this time when the Soviet leaders probably recognize that the United States has a greater capability to inflict damage in general war upon them than they upon us. Thus, insofar as the danger of general war is concerned, we are now in a relatively better position than the USSR to have a showdown on Berlin provided we make timely preparations for all contingencies. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that we now establish a clear, positive U.S. policy on Berlin and gain the adherence of our Allies through the strength of our own determination. To carry conviction with them as well as with the Soviet Union, we must be visibly prepared for military conflict growing out of the Berlin situation.

6. In consonance with the foregoing views, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations as to modifications to the policy paper (Appendix "A" hereto) are appended as Appendix "B" hereto. Additionally, they will submit from time to time to the Secretary of Defense specific proposals with regard to actions necessary to support U.S. policy on Berlin.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix "A"²

Washington, February 18, 1959.

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The re-examination of Berlin contingency planning which has been undertaken on the basis of the United States aide-mémoire of December 11, 1958 would be facilitated by a more precise description of the measures which would be taken to deal with and to prepare for a situation in which the USSR attempted to withdraw from its present functions with respect to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin and in which officials of the so-called "German Democratic Republic" (GDR) refused to allow the traffic of the Three Powers to pass without submitting to some form of control.

Agreement should therefore be reached at this time on the more detailed plan of action outline in paragraphs 1 through 5 below.

1. Measures to be Taken Immediately:

(a) The Three Powers will continue their efforts to bring about a Foreign Ministers' meeting with the USSR on the various aspects of the Germany question, as provided in instructions to 3 ambassadors in Moscow bearing in mind that one of the purposes of such a meeting would be to provide the USSR with a cover which could facilitate the modification or the indefinite postponement of its "ultimatum" that it will withdraw from its functions with relation to the Three Powers' access to Berlin after May 27.

(b) In view of the possibility that the USSR may nonetheless withdraw from these functions and in order to provide evidence of the Three Powers' determination to maintain their free access, the Three Powers will, in the period between now and May 27, take quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence. These measures will be planned and coordinated in the first instance by the military headquarters of the Three Powers in Germany. Recommendations for preparatory measures, regardless of origin, will be referred to the national Chiefs of Staff and thereafter be coordinated tripartitely or NATO-wide as may be agreed, bearing in mind the availability of military advisers in Washington.

2. Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions:

After the announced or attempted withdrawal of Soviet personnel from the access checkpoints, the first Allied movement via the

²Secret.

Autobahn will be one or more trucks accompanied by a scout car or a comparable armed vehicle. If necessary, the vehicles will be identified to the GDR officials as vehicles of one of the Three Powers, but no stamping of papers or inspection by GDR officials will be allowed. The movement will proceed until its passage is physically obstructed. It will not fire unless fired upon, but if fired upon will take whatever defensive action seems necessary.

3. Possible Substitution of Allied for Soviet Personnel:

The Three Powers might consider the possibility of substituting their own personnel for the Soviet personnel withdrawn from the Nowawes and Marienborn checkpoints.

4. Efforts to Increase Pressure on USSR and GDR:

If the initial probe or probes described in paragraph 2 above is physically obstructed, the Three Powers will temporarily suspend surface traffic and will make parallel efforts along the following lines to increase pressure on the USSR and the GDR:

(a) The Three Powers will seek to mobilize world opinion against the USSR as a violator of agreements, as a user of force, and as a threat to the peace. The situation could be taken to the United Nations Security Council and, in the event of a Soviet veto, to a special session of the General Assembly. Consideration would be given to further forms of diplomatic or other pressure, including the withdrawal of the Ambassadors of the Three Powers from Moscow.

(b) The Three Powers will intensify their military preparations. At this point the preparations could include measures which would be readily observable, for example, the evacuation of dependents from Berlin, and possibly from the Federal Republic.

5. Use of Additional Military Force:

If the measures described in paragraph 4 above do not suffice to restore the free access of the Three Powers to Berlin, the Three Governments after suitable consultation will decide whether further military pressures should be applied. As a supplement to military pressures consideration might be given to possible economic measures.

The attitude of the Three Powers towards dealing with personnel at the Nowawes and Marienborn checkpoints should be also defined more precisely with respect to two points.

The first of these relates to the so-called "agency principle." The Three Powers cannot deal with GDR personnel as Soviet agents if the USSR denies that such an agency relationship exists. If, however, the USSR should ultimately propose a compromise under which the USSR, as principal, would expressly authorize GDR personnel to function as Soviet agents in performing Soviet functions with relation to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin, the Three Powers should consider the

possibility of accepting such a compromise solution, with appropriate safeguards for their own rights.

The second point involves the practical problem of identifying the vehicles of the Three Powers at the Nowawes and Marienborn checkpoints in order to establish that they constitute an Allied military movement enjoying the right of unrestricted passage between Berlin and West Germany. If Soviet personnel are withdrawn from the checkpoints, there would be no objection to providing mere identification of the vehicles of the Three Powers for the information of GDR personnel at the checkpoints. Such identification should not, however, include the stamping of papers or any other form of inspection or control, and it should not be construed as acquiescence in the substitution of GDR for Soviet personnel. The Three Embassies at Bonn, after consultation with the military headquarters of the Three Powers in Germany, should determine the appropriate procedure for identifying the vehicles of the Three Powers and incorporate this identification procedure in the detailed instructions which the Embassies are now developing for Autobahn travel by military convoys and vehicles and by the privately-owned vehicles of official personnel of the Three Powers.

Appendix "B"³

PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S. POSITION ON BERLIN

1. Delete paragraph 1 (b) and substitute the following:

"In view of the possibility that the USSR may nonetheless withdraw from these functions, between now and May 27, the Three Powers should take the necessary preparatory and pre-cautionary military measures to prepare for an outbreak of hostilities arising from the Soviet threat against Allied rights in Berlin. These actions will be given the visibility necessary to alert public opinion of the United States to the serious nature of the threat to Berlin and to convince the Soviets of U.S. and Allied resolution to resist any change in the present status of West Berlin."

2. Delete paragraph 4 (b).
3. Delete paragraph 5 and substitute the following:

"If the above mentioned diplomatic measures and military preparations are not successful in restoring free access, the governments of the

³ Top Secret.

Three Powers will apply the necessary military force to reopen and maintain communications with West Berlin.”

4. Delete remainder of paper beginning with unnumbered paragraph, page 3, “The attitude of the Three Powers . . .”.⁴

⁴ Ellipsis in the source text.

213. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, March 12, 1959, noon.

4708. Paris for Embassy, USRO and Thurston. According to official Macmillan talks with Debre and de Gaulle concentrated on Germany and Berlin but there was also some discussion of Africa and very briefly of free trade area. Prime Minister raised question of Mediterranean fleet and expressed objections “in general terms” to French action.

Lloyd at first meeting gave Debre summary of Macmillan’s and his talks in Moscow. Macmillan added that three points emerged from these talks: 1) Khrushchev would be satisfied with de facto rather than de jure recognition of the DDR, 2) Soviets willing for West Germany to remain in NATO for present and 3) Khrushchev interested in a thinning out of forces in Europe. Macmillan said the question for West was how to play hand. If decision were to push Berlin issue to point of war then various military measures such as mobilization should be undertaken. Macmillan stressed importance of avoiding bluff from which we would subsequently have to back down. Debre replied that he agreed West must consider possibility of military catastrophe over Berlin but should try to avoid it. Western unity essential. While West might accept no present prospect of German reunification, essential to maintain position in Berlin. Debre showed no enthusiasm for disengagement or limitation of arms.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4151/3-1259. Secret. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Paris, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow. For another account of Macmillan’s visit to Paris, March 9–10, see Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, pp. 636–638.

Couve de Murville gave summary of de Gaulle talks with Adenauer. De Gaulle found Adenauer realistic on reunification and prepared concentrate on European security. Germans reluctant to look at limited arms zones or disengagement because of possible implications for continued maintenance Western forces in Germany. Adenauer had aired views on general disarmament.

Macmillan said he had not discussed demilitarized zone or zone of special arms limitations with Russians and they had not for their part suggested neutralized or denuclearized Germany.

Macmillan said four possibilities: 1) firm actions as well as words by West with respect Berlin, 2) Russians might not climb down and we would then have war, 3) we might have compromise (no indication in record of conversation that nature "compromise" spelled out), 4) we could conduct bluff which would be disastrous our interests. Debre replied that we must decide what we can accept on Berlin and then hold firm. He suggested quadripartite consideration Berlin and tripartite study German question.

Macmillan said Soviets publicly committed to negotiations and since it was clear negotiations should be with Khrushchev this meant a summit meeting. West might propose summit end of July or early August with Foreign Ministers' meeting to prepare for summit.

In discussion March 10 between Couve and Lloyd former said he was opposed to replacing Western forces with UN forces in Berlin since this merely variant Soviet free city proposal. With respect zone of limitation of forces Lloyd said such arrangement must not 1) disturb military balance, 2) result in break up of NATO or 3) in withdrawal US forces from Europe. Subject to these considerations UK was prepared to look at plans for zone of limitation of forces. He added however that Rapacki Plan¹ or neutralization of Germany not acceptable. Lloyd said might be some advantage in setting up zone with provision for inspection in area of Germany east of Rhine with corresponding area east of DDR frontier but matter would have to be discussed with Germans. Lloyd said such scheme should be part of package deal including settlement of Berlin but not providing for German reunification. Macmillan in conversation with Debre and de Gaulle stressed control features as most important aspect zone of limitations. He also thought zone might constitute start toward disarmament and useful anti-surprise attack measure.

In meeting with Macmillan March 10 de Gaulle took firm line on Berlin saying we must insist on our right of passage and Khrushchev would back down since he doesn't want war. Macmillan agreed but said negotiations must come first. He again stressed that if we are going to

¹ See footnote 2, Document 43.

threaten we must take supporting actions such as for example mobilization. De Gaulle said that since France had no atomic weapons its resources in showdown limited and that it would be mainly matter for United States. De Gaulle agreed on need for summit but doubtful on proposing date for it. He remarked that he felt no sense of urgency in arranging summit talks but perhaps British had internal political reasons for wishing early summit. Macmillan replied that proposing early summit meeting might dissuade Russians from taking precipitate action. De Gaulle also willing have examination, without commitment, of new arrangements for Berlin but made it clear we should meanwhile continue maintain legal basis our presence Berlin. Macmillan said we should encourage some "cooperation" between two Germanies since reunification through free elections not possible at moment. De Gaulle agreed on desirability increased contacts between Federal Republic and DDR but said Adenauer afraid of expanding Communist influence in Federal Republic. De Gaulle said he had told Adenauer firmly that new frontiers a fact which would have to be accepted and Adenauer had agreed not only with respect Oder Neisse but also Czech frontier.

Debre reverting to Berlin said alternatives were to 1) stand on existing rights or 2) negotiate new status. Macmillan said he favored second alternative since this would provide opportunity strengthen our legal position in city. Couve expressed doubts about value new agreement with Soviets and opposed any UN solution which would open way to UN interference Western rights Berlin.

De Gaulle thought blockade Berlin unlikely but if it occurred West should not give in. Macmillan and de Gaulle agreed that essential question in event of hand over by Russians to DDR was whether route blocked rather than who stamped what.²

Finally Macmillan asked de Gaulle what his attitude was toward NATO. De Gaulle replied that he stood by Alliance, but it should be reorganized with accent on cooperation rather than integration.

Whitney

² On March 12 the Department of State cabled Paris, London, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow that Alphand had also given a brief rundown on Macmillan's visit to Paris. The visit had served to dispel fears about what Macmillan had agreed to in Moscow, but Alphand noted that differences remained on the questions of Berlin and reunification of Germany. (Telegram 3348 to Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 033.4151/3-1259)

214. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, March 12, 1959, 6 p.m.

755. Re: Berlin.

1. We met with Dixon, Beeley and other members UK Del and de Vaucelles of French Del with his advisers to exchange views on methods by which UN might be seized of Berlin question as well as general discussion of timing, tactics and related matters pursuant Deptels 735 and 741.¹ Although mtg did not reach any firm conclusion, believe it certainly had educational effect. We plan further mtg tentatively scheduled 13 March. Following is paraphrase of what we said:

2. Lodge: It seems inevitable that UN would eventually be seized of Berlin matter. It was out of question to believe UN would not have to deal with it. Only question is by whom, at what time, and how. Re timing, seizure could be (1) before any change of status quo, (2) after change but before West reacts, (3) during or after West reaction. Speaking personally rather than expressing official view, since there had been no decision taken, we should go to SC before any breach of status quo including even a paper change such as a transfer of Soviet power to the GDR, and call for a standstill and four power negotiations. In order to avoid danger which would result if Soviets transferred power during Foreign Ministers' conference, three powers should go to SC in this preventive type of action before Foreign Ministers' conference. This is only way avoid situation where Soviets could change status quo and go to UN, thereby gaining initiative, putting UN's well-known pro-status quo feelings on Soviet side, and thus restraining three power reaction. Whatever we do here must be coordinated carefully with our over-all strategy.

3. Dixon: My analysis leads to similar conclusion that subject almost bound come to UN. But present need is to relate various possible UN actions to general policy on over-all problem. We do not yet know what our over-all policy is going to be. UK Del saw two different kinds of action (1) first, diplomatic use of UN, designed support our case and expose illegalities of Soviet proposals, for example, by calling for ICJ consideration or ICJ advisory opinion, or by using SYG in some manner. Another example of diplomatic use would be summit meeting under SC aegis; however, ChiComs would probably again prevent Khrushchev's

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1259. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

¹ See Document 210 and footnote 1 thereto.

attendance as was case last fall. (2) Other use of UN would be to put to Soviets substantive proposals for use of UN machinery such as, for example, (a) some form of UN force (for which recruitment would be admittedly difficult), (b) movement UN headquarters or UN Geneva offices to Berlin or West Berlin (as Dixon understood Spaak favored) or (c) some form of UN commission. (UKDel thinking in terms of UN commission which would have some operation as between East and West Berlin sectors and along access routes and which would supplement but not supplant West forces in Berlin. Dixon mentioned UN's role in checking convoys to and from Mt. Scopus. He felt this approach had real merit and deserves further study.) Proposing use of UN machinery in such fashion should precede "diplomatic" use of UN. Our case in SC would be on more firm grounds if substantive proposal along lines of second course had been proposed to Soviets and rejected by them. Our position would be strongest in SC if Soviets had previously rejected substantive proposal along these lines and if Soviets had physically obstructed our access to Berlin. Fear we would be on weak grounds if we went to SC before obstruction had taken place since Soviets could argue only threat to peace stemmed from our intention to use force. If we reacted in SC before physical interference by Soviets, this act by itself might precipitate physical interference even if this were not original Soviet intention.

4. De Vaucelles: GOF is primarily concerned that UN not be allowed to paralyze our ability to respond to change of status quo. GOF favors awaiting physical interference, then reacting with whatever force necessary and simply informing SC simultaneously of action taken in self-defense per Article 51. GOF felt we must not be limited in four power negotiations to Berlin only, but on other hand UN could only be concerned with Berlin and not larger problems of Germany or peace treaty. Berlin would be only question on SC agenda. Therefore GOF did not favor setting UN machinery in motion in any way until after Soviets obstructed and West reacted. In any case we should avoid action in SC which permitted Soviets to limit further negotiations to Berlin only.

5. After more argument by Lodge all finally agreed worst timing for submission by three powers to SC would be after physical interference but before Western reaction.

6. Re Soviet tactics and arguments. British said Soviets would tend to favor consideration in GA, not SC, since GA hard to control and more tempted by its nature to work for solutions through compromise in which West would lose. We would find it difficult to demonstrate that mere transfer of rights to GDR or our refusal to permit GDR stamp our documents is menace to peace; Soviets have easy reply that only threat lies in our assertion we need use force. In GA Soviets would be on firm grounds in arguing that only threat to peace was presence our forces in

Berlin and they would probably ask GA to bring about withdrawal those forces.

7. But, in spite of the above talk about GA, when Lodge asked specifically what UK thought Soviets would be most likely to do Beeley said that, having heard U.S. argument, he believed most likely Soviet plan would be move into SC after they had altered status quo so as to seize initiative and prevent us from reacting. He agreed with Lodge that since this would be most dangerous move from our viewpoint, it would be most likely Soviet move.

8. UKDel noted inscription of Berlin item during earlier SC consideration had been opposed by Soviets on basis Article 107.²

9. As to Soviet objectives Dixon said Macmillan was impressed by Khrushchev's desire to solidify his position in Eastern Europe and by his pathological fear of espionage from West Berlin (as well as from our disarmament inspection schemes). Although Khrushchev interested in meeting President Eisenhower, Macmillan reported that Khrushchev did not put too much stress on summit meeting. Impression resulting was that Khrushchev, while bargaining for more, was willing to settle for our acceptance of status quo plus some greater recognition of GDR and would do this even in four power negotiations at FonMins level.

10. Although agreed would be advantageous if we seized SC before any change in status quo, this presented many dangers if done despite Soviet objections. One hypothetical possibility discussed was that of using summit as "bait" in order bring about Soviet cooperation or, at least, noninterference; SC would be called upon to ask for standstill in order bring about summit meeting preceded by Foreign Ministers' conference. We made clear U.S. did not favor summit meeting.

11. Re initiatives other than by three powers, it was generally agreed Berlin is so much a four power responsibility that three powers could not afford let anyone else take initiative. (Earlier, however, UKDel indicated vague possibility of using SYG in some manner.)

12. Dixon asked how East and West Germans might be associated with any SC action. De Vaucelles pointed out Soviets recognize both and could accept presence of both at SC. He asked if we could. We agreed this matter deserves study.

13. Dixon also noted frequent local inquiries and said at some stage we must talk to Germans, plus NATO members, plus other SC members, as well as press. It was agreed for time being we would say nothing.

²In 1948 the Soviet Union had rejected the proposal of taking the Berlin question to the Security Council; see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. II, p. 1210.

14. Although inconclusive, group felt exchange of views useful and should be resumed after capitals had chance react to various views set forth.

15. While leaving meeting Dixon said to Lodge: "you out-argued us."

Lodge

215. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Eisenhower

Paris, March 12, 1959.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

DEAR GENERAL EISENHOWER,

In the crisis that has arisen over Berlin, I wish to point out to you what I believe to be essential concerning the attitude that we of the West should jointly adopt.

In my opinion, we must not, above all, give in to any ultimatum, especially regarding the movements of our forces and supplies between Berlin and West Germany. We have the right of passage. Hindrance to our passage on the part of anyone would therefore constitute a deliberate act of force against us. We should have to oppose such an act with like means. The responsibility for what might follow would fall upon those who first used force to prevent us from going to a place to which we have the right to go. In my opinion, this is the essential point. It could, moreover, be decisive, for I have the feeling that the Soviet leaders do not wish this situation to lead to war.

Having said this, I do not believe that we should reject negotiation through normal channels on all the problems that the Russians, or we ourselves, would like to bring up. Not that I have many illusions concerning the likelihood of an effective settlement. However, in view of world-wide apprehension, an attitude of refusal to hold talks would, in my opinion, present more disadvantages than advantages. It goes without saying that, before a "summit" conference is held and even before a date is set for one, a meeting of foreign ministers should be called and be

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Delivered to the Department of State under cover of a transmittal note from the French Embassy requesting that it be forwarded to the President.

allowed to remain in session for some time. Matters should be carried no further if such a meeting failed to yield good probabilities of agreement on some important points.

With respect to the German problem as a whole, we could not of course abandon the principle that reunification should take place just as soon as circumstances permit. It is on the basis of this principle that we must refrain from recognizing the "German Democratic Republic" as a sovereign State, but, the ideal having been acclaimed and the distant goal designated, the fact remains that reunification is not possible at the present time. For that to become possible, we must either impose it upon Soviet Russia by force—which is not our intention—or Russia must agree to German unity on the basis of freedom, which it certainly will not do. However, while not ceasing to condemn the oppression whereby the communist system is preventing the inhabitants of Prussia and Saxony from expressing their will, we could very strongly and very urgently recommend that as numerous and broad relations as possible be established between the two Germanies.

Such relations would not, of course, be directed toward the establishment of a common political régime but would be deliberately limited to such practical fields as transportation, postal communications, economic cooperation, supply, culture, movement of persons, etc. But the very fact that contacts would be multiplied between Germans, within and to the benefit of the "German State," would keep alive the hope of the people in their future unity. In any case, such an attitude on the part of the Western powers would give their policy a constructive character.

With respect to the status of Berlin, the following position, should, in my opinion, be maintained in any event: West Berlin is a Western city and wishes to remain so. We could not agree to have it otherwise. That is why nothing would be worse than to let it be assumed that we could a priori consider the withdrawal of our forces. Our presence is a right which we do not have to debate, even if the Russians pretend to waive that right for themselves. If they later propose measures and guarantees concerning West Berlin that actually satisfy us, it will then be time to examine the question of our garrisons.

The matter of "disengagement" would appear in an entirely different light, depending on whether it was a question of controlled limitation of armaments of all kinds over a very widespread area, for example, all Europe, the Arctic region, etc. . . .¹ or of demilitarization, that is to say, neutralization of Germany and, with their apparent counterpart, a similar system applied to East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

¹ Ellipsis in the source text.

In the first case, we should have no reason to refuse to engage in discussions. In the second case, we should do it only if the States that are to become buffer States are first returned to their own people through free elections giving rise to the formation of free governments, without which their neutralization would be only a means of tricking us.

In any case, it seems to me that you Americans, the British, and we French are not in very close agreement in this grave international situation. Of course it is true that, for many political and geographical reasons, we are impelled to consider matters from a somewhat different point of view. However, it is you, the Americans, who at present possess the most powerful means—and by far—of the Western forces. I believe however, as I wrote to you a short while ago, that it is of vital interest to the free world that our cooperation at the world level be organized in the political field—since the questions involved could lead to war—and in the strategic field.

If events should cause you to pay a personal visit to France in the near future, this is a subject which, if you are willing, we should have occasion to examine most carefully together.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration and sincere friendship.

C. de Gaulle²

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, March 13, 1959, 8:20 p.m.

3373. For Hillenbrand.¹ Bonn's 1962; Moscow's 1747, 1774; London's 4654, 4671.² Department believes there remains advantage in preserving our long-held position on form of proceeding to Summit meeting, i.e., through Foreign Ministers' meeting which has dealt in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/3-1059. Secret. Drafted by Freers and McSweeney, cleared by Vigdeman and Kohler, and approved by Merchant. Also sent to London, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow.

¹ Hillenbrand was in Paris as Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Power Working Group; see Document 242.

² Telegram 1747 is printed as Document 197. The other telegrams dealt with various aspects of the draft reply to the Soviet note of March 2. (Telegram 1962, Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-959; telegrams 1774 and 4654, *ibid.*, 396.1/3-959; telegram 4671, *ibid.*, 396.1/3-1059)

substance with some problems at least, as indication of strength our basic approach to negotiations and to dampen Soviet enthusiasm about their capabilities for shaping form of negotiation. While we inclined agree that any sizeable Soviet concession is unlikely occur except in meeting at which Khrushchev speaks for Soviet Union, Foreign Ministers' meeting could have value of setting forth in understandable fashion both to Soviets and world public merits of Western position. It could also give some indication of what we might be faced with re Soviet positions in subsequent Summit meeting.

As British have pointed out intervening time between present and proposed mid-Summer Summit meeting can be advantageously used in conditioning public opinion. May Foreign Ministers' meeting provides both time and forum.

To gain maximum value from Foreign Ministers' meeting it should be generally understood that meeting would deal in substance. Thus we prefer in our reply to Soviets to indicate readiness for Summit meeting should progress of Foreign Ministers' meeting indicate that such is appropriate.

Agenda for Foreign Ministers' meeting clearly raises great difficulty. It must be acceptable to Soviets while giving us opportunity broaden range of questions considered. At same time any language suggested must not give public impression that major unreciprocated concession has been made by West re agenda. Language suggested in US draft note³ was taken from Macmillan–Khrushchev agreed communiqué⁴ as meeting these requirements. Main element in negotiations themselves, of course, is what Western Powers are prepared assert as their interpretation of phraseology agreed upon and program of discussion they will insist upon at meeting. While we do not insist on specific mention of reunification on formal agenda as matter for discussion by Foreign Ministers it difficult see how there could be discussion peace treaty drafts or principles without consideration of subject. Department recognizes difficulty suggested in Moscow's 1774 for Foreign Ministers in fixing agenda for Summit meeting if reunification discussion becomes pointed issue at Foreign Ministers' meeting. However Department has some question about Khrushchev's willingness or capability deal with reunification at Summit meeting since he would be called upon to make concessions concerning system in East Germany, particularly re human rights, which should be applicable by analogy to other Soviet bloc systems but which he could not afford permit. Department believes any concessions he might make, in any event, would be result

³ See Document 242.

⁴ See footnote 1, Document 198.

of pressures on him on specific issues rather than emerging as his voluntary contributions toward compromise. Since our present objective in negotiation is at minimum to develop better public posture, and much of effort in formulating proposals is directed to this end, such clarification of present status of reunification issue as can be attained at Foreign Ministers' meeting would seem have some value all around.

Re Bonn's 1962, excerpt from Soviet note of March 2⁵ re access was included in our draft with idea making clear expressed intent of Soviet Government itself and thus underscore its consequent responsibility if it were to conclude separate treaty with GDR. Balance of para was designed reaffirm our refusal tolerate GDR interference with access. Re Moscow's 1774, Department agrees unilateral Soviet action to hinder access is unlikely before negotiations begin. But negotiations and preparations therefor may extend over considerable time and draft note's language was meant point out to Soviets detrimental nature of such an act at any time in process.

Re Polish and Czech participation we understand UK now prepared agree this matter should be, in first instance, dealt with as suggested in US draft. In view difficulties connected with additional western as well as eastern participation, we prefer handle it this way at least for now.

Herter

⁵ See Document 194.

217. Letter From the British Ambassador (Caccia) to Acting Secretary of State Herter

Washington, March 13, 1959.

DEAR ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE, Immediately on his return to London this evening, the Foreign Secretary sent a telegram asking me to let you know that the Prime Minister and he have had a prolonged discussion with Chancellor Adenauer and Herr Von Brentano about our Note to the Russians.¹

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret.

¹ On March 16 Ambassador Whitney reported that the Foreign Office had briefed the Embassy in London along similar lines. (Telegram 4782 from London; *ibid.*, Central Files, 033.4162A/3-1659) For two other accounts of the visit, see Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, pp. 639-640, and Document 219.

The Germans agreed with the arguments which the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary used about a Summit Meeting. They were:

- (a) Khrushchev is the only Russian with whom a negotiation could be successfully conducted;
- (b) We cannot be expected to take vital decisions involving the possibility of war before there has been a Summit Meeting;
- (c) If it is known that there is going to be a Summit Meeting, then the meeting of Foreign Ministers is more likely to produce some useful results;
- (d) The Russians would have no incentive to precipitate a crisis if a Summit Meeting was fixed, and world opinion would be against them if they started something in the meantime;
- (e) If, on the contrary, no date had been fixed for a Summit it would be in their interest to start something precisely in order to force us to a Summit under the pressure of a crisis;
- (f) A wide agenda including e.g. disarmament could only be obtained at a Summit Conference.

The Chancellor thought that we should so word our Note as to suggest that the Summit Meeting which we were proposing would be the first of a series. As to the date, he prefers "August" to "the end of July or beginning of August".

As regards the agenda of the Foreign Ministers' meeting, we accepted the view that if a definite date was proposed for the subsequent Summit Meeting Khrushchev would be less likely to resist a formula such as that suggested in the American draft reply²—"Questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin". If the date for the Summit was included in the Note, we would accept such a formula. In fact we recognized that one of the arguments in favour of fixing this date was that it would probably have the effect of enabling us to avoid a wrangle about the agenda of the Foreign Ministers' conference with which public opinion would have little patience.

The Chancellor made the point that in offering Khrushchev a Summit Conference, we ought somehow to tie him down to taking no unilateral action to disturb matters in the meantime. Although it would go without saying that our offer was made on this understanding it would nevertheless be better to say it. The Ministers discussed whether this might best be said through the diplomatic channel or in the Note itself and left that over for further thought.

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary agreed with the Germans that until they had had time to discuss these ideas with you in Washington, it might be best for the Working Group in Paris to suspend

² See Document 242.

their discussion about the Note and turn to other matters, e.g. the questionnaire, and possible Berlin solutions.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary realise that large issues are involved about which the United States Government may wish to have time to reflect before reaching a decision. They thought that you would like to know what passed in Bonn and they look forward to pursuing the discussions next week.

Of course if you have any preliminary view about the matters raised in this letter, I shall be glad to convey them to the Foreign Secretary. As you know, he will be leaving London with the Prime Minister next Tuesday evening, March 17, for Ottawa.

Most sincerely,

Harold Caccia

218. Memorandum of Discussion at the Second Meeting of the Berlin Contingency Planning Group

Washington, March 14, 1959, 10 a.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of State
Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense
Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor, Department of State
Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Loftus E. Becker, Legal Adviser, Department of State
John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Rear Adm. C. O. Triebel, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC and other Staff officers

Secretary Herter opened the meeting by reading points which he understood had been agreed upon by the Inter Departmental working

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. Another record of this meeting, drafted by Smith, is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany.

group on the Berlin situation.¹ The first point was that all of the actions contemplated in a discussion paper² which had been circulated depended to a greater or lesser degree upon cooperation and support of our allies, U.K., France and West Germany. It was agreed that there should not be any added public opinion drive at this time, also that the President should not be asked to rescind his decision on the 30,000 man reduction in the Armed Forces, but that strength in Europe should be restored. The desirability of referring the question of the Soviets turning over to the Germans control of allied access to Berlin to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion should be examined. While noting the President's opinion that we should not accept East German credentials, the working group pointed out that K-Day would actually occur when allied access to Berlin is forcibly blocked and we have to mount a probe, rather than automatically on May 27. If the East German officials attempt to exercise sovereignty by stamping documents, we will not accede, but will then move ahead until forcibly blocked.

Mr. Gray cited the importance of determining what we mean when we say "forcibly blocked".

Secretary Herter continued the list of agreed working group points, the next of which was that in no event would the U.S. initiate general war. Even if negotiations are still under way and our access forcibly blocked, we would still want to try a probe. It was agreed that we should take the problem to the United Nations after we have been forcibly blocked and tried a probe. Secretary McElroy questioned when general war would happen, for example, suppose our people had been subjected to military action by the Soviets in connection with Berlin. Secretary Herter said that then the Soviets would have been the ones who had initiated general war. Secretary Quarles thought that the working group's statement was not referring to initiating general war, but rather to preventive war. Secretary Herter thought that this point was already clearly covered in existing approved policy.

Secretary Herter said the next point agreed by the working group was that general mobilization should be deferred until after K-Day. Then we would probably go into general mobilization, although it might be only partial mobilization. Secretary Herter cautioned that whatever was put in writing on this subject and submitted to the President was liable to leak. He, therefore, felt that any such written documentation should be looked at from the point of view of what would happen if it got out publicly. Secretary Herter thought that after various

¹ See Document 208.

² Presumably a reference to Appendix A to Document 212.

points were agreed by the President we should then look at what the Russians should know.

Secretary Herter said that there would be many variables which could not now be foreseen, especially when K-Day occurs. He thought K-Day was unlikely before May 27, but from there on we might have to deal with the East Germans. From then on we would have to make clear our response. One of the questions would be what we do if a single East German sentry refuses us access. Would we then go immediately to the United Nations. There is also a question of whether, following our initial probe, we try a second probe of considerable force. Secretary McElroy said he did not think much of the latter idea. Secretary Herter said he did not either. Secretary McElroy thought that we must assume that if we get into a fight it will be a big one.

General Twining then read a list of actions³ which the Joint Chiefs were now taking. Concerning the types of convoy, both General Twining and Secretary McElroy felt that we should do the same thing after the Soviets turnover to the East Germans as we did the day before. Secretary Quarles thought it might be desirable to build up the type of convoy before such a turnover, although not necessarily including a scout car in the convoy. Secretary Quarles noted that our military planning was based upon the assumption that we would not negotiate with the East Germans as Soviet agents.

Secretary Herter said that this assumption was correct, but that it was possible we might be able to negotiate an acceptable settlement before the turnover takes place. Secretary Herter said that it would be all right for the East Germans to request identity papers but any inspection or blocking by them would not be accepted.

Secretary McElroy thought that it was necessary that we send some people (preferably someone who understands the problem fully) to go up and down the corridor with convoys. He said it is extremely important to avoid the appearance of being very aggressive on what may be construed publicly as a technicality. Secretary Quarles said we must distinguish between policing of traffic and control of access. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs would send someone from the Joint Staff. Secretary McElroy questioned whether someone from State should also go, probably from Mr. Becker's office.

Mr. Herter said that Secretary Dulles feels that what the Soviets will try to do is to force us to negotiate with the East Germans. That in itself would constitute a recognition that the Soviets have the right to turn over to the East Germans. Secretary Herter thought that it was very

³See footnote 8, Document 201.

important to have clear instructions for the first convoy after such a turnover.

Secretary McElroy asked whether acceptance of the stamping of papers by the East Germans would constitute recognition. Mr. Murphy said that if we accepted such stamping, we would then be on a slippery slope, with the danger of losing our entire rights in Berlin. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the right of the East Germans to regulate civilian traffic has already been recognized. We were prepared, therefore, to accept an East German request for identification to distinguish an allied convoy from civilian traffic.

Secretary Herter said that if we do not recognize East German rights, they must then be forced to stop us. Secretary Quarles said that the trouble is if the East Germans gave one of our convoys a mark of identity, the next convoy would be required to have such a mark. Mr. Irwin said that if we accept East German identification, we are then saying that the East Germans have a right to question such identification.

Secretary Herter thought that this problem involves two inter-related steps. First, if the Soviets turn over to the East Germans, we will protest and say that it does not affect our rights. If the East Germans then say they have the right to question our free access, the minutiae regarding clearance procedures will have assumed new proportions. If the East Germans say nothing, but then move to control our traffic, that will constitute K-Day.

Mr. Wilcox said that the problem of refusing to accept East Germans stamping documents would be difficult to explain in the United Nations. He pointed out that we must be able to get support in the United Nations that what we are doing is right. Secretary Herter said that is why we are considering referring the question of credentials to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Mr. Becker said that we must have someone check as to whether any East German stamp would constitute control of access. Secretary McElroy pointed out that such questions testify to the need for a thorough understanding of convoy procedures. He thought we should not reach any final decisions regarding these procedures until after people have been sent to study the existing procedures. Secretary Herter thought that we could agree now that we would not accept any forcible denial. Then later we could determine what constitutes denial in terms of the minutiae of clearance procedures.

Secretary Quarles thought that the study of the convoy procedures should also include the following points: First, a careful study of the existing forms of Soviet access to West Germany, and how important such access was; secondly, what is done on the railroads where there is customs control when it passes from East to West Germany; third, a study of the procedures for access by air.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that we have now been flying in the corridors above 2,500 feet and below 10,000 feet. He said that if we have to start an airlift to Berlin, we would want to use new aircraft at higher altitudes. Defense, therefore, thought that they might start now using C-130's at around 25,000 feet. Secretary Herter said that they had discussed this question in the State Department and that they did not feel that they were savvy enough to make the military judgment involved. He felt that if Defense needed to do this, then they should. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Russians had said that if we fly over 10,000 feet they cannot give assurance of air safety. Mr. Murphy questioned why we could not start flying above 10,000 feet with the type of aircraft now in use. He suggested that this would not give away that we were contemplating the use of an airlift.

Secretary Herter pointed out that the NATO defines an attack on one as an attack on all. Therefore, the British and French are in the same position as the U.S. Secretary McElroy said that this was why he felt we should have a solid position before Mr. Macmillan arrives.

General Twining referred back to the question of airlift and said that a plane flying between 25 hundred and 10 thousand feet was very vulnerable to ground fire. Secretary Quarles said he thought that the 10 to 20 thousand-foot altitude was reserved for civilian traffic control, and that this is why we wished to fly at 25,000 feet and above. Mr. Murphy said this problem also raises the question of whether the Russians will pull out of the Berlin air control center.

Secretary McElroy proposed that the question of flying at higher altitudes be put up to the President. Secretary McElroy also said that Defense will send people to get a specific report on ground, rail, air, and canal procedures for access to Berlin. Secretary Herter said that the State Department would also have someone from Mr. Becker's office go over to study these procedures. Secretary Quarles again recommended that we not overlook the reciprocal aspects of Soviet access into West Germany. Mr. Merchant suggested that when the people come back from their study of access procedures, it would also be desirable to bring back a U.S. official from the Three-power working group on Berlin contingency planning.

Secretary Herter pointed out that Mr. Reinhardt was coordinator within State in preparing for the Macmillan visit. He suggested that Defense let Mr. Reinhardt know anything that they wanted on the agenda.

Mr. Irwin returned to the question of what actually constitutes obstruction of our access. Mr. Murphy said that there has got to be an element of force used in stopping us. Mr. Reinhardt said that we would not be able to get on the Berlin road without some form of action, because there is a bar at the East German checkpoint. Secretary Herter said that we would try to get through without shooting so that they would be the ones who would have to shoot first.

Secretary Quarles pointed out that if they stop us to check identity then there is a question of what they will accept. If they do not accept our identification, Mr. Quarles said he understood we would not then attempt to raise the bar. Mr. Irwin questioned what we would do if the East Germans do the same as the previous Russian pattern. Mr. Murphy said we would deny the East Germans right to do so. Mr. Wilcox pointed out that how we denied that right is very important for U.N. purposes.

Mr. Smith suggested, and it was agreed, that we should have a full photographic record of what happens to convoys going through.

In answer to Mr. Gray, Secretary Herter said that they would have to decide whether to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviets at the time that the turnover takes place. Secretary Herter said they are also looking at the possibility of a limited blockade of the USSR, even though he realizes that the President is not enthusiastic about this idea.

Mr. Murphy asked why we should not take photographs of the present convoy operations, and Secretary McElroy agreed that we would.

General Twining then enumerated various things that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought should be done. First, he said that the JCS were unhappy about two points. One was that military action should now go beyond those which could be picked up by Soviet intelligence. The second was that we have a firm U.S. position before Macmillan arrives, and a clear decision as to whether we would go all the way down the line to war.

Secretary McElroy asked whether the British questioned this latter decision. Mr. Murphy said the British do not disagree with our basic position, but may want to drag out negotiations for a long time. Secretary McElroy thought we should be prepared to adjust some positions with the British, but not our basic decision.

Mr. Irwin said that the problem may arise with the British as to whether, if we are forcibly blocked, we decide now that we would use

force. Mr. Murphy said the British maintain they cannot accept that decision as a matter of principle without joint planning.

Secretary Herter said that if you assume we are stopped and take the problem to the U.N., we are in effect imposing a blockade upon ourselves. He questioned how long we would wait for U.N. action. Secretary McElroy thought that we should test our access each day. General Twining believed that we should use whatever force was needed progressively.

[3 paragraphs (29 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Quarles commented that the arrangements for Berlin were created at a time when the Soviets were supposed to be our friends and the Germans our enemies. Today the situation is the opposite. He thought that we should make clear that the issue is not a question of whether the Soviets transfer their rights to the East Germans, but whether they abridge our rights. He thought we were not sufficiently cultivating the attitude of the German people on this question. Mr. Murphy said that the Germans were the ones who put steel into the details of our position, especially regarding East Germans stamping documents. Secretary Quarles felt that we should not be strapped by the West Germans who themselves accept many forms of relations with the East Germans.

Mr. Irwin felt that further efforts should be made to try to clarify the points of issue in the public's mind, even though there was not a major campaign. Mr. Herter said that the President's Monday talk⁴ would be designed to provide such clarification. He expressed his view that not everybody in Government should get in on the act of clarifying our position. He said that Mr. Merchant was working on the drafts of the President's talk.

Mr. Merchant said that he agreed that we should reexamine our whole position in detail before Macmillan's arrival, and be prepared to hold a solid line. He said that Secretary Dulles believed that he came back from Europe with a firm agreement with the British, French and Germans that we would not accept a blockade of our access to Berlin. Mr. Merchant thought that the British differ with us on two points. First, they have doubts as to whether we should refuse to accept East Germans stamping documents; second, they contemplated a longer negotiating period before more force is applied. However, Mr. Merchant said that there was a basic agreement with our allies and, in fact, with NATO.

Secretary Herter said the problem was mainly one of hashing out the details of our position. Mr. McElroy commented that the French seem to be taking a tough position with our troops.

⁴See Document 225.

Mr. Gray asked whether there was anything which the Joint Chiefs wanted to do, to which the British and French could contribute. General Twining said that some of the steps would involve or be taken by our allies. Mr. Murphy commented that the British have long urged joint plans but we have been opposed. Secretary Quarles differed with Mr. Murphy's statement, saying that we have only declined joint planning in Washington but that such planning had been done in Europe.

Mr. Gray reported that he has set aside on the President's calendar the time from 9 to 10:30 a.m. on Thursday morning for the regular NSC meeting. This time would, therefore, be available if it was needed for other purposes.

Mr. Smith said that if we assume that we have failed in a diplomatic solution to forcible denial of our access to Berlin, we will then be faced with three choices: One would be further military action to gain entry to Berlin; the second would be a possible blockade of the USSR; and the third would be general war. Mr. Smith suggested that there should be a joint State–Defense study of these alternatives in the same manner that had been done regarding possible action in Korea.

Mr. Irwin said it was his understanding that the Joint Chiefs are planning that, if our diplomacy fails, we will attempt to force access to Berlin. He said that what was puzzling is what would happen if our allies do not go along with us on that. Secretary McElroy thought we should say that we are going to maintain access to Berlin.

Secretary Herter said that there will be probing as to the actions we are going to take from all sides. He proposed, and it was agreed, that Mr. Smith and Mr. Irwin would prepare recommendations to the President along the lines discussed in this meeting, including the question of a possible joint State–Defense study of alternatives.

219. Message From the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce) to Director for Central Intelligence Dulles

Undated.

Sorry to feel it necessary send this message [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] but as you read it you will understand reasons. Expect almost simultaneously transmit adequate but expurgated report same conversation,¹ together with information gathered from Amba-

Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.

¹ The expurgated report was transmitted in telegram 2024 from Bonn, March 14 at 1 p.m., and was received in the Department of State at 10 a.m. the same day. This paragraph was not in the telegram, and other differences are noted in subsequent footnotes.

sador Steel, to Department. If in exercise your own judgment, you think advisable show this message selected officers Dept, that thoroughly satisfactory to me. In view Chancellor's ineradicable conviction President [Secretary?] ill man, I have little choice about how to convey this present account, especially since Chancellor anxious certain parts go only to Foster.

Last night, after Adenauer had accompanied Macmillan airport he sent for me. First, he spoke of how satisfactory his visit de Gaulle had been,² the cordiality of their relationship, and the mutuality of their views on European problems. He indicated they had not descended to particulars, but had remained on mountain top.

Re Macmillan, with whom he had been in intermittent conversation for thirty hours, he had following observations to make.

Adenauer had taken Macmillan to task for the mention of disengagement in Moscow communiqué. British PM had answered he had been misinterpreted by Western press.

Having jumped this hurdle, and knocked over all the bars, the two continued in strict privacy, while their Foreign Ministers kicked about in another room. Result, Adenauer thinks, should be carefully analyzed in Washington.

PM related impressions derived from Moscow trip. His listener was not impressed, either by this, or by subsequent knowledge of same conclusions imparted by Lloyd to von Brentano. Chancellor thought they had incorrectly assessed Soviet intentions. British seemed unaware Soviets have different set political morals from Western ones, and what they term morals are utterly deplorable. British over-rate Khrushchev's position in Sov Union.

Discussions on first day with PM were tough, because British diplomacy had not profoundly considered implications subjects under scrutiny, particularly disengagement. Posture and tactics British Labor Party opposition play great part in Macmillan's attitude, and PM evaded answer when queried as to who inserted mention of disengagement in communiqué.

After their preliminary talks, they returned to feast following day, while Lloyd and Brentano sat well below the salt.³

PM made as essential points:

1. Present situation dangerous and might lead to war. British ready to take risks, but owe it to their people to try to avoid war.

² See Document 203.

³ This sentence was not in telegram 2024.

2. Gromyko is minor character in Soviet cast. Much less important than was Molotov. A technician, a tool. Khrushchev treats and regards him as such.

3. Therefore, in FonMin conference, Khrushchev would not allow Gromyko to make major decisions, and instead desires summit conference.

4. Consequently, Macmillan, realizing situation, will use his influence to induce Western nations agree to summit meeting, with FonMins as prelude.

5. Further, Macmillan believes Khrushchev will only enter into genuine negotiations, if given definite summit date, perhaps August.

Adenauer rejoined by offering opinion Khrushchev would indeed try to sabotage possibility real achievement in FonMin meeting. But, on other hand, he did not subscribe to Macmillan proposal of "A Summit Conference". He thought there should be a series of Summit meetings, denominated "First Stage, Second Stage etc." The first might perhaps last eight days and be followed by technical conversations, before resumed at Second Stage. Little could be expected to be accomplished by single meeting of Chiefs of State.

Khrushchev should be informed West will not negotiate at summit under threat of peace treaty, Berlin, or recognition GDR. Therefore, Adenauer thinks West should demand Khrushchev confirm status quo of Berlin and present East Zone arrangements for five years, so that problems can be calmly examined, and constructive negotiations take place.

Macmillan asked if German people would put up with status quo for another five years. Adenauer replied in affirmative, saying it would be helpful if SovZoners could again freely visit FedRep, and if pressures against two Christian churches were relaxed.

Chancellor asked whether Macmillan had inquired into de Gaulle's position on summit meeting. Answer was French President not "averse".

Adenauer now repeated to me what he regarded as capital. Agreement by US, UK and France to summit meeting with USSR must be predicated on Khrushchev paying price of five years extension status quo. Believed this realistic, because Khrushchev's strong desire conversations other Chiefs State.

Chancellor had told Macmillan Dulles illness greatly complicated matters. Unknowing when Secretary would become mobile, one cannot predict who might manage first stage summit negotiations for U.S. Since U.S. was leading power free world, summit conversations, without participation Dulles, would be dangerous.⁴

⁴This paragraph was not in telegram 2024.

Evident, according Adenauer, Macmillan thinks FonMin conference has little significance and would probably serve only preparation agenda for Summit, and footling interchanges.

It will be to convey such impressions PM will visit Ottawa and Washington.

For moment this seemed end of Chancellor's comments, but after ponderation, he resumed conversation, saying the four Foreign Ministers must at end of month in Washington deliberate over answer to Soviet notes, and Macmillan and Lloyd will advocate promise of Summit meeting.

Adenauer is absolutely opposed to this tactic, for Soviets would immediately accept and pocket such concession, yielding nothing in return. That would be, in Chancellor's estimation, a sale at too low a price.

Chancellor is conscious FonMin meeting, in light Khrushchev's views, offers little prospect unless Summit follows. But Summit unsafe without strong U.S. leadership.

When Chancellor had presented these arguments to Macmillan, PM agreed to Adenauer proposals: (1) Maintenance status quo for 5 years should be condition precedent to Summit; (2) Summit should take place in stages.

From time to time during exposition, I questioned Chancellor, but only answer of importance was that he had not discussed Summit possibilities with de Gaulle. Evident he will quickly remedy this omission, but through what instrumentality or oddity God wot.⁵ He formed during Paris visit favorable impression of Debré, has invited him Bonn, but will probably not await his coming to try to line up de Gaulle.

Always with this whimsical old gentleman there is something juicy in reserve. He asked me whether I had any recent private news of Foster's health, and if I thought it possible he might be at Camp David to supervise conversations between President Eisenhower and PM. I answered I was without information on that subject. He said Globke had recently been told by unrevealed source President was thinking of making Foster Prime Minister so he could represent US at Summit conferences. Was that possible under US Constitution? I told him it was not, but, borrowing from Soviet example, I saw no reason why Foster should not, as had been done when Khrushchev was hierarchally subordinate to Bulganin, participate in Summit conversations. This cheered him considerably.⁶

As to place of possible Summit meeting, Chancellor is specifically against Moscow or London, and favors some location in US. He thinks

⁵Middle English form of "knows."

⁶This paragraph was not in telegram 2024.

Khrushchev would give much to see US, and would be impressed by its manifest vitality.

In conclusion, Adenauer requested that the substance of his talk with me be treated with greatest discretion, and certain undesigned parts of it be suppressed unless conveyed only to Foster [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

I saw Steel this morning. He said PM had agreed we ought attempt obtain concessions from Soviets in return for agreement on Summit conference, but PM had not, at least in Steel's presence, committed himself on five year suggestion. Notes on meetings are in London, and Department will be informed from there what transpired. Steel's own view is insistence of five year standstill unrealistic, but feels proposals for more limited concessions deserve thorough study.

220. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, March 14, 1959, 3 p.m.

3354. Department pass Defense. From Hillenbrand. Following are some general impressions as first week of Working Group session in Paris¹ draws to close:

1. British seem to be interested in maintaining maximum fluidity in Western positions limiting working group report largely to posing issues for later resolution. This presumably related to desire give Macmillan opportunity to push his ideas in all three capitals before committing themselves. Reaction of British Delegation to our elements paper² as plan with public appeal has been generally favorable, but they obviously regard Berlin proposals which West prepared to make possibly

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1459. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹ See Document 242.

² Reference is to "Elements of a Western Position at a Conference with the Soviets," undated, which was tabled by the U.S. Delegation at the Four Power Working Group on March 12. The nine-page paper includes sections on Soviet intentions, Western objectives, Western tactics, and a Western offer on German reunification, European security, and Berlin. (Attached to a note from Calhoun to Goodpaster dated March 17; Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records)

separate from general settlement as crux of problem and will want to keep Western position on these open. British apparently also wish to pose question of whether any security measure in Europe can be taken separate from political settlement. This attitude reflected in their unwillingness even to draft at this time agreed estimate of Soviet intentions which might precondition Western approach.

2. French are following conservative essentially negative line and for different reasons may be expected to end with British in supporting working group report main function of which will be to pose issues for later resolution. Traditional French attitudes on subject like disarmament features American paper continue to dominate. However, they have apparently not dropped idea of some special status for reunified Germany in NATO and may come up with some new formulation on this subject and a declaration on exclusion IRBMs from zone of limitations.

3. Other than revival of Fechter–Meissner reunification plan³ (portions of which adopted in American paper), Germans seem to have little to contribute. They had indicated that more may be expected when Grewe comes from Bonn next week, hinting they have some proposals to advance in European security field but are reluctant to do so before they have some basis for estimating probable American reaction.

4. Tabling of American elements paper has had stimulating effect and plan for reunification and European security will undoubtedly appear in working group report, perhaps as major annex. However, for reasons indicated above, seems unlikely that report will have basic four-part structure, as set forth paragraph one of American paper. Given circumstances, we do not consider this tragedy as long as important issues which can only be resolved at higher level are clearly indicated.

5. As to Western reply Soviet note of March 2, primary unresolved issues are formulation of agenda and language re summit meeting. As long as British remain tightly bound by present instructions from Macmillan possibility of reaching any agreement by early next week seems remote. FYI. Hancock personally prefers our language on agenda and probably on summit and can be counted on to make effective presentation French and our arguments against British formulations.

³The Fechter–Meissner proposal had been tabled by the German Delegation to the Working Group on German Unity in March of 1957. The revised proposal, presented by the German Delegation in Paris on March 10, called for the convening of an all-German committee to deal with the extension and coordination of contacts between the two parts of Germany. One year later an all-German Council would be elected to draft an election law for a national assembly that would draft a constitution for Germany. (Telegram 3289 from Paris, March 11; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1159)

6. We have just learned from von Baudissin that Macmillan and Adenauer apparently reached agreement in Bonn that efforts to coordinate Western reply to Soviet note should cease until after Macmillan visit to Washington. This presumably means both German and British Delegations will be instructed to cease discussions this subject in working group.

Houghton

221. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Herter to the British Ambassador (Caccia)

Washington, March 14, 1959.

DEAR HAROLD: I appreciated very much the promptness of your report on the principal results of the Prime Minister's talks with Adenauer and brought your letter of March 13¹ immediately to the attention of the President. He has asked me to let you know and to ask you to inform the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of his concern about several aspects of this report.

First of all, on the question of the proposed commitment to a definite date for the Summit Conference, we feel strongly that if we give Khrushchev a date at this point the Foreign Ministers Conference would be condemned to sterility. On the other hand, if we indicated that as a minimum the Foreign Ministers meeting would have to reveal some prospects for serious Summit negotiations, then we would enhance the chances of getting something constructive out of the May meeting. Moreover, the policy which we consistently followed throughout the exhaustive exchanges of last year—that a Summit meeting could only be accepted if preparations gave a real prospect for reaching agreement on significant subjects—is well known to Moscow, as well as to our own peoples. Recession from this position at this stage would risk giving a dangerous impression of weakness. Actually, the President himself agrees that we should be relatively forthcoming in our reply as regards a

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and cleared with President Eisenhower at a meeting with Herter during the morning of March 14. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

¹ Document 217.

Summit Conference and personally proposed the new formula which we have introduced into the Working Group in Paris as follows:

“Assuming that the Foreign Ministers meeting gives promise of progress at a Summit Conference, this Government would be happy to participate in such a Summit Conference at any reasonable place and time.”

Supplementing this, we think it would be possible to allow our Ambassadors in Moscow to indicate to the Soviets that a Summit Conference might be contemplated next summer provided there was satisfactory progress at the Foreign Ministers Conference. Under the natural assumption that the Conference were held outside the United States, it should be borne in mind that our constitutional system puts severe limits on the time the President can be continuously out of the country. This is possible for only a few days.

Our own basic estimate is that we see less danger than you apparently do of the Russians taking precipitate action with respect to access or the threatened conclusion of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. In fact we had received the impression from the reports of the Prime Minister's talks with Khrushchev that you felt that danger of precipitate unilateral action by the Russians had lessened.

As you know, our formulation of the agenda item was taken deliberately from the communiqué concluding the Prime Minister's talks in Moscow with Mr. Khrushchev and hence represents a formulation to which the Russians have publicly subscribed. We think it would be difficult for them to turn this down. Of course, the French think that we should be even more specific and the problem might be met by adding a sentence in our note to the effect that: “Naturally, any of the four participating governments should have the opportunity to raise for discussion any question which it may consider relevant to the problems under consideration.” This seems close to the approach suggested in the British text tabled in Paris.²

Except for the question of fixing a date for the Summit Conference, we had had the impression from your letter of March 9³ and from reports of our representative on the Working Group in Paris that there was in fact little substantial difference in the views of the four Governments on the content of our reply to the latest Soviet note. Frankly, we

² The text of the British draft was transmitted in telegram 3330 from Paris, March 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/3-1359)

³ In this letter Caccia told Herter that Macmillan very much favored a Summit meeting since only Khrushchev could make decisions on Germany. This meeting would be preceded, but not dependent on, a Foreign Ministers meeting. Attached to the note was an official summary of the discussions that took place in Moscow during Macmillan's visit. (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

had hoped that it would be possible for the Working Group to finish coordinating the replies this week so that they could be delivered to Moscow even before the Prime Minister's arrival here. It had seemed to us that this might produce some useful reactions from Moscow which the President and Prime Minister could take into account in their talks. We recognize that this time schedule may no longer be possible. However, we still think that the Working Group should get on with the job without delay and that if the matter of commitment to a specific date for a Summit Conference were dropped, there should be no difficulty in prompt agreement. We hope you will agree to this.

I am informing the German Chargé here regarding the substance of this letter and asking him to pass our views along to Bonn.

Sincerely yours,

Christian A. Herter⁴

⁴Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

222. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, March 14, 1959, 5:45–6:30 p.m.

The Secretary discussed with Governor Herter and Mr. Merchant on Saturday afternoon¹ the U.S. posture vis-à-vis a Summit meeting. He said that he had expressed to the President the previous afternoon² the thought that it is dangerous to gamble on Khrushchev, even at a Summit meeting, agreeing to anything that we could safely accept, and sticking to it. The Secretary said he had not been able to think of any matter on which Khrushchev would be prepared to deal reliably with us; he had recalled to the President the Soviet perfidy following the 1955 Summit meeting, when the Soviets had made an arrangement with the GDR³

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/3-1459. Secret. Drafted by Greene. The conversation was held at Walter Reed Hospital.

¹March 14.

²The President visited Dulles from 2:45 to 3:13 p.m. on March 13. (Eisenhower Library, President's Daily Appointments Book)

³Regarding Soviet-GDR agreements signed at Moscow on September 20, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXVI, pp. 537–538.

even before the Foreign Ministers met, which arrangement effectively precluded the possibility of the Foreign Ministers carrying out the directive of the Heads of Government on German reunification. The Secretary thought that if we do get to a Summit meeting we might ask Khrushchev at the outset whether he is now prepared to stand by the 1955 agreement,⁴ and point out that unless he is so prepared there is no point in seeking to negotiate any further agreement.

The Secretary had also expressed to the President the thought that another danger of getting to the Summit is that public pressure will be very great for some kind of "agreement" however illusory. He thought it might be worth trying to find out through the Diplomatic channel, if not at a Foreign Ministers meeting, whether there is any prospect of positive accomplishment at the Summit, before we agree to go there. It might also be worth considering having the Foreign Ministers and their Deputies discuss the German problem at length, as the Deputies discussed the Austrian problem. In this connection, Governor Herter reported Adenauer's idea of a five year moratorium in return for a Summit meeting (Bonn telegram 2024).⁵

The Secretary said that as far as the British are concerned he has no objection to Macmillan getting whatever political advantage he can at home out of the form of a "leadership" of the West, as long as we continue to control the substance of the Western position.

The Secretary said he had also told the President he thought it undesirable to let the public think that we are on the verge of war over Berlin: we are not, and if people think we are they will want the leaders to pull back from the determined positions that are essential to preserving peace. The United States has ample physical power to deter the Soviets from starting a war and must have the will and steadiness and skill to use this asset effectively. As to Berlin, our position is legally and morally unassailable, so we need not give up any of it to the Soviets except as we may get a broader settlement which meets the aspirations of the German people and the requirements of security in Europe.

JG

⁴ For text of the Heads of Government directive to their Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955, see *ibid.*, vol. V, pp. 527-528.

⁵ See footnote 1, Document 219.

223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, March 14, 1959, midnight.

3389. Ref: Embtel 3357.¹ Following is text of message from President to President de Gaulle, replying to latter's letter of March 12, for delivery soonest. Advise date and time delivery.

"March 14, 1959. Dear General de Gaulle: I have received and read with great care your letter of March 12² and wish to reply immediately to express my gratification at having this expression of your views.

Your analysis of the artificial crisis precipitated by the announced intentions of the Soviets to change the status of Berlin, and the existing arrangements for our access to Berlin seems to me to sum up the situation admirably. More than two million people in West Berlin look to us for the protection of their continued safety and welfare. We could not think of risking our honor by accepting, under the threat of force, conditions which would undermine our ability to fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin. Our rights are clear. I share your view that if force is used to oppose our exercise of these rights, the world will know precisely who in this controversy first resorted to force to settle a dispute. The more we and you and our NATO allies are firm and united, the less chance it seems to me that we shall run the risk of dangerous Soviet counteraction.

As you say, there is every reason to convoke a conference of Foreign Ministers, and to let such a conference run on while both sides exhaustively canvass possibilities for solution. We should not commit ourselves to go to a "summit" conference until there was some promise that such a conference could, in fact, yield satisfying results. I am communicating these same considerations, which appear of major political importance to me, to Prime Minister Macmillan.³

The reunification of Germany would effectively remove from Central Europe the main cause of tension there. Other important political consequences, which we would all welcome, would undoubtedly follow in its train. This happy event, as you suggest, is not likely to occur very soon, and I agree entirely that in the interim contacts between the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/3-1459. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Merchant and cleared in draft by Eisenhower and Herter.

¹ Telegram 3357 is not printed.

² Document 215.

³ No direct communication between the President and the Prime Minister along these lines has been found, but Eisenhower may have been referring to Herter's message to Caccia, Document 221.

two parts of Germany should be encouraged. I would here only enter a note of caution, with which I am sure you would agree, that, for many reasons, contacts which risk enhancing the position and prestige of the Soviet puppet government should be minimized.

In discussing the Berlin crisis and the difficult situation in Germany, the vital importance of the continued strength and unity of our NATO alliance inevitably also comes to my mind. I am sure you will of course agree that our common defenses must be maintained at maximum effectiveness if we are to deal with the Soviets with the firmness which both you and I desire. I believe we should proceed on this score calmly and purposefully. We should not take hasty measures designed superficially to build up our defenses which would only be interpreted as a sign of fear on our part, nor should we do anything to weaken our defenses, or make moves which could be interpreted as weakness or lack of determination. In addition to maintaining our military strength, we must also maintain a spirit of common political purpose among all members of the Alliance. Otherwise we will increase our vulnerability to Soviet efforts to divide us. Everything possible should be done to ensure that the military strength and political unity of the Alliance are maintained.

With reference to another portion of your letter, I am gratified to note that your views on the subject of "disengagement" are very close to my own. We have, as you know, felt that a technical approach to the problem of surprise attack, with measures not confined to a narrow or limited area, would be a worthwhile next step in the disarmament field. Unfortunately, the conference with the Soviets on this matter at Geneva last fall made it clear that their approach to the problem was completely unacceptable. The Soviet proposals would have led to the creation of a narrow demilitarized zone in Central Europe without any real assurance that the danger of surprise attack would be reduced. I continue to hope, of course, that it will be possible to make progress in the disarmament field, but I fully agree with you that we cannot accept measures which would jeopardize our basic security interests.

I also wished to refer briefly to our previous correspondence regarding a closer tripartite relationship among France, Great Britain and ourselves. I believe, as you expressed last month to Secretary Dulles in Paris, that these talks have already begun to serve a useful purpose. We, for our part, are disposed to continue these talks, and I am gratified that a date has been set early next month for the next meetings in this series.⁴

⁴Regarding the tripartite talks on Africa, held in Washington April 16-21, see vol. VII, Part 2, Document 107.

I will be discussing these vital subjects, particularly those concerning Germany, with Prime Minister Macmillan next week and will, of course, keep in mind during these talks your cogently expressed ideas. In the light of these talks I will write to you again to give you my appreciation of the situation and actions which we might wish to take.⁵ It is essential that we seek common accord and that our mutual strengths be concerted. These private exchanges of views can contribute importantly to that end.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration and sincere friendship.

Dwight D. Eisenhower."

Herter

⁵ President Eisenhower sent de Gaulle his summary of Macmillan's visit on March 24. Copies of this message and a similar one sent to Adenauer the same day are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. For memoranda of the discussions between the President and the Prime Minister, March 20 and 21, see Documents 234–241.

224. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, March 16, 1959, 7 p.m.

767. Re: Berlin.

1. In course of meeting with UK and French delegates this afternoon, which I will report in full in later telegram, ¹Dixon (UK) requested that three delegates here continue our discussions by exploring all possible ways in which UN could play a role in connection with Berlin. He had in mind in particular proposals that might be put forward during negotiations with USSR across conference table and referred to his earlier thoughts regarding a convoy arrangement like that of Mt Scopus convoy (see mytel 755² as well as Nielsen (Norway) ideas in mytel 756³).

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1659. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

¹ Transmitted in telegram 776 from USUN, March 17. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/3–1759)

² Document 214.

³ Telegram 756, March 12, reported that Norwegian Representative Nielsen believed that the United Nations was not the forum for a discussion of German reunification or European security, but that it had a pertinent role in the Berlin question. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1259)

Dixon said UK felt it important to discuss all possibilities on hypothetical basis in order be prepared for all eventualities. He pointed out there would be some discussion of this type in working group now meeting Paris where apparently there are no experts with UN experience. Dixon hoped we could begin such discussions on tripartite basis at once.

2. Vaucelles (France) said his present instructions did not permit him to participate in such discussions. French government's sole idea with respect to UN was to keep it completely out of Berlin problem.

3. French attitude about relationship of UN to Berlin situation is not only negative; it is unrealistic in extreme. Failure to consider ways in which UN could play role in Berlin could have extremely grave consequences. UN may be one of best ways out of Berlin crisis and is in any event sure to be involved. All of UN implications and subtleties should be analyzed by those having greatest experience in this field.

4. We should begin considering all possibilities of kind Dixon suggests and any others Department may have in mind promptly, preferably with all three delegates, but we should not await the French. UKDel wishes meet with USDel regardless.

5. Department's working paper⁴ now being used as basis for Paris discussions has not been received here. Request it be made available to me for these discussions.

6. Recommend I be authorized begin discussions with UKDel, informing French, of course that we are doing so, desire their participation, and will keep them informed if they are not yet ready attend.

Lodge

⁴See footnote 2, Document 220.

225. Editorial Note

On March 16 at 9:30 p.m. President Eisenhower addressed the American people on the subjects of Berlin and national defense posture. In the first part of his address the President reviewed the background of the Berlin crisis and defined the United States position on the city and on negotiations concerning it. He concluded by stating:

"Our position, then, is this: We will not retreat one inch from our duty. We shall continue to exercise our right of peaceful passage to and

from West Berlin. We will not be the first to breach the peace; it is the Soviets who threaten the use of force to interfere with such free passage. We are ready to participate fully in every sincere effort at negotiation that will respect the existing rights of all and their opportunity to live in peace.”

For full text of the President’s address, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 273–282.

226. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 17, 1959, 9:45–11:13 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
Assistant Secretary Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Hagerty
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

Secretary Herter explained the reason for his requesting this meeting: to summarize for the President matters which Prime Minister Macmillan might bring up on his forthcoming visit.

Before addressing the briefing book,¹ the President remarked about his surprise this morning, in reading the newspapers, to see that his speech² of the night before had been interpreted as agreeing to a summit meeting. As a related issue, the President expressed perplexity over the inconsistent reports which he receives from Macmillan on the one hand and from de Gaulle or Adenauer on the other with regard to the conclusions being reached in high-level talks in Paris and Bonn. Mr. Hagerty and Mr. Murphy agreed that the reports coming from the British, French and Germans had been inconsistent.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Appointment Book. (*Ibid.*)

¹ No briefing book as such has been found, however, briefing papers on the various topics that might be raised during Macmillan’s visit are *ibid.*, International File and in the Staff Secretary Records.

² See Document 225.

The President then went on to describe Adenauer's stated view that summit talks should be routine affairs rather than one-time operations. Adenauer believes there should be a series of such meetings. The President remarked at the readiness of people to tell the President of the United States to chase all over the world.

Secretary Herter then touched on the matter of contingency planning. He expected that in the meeting to be held later in the day this matter would be clarified.³ He expressed the hope that our current plans would undergo minimum change. We are currently receiving reports from overseas as to the exact details of what is going on. State is satisfied with the instructions as they stand, but Defense desires more precision.

The President mentioned the question posed by Ambassador Lodge as to the possible use of the UN. Secretary Herter answered that we recommend going to the UN immediately if the Soviets turn down the reply which we are preparing for transmission within the next few days.

The President then turned to the question of stamping of identification papers. He admitted that if he were to place himself in the situation of the Soviets, he could see flaws in the U.S. position. We recognize the FRG, whereas the USSR recognizes the GDR. If a final peace treaty between the FRG [USSR?] and the GDR specifies that:

- (1) there will be no interference with authorized traffic to and from Berlin, and
- (2) that stamping identification papers will merely verify this identification,

then it is difficult for us to argue with them. The GDR could take the position that this identification is necessary for a checkpoint in Berlin to ascertain that a convoy did in fact originate in the Western zone. Secretary Herter agreed that the real issue is whether the Communists actually restrict our traffic. The President observed, however, that the USSR has stated that we must leave Berlin. Mr. Murphy added that stamping of papers might be considered the "thin edge of a wedge."

The President asked whether a treaty between the USSR and the GDR would be considered valid if there were no Berlin problem. Secretary Herter admitted that we would argue with such a treaty only when it cuts across our rights.

The President then considered an additional complication. Even if the GDR were to pledge themselves to carry out the responsibilities heretofore exercised by the Soviets, we could not, even though tempted to accept, give it consideration, because it would be death to Adenauer.

³ See Document 228.

The President then expressed the opinion that Macmillan may be making a serious mistake even in the context of his narrow domestic political viewpoint. The main weakness of Macmillan's reported position consists in accepting a summit meeting without receiving any quid pro quo. It would appear that the British public would finally ask how long Britain needs to be slapped in the face. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

In connection with the subject of German reunification, the President remarked that we seem to be fighting with pillows. Adenauer is now talking as if the first step toward unification might be a federation. The President asked what we currently mean by the term "reunification." At Geneva we had specified that reunification must come about as the result of free elections. Here we appear to be considering the prospect of a federation, that is, anything to enable us to include all of Germany in a peace treaty. Secretary Herter answered that the FRG is extremely leery of the idea of a federation, and the paper which is being worked on in the State Department includes many steps toward eventual reunification. (The President recalled that the process is expected to take three years.) Mr. Merchant then stated that Adenauer's fears are of the concept of equality. He does not wish the GDR to be given a veto over the actions of the FRG. A possible solution to this would be the concept of a Council of German States. This would avoid the actual governments of East and West Germany becoming involved. Mr. Murphy added that the Germans are busy working on all sorts of ideas for unification below the federation level.

The President then referred to our metaphor of "walking a rickety fence." Here it would appear that we are walking two fences in different directions. In particular, he had in mind the difficulties in backing both Adenauer and the British, whose views appear to be diametrically opposed. The President noted in the briefing book that Britain would just as soon see Germany remain divided. He pointed out, however, that the Germans are one people and the desire on their part to reunite is strong indeed.

Mr. Murphy then pointed out the difficulties within Germany itself. Mayor Brandt and Chancellor Adenauer are hardly on speaking terms. Berlin is a hotbed of Social Democrats, and party politics within Germany are highly competitive. He pointed out further that areas such as Saxony and Thuringia are strongholds of the Social Democrats. Adenauer feels that his party would be thrown out if reunification came about tomorrow.

The President turned to the subject of how to ensure that the West German viewpoint is represented in a "summit" meeting. At the Geneva conference of 1955, we had set up a pipeline to Adenauer. In any

further conference, however, the views of Adenauer would be so important to the Western delegations that it would be necessary to keep him in the next room. With Adenauer close at hand, we would have to face the criticism in our own press that Adenauer is a stumbling block for us. Mr. Merchant pointed out that during the Geneva negotiations Adenauer had come to a summer home near the city, where he was readily accessible.⁴

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

⁴ At a second conference on March 19 Herter and Eisenhower again reviewed the British and U.S. positions on a Foreign Ministers meeting and a Summit conference. (Memorandum of conference with the President, March 19; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material)

**227. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(Norstad) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Twining)**

Paris, March 17, 1959, 3:25 p.m.

ALO 284. Exclusive for JCS. References: A. Dept-Bonn 1865, dated 18 Feb 59 (Notal); B. Dept-Paris 3249 dated 6 Mar 59 (Notal); C. Dept-Bonn G-397 dated 19 Feb 59 (Notal); D. EC 9-10438 dated 15 Mar 59; E. EC 9-10240 dated 23 Feb 59; F. Paris-Sec State 3200 dated 4 Mar 59 (Notal); G. Paris-Sec State 3295 dated 11 Mar 59 (Notal).¹

1. Although over 3 months have passed since the Russian ultimatum, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France have not yet made provisions for tripartite military planning to cover possible developments of the Berlin crisis nor provided for a tripartite military command should such an establishment be required. Dept-Bonn 1865 dtd 18 Feb 59 (ref A) proposed with Defense concurrence that

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1759. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Noform. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text.

¹ Airgram G-397 is printed as Document 181. None of the other references is printed: A. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1859); B. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/2-2559); D. (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Department of the Army Communication Center Files, DA IN 198085); E. (*Ibid.*, DA IN 762.00/3-459); F. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-459); and G. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/3-1159)

three unspecified military headquarters in Germany should “plan and coordinate quiet preparatory and precautionary military measure” since each of the three countries have two co-equal HQs in Germany, Army and Air Force, each vitally interested in this subject. The proposed planning group would consist of representatives of at least six commands, and to this I would feel that Navy representation would also have to be added.

2. Dept–Paris 3249 dated 6 Mar 59 (ref B), again with Defense concurrence, makes what appears to be a new proposal, and adds to this proposed planning group the three embassies at Bonn. As far as is known to me, there has been no coordination with the British and the French, and certainly no agreement. In spite of these proposals, I assume there is no question in the minds of the JCS, as there is none in mine, that if trouble starts the whole military problem, whether on a NATO or national basis, falls squarely into my lap.

3. As stated in the course of my meeting with the JCS in early Feb,² I consider it essential to set up without further delay a tripartite military staff, operating under Deputy CINCEUR acting for me, to deal with the planning for tripartite military questions arising out of the Berlin situation, including those envisaged in par 1 of ref A, and the military aspects of Dept–Bonn G–397, dated 19 Feb 59 (ref C), except the last paragraph, in which case my ER 9–10438, dated 15 Mar 59 (ref D) applies. In due time also, a tripartite commander should be designated to take over the responsibility for the direction of the staff and for such subsequent operational activities as the situation may require. As reported in EC 9–10240, dtd 23 Feb 59 (ref E), I have established a U.S. nucleus for a tripartite staff on 18 Feb, and on 19 Feb I approached Sir Frank Roberts on the subject of British participation. As reported in Paris–SecState 3200, dtd 4 Mar 59 (ref F), Roberts informed me on 3 Mar that Selwyn Lloyd, after discussion with Macmillan, had given the informal and personal response that the British thought it was a good idea and would be pleased to participate. This was confirmed by Lloyd when I talked to him on Monday, 9 Mar. As reported in Paris–SecState 3295 dtd 11 Mar 59 (ref G), I opened the subject with Gen Ely on that date. Ely was personally favorable and thought it important to initiate tripartite planning quickly. This morning he advised me that the French Govt should now be approached formally since they were in broad agreement with the proposal.

4. Having gone so far informally, this activity should now be formalized. The question was asked in Paris–SecState 3200 (ref F) whether this activity should be formalized by authorizing me to deal with the

²No record of this meeting has been found.

U.K. and French Permanent Reps, or if other channels should be used. This question has not been answered.

5. I visualize a very small tripartite staff of perhaps 20 officers and the same number of clerks, etc. It would function strictly as a staff of the military commander. It would be essential to have qualified technical experts on liaison duty from the several air and ground headquarters in Germany, and liaison agents from the MOD's of the U.K. and France would be necessary. It would also be essential that the staff maintain the very closest possible liaison with Amb Bruce and with whatever political authorities may be designated by the British and the French respectively, since the staff would have to depend upon them for direct political guidance and advice. We also contemplate some German participation, at least for coordination purposes.

6. It is proposed to keep this tripartite staff concealed initially under a cover that it is "planning the common use of military facilities." The code name for this activity is "Live Oak," which will be used in all messages bearing on this subject. Space and other facilities have been prepared at Camp des Loges.

7. Although I can make direct official representations to the French and U.K. Govts thru their Perm Reps, MOD's or Chiefs of Staff, it is my judgment that the way to establish this agency on the soundest and best basis is by official U.S. Govt representation thru the respective embassies. I would, however, sacrifice what may appear theoretically to be the best approach in the interest of immediate action, should that be necessary.

228. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 17, 1959, 2:53–3:40 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Messrs. Herter, Murphy, Merchant
Gerard Smith, McElroy, Quarles
Twining, Irwin, Persons, G. Gray
General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter handed the President a memorandum relating to contingency planning.¹ The President asked a number of questions to clarify and sharpen up the significance of some of the points made, for example on the question of flying above 10,000 feet, and on the question of “stamping” documents. The President said that he understood the difficulty of stamping is really Chancellor Adenauer—that he would be inclined to agree with Defense’s de-emphasis on stamping except for Adenauer’s position.

The President then asked questions regarding the proposal for the use of force locally. Answers were not completely clear as to the significance of the term “local.”

The President also asked regarding the possibility of a program of reprisals such as stopping trading and breaking relations. The key point here is the extent to which our allies would stand with us in this matter. Again the answers were not completely clear, although State representatives indicated that these questions are receiving consideration.

General Twining mentioned the suggestions that have been made for “heckling” operations such as blockade. The President said we should not go into blockade until we have had such provocation that this would be reprisal rather than pressure.

The President next indicated he had a question as to the arming of the first convoy. Mr. Herter indicated the purpose of this is to put the onus on the other side to make the first use of force.

Mr. McElroy said that the men in the convoy always have side arms. He stressed the need for more factual information as to just what the situation is at the check points. He said it would be planned to send photographic equipment along with the convoy to provide a record of

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Another memorandum of the meeting, drafted by Smith and the same in substance, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1759. A brief summary prepared by Gray noting the time of the meeting is in Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President.

¹ Document 229.

just what happened. The President asked whether members of the press would be sent in. Mr. Merchant thought they might, in correspondents' uniforms.

With regard to the suggestions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. McElroy said he has opposed sending a 7,000 man increase in strength to Europe. General Twining said General Norstad's chief purpose is to stop the cutback now going on in certain support units. Mr. McElroy said he is inclined to think this is a step to have in mind to do when we want to gain some special effect. The President recalled that his thought was that if we keep extra personnel in Europe, we should not ask the Army to make compensatory cuts elsewhere.

The President next noted the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation for compensatory replacement for any USAREUR divisions moved up to North Germany to form a composite force, and returned to his question as to what was meant by "local action." General Twining said it was of the order of one division reinforced, having in mind that if the job can't be done with a force of this size we had better shift to some other mode of action. Mr. McElroy confirmed that when we do that the "fat is in the fire."

Mr. Herter next raised the question of concessions for the sake of unity. The President said that negotiation always implies some flexibility. It is not possible to specify the extent to which we will modify in general terms. Some things can be modified but some cannot.

The President next asked when we will make moves that would be visible, for example the removal of dependents. Governor Herter said that would come the minute we are blocked. There was some doubt as to whether dependents could get out in those circumstances. Mr. Quarles said we have assumed that civilian travel would continue. The President asked that a reference to "political negotiations having failed" be changed to something like "political negotiations having failed to resolve the situation."

The President asked Mr. Herter to be ready to review this contingency planning with Macmillan, having additional people present for the discussion as might be required.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

**229. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McElroy and
Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower**

Washington, March 17, 1959.

SUBJECT

Berlin Contingency Planning

1. You asked recently to be brought up to date on Berlin contingency planning.

2. Berlin contingency planning has proceeded on the basis of guidance which you approved at a meeting on January 29, 1959,¹ with Secretary Dulles, Secretary McElroy and General Twining (Tab A).²

3. In order to obtain full understanding of the access control question, a joint State–Defense team of officials acquainted with current contingency planning will proceed promptly to Germany to make first-hand observations of current Soviet practice concerning access.

4. The following steps are now recommended for your approval:

(a) At an appropriate time before May 27, test flights should be made in and out of Berlin above 10,000 feet. The Soviets have denied that we have a right to fly above that ceiling. We have maintained that we do have such a right, but have never in fact exercised it.

(b) Present contingency planning provides that after the attempted or announced substitution of GDR for USSR, the first unit to go through would be a truck or trucks accompanied by a scout car or some other vehicle with a capability for shooting. We recommend that this concept be changed, and that the first unit to attempt passage in such circumstances should be a routine convoy to emphasize our intention to continue past practices. If this unit is blocked, we recommend that the next unit should be accompanied by a scout car or similar vehicle. Its purpose would be to establish the existence of forcible blockage.³

(c) We recommend that you ask the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA to prepare for you on an urgent basis an analysis of the political and military implications of the four alternative courses of action with respect to the use of force, discussed in paragraph 7 below. We suggest a deadline of April 7. You may recall that a similar study proved useful in connection with the Korean War (NSC 147 of April 2, 1953).⁴

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret.

¹ See Document 149.

² Tab A is airgram G-397, printed as Document 181.

³ Next to the last two sentences in the source text is the handwritten note "Doubtful as to this. C.A.H."

⁴ For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. XV, Part 1, pp. 838–857.

[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Open Questions

5. *Concessions for the sake of unity.* At the meeting in your office on March 5⁵ after the NSC meeting, it was agreed that continued Allied unity on Berlin was essential. That leaves open the question whether and, if so, to what extent we should modify our basic position if that turns out to be necessary in order to get Allied agreement.

6. *Substitution.* The doctrine that we will allow "no substitution" of GDR for Soviet personnel (at least unless there is an acknowledged agency relation between the two) is being questioned in various quarters—both foreign and domestic. Attention is focusing on the "no stamping" application of the "no substitution" doctrine, i.e., the proposition that we will refuse to allow paper stamping as a means of identifying allied military traffic to GDR personnel since this would imply acceptance of control.

[4 paragraphs (17 lines of source text) not declassified]

7. *Alternative uses of force.*

(a) Recent discussions between State and Defense officials confirmed agreement that we should be prepared to resort to force if necessary to maintain access to Berlin—even at the risk of general war.

(b) Four alternative uses of force, in the event of failure of political negotiations, have been discussed:

(i) A substantial effort to reopen ground access by local action.

(ii) A substantial effort to reopen air access, if blocked.

(iii) Reprisals against the communists in other areas, e.g., Western naval controls on bloc shipping.

(iv) General war measures.

(c) In paragraph 4 (c) above, we recommended that you direct preparation of an analysis of the implications of these alternative courses of action on an urgent basis.

8. *Timing of force.* It may be difficult to maintain a state of high military readiness over a long period. On the other hand, there would be political difficulties in breaking off negotiations, or a debate in the United Nations, and resorting to force, especially if civilian traffic to Berlin was still moving freely.

⁵See Document 201.

If political negotiations prove prolonged, at what point should we be prepared to resort to one of the four alternative uses of forces described above? The answer to this question will, of course, hinge in considerable measure on your decision after the completion of the study recommended in paragraph 4 (c).

Neil McElroy
Christian A. Herter

[Tab B (2 pages of source text) not declassified]

230. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, March 18, 1959, 6 p.m.

782. Re: Berlin; mytel 776.¹

1. My chief impressions emerging from exchange of views reported by paraphrase in refel are as follows:

A. All three dels agree there should be no recourse to SC prior four power negots despite risk involved this may later permit Soviets seize initiative.

B. Basis for this agreement is US-UK view that no matter how we might view such recourse, Soviets could successfully portray it as our attempt obstruct negotiated settlement. French agree not for this reason but because up to now their only concern is that UN be kept totally out of picture until after three powers have reacted on ground to physical interference with our access to Berlin.

C. My personal belief continues to be contrary to statement in Department's 747² that a *démarche* in SC would necessarily give Soviets chance in SC to circumvent FM meeting. Realistic management should be able prevent this, particularly as SC is a forum where we have such an advantage. Nor do I agree that such a *démarche*, if it were linked to US

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1859. Secret; Limited Distribution.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 224.

² Dated March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-959)

willingness to attend a summit meeting as this was expounded by the President last Monday night,³ could inevitably be successfully portrayed as an attempt to obstruct settlement.

D. We and British agree there is strong probability that mere transfer of Soviet rights to GDR would result quickly in introduction of new situation into UN, either by Soviets or some other party, and that under these circumstances we would be subjected to strong diplomatic pressures to accept new status quo.

E. We and British agree there is slight likelihood Soviets would transfer rights during course of FonMins negots but strong likelihood they may do this if they view negots as unsatisfactory. Likelihood would increase if Soviets believed we were not willing to summit.

F. With this in mind we and British see strong advantage if we seize initiative at UN (in SC) before Soviets have chance to change status quo by transferring rights. Our main purpose would be to seize SC of present situation and build pressure against any unilateral Soviet move to alter it while at same time preserving our ability to respond to any alteration and calling for renewed negots.

G. In support of such initiative we and British believe we should have some substantive proposal we could point to which on the face of it would appear to offer basis for negotiated settlement—at least of those problems resulting from Soviet attempts deny our rights in Berlin and access thereto. We also agree this would lead to renewed pressures for further negots at summit level.

H. We and British agree on need for further study here of (1) possible uses of UN machinery which might be included in three-power substantive proposals to Soviets during negots, and (2) possible diplomatic uses of UN to support three-power position.

I. As reported mytel 767,⁴ French thinking has not evolved this far and further tripartite exchanges here are stymied.

Lodge

³ See Document 225.

⁴ Document 224.

231. Memorandum of Meeting Between President Eisenhower and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, March 19, 1959, 10:45 a.m.

1. I indicated to the President that I wished to talk about Berlin and Germany. First, I wanted to follow up on the Tuesday (March 17) meeting. I reminded the President that the background for this meeting was really the Special NSC Meeting of 5 March, which he had requested, to discuss Berlin and Germany. I said that in my judgment the Special Meeting had not been satisfactory because of inadequate staffing and because the discussion did not follow the agenda which had been prepared for the meeting. Subsequent to the meeting I had talked with Mr. McElroy and Mr. Herter, both of whom agreed that we needed more preparation in advance of another meeting with the President, to be attended by representatives of State and Defense and Gordon Gray. The first such meeting had been held on Monday, 9 March; the second briefly on the 12th, and the third, and a very successful one, on the 14th. At that time I had agreed that State and Defense would draft the agenda for the meeting. However, the agenda did not come to me until about a half hour before the meeting and then it was in the form of a memorandum to the President.

I expressed to the President my view that the memorandum advanced the ball considerably but was inadequate in that it did not cover many contingencies which should have been presented and in it the assumptions were not clearly stated. I further expressed the view that neither State nor Defense representatives were too well prepared to discuss the memorandum which both Departments had signed.

I then raised this question with the President: Would it be desirable to have Gordon Gray assume a role in such meetings similar to that in National Security Council meetings in order to make sure all points were covered and all differences of view were expressed. The President felt that this would be desirable.

Next, I indicated to the President that there seemed to me to be four major phases of Berlin and Germany which should now be discussed. The first was immediate negotiation with our allies, that is to say; the impending conference with Mr. Macmillan. I indicated to the President that I did not believe this to be a matter in which I would be involved and I had no suggestions, realizing that he was in every way fully prepared for the conference.

I said, however, that I did wish to discuss the other three phases. The first of these was contingency planning, and particularly the specifics of U.S. actions. I asked the President whether he wished me to continue to follow this and make certain that adequate staff work was accomplished in view of his repeatedly expressed concern about being sure we knew what we would do in various contingencies. I offered the view that I was not sure that State-Defense coordination was sufficient without the addition of staff work on behalf of the President, especially in light of the experience of the March 17 meeting.¹ The President felt that he wanted me to undertake such a role.

As examples of matters which need to be considered I gave the following:

(a) The importance of the dispatch of teams to Europe to examine what actually occurs at the check points. I pointed out to the President that in all the meetings he had had on this subject there had been no one in the room in any case who in recent years had observed the procedure on the ground. I pointed out to him that pending the report of the team, many decisions were stymied.

(b) The question of referring credentials to the International Court of Justice.

(c) The question of having Western guards replace East German guards.

(d) The question of the assumption by the United Nations of the identification function.

(e) What constitutes K-Day.

(f) What is meant by "forceable obstruction."

(g) Can we make a distinction between identification and stamping.

(h) The question of recourse to the United Nations—what, how and when.

(i) The question of diplomatic rupture.

(j) The question of trade impact on the Soviet Bloc following diplomatic rupture.

(k) Blockade.

(l) The question of whether we would consider a probe if negotiations were in progress but deadlocked, such as in the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Testing.

The second phase involved the study and analysis of alternative uses of force by State, Defense, JCS and CIA which had been approved by the President on 17 March. I said that I believed that the President had on 17 March approved the notion of having this report made to a Special Meeting of the NSC but that I wished to make sure that there was advance preparation of the principal members of the Council before the

¹ See Document 228.

report was actually presented and wished to communicate the desirability of this procedure to the principals. The President agreed.

The final phase involved Germany as a whole. I pointed out to the President that the working group which is now in Paris would be finishing their work this weekend. They have been using a talking paper which of course was ad referendum but which contained all sorts of national security policy issues such as disarmament measures, neutral zone, etc. I pointed out to the President that there would be a Three-power Foreign Ministers Meeting (US-UK-France) probably on March 31, or April 1, and also probably a four-power Foreign Ministers Meeting (US-UK-France-Germany) at the same time. The purpose of these meetings has been stated to give general guidance with respect to governmental positions on the whole German problem. Furthermore, the NATO meeting would take place April 2 to April 4.

I then said to the President that the big question was this: At what point do the document and the positions covered by the document cease to be a talking paper and become the beginning of a U.S. position. I indicated that it was not clear that a U.S. position must be firm before the end of this month but the time was coming when matters would have to be presented to the President for his final decision.

I raised with him the question of whether a report of progress of the working group and the State Department estimate relating thereto, should not be given to the NSC on March 26 or a Special Meeting of the Council at about that time. I suggested that the purpose of this meeting would not be to arrive at final decisions but to identify those problems with respect to which Presidential decision would be required and also with respect to which differences of view existed within Executive Departments.

The President thought well of this and suggested that a presentation be made visually, that is to say, by the use of charts. He felt that the various steps in the process leading to a German settlement could be visually presented and those checked off with respect to which decisions had already been taken or could easily be taken and others could be flagged for serious consideration.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Gordon Gray

232. Memorandum of a Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, March 19, 1959, 5 p.m.

I said to the President that I assumed there would be three major points of possible disagreement or differences of emphasis between the British and ourselves: Whether to agree now to a Summit conference; whether to accept the principle of the Rapacki Plan; and what to do about the testing negotiations. I said that I would like to present briefly my own views on these points to be sure they coincided with those of the President and that he would therefore be agreeable to my presenting them to Macmillan tomorrow:

As to the Summit meeting, I recalled that we had in May 1955 agreed to a Summit meeting after the urging of the British Government that this was for them a political necessity. But also we had agreed to it not just on this account but because in a sense the Soviets had paid the price which the President had been demanding as proof of willingness to do something for peace in terms of deeds as against mere words. They had agreed to and signed the Austrian State Treaty which was the one point which the United States had most strongly emphasized as necessary to demonstrate Soviet honorable intentions. Also at that time the Soviets had accepted without question our concept as to the character and composition of the meeting. At the present time the Soviets were trying to bring about a Summit meeting not through good behavior but by coercing us with threats and with violations of our established rights. Furthermore, there were strong indications that they would seek as part of such a meeting to establish the so-called principle of "parity" which would have for them very considerable political advantages and for us very considerable political embarrassments. It seemed to me that it was of the utmost importance to the integrity of our position not to give in to the kind of pressures to which we were now subjected, but to continue to take the position which heretofore we have consistently taken that there must be a prospect of some useful positive result out of a Summit meeting before we agree it should be held. This was the more true because the agreements of the last Summit meeting had almost immediately been repudiated by the Soviet Union.

The President indicated he was in full accord with this view. He had at Mr. Herter's request somewhat diluted his phraseology in his Monday night speech but he recalled that he had instructed Mr. Herter

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Conversation with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. The conversation was held at Walter Reed Hospital.

to tell the British Ambassador that the President assumed that the “developments” that he referred to would be “favorable” developments. The President was firmly of the opinion that we should not at this time agree to a Summit meeting.

With respect to the Rapacki Plan or some “thinning out” proposal, I recalled that I had pointed out to Macmillan in London¹ that from a political standpoint some thinning out seemed to me acceptable provided that it did not involve discrimination in terms of any particular country and provided it did not involve rejection of the principle of collective security and of the right of one country to send its troops onto the soil of another at its request for self-defense. As to the military aspects, I had no judgment. I did however have in mind that it so happened in the case of the Western Allies that our principal strength was in the forward positions where were the forces of the Germans, the British and ourselves and that there was no very good alternative position in Europe to which these could be shifted. In view of General de Gaulle’s attitude, I did not think we would want, and I doubted whether he would be willing, that more American troops should be stationed in France. Therefore the thinning would dislodge the main body of our strength and dislodge it very seriously, whereas in the case of the Soviets this was not the case because they could put their troops anywhere in the area they dominated.

The President indicated general agreement with this point of view although he pointed out that there might possibly be some advantages in the thinning out program which involved inspections and controls of the kind we had been trying to get in various aspects of our disarmament talks.

I then referred to the nuclear testing negotiations.² I said it seemed to me quite clear by now that the Soviet Union would never accept within its national borders a genuinely independent group of inspectors with mobility and independence of action. Therefore I suggested that we should call off the present negotiations or at least shift their character by stating that the Soviet position on controls made the original project wholly unrealistic but that the United States would be willing to initiate a suspension of atmospheric testings in the hope and expectation that the Soviet Union would do the same. It might in this connection be possible to have some international posts outside of the territorial boundaries of the countries in question as on some of the Pacific islands, etc. The President indicated his general accord with this point of view.

¹ See Document 158.

² Documentation on the nuclear testing negotiations at Geneva is scheduled for publication in volume III.

The President said he thought there was a fourth point that might come up which was the British tendency to recognize de facto the GDR. I recalled that I discussed this with Macmillan in London and emphasized that in my opinion this was a very dangerous thing to do because it undermined the basic principle which gave us our rights in Berlin. We were in Berlin as sovereigns and to the extent that we had reserved our rights in Berlin we were as much sovereign there as we were in Washington, D.C., or any place else in the United States. It seemed to me we could never accept the concept of the Soviet Union being able to give the GDR rights which would override our own sovereign rights in Berlin. If we did this, our basic position would, as I had said, be jeopardized and could lead to a chain of consequences which would be extremely serious to us. I recalled that Macmillan had seemed to accept this thesis when we were in London although he had not gone so far as to say that he had actually committed himself to a degree so there would be any lack of good faith in his now taking a different position.

We then turned to a discussion of some of the practical arrangements of the proposed meeting on Friday.

JFD³

³ Joseph Greene initialed for Dulles.

233. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Acting Secretary of State Herter

Washington, March 19, 1959.

We asked Bob Bowie¹ down on Wednesday² to give us his views on Berlin and Germany. I thought you might be interested in a brief summary.

I. Berlin

1. To preserve our position in Berlin, we must be prepared to use whatever force is necessary—to and including general war. There is a good chance that force will be required; at least, we must act on this assumption.

2. We should, therefore, draw the issue in terms which will seem, to our own people and our allies, to warrant the use of force. This means not drawing the issue in terms of substitution of GDR for Soviet officials. Such a position will command neither allied nor domestic support, but rather cloud the essential issue: our free access to Berlin.

3. To avoid making our acceptance of GDR officials seem like a backdown, we should begin now to de-emphasize this issue, emphasizing that the GDR are Soviet puppets and that we hold the Soviets responsible for their actions. This will no more involve GDR recognition than our dealings with ChiComs involve their recognition. We should stress that physical interference is the real sticking point rather than who carries it out.

4. If GDR officials proceed to increased restriction on our traffic, we should:

(a) Suspend surface military movement to Berlin, and keep flying in essential garrison supplies without calling it an airlift.

(b) If our planes are interfered with, resort to whatever military action is necessary to maintain access.

(c) At some point, be prepared to apply countermeasures elsewhere (e.g., mining the Dardanelles).

(d) If these actions do not maintain our access, resort to a large-scale ground operation designed to seize and maintain control of the autobahn, recognizing that this is very likely to lead to general war (and being prepared to go to general war rather than accept a local defeat).

Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany. Confidential. Initialed by Herter. Copies were sent to Greene, Murphy, Reinhardt, Merchant, and Becker.

¹ Bowie was Director of the Policy Planning Staff and Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning from 1950 to 1955.

² March 18.

5. To create maximum deterrence we should now repeat the firm note struck in the President's speech in a Congressional resolution and drop any pretense of business as usual in our military posture. This is the most serious crisis since World War II and we should act accordingly.

II. *Germany and Europe*

6. We should make a respectable offer to the USSR on unity, but we should recognize that it will probably be turned down and we should not allow the Soviets to fuff that turn-down by ourselves agreeing to any loose confederal relation between the two Germanies.

7. In the European security field, we should not agree to restrictions which would weaken Germany's attachment to the West, by making it look as though the US and USSR were ganging up on the Federal Republic

8. We should try to use the present crisis to promote European unity. We might make a bold proposal to this end, e.g., US assistance in the creation of genuinely integrated missile-nuclear strategic capability controlled by WEU or the Community of Six.

III. *Questions*

1. Asked if substitution would not be the first step on a slippery slope: We are on that slippery slope already, since the GDR now controls civilian traffic, and could take action against it at any time.

2. Asked if it would not be very difficult to get support for resisting any minor increase in present traffic procedures: The principle involved (that of physical interference with free access) could be made convincing here, as it could not be made convincing on substitution.

3. Asked if it would not be useful to hold on to the substitution issue for bargaining purposes: On the contrary, this would make its eventual concession a symbol of weakness. The sooner we got rid of this issue, the better position we would be to threaten force convincingly on the issue of no increased interference. If then there was no interference after the turn-over, our firmness would have seemed to pay off. Whereas, if we entered the turn-over period with a concession (having held to "no substitution" right up to the turn-over), the Soviets would be encouraged to press on, as they would not if we now started to play down this question.

4. Asked about "disengagement": Mutual withdrawals would not reduce the danger and might increase it.

5. Asked about a separate GDR treaty: He did not think this would do such damage to our position in Germany that we should make any significant concessions to the Soviets to avoid it.

6. In further discussion, Bob repeated this basic point: We must be prepared to face up to general war, recognizing that it may well come to that. All the more reason, he thought, to draw the issue with great care, to make our firmness clear from the very start, and to exhaust every military measure before proceeding to general war.

234. Memorandum of Conversation

MVW USDEL MC/1

Washington, March 20, 1959, 11:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Macmillan
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd

President Eisenhower
Secretary Dulles

At the President's invitation to me to comment on some of the subjects that he would be discussing with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, I said that I would first like to speak of the broad aspects of the situation now confronting us, as I saw them. I said that I thought the free world allies should not give the people of the world the impression that we are frightened of the Soviets or that the Soviets are in the driver's seat. In some parts of the world, notably in Asia, Africa and parts of Latin America, people are watching closely to see whether they think the Soviet Union or the Western Allies are the more powerful. We cannot, of course, prevent Khrushchev from strutting across the stage and making his grandiloquent speeches. But we can avoid the impression that whenever he sounds conciliatory we rejoice and whenever he sounds threatening we are fearful as though he were the Lord of Creation.

As to Berlin, I said that I thought that we should make no concessions nor agree to any changes in the present arrangements except as part of a larger agreement out of which we would get something. I said that I thought our position in Berlin legally and morally impeccable and

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dulles and Greene. The conversation was held at Walter Reed Hospital. For two other accounts of this conversation, see Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 352–353 and Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, pp. 643–644. Additional documentation on Macmillan's visit to Washington is presented in volume VII, Part 2.

our sovereignty there sound; the Soviets cannot by their own act deprive us of sovereignty in Berlin nor put the GDR in a position to control our exercise of it. I noted that in such matters we can, as we did in the contractual agreements with the Federal Republic,¹ voluntarily renounce some or all of our sovereign rights when it is expedient to do so; but I thought the assumption that, simply because the Soviets challenge our rights and position, we have to seek a compromise, is all wrong.

As to the possibility of an early Summit meeting, I said that I had not found persuasive the arguments favoring such a meeting, and that I did not think we should now agree to go to one unless we can exact a reasonable price in Soviet "deeds not words". I recalled that in 1955, the Soviets had paid such a price by agreeing to the Austrian Treaty. Also they accepted the composition we proposed. I said that I had seen no evidence that Khrushchev now seems prepared to pay a price, but rather to drive us to the Summit by threats. Nor had I been able to think of any acceptable agreement that Khrushchev might now be willing dependably to make with us. I said that I was opposed to the idea of a Summit meeting premised simply on the hope that it might produce something positive, without having any evidence that there is a real prospect of this. I said that at such a meeting there would be almost irresistible pressure upon the leaders of the democracies to reach an agreement. The Soviet leaders would be under no such pressure and we would be at a distinct disadvantage. I asked the Prime Minister whether in his visit to Moscow he had discovered any element in the Soviet thinking which might give hopes of useful negotiation at the Summit.

The Prime Minister did not indicate that he had any basis for believing that a worthwhile, acceptable agreement could be reached with Khrushchev. He did, however, go on to discuss generally the question of German reunification.

The Prime Minister said that he had the general impression that zeal for German reunification has somewhat abated. He had discussed this with Chancellor Adenauer,² and also had tried to elicit the Chancellor's views on dealing with the GDR. The Prime Minister said that somewhat to his surprise Adenauer had indicated that he is prepared to accept the status quo. Mr. Macmillan said that he had commented to the Chancellor that this seemed to be close to what Khrushchev says he wants and Adenauer had replied that the ultimate goal of German reunification could not, of course, be explicitly abandoned and indeed it should be held out as a light at the end of what might be a very long tunnel. In the time that would elapse before this light were reached,

¹ Documentation on the contractual agreements signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, is in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.

² See Documents 217 and 219.

ways could, as Mr. Macmillan understood Adenauer's view, be found to lighten some of the human burdens borne by the people of East Germany.

I recalled that I had discussed with Adenauer the possibility of arranging for a long-term negotiation by Foreign Ministers and their Deputies, similar to the negotiations that had eventually led to the Austrian Treaty.³ I said that I thought this a possibility which ought not to be wholly discarded in the present situation and I cited too the talks that we have been having with the Chinese Communists.⁴ Such talks can provide a context for avoiding hostilities, even if the substantive content of the talks is relatively inconsequential.

I repeated that to agree now to go to a Summit meeting at a fixed date in the future would be a grave error and would suggest to the world that we had completely given in to the Soviets, in reversing the attitude we have taken for the past two years, namely that there must be some prospect of fruitful results at a Summit meeting before we could agree to go to one. I thought that it would be most dangerous to ourselves to give such an impression.

I said that if we shall have to face the issue of whether to make prospect of a positive outcome a condition of going to the Summit, I felt that we might as well face it now, while there is still time to find out, free of public pressures. Through a meeting of Foreign Ministers, or privately through diplomatic channels—or, I said, not necessarily through private channels; after all Mr. Macmillan had talked directly with Mr. Khrushchev—we could try to ascertain whether Khrushchev is prepared to make an acceptable deal. I said in this connection I agree with the thought that there will probably not be agreement with the Soviets except with Khrushchev; and that in many respects the prospect of talking with Gromyko was a bleak and barren one. But I did believe that ways existed for finding out whether or not there was anything that Khrushchev wanted that we could give and get a quid pro quo; and that the possibility of Deputy talks should not be discouraged.

Mr. Macmillan said that as the British people see the present situation, the Soviets, far from adopting an aggressive posture of advancing on the West, have simply said that all they want to do is go away from where they are. The Prime Minister said that if the Soviets carry out their threat to hand over to the GDR control of our access to Berlin, we shall be faced with very difficult practical problems, not the least of these avoid-

³ Regarding Dulles' discussions with Adenauer, see Document 165.

⁴ Documentation on U.S. talks with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw is presented in volume XIX.

ing appearing to blockade ourselves out of Berlin. Mr. Macmillan said that he saw four possibilities:

1) That the Soviets give in; 2) that we give in; 3) that there be negotiations leading to an agreed solution for Berlin and the broader problems of central Europe, and 4) that there be war. The Prime Minister said that his Government would be quite prepared to mobilize more armed forces if necessary. Also Macmillan would feel under a duty to try to remove all of the young children from the United Kingdom to Canada so as to keep their stock alive as against the total devastation of nuclear war.

Mr. Macmillan said his Government would not have the necessary public support unless they had a publicly comprehensible issue. He thought that negotiations would have to be attempted and would have to fail, before the British public could be convinced of the need for preparations of force.

The President, on Mr. Macmillan's point that the Soviets are not "advancing", observed that they are in fact trying to get us out of Berlin and he wondered whether that were not a sufficiently aggressive issue to be persuasive. I said that I quite disagreed with the Prime Minister's theory that if we are threatened, we must negotiate, lest the public not support our being firm. I said that our present considerable strength is conceived as a deterrent to Communist imperialist aggression. It is a deterrent, and there is not going to be the war of which the Prime Minister spoke. In being firm we have sometimes to take added risks, such as our sending troops to Lebanon and Jordan and holding Quemoy. But in that instance, I felt sure, our show of firmness and determination, coupled with our deterrent power, had avoided war. On Mr. Macmillan's point that the issues now posed in Berlin are so difficult that we should negotiate a new arrangement for the city, I said that I could not agree that there is anything wrong in our present position there. It is the Soviets who are trying to make it wrong, but that does not mean that we have to negotiate with them about it. I asked what is the use of our spending \$40 billion a year or more to create deterrent power if whenever the Soviets threaten us and want to take something from our present positions we feel that we have to buy peace by compromise. If that is going to be our attitude, we had better save our money.

The Prime Minister argued that the premises of our position in Berlin, and particularly the premise of our presence by right of conquest, are fast fading away, and that with their control of the GDR, the Soviets have the upper hand. Hence, he said, we should try to salvage something by negotiation.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

235. Memorandum of Conversation

MVW USDEL MC/10 Camp David, March 20, 1959, 3-4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Prime Minister Macmillan's Visits to Paris and Bonn

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Herter
Ambassador Whitney
General Goodpaster
Mr. Merchant

The Prime Minister
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Norman Brook
Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Bishop

The Prime Minister gave a brief report on his visit to Paris.¹ He said in general he found the French relaxed, but firm on Berlin. Debre he thought very nice. General de Gaulle talked a great deal and left on Mr. Macmillan a firm impression that he is the boss. De Gaulle seemed obsessed with the atom bomb in terms of its constituting the ultimate weapon which left nations not possessing it in a secondary role. According to Macmillan, de Gaulle felt there was no use preparing for possible difficulty by mobilization or other preparedness measures. Macmillan indicated that this attitude was incomprehensible to him. De Gaulle also was reported as considering the main issue or crucial point [was] that at which there was actual blockage of the Allied access to Berlin. In conclusion Macmillan said that the French "agreed with them on everything."

With respect to his visit to Bonn, the Prime Minister said that he and the Chancellor agreed well.² He mentioned that in his private talk with Adenauer the latter had suggested securing a commitment from the Russians as a condition precedent to holding a summit meeting an undertaking that the status quo would be preserved for five years. Macmillan said he did not agree to this and that in the subsequent plenary session the idea was explicitly abandoned.

The Prime Minister believed that the Chancellor had moved into a fundamentally different position from the past. He thinks that he can now live with the status quo though it would be wrong to abandon public lip service to this objective. He said that the Germans agreed with the

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. The meeting was held at Aspen Lodge. The beginning of the conversation is recorded in MVW USDEL MC/9, during which Macmillan reported on his visit to Moscow. (*Ibid.*) For the President's account of this conversation, see *Waging Peace*, pp. 353-354; for Macmillan's account of the sessions at Camp David, see *Riding the Storm*, p. 645.

¹ See Document 213.

² See Documents 217 and 219.

British in believing that a fixed date for the summit meeting should be offered in the Western replies to the Soviet note. It was also agreed between them to make as a condition for a summit meeting either through diplomatic channels or by incorporation in the note the understanding that there would be no unilateral alteration of the status quo prior to and during the process of negotiation.

Mr. Macmillan said that the Chancellor then inquired about the British ideas for an area or zone of inspection. Macmillan felt that his explanation satisfied the Chancellor and relieved his fears. He said that he told the Germans what he had in mind was an inspection zone within which there would be ceilings on both sides of the lines on force levels and limitations on armaments. Its establishment, however, would be subject to the following three principles: First, there should be no alteration of the present balance of forces to the disadvantage of the West; secondly, its terms should be such that NATO would not be broken up; nor, thirdly, the United States be forced out of Europe. On the latter point he expressed his view that if United States forces were removed from Germany they would in fact have no place to go except home.

Mr. Macmillan said he went on to emphasize to the Chancellor that he was not thinking of disengagement nor of the creation of a great neutral no man's land which would constitute a dangerous vacuum under modern conditions of war. What he was trying to do was to quell the appeal of the Rapacki plan which had caught the imagination of many unsophisticated people.

The President interjected that he was still confused concerning Adenauer's understanding on the question of prior conditions for a summit meeting because he had been very explicit in telling Bruce after the Macmillan visit that Macmillan had agreed to a five-year standstill as a condition precedent.

Mr. Macmillan replied that when they had heard of this apparent misunderstanding they had sent their Ambassador back to von Brentano who assured him that there was no misunderstanding on the Chancellor's part nor on his own.

The President then said jokingly that if we could get a commitment from the Russians to make no change in the status quo for five years then we could postpone going to the summit until the end of that period. He then went on to say with utmost seriousness that he would not go to a meeting under circumstances which made it appear that he had his hat in his hand. To him there was an elemental requirement which must be met and that was the Soviets negotiate at a foreign ministers' meeting in good faith and progress be revealed. He said with finality that he would not agree at this time to go to a summit meeting on a fixed date.

There then followed some conversation on the report which had been received of a statement by Adenauer before his party members to the effect that the Federal Republic might or should extend de facto recognition to the GDR. It was noted that if this report was confirmed it represented a very substantial shift in Adenauer's position on relations with the GDR.

236. Memorandum of Conversation

MVW USDEL MC/11 Camp David, March 20, 1959, 3–4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin, Summitry, and Reply to Soviet March 2 Note

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Herter
Ambassador Whitney
General Goodpaster
Mr. Merchant

The Prime Minister
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Norman Brook
Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Bishop

The conversation then turned to Berlin. The President said that we would absolutely refuse "to throw the West Berliners to the wolves."

The Prime Minister said that as he saw it there were two acceptable solutions for Berlin. First was to deal with the GDR on our access rights on the basis of an acknowledged agency relationship between them and the Soviets. The second was to negotiate a treaty that would be registered with the United Nations which would guarantee our position in Berlin and the rights of access. This he would regard as an improvement over our present situation. There was some brief discussion as to what effect this would have on our fundamental rights acquired by conquest.

Reverting to the question of the relationship between a Foreign Ministers and a summit conference with the Soviets, the President suggested that Mr. Herter and Mr. Lloyd review the present language of our draft reply¹ and see if there could not be inserted useful quotations

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant. The meeting was held at Aspen Lodge. See the source note, Document 235, for other accounts of this meeting.

¹ See Document 244.

from Khrushchev's press release the day before² to tie the Soviets to a commitment to genuinely attempt to achieve some progress at the Foreign Ministers level. It was agreed that this would be done though the danger was pointed out of relying on ticker reports of a press conference.

The President then said that a prolonged summit conference or a series of conferences would be impossible for him by reason of the requirements of our Constitution. It might be possible, however, he said, for him to go for two or three days at the opening and leave Vice President Nixon as his personal representative, returning himself at the conclusion of the conference if the results warranted it.

Mr. Macmillan then said, with general agreement, that we can't afford to have another show of the character of the last Geneva Summit Conference which was little more than an exchange of propaganda speeches. This is no way to approach serious negotiation. He felt that the Foreign Ministers should sharpen the issues and outline available choices. The Heads of Government could then negotiate in private with very few plenary sessions.

Mr. Herter pointed out that there were really two points at issue in our draft reply. One was the agenda and the other was the matter of a fixed date for the summit.

The President suggested that we stipulate that one of the duties of the Foreign Ministers was to explore opportunities for agreement and that dependent on their progress they could then agree on a date for the summit. He reiterated that he would not agree at this time to a fixed date and said that he thought "justify" was a good word to describe what was required of the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

Mr. Macmillan raised the question as to whether it would be possible to hold the summit conference in the United States presumably as a means of avoiding the constitutional difficulties of a prolonged absence of the President from the country. Specifically, he wondered if Newport wouldn't be a pleasant site.

The President indicated skepticism as to holding such a conference in the United States though he did mention San Francisco might be a possible location in light of its background as the scene of the foundation of the United Nations.

Mr. Herter raised the question of Czechoslovakian and Polish participation in the Foreign Ministers conference, and the Prime Minister replied that he liked our formula. The meeting thereupon ended at 4:40 p.m.

² For a transcript of Khrushchev's press conference on March 19, see Embree, *Soviet Union and the German Question*, pp. 139-153.

237. Memorandum of Conversation

MVW USDEL MC/12 Camp David, March 20, 1959, 6:30–7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Reply to Soviet Note of March 2

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Acting Secretary
Ambassador Whitney
Mr. Merchant

The Prime Minister
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Norman Brook
Sir Derick Hoyer-Millar

At the conclusion of a prolonged discussion between the Prime Minister and the President (with advisers present) on the form of our reply to the Soviet note, the meeting broke up at 4:40 p.m.,¹ with the President and the Prime Minister leaving for a drive.² They agreed to return at 6:30 to consider the matter further and suggested that Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Herter continue the discussion.

After a short recess Mr. Herter, Ambassador Whitney and myself met with Mr. Lloyd, Sir Norman Brook and Sir Derick Hoyer-Millar. Each side had in the interval prepared a redraft³ of the Summit language. We were unable to reach agreement.

Upon the return of the President and the Prime Minister from their drive the lack of progress was reported and the Prime Minister retired to draft personally the passage dealing with a Summit conference and agenda. When this draft was ready the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister (with advisers) resumed. The Prime Minister became exceedingly emotional. He said that we were dealing with a matter which in his judgment affected the whole future of mankind. He said that: "World War I—the war which nobody wanted—came because of the failure of the leaders at that time to meet at the Summit. Grey⁴ instead had gone fishing and the war came in which the UK lost two million young men."

The President interjected that there had been meetings at the Summit before the outbreak of World War II and that those meetings had not prevented that war.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant. The meeting was held at Aspen Lodge. For the President's account of this conversation, see *Waging Peace*, pp. 354–355.

¹ See Document 236.

² For the Prime Minister's account of the conversation with President Eisenhower during their drive to Gettysburg, see *Riding the Storm*, p. 645.

³ None of the drafts mentioned here has been found.

⁴ Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary.

The Prime Minister rejoined that at that time "we were dealing with a mad man—Hitler."

The Prime Minister continued that he could not take his people into war without trying the Summit first. If war was to result there was much that he must do. They had no civil defense worthy of the name and this must be rectified. They must mobilize and disperse a substantial part of their people to Australia and Canada. Eight bombs, the Prime Minister said, would mean 20 or 30 million Englishmen dead. Throughout the discussion he kept repeating this reference to eight bombs.

The President said in effect that we cannot consider these problems exclusively in these terms. What we must consider is the alternative of surrendering to blackmail. He reminded the Prime Minister that we would not be immune to punishment. In fact he said that the lowest level of casualties he had seen estimated in event of an all-out thermonuclear attack on this country was 67 million. He emphasized that we don't escape war by surrendering on the installment plan, that the way to prevent war is by willingness to take the risk of standing on ground which is firm and right.

The President then went on to say that he would not "be dragooned to a Summit meeting." He said that if there was even slight progress at the Foreign Ministers meeting then he would go but that he would not commit himself now to go under any and all circumstances.

Mr. Herter pointed out at this juncture that in the event the Foreign Ministers broke up in total failure we would obviously consider all remaining possibilities for further negotiation including a Summit meeting which might be held in the Security Council.

The Prime Minister reverted to his highly emotional mood saying that he was an old man and that he owed a duty to his people; that this question of agreement now to a Summit meeting was probably the most fateful decision he would ever have to take; that he must sleep on the matter and that he was not prepared to discuss it further that night.

The group then at 7:30 went to the table for dinner and there was no further substantive discussion that evening.

238. Memorandum of Conversation

MVW USDEL MC/14

Camp David, March 21, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Tactics at Foreign Ministers Meeting with Soviets

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
 The Acting Secretary
 Mr. Murphy
 Ambassador Whitney
 Mr. Merchant
 Mr. Reinhardt
 Mr. Irwin
 General Goodpaster
 Major Eisenhower

UK

The Prime Minister
 Mr. Lloyd
 Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
 Sir Patrick Dean
 Sir Anthony Rumbold
 Sir Harold Caccia
 Sir Norman Brook
 Mr. Bishop

The group turned at once to the question of the reply to the Soviet note on which agreement had not been reached at the close of the discussion the previous evening.¹ The Prime Minister started by saying that he felt we were close together on a formula for a Summit meeting. There was a difference of opinion as to the effect on the possibility of accomplishment at a Foreign Ministers meeting which would result from a concurrent acceptance of a Summit meeting in the summer. The British wanted to agree to such a Summit meeting and set a date for it in the present reply. They understood, however, our point of view.

The President said that he would repeat to the Prime Minister his past expression of a willingness to look hard for any progress at all at the Foreign Ministers meeting which would justify thereafter holding a Summit conference but that he absolutely refused to promise unconditionally at this point to go to a Summit meeting "come hell or high water."

The Prime Minister then put forward new compromise language for this passage in the note. The President also gave the language which we had considered overnight.² Agreement was finally reached on the

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. The meeting was held at Aspen Lodge. For Macmillan's account of this conversation and the two that follow, see *Riding the Storm*, pp. 646-647; for Eisenhower's account, see *Waging Peace*, p. 355.

¹ See Document 237.

² Neither Macmillan's compromise language nor the President's has been identified further.

form of words which was later in the morning telegraphed to our working group representatives in Paris³ The British accepted our formulation of the agenda item. They also confirmed their acceptance of our phraseology for handling participation by the Czechs and the Poles. There was some further general discussion subsequent to this by the President of the actual text of our note which will vary in its preambular and non-operative passages from the British text. A clean draft of the US note reflecting the President's changes and approval was also forwarded to Paris for our representative on the working group.⁴ Sir Anthony Rumbold and Mr. Merchant then retired to draft parallel instructions with respect to the handling of the note to our Embassy in Bonn and Paris, it having been agreed that our permanent NATO representatives would be the members of the Four Power working group to handle in Paris the final concerting of our replies with the Germans and the French and thereafter with the NATO Council.

³ Transmitted from Camp David in CPD-1018, March 21, and received at the Department of State at 2:21 p.m. for transmission to Bonn, Paris, Moscow, and London. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214) Regarding the final text of the note, see Document 244. Notification of the agreement reached was transmitted in CPD-1017, March 21. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214)

⁴ Transmitted In CPD-1018 from Camp David, March 21. (*Ibid.*)

239. Memorandum of Conversation

MVW USDEL MC/15

Camp David, March 21, 1959, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

German Reunification and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
 The Acting Secretary
 Mr. Murphy
 Mr. Reinhardt
 Ambassador Whitney
 General Goodpaster

UK

Prime Minister Macmillan
 Foreign Secretary Lloyd
 Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
 Sir Patrick Dean
 Ambassador Caccia
 Sir Norman Brook

There was some discussion of the plan being developed by the Working Group in Paris as well as the "personal" proposal which Ambassador Grewe had just put before the Working Group.¹ The President expressed himself in favor of the East-West study group envisaged in the American plan and was very emphatic on the impossibility of using the term "confederation" at this stage of any negotiation. It was noted that although the Grewe plan made a concession to the Soviet demand for direct negotiations between East and West Germans, it nevertheless had a built-in condition involving the reestablishment of civil liberties and human rights in the Eastern zone which would make it quite unacceptable to the communists.

Adverting to Berlin, the Prime Minister said that according to the French there were two ways to set about getting a settlement. The one was to take existing rights and make agreed adjustments to them such as establishing the "agency" plan. The other method would be to negotiate a new title to Berlin, possibly with United Nations participation. In this connection, the attitude of the Chancellor with respect to *de facto* recognition was of great importance. Mr. Murphy observed that the Chancellor's reported new position on recognition should open the door to a Soviet concession on the agency issue. The Prime Minister thought that in the short-term the simplest thing might be to follow the first method

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt. The meeting was held at Aspen Lodge. For other accounts of this conversation, see the source note, Document 238.

¹ "Grewe's Plan" had been tabled on March 19 and involved a declaration by West Germany that it would begin discussion with East Germany on reunification and an all-German government if the East German authorities restored human and political rights in East Germany. (Telegram 3462 from Paris, March 19; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1959)

but that in the long-term the position of the West would be better preserved by a new comprehensive agreement.

The President noted that the basic Soviet objective was to get rid of Berlin. He said we had sent some people over to take a look on the ground at exactly how the road, air and rail communications to Berlin looked. So far the morale in the city was good and there were weaknesses in the Soviet position that might tend to make them want to negotiate. Nevertheless, there were more than 300,000 Soviet troops surrounding the city and if we made Berlin a free city, it would be easier for the Russians to violate it than in the present situation. The Prime Minister said the object was not to weaken but to strengthen Berlin.

The President said he would have no objection to our beginning our negotiations on a broad concept for German settlement, but that the immediate objective was to get a "breathing space" and a respectable agreement for the next few years. Perhaps we should not talk too much about what East and West Germany were going to do. What we must find was the best formula to maintain the status quo and give the Soviet Union the necessary face-saving.

The Prime Minister said that everyone was in favor of reunification in principle but the curious situation was that nobody wanted it now, neither the Russians, Adenauer nor the French. (Though he did not say so, he left the clear implication that Britain too did not want it.) Therefore, he concluded, a de facto approach seemed the only feasible one. The President pointed out that when we went to Geneva, we had also been aware of the dangers inherent in the reunification of Germany. Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar thought that if one were to have a long breathing spell, then the problem was to get a settlement for Berlin.

United Nations

The Acting Secretary mentioned the United Nations aspect of the Berlin problem and the possibility of taking the issue to the International Court of Justice. He said the Department's Legal Adviser thought this might be a very useful exercise. Mr. Lloyd observed that on the contrary the Foreign Office Legal Adviser thought we would lose on such a submission. Mr. Lloyd said he had also raised the question with Mr. Gromyko but had gotten no reaction. As far as the United Nations was concerned, Mr. Lloyd thought it best to go to the United Nations after the Russians had taken some overt action. The Acting Secretary thought that we were pretty much in agreement as to how the United Nations could best be used.

240. Memorandum of Conversation

MVW USDEL MC/16

Camp David, March 21, 1959, 11:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Tactics at Foreign Ministers Meeting with Soviets

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
The Acting Secretary
Mr. Murphy
Ambassador Whitney
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Irwin
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

UK

The Prime Minister
Mr. Lloyd
Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
Sir Patrick Dean
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Norman Brook
Mr. Bishop

At 11:10 a.m. Mr. Irwin and Mr. Merchant joined the main group in Aspen. The discussion of the possible resort to the United Nations in connection with the Berlin crisis was concluding.

The President then told the Prime Minister that we favored tabling at the Foreign Ministers meeting in May a comprehensive and detailed plan for all of Germany including reunification, security arrangements and a treaty. It was our concept that within this framework the problem of Berlin could be readily dissolved. The President said that our proposal which was under study in the working group contained, he felt, great appeal which would be an impact on neutral as well as German and Allied public opinion. He felt it was an ambitious proposal and the right way to approach the negotiation and expect to come out with something more modest.

The Prime Minister indicated without committing himself with any precision that he was in general agreement with this approach.

In some further discussion it was agreed that in our presentation at the Foreign Ministers meeting we would stand on our rights and present position with respect to Berlin but put in a comprehensive package plan in which the problem of Berlin would be wrapped.

The conversation then turned to an explanation by the British of their thoughts on security measures in Central Europe. The Prime Minister said there had been much misunderstanding on this. He said that

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. For other accounts of this conversation, see the source note, Document 238.

he "hated the Rapacki Plan." At this point Selwyn Lloyd interjected that the British "loathed disengagement" but feel they must put something forward on security which would take the field away from woolly proposals for disengagement which seemed to find a broad and sympathetic response not only in British public opinion but elsewhere.

The meeting then broke up for luncheon after a brief discussion of the handling of the press and agreement that there would be no formal communiqué issued at the end of the weekend.

241. Memorandum of Conversation

MVW USDEL MC/17

Camp David, March 21, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Contingency Planning for Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
The Acting Secretary
Mr. Quarles
Mr. Murphy
General Twining
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Whitney
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Irwin
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

UK

Prime Minister Macmillan
Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Norman Brook
Sir Patrick Dean
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Bishop

At the President's request, Mr. Irwin outlined the United States contingency plans as presently conceived. Whereupon the President asked whether the British were doing anything comparable. The Prime Minister's reply was to say that they had not been asked, but would do so if General Norstad asked them. There followed a discussion of the best locus for developing tripartite planning in this connection. Mr. Quarles referred to the fact that we had sent a team of qualified people

to "ride the Autobahn" and report the actual facts of the present situation with respect to Soviet and East German procedures so that we might have a completely accurate picture. Mr. Lloyd asked that this team coordinate with the British and French authorities in Germany before returning to Washington so that we might have an agreed tripartite picture of the present situation.

There followed a discussion as to what would constitute interference or obstruction to our access to Berlin. Mr. Quarles observed that the military were awaiting precise instructions on this point. The Prime Minister described the issue as being that of determining whose game keeper was acting. And given the possibility that nothing might happen following a Soviet handover to the East Germans, whether we should consider impersonification or actual obstruction as the breaking point. Mr. Murphy noted that the problem really came with the stamping of documents, which was something to which we would not agree. The Prime Minister summarized his question by asking whether the moment for action came when the East Germans actually would effect some obstruction or when they merely said they had the right to do so. The President said we agreed that we should show papers for the purpose of identification, that we found the issue of stamping more difficult. The Acting Secretary stressed the value of a forthright announcement of our position both as to our juridical rights and what we intended to do as a practical matter immediately upon any Soviet handover to the GDR or the signature of a treaty between them and the Soviet Government.

Sir Frederick noted that there was an obligation on us to keep access open to Berlin for civilian traffic but that no such obligation rested on the GDR. The Prime Minister suggested that the threat to civilian traffic was even more acute than the threat to our military traffic but Sir Anthony Rumbold pointed out that this was not the case, at least under the present announced Soviet policy.

Mr. Irwin said that a problem for contingency planning was whether you went to the United Nations after the first refusal by GDR authorities to let your traffic through on the old basis or whether you tried a second probe to see whether they would support that refusal by force; in other words, whether one wished to create the symbol of force before going to the United Nations or wished to go there before such a symbol of force had been created.

The President said that the Foreign Ministers should be instructed to ascertain what the Soviets really intended to do. He also pointed out that if we were to take any positive action such as blockading the Dardanelles and the Baltic, we would have to have public opinion with us. The Prime Minister again asked whether we acted in the presence of a symbol of authority (paper) or in the presence of a symbol of force (bar-

rier or other physical obstruction). As far as the United Nations was concerned, he thought we should go there as soon as it was clear at a Summit or elsewhere that no progress was possible with the Russians.

242. Editorial Note

The Four-Power Working Group at Paris met from March 9 to 21 to consider the Western position at a conference with the Soviet Union. Martin Hillenbrand led the U.S. Delegation, while Jean Laloy, Patrick Hancock, and Georg von Baudissin, respectively, led the French, British, and West German Delegations.

Following initial discussions, March 9–11, the United States Delegation submitted its basic paper "Elements of a Western Position at a Conference with the Soviets" on March 12. This paper included an estimate of Soviet intentions, Western objectives, tactics, a four-stage proposal for German reunification, and proposals on Berlin and became the basis for the final report of the Working Group. See Document 220.

On March 12 the four delegations also began drafting a reply to the Soviet note of March 2 (see Document 244), but this work was suspended at British insistence on March 14 until Prime Minister Macmillan could visit Washington. During the rest of its sessions the Working Group drafted a report that included six sections devoted to Soviet objectives, Allied objectives, method of unifying Germany, security measures in Europe, future status of a reunified Germany, and Berlin; annexes entitled "Proposal for Phased Plan for German Reunification, European Security, and a German Peace Settlement" and "Elements of an Interim Berlin Settlement"; three supplementary papers that considered Soviet intentions, a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany, and a proposal concerning a preliminary stage of German reunification; and a two-page paper on tactics.

A copy of the report is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1225. Reports on the sessions of the Working Group and the discussion by the North Atlantic Council on March 18 and 19 are *ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/3-959 through 3-2159.

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, March 24, 1959, 6 p.m.

2119. Paris pass USRO.

1. Saw Chancellor today. He told me Ambassador Steel had on March 17 discussed with von Brentano certain points I had raised with Steel re my meeting Adenauer March 13, and latter's report on his private conversations with Macmillan (Embtel 2024).¹ I had been particularly interested in attempting to ascertain from Steel whether PM had in fact committed himself to (1) maintenance status quo for five years as condition precedent to summit; (2) accord summit meetings might be in stages, interspersed with FonMin and expert conferences.

2. Steel had asked London for official British FonOff transcript or memorandum on Bonn talks.

3. Memo dated March 15 had been sent by London to Chancellor, and he read it to me in its entirety. Part pertinent to questions I posed Steel were that FonOff believed understanding had been reached: a) West should seek agreement, possibly through diplomatic channels, that Soviet would not take unilateral action while conferences in progress; b) a summit meeting could lead to other summit meeting as long as no unilateral action taken by Soviets; c) Macmillan felt Soviets would never agree to five year standstill.

4. Chancellor has given instructions to tell British FonOff this memo does not properly correspond with conversations he had privately held with PM (it was evident according Adenauer, PM had not adequately informed FonOff details these talks).

5. Chancellor then read me memo prepared from his own interpreter's notes. During my talk with him on May 13 he had spoken without notes, but there was no substantial difference between what he had then said and his exposition today, except memo disclosed that he, in conversation with PM, had stressed opposition to conferences in face of ultimatum, which would continue to exist unless stipulated that standstill had been assented to by Soviets. Such standstill period should not be limited merely to period covered by conferences, but could extend as long as five years. (Chancellor said he had conceived this idea while conferring with PM.)

Summit meeting, Adenauer told PM, has been Soviet objective for years, and would represent considerable internal success for Khru-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2459. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and Vienna.

¹See footnote 1, Document 219.

shchev. West should not again make mistake of accepting Soviet wishes without exacting suitable counterconcessions.

6. PM had told Adenauer he considered these points constructively made, and would give them serious consideration.

7. Another subject discussed, that Chancellor had not previously mentioned to me, was British-German relations. In this connection PM dwelt on FTA troubles.

8. At conclusion above, I told Chancellor I had clearly understood during our previous interview that he believed he had obtained commitment from PM on proposals for five-year standstill and summit in stages. He was disinclined to answer this and replied with the one word "no".

Adenauer then developed what he called part II of his conversation with me.

1. From press accounts of what had transpired at Camp David British had suggested certain freeze of military force on either side Iron Curtain. These contingents already having nuclear weapons would keep them! Those not having them would not get them.

Chancellor had asked his Ambassador Washington to see Acting Secretary and Merchant to advise him what had really taken place but so far had no answer.

2. Reports from his London Embassy had described PM as having, according to British press, achieved great triumph in bringing UK influence to bear on world policy.

3. Chancellor doubts whether US has agreed to freeze. Hopes not. Subject was never mentioned during PM Bonn visit. Has instructed Ambassador von Herwarth to ask British Foreign Office exactly what were PM's proposals this matter on Washington trip.

4. Under no circumstances, Adenauer emphatically declared, will FedRep Govt agree to any such scheme. Proposition of this kind is senseless and would mean end of NATO. FedRep could not accept deal whereby its forces not equipped with nuclear weapons while others had them. I should at once convey such a message to Acting SecState.

5. Chancellor pessimistically remarked that it seemed to him Western powers were divided as to policy and heading for trouble. Said he had conferred yesterday with Ollenhauer, Carlo Schmid and Erler; even Erler was disturbed over position taken by Brit Govt.

6. No question whatever Adenauer thoroughly disturbed and aroused over what he considers most serious dangers freeze idea.

Bruce

244. Editorial Note

Drafting the Western response to the Soviet note of March 2 began the week following its receipt. The Department of State transmitted its initial draft to Paris in telegram 3267 on March 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/3–659) Three days later the French distributed to the other Western powers a draft along similar lines. (Telegram 3262 from Paris, March 9; *ibid.*, 762.00/3–959) Correlation of these two drafts and suggestions by the British and West Germans was undertaken by the Four-Power Working Group in Paris, March 12–14 (see Document 242), but work on the drafts was suspended at British insistence until Prime Minister Macmillan had visited Washington. During this visit the Prime Minister and President Eisenhower agreed on language regarding a Summit Conference and the agenda for a Foreign Ministers meeting.

The draft text was then taken up again by the Four-Power Working Group for agreement by the French and West Germans. Final agreement was reached by the Working Group on March 23, and the text was then discussed for 2 days by the North Atlantic Council. Documentation on the drafting of the reply, including the several drafts mentioned above, is in Department of State, Central Files 396.1 and 762.00.

At 10:30 a.m. (2:30 a.m. in Washington) on March 26 Ambassador Thompson delivered to Foreign Minister Gromyko the United States reply to the Soviet note of March 2. The note proposed that the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union convene at Geneva on May 11 to consider questions relating to Germany including a peace treaty and Berlin. The purpose of the Foreign Ministers meeting would be to reach agreements or in any case to narrow the differences between the two sides in preparation for a Summit conference later in the summer.

“On this understanding and as soon as developments in the Foreign Ministers meeting justify holding a Summit Conference, the United States Government would be ready to participate in such a conference.”

The note continued that the United States recognized the interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia in certain issues that might arise at the conference, but stated that “at least at the outset” only the four powers responsible for Germany should be involved. For text of the United States reply, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pages 638–639; for text of the British reply, see *Cmd. 719*, pages 9–10; for text of the West Germany reply, see *Moskau Bonn*, page 539; for text of the French reply, see *Le Monde*, March 27, 1959, page 12.

On March 30 the Soviet Union replied to the Western notes, accepting the place and date for the Foreign Ministers meeting. Ambassador Thompson transmitted the note in telegram 1966 from Moscow,

March 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/3-3059) For the text sent to the British, see Embree, *Soviet Union and the German Question*, pages 154-155; for the text to the West Germans, see *Moskau Bonn*, page 540; for the text sent to the French, see *Le Monde*, April 1, 1959, page 4.

245. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 26, 1959, 9 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President Nixon
Secretary Herter
Secretary Quarles
General Twining
Mr. McCone
Mr. Allen Dulles
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Gordon Gray
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

Mr. Gray opened by explaining to the President that the State and Defense Departments were coordinating on a couple of subjects, such as reunification of Germany, European security, and contingency planning. The purpose of requesting this meeting is to obtain additional guidance in preparation for the foreign ministers talks to begin on March 31st.

Secretary Herter then outlined the one problem in contingency planning which concerns the group, namely, provision for flying over 10,000 feet in the corridors. If we would deliberately fly above this altitude, a measure to which we have previously claimed the right but not exercised, the fact of maintaining a fighter alert for protection of the aircraft might well result in an undesired opening of hostilities. General Twining added further explanation that our normal procedure is to fly at 6,000 and 8,000 feet. We always have fighters ready for scrambling to

protect our air traffic. Therefore, should difficulties result from this venture, we could possibly have an incident. He further stated that action on the part of the Communists of a minor nature, such as buzzing or flying alongside our aircraft, happens continually and it creates no problem for us. We do not regard any Communist action short of firing across the bow as a hostile act. Mr. Quarles added that while there is a chance of a protest, there is a good chance that this flight might go unnoticed. Polish transports come in at 25,000 feet. The use of a jet or turbo-prop aircraft would give us a legitimate reason for this reversal of procedures. He added the operating factor that the Soviets are not particularly alert in their four-power airway control center. As a matter of fact, the Soviet member is normally either intoxicated or violently hung over. This factor might well permit the filing of a flight plan about [above] 10,000 feet without Soviet protest.

The President was highly critical of the actions which have brought about this situation. The fact of our having observed this 10,000-foot ceiling gives this alleged Soviet restriction the stature of a status quo. We therefore place pressure upon ourselves when we bring this matter to a test case. He is concerned over the possibility of alarming the world. However, on balance, he granted permission to send in a jet aircraft over 10,000 feet, using as a rationale the argument that it needs the additional altitude. Mr. Herter stated that he just wanted the President to know of the potential difficulty.

Mr. Herter then explained a rather gloomy eventuality which has come to our attention with regard to the four-power working group that functioned in Paris. The atmosphere has not been conducive to the most constructive work. This has been due to a series of peculiar circumstances with regard to the other nations represented on this group. In the case of the Germans, von Brentano appears to be somewhat in disfavor, and the Germans in the group found it difficult to determine exactly whose lead to follow within their own camp. The French delegation took a practical and realistic stand in this group, but they fear de Gaulle and are uncertain as to whether their stand will be backed up. The British have been practically silent, pending the outcome of the Macmillan visit to the U.S. Accordingly, Mr. Herter said we will not learn much until the foreign ministers meeting here in Washington. The President agreed that since many of the delegates to the foreign ministers meeting are en route, there is little that can be done to rectify this situation until they arrive here.

Mr. Herter then referred to the U.S. draft of a phased plan for reunification of Germany.¹ This includes some proposals which impinge on the interests of the Department of Defense. They are anxious

¹ Document 242.

not to address any military disengagement arrangements without corresponding political agreements resulting in an over-all settlement. The President stated that this has been our position for six years, that we can unify Germany only under the umbrella of a general agreement. Mr. Herter agreed that our four-stage plan does represent an over-all plan. To address Berlin by itself would be a retreat from this position. The President reiterated that our goal is for settlement of the German problem through a peace treaty with all of Germany. This would be followed by disarmament negotiations. To the President's inquiry as to where the U.S. draft position will be tabled, Mr. Merchant and Mr. Herter indicated that it will be presented at the May 11th foreign ministers meeting,² at which time the Western powers should table their comprehensive Western position. For the time being, in our March 31st meeting with the Western foreign ministers, we will deal primarily with principles rather than details of implementation.

Mr. Herter then reviewed the schedule of action which includes the Western foreign ministers meeting March 31–April 1, the meeting of the NATO Council April 2–4, the reconvening of the working group in early April, to complete its work by April 20, and subsequent consideration by the Western governments on April 27, all culminating in the molding of our position for the foreign ministers meeting of May 11th.

Mr. Gray then asked Mr. Herter to outline the decisions we hope to reach this next week. Mr. Herter answered that our primary problem is that of the relationship of the GDR to the Soviets. The American position is that we will deal with the GDR at check points only with an acknowledged agency relationship between them and the Soviets. Otherwise, we insist on a status quo. The British, on the other hand, would like to see a new contractual agreement between the occupying powers and the Germans. This contractual agreement would maintain all of our current rights but waive occupational status as such. This surprised the President a little bit. He had understood that the British desired only an amendment or codicil. However, he admitted that our viewpoint on this matter is not vital if we maintain essentially our same pre-1959 rights with a couple of amendments and with the name of a new contractual agreement.

Mr. Quarles stated that he had been surprised when, at the Macmillan talks, he had learned that the 1949 agreement³ merely reverted to our pre-blockade status, which had been expressed in extremely vague

² In their notes on March 26 (see Document 244) the Western powers proposed that the Foreign Ministers meeting begin on May 11.

³ For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.

terms. Mr. Quarles suggested that this fact would argue in favor of a completely new codification of our rights. The President, backed up by Mr. Merchant, disagreed with the impression that the rights as spelled out in the pre-1949 status had been vague. The President's understanding, in which Mr. Merchant concurred, was that our rights of unhindered access were quite clear in those arrangements. Mr. Merchant added, however, that the matter of how to exercise those rights had not been adequately spelled out.

At this point Mr. Dulles brought up the question of our views with regard to the rights of commercial traffic. This is a most vital point, in his opinion, since a garrison lift as such would be extremely easy to maintain. The President stated that there had been little provision for commercial traffic in any agreements. No need had been visualized for such a provision at the time of agreement. The de facto usage by the West Berliners of the roads other than the one agreed autobahn access route was a matter which had become sanctified only through practice, in a manner somewhat similar to the way in which our 10,000 altitude ceiling had become sanctified. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the 1949 agreement reaffirmed the right of the passage of commercial traffic, but the President reminded him that this had applied only to the main access route. Mr. Dulles said that he did not recommend bringing this matter up, but felt we should keep it in mind.

The President then called attention to his understanding of the British concern with regard to interference on access routes. They fear, not an abrupt action in which the GDR would be placed in a position of making the first overt move, but rather a foot-dragging type of interference with the routes. All agreed.

There was some discussion then of the President's schedule, in which Mr. Herter expressed the hope of seeing the President prior to the March 31 foreign ministers meeting. Mr. Gray indicated that in meetings between State and Defense, the matters that must move to agreement will be identified. Probably a small group will meet with the President either Easter Sunday, March 29, or Monday evening March 30.

The President then asked for opinions on the subject of the efficacy of the four-power working group since they have had difficulties up to this time. He questioned how well they will perform when they meet again in April. In the discussion which followed, it was concluded that the difficulties which have beset the four-power working group up to this time will be largely overcome by the time they meet again. In addition, they will have the benefit of additional guidance stemming from the meeting of the foreign ministers. The President then directed that we

make a study of the history of the four-power working group and from that study identify the items on which we must reach decision. We should also identify what our proposal has been on each, even though those proposals have not been commented on satisfactorily by the other powers. The results should be studied by State and Defense. Mr. Merchant assured the President that a paper is already in existence which does just this, and it is being sent this afternoon to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for study.⁴ The purpose of this paper is a briefing for Mr. Herter for the foreign ministers meeting. Mr. Gray added that the working group had actually identified about fourteen areas to be considered.

Mr. Quarles then brought up the matter of a zone of limited armaments. He admitted that he had seen no cables to this effect, but he had read the press conference conducted by de Gaulle in the morning paper.⁵ It appeared to Mr. Quarles that de Gaulle had opposed measures on which Macmillan had staked his political fate. The President remarked that de Gaulle is in a poor position to play the star supporter of NATO (referring to the declared intention of withdrawing the fleet from NATO command in time of war). Mr. Quarles, however, added that on this particular matter of thinning out forces, he agrees with de Gaulle in opposing the idea. While not disagreeing with this viewpoint, the President pointed out that he had discussed with Macmillan the virtues of finding some way of implementing a mutual inspection system if only as a gesture to the world. Something of this sort might represent a start.

Here the Vice President inserted the impressions he had received from a conversation at a dinner the other evening, primarily from Representative McCormack. Mr. McCormack had expressed the view that any form of disengagement such as proposed by the Rapaki Plan would be unacceptable. However, some proposal regarding the "freezing" of forces in Germany might be considered. The President agreed and mentioned to Mr. Merchant that in his position paper, which the President had referred to before, we should show some flexibility, and consider not only our optimum position, but also a possible fallback. He then mentioned in passing once more that the news with regard to the ineffectuality of the working group had been most disappointing. Mr. Herter assured the President that this was not the fault of the U.S. delegation.

Mr. McCone then inserted a point on the matter of reunification of Germany. Based on the extensive time which he himself had spent in Germany in a private capacity, he had become convinced that the attitude of the Germans is that the problem of German reunification is

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ For text of de Gaulle's press conference on March 25, see de Gaulle, *Statements*, pp. 41-51.

theirs. In this regard, the German businessmen have shown much concern over the attitude of the Adenauer government. (He mentioned a Mr. Beitz, General Manager of Krupp.) Mr. McCone feels that the recent flexibility shown by Adenauer is the result of pressure from German business. To this Mr. Herter mentioned the proposal which has been made by the West German government.⁶ It bears strong resemblance to the U.S. "four-stage" proposal, but the conditions which it lays down are so stringent as to require the GDR to be in the Western camp in order to implement it. The President agreed that the series of "provided thats" leaves no chance for German acceptance. Mr. McCone repeated his impression that the Germans regard their reunification as their own private problem. He recommends that the position of the Germans in the entire matter be kept "out in front" during negotiations. If von Brentano is now being forced out of his job, Mr. McCone feels that this eventuality is due to pressures exerted by German business. Mr. Dulles interjected the opinion that the attitude which Mr. McCone had witnessed is not universally held in Germany. The President repeated that our position has consistently favored free elections in Germany. In this we have learned from the experience of the Versailles Treaty, in which conditions were imposed on Germany from without. Therefore, our initial steps should point to some progress toward the place where the [8 lines of source text not declassified].

The President completed the discussion by reiterating our desire to create a good atmosphere for the Germans to work in, which would not be conducive to the rise of another Hitler. Unfortunately, we are still, after fourteen years, in the position of conquerors.

There was then a brief discussion on the subject of participation of the Poles and Czechs and Italians in the May 11 conference. The President felt that if we admit them initially in the position of mere observers, we are asking for trouble from them. He felt, however, that they might be brought in at a later stage. Mr. Herter stated that what the Russians are really looking for is the principle of equality of representation.

There was then another brief discussion of the working group in which the view was expressed that this body will find much better results with the benefit of the guidance coming from the next foreign ministers meeting.

The President then conducted a brief discussion with Mr. Herter on the subject of the NATO festivities celebrating the tenth anniversary, to be held early in April. He expressed some annoyance at the degree to which he has been required to participate personally.

⁶ See footnote 1, Document 239.

The President terminated the meeting by requesting State and Defense to cooperate closely with Mr. Gray in the formulation of our position paper for the March 31 foreign ministers meeting. He expressed the possibility of making that paper a formal NSC record.

John S.D. Eisenhower
G

CONFERENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED
KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND THE SOVIET
UNION AT GENEVA MAY 11–AUGUST 5, 1959

MARCH–MAY 1959: PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE

246. Memorandum of Conversation

USDEL/MC/19

Washington, March 31, 1959, 11 a.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

APRIL 2–4, 1959

SUBJECT

Negotiations with the Soviets on Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side

The Acting Secretary
Mr. Murphy, G
Mr. Merchant, EUR
Mr. McBride, WE

French Side

M. Couve de Murville, Foreign
Minister
M. Alphand, French Ambassador
M. Lucet, French Minister
M. de Beaumarchais, Chief of
Cabinet to the Foreign Minister

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville opened the meeting by inquiring regarding the Secretary's health. He then noted that it now appeared we would be going to Geneva on May 11.¹ The Acting Secretary said that we were studying the differences in the Soviet replies to the different Western powers. He noted that in the reply to the U.S. the Soviets appeared to take the summit meeting for granted whereas in the reply to the French there were certain different shadings. The Foreign Minister agreed. He said that the point regarding Poland and Czechoslovakia

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Confidential. Drafted by McBride and approved by Herter on April 20. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 3645, March 31 at 8:23 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/3–3159) During the meeting Herter and Couve de Murville also discussed Spanish membership in NATO, tripartite talks, Algeria, SEATO, and East-West trade. Memoranda of these conversations are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1226.

¹ See Document 244.

participating was still not clarified so he assumed that we would spend a week at the Foreign Ministers' meeting discussing it. Couve remarked on the amiable tone of this Soviet note. He concluded that the Soviets wished to have talks and they were therefore pleased by the tone of our last notes and by our having made a definite offer. He remarked that he had crossed on the plane with Mr. Hammarskjöld² and that the latter said he was pleased with the tone of the last French note.

The Foreign Minister said that the principal difference between the French and British positions on substance was that the British believe that we should be flexible at the start of negotiations with the Soviets whereas the French believe we should be tough at the start. The Acting Secretary said that we could discuss these problems at the tripartite meetings this afternoon and that the first point of discussion would be the French comments³ which had been submitted yesterday. Mr. Murphy said that we hope to have a U.S. redraft by 2:45 this afternoon. He added that the new French text had been helpful.

Couve stated that with regard to contingency planning we had been discussing details for the past three or four months without any agreement on a firm common policy. He said that admittedly it was difficult to plan in advance. However, the basic principle we should enunciate is the demonstration of our manifest will to maintain our access rights to Berlin. We must say that we must have the will not to be blocked by Soviet actions. Furthermore, demonstration of our will should not be dependent on the UN since recourse to the UN would merely delay any action. The Acting Secretary agreed a self-imposed blockade was unacceptable. He said we should make clear that if unacceptable conditions were imposed involving the East Germans we would send a force to Berlin of such degree as SACEUR believed necessary. We must also determine at what point no further negotiations were possible. In all events we must demonstrate that we have the will to maintain our rights. The Acting Secretary agreed with Couve's reasoning and said it was of course clear that we must show manifest will to maintain our rights. However, there was also a question of timing and of what overt steps we should take in the military field to show this will and at what point we should establish a SAC air alert, etc. He said we

² Hammarskjöld was returning from Moscow where he discussed the Berlin situation with Khrushchev on March 25 and 26. On March 31 Lodge reported that Hammarskjöld had briefed him on the discussion and stated that Khrushchev had assured him that there would be no unilateral action on Berlin until the possibilities of negotiation had been fully explored. (Telegram 840 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-3159) Couve de Murville elaborated more on his conversation with Hammarskjöld in the quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting on April 1; see Document 250.

³ The French comments have not been found, but they are described further in Document 247.

were also considering the possibility of a naval blockade of the Black and Baltic Seas.

Mr. Murphy noted that we might at some point have recourse to the Security Council. The Acting Secretary said that if we went to the UN at all it should be presumably after the Soviets had granted full sovereignty to the East Germans and concluded a peace treaty with them, thus altering the status quo. Couve thought that the Western Powers might report to the UN under Article 51⁴ since this was undoubtedly a situation giving concern but that we should not submit a case to the UN. The Acting Secretary said that until such time as we might or might not decide to have recourse to the UN we should make clear our intent to exercise our rights in Berlin.

The French Foreign Minister said that the Soviets were unlikely to take any drastic measures during the long negotiating period on which we were now embarked. The danger would be great however after the failure of a summit meeting. The danger at that point would be so great that we would be bound to take measures. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Tactically, he thought it important to show our determination at the start.

The Acting Secretary agreed that this was extremely important. He also thought we must try to avoid the problem whereby we have the threat hanging over our heads during negotiations with the Soviets of the conclusion of a Soviet-East German peace treaty.

The Acting Secretary reverted to the Working Group paper⁵ on Germany and asked if there were any points to be made on this now. Couve said he did not believe so although much preparatory work remained. He thought disengagement was the principal problem. He said he was unable to ascertain what is in the minds of those who favor disengagement and he considered it a very vague concept. The Acting Secretary said that this point was not clarified at the Camp David talks.⁶ Couve said that the British had been vague in their recent talks with the French in Paris⁷ too and as far as he could see had been precise only with the press. Mr. Merchant said that he thought perhaps the United Kingdom might at a later date reveal a desire to break the disengagement element alone out of a package proposed allegedly in order to relieve tensions. However, this point had not been reached yet. Mr. Murphy

⁴ Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter U.N. member states reported measures taken in self-defense, but these measures did not affect the authority of the Security Council to take actions it deemed necessary to maintain or restore peace.

⁵ See Document 242.

⁶ See Documents 235–240.

⁷ See Document 213.

said that we were opposed to disengagement but might consider some thinning out proposal as part of a package. Furthermore it was unclear whether we were really talking about a thinning out proposal or a freeze of the status quo. Couve said that for the Foreign Ministers' meeting we were left with an agenda relating to Germany only and he wondered how disengagement fitted into such an agenda. He would not propose any disengagement scheme. The Soviets wanted to talk about a peace treaty and Berlin, and accordingly he did not see how disengagement arose in this context. He thought that the British idea was to present a disengagement scheme to the Soviets as a trade for the settlement of the Berlin problem. He thought that this implied the neutralization of Germany, and concluded that this matter should be discussed further in the Working Group. The Acting Secretary said that we did not intend to raise the disengagement question. Furthermore we had discussed a thinning out proposal only as part of an over-all political settlement of the problem and not as a trading point. Couve pointed out his belief that there would not be any general political settlement. The Acting Secretary said that, however, we should nonetheless have an over-all plan to present to the Soviets perhaps including proposals of this type but that it should be made clear that this was a nonseparable package.

Ambassador Alphand inquired regarding the British idea of a "new and better title" for Berlin. Mr. Merchant said that this was also rather unclear and was clear only on the point that the British intended to substitute a contractual right in Berlin for the present arrangement. Couve said that this was apparently envisaged under the aegis of the United Nations. Mr. Murphy said that it was also apparently limited to East Berlin only and not to Eastern Germany. Couve said that he thought we should maintain our present title which was both clear and satisfactory. Furthermore he was afraid that a new title might involve a greater role for the UN which he opposed. Mr. Murphy said that we agreed and did not see why we should weaken our present clear rights. The Acting Secretary said that furthermore any solution must be acceptable to the German people. Couve said that we would probably have a very difficult discussion on this point and that he thought it was a mistake to accept something dangerous at the outset. The Acting Secretary agreed saying that the Soviets had taken the initiative in upsetting the status quo and he did not see why we should make concessions at the beginning. Couve agreed that we had not asked for any change in the present situation. The Acting Secretary said that the British apparently had in mind the consideration that East Germany can squeeze the economic life out of Berlin by a policy of harassment and that they therefore felt concessions might be necessary in order to preserve the status quo in Berlin.

Couve reported on Hammarskjöld's impressions in Moscow. He said that the UN Secretary General said Khrushchev had repeatedly stated that he did not intend to menace or threaten the West but merely wished to negotiate. He did not consider any of his recent notes as an ultimatum. His policy was to consolidate the GDR and Berlin as accordingly a secondary problem. However, Berlin as presently constituted represented a weak point for the GDR. Therefore this was not a problem per se. Hammarskjöld concluded that any Berlin solution must therefore not be such as to prevent the consolidation of the GDR. The Acting Secretary concluded that from the tactical point of view the Soviets must present a convincing case before we should make any concessions on Berlin.

In response to a question from Couve as to how long the Foreign Ministers' meeting might last, Mr. Merchant guessed perhaps a month. Couve said he thought that a summit meeting would probably be shorter. The Acting Secretary said it would certainly be shorter in so far as the President's participation was concerned but that the Vice President could replace him if necessary. They agreed that it seemed almost inevitable that a summit meeting would end with directions being given to Foreign Ministers to implement certain questions as had been done in 1955. Couve said that he thought the idea of holding periodic summit meetings was a good method for insuring our having a crisis every six months. The Acting Secretary pointed out that the U.S. system of Government was very awkward for this idea of holding recurrent summit meetings. He mentioned the Congressional problems involved as well.

247. Memorandum of Conversation

USDEL/MC/6

Washington, March 31, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

APRIL 2–4 1959

SUBJECT

New French Paper on Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. D.S. Laskey

United States

Acting Secretary Herter
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
Assistant Secretary Merchant, EUR
Mr. W.N. Dale, BNA

Mr. Lloyd stated that the new French formulation concerning military aspects of contingency planning¹ was the opposite of what the French had proposed in January [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Mr. Herter said that what the French are driving at is for our military experts to plan now what we would do militarily in case negotiations fail.

Mr. Lloyd added that the wording of the French formulation does not worry him but Ambassador Alphand's interpretation of it cannot be accepted. The Foreign Secretary expressed his belief that the minute worked out at Camp David,² namely that we will decide what to do militarily in light of the situation as it develops, is the best course. Mr. Herter reviewed a number of steps which the U.S. has in mind for this contingency, such as certain types of mobilization, action in the UN and other means of alerting public opinion and obtaining support for the Western position. He did not see any great difference in wording between our own agreed minute and the French proposal. Mr. Murphy reviewed the substance of the French paper and concluded that its tone was more positive than ours. Mr. Lloyd said he was all for firmness even "from those with only families left in Germany". He said he wanted to ask the French what the change in their attitude since January actually is

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1226. Secret. Drafted by Dale and approved by Herter on April 13. Also discussed were the draft report to NATO and a U.S. high altitude flight to Berlin. Memoranda of these conversations are *ibid*.

¹ The French formulation is described in Documents 246 and 248.

² A copy of the agreed U.S.-U.K. minute is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214.

and what their new paper really means. Mr. Herter said that he agreed that this should be done since it is important not to let language go with different interpretations. Mr. Lloyd reiterated that there can be no automatic decision now to take measures later on [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Mr. Merchant said that he liked the French language which went beyond our agreed minute and suggested that we ascertain whether Couve de Murville agrees with our interpretation of it. It was agreed that the French would be sounded out accordingly.

248. Memorandum of Conversation

USDEL/MC/15

Washington, March 31, 1959.

TRIPARTITE-QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS

SUBJECT

Minutes of Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting of March 31, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Acting Secretary
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Burgess
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Berding
Mr. Irwin
Mr. Knight
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Timmons
Mr. McFarland

France

Maurice Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Charles Lucet
Jean Laloy
Pierre Baraduc
Jacques de Beaumarchais
Jean-Claude Winckler

UK

Selwyn Lloyd
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Frank Roberts
Lord Hood
Peter Hope
Anthony Rumbold
Patrick Hancock
Denis Laskey
John Drinkall
Donald Logan

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McFarland and approved by Herter on April 15. The meeting was held at the Department of State. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2307, April 1. (*Ibid.*, CF 1226)

The Acting Secretary opened the meeting by welcoming the British and French Foreign Ministers and their staffs. He declared that the two principal tasks of the meetings today and tomorrow would be to review the Working Group Report and to consider the responsibility of the three Foreign Ministers to report to the NATO Foreign Ministers on Contingency Planning. Contingency Planning had been the subject of much discussion. Ambassador Alphand yesterday had presented a new draft¹ which might be the subject of discussions here. There was the further problem of how to divide up the reports to be made to NATO. He asked if the other Foreign Ministers had any general remarks they wished to make.

When neither Couve nor Lloyd had indicated a desire to make such remarks the Acting Secretary said that perhaps it would be better if we start with the Contingency Planning paper to be sure we are all in agreement on the meaning of the words used and the reasoning behind them.

Couve referred to the 18 page Contingency Planning paper² considered by the Tripartite group in Washington (Deputy Under Secretary Murphy and the British and French Ambassadors) and noted that it was essential that we know what we want and what our policy is. It was a question of high and important policy. If our convoys are blocked en-route to Berlin, did we want to take action? If we want to start something then the paper must express our will to take action. He recognized that it was difficult to take a decision in advance of actual developments since we do not know exactly what our position may be at the time. The situation represents a test of our will. From that point of view the draft given us a week or two ago³ is not very clear. It says if our probe doesn't succeed then we will suspend traffic and take certain steps which, however, will not prevent our continuing to be stopped.

He referred to paras. 9 and 10 of the contingency paper and said that we should change the wording to allow us freedom to act to restore our freedom of passage. This did not imply anything which would prevent us taking all necessary steps to inform public opinion or report to the UN. We shouldn't say something in the paper which results in our suspending traffic and leaves us no way to resume it.

Mr. Lloyd commented that he had just seen the new wording. He agreed with the position of the French Gov't as stated in January. He read from the French statement of that period. That statement was in complete accord with British views. The British position was still the

¹ See footnote 2, Document 247.

² Not found. The agreed contingency planning paper is printed as Document 255.

³ Presumably the draft referred to in footnote 2 above.

same. If the new paper was not a departure from Alphant's position in January the British agreed to it.

The Acting Secretary noted that Mr. Murphy had suggested changing "whether" to "when". There was no US objection to the Alphant formula, assuming there is agreement among us all as to what it means.

Couve stated that the paper really means:

- a. we want to maintain communications;
- b. we will take all necessary measures to do so;
- c. a final decision will be made on the foregoing basis and in accordance with existing circumstances.

Lloyd agreed with French statement.

The Acting Secretary said that we would like to see para. 9 left in.

Couve insisted that he did not like the statement in para. 9 that "allies will temporarily suspend traffic".

The Acting Secretary agreed that the statement could be strengthened. Actually the military effect of suspension would not be important since our garrisons have plenty of supplies.

Lloyd noted that the wording looks like we are willingly accepting blockade. This, of course, was not so, but de facto we would be stopped while considering what to do next.

The Acting Secretary commented that this was understood. From a practical and military point of view, we would want to take time to get ready for future action rather than resort to shooting. We would be trying to get public opinion on our side while intensifying our military preparations. These courses of action go on independently.

Couve noted, however, that when suspension had been accepted, it became very hard to resume movement.

Lloyd asked if we needed to refer to suspension of traffic, and suggested that the phrase "will temporarily suspend traffic" be taken out. He asked Couve if this made the para. more palatable. Couve replied affirmatively. He then noted that if we go to the UN before taking action ourselves, we tie our hands. This was a very dangerous procedure.

Mr. Murphy remarked that there was nothing mandatory about going to the UN. Lloyd suggested inserting the phrase "One possibility is that" (matter could be taken to the UN). He did not in the least subscribe to the necessity of going to the UN. He didn't like to contemplate that organization getting hold of our problems. He suggested language "perhaps to the General Assembly"⁴ If we got a favorable vote (say 9 to 2) in the Security Council we might not find it necessary to

⁴Ellipses in the source text.

go to the GA at all. It was not quite clear how para. 10 would read if changes to para. 9 were accepted.

Couve said it was difficult to know what to do until the time comes. It was much more difficult to take action later than on the spot. Whatever does happen will be only after a Summit Conference.

The Acting Secretary agreed. A first indication of failure will be when the Soviet Government signs a separate Peace Treaty with GDR.

Couve remarked that in any case we should make such advance preparations as we can.

Lloyd asked if he meant we should not exclude some immediate reaction? Did he feel we might be committing ourselves to endless talk? This was one thing which ought to be examined—how were we going to play out our hand?

Couve replied that the paper should provide that if our probe doesn't succeed then the three Governments may take immediate action or act only after efforts to win over public opinion and such other intermediate steps as they may deem necessary.

Lloyd noted that the document had originally been drawn up with a May 27 deadline in mind. The situation was now somewhat different with a Foreign Ministers meeting and a Summit Conference in view which virtually everyone now regarded as inevitable. He did not wish to exclude other possibilities in the new situation.

The Acting Secretary noted that para 9 had been corrected as indicated.

Lloyd asked what the phrase in para 10 "further to" meant. Did it mean "further to 8"?

A general conference among individual delegations followed for several minutes. The Acting Secretary then resumed, raising the problem of the contingency planning report to NATO. There had been some study yesterday in our own group as to how much detail to go into with NATO in view of the very real interest of NATO in the whole matter. He noted that this was a very sensitive paper.

Lloyd declared that there were two possible ways to handle the paper, either on the basis that it was going to leak or that it wasn't. He then made a special plea for keeping all conversations confidential if at all possible. Both the Acting Secretary and Couve agreed to the necessity for the tightest possible security measures. The Acting Secretary asked whether it was preferable not to have the report deposited in NATO.

Lloyd suggested depositing the report only with the Secretary General of NATO. The Acting Secretary suggested that with regard to taking the matter to the Council, it would be appropriate if either Lloyd or Couve made the presentation. Ambassador Bruce joined the meeting at

this point.⁵ The report to the NATO Council should give some background, putting Soviet probes throughout the world in their proper context.

There was discussion at Mr. Lloyd's initiative of the agenda of the NATO 10th anniversary meeting. It was noted that Berlin would be high on the agenda of the NATO Foreign Ministers, under the general heading of The International Situation in the Light of Current Developments.

It was decided that Mr. Lloyd would make one statement to the NATO Foreign Ministers and Couve the other, but the decision would be withheld until tomorrow as to which of the two Ministers would report on Contingency Planning and which on the Four Power Working Group agreed report.

The Acting Secretary then asked for reactions, if any, to the Soviet note. Lloyd declared that he had "reacted" to it three times at three different airports. He had said that it was satisfactory.

The Acting Secretary asked if the Soviet reply to the French note had been the same as given on the ticker. Couve replied affirmatively. The gist was that if everybody was a "good boy" everything would be all right. He handed the Acting Secretary a copy. The latter noted that the implication of the Soviet reply was that if the Foreign Ministers conference failed, there was all the more reason to have a Summit Conference. He then read aloud a brief draft statement to the press to be issued today by the three Foreign Ministers giving their reaction to the Soviet note. The statement was discussed and later agreed upon by the quadripartite meeting.⁶

Couve raised the question of participation of other countries. He noted that our last notes to the USSR had sought to exclude the Poles and Czechs from the Foreign Ministers meeting and had implied that if the Russians insisted on the Poles and Czechs participating, we obviously would want others, above all Italy to participate. He assumed therefore, that if the Russians insisted on Polish and Czech participation we would then insist on Italian participation.

The Acting Secretary noted that the Soviets would immediately counter with a demand that Rumania be included. Lloyd declared that the British view was that it would be best to have only the Four Powers with German advisers. If the Poles and Czechs attend as observers then

⁵ Bruce, who was in the United States March 29–April 7 for consultations, met with the President from 2:47 to 3:27 p.m. In his diary Bruce noted that the President "affirmed his belief that the determination to use nuclear power, if necessary, to maintain our position there [in Berlin], was the best way to influence the Soviets to be reasonable." (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

⁶ For text of this statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 639–640.

Italy should be offered the same status and left to decide whether it wishes to accept. If the Poles and Czechs attend as full members, we must have Italy even if it means bringing in Rumania.

The Acting Secretary noted that we had been approached also by the Dutch and the Belgians. Lloyd noted that this had been discussed last year with NATO which had agreed that Italy should be represented. The Italians said they are going to have IRBM's and therefore ought to be represented. Couve noted that the Soviets already knew about Italy's demands. Mr. Murphy stated that the Soviets didn't seem to be pressing very hard. Lloyd remarked that perhaps we can all get off the hook. The Acting Secretary declared we should avoid a discussion again in NATO if we could. Couve remarked that this would be difficult to avoid in the NATO ministerial meeting.

The Acting Secretary asked if there was any further business to take up before the 4:45 meeting. Discussion of the wording of the statement to the press was resumed. Mr. Lloyd remarked that he hoped this would be the only "Pabulum" for the press during the entire session. He asked for agreement that there not be a leak of every word to the press. The Acting Secretary remarked that a public posture of unity was one of the most essential points to be borne in mind. Lloyd didn't want to tell anything to the press and Couve agreed. After conferring with Mr. Berding, the Acting Secretary remarked that he felt we should give the press something every day. It needn't be substantive.

Lloyd returned to Contingency Planning. He wondered whether the para. beginning on middle of page 2 of the report to NATO⁷ with "A more crucial phase" was precisely consistent with the formulation on which there had been previous agreement? He was not quite clear as to what it meant. He asked if the reference to limited military force referred to the "Scout Car" concept (i.e. a probe with one or more lightly armored vehicles). Mr. Irwin replied that the Scout Car concept or other means might be inferred. Lloyd agreed that the Soviets (and/or GDR) must be put in the position where they have to shoot to stop us. But he did not agree to sending tanks after Scout Cars. The para. was not clear. The Acting Secretary explained that if the Soviets (GDR) closed the barrier we would open it and attempt to go through. Lloyd agreed that this interpretation was acceptable. He then referred to the question of flights over 10,000 feet. He understood the US had sent in a flight several days ago at 25,000 feet to assert our right of passage at that altitude.⁸ He

⁷ A copy of this four-page report, April 1, which traced contingency planning since November 1958, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1227.

⁸ The flight had been made on March 27. On April 4 the Soviet Union protested the use of the air corridor above 10,000 feet and on April 13 the United States rejected the protest. For texts of the Soviet note and the U.S. response, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 4, 1959, pp. 632–633. Additional documentation on the flight is in Department of State, Central File 762B.5411.

understood that it had been accompanied by Soviet fighters. Was there an intention to make such flights again?

The Acting Secretary gave some background on the question. We had voluntarily refrained from flights over 10,000 feet. The Soviets have said flights over 10,000 feet are made at our own risk. When it came to planning a garrison airlift the Air Force had noted that the types of planes to be used needed to fly over 10,000 feet for maximum operating efficiency. The Air Force wanted to establish this as normal procedure, not tied exclusively to a garrison airlift. The need to fly over 10,000 feet was based on the characteristics of individual planes. Planes of other countries are flying above 10,000 with impunity.

He noted that Soviet fighters had flown within ten feet of our C-130 and that we had protested this dangerous practice.⁹ We had planned to make another such flight today. Mr. Irwin (Defense) noted that we planned to continue such flights but only under conditions of unlimited visibility.

Lloyd expressed his feeling about our preparatory measures by wondering aloud whether they shouldn't have been cleared with our Allies. Now our right had been asserted, what was the point of going on? We have been trying to put the Soviets on the spot in negotiations. Were we now trying to create an incident which would make negotiations impossible? We have had a position of being reasonable people. Do we want to provoke an incident possibly resulting in a fatal accident? We wouldn't want to go to a meeting if American flyers had just been killed. He was not questioning either our right to fly or to assert this right. We had accomplished this, however.

The Acting Secretary declared that he appreciated having Mr. Lloyd's views and declared that the question was under consideration here. Couve asked about the Soviet reply to our protest in BASC. The Acting Secretary replied that the Soviets had said we had no right to fly over 10,000 feet. Couve asked if this was a military cargo plane. Would garrison airlift planes have to fly over 10,000 feet? The Acting Secretary replied affirmatively. Lloyd remarked that there may be a genuine accident but it would automatically become an incident. The Acting Secretary stated that we felt the introduction of new planes was a valid reason to make the flights. Mr. Murphy noted that the provocation was on the other side.

Couve replied that if you don't go on you accept the Soviet position that you have no right to do so. Mr. Murphy asked if Mr. Lloyd would feel better if we sent fighter escort with planes. Lloyd replied that he did

⁹ A copy of the protest, made on March 28, was transmitted in telegram 2160 from Bonn, March 28. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/3-2859)

not understand the purpose of continuing the exercise. Did we want an incident or didn't we? He thought it unwise but it is for the US to decide.

The meeting ended at 4:35.

249. Memorandum of Conversation

USDEL/MC/16

Washington, March 31, 1959, 4:45 p.m.

TRIPARTITE-QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS

SUBJECT

Minutes of Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting of March 31, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Acting Secretary
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Burgess
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Berding
Mr. Irwin
Mr. Knight
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Timmons
Mr. Lampson

UK

Selwyn Lloyd
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Frank Roberts
Lord Hood
Peter Hope
Anthony Rumbold
Patrick Hancock
Denis Laskey
John Drinkall
Donald Logan

Federal Republic

Heinrich von Brentano
Albert van Scherpenberg
Georg Duckwitz
Georg Count Baudissin
Hans-Juergen Dietrich
Gunter von Hase
Hermann Kustrer (interpreter)
Ambassador Grewe
Franz Krapf
Rolf Pauls

France

Maurice Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Charles Lucet
Jean Laloy
Pierre Baraduc
Jacques de Beaumarchais
Jean-Claude Winckler

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lampson and approved by Herter on April 15. The meeting was held at the Department of State. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2297, April 1. (*Ibid.*, CF 1226) For another account of the four Foreign Ministers discussion of the Working Group report and particularly the German position, see Grewe, *Rückblenden*, pp. 396–399.

Governor Herter opened the meeting by extending a warm welcome to the other Foreign Ministers and stressing the importance of the meeting. He then outlined the objectives of the meeting. The Foreign Ministers should give their formal approval to the agreed portions of the Working Group Report,¹ resolve as many as possible of the outstanding issues in the Report and instruct the Working Group to study the issues which remain unsolved and lay down policy guidance for the next Working Group session on the substance and presentation of the Western position. They should also agree on a report to be made to the NATO Council to be as complete as possible in giving their preliminary views. They should also report to the NATO Council on contingency planning measures.

Governor Herter then emphasized the importance of keeping publicity to a minimum. It was vital that nothing should detract from the emphasis which must be placed at this time on the unity of the West. There was great danger that any discussions outside of this room might be seized upon by the avid press and create an impression among the public of differences and divisions between the Four. He hoped that the Ministers could agree this afternoon on a non-substantive communiqué.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd warmly supported Governor Herter's remarks about publicity. He hoped that they could agree on a line which would not be exceeded and that it would be understood that no additional information would be given.

Herr von Brentano began his remarks by saying that he had not had an opportunity fully to analyze the Working Group report. The report had only been submitted to the German Government last Thursday and the Government had not completely finished its analysis. Thus he hoped that the report would only be discussed along general lines and no decisions about particulars would be taken at this time until the German Government had fully considered the implications of the Report.

Governor Herter pointed out that the work of the Working Group would be thoroughly reviewed again at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on April 27 in Paris. Mr. Couve de Murville added that everything that was done at this time was revisable. He hoped that the Ministers would not feel that they would be prevented from beginning discussion of the substance of the report at this time and would find themselves unable to give guidance to the Working Group.

Governor Herter then commented on the general approach of the United States Government to the plan which had been prepared by the Working Group. It considered the plan to be one comprehensive package. This package should be designed so that it would appear reason-

¹ See Document 242.

able and would receive Western public support. If this was agreed it would provide the Working Group with a general frame of reference. It was especially important that the principle is clearly spelled out that the various parts of the package are inseparable. The other side would undoubtedly attempt to pick out bits and pieces of the plan which suited them and would try to get them accepted independently of the other features of the plan. This would be extremely dangerous. It must be made absolutely clear that the Western plan is a unit and must be taken as a whole or not at all.

Governor Herter then asked Herr von Brentano to comment in general on German thinking on the subject of reunification.

Herr von Brentano then summarized some of the general considerations in the light of which the German Government viewed the plan of the Working Group. Anything which led in the direction of a confederation was completely unacceptable. It was impossible to have a confederation between states or parts of states which are built upon different principles—which do not agree at least on the basic objectives which they have in mind. One has only to refer to the stated objectives of the Soviet Zone to see how completely incompatible they are with those of the Federal Republic. Any plan which provided for the formation of an all-German body composed of representatives chosen by the Soviet Zone regime would mean that the body would include some Communists who were in no way representative of the German people. He therefore had serious objections to the alternate plan suggested by the American delegation to the Working Group.² If we adopt such thoughts we would find ourselves approaching the concept of a confederation. It would be particularly dangerous to allow such a body to draft a constitution. Providing for a referendum would be no safeguard. The population would be quite uncritical if called upon to vote for a constitution if they felt that an affirmative vote would bring about reunification. They would vote in a highly emotional frame of mind and would accept practically any constitution rather than placing themselves in a position of voting against reunification by voting against the constitution. There was a great danger that such a constitution would leave the Soviet Zone free and unfettered to infiltrate the Federal Republic.

He also expressed the opinion that any group composed on the basis of Laender in the Soviet Zone and the Federal Republic would prove to be an unreliable body in terms of drafting a constitution. The delegates from the Eastern Laender would not be representative of the people. There was a great danger that some Western delegates having

² Reference is to the U.S. four-stage plan for German reunification, submitted to the Working Group on March 12; see Document 242.

affinities with leftist groups would work together with delegates from the Soviet Zone in producing a constitution which would tend to become a communist constitution and would not provide the necessary safeguards for democratic institutions. A referendum would provide no safeguard.

Herr von Brentano said that he also had serious objections to the idea of giving the Laender parliaments competence to deal with economic and social affairs. The Federal Government recognizes that it would be impossible to transfer the institutions of West Germany to the Soviet Zone in one single act. It would be extremely difficult to make such transfers. But to place power to deal with social and economic institutions in the hands of legislatures under the strict control of the SED would contribute to the disintegration of Germany. It would be unthinkable to set up in such a small area as the Soviet Zone social and economic institutions different from those in the rest of Germany. Such a proposal would be quite impracticable.

Herr von Brentano concluded that we must find other ways and means than those proposed here which were completely wrong.

Governor Herter commented that the proposals which had been approved by the Working Group had been based on thoughts which had been contributed largely by the German members of the Group.

Herr von Brentano replied that it had been valuable that the Working Group had made a number of proposals and their discussions had not been dogmatic in tone but their recommendations now had to be considered very carefully.

Governor Herter added that the views expressed by Herr von Brentano had never been reflected in the discussions of the Working Group which had begun its discussions in February.

Herr von Brentano replied that this showed the need for further detailed analysis. It would be dishonest on his part if he concealed his views. The Working Group had only a limited time in which to work. The task of the Foreign Ministers was to examine all points and raise objections as necessary. He had to emphasize that he would be very disturbed if the proposal outlined in the Working Group paper was accepted. It would lead to a situation similar to that which had existed in Czechoslovakia.

Herr von Brentano then referred to the German paper³ which had been submitted toward the end of the Working Group session. It contained the idea of introducing preliminary conditions for cooperation between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone. This would provide some way for reducing the tension between the two parts of the country

³ See footnote 1, Document 239.

which he had referred to previously. The recognition of human rights and political liberties by the Soviet Zone was a necessary precondition for any political collaboration with the GDR.

Herr von Brentano concluded by saying that most of his remarks had been directed against the alternate plan proposed by the U.S. delegation. The first proposals which had been approved by the Working Group as a whole did not go nearly so far. For example, they did not speak of a constitution being drafted by a body which was not elected and did not have any provisions dealing with the competencies of the Laender.

Governor Herter asked the German Foreign Minister whether the German plan on preconditions had been drafted by Ambassador Grewe and was conceived of as a reserve position in case it was desirable to propose direct East-West German conversations. He then asked whether Herr von Brentano would be prepared to submit a proposal tomorrow which the Group could consider. Herr von Brentano replied that he would submit a paper tomorrow.

Mr. Couve de Murville summed up the position of the German Foreign Minister. As he understood it there were three proposals on German reunification. First was the approved plan contained in Annex I of the Working Group Report; second was the American alternate plan; third was the supplementary plan which had been prepared by Ambassador Grewe. He understood that the German Foreign Minister had strong reservations about the second and the third. He wondered whether the Germans believed there were elements of at least the first plan which could be kept. Herr von Brentano said Mr. Couve de Murville's summation was correct.

Governor Herter suggested that discussion of particulars about what the Germans were willing to accept be postponed until tomorrow since Herr von Brentano had promised to introduce a paper at that time. It would be more profitable to continue the discussion on the basis of this paper.

Mr. Couve de Murville then said that he wished to discuss another part of the Working Group report—namely, the section on security measures and disarmament. He referred to the mention of the limitation of forces in paragraph six and at the end of paragraph 31 in stage II. These paragraphs related the total force levels of the Four Powers to limitations in an area comprising Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia and to progress towards reunification. He had grave doubts about the wisdom of these measures. He did not see the connection between limitations of the total forces of the Four Powers and the German question. In short he questioned the wisdom of linking general disarmament to German reunification and European security. He did not think it would facilitate the discussion of German reunification to make it dependent

on progress in general disarmament. He did not think this sounded like a serious proposal. Therefore he doubted that it would have appeal for public opinion.

Governor Herter said that he agreed that we would not want the discussion of German reunification to turn into a discussion of disarmament. He pointed out that the plan contained no commitment on the limitation of arms except as part of an agreement also providing for the settlement of political questions. He disagreed, however, in his estimate about public reactions. He thought the idea of concomitant progress towards disarmament would have a great deal of public appeal. He added that both the U.S. and the French had insisted on the connection between the reduction of troops of the major powers and progress in the settlement of political questions.

Mr. Couve de Murville replied that he thought we had always put things the other way around. We had never made progress on reunification dependent on disarmament. Governor Herter repeated that he thought if the two were represented as going hand in hand this would have a considerable appeal to public opinion. If it were possible to secure reunification independently of disarmament this would probably be highly desirable but most people did not think this was so. There is a natural feeling that the reduction of tensions which would result from progress in disarmament would increase the chances for reunification.

Mr. Couve de Murville replied that one should make a distinction between general disarmament and European security. We had long been in favor of special measures in the European security field. But general disarmament was quite a different matter.

Herr von Brentano said that we were all aware that under present circumstances there was no such thing as European security in isolation. This would only produce insecurity. It is necessary and logical that a beginning be made in the disarmament field. What is essential, however, is that one does not stop at the first step in disarmament. Progress must continue step by step. Unless there were this kind of progression there would be a danger of a change in the military balance of power to our disadvantage. Governor Herter commented that this view was shared by the U.S. military experts.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd directed the attention of the other speakers to specific paragraphs of the Working Group paper. He said he understood that Herr von Brentano had objected to paragraphs 16 through 20 of Annex A of the Working Group Report. But they do not have the same objections to paragraphs 8 through 15. He understood that the Germans considered that the latter paragraphs could be discussed. Referring to the French distaste for paragraphs 6 and 31, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that

his view on these sections would depend upon what was in the rest of the paper.

Governor Herter pointed out that the parts in the paper dealing with disarmament would bring us close to the 1957 London disarmament proposals. Mr. Couve de Murville asked what was the use of doing so. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd commented that it was getting to be a question of what would be left in the plan. He asked the Germans what they thought of the staged approach to reunification.

Herr von Brentano said he believed it was essential that the creation of any all-German body must be preceded by the reestablishment of political freedoms in the Soviet Zone. Otherwise there would be Communist party delegates in the all-German body who would block reunification. We cannot build on the basis of two Germanies or two parts of Germany which are totally different in structure and ideology. We must find some kind of a democratic basis on which to build. Once this has been done there would be no objection to steps such as are outlined in the plan.

Governor Herter asked how he thought these democratic processes could be created. Herr von Brentano replied that if it could not be done then we could not make any progress toward reunification. There would be no way of proceeding. He could not accept any method which would turn the German people over to Communist rule.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that he could understand Herr von Brentano's point about the danger of having a constitution drafted by a non-representative group in which Communists had a say. But supposing this constitution-drafting proposal were dropped, would the Germans then rule out closer contacts between East Germans and West Germans?

Herr von Brentano replied that they had always tried to increase contacts between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone. They strove to promote freedom of movement. They would welcome anything which could be done to do away with the obstacles and handicaps which separated Germans in the Federal Republic and in the Zone. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd then asked whether the German objection to the all-German committee provided for in the Phased Plan applied only to the question of the constitution. Herr von Brentano agreed that was their main objection, but that they also disliked the Laender competency feature.

Governor Herter then turned the discussion to the question of whether to table a peace treaty or the principles of a peace treaty. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said this really broke down into two questions. Should we table a peace treaty? If so, what should be in it?

Governor Herter summarized the U.S. position. It seemed clear that the Soviet Union would insist on discussing a peace treaty. We felt that

we would be in a stronger position if we had a peace treaty of our own from which to talk rather than being forced to discuss a Soviet draft. This would seem to leave the initiative to the Soviets and put us in a poor and defensive public posture. We could either table a draft or principles of a peace treaty on the understanding that when there was an agreement in principle we would table a draft.

Mr. Couve de Murville said that frankly he was not sure that we should put ourselves in the position of discussing a peace treaty. We would find ourselves talking about the possibility of a peace treaty with two Germanies. What would be the purpose of a peace treaty? Almost all the questions involved in such a treaty have been regulated by agreements between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic on one hand and the USSR and the Soviet Zone on the other. Only two questions remain to be settled. They are frontiers and the military status of Germany. So long as there are two Germanies we cannot discuss these questions.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd pointed out that we have now agreed to go to a conference at which a peace treaty will be discussed. There would be a tactical advantage in presenting a draft. We would not be able to evade the discussion of a treaty. There would be a spurious advantage appealing to the uninformed if we had our own draft.

Governor Herter explained that we would naturally be agreed that there would be only one treaty with one Germany. There would be some appeal in comparing what we have to offer to what the USSR has offered.

Herr von Brentano expressed his concern about a peace treaty which went into details. This would bring about a discussion which would certainly be to the disadvantage of the future all-German government. He thought it much better to state principles. The first of these principles would be that only a democratically constituted all-German government could speak for the German people and conduct negotiations on their behalf. It was much better to focus public attention on this point than to permit this question to be set to one side while discussions go on about details on a peace settlement. He agreed, however, that we would obviously have to discuss the question of a peace settlement. He thought the advantage lay on the side of presenting a statement of principles. The best subject on which to center an argument with the USSR on this subject was the question who will be the German partner. If it were a question of stating general principles these could be extracted

from the Bonn Conventions⁴ with the exception of the question of frontiers and military status.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd asked whether a statement of principles could deal with the question of frontiers. Herr von Brentano replied that this was a very difficult internal question. Moreover, the Federal Republic obviously could not bind an all-German government. But the Federal Government could state with the approval of the Bundestag that it was ready to make guarantees to its Eastern neighbors that it would not use force in the settlement of any questions outstanding between them and to enter into discussions with them on these questions. This could lead to the opening of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the countries to the east of it. This plan had been outlined at the first meeting of the Working Group.

Governor Herter then circulated a draft statement to the press⁵ which was accepted by the Group with minor amendments. The meeting was adjourned until 10:30 a.m. the following day.

⁴ For texts of the conventions signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 111 ff.

⁵ Not printed. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1226)

250. Memorandum of Conversation

USDEL/MC/17

Washington, April 1, 1959.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Quadripartite Foreign Ministers' Meeting of April 1, 1959
(Morning Session)

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1227. Secret. Drafted by Vigdeman and approved by Herter. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2308 at 11:31 p.m. on April 1. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/4–159)

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Acting Secretary
 Mr. Murphy
 Mr. Reinhardt
 Mr. Merchant
 Ambassador Burgess
 Ambassador Bruce
 Mr. Berding
 Mr. Irwin
 Mr. Knight
 Mr. Hillenbrand
 Mr. Timmons
 Mr. Vigderman

Federal Republic

Heinrich von Brentano
 Albert van Scherpenberg
 Georg Duckwitz
 Georg Count Baudissin
 Hans-Juergen Dietrich
 Gunter von Hase
 Hermann Kustrer
 Ambassador Grewe
 Franz Krapf
 Rolf Pauls

France

Maurice Couve de Murville
 Ambassador Alphand
 Charles Lucet
 Jean Laloy
 Pierre Baraduc
 Jacques de Beaumarchais

UK

Selwyn Lloyd
 Ambassador Caccia
 Sir Frank Roberts
 Lord Hood
 Peter Hope
 Anthony Rumbold
 Patrick Hancock
 Denis Laskey
 John Drinkall
 Donald Logan

The Acting Secretary began the meeting by suggesting that the Ministers should, during the course of the day, agree on (a) a Minute of the four Foreign Ministers giving further direction to the work of the Four-Power Working Group, (b) a report to the North Atlantic Council on the Western position in a meeting with the Soviets, and (c) a communiqué.

The Acting Secretary then raised the question of the extent to which we considered that the Russians were ready to enter into a serious negotiation, particularly with respect to the reunification of Germany. The answer to this question had special importance as concerns public opinion in our own country and in the rest of the world. Mr. Lloyd responded that the British estimate was that the Soviets would be disposed to do business at a Foreign Ministers' meeting if they were reasonably certain it would be followed by a meeting at the Summit. If the Soviets did not have that conviction they were likely to take unilateral action in matters concerning Berlin and to break off the Foreign Ministers' Conference without serious negotiation. On the whole, Mr. Lloyd considered that the Soviets would come to the meeting intending to have a serious discussion of the items in the agreed-upon agenda. Mr. Lloyd stressed the importance of avoiding public sessions of the Ministers and refraining from handing speeches at the Foreign Ministers' Conference to the press.

The Acting Secretary expressed his agreement that the Foreign Ministers' meeting should not become a public spectacle.

Couve de Murville suggested that we must not play with the idea that the Foreign Ministers' Conference would be an empty ritual. He was convinced that the Soviets were ready to be serious. The question was what we were likely to be discussing with the Soviets. As he saw it, the first discussion would center on the question of Polish and Czechoslovak participation. This would be followed, he thought, by a general discussion making clear the position of each side on German problems. This brought us back to the matter of the Working Group Report.¹ The Soviets plainly do not accept reunification on any terms acceptable to the West. We could not accept any regime which acknowledged the permanent partition of Germany. The problem was therefore how we reach an acceptable *modus vivendi* with the Soviets. We need some kind of arrangement about Berlin, and something in the military field. We must be prepared to be in a position to expand our ideas on a possible German settlement. Our position must be so stated as to demonstrate that we are not being negative.

The Acting Secretary pointed out that an interim solution for Berlin was required if it was expected that the reunification process was to take place in stages over a three-year period. He then asked the German Foreign Minister if he was ready to describe his ideas of a suitable reunification plan which the Minister had promised to provide following his criticism of the reunification portion of the Working Group Report.

Dr. von Brentano said he had not had much time to develop his thought in detail and what he was about to present should not be considered as the last word. He recapitulated the ideas he had advanced yesterday² by saying the idea of a mixed commission to prepare elections was a good concept. It went a certain distance to meet two fundamental Soviet points, namely that reunification was a matter for the two Germanies and that free elections could be the first step in the reunification processes.

Dr. von Brentano said (1) that the mixed commission must be kept distinct from any idea of the "confederation" of the two Germanies, (2) that the principle of parity between the two sections of the mixed commission must be rejected because this violated fundamental democratic principles and (3) that the function of the commission should be limited to preparation for free elections. The mixed commission could, however, make proposals for increasing technical contacts between the two

¹ See Document 242.

² See Document 249. A memorandum submitted by the German Delegation on the preliminary steps to the reunification of Germany, which follows the lines laid out here by Brentano, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-159.

parts of Germany and could study how the human rights articles of the Soviet draft peace treaty could be implemented. The important thing was that the commission should not have any executive or administrative functions. Finally, the composition and functions of the commission had to be considered with extreme care because the commission would have a decisive influence on the working out of reunification.

Dr. von Brentano thought that the selection of the members of the commission should not be left, in effect, to the East German Volkskammer on the one hand, and the West German Laender parliaments on the other. This method of choice was invidious to the Bundestag of the Federal Republic. It was better to envisage the selection of the members of the mixed commission on the one hand by the Government of the Federal Republic, and on the other by the authorities of the so-called German Democratic Republic.

If the mixed commission, so constituted, had the right to make proposals as to increased contacts between the two parts of Germany for the protection of human rights and freedoms, this would force both parts of Germany to take a position on these questions and would put up to the Soviet Zone authorities the need to make their views on these questions known.

Dr. von Brentano said that the idea of an all-German committee as envisaged in the Working Group report was not a happy one, nor was the notion of the Laender selecting nominees for the Committee, particularly since the Laender in the Soviet Zone existed only on paper. Moreover, the selection of, for example, five nominees from Laender with a population of 5,000,000 provided too little representation and could easily produce accidental results.

Dr. von Brentano said that the commission should have the task of preparing an election law. The election must be genuinely free. The Commission could not be entrusted with guaranteeing the freedom of the election. This should be the task of the United Nations. The West should not be concerned about putting forward maximum demands, for public opinion would understand the reasonableness of the Western position. If we come forward with minimum requests on our side we will have lost our room for maneuver. The Federal Republic would further elaborate its ideas on the reunification process and would give them to the Working Group as soon as the Federal Cabinet had approved them. Dr. von Brentano said he would like to make two further observations: (1) that it was extremely important that the West present its proposals as a package. There should be no dealing with isolated problems. (2) That his thoughts on the reunification processes were preliminary only and would be supplemented by more definitive German proposals.

The Acting Secretary said we would, of course, wish to examine the German proposals in greater detail, and asked if what Dr. von Brentano had sketched out was to be accomplished in one phase or in several phases. To this, Dr. von Brentano explained that his proposals were a part of the package. Mr. Lloyd raised the question of when it could be expected that the Federal Cabinet would approve the German reunification proposal. Dr. von Brentano said that he expected to see the Chancellor on April 8.

The Acting Secretary raised the question of the disassociation of the global disarmament portion of the Working Group report from the problem of Germany. Couve said that the Working Group report covered two kinds of disarmament proposals. The first was general disarmament, and the second was specific measures in a special security area comprising Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps Hungary. The idea of some general disarmament, expressed as a limitation on the forces of the Four Powers, appears in all three stages of the Working Group Plan. The limitation of forces is only a small part of the 1957 disarmament package. The Working Group report does not touch nuclear armaments, the question of control, or the limitation of conventional arms.

Couve asked what value there was in such an approach. He presumed it was for the benefit of public opinion but he did not think it was a very convincing proposition.

The Acting Secretary said he understood the Germans were anxious to have regional disarmament limitations tied to global limitations.

Couve asked whether we could propose that during the various stages of German reunification disarmament discussions could be proceeding simultaneously, conceivably in a UN committee. This would have the effect of putting the reunification process in the general context of global disarmament and in this way phased progress towards both goals could be achieved. Dr. von Brentano approved this idea. The Acting Secretary said we could examine it further.

Mr. Lloyd said we must appear to have constructive proposals of our own on the subject of ceilings on forces and armaments. We must have something by way of proposals to draw fire from proposals for disengagement, for disengagement was a very dangerous idea which would inevitably lead to the neutralization of Germany.

Couve reverted to the various items in the Working Group report which singled out subjects which were part of the 1957 global disarmament package, and voiced objection to the inclusion in the Western negotiating package of any global limitation on the forces of the Four Powers.

Mr. Lloyd agreed. He thought discussion of disarmament should be put in a wider framework. He knew that Mr. Khrushchev agreed that

the 81-nation United Nations body charged with the disarmament question was a hopeless proposition. We could make proposals for getting disarmament discussions started on a more sensible basis. The Acting Secretary then proposed, and it was agreed, that the Working Group should be charged with defining the relationship between disarmament and reunification.

Couve said that as concerns the forces in Central Europe, these were of two kinds: the national forces and the visiting forces. He considered that as concerned national forces, it might be well to propose that the limitations on German forces and arms should be those prescribed in the London and Paris accords. These limitations could apply to a reunified Germany. This proposal would make for a very good presentation to the Soviets.

Dr. von Brentano agreed that as concerned the measures in paragraphs 21 to 23 of the Working Group Report,³ this was a good proposal, but he asked whether the inspection system should not be made dependent on the implementation of Stage III. There was a danger in inspection being permitted to the Soviet Union until the completion of Stage III. The Acting Secretary said that Couve's proposal was logical, but he did not see how it fitted into the proposal for German reunification.

Discussion then turned to Berlin, and the interim arrangements for Berlin proposed in the Working Group Report. Couve said the problem was what we say on Berlin in presenting our proposals. He thought we should not say much since Berlin was a part of the package and its special status would disappear with the reunification of Germany. We must have interim solutions for difficulties which may arise during the stages of the reunification process, and we should be prepared to consider adjustments during that period. The real problem, however, is finding a *modus vivendi* for Berlin in the absence of reunification. Couve agreed with the Working Group analysis that Four Power control was better than UN control in Berlin; that any solution must guarantee continued freedom of access; that there should be no modification of the rights of access; and that the West could accept the substitution of the East German authorities if the Soviets explicitly made them their agents.

Dr. von Brentano agreed with Couve and said that the legal basis of the Western position must continue to rest on the conquest of Germany. We should not change this legal basis by any new agreement with the Soviets for three reasons:

³These paragraphs dealt with security measures.

1. Any new agreement would be subject to interpretation and the consequent familiar erosion of our position by the technique of Soviet "interpretation";
2. For any new arrangements the Soviets would demand the participation of the Soviet Zone authorities;
3. The NATO guarantee for Berlin was valid only on the basis of the existing position. NATO might not be ready to extend its guarantee if new arrangements were entered into with the Soviets.

Mr. Lloyd said all this depended on what sort of a new treaty we could get. The Soviets and the East German regime had the power to make the Western position awkward, without any specific hostile act. Our position was quite unsatisfactory, for the Communists had the power to interfere with life in Berlin in many ways. The question was, therefore, whether we could improve our present position. We should at least try to do so. Rights based on conquest gave a good title but the question was for how many generations would it remain a good title. From the point of view of public opinion should we not now offer to enter into new arrangements in order to put the Soviets a little more on the defensive. We should make it clear that we were not abandoning our rights based on conquest but we were willing to talk about a new status. This would have distinct public opinion advantages. We might consider how UN personnel could be used to supervise the new arrangements.

Dr. von Brentano said he saw no contradiction between his views and those of Mr. Lloyd. We must continue to maintain the existing legal basis for our rights, but we could come to an agreement as to how those rights were to be exercised. In this we could show some flexibility. Mr. Lloyd said we must have new ideas on reunification and a new plan for Berlin. We must appear to have a positive approach.

Couve asked whether Mr. Lloyd was talking about West Berlin only, or all Berlin, in his suggestion for a new status. Mr. Lloyd said he would start with Berlin as a whole and then fall back to a new status for West Berlin.

The Acting Secretary asked how it was possible to maintain the legal concept that our rights were based on occupation and at the same time to appear to be giving them up. He also asked what the situation would be as concerns the NATO guarantee in the new arrangements envisaged.

Mr. Lloyd replied that he would hope NATO would endorse the new status and extend its guarantee to it. As concerns the legal position he was sure that our draftsmen could take care of that point. The preamble to the new agreement could say that the Soviets reject the concept that the West has rights by conquest and that the West insisted on those rights. The new arrangement would be without prejudice to the position of either side, and we were therefore ready to negotiate a new arrangement which would not cancel out the existing legal status. As concerns

the problem of relationships with the East German regime, if a new arrangement were to be entered into, Khrushchev had told the British that he did not consider it necessary that there be any direct relationship between the East German regime and the Federal Republic, nor was it necessary that there be a direct juridical relationship between the West and the East German regime.

The Acting Secretary suggested that the British prepare a paper elaborating their ideas, and meanwhile the lawyers would look into the question of whether Mr. Lloyd's proposal was legally feasible.

Couve said we all agree that it would be better if we could keep the present legal status, and he would accept the Lloyd suggestion only as a fallback position. He inquired whether Mr. Lloyd wanted to begin negotiations with the Soviets on the new basis. Mr. Lloyd replied that the prospect of the reunification of Germany had grown more remote. The West's position in Berlin was, to say the least, inconvenient. Whenever the Soviets wished to be bloody minded they can choke off life in Berlin. We had to ask ourselves whether we could get more of an international presence in Berlin and get an international underwriting of the responsibility for keeping Berlin free. The idea of using UN personnel to ensure freedom of access would appeal to public opinion, and it would embarrass the Russians to be put in the position of refusing this proposal. The new arrangements need not extinguish our present rights.

Mr. Lloyd continued that the fact was that the present legal basis of our rights was flimsy. The agreement of 1949⁴ only ensured the return to the status quo—whatever that was. It is unclear what the civilian rights of the inhabitants of West Berlin are. Were these people the subjects of the occupying powers?

The Acting Secretary acknowledged that our present agreements were imprecise. He pointed out that in the 1948–1949 blockade we used these rights as justification for our supplying Berlin. Mr. Lloyd responded that there was no doubt that the Russians had it in mind to constrict activity in Berlin by many methods, including the shutting off of raw materials. We must plan to do more than keep Berlin alive. The situation today was quite different from the situation in 1948 when Berlin was much less prosperous than it is today. The Acting Secretary proposed that the Working Group study the juridical position of the West.

Couve said it was basically important that our rights were based upon conquest and not on agreements with the Soviet Union. This was not to say, however, that we could not make adjustments. We should be prepared to consider some limitations on our position in Berlin, as for

⁴ For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.

example, by a limitation on our forces in Berlin, and by restricting or eliminating some of our activities in Berlin. He cited specifically the periodic meetings of the Bundestag in Berlin.

Mr. Lloyd said that if the Soviets would underwrite that the East German regime would respect the new arrangements this would solve the problem of the physical association of the East German regime with the Western right of access.

The Acting Secretary then said we might adopt the legal theory that the Russians, by signing a peace treaty with the East German regime, were abandoning their rights, and that these rights therefore reverted to the other Three Powers. There were elements in the United States Government which support this view. A logical consequence would be the installation of Western sentry posts to control access. Couve said he doubted whether this idea would gain much acceptance.

Upon the question of the UN role in Berlin, Mr. Lloyd said that he understood that the representatives of the Three Powers at the UN had made agreed recommendations. The Acting Secretary said that they had examined the role of the UN only on a hypothetical basis. Couve said that he had been informed by Hammarskjöld that Khrushchev recognizes that there could be no UN presence in Berlin, for the UN wouldn't have the troops for it.⁵ Mr. Lloyd said that the problem of paying for the troops was serious.

The Acting Secretary asked whether Mr. Lloyd envisaged the stage at which the UN should be brought into the problem. Mr. Lloyd replied that this depended on what we want the UN to do. Couve considered it would be dangerous to bring the UN into the problem, because once the affair is in the hands of the UN it would be difficult to predict what would happen. Mr. Lloyd considered that if the Russians surrendered their rights and obligations it would be a good idea to substitute UN posts for controlling access. This would be a sound public position, although Khrushchev certainly wouldn't accept it. The Acting Secretary remarked that he would be glad to see the specific proposals of the British in this regard. He pointed out that Mr. Dulles was of the opinion that we could not negotiate a new arrangement for Berlin without effectively losing our rights based on conquest. Couve suggested that the Working Group must study the threat to the communications of the civilian population of Berlin.

Mr. Lloyd repeated that West Berlin was geographically surrounded and physically isolated. He did not want to end up with a self-imposed blockade. If there was to be a military operation to free Berlin it was most important for the public to understand that we had tried everything before resorting to force.

⁵Regarding Hammarskjöld's visit to Moscow, see footnote 2, Document 246.

The Acting Secretary then reverted to the question of the introduction of a peace treaty in the negotiation with the Soviets. He said that the United States was prepared to agree that the principles of a peace treaty should be offered, and if they should be accepted we would then table the draft of a treaty. To this the other Ministers agreed.

The meeting adjourned at 12:20 p.m.

251. Memorandum of Conversation

USDEL/MC/18

Washington, April 1, 1959.

TRIPARTITE-QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS

SUBJECT

Minutes of Afternoon Session of Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting of
April 1, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Acting Secretary
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Burgess
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Berding
Mr. Irwin
Mr. Knight
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Timmons
Mr. McFarland

France

Maurice Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphan
Charles Lucet
Jean Laloy
Pierre Baraduc
Jacques de Beaumarchais
Jean-Claude Winckler

Federal Republic

Heinrich von Brentano
Albert van Scherpenberg
Georg Duckwitz
Georg Count Baudissin
Hans-Juergen Dietrich
Gunter von Hase
Hermann Kustrer
Ambassador Grewe
Franz Krapf
Rolf Pauls

UK

Selwyn Lloyd
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Frank Roberts
Lord Hood
Peter Hope
Anthony Rumbold
Patrick Hancock
Denis Laskey
John Drinkall
Donald Logan

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1227. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McFarland and approved by Herter on April 15. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2310, April 2. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-259)

The afternoon session of the April 1 four Foreign Ministers meeting (U.S., U.K., France and the Federal Republic of Germany) was taken up almost entirely with discussion of 4 papers: The session opened with a renewed injunction regarding security and not revealing to the press anything which transpired in the meeting. There was some consternation evident over a detailed article in the afternoon *Washington Star* under the headline "Ministers Get Bonn Warning" (not to take too soft a line with the Soviets).

The four papers discussed were:¹

1. a joint communiqué;
2. an agreed minute, which contains formal instructions to the Working Group for its next meeting;
3. a report to the NAC on the Western position on German Reunification, European Security and Berlin;
4. a report to the NAC on Contingency Planning.

The communiqué was largely non-substantive in nature. It announced that the Working Group will reconvene in London April 13, have a report ready by April 25 for consideration by the next four Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris April 29.

There were several interesting substantive exchanges on the language of the Minute, particularly involving British views on European security and the linking of security to German reunification. The British proposed that the group consider measures in the field of security without this link. They saw the possibility of having to consider reunification in connection with Berlin, for example, or as a completely separate issue. Lloyd stressed that he was speaking only of very limited European security measures and not of disengagement.

The French Foreign Minister announced that he had had second thoughts on the whole concept of a special security area. He felt this smacked too much of the Rapacki Plan.² Couve stated he was not rejecting a special area altogether but was notifying the group that he had not yet made up his mind on the whole concept.

The French, joined by the Germans and the US, opposed the British effort to separate out European security so that it could be considered by itself. Compromise language was agreed to which maintained the link between reunification of Germany and European security.

The Germans objected to the paragraph of the Minute (which the French had proposed) suggesting that the Working Group study the

¹ U.S. drafts of these four papers, April 1, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1225. For text of the communiqué as released on April 1, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 639–640; copies of the agreed minute and the two reports to the North Atlantic Council are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1236.

² See footnote 2, Document 43.

possible application of the limitations of the protocols to the Brussels Treaty to a reunified Germany. It was agreed to drop the paragraph. The German position appeared based on the fear that this provision would become public knowledge and that it would have an unfortunate effect (mostly on German public opinion). The Germans noted that they did not object to consideration of this subject in the Working Group but did not want it mentioned in the Minute.

Couve declared that the link between the discussion of general disarmament and German reunification made the Western package proposals less negotiable. The subjects could be discussed simultaneously or in parallel but he did not think the two should be linked. The Acting Secretary pointed out that the link was based partly on the fact that if the Soviets agreed to the principle of reunification it would make possible much more rapid progress toward general disarmament. The French suggested language to remove the link between disarmament and reunification.

The question whether to submit a draft peace treaty at the May 11 Foreign Ministers meeting or only the principles governing a peace treaty was discussed. It was agreed the Working Group should try, if practicable, to draft a peace treaty. The principles for a draft treaty would be tabled. The tabling of a draft treaty was a matter for further consideration.

The next document discussed was the Report to the NAC on the Western position. The principal problems discussed were how much to tell NATO and the specific language they would use. The Report to NATO follows a standard pattern. It goes into more detail on German reunification and European security than has been given to NATO before. It adds nothing new on Berlin. The discussion of the Report was somewhat repetitious in order to bring it into harmony with the language of the Agreed Minute. It was agreed that proposals on the method of reunification of Germany should be part of the Western package. Lloyd suggested language to indicate flexibility whereby Stage I of the reunification plan might be put forward alone if the Soviets rejected the rest of the plan. This was opposed by all three other Ministers. The Acting Secretary declared the several stages went together as a unit.

Lloyd agreed that we should put the package forward as our first position. He only wanted to know what we would do if, as he felt likely, the Russians rejected the package. Couve objected to giving NATO any fall-back positions to consider at this time, principally because of the danger of leaks. He did not exclude considering possible fall-back positions later, principally in return for concessions on Berlin. The Germans objected strongly to anything limited to Stage I which did not contain a timetable setting forth when the next Stage was to take effect.

On the European security section of the Report to NATO there was considerable discussion of the language, as was also true for the Minute. The French repeated their previous objections to the special security area; the Germans objected to having language on the non-transfer of the custody of nuclear weapons. There was some feeling among the other delegations that there might be some confusion in the minds of the Germans as to the actual effects of this provision. The section in the Report to NATO on the draft German Peace Treaty was changed to make it conform to the Minute.

The section on Berlin was extremely skimpy. The French pointed out that NATO already received more from the Working Group at its last session in Paris than the Report gave them. Couve read the three points given NATO by the Working Group: (1) that a quadripartite solution on Berlin was preferable to a UN solution; (2) any solution must allow the West to retain forces in Berlin and maintain access; (3) our position in Berlin must continue to be based upon our right of conquest. The British had trouble with both 1 and 3. They could see the possibility that a UN solution might be necessary. They thought the passages about our rights of conquest were too flat a statement and foresaw some possibility of a contractual arrangement. Lloyd pointed out that the Working Group Report to NATO had not been a Governmental statement. Compromise language was worked out to cover this point.

The Report to the NAC on Contingency Planning was accepted with only one minor change.

The Ministers further developed an agreed formula on how and at what stage Italy would be invited to participate as an observer or as a full member in the Foreign Ministers meeting of May 11 or a subsequent Summit meeting. It was agreed that the information would be conveyed to Italian Foreign Minister Pella orally.³

The method of presenting the reports to the NAC on Thursday was discussed and agreed to. Foreign Minister Lloyd will present the report on the Western position and Couve de Murville will report on Contingency Planning.

The meeting ended at 5:50 p.m.

³ Herter briefed Foreign Minister Pella at 9 a.m. on April 2; a summary of their conversation was transmitted to Rome in telegram 3353, April 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/4-259)

252. Circular Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, April 4, 1959, 10:57 a.m.

1151. From USNATO Del. Following summarizes NAC Ministerial session afternoon April 2¹ (first business meeting).

Spaak opened meeting by suggesting message from Council to Secretary Dulles conveying best wishes for his speedy recovery.² He then, by prearrangement,³ suggested that two statements be read dealing with the Germany-Berlin problem. He emphasized need for complete secrecy; said no verbatim record would be kept, but that a COSMIC Top Secret record of these papers would be on file with the International Secretariat.

France (Couve de Murville) then read tripartitely-agreed report on contingency planning for Berlin.⁴

U.K. (Selwyn Lloyd) read quadripartitely-agreed report of Western position on German reunification, European Security and Berlin. (This being airgrammed to addressees this telegram.)⁵

U.S. (Herter) read a message of greeting from Secretary Dulles.⁶ Acting Secretary then gave a review of international situation, placing Berlin problem in perspective of other threats around world during past year. (Statement being pouched to addressees this telegram).⁷

U.K. took floor again to give present British thinking regarding Germany-Berlin problems. Agreeing in general with U.S. résumé of world situation; Lloyd said it was necessary to look into future and to try to devise ways of avoiding "a situation of choice between war and a resounding diplomatic defeat". He made following points:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-459. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Nolting on April 3 and cleared by Timmons and Merchant. Transmitted to all NATO capitals except London, Bonn, and Paris, which were informed by separate cable on April 2. (Topol 3313 to Paris, repeated to Bonn, London, Berlin, and Moscow; *ibid.*, 396.1-WA/4-259)

¹ The verbatim record of this session, C-VR(59)13, April 2, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1236.

² A copy of this message is *ibid.*

³ Herter briefed Spaak on the outcome of the tripartite and quadripartite meetings at 8:30 a.m. on April 2 and told him who would present the two reports to the Council. (Memorandum of conversation, USDEL/MC/8; *ibid.*, CF 1235)

⁴ See Document 251.

⁵ Not printed, but see Document 251; the report was transmitted in circular telegram 513, April 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-259)

⁶ A copy of this March 29 letter is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1236.

⁷ Transmitted in circular airgram CG-516 on April 3. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-359)

(a) U.K. believes Soviet leaders have basically more to lose from relaxation of tension than West has. While USSR has made remarkable progress in certain fields, their system has failed in providing human wellbeing. Therefore, any relaxation of tensions will tend to accentuate pressures upon Soviet leadership to devote more resources to human needs;

(b) Nevertheless, British leaders convinced by recent trip that Khrushchev genuinely wants negotiations, certainly on Berlin;

(c) U.K. favors Summit meeting after Foreign Ministers conference, because: (1) they convinced Khrushchev alone can make major decisions; (2) Soviets unlikely act unilaterally on Berlin if Summit meeting in prospect; (3) public opinion will demand Summit meeting before being willing undertake preparations for war.

(d) Re Germany and Berlin, U.K. position is that West must be firm in protecting Berlin's right to freedom; West must avoid a neutralized Germany; West must avoid "disengagement" in sense of any pulling apart of forces, discrimination against forces of any country, or discrimination in weapons. West must avoid any security disadvantages in considering ideas in security field. UK does, however, see advantages in inspection in an agreed zone as providing precedent favorable to West, and some safeguard against surprise attack.

(e) On question German unification, UK had no new thoughts, but considers method of presentation needs careful study.

(f) On Berlin, optimum, of course, is Berlin as capital of reunified Germany, but UK recognizes that West's position in Berlin extremely exposed, and existing arrangements vague and tenuous. Rights of occupation, although legally sound, not publicly convincing in UK view. UK thinks West should take good look at status quo and determine whether some new and better basis for protection Berlin's freedom cannot be worked out without abandoning present legal basis. These preliminary thoughts on which UK seeks views its Allies.

France (Couve de Murville) gave general exposé French position, emphasizing France believes that USSR wishes negotiate both on Berlin and Germany rather than fight. France believes present situation grave and tense, but stresses that tension created by Soviets who are aiming for two legal entities in Germany. Stressed military confidence USSR, noted that while this not a good basis for conference, it nevertheless evident that Khrushchev wants to negotiate at Summit.

Taking considerably tougher line than Lloyd, Couve said manner in which Soviet challenge on Berlin was made requires absolute firmness and resolution in West. Further, Berlin's exposed position makes a firm Western response doubly necessary. Stressing difficulty and danger of detailing successive Western positions, Couve warned against going much beyond Western Four report at this stage. Defined points on which France thinks can be no compromise:

(1) Maintenance of Western garrisons in Berlin, stressing absolute need to hold to present legal basis of occupying powers; (2) avoidance any step leading to de jure recognition of GDR.

France supports keeping NAC well informed, as NATO support in this situation very important.

Brentano indicated that he would wish to speak April 3. The Chairman suggested discussion be adjourned until April 3 to give opportunity for reflection and preparation of views.

Herter

253. Circular Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to Certain Embassies

Washington, April 3, 1959, 9:59 p.m.

1149. From US NATO Del. NAC Ministerial session morning April 3¹ devoted entirely to continuation discussion Germany and Berlin under first agenda item.

Von Brentano (Germany) stressed West would be wrong to show optimism regarding alleged Soviet desire to negotiate. Nevertheless Western public opinion expects governments make every effort to keep peace through negotiations. Western Powers must agree on limits beyond which they cannot go. If three Western Powers gave up legal basis their position in Berlin, freedom of all Europe would eventually be involved. As Lloyd had asked yesterday² "If Berlin falls today who would be the next victim?"

Von Brentano was glad that unanimity reached by four Ministers that there could be no peace treaty with two Germanies as proposed by Soviets. He hesitated to propose counter-draft to Soviet peace treaty draft. He felt it better to put forward principles including who to represent Germany at peace treaty negotiations. As to reunification point must be stressed that division of Germany was not cause but expression of world tensions. Therefore, isolated solution to German problem not

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-359. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted and approved by Hillenbrand and cleared by Fessenden. Sent to all NATO capitals and Berlin, Moscow, and CINCPAC POLAD.

¹ The verbatim record of this session, C-VR(59)14, April 3, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1237.

² See Document 252.

possible and Western proposals must be submitted as package. Agreement on controlled disarmament would be of decisive importance to solution German problem.

As to UK statement yesterday, von Brentano continued, he was glad that any idea disengagement or neutralization of Germany was rejected but he could not accept British idea creation of limited security zone. Such zone unacceptable if not accompanied by political progress.

If Soviets progressively withdrawing from ultimatum on Berlin this was because of firmness shown by NATO in December.³ It would be tactically dangerous to buy through concessions, as suggested by UK, right of Western Powers to protect Berlin.

Pella (Italy) noted difficulty reaching any results on specific problems during first meeting Foreign Ministers with Soviets, but it was urgent Berlin problem be settled and evidence given of sincere effort by West to reach peaceful solutions. Western countries must be firm and not concede questions of principle; concessions not involving principle should be counter-balanced by equivalent Soviet concessions.

Pella said report on behalf four Ministers to Ministerial Council did not mention how Berlin problem should be handled with Soviets. This must have priority in Western preparations. Regarding control of traffic, West must avoid giving impression we were ready to risk war on purely procedural matter. Pella also stressed that West cannot abandon position that German solution must at some point involve free manifestation of will of people, although it might be useful to follow up suggestion made yesterday of establishment some temporary all-German body to promote contacts between East and West Germany. Pella expressed skepticism regarding any special zone of security in Europe. If such zone to be established it must involve effective controls, and area proportionate to strategic concern of all governments involved.

Pearkes (Canada) laid down principle that war no longer a legitimate extension of policy under contemporary conditions. To succeed in negotiations with Soviets West must know minds of adversary. This now more clear in view Macmillan visit to Moscow. Soviets obviously want to advance their interests, which are contrary to West, but not at price of nuclear war. West must also know its own mind. Canada agreed that we could not jeopardize freedom and security West Berlin, ties of Federal Republic with Western Europe, or abandonment of German reunification. However despite undoubted legal basis position Western troops in Berlin, Canada saw inadequacies in present system which

³ Regarding the discussion of Berlin by the Council on December 16, see Document 112. For text of the NATO declaration on Berlin, December 16, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1959, p. 4.

lacks fundamental international instrument guaranteeing security of city and freedom of access thereto. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] West should therefore not start with assumption that any change in status quo necessarily for worse. Four-Power agreement on Berlin involving UN might stabilize situation. Permanent NATO Council should study possibility of (a) role of UN in verifying that all parties abiding by terms of agreement, (b) Soviet pledge to permit freedom of access along with acceptance of UN presence. Any UN responsibility for West Berlin would be complementary to present responsibility of Four Occupying Powers.

If negotiations broader than Berlin take place, Canada saw little prospect for any agreement on reunification. Continuing commission to supervise and promote progress toward reunification might be useful. West should also accept some arms and forces limitation with inspection and control in portion of NATO and Iron Curtain area. Some mutually profitable measures of redeployment would benefit both sides and West should not reject out-of-hand possibility such arrangements.

Krag (Denmark) reiterated need for both firmness and willingness to negotiate with patience. West should consider creation at conference of body of experts comprising Four Occupying Powers, supplemented by FedRep and GDR advisers, to examine ways and means to enable further negotiations at governmental level. Existence such body would tend to prevent dangerous incidents.

Wigny (Belgium) made long rambling statement, main point of which was to show that while Western principles must be firmly held regarding reunification and maintenance of rights in Berlin, this should not preclude acceptance fact of GDR existence and need for certain Western adaptations thereto. He apparently gave qualified approval to UK approach on limited security arrangements, noting that Western public opinion desired this.

Lange (Norway) conceded difficulty consultation with NATO of Powers primarily responsible but expressed hope views of other NATO countries would be taken into consideration in development position. While West could not accept neutralization of Germany or withdrawal US, UK, and Canadian forces from Europe, Soviets could be given somewhat more far-reaching security guarantees than in 1955.⁴ He agreed with Lloyd that limited security arrangements would be feasible involving arms and forces ceilings and inspection controls in central European zone. This must not upset present military balance or jeopardize Western security. Lange also supported UK idea that certain new ar-

⁴For documentation on the Western security proposals submitted to the Foreign Ministers meeting in 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 537 ff.

rangements would strengthen Western position in Berlin and enable continuance of presence there. Also thought possibility of UN role should be considered.

Canellopoulos (Greece) stressed that any important concession to Communism represented defeat of democracy. Despite great financial problems, NATO countries must continue vigorous defense efforts.

Luns (Netherlands) noted he had presented his general views at opening session yesterday. He expressed gratitude for information received regarding tripartite contingency planning and concurred in conclusions of report. However, information given Council regarding Western position at conference was not very substantial, and more detailed information needed if support public opinion to be obtained.

Zorlu (Turkey) emphasized broad Soviet objective of world domination and that Soviets would continue to pursue this goal despite any local arrangements made. He supported general policy of firmness as only way of reducing Soviet intransigence. He opposed any special security zones without general disarmament as only leading to false confidence.

In concluding remarks Spaak said he had mixed feelings at end of morning's discussion. Many interesting statements had been made, but he was concerned that they did not really reply to one another. There obviously were certain divergencies between certain members. While it possible to distinguish countries directly interested from other NATO countries and to accept this distinction for practical and procedural reasons, entire NATO organization was involved in Berlin situation through common commitments. Situation could not be allowed to arise whereby, if discussions with Soviets a failure and this failure led to need for practical decisions NATO countries could complain that they were not sufficiently consulted.

He noted that there was complete agreement on a number of points, such as no reunification without free elections, no neutralization of Germany, no abandonment of West Berlin, and no US-UK-Canadian withdrawal from continent. Beyond this however clarification of several points was necessary:

a) Was acceptance by Soviets of free election principle necessary before any of phased plan could go into effect? If so, this obviously unacceptable to Soviets. Yet West has said Berlin question must be discussed as part of whole complex. If no solution found to broader problem, Berlin problem would be put to West in isolated manner.

b) Reference had been made to package proposals but not made clear whether progress in security field had to be tied to reunification under all circumstances. Would Soviets have to accept parcel all at once or could there be a number of little parcels?

c) He believed that stress on peace treaty at this time strangely anachronistic.

d) After noting apparent difference between views that Western Powers should stand on their rights in Berlin or attempt to improve those rights, he concluded that merely adding something to what already existed did not involve real issue.

e) If Berlin problem forced into UN, whether or not Western Powers willing, rigid insistence on legal basis must be put in such a way as to obtain UN support. He did not favor emphasis on rights flowing from occupation or conquest, especially if UN involved and there was need to find another formula. It would be best to obtain UN guarantee of any agreement reached rather than have organization attempt settle problem possibly via General Assembly discussion.

Session ended at this point, with possibility left open [open?] for Foreign Ministers to discuss specific points raised by Spaak at afternoon meeting.⁵

Herter

⁵In the discussion in the afternoon session on April 3 the other NATO countries expressed a desire for the closest consultation between the four Western powers and the Council on Germany and it was agreed that the Working Group and the four Ministers would report to the Council at the end of April. (Circular telegram 1155, April 4; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-459)

254. Memorandum of Conversation

USDEL/MC/11

Washington, April 4, 1959, 9 a.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

APRIL 2-4, 1959

SUBJECT

Preparation of Western Position for Conference with Soviets

PARTICIPANTS

German Foreign Minister von Brentano

Ambassador Grewe

The Acting Secretary

Mr. Merchant

Ambassador Bruce

Mr. Hillenbrand

The Acting Secretary said he would like to speak frankly. We had studied the paper tabled by the Germans at the quadripartite ministerial

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1238. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Herter on April 13. A similar but much briefer account of this conversation is *ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2345 at 4:39 p.m. on April 4. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-459)

meeting on Wednesday¹ and it left us wondering. It seemed to contain little more than negatives. It was difficult to see how the Working Group could provide an attractive package with appeal to public opinion on the basis of such a paper, or even how the phased plan could be maintained. The Acting Secretary said he hoped that, as soon as possible, the German Government would come up with something more precise so that the Working Group could have something to begin on. The Acting Secretary said he knew, from a luncheon conversation with the German Foreign Minister,² that the latter was conscious of the fact that the German paper was negative. It appeared that the Western Powers were now at a standstill as far as the preparation of their position was concerned.

Von Brentano agreed that the German paper was predominately negative. However he felt that it was realistic. He thought it fallacious solely to emphasize that West Germany had more than 50 million people, as compared with the 17 million people in East Germany, and therefore should exercise much greater attraction in terms of its flourishing economy and comparative advantages. Those who said this did not really know how a totalitarian system operated, with its monolithic purposes opposed to the divisive forces within a democratic system. Therefore, he did not think there was a possibility of doing much more than suggested in the German paper if the risk of Communization of all of Germany were to be averted. If the recent proposals made by the SPD³ (which, of course, went beyond the working group report) were to be accepted, then he could personally guarantee that, within 5 years, Germany would at least be at the stage of Communization reached by Yugoslavia.

It was difficult to find an acceptable interim approach, von Brentano continued. This would involve an attempt to synthesize fire and water. The basic differences between the two systems were too great. The Pankow regime did not want to work together with the Federal Republic, but aimed at the subversion of all Germany. Behind this regime stood the Soviets. While differences in the social and economic fields could perhaps be overcome, the cleavage in the cultural and spiritual fields was too great.

The Acting Secretary noted that, perhaps the point at which our thinking diverged most was that we were more optimistic as to the

¹ See Document 250 and footnote 2 thereto.

² The conversation has not been identified further.

³ Reference is to the SPD "Plan for Germany" approved by the party on March 18 and released to the press the following day. The Embassy in Bonn transmitted the text of the plan as an enclosure to despatch 1440, March 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2359) For text, see *Dokumente*, Band 1, 1958–1959, Zweiter Halbband, pp. 1207–1222.

basic strength of West Germany. We believed that a point had been reached where the West Germans would resist Communistic blandishments. From all the information available to us, and in terms of our own estimates, the Federal Republic was apparently stronger than its own Government thought it to be. We had great faith in the strength of a free system.

Von Brentano said that what would follow he would not say gladly. He also felt that we must get out of the present deadlock. However, the Federal Republic had a great responsibility for the 50 million people in West Germany and must most carefully consider to what it could afford to commit itself. Present German leaders had lived through one totalitarian regime and had experienced how incapable Democracy is of resisting a totalitarian drive to power. It was not the Government that was weak, but the people. It was not really a question of there only being 17 million people in East Germany. The Red Army was still there. Acceptance of reunification would in effect mean suicide for the officials of the GDR. They would not concede this as long as the Red Army remained there. One spoke too lightly of contacts, von Brentano said. For example, take the question of contacts in the field of justice. The concept of justice in the two Germanies was entirely different. Eighty-five percent of the judges in the GDR were so-called "Peoples Judges." The whole structure of the Soviet Zone had changed completely, and any attempts at integration would mean subversion of the West. Von Brentano indicated he would have nothing fundamentally against trying out those ideas which could be safely carried out. For example, reciprocity relative to freedom of movement would be highly desirable. There is already freedom of movement into the Federal Republic from the GDR, but the Pankow regime is not prepared to permit its own inhabitants to leave freely. However, he felt that any institutionalization would necessarily involve great dangers. Perhaps the Acting Secretary was correct in saying that the Federal Republic undervalued its own strength. This was better than to overestimate it. [8 lines of source text not declassified]

The Acting Secretary said that, if it were granted that the Federal Republic had a difficult problem and feared the possibility of a coalition between the SPD and East German elements, he wondered how the German Foreign Minister envisaged the resulting situation in terms of long range solutions. Did he foresee a change in the internal political situation with the opposition moving away from the extreme left, or did he hope for a cultural change?

Von Brentano once again said that he would not say gladly what was to follow. He had already hinted yesterday, in the NATO Ministerial Meeting,⁴ that any attempt to deal with the German problem in

⁴ See Document 253.

isolation would bring more dangers than opportunities. It would be better to preserve the status quo for some time than to change it by entering into risks that were not calculable. Perhaps such a development as a first step towards disarmament might change the situation by lowering tensions and reducing Soviet insistence on keeping the GDR as an integral part of the Soviet bloc. It was not pleasant for a German to have to say this, but he felt the German problem was regarded as sort of a lock on the door which everyone was trying to open in order to escape from situations of tension.

The Germans recognized their responsibility for what had happened prior to 1945. What happened after 1945 was not their fault. It was out of their reach to change the division of Germany.

The Acting Secretary commented that the problem was described in the statement that it was out of practical reach to change anything. Basically the Federal Republic did not appear to want reunification, since there are no conditions it could foresee that would make it attractive. This created difficulties for the United States, since we have been supporting the German position for many years on the assumption that efforts to eliminate one of the causes of tension might lead to some sort of disarmament possibilities. We have said that the Berlin problem can be settled only in the context of the general German problem. We would now be confined to dealing only with Berlin.

Von Brentano said that he would report this discussion carefully and in detail. He fully recognized the difficulties with which we are faced. He understood that the Germans sometimes made big demands of their allies and he also saw that it was dangerous to go into a conference if public opinion could not be given the impression that the Western Powers were prepared to go one step forward.

The Acting Secretary said he felt the Soviets would win a bloodless victory of the first order if the Western Powers took the position that they did not want any political changes.

Von Brentano said that the United States had such an excellent Ambassador in Bonn that he would be interested in hearing his comments.

Ambassador Bruce stated that he thought we faced a practical problem. He agreed that it was unrealistic to think we could give up anything in West Germany to get real concessions from the Soviets. But because of the demands of the public we could not simply fall back on the old position of free elections. If we could agree on a package with a number of offers, even if the Soviets could not accept it, this would be good. The reversion to Geneva was unacceptable. What we must attempt to do is not to abandon principles, but to appear flexible in posture and tactics in order to bring about public understanding that it is the Soviets who are obstructing progress.

After its session in London the Working Group would have to make a report to the Ministers. It could not get anywhere unless the delegations were clearly instructed. It was bad to have the German Delegation join in drafting papers only subsequently to be repudiated by its own government. The problem must be solved for if, when the Foreign Ministers meet again late in April, there are still decided differences, the Soviets would exploit them as they had in the past. As a practical matter, the Soviets would not surrender their position except to gain a position more favorable to them. The Working Group must have some latitude in drawing up its proposals, otherwise the West will enter the Geneva conference in a disorganized fashion. The Acting Secretary said he concurred with Ambassador Bruce's remarks. He said that, even if the four Foreign Ministers could agree, there was also the problem of dealing with our NATO Allies.

Ambassador Grewe noted that, practically, this meant the Federal Republic must put forward some further concrete proposals, perhaps in lieu of the Laender scheme, which would fit into the stages of the reunification process.⁵ The Acting Secretary agreed in encouraging the Germans to produce something which would fall into place within the staged plan.

⁵ According to Bruce's Diary, he and Grewe talked privately after this conversation and the German Ambassador said that he approved Bruce's remarks and thought they should also be made to the Chancellor. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

255. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, April 4, 1959.

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

[Here follow an introductory paragraph and a table of contents.]

1. *Preparatory Military Measures*

a. In view of the possibility that the USSR may withdraw from its functions with respect to Berlin and in order to provide evidence of the

Source: Department of State, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany. Secret. A note on the first page indicates that this paper was an agreed tripartite plan evolving from the U.S. aide-mémoire of December 11, 1958 (see Document 98), and subsequent tripartite discussions culminating in the meeting on March 31. Copies of this paper were transmitted to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin on April 6 (Circular airgram CA-8581; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-659) and to the White House on April 7.

Three Powers' determination to maintain their free access, the military authorities of the Three Powers will plan quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence. These measures are to be implemented as soon as they have been agreed.

b. The military authorities of the Three Powers will also plan more elaborate military measures in Europe, which would be generally observable, including (1) measures to be implemented after the Soviet Government has turned its functions over to the GDR and (2) measures to be implemented after Allied traffic has been forcibly obstructed.

c. The planning of the measures described in paragraphs 1a and 1b above will be carried out on a tripartite basis under the general supervision of General Norstad in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe. The exact arrangements for the planning will be further concerted between the military authorities of the three countries. These military authorities will also plan measures on a purely national basis in support of the measures referred to above.

2. *Notice to Soviet Government*

The Three Ambassadors in Moscow should inform the Soviet Government at an appropriate time (1) that the Three Powers continue to hold the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics fully responsible under quadripartite agreements and arrangements concerning Berlin; (2) that the Three Powers have noted Soviet statements to the effect that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will withdraw from its remaining occupation functions with respect to Berlin: that they assume this means the Soviets intend to withdraw Soviet personnel from the Interzonal autobahn and railway checkpoints and from the Berlin Air Safety Center; (3) that the right of the Three Powers to unrestricted access to Berlin would remain unaffected by such Soviet withdrawal; (4) that the Three Powers will not tolerate any attempt on the part of the "German Democratic Republic" to assert any control over or to interfere with their traffic to and from Berlin via quadripartitely established routes, and that they would take all measures necessary to protect their rights in this connection; (5) that, if the Soviets withdraw, the Western Powers will act on the assumption (a) that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has decided to abolish unnecessary administrative procedures at interzonal borders, and (b) the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can and will, without benefit of exchange of flight information in the Berlin Air Safety Center, maintain absolute separation of Soviet aircraft and all other aircraft flying in the Soviet Zone from aircraft of the Three Powers flying in the Berlin corridors and the Berlin Control Zone; (6) that the Three Powers will expect their traffic to move freely to and from Berlin and will

assume the Soviets have given blanket assurance of safety of all Three Power aircraft in the Berlin corridors and the Berlin Control Zone.¹

3. *Public Statement*

There will be drawn up without delay a tripartitely agreed draft of a public statement to be made if and when the Soviet Government announces the imminent turning over of the checkpoints to the GDR. This statement would explain the legal construction which the Allied Governments place upon the Soviet announcement and the procedures they will follow.

4. *The "Agency Principle"*

The Three Powers cannot deal with GDR personnel as Soviet agents if the USSR denies that such an agency relationship exists. If, however, the USSR should ultimately propose a compromise under which the USSR, as principal, would expressly authorize GDR personnel to function as Soviet agents in performing Soviet functions with relation to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin, the Three Powers should consider the possibility of accepting such a compromise solution, with appropriate safeguards for their own rights.

5. *Identification of Allied Vehicles*

If Soviet personnel are withdrawn from the checkpoints, there would be no objection to providing mere identification of the vehicles of the Three Powers for the information of GDR personnel at the checkpoints.

6. *Continuation of Allied Traffic after Soviet Withdrawal*

If and when the Soviet personnel are withdrawn from the checkpoints, the Three Powers will make every effort to continue normal traffic by Autobahn and railroad, except that they will substitute for the procedures followed at present with the Soviet personnel those procedures which the Three Powers themselves have determined to be necessary to identify their trains, convoys, or vehicles as Allied movements

¹ The notice to the Soviets contemplated in this paragraph has already been given in part by the Three Powers' notes of December 31, 1958, which read in part as follows:

"As the Soviet Government knows, the French, British, and United States Governments have the right to maintain garrisons in their sectors of Berlin and to have free access thereto. Certain administrative procedures have been agreed with the Soviet authorities accordingly and are in operation at the present time. The Government (of the United States) will not accept a unilateral repudication on the part of the Soviet Government of its obligations with respect of that freedom of access. Nor will it accept the substitution of the regime which the Soviet Government refers to as the German Democratic Republic for the Soviet Government in this respect." [Footnote in the source text. Regarding the Western notes of December 31, 1958, see Document 118.]

entitled to unrestricted access and whatever procedures may be tripartitely agreed to be reasonable to enable the GDR personnel to ensure the orderly progress of traffic on the Autobahn or railroad.

7. *Detailed Procedures at Checkpoints*

The Three Embassies at Bonn, in consultation with the appropriate military headquarters, should complete the drafting of instructions to the commanders of military trains and convoys and to the drivers of individual vehicles regarding the procedures to be followed at the railroad and Autobahn checkpoints in the event of the withdrawal of Soviet checkpoint personnel. In drafting those instructions, provision will be made for a situation in which the Soviet Government has acknowledged the GDR personnel to be its agents and for a situation in which the Soviet Government has not done so. The Embassies, in consultation with the same military headquarters mentioned above, will also develop appropriate procedures for the identification of Allied movements and draft the above-mentioned instructions to conform with these procedures.

8. *Possible Substitution of Allied for Soviet Personnel*

The Three Powers should consider the possibility of substituting their own personnel for the Soviet personnel withdrawn from the Nowawes and Marienborn checkpoints.

9. *Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions*

If Allied surface access is interrupted as a result of an attempt by GDR personnel to enforce formalities or controls going beyond those which the Three Powers have determined to be acceptable (cf. paragraph 6 above), the Three Powers will then make a probe or probes to determine whether the Soviets are prepared to use force or to permit the use of force to prevent the passage of an Allied movement. The vehicles will be identified to the GDR personnel in accordance with the procedures which the Three Powers have agreed on, but no further inspection or control will be allowed. The movement will proceed until its passage is physically obstructed. It will not fire unless fired upon, but if fired upon will take whatever defensive action seems necessary.

10. *Efforts to Increase Pressure on USSR and GDR*

If the initial probe or probes as described in paragraph 9 above are physically obstructed, the Three Powers will make parallel efforts along the following lines to increase pressure on the USSR and the GDR:

a. The Three Powers will seek to mobilize world opinion against the USSR as a violator of agreements, as a user of force, and as a threat to the peace. A possibility is that the situation could be taken to the United Nations Security Council and, perhaps in the event of a Soviet veto, to a special session of the General Assembly. Consideration would be given

to further forms of diplomatic or other pressure, including the withdrawal of the Ambassadors of the Three Powers from Moscow.

b. The Three Powers will intensify their military preparations. At this point the preparations could include measures which would be readily observable.

11. *Use of Military Force*

a. The Three Governments will make jointly the appropriate decisions for restoring freedom of passage. The measures required for their implementation should be the object of a study by the tripartite staff in Paris.²

b. Supplementing military decisions, consideration might be given to possible economic measures.

12. *Air Access to Berlin*

a. As a concomitant to the above courses of action regarding surface access to Berlin, the Three Powers should, from the start, take steps to maintain their unrestricted air access to Berlin, which would be essential to maintaining the status and security of the city.

b. The Three Embassies at Bonn, in consultation with the tripartite staff in Paris or with other military headquarters as appropriate, should review or complete contingency planning to deal with the following aspects of the Berlin air access question:

- (1) Possible Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center;
- (2) Possible Soviet or East German threats against the safety of flights in the Berlin corridors and control zones;
- (3) Measures which might be taken to continue civil air services as long as possible in the event of any change in the present situation;
- (4) Possible establishment of a "garrison airlift" to transport Allied personnel and material as necessary in the event of an interruption of Allied surface traffic;
- (5) The possible substitution of military for civil aircraft to maintain air services to Berlin if civil aircraft cease operations;
- (6) Possible direct interference by the Soviets or East Germans with flights in the Berlin corridors or control zone; and
- (7) Flights in the Berlin corridors above 10,000 feet. (This issue might be resolved by a simple tripartite agreement to fly at an altitude appropriate to efficient operations of individual aircraft.)

c. Planning regarding b (4) and b (5) above should be conducted on the understanding that no policy decision has been taken on a "garrison airlift" or on the substitution of military for civil aircraft.

²See Document 227.

13. *Planning Responsibilities and Coordination*

a. The Tripartite Ambassadorial Group meeting in Washington is responsible for the over-all coordination of Berlin contingency planning and for the drafting of the statement mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

b. The Three Embassies at Bonn are primarily responsible for the development of recommendations regarding identification of Allied movements (paragraph 7 above), instructions regarding detailed procedures at the checkpoints (paragraph 7 above), and air access planning (paragraph 12 above).

c. The Tripartite Staff in Paris, under the supervision of General Norstad, is responsible for coordinating the preparatory military measures and the planning described in paragraph 1 above, for studying measures which might be taken to restore freedom of access (paragraph 11 above), and for assisting the Three Embassies at Bonn in carrying out their responsibilities as described in paragraph 13 b above.

d. The Ambassadors of the Three Powers to the United Nations are charged with making recommendations to their Governments regarding the basis and timing of a possible approach to the United Nations (cf paragraph 10 a above).

e. The Headquarters of the Three Powers in Berlin will give the Three Embassies at Bonn whatever assistance the latter may require in carrying out their responsibilities as described in paragraph 13 b above.

f. The military authorities in each of the Three Countries are responsible for the planning of measures on a purely national basis, as mentioned in paragraph 1 above, in support of tripartite by planned measures.

256. **Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research**

No. 7994

Washington, April 7, 1959.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT POSITION
ON THE BERLIN SITUATION¹

[Here follows a two-paragraph abstract of the paper.]

French Government Position

Throughout the current Berlin crisis the French official position has been firm, but the French have been extremely reluctant to initiate any

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret; Noforn.

¹ Similar reports on the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, Nos. 7995 and 7996, were prepared on April 8. (*Ibid.*)

negotiating positions which might be taken by the West. This is not to say that the French position is flabby but rather one of “stand-pattism” and not showing one’s cards. The French approach is undoubtedly based on the French interest in preserving as much as possible of the status quo. The French are most reluctant to assist in steps which might lead to a general European settlement adversely altering the relative power status of France vis-à-vis Germany or weakening the security of Western Europe.

Several factors need to be taken into account in explaining the French position. Unlike the German and the British governments the French government is not faced with a vigorous and effective opposition party in Parliament. This, of course, enables the French government to reveal as little of its position at any particular time as it sees fit with no need to parry the critical curiosity of the opposition party. It also means that the position taken need not represent an internal compromise—there is no need to accommodate the position to opposition demands. The result might well be a more stubborn, rigid attitude. A further factor related to this is the dominating personality of General de Gaulle. For the foreseeable future French policy is likely to be de Gaulle policy no matter what other views may be held at Foreign Office (or other ministerial) working levels. De Gaulle may, as in the past, fail to coordinate his policy in any very thorough manner with his Western allies but nonetheless, the end result is likely to be a position in favor of a firm Western stand, including the will to force access. De Gaulle’s policy is less likely than that of any Western power to encompass any disengagement—thinning out of forces—compromise schemes.

Of all the Western allies, France is the least interested in the reunification of West and East Germany. While the other Western allies see the Berlin crisis in terms of achieving general European solutions, the French are happy with the status quo and anxious to avoid the Berlin issue bringing about any weakening of the Western position via disengagement. This undoubtedly helps to account for the rigidity and legalistic character of the French approach. Whereas the French believe the other Western allies consider that the status of Berlin is only negotiable in terms of wider issues—Germany, Central Europe, disarmament—the French prefer to stand on legal rights and to confine the issues to the access question. This may be further reflected in a reluctance to engage in a Summit conference.

French Estimate of Soviet Objectives

In considering the Soviet objectives in precipitating the Berlin crisis the French Foreign Office at the outset (Nov. 14) believed that Khrushchev wanted to get US forces out of Europe and to prevent an armed, unified Western Europe. In a subsequent analysis, presented by the

French delegation of the Four Power Working Group in Paris on March 10, the French amplified their views. In an effort to perpetuate the present division of Germany the Soviets, in the French view, wish to constrain the West, by explicit recognition of East Germany, to share the responsibility for maintenance of the division of Europe. To achieve this goal, the Soviets are using Berlin and threat of war over Berlin to wring concessions from the West which France in particular is not willing to make. While France has nothing against the division of Europe in its present form, it cannot countenance this division within the framework of disarmament, disengagement, or weakening of the West's military posture vis-à-vis Soviet military strength.

French Views on Reunification, Disengagement, and Disarmament

De Gaulle has in private conversations clearly stated that he is no friend of German reunification (although offering it lip-service in public pronouncements). The reasons are obvious. France does not want the balance of power in Western Europe altered so as to increase the strength of Germany. Nor does it wish to see Western Germany cut loose from its Western military and economic ties. Quite apart from Germany, per se, reunification on terms acceptable to the Soviets would alter the entire military balance in Europe to the almost certain detriment of the West and this is an added reason for French aversion to reunification.

The French are very leery of disengagement and under the firm hand of General de Gaulle, whose thinking on this problem is premised on military rather than political considerations, there is likely to be great reticence on the part of the French government to agree to any of the disengagement plans currently under discussion (e.g., Rapacki plan, Kennan plan, Gaitskell plan).² Any partial disarmament as a possible concomitant of a Berlin settlement is equally unappealing to the French. Both disengagement and partial disarmament in the French view are likely to lead to a situation in which France is impotent and isolated in the face of a Soviet military threat. General de Gaulle has stated categorically (in his March 25 conference)³ that disengagement has no value for the French and that disarmament would only make sense in terms of a zone extending to the Urals. The French are against disarmament being one of the themes for discussion at a Ministerial or Summit conference with the Russians, since they consider that the West has no agreed posi-

² Regarding the Rapacki Plan, see footnote 2, Document 43. The Kennan plan is presumably a reference to George F. Kennan's "Disengagement Revisited" in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1959, vol. 37, pp. 187–210. The Gaitskell plan probably refers to Hugh Gaitskell's "Such a Policy Might Pay" in *Western World*, Spring 1958, pp. 36–44.

³ For a transcript of de Gaulle's press conference on March 25, see de Gaulle, *Statements*, pp. 41–51.

tion on disarmament and discussion of this subject would give the Soviets a chance to maneuver Communist China into the discussions.

Jules Moch has been quoted as saying that from the French point of view any two of the three proposals—reunification, an armed Germany, a neutral Germany—are acceptable but not all three together. It is no doubt with this in mind—even if only subconsciously—that the French are suspicious of reunification and German neutralism. They realize that a reunified and neutral Germany would hardly be left unarmed.

Berlin—Access and Rights

France, like the other Western allies, wants to maintain access to Berlin and the freedom of West Berlin. This has to do with prestige and with the fear that loss of Berlin (or weakening of the Allied position in Berlin) would inevitably result in the gradual breakup of NATO. In the French view, the Soviets are using Berlin as a gambit to maintain “a state of constant tension tending to weaken German resolve and bring about a desire for neutralism in Germany.” For this reason, regardless of other considerations, Berlin must be held. There must be no drift towards neutralism. The French consider that there are groups in West Germany of all political colorings that are inclined towards neutralism. Failure of the West to take a firm stand in Berlin might well enable these groups to impel West Germany into the neutralistic camp.

It is hardly surprising that the French have a rigid position—a legalistic approach toward the Berlin crisis. They want to maintain the European *status quo including that of Berlin*—not at the price of Berlin. They accordingly take a “tough” line, and de Gaulle is known to advocate maintaining access by every means possible not excluding force. He tempers this by saying that the West should not be provocative or use force first. The French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, has also stated categorically that the West cannot brook interference with air or land communications with Berlin. He considers it essential that the Western Allies retain the rights which they acquired by the German surrender, including freedom of communication with Berlin.

Berlin and the UN

As was to be expected, the French do not want to take the Berlin problem to the UN because they fear that UN debate could tie the hands of the West. They have reluctantly agreed to exploratory discussions with the UK and US Ambassadors at the UN but obviously intend to remain adamant regarding Western introduction of the issue into the UN for UN consideration. The most they would be willing to do is to go to the Security Council under Article 51 of the Charter to inform the Council of Allied measures taken in response to interference with access to Berlin. The French are especially concerned lest the approach to the UN might occur following a probe by the West but prior to the use of

force by the West with a resultant blockade situation in which the initiative passed from the Western Allies to the UN.

Foreign Office Views on Berlin

Although there is no French opposition attitude on Berlin there has been some indication that there have been some divergent views within the Foreign Office upon various aspects of handling the crisis. For some weeks following the Khrushchev speech of Nov. 10, the Foreign Office took no official position on the crisis in spite of the fact that the working level in the Foreign Office had consistently advocated a firm policy. The French Foreign Minister indicated at an early stage that he was inclined to feel that continued Western insistence on the "non-existence" of the East German government might be unrealistic. In early December Couve was reported as tentatively proposing negotiations on the whole German question as a means of appearing to give a positive reply to the Soviet Note of Nov. 27. In January Couve stated that although France in its reply to the Nov. 27 note was resolved to reject anything prejudicial to France's incontestable rights in Berlin, France is prepared, if there is any prospect of arriving at an accord, to discuss the entire German problem including reunification and a peace treaty. The Foreign Office has also had some internal divergence of opinion regarding Soviet motives. One leading official (formerly French Ambassador to Moscow) believes the Russians may be willing to lose East Germany (in the sense of troop withdrawal) to obtain a neutralized, united Germany. The working level of the Foreign Office rejects this view.

Regardless, however, of these apparent divergent opinions, the Foreign Office is certain to follow the line met [set?] by de Gaulle, and part of the "rigidity" of the French position may stem from the fact that the Foreign Office must wait to receive its cue before disclosing its position. Because de Gaulle (as is recognized by the Foreign Office) is unpredictable, it is necessary to adopt an extremely circumscribed approach on any theme on which de Gaulle's views are not yet known.

[1 paragraph (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

Berlin and NATO

Since the accession of de Gaulle to power, it has been apparent that the French are determined to acquire a role in NATO equal to that of the UK and superior to that of Germany. The Berlin crisis may prove to be of great assistance to them in this endeavor because of the close working arrangements, both military and political, among the Three Powers, which the new situation has necessitated. It seems likely that the French will exploit the situation to the full. (French anger towards the US in connection with the Algerian-Moroccan problems may also provide a manipulatable lever in achieving French NATO aims. The French Foreign Minister has very recently stated that US unilateral action in decid-

ing in principle to supply Morocco with arms would encourage de Gaulle in taking unilateral French actions vis-à-vis NATO to achieve French goals. The US and other NATO countries, faced with the Berlin crisis, will be obliged to discourage any actions which would impair the cohesiveness of NATO as a military force.)

One rather strange suggestion, somewhat unemphatically made by the French on one or two occasions, is that a tenuous relationship for a reunified Germany with NATO (parallel perhaps to the Russo-Finnish relationship) might somehow be developed as a part of the solution of Berlin. This idea, still very nebulous, seems likely to remain so in view of the improbability of Russian acceptance of any kind of military affiliation of a united Germany with the West.

Conclusions

There are undoubtedly large segments of the French population, particularly the Communists, which are opposed to the firm policy of the French government on Berlin. However, in view of the existing political situation in France, it seems unlikely that dissident groups have had, or are likely to have, any significant influence upon decisions taken by the de Gaulle government. While fear of war as a consequence of the Berlin situation certainly exists in France as in the rest of West Europe, the absence of an effective opposition to exploit this aspect has meant that the government has not had to cater to the public's fear.

In sum, the French throughout this Berlin crisis, both because of the present political situation within France and the foreign policy aims of the French government, have taken a very firm stand. They will bend every effort to maintaining the status quo in Berlin with freedom of access for the Western Allies. They will balk at any step which may be taken to solve the Berlin crisis if it seems likely to have an adverse effect upon France's military security. For various reasons—e.g., the existence of a strong government, lack of opposition, France's geographic position on the continent, concern regarding Germany's future vis-à-vis France—France has responded to the Berlin crisis in a manner that seems to take into account to a far lesser degree the actual dangers and implications of war than has been the case in the UK or even West Germany. While General de Gaulle's actions and pronouncements are often unexpected as to timing and content, there seems no reason to think that France's policy on Berlin will become any less firm. The French are unlikely to cause the US any major difficulties in any aspect other than procedural matters, provided that the US position itself remains firm. France's own firm policy, as de Gaulle himself has said, is predicated on American power and leadership.

In a conversation with the Acting Secretary of State on March 31,⁴ the French Foreign Minister outlined several of the principal elements of the French position on Berlin. In particular he stressed the need for maintenance of rights, a tough policy rather than flexibility, a desire to avoid implicating the UN, and general mistrust of British policy.

⁴See Document 246.

**257. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the
Department of State**

Moscow, April 9, 1959, 7 p.m.

2034. As Four Power Working Group prepares resume preparation of Western negotiating position for Foreign Ministers' Conference, believe it should be useful sum up various aspects of Soviet position as they are likely to unfold at Geneva. Developments for possible later Summit meeting are largely excluded since too much will depend on interim events.

Kremlin objectives now seem clear. Primary one is to achieve result which will in fact amount to Western acceptance of East European status quo epitomized by some sort of recognition of GDR. This is, of course, to be accomplished with as much loss as possible of Western prestige and political stature so as to produce maximum disorganization of NATO, West European unity efforts, defense measures, and West German domestic stability. However, latter gains would at present time serve essentially as icing for Soviet cake, main ingredient of which is to be legitimization of "irrevocable" incorporation of Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany into "socialist camp". This does not mean that achievement of latter aim by Moscow would herald end of Communist-led political warfare against West in Europe (or elsewhere), but it would create new phase and changed conditions of struggle, perhaps related to Khrushchev's concept of economic competition of two worlds which has prerequisite in his eyes of full consolidation of Eastern empire (Soviet hegemony).

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-959. Secret. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

Berlin has been lever by which Kremlin has pried loose Western resistance to top-level conferences, and Soviets will undoubtedly contrive to continue to keep it in forefront of attention in coming weeks and months as means of persistent pressure on most vulnerable Allied point. This is not to say that status of and arrangements for Berlin are not themselves important element in overall Kremlin force play to obtain acknowledgment of status quo, but this probably secondary. Indeed, if Moscow should approximately succeed in its major ambition, British may well be correct in assuming that West can get "improved title" providing better-defined access rights and other matters, though probably no longer on basis of occupation rights, and certainly involving agreement to some sort of GDR role and to some diminution of those "subversive activities" which most directly impinge on GDR internally and which are thus incompatible with new agreement on status quo. On other hand, Embassy would emphasize that if Western position on what adds up to status quo proves unyielding during negotiations (including Summit), Berlin issue is likely to prove insoluble and to develop to point where military considerations and contingency plans for serious trouble will forcefully enter picture.

We are not predicting unavoidable outbreak of war at that point, but serious danger of it and, at minimum, start of active Soviet probing and pressures on Allied and (eventually) West German access to Berlin. This is not because, having started crisis and committed his prestige, Khrushchev must, for sake of his domestic power position and worldwide "face", produce victory, although that is factor always deserving consideration. Main reason, rather, is that Khrushchev is in deadly earnest, on basis of Soviet national interest, as he sees it, in aiming for fatal blow at Western pretensions to challenging existing boundaries of Soviet empire. Since he undoubtedly conceives of himself as being in strategic situation vis-à-vis West which is much improved over that of recent years, and in tactical position at Berlin which is almost ideal, he will not surrender his advantages and return to situation which existed prior to November 10 last year without major effort (if even then or at all) in which all Soviet power and advantages of position will have been brought into play. However, it would be at some point during this major effort that Soviets would presumably have to decide about peace or war, and we continue to believe that there will be great Soviet desire to avoid letting matters get out of hand.

Under this analysis, therefore, crisis over Berlin status involving unilateral Soviet actions would be most unlikely prior to and during Foreign Ministers Conference. If latter were complete failure, tension arising directly from Berlin might begin to increase and troubles develop even before Summit Meeting, although definite agreement to latter would almost surely cause Soviets to hold back until it too had taken

place. This does not mean, of course, that Communist side will not talk great deal about plans for changed Berlin status throughout next months as pressure tactic.

As for Soviet tactics at Foreign Minister Meeting itself, initial positions are, of course, on record and will be brought forth at early stage regarding peace treaty, reunification (confederation), and question of Czech and Polish participation, as well as on "solution" for West Berlin. We would not be surprised if Western negotiators, after hard bargaining, gradually encounter series of Soviet "fall-back" positions on individual articles of peace treaty, on specifics of Berlin solution, and on temporary or provisional exclusion of Czechs and Poles from meeting. Essential sticking point, however, would always be over agreement with any Western proposals which would obviate necessity for West to give substantial de facto recognition to GDR. While we would not anticipate much Soviet initiative on European security aspects of problem, Moscow will probably be ready discuss some items, including versions of Rapacki Plan arms freezes and other limitations, providing that these proposals operate explicitly towards confirming general status quo and would not be disadvantageous to Soviet military position.

In terms of attaining basic Soviet objectives, directly suitable vehicle for Moscow is Soviet form of East-West German confederation which would, in effect, sanctify existing split of Germany and perpetuate two states into indefinite future. Soviets will probably play this game by ear depending on their assessments of West German political scene. Their immediate reaction to Adenauer decision to seek presidency¹ is that incalculable new elements of fluidity have entered picture which cannot but encourage their hopes for greater ascendancy of those West German forces willing to dicker with Moscow and Pankow. (Recent Soviet publication of SPD reunification scheme² was undoubtedly meant to bolster those same forces.) Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers have no doubt gotten hold of information indicating major cleavages within Bonn Foreign Office and CDU on proper policy response to Soviet challenge, and may even have heard of recent Adenauer vacillation.

Soviet negotiators can thus be expected to make major probe of exploitability of political currents in West Germany who may be willing to abandon long-standing Western policy on reunification. They likely to assume that if official West German position becomes soft, France and especially UK will not overly object, and US will be unable to do more than slow down trend. Presence at Geneva of representatives of two German states will provide opportunity for Soviets and East Germans to

¹ On April 7 Adenauer had announced his decision to seek the Presidency of the Federal Republic.

² See footnote 3, Document 254.

indulge in numerous maneuvers to wage varied political and psychological warfare to get delegates of both Germanies together by themselves as big first step towards political dealing.

Peace treaty discussion is not quite as salable a topic as confederation for Soviet moves towards consolidating status quo, but it has obvious possibilities nevertheless. Attractiveness to some Germans of simple treaty with two German states might increase if Soviets dropped what amount to punitive provisions and to clauses loaded to favor Communist cause, especially if Soviets seem to introduce new articles with implied concessions. Such Moscow shifts are therefore conceivable. Threat of separate Soviet treaty with GDR will be kept in readiness for appropriate use, if possible, to promote primary objective.

There is some chance that Soviets will attempt to sweeten general atmosphere immediately prior to Foreign Ministers Conference by making enough concessions at Geneva Atom Test Talks to produce agreement there. This would strengthen hand of Westerners arguing for flexibility and asserting that USSR genuinely desires negotiation and compromise. More specifically, it might well give impetus to advocates of European security arrangements who desire various arms limitation and inspection schemes even when separated from progress on European political settlements. Although we are inclined to think that any major new Soviet proposals in this field (and global disarmament) are likely to be held back for Khrushchev himself to introduce at summit, Moscow probably has greater area for relatively safe concessions in this field than in any other, and signs of this may show up with Foreign Ministers. Difficulty for Kremlin is that it is possible for Western statesmen to design security plans which might attract many Westerners and even meet some of Soviet considerations without necessarily involving de facto recognition of GDR and status quo. This would not fulfill primary Kremlin aim which is, after all, not enhanced military security for USSR but protection of their basic political situation. Considerations of this nature may explain signs of relative Moscow disinterest in security questions, which, indeed, are not even on Soviet agenda for Foreign Ministers.

As suggested above, Berlin itself may not initially be major focus of negotiations (once Soviets have tabled their plan) until USSR determines trend of conference on other topics. However, if it becomes apparent that fundamental Western position on German problem is not changing from that of recent years, Moscow is likely to step up conference emphasis on Berlin itself in effort to use settlement of its status as last resort means for breaking Allied position and attaining own goals.

It is clear that Soviet aims require Moscow to be appealing incessantly to Western (especially West German and British) opinion during negotiations probably coupled with threats in attempt to force changes in Western stand. As in other recent talks with USSR, therefore, it is illusory to expect any maintenance of secrecy except on certain informal occasions.

Thompson

258. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, April 10, 1959, 5 p.m.

860. Reference: Berlin tel to Bonn 694 rptd Dept 778 Paris 185.¹ Beginning with and largely resulting from President Eisenhower's March 16 statement on Berlin² there has been noticeable abatement tension throughout population. American firmness credited with success in achieving abandonment by Soviets of Khrushchev's November ultimatum. Abatement tension partly mere temporary relief that May 27 now no longer represents in Berlin deadline date beyond which no one could make plans or have hopes with any sense of reality. Berliners by no means feel that their city has been saved, but their hope that it will be is now grounded on a feeling that they have strong friends and real support, not merely on their own courage. They will continue to follow most closely all developments connected with the formulation of Western policy, especially with the crucial question whether US prepared resort to force if necessary.

Congressional interest manifested by visits 18 Representatives and 3 Senators during recent weeks and firm bipartisan assurances of backing for President's stand re Berlin as well as numerous statements by SecDefense and US military leaders (Norstad, Twining, White, Taylor) have had uplifting effect.

Firmness re Berlin NATO FonMins, certainty of East-West FonMin meeting, and strong probability subsequent summit conference have

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1059. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, Paris, and London.

¹ Document 209.

² See Document 225.

materially contributed to improved atmosphere, as have unexpectedly favorable economic trends (Berlin's G-367 SecState, G-185 Bonn).³

On other hand there is in Berlin considerable apprehension re confusion surrounding international debate on Berlin and all German problems. Berliners' gratification over apparent unanimous determination that they shall be saved is tempered by concern generated from dispute as to methods by which they may be saved and worry as to whether hopes of German unity might be sacrificed for Berlin. There is also continuing and grave concern about British position and fear that British Govt may for domestic reasons drag US into some sort arrangement in which valuable ground may be bartered away for the sake of agreement to ease international tensions which may prove illusory in long run.

Mayor Brandt is emphatic in his belief that Sovs hope obtain some kind agreement introducing new element into status Berlin or altering that status, even if only implicitly, in manner which might permit it in some unforeseeable way to be eroded by Sovs. He strongly feels that maintenance status quo is preferable to any compromise. Despite weakness, present legal basis constitutes clearer claim right maintain occupation forces Berlin, Brandt believes, than any compromised situation which would give "batteries of Communist lawyers" opportunity over period years nibble away at legal position occupying powers. Mayor Amrehn, even more than Brandt, is fearful of results if East-West conference separates German problem from Berlin problem and deals with latter in isolation. Both mayors, most political leaders, and newspapers such as influential *Tagesspiegel* believe that failure reach East-West understanding re Berlin and subsequent showdown would be preferable to any change which could possibly weaken legal basis Western presence. Berlin leaders all view with apprehension any solution involving transfer occupying powers' responsibilities to UN. Interior Senator Lipschitz said "Commies would need only 24 hours seize West Berlin by force, and UN obviously incapable making immediate decision and acting swiftly enough to resist such a seizure." He added, "interminable deliberations after fact would not restore city's freedom."

Gufler

³ Dated April 3, it transmitted Berlin Weekly Stability Report No. 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 862A.00/4-359)

259. Notes of Discussion

Washington, April 11, 1959, 10 a.m.

[Here follows a list of participants.]

Mr. Gordon Gray explained that he had suggested this meeting primarily to consider the two studies on military and nonmilitary actions which might be taken to maintain allied access to Berlin after such access has been unacceptably interfered with. Mr. Gray suggested that if agreement could be reached on these studies at this meeting, the principals responsible for the studies plus other officials as determined by the President, might go to Augusta on Thursday of next week (the usual NSC meeting time) to present these reports to the President.

General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had found the military paper on the Four Alternative Uses of Force generally O.K., but were very opposed to including the Summary and Conclusions. The Chiefs felt that only the basic study should be submitted to the President. The Chiefs had some comments on the study on non-military measures, but had found it generally O.K.

Mr. Irwin said that Defense found the papers generally O.K., subject to a few changes which could be worked out without taking them up at this meeting.

General Twining added that the Joint Chiefs recommend that the military paper be sent to General Norstad, and that his comments be awaited before submitting it to the President.

Mr. Gray showed some charts which had been prepared by CIA based on the Summary and Conclusions of each of the studies. Mr. Gray also said that the Joint Chiefs had some maps to illustrate the studies. He suggested that these might provide a means of presentation of the reports to the President, subject to the decisions as to the content of the reports.

Mr. Murphy said that he would go along with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He felt it would be premature to present these studies to the President next Thursday. He thought we should have the reaction of General Norstad's Paris Planning Group first. Mr. Murphy said that this whole problem was in flux and, unless there were to be preliminary presentation to the President, more time would be required. He pointed out that the International Working Group will reconvene in London next Monday (April 13, 1959), and we should know more as a result of those meetings.

Source: Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Executive Secretary Subject Files, Berlin Contingency Planning. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Conference Room at the White House.

Mr. Gray said that was a respectable viewpoint, but his experience indicated that nothing was ever really ready, and meanwhile we go along making decisions by the force of events. He asked what national security policy decisions the President has to make. Mr. Gray understood that Defense and JCS were deeply concerned at the Four-Power Working Group report. In summary, Mr. Gray wondered whether the President's reactions and comments on these two studies would not be helpful now.

Mr. Irwin pointed out regarding the military study that the paper does not include Norstad's planning for a possible probe. Mr. Irwin pointed out that if the paper was sent to General Norstad it would probably go into the Three-Power Planning Group.

Mr. Gray questioned whether this group would want to put the military study into the Three-Power Planning Group without the President's knowing what has been put in there. Secretary McElroy said he thought the President should have the study and read it before it is put into the Four-Power Group. Mr. Gray suggested then that a decision be made whether to have the Thursday meeting with the President.

General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs wanted the military paper sent to the Three-Power Group in order to smoke out just what our allies are willing to do. He said that the reports to date were not encouraging. Secretary McElroy agreed that we want to find out whether our allies are prepared to go along with us. Mr. Gray said the question was whether responsible people think these studies are ready for the President. Secretary McElroy agreed that there were two or three things that still needed to be straightened out.

Mr. Murphy questioned whether there should be one paper or the entire problem submitted to the President. The State Department has visualized giving the President a comprehensive briefing on the entire problem of Berlin and Germany. Mr. Gray said that he had proposed that only the two studies be submitted to the President at this time. Mr. Murphy also thought that General Norstad should see the military study. Mr. Gray asked whether the military or the non-military studies should now be submitted to the President. Mr. Murphy thought that they should be submitted only after General Norstad's comments have been received. General Twining said he wanted General Norstad's comments but he also wanted the views of our allies as soon as possible. He said that until we submit our views the British have indicated that they will not plan for these contingencies.

Mr. Gray pointed out that May 11 is going to be a very important date. If Defense is to be prepared to take the steps contemplated in these studies, they need to know.

Mr. Murphy felt that General Norstad [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] should have a reasonable time of three or four days, and then be asked to reflect his views before the studies go to the President. Mr. Irwin suggested that the studies could be sent to London tomorrow (April 12, 1959) for delivery to General Norstad by people who are going over with the working group. Secretary McElroy agreed that we should have General Norstad's comments before submitting the studies to the President. He also believed that they should be submitted to the President before they are given to a Three-Power group. However, we must as soon as possible get these studies into a Three-Power group.

Mr. Gray questioned whether after General Norstad's comments were received, how the studies should be presented to the President. Secretary McElroy thought that next Thursday would be a nice date to plan on and then let the President decide what further he wanted to do. Mr. Murphy suggested that the studies be given to the President to read and then he can decide what he wants to do about a meeting. Secretary McElroy thought that the President should be asked to read the studies looking toward Three-Power action. In answer to Mr. Gray's question as to whether the non-military paper would also be submitted, Mr. Murphy said that State would like the President to read that as well. Mr. Irwin suggested that the non-military paper be treated the same as the military. It was generally agreed that these two studies should be treated the same, and that an overall memorandum of transmittal to the President should be agreed upon.

In answer to Mr. Gray's question, General Cabell suggested that the intelligence splits in the military paper not be hidden. General Cabell felt that the users of that document should see those split views. General Twining said he thought that was right. Mr. Gray agreed that the intelligence splits should not be hidden but questioned whether the principals would like to express their views on these splits. Secretary Quarles thought the President may not wish the principals to resolve these splits. He thought that they should be presented as balanced judgments. Mr. Gray pointed out that these are very fundamental splits, and that the President may have to decide. However, Mr. Gray understood that the principals do not want to try to resolve them.

Mr. Gray then questioned whether the principals should address themselves to the timing of the various measures in the study. Mr. Murphy thought that making plans for these measures was essential but he personally did not think that any of them would ever happen. General Twining said that the JCS did not think that the specific actions that should be taken at any given time can be accurately predicted in advance. Mr. Irwin thought that we must make our plans for the worst contingencies in any case.

Mr. Gray then summed up his understanding that the remaining disagreements on the two studies would be ironed out—that the non-military paper would go along with the military, plus an agreed memorandum of transmittal—and that we would await General Norstad's comments before sending the studies to the President.

General Twining asked whether the summary and conclusions were going to be sent to General Norstad. Admiral Triebel expressed his concern because the study itself does not make clear that a "garrison airlift" has already been agreed upon.

Mr. Gray asked whether there should be any conclusions. General Twining suggested that the military paper begin with the body of the study on page 10, and that there be no conclusions. This was agreed. It was also agreed that the summary on the non-military paper was O.K.

Mr. Murphy suggested that both General Norstad and the planning group in Bonn get the non-military paper. Mr. Gray suggested that if either of them had any comments they might also go to the President with the paper.

Mr. Gray then asked what decisions were needed regarding the so-called "phased plan" which was going back to the Four-Power Working Group. He asked whether there were any differences between State and Defense on this plan. Also he wondered if there were any policy decisions on the high altitude flight to Berlin.

On the latter question, General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs were waiting for the U.S. reply to go back to Moscow. Secretary Quarles said that Secretary Herter had cleared that an additional high altitude flight might be made, but not until the U.S. note had been delivered in Moscow. Then, there was to be a limit of one flight. General Norstad had been told to be prepared for this flight but to await further word.

General Twining said that Admiral Dudley now had received some new comments from the Joint Chiefs on the "phased plan". Mr. Irwin said that there are differences between State and Defense on which they would be getting together with State after this meeting.

At Mr. Murphy's request, Mr. Merchant said that the May 11 meeting would deal with Germany with all its aspects and Berlin. He did not worry as much as Mr. Gray over the "phased plan" or possible differences. At the May 11 meeting we will present four positions:

1. On Berlin, which will be simple if we mean what we say about not being kicked out.
2. On reunification of Germany.
3. On European security arrangements.
4. On a German peace treaty.

On Berlin, we are working from a clear national policy, only the modalities have to be worked out. On reunification, we are working from

existing policy based on free elections. On the peace treaty, there is a clear policy going back to 1955. European security is the only area where there is discussion between State, Defense and JCS as to whether extensions of past policy should be worked in, in order to obtain the support of public opinion for our position. This area also deeply involves the attitude of our allies. The question is how much of our 1957 disarmament proposals we will include in the plan. We must obviously talk this question out with our allies.

Mr. Merchant said there is also the question of stationing certain missiles in Germany. Defense and JCS do not wish to waive that right, whereas the British, French and West Germans would waive it. He pointed out that, after all, we cannot make the West Germans refuse to waive that right.

Mr. Merchant said there was also the question of inserting surprise attack formulas in the package. Defense and JCS are reviewing our past positions on this subject during the next two weeks. This question must also be determined in part by discussions with our allies.

Mr. Merchant summed up that some of these questions may be ones on which State and Defense will have to get a command decision. However, he thought that they were not yet matured sufficiently for presentation to the President. As far as the other aspects of the negotiations are concerned, Mr. Merchant said that he does not feel unprepared as regards to policy, and the rest of the problem involves tactics. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Acting Secretary of State would certainly want to get the President's approval to positions before going to the negotiations.

Mr. Irwin agreed generally with Mr. Merchant. He said that what points of difference there were were related to the European security arrangements. He felt that the U.S. position should not be based on the feelings of our allies, but rather we should determine what position we wish to take with our allies. Mr. Gray agreed that the problem was that the U.S. position should not be determined by our allies. Mr. Merchant said that he had intended to suggest that our position be influenced by, but not determined by, our allies.

Mr. Gray said that he was only concerned that, if basic decisions involving national security were required, that they be secured in time.

Mr. Murphy said that the State Department was determined to get a decision on their European security proposals. He hoped that they could be reconciled with Defense, but that otherwise they would certainly go to the President in ample time for his decision. In answer to Mr. Gray, Mr. Murphy said that we must get the President's decision before the Four-Power Working Group meetings are finished.

Secretary Quarles said they had discussed with Secretary Herter the problems of disarmament and surprise attack. As a result, both State and Defense have instituted a broad attack on both problems. Mr. Quarles felt that these problems were much the most serious. He referred to the 1957 policy on disarmament and said that it was very dangerous to make piecemeal changes in that document. He urged that we block out the disarmament issues in a way which would identify any revisions in the August 1957 policy. He felt sure that there must be time for the President to consider this issue, or otherwise we might make a dangerous slip. Secretary Quarles said that he did not disagree with the State Department on the need for negotiating tactics, but he felt that we should be very clear on our policy before playing it in a conference.

Mr. Gray said that he assumed from this discussion that a decision would be sought from the President in a broad and timely way.

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, April 11, 1959, 2 p.m.

2283. London for Hillenbrand. All reasons for Adenauer's decision seek presidency¹ and for timing his action, and their relative importance can probably never be determined.

Macmillan's trip Moscow gave Adenauer deep concern from start. To him fact of trip itself, quite apart from any results it might have, constituted dangerous and totally unnecessary step, which could only be interpreted by Khrushchev as evidence significant disunity in Western camp. The substantive by-products of trip can only have confirmed Adenauer's fears and justified his apprehensions. That Macmillan and Khrushchev should have agreed officially explore further some form alteration of existing military and security arrangements Central Europe, undoubtedly added to his resentment and gloom.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.13/4-1159. Secret; Priority; Noform. Transmitted in three sections and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Rome, Berlin, and Vienna.

¹ Adenauer announced his candidacy for President on April 7; for his account of the background to this decision, see *Erinnerungen*, pp. 489 ff. A shorter discussion of the party factors involved was transmitted in telegram 2251 from Bonn, April 9. (*Ibid.*, 762A.13/4-959)

Secretary Dulles' visit to Bonn early February² was closely followed by announcement his illness. It not difficult imagine how deeply Chancellor must have been affected by possibility his relationship with Secretary Dulles which was epitome close collaboration and common policy with US, might now be coming to end. It would, in our view, be wrong underestimate effect upon Chancellor's outlook on future, of coincidence of Secretary's illness with what to him seemed to be venomous fruits of Macmillan's trip Moscow and, in fact, of his overall posture thereafter.

Whether, and if so, to what extent Chancellor has formed impression of trend toward general abandonment basic positions held by West, and by him and Secretary Dulles in particular, we will probably never know. By "basic position" the Chancellor naturally means his own views on any subject, at heart of which lies his unshakeable conviction nothing must be allowed threaten presence US forces Germany. We know he has long felt there is practically nothing argue about as to what constitutes right and proper attitude of West toward the Soviet Union, and that all discussions such concepts as "flexibility" are to him not merely useless but pernicious. It not unreasonable suppose that in light his own convictions and suspicious nature, the Chancellor may have become increasingly fearful that West on way down slippery slope dangerous concessions under pressure from the Soviet Union.

In view of Chancellor's political record and public comportment would doubtless be mistake attribute excessive weight to effect personal attacks upon him as one remaining obstacle to possibility reasonable accommodation Soviet Union. However he is in certain respects curiously and intensely emotional human being. While he has always publicly welcomed and prided himself upon Soviet attacks against him when Secretary Dulles was similar target, would be rash suppose his temperamental robustness has not been somewhat impaired of late by addition the British press onslaught of last few weeks at time when he no longer so sure US standing rock-like beside him. We feel that prominence he gave in his public address on April 8³ to Anglo-German relations indicative that he deeply troubled by this matter.

We do not know how Chancellor assessed implications recent discussions Washington, to what extent von Brentano's report to him may have increased his doubts, and weighed on his mind at time when he was considering decision which he finally took that same day. However we feel one cannot reasonably exclude possibility that combination, or the mere culmination, of factors broadly discussed above may have

² See Documents 165–169.

³ A copy of this address is in Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327.

played role precipitating his decision, at least at time and in form in which it was taken.

By virtue of very nature Adenauer's reasoning as analyzed above, Chancellor would not wish to reveal it to public, and line given out by his closest advisers and picked up by all CDU naturally puts total emphasis on domestic political aspects his action. Furthermore, internal problems succession and continuity have undoubtedly been increasingly weighing upon Adenauer, and certainly uppermost in thoughts his closest advisers and friends. How decision, and events expected flow from it, are viewed politically in FedRep are discussed below without further reference to private worries of Chancellor which stemmed mostly from external sources.

It certainly not Adenauer's intention leave helm during period conferences ahead and we have found no CDU politicians who sense any defeatism or resignation in Chancellor or in his party as result his action. Rather we and other observers find throughout CDU elation that good solution worrisome problem transition with which grim fact of Adenauer's age faces party, has now been found. CDU believes Chancellor determined and politically able maintain his policies through critical months ahead, and has now taken steps which he hopes will assure their continuance for years and will promote future election prospects party and his chosen successor as Chancellor.

Problems leadership transition and policy continuity after Adenauer have long troubled CDU leaders and have, to our knowledge, been active in Chancellor's mind at least for past three or four months as approaching end Heuss' term⁴ presents opportunity do something about them. Chancellor's tentative move January make Krone President was taken with these problems in mind, and in subsequent search for another candidate succession to Chancellorship has been first consideration. Chancellor's closest party advisers have become convinced would be vastly preferable for Adenauer use his prestige and authority to direct changeover than have it settled in free-for-all under uncertain future circumstances. Globke and Krone have pressed these considerations on Chancellor, building up potential powers presidency and pointing out to him that despite his extraordinary vigor, he will increasingly have to save energies for great issues only, and forcing him consider that even he could not be sure leading 1961 campaign, as he wished to do, at 85. In this connection there are reports Adenauer's family, physician, and close personal friends such as Pferdmenges have for some time been urging him consider giving up Chancellorship in order spare himself. With presidential elections set for July 1, Adenauer had

⁴ President Heuss' term was due to expire in September 1959.

to act before mid-June at latest, and meeting party committee to seek presidential candidate had been called for April 7.

Furthermore, present state international affairs certainly tends convince Adenauer his foreign policy can only be continued by one wholly dedicated to it. Although Economics Minister Erhard's claims to succession have been steadily growing stronger, Adenauer's preference is for Finance Minister Etzel. Present offers best chance make Etzel, who for years has been active supporter European integration, Chancellor and to have time build up his popularity and prestige to point where he can lead and win 1961 elections in order to stay in. Etzel's name, highly respected in political circles but little known popularly, now frequently mentioned in press and parties; many CDU deputies have gone out their way to praise him to us as next Chancellor.

As regards implications and consequences of change, situation can perhaps be best summed up in phrase: "We are not in end but in beginning of end of Adenauer era". Nature of German policy for next two years—(until 1961 elections) will to large extent depend on who succeeds Adenauer as Chancellor next September. This question already the big issue in Bonn political circles especially among CDU/CSU deputies, and there is general agreement that either Etzel or Erhard will be next Chancellor. To some extent Adenauer is gambling. Deputies will be aware that their future election will not depend on Adenauer and his power over faction will be correspondingly lessened. Although as President Adenauer may make first proposal for new Chancellor it not certain he can then still command faction support.

When several weeks ago Chancellor tried shelve Erhard by pushing him into presidency, he was publicly overriden by CDU Bundestag faction and an unprecedented expression popular desire to keep Erhard in active politics. This rebuff was taken bitterly by Chancellor and is another element of discouragement which may have influenced his present decision. More importantly, incident is generally evaluated as a mandate for Erhard and his economic policies from general public and CDU Bundestag faction and is evidence that if Etzel wants chancellorship he may be able marshal overwhelming support against possible efforts by Adenauer to name another. It seems doubtful to us that Adenauer would risk such a showdown and we expect he will, therefore, have to reckon with Erhard in question of forming next government.

Under either Etzel or Erhard, strength of CDU dissidents (such as Gerstenmaier and Gradl, with their emphasis on greater tactical flexibility in seeking reunification) in Bundestag faction will probably increase to certain extent once Chancellor's personal control of CDU removed when he assumes presidency. If Etzel becomes Chancellor, we may expect continuation basic elements Chancellor's policies; and in period be-

fore next election unlikely that CDU dissidents would bring about any significant alterations foreign policy. If Erhard becomes Chancellor there might be some change—most notably there would probably be less emphasis on European integration, Common Market and special alignment with France than under Adenauer. Furthermore, Erhard's good friend Gerstenmaier may have more influence foreign affairs. Under either Etzel or Erhard FedRep's close relations with and reliance on US and its firm support of NATO should remain unchanged. It worth emphasizing that CDU headed not only by Adenauer but by great number strong men who broadly share his views and that an important element of Adenauer's power has been popularity his policies. There accordingly little reason expect any upheaval FedRep's policies. Over longer run those who advocate greater flexibility may gain influence but they will have to fight for it.

Adenauer may also have been oversold on powers presidency. Legally they very limited indeed and real power rests in chancellorship. If Adenauer's man in that job then potential considerable but with an opponent as Chancellor, President is hamstrung. Adenauer may be shocked to see how fast his star falls once real power out of his hand and others run cabinet, Bundestag faction and party. However, would be misleading underestimate Adenauer's cleverness, and by appeals to public, personal influence and use of representative nature of office to deal with foreign powers he might make it very influential position. It will certainly be different from situation under Heuss.

At present stage feel following conclusions justified:

1. Adenauer seems sure be elected President July. His enemies are so delighted see him leave office Chancellor and probably fearful that he might remain Chancellor if defeated as President, that many may vote for him as enthusiastically as his friends. (Carlo Schmid as SPD opponent has already quipped that he will vote for Adenauer.)

2. Regardless either Chancellor's or party's motives prior event, decision will probably make transition from Adenauer to CDU successor smoother than confused results his sudden death while in office Chancellor would have permitted.

3. We have assumed on basis evidence presently available that Chancellor prefers Etzel as his successor. We know Erhard has many supporters for job including very active Gerstenmaier busily promoting his own ambitions by pushing Erhard. If Erhard does not wish step aside to make things easy for Chancellor and Etzel, we can expect at least severe struggle within CDU in coming months which would not bode well for "smooth transition" from Chancellor to successor.

4. From now until September, however, Adenauer will be Chancellor and will probably have only slightly diminished control over foreign policy, specifically such matters as instructing working group representatives, Brentano, and FedRep observer at Foreign Ministers and possibly summit meetings, and we see in present circumstances no reason for him to be less rigid than previously.

5. It seems most unrealistic for US assume that Adenauer, after becoming President and surrendering leadership party (required by constitution) will have anywhere near power and influence which he has today or even that amount which his supporters now claim he will have.

6. Although there every indication that any responsible CDU successor will have same general outlook on relations to, and on position in, Western world of FedRep, we cannot count on there being no change. In effect, diverse groups within rather ill-disciplined German Foreign Office and vari-colored ideas which spring from them are but reflection in microcosm of nervous stirrings of politically and foreign affair-conscious non-socialist groups throughout country. Under Adenauer until very recently these people and such ideas which might in any way, in his opinion, conflict with or even distantly threaten his fundamental view of basis of FedRep's security and rock-like policy for which he personally has always stood, have been ruthlessly squashed. No possible successor to Adenauer will wield such authority in such a way. What this may mean for our relations with FedRep under new Chancellor is that although we will continue to have staunch ally, we shall probably have less predictable one.

Bruce

261. Telegram From Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, April 14, 1959, 8 p.m.

5330. Paris for Embassy, USRO and Thurston. Embtel 5248 to Department, April 10.¹ Discussions April 13 between Macmillan and Lloyd and Debre and Couve de Murville concerned almost exclusively with problems Berlin, Germany and forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting with Soviets. Foreign Office quite pleased with talks and considers large measure of agreement exists between British and French approach these problems.

With respect Berlin Macmillan and Debre in agreement that there should be no tampering with existing legal rights but new agreements on access might be negotiated and superimposed on existing legal rights. Debre thought that in such new agreement provision should be made for guaranteeing right of access for civilian population. Debre also expressed view that in course negotiations with Soviets they might be given some satisfaction with respect 1) limiting propaganda originating in Berlin 2) ending obvious political links between Berlin and West Germany and 3) with respect to refugees (according Foreign Office Debre did not elaborate on latter point). In exchange Russians should be required recognize their responsibility for guaranteeing exercise Western rights in Berlin even if they were to conclude separate peace treaty with DDR.

British raised question of UN role in approving or giving sanction to East-West agreement on Berlin. Debre's reaction was completely negative with respect to UN involvement in any way in Berlin settlement. He pointed out Soviets enjoy veto in Security Council and there might be adverse majority with respect Western position in General Assembly. He said that UN was of no use to West in matter and in fact Soviets might subsequently attempt make use of UN to get out of agreement if one were concluded.

On subject free elections Couve de Murville said that Western initial position must be more realistic than in 1955. It would not be realistic to put forward free elections as first step. He was not pessimistic about possibility obtaining German acceptance this point of view despite position taken by von Brentano during recent Washington meetings. Debre asserted with emphasis that other Western powers could not afford

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/4-1459. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.

¹ Telegram 5248 reported the background for Debré's state visit to London, April 13-14. (*Ibid.*, 033.5141/4-1059)

antagonize Germans even though it was necessary to get *modus vivendi* with Russians. There could be no *de jure* recognition of the DDR but increased contacts between Federal Republic and DDR were possible. According Foreign Office Debre repeatedly emphasized importance carrying Germans with us.

There was some general discussion Macmillan idea of zone of force and arms limitations with emphasis in British presentation, according Foreign Office, on zone of inspection. Debre was not opposed to special security zone in Europe provided there was no question of neutralization of Germany and provided present European "political organization" was not prejudiced thereby, i.e. NATO and presence American forces in Germany. He also expressed view such zone should embrace portion Russian territory. Without offering answer, Macmillan posed question of what proposals West should make in Foreign Ministers' meeting after initial position based essentially on 1955 proposals had been tabled and rejected by Soviets. Debre thought that Russians would not play all their cards at Foreign Ministers' meeting but would reserve fall-back proposals for summit. He thought West should do likewise. Macmillan said that it was important to be clear in our own minds whether we wanted to go to the summit or not so that our tactics at the Foreign Ministers' meeting could be adjusted accordingly. He made it clear that UK Government continued to believe in desirability of summit talks. Debre said that Western Foreign Ministers at April 29 meeting should be able to take some definite decisions about Berlin but probably would be able express only general views on zone of inspection.

Whitney

262. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, April 15, 1959, 2 p.m.

5340. Paris for USRO. Pass Defense. From Hillenbrand. Following are some general impressions after second day of Working Group session.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1559. Secret. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, Moscow, and Paris.

¹Hillenbrand was in London as the head of the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Power Working Group, which began work on April 13 (see Document 270).

1. Both Germans and French continue to take extremely cautious position on reunification proposals, and there appears to be little prospect in Working Group of restoring major elements of original US proposals or even German proposals made at Paris meetings.² It should, however, be possible to preserve framework of phased plan and to retain a few novelties in its content such as creation of mixed committee prior to holding of free elections. New and peculiar German proposal to use residual authority of occupying powers to implement decisions of mixed committee obviously needs to be reconsidered (see Embtel 5334).³

2. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Having read spate of newspaper speculation about possible confederation proposals, they apparently insist on labeling any contact between East and West Germans beyond those in their own proposals as equivalent to confederation, even though such contacts or institutionalizations thereof involve no executive or other governmental powers. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

3. British are playing unusually reticent role. They have put forward no security proposals and their Berlin paper⁴ reflected none of willingness to accept basic changes which they allegedly are resigned to. If we may hazard guess, they will not reveal themselves further in present Working Group sessions but will concur without too much difficulty in agreed recommendations reached by Working Group. There have been no hints of any proposals for European security measures not linked to phased plan.

4. French generally can be counted on to react almost pathologically to suggestions that UN might play any significant role. They have, however, indicated at least willingness to consider possibility of UN function re Berlin as envisaged British paper. We are sending separate cable commenting on French security proposals.⁵

Whitney

² See Document 242.

³ Telegram 5334, April 14, transmitted a summary of the discussion at the second session of the Working Group, which focused on a German plan for reunification of Germany. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1559)

⁴ A copy of this paper, given to the Department of State on April 10, was transmitted to Bonn in airgram G-453, April 10. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/4-1059)

⁵ A copy of this paper was transmitted in airgram G-897 from London, April 14. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/4-1459)

263. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 15, 1959.

SUBJECT

Germany and Soviet Tactics

PARTICIPANTS

French

M. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹
M. Herve Alphand, French
Ambassador
M. Charles Lucet, French Minister of
Embassy

American

Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under
Secretary
Mr. Robert McBride, WE
Mr. L. Dean Brown, WE

M. Joxe expressed France's regret at learning of the Secretary's resignation² and extended his sympathy to the Secretary. He then asked Ambassador Alphand to convey the sense of the latest instructions from Paris.

The Ambassador said that Couve had sent a cable from London asking him to take up immediately with the State Department the French belief that European security and reunification should be combined in any presentation. The French have come up with a counter-proposal to the draft prepared by the London experts and hope that it can receive prompt consideration by the US. The French believe their proposal can receive the support of all concerned, including the Germans. (M. Lucet saw Mr. Kohler on this subject later in the day.)³

Mr. Joxe said that there are dangers in initiating European security plan consideration without this link. This could lead directly into the Rapacki plan. Security and reunification need to go hand-in-hand with parallel steps to be taken. This is what the French propose.

Mr. Murphy said that he too believed that a jump into thinning-out proposals could create dangers.

M. Joxe said that the Paris Accords⁴ provide a basis. Under these the Germans freely accepted certain limitations. Initially, the Soviets

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1559. Secret. Drafted by Brown and initialed by Murphy.

¹ Joxe was in Washington for tripartite discussions on Africa, April 16–21.

² Dulles tendered his resignation as Secretary of State on April 15.

³ A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1559.

⁴ For texts of the Nine- and Four-Power agreements signed at Paris, October 23, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.

denounced these accords. They might by now have a different conception of them and might be willing to come up with some sort of "revised Locarno".

Mr. Murphy said that the Soviets seem to be seeking to freeze the status quo, with, perhaps, an exception for Berlin.

M. Joxe said he believes they do fear competition from Berlin. He did not think, however, that the Soviets were searching for a permanent freeze of the status quo in Germany but rather sought the ability to play the German problem over a long period of time. It might be a neutralized, reunified Germany which could be a later goal. He asked if we thought the present freeze is due to Asian pressures.

Mr. Murphy said that this is certainly a reason. There are pressures within the Communist hierarchy and from Mao and Chou. The Soviets seek about for ways to ease pressures on themselves or put them on us. They tried in the Middle East and were rather checked by a lack of success with Nasser.

In response to M. Joxe's question as to whether we believe the Soviets find Communist China a dangerous ally, Mr. Murphy said that he did not think it went that far. The Soviets are perhaps suspicious of the power and attitudes of the ChiComs. There is some uneasiness between the two. There is for us the question as to how we can estimate these differences.

M. Joxe said that he did not want to force conclusions. He saw difficulties growing; he noted the differences on agricultural theory. In the past, he continued, the ChiComs have been the pragmatic ones; the Soviets, the theoreticians so far as foreign affairs are concerned. They now seem to be reversing roles and it is increasingly clear the ChiComs are entering the international sphere as, for example, in Africa. When he sees Russians, he said, he finds that they tend to talk about Europe and regard themselves as Europeans. He has no illusions that there is a divorce between the Soviets and the Chinese, but we cannot ignore the evidence.

Mr. Murphy said that the Soviets who come here seem genuinely interested in the betterment of conditions inside Russia.

M. Joxe said the Soviets realize that they are without all the advantages of the US yet believe they can play a role in economic development. He had been encouraged to note that the Soviets were permitting a US exhibition at their Moscow fair.

Mr. Murphy said this seemed to illustrate a measure of Soviet self-assurance.

M. Alphand said there is a suppleness in Soviet policy. They are not issuing ultimatums. Their reactions to the high altitude flights showed self-assurance.

Mr. Murphy mentioned the recent C-97 flight⁵ and said we were undertaking another with a C-130 at a high altitude but had had no reports yet other than to say that there had been no incident.⁶

When M. Joxe said the West must remain firm, Mr. Murphy added that we must also not be afraid. Too many statements about apprehensions, as are being made in the UK, sap our position. We don't want and don't expect war and don't believe the Soviets do either. Firmness is the only way.

M. Joxe agreed with this. He then reverted to Germany. He said we have made two tactical errors. We should not have agreed so fast that the two Germanies could attend the conferences. We should have waited and let this concession be extracted from us. Second, we talked too soon and too much about disengagement. We should have been more reserved.

Mr. Murphy asked if this had been discussed in London between Debre and Macmillan.⁷

M. Joxe said that he did not have many details on these talks. There did not seem to have been any agreement on European security. It was agreed the West had to remain firm on its access rights to Berlin.

Mr. Murphy said that he understood that there had been discussion of maintaining the base of our rights but superimposing other ideas on top of that.

Mr. Joxe agreed and added that we cannot negotiate a new juridical status for Berlin. One must be firm when negotiating with the devil.

Mr. Murphy asked if the French expected any accomplishment from the Foreign Ministers' conference.

M. Joxe said that he foresaw a long series of conferences and meetings. We won't know the Soviet position until the last moment as the Soviets are still testing whether we will remain firm.

Mr. Murphy said they might vary their behavior, alternating suppleness with hardness.

M. Joxe agreed and said the Soviets really want a Summit Conference. They may make gestures to make it possible.

In response to Mr. Murphy's question as to why the Soviets want a conference, M. Jones said Khrushchev seems to need a Summit for internal party reasons.

⁵ Documentation on the C-97 flight on April 3 is in Department of State, Central File 762B.5411.

⁶ The second C-130 flight was made during the morning of April 15.

⁷ See Document 261.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the French had any thoughts on softening the presence of the three powers in Berlin, aimed at calming Soviet apprehensions on espionage, propaganda or refugees.

M. Joxe said this is a point to consider but we should hold it in reserve. We could ask them if they have such fears and then say we'll consider what we might do.

M. Alphand said we could also stimulate contacts between the two Germanies.

M. Joxe interjected "but without recognition". He then went on to say that he believed Adenauer had taken over the Presidency for internal reasons but doubted if he could go all the way and impose Etzel. The German position seems to have two cardinal points: hold in Berlin and no recognition. After these, it seems fairly open.

M. Alphand mentioned the Pan-German committee to prepare the electoral law, which the Germans had proposed.

Mr. Murphy said that this should probably be presented as something flexible rather than iron-clad so that it can contribute the idea that the two Germanies can live together.

Mr. Murphy then inquired about Italian participation. He said that Pella and Segni are pushing hard.⁸ He asked if the Italians had been in touch with the French recently.

Mr. McBride then said the Italians yesterday had proposed some new wording, including "support" and "from the outset", which seemed difficult. They had said they had not yet tried the idea on London and Paris. We had suggested they do so. They also want now to take part in the 29th conference.

M. Joxe said that the latter is new. He will see if the French have been approached.

⁸ On April 14 Ambassador Zellerbach reported that Prime Minister Segni spent the better part of a half hour conversation on the question of Italian participation in the forthcoming talks on Germany. (Telegram 3060 from Rome; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1459)

264. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

Call by the Federal Republic Defense Minister on the Acting Secretary¹

PARTICIPANTS

Defense Minister of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Franz Josef
Strauss
Minister Franz Krapf, German
Embassy

Acting Secretary Herter
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
Major General Herbert B. Thatcher,
Chief, MAAG (Bonn)
Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman—GER

After a preliminary exchange of amenities, at the Acting Secretary's invitation, the Defense Minister commented on the decision of Chancellor Adenauer to offer himself as a candidate for the Presidency of the Federal Republic as follows:

Newspaper speculation that the Chancellor was ill, or that he was driven to his decision by tensions within his own party are wholly wrong. The Chancellor's health remains unbroken and there is no tension between the Chancellor and his party. What happened was that during Easter, after due deliberation, the Chancellor concluded that his physical and mental strength would be too soon exhausted if he remained on as Chancellor. Moreover, if he were to be suddenly removed from the scene the confusion thereby generated would work harm to the interests of his party and his policies. He, therefore, decided to relieve himself of the burden of the Chancellorship.

As President, Dr. Adenauer would be in a position to propose a new chancellor, and to use his moral authority as President to give continuity and stability to his policies. There will, in fact, said Minister Strauss, be no change in the Federal Republic's basic policies resulting from the Chancellor's decision.

As to the Chancellor's successor, only Messrs. Etzel and Erhard are serious candidates. Both are supporters of the Chancellor's foreign pol-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1649. Secret. Drafted by Vigderman and approved by Herter on April 21.

¹ Strauss was in the United States for an 18-day tour of U.S. military installations. Memoranda of his conversations with Murphy, which are similar to this one, and with Dr. York of the Department of Defense on missile development, both on April 16, are *ibid.*, 033.62A11/4-1659. After his tour of the installations Strauss returned to Washington to discuss various aspects of the trip. A memorandum of his conversation with Quarles on April 29 is *ibid.*, 033.62A11/4-2959.

icy. Erhard is more liberal in economic matters and a proponent of a free trade zone. The Chancellor is for the European Economic Community, and fears that damage would occur to French-German relationships if Erhard's concepts were to be adopted. The Chancellor is therefore "51%" for Etzel to succeed him. The Party and the Bundestag CDU faction support Erhard, and the Minister gave it as his opinion that Erhard would become Chancellor in the end.

The Minister then expressed his sympathy for Mr. Dulles and the gratitude which the German people owed to him. He remarked on the close personal friendship between the Chancellor and Mr. Dulles and suggested that the Chancellor would no doubt be extremely depressed about the news of Mr. Dulles' resignation.

The conversation then turned to the Berlin crisis, with the Minister remarking that he had been encouraged by Mr. Murphy's optimism on its outcome and expressed the view that Khrushchev would not risk a war over Berlin. The Acting Secretary said that no one wants war, but unless we were willing to go to war, there was a great danger of war which might arise from miscalculations. The Minister pointed out that the concept of disengagement was extremely dangerous. In the end the Germans would slide out of the alliance if any disengagement scheme were put into effect. Moreover, without a solution of the Berlin problem, disengagement concepts were dangerous, since the Russians were in a position to blackmail the West every year. Military solutions without political settlements were worse than worthless. The Acting Secretary said he was concerned about the problem of civilian access to Berlin.

The Minister said the Germans had learned through intelligence sources that Ulbricht had last year been very depressed and had told Khrushchev he could not keep the East German regime stable without support from the Soviet Union. People were constantly leaving the Soviet Zone. Laws had been passed to punish flight from the Zone, including laws which require individuals, under penalty, to denounce others whom they know are preparing to leave.

According to the Minister, Khrushchev has two aims. The first is to break Western influence in Berlin and eliminate the continuing danger that Berlin represents to the Communist cause. The second is to use the Berlin crisis as blackmail to bring about a summit conference. At a summit conference the Soviet Union hopes for bilateral discussions with the United States. Their aim is to isolate the United States from its European allies who in turn, would, in desperation, turn to the Soviet Union.

The Minister thanked the Acting Secretary for the courtesies which had been shown him in the United States, praised the good relationships between MAAG Germany and the Minister of Defense, and remarked on the openmindedness of everyone he had talked to. He concluded by telling the Acting Secretary that the agreement under 144 b of the

Atomic Energy Act had been agreed in principle,² and that on the general question of the arming of the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons, no important political question really continued to persist in Germany. Once the decision had been taken the problem largely disappeared from the political scene. The Germans, the Minister said, were ready to renounce modern weapons, but only in the context of a world-wide disarmament solution (for which there was no real hope) or a satisfactory solution of the problem of European security.

² For text of the agreement signed at Bonn on May 5 regarding cooperation between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense, see 10 UST 1322.

265. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Murphy to President Eisenhower

Washington, April 18, 1959.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. 3-page memorandum and 47 attached pages not declassified.]

266. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, April 19, 1959, noon.

2348. Deptel 2454.¹ Original objectives of C-130 flights as proposed last year were to assert right to fly above 10,000 feet, test Soviet reactions

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/4-1959. Secret. Drafted by Bruce and Tyler.

¹ Telegram 2454, April 17, asked for Bruce's views on continuing high altitude flights to Berlin. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/4-1759)

and open up higher altitudes for regular USAFE flights and if possible eventually for commercial flights. At that time we had British and French support for such a program.

The timing of recent C-130 flights brought new elements into picture, namely relationship between flights and FonMins conference. As result, Soviets took formal governmental notice of flights and played up political aspects of operation in relation to that conference. [1 paragraph (2 1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

I therefore feel strongly that flights over 10,000 feet should not be repeated at least before April 29 FonMins meeting, where the matter should be tripartitely discussed. We should first come to understanding with British and French, and demonstrate a united front at Geneva by taking initiative in raising corridor issue with Soviets. We forced the issue with Soviets in first place and we should not let them put us on defensive. Our case is good.

Bruce

267. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, April 20, 1959, 6 p.m.

5465. Reference: Deptel 9217.¹ Paris for Embassy, USRO and Thurston. Selwyn Lloyd was my week-end guest and high-flights into Berlin most prominent subject discussed. He began by expressing irritation that he had been accused of sowing discord between USG and HMG on this subject because his one abiding determination was to smooth over disagreements of this sort whenever they arose. Lloyd added that when in Washington he and Herter had agreed that high-flights could provoke Soviet reaction and should be conducted with discretion.² Herter had told Lloyd that he had secured postponement of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/4-2059. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bonn and Berlin.

¹ Telegram 9217, April 17, authorized Whitney to bring to Lloyd's attention U.S. concern over British press treatment of the C-130 flight to Berlin. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/4-1659)

² See Document 248.

second high-flight and Lloyd had so told members of his Foreign Office staff. Lloyd stated further that Foreign Office press briefing on this subject (Embtel 5370)³ may have construed recurrence of high-flights as indicating disagreement between State Dept. and other elements of USG, or indeed journalists present may have invented the story out of whole-cloth.

Lloyd added, however, that in his opinion the unfortunate suggestion that HMG opposed American action over high-flights and believed State Dept. had been over-ruled by Pentagon on this matter had been planted in Washington rather than in London. *Comment:* Despite this statement, I judge from the protracted way in which Lloyd ruminated over this subject that he felt somewhat on defensive. *End comment.*

Lloyd stated that in replying to House of Commons questions he would state that USG and HMG were in full agreement that high-flights should be conducted with discretion. I suggested somewhat stronger wording indicating that the high-flights in fact had been conducted discreetly but elicited no specific comment. Since subject of high-flights is far down list of questions for reply during question period April 22, this topic may not be reached and may have faded somewhat from public mind on next occasion Foreign Secretary answers questions, April 27.⁴

Meanwhile partial change has occurred over week-end in treatment of high-flights by some newspapers and is not likely that this change is entirely spontaneous. For example, *Daily Telegraph*, after discussing high-flights with Embassy officers, stated April 17 that "it is possible . . .⁵ to put up good arguments (for and against high-flights). It seems highly doubtful, however, whether British well advised to press their view to point of making it serious issue between two countries. Impression this gives to world is one of Britain unwilling to take any risks in face of Soviet threats. This belief . . . carries far more dangers to Western unity than any incident likely to arise (from high-flights)."

Sunday Observer which had strongly criticized influence of Pentagon on US foreign policy decisions stated somewhat piously April 19th that "it is doubtful if section of British press has done much service to Western Alliance by showing such excessive alarm over American deci-

³ Telegram 5370, April 16, reported on an April 15 Foreign Office Press Department off-the-record backgrounder that reflected British nervousness about the high altitude flights to Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/4-1659)

⁴ Lloyd answered written questions on the flights on April 20 and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs John Profumo answered oral questions on May 4. For texts of these replies, see 604 House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, cols. 6–7 and 605 *ibid.*, cols. 23–24.

⁵ All ellipses in the source text.

sion to fly occasional transport plane above 10,000 feet . . . over air corridor to Berlin.

BBC news broadcast and several newspapers gave heavy week-end coverage to State Department's claim that British press showing "timidity." Somewhat surprisingly this charge has provoked so far no angry editorial reaction except in *Daily Mail*. (For full press summary see Embtel 5460).⁶

Whitney

⁶Dated April 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/4-2059)

268. Memorandum of the Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, April 23, 1959, 9:03–10 a.m.

Present at this Special Meeting of the NSC were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; and the Director, U.S. Information Agency. Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of State; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

Mr. Gray explained the purpose of this Special NSC meeting and the general nature of the papers to be discussed. He suggested that the members of the Council bear in mind the final question which would be put to them; namely what if any of the contents of these two papers¹

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Appointment Book. (*Ibid.*) A copy of a much briefer memorandum of this discussion is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany.

¹Reference is to enclosures 1 and 2 to Document 265.

should subsequently be transmitted to our Allies? He also noted that the President had already approved transmission of the studies to General Norstad for his use in preparing preliminary U.S. positions in the Tripartite Staff in Paris (Live Oak). Thereafter, Mr. Gray suggested that the Council take up the so-called military paper entitled: "An Analysis of the Political and Military Implications of Alternative Uses of Force to Maintain Access to Berlin". Mr. Gray thought it would be more useful to ask for comment on the main sections of this paper rather than to attempt to go through it paragraph by paragraph. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).²

Upon completing his introductory remarks, Mr. Gray inquired whether there were any comments on the introductory section of the military paper. Secretary Herter merely stated that the paper was an agreed paper. Mr. Gray then inquired if there were any comments to be made on the Third Section entitled: "Preparatory and Supporting Actions" covering Pages 4 to 10 of the paper. There being no immediate comment, Mr. Gray pointed out the bracketed phrase in Paragraph 13 suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reading as follows:

"Thus, 'Shield Force' elements in Central Europe which are actually displaced in support of any Berlin operation, should be replaced with units in kind [or the risk of mal-deployment accepted]"³

He asked General Twining to explain why the Joint Chiefs had felt it desirable to add this phrase whereas the majority had apparently not felt it necessary to include the phrase.

General Twining, turning to the President, indicated that the President had brought up this question once before. The purpose of the Joint Chiefs was here simply to call attention to the risk of mal-deployment.

The President said he wanted to inquire in the first place what purpose would be served by moving these forces toward the Western end of the Soviet Zone of Germany. General Twining replied that all such forces would be used on the Autobahn to break the Soviet blockade if it were instituted. The President commented that this would mean the Reinforced Battalion. General Twining answered in the affirmative and added "or perhaps a reinforced division." The President said that if we were now getting forces of the size of a reinforced division, it was a pretty serious matter. He added that if we were going to make such significant military moves in, and/or toward the Corridor, such moves must be specifically brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and himself before they were taken. This was especially true of the

² Not printed.

³ Brackets in the source text.

movement of a force of division size. We are involved here, said the President, with mounting a threat against the Soviet Union without having at our disposal a really great force with which to confront the forces which the Soviet Union would be in a position to confront us with.

Secretary Herter observed that these matters raised the whole question of the timing of these various moves. The timing of these moves had not been specified or agreed to in the paper under discussion. However, if the question of reinforcement of our troops should arise, timing would become a vital matter and we would have to be prepared to go a very long way. Secretary Herter said that this problem could be discussed later. The question of timing was certainly rather fuzzy now.

The President stated that Section A, covering political action under the general heading of Section Three on "Preparatory and Supporting Actions" bothered him a little. While the political actions to be taken are specifically listed, nothing is said in this section with respect to *how* these actions are to be carried out. For example, asked the President, would publicity be given to this series of political actions? When Secretary Herter replied that publicity would be given to them, the President asked what kind of publicity? Secretary Herter answered that the publicity would consist of high-level speeches as well as publicity by the U.S. Information Agency and in other forums. Mr. George Allen, the Director of U.S.I.A., reminded the Council that his Agency would have to tie in its work to preliminary public speeches by U.S. officials. U.S.I.A. could not handle the publicity on these political actions independently of the guidance provided by official speeches. Secretary Herter confined himself to stating that a great deal more had to be done on both of these papers by way of detail.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the discussion had now reached the First of the Four Alternative Courses of Action; namely, "A Substantial Effort to Re-Open Ground Access by Local Action." Mr. Gray pointed out on Page 15 a difference in the Intelligence Estimate of the response which we might expect from the Soviets if we undertook this First Alternative. Air Force Intelligence (A-2) believed that this course of action would convince the Soviets that the Western Allies were prepared if necessary to proceed to General War, and that the Soviets would therefore find ways to ease the crisis. Mr. Gray pointed out that this difference of view was one factor to be considered if this paper were to be transmitted to other Allied Governments. In such a case, he asked, should these splits in Intelligence Estimates be reflected at all? If they were to be reflected, should the identity of those who held the differing views be made clear or alternatively should just the Majority Estimate be provided to the other Governments?

Secretary Herter stressed the very great importance of the Intelligence Estimates in the paper. He added that it was his personal view

that if we carried out the First Alternative now under discussion, the Soviets were likely to fight unless they were really prepared to let our military forces, either of battalion or division size, move down the Autobahn into Berlin. General Twining wondered whether it would not be possible to express the Majority view and the Dissent in rather generalized terms. Mr. Allen Dulles thought that General Twining's suggestion was a good one but advised against identifying the source of Dissents in the Intelligence Estimates. He suggested that the paper just provide the Minority view as one which differed from the Majority Intelligence Estimate. If the paper were to be given to the French, Mr. Allen Dulles urged that it be "sanitized" first.

The President said that he had asked several people about giving such papers such as this to our Allies. It was all right to provide this paper to General Norstad to look into but if the papers were to go any further, should they not be transmitted in rather more general terms than in the detailed fashion in which they were now written?

Secretary Herter expressed the opinion that all such papers would have to be transmitted in a sanitized version. The President expressed his agreement in favor of shorter papers summarizing the contents of the more detailed ones.

Mr. Gray pointed out to the Council that while over the years the British have been very anxious to engage with the U.S. in contingency military planning all over the world, they have been firm in the one exception as to joint contingency planning on Berlin. General Twining confirmed Mr. Gray's statement of the British attitude while Secretary Herter pointed out that we ourselves had not desired at first to join with the British in contingency planning until we had gotten further along in our own plans. Mr. Gray pointed out that the President would want to determine when we should go forward with joint contingency planning on Berlin. He specifically inquired whether the paper under discussion should be transmitted to the Tripartite Staff in Paris (Live Oak). Secretary Herter suggested holding off a decision on this point until further discussion of the Group here. It might be desirable to transmit the paper through diplomatic channels to our Allies.

There being no further discussion of Alternative One, Mr. Gray directed the Council's attention to the Second Alternative; namely, "A Substantial Effort to Re-Open Air Access, if Blocked." As in the case of the First Alternative, he noted that this Alternative also involved a difference in the Intelligence Estimate of the reaction which we might expect from the Soviets if this Alternative were attempted (Page 21). He suggested that the same considerations should apply in the case of this split as applied in the case of the split Estimate as to the First Alternative.

Mr. Gray then referred to the Third Alternative, that is, "Reprisals Against the Communists in Other Areas, e.g., Western Naval Controls

on Bloc Shipping." Initially Mr. Gray pointed out that the same problem of timing existed with respect to this Alternative as with the first two Alternatives. Secretary Herter called attention to the footnote on Page 26 reading as follows: "There is a serious question as to whether one or more of such actions would constitute retaliation, which is regarded as belligerent action". Secretary Herter said that he himself believed that some of the suggested actions under this Alternative might be called aggressive and belligerent. Secretary McElroy expressed agreement with this view of Secretary Herter.

Mr. Gray proceeded to the Fourth Alternative: "General War Measures". Here again he pointed out that there was a difference of opinion as to the Intelligence Estimate on the reaction to be expected from the NATO Governments if the Fourth Alternative were undertaken (Page 34). Mr. Allen Dulles commented that this time the Dissent came from the State Department rather than from the Military Intelligence Agencies.

Mr. Gray inquired specifically of the Attorney General whether he had any comment to make on this Fourth Alternative, pointing out that when we become involved in General War Measures, we are getting into the business of the duties and prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief vis-à-vis the U.S. Congress. The Attorney General replied that he did not believe that this Alternative presented any great problem. A great deal of contingency planning had already been done—more than had ever been done in our history before this time. This he thought was not really a legal problem so much as a problem of public reaction to undertaking General War Measures. Mr. Gray replied that he thought this matter extremely important from the point of view of the President's approval of these papers. Mr. Rogers promised to review the issue again but stated that he was confident that no severe problems would emerge. Secretary Herter pointed out that of course each move in these papers was subject to the President's approval.

At this point the President brought the discussion back to the Third Alternative, that of reprisals against the Communists in other areas, and said that he felt that the Third Alternative was somewhat out of line. He feared that if we undertook such reprisals as were listed under this Alternative, we would manage to get the whole world peeved at us without actually improving our own situation. He said he was quite convinced that with respect to the First Alternative on ground access that the U.S. must be fully prepared to act. However, through this committee here or by asking Foreign Minister Lloyd we must secure agreement from both the British and the French to "Show the Flag" and make it clear that we were serious. However, if we contemplate going beyond the First Alternative in our military actions as opposed to our political actions, we should realize that the situation will be changing day by day.

That is, if we undertake military action on a larger scale and at a further stage than that of the Reinforced Battalion, we would encounter new problems and the need for new decisions. In such a contingency we here in the National Security Council would be meeting regularly. In short, said the President, we cannot expect to be able to respond automatically, in these contingencies, to rigid plans of action which we had made in advance. We simply would be unable to see the results. For example, said the President, would we be willing to start a war without the support of our allies? If we do so, the President believed such action would constitute a great Soviet victory. Therefore, said the President, anything we do after we make our first move (Alternative One) is going to have to be played by ear.

General Twining said that of course CINCEUR was well aware of the points that the President had made. The President went on to say that of course if we undertook the First Alternative, we would reinforce our moves to gain ground access to Berlin with air operations. General Twining observed that the main thing was to stir up the Tripartite Group in Norstad's Headquarters in Paris to get down to work. Secretary Herter commented that of course the military courses of action must be dove-tailed with the political courses of action. He felt reasonably sure, he said, that our Allies would go along with our proposed military actions if they are convinced that we had exhausted all the other possibilities.

Mr. Allen Dulles again came back to the problem of reprisals. He pointed out that there was one type of naval reprisal which we might well consider and which might not seem too belligerent. If the Soviets held up one of our Berlin convoys we could retaliate by holding one Soviet merchant vessel, on one pretext or another, in an Allied port. Mr. Dulles was quite sure that the Soviets would deduce the meaning of such an action. Secretary Herter thought this was a useful idea but of reprisals in general, under Alternative Three, he pointed out that the three Allied Governments had definite legal rights with respect to access to Berlin. On the other hand, if we held up Soviet shipping on the high seas, we could not do so on the basis of any clear legal right. The President said that he would not object to limited harassments of the sort suggested by Mr. Allen Dulles.

Mr. Gray next inquired whether the same considerations would not apply to Alternative Two as applied to Alternative One with respect to General Norstad's planning. In reply the President pointed out that obviously we could not conduct an air battle in a ten-mile wide corridor. Mr. Gray, however, pointed out that we could likewise not conduct a ground battle on an autobahn strip. Agreeing, the President pointed out that both contingencies required space sufficient for a campaign. Amid considerable laughter, General Twining pointed out that the paper un-

der consideration required us to confine our military action to the Corridor if possible.

Mr. Gray then invited the Council's attention to the final section of the paper: "Reactions within Germany to the Four Courses of Action." There being no comment or discussion on this section, Mr. Gray turned to the President and said he supposed that the President would wish to approve this paper in principle as the basis for further work by the four agencies which had prepared the paper (State, Defense, JCS and CIA). The President replied in the affirmative and added that he would send the paper to General Norstad. He would not object to General Norstad mentioning these Alternatives in discussions with the Tripartite Group but in so doing he should make clear that as of the present moment these actions are not all practical.

Secretary McElroy inquired whether we should omit Alternative Three in any material which we transmit to our Allies. The President thought it would be a good idea to omit this Alternative but we should get at it by asking our Allies what they could suggest by way of reprisals and harassments.

Mr. Gray reminded the Council that Mr. Robert Murphy in his covering memorandum⁴ sending these two studies to the President had asked the President to approve three recommendations. He singled out in particular the third recommendation dealing with the problem of the selection and timing of the general political, economic, and military measures outlined in these studies. Thereafter he asked the President whether he would wish to have progress reports from time to time on this recommendation. The President said he would but added that he did not feel that much effective work could be done at the present time unless a single individual was appointed and given authority to look over the whole range of our contingency planning on Berlin. This range would include also any Allied suggestions because, said the President, we need solid support and agreement from our Allies. The President then suggested that the individual who could most effectively fill this job would be Mr. Robert Murphy of the State Department. If he were not available, some other State Department official should be selected because, as the President said, in the early stages at least much of what we would be doing with respect to counter-measures in the Berlin crisis would be in the realm of political planning and action. Secretary McElroy concurred in the President's view that the individual to have charge of such a group should come from the State Department.

The President said that the group meeting under Mr. Murphy should convene every day and should as necessary check with the Na-

⁴ Document 265.

tional Security Council. The President added that he was assuming in making this suggestion that Premier Khrushchev had really meant what he said when he stated that he was not going to upset the applecart once negotiations over Berlin had been started between the West and the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Gray indicated that this seemed to conclude the discussion of the first paper and suggested that the Council turn its attention to the second paper, non-military, entitled: "Analysis of Non-Military Measures to Induce the Soviet Union to Remove Obstructions to Western Access to Berlin". He promptly called on Secretary Herter for a summary of the contents of this paper.

Secretary Herter pointed out that the summary and conclusions of the paper were provided in the first four pages. Most of the courses of action presented in the paper were to be studied as possibilities. None of them is necessarily going to change the mind of the Soviet Union but at least they should all be discussed with our Allies. More work was certainly needed on the question of the role of the United Nations in the picture. What precisely, for example, is meant by the phrase "a United Nations presence in Berlin"? This was still a very fuzzy concept. Incidentally, added Secretary Herter, the French attitude toward any United Nations' participation in the Berlin problem was positively psychopathic. Nevertheless from the point of view of world public relations, the role of the United Nations can still be of great importance.

The President said he found the course of action set forth on Page 16 of the paper, that is "Termination of Non-Diplomatic Contacts with the U.S.S.R." quite an interesting problem. The President wondered what the Soviets would infer from a break in relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. They might well consider this break tantamount to a declaration of war. Moreover, such a break, effected by the U.S. alone, would not carry very much weight. With respect to the paper as a whole, the President suggested that we should try to set down our questions and answers in very short and terse form. He said that he had studied this particular paper at considerable length but even so had found it difficult to reach clear and firm conclusions with respect to its content.

[1 paragraph (19-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President said that looking at the Berlin crisis as a whole, he felt that one of three eventualities could come to pass. The first would be some kind of a deal through negotiations between the Soviet Bloc and the West. The best we could hope for in such a deal would be Soviet agreement to maintain the status quo for three or four years. The second possibility was a backdown by the U.S.S.R. The third possibility was general war. The President went on to warn that once we resort to the use of military force, as opposed to political action, there are really no limits that can be set to the use of force. This was a fact that the President

felt we must look squarely in the face. The President said he was reminded of the circumstances of 1916 when President Wilson would not even permit our little War College to make any studies about what we might do if we became involved in the War. Nor would he permit any contingency war planning by the War or the Navy Departments lest such planning seem to constitute belligerent action by the U.S. Today we are of course taking the opposite course. Certainly there were a number of things we could try to do to change the Soviet mind but we should never forget the possibility of war even though in the President's judgment there would not be war.

[2 paragraphs (22 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Anderson said he had been wondering whether it would be possible for members of the State Department to approach leaders of both parties of the Congress with suggestions that they make statements on the floor of the House or the Senate with respect to our course of action on Berlin. The statements he had in mind, said Secretary Anderson, would not be cast in a belligerent form but would be designed as an indication of the firm resolution of the U.S. If such statements were carefully prepared and delivered, Secretary Anderson believed that they would constitute a source of strength for the U.S. position at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers' Meeting. They would also serve the purpose of preparing the people of the U.S. for all the eventualities they faced. Lastly, such statements would help Mr. Allen and the U.S.I.A. to mobilize world opinion in defense of the U.S. and the Western position.

Secretary Herter commented that he believed that the President's recent speech⁵ had done the best job in explaining the problem of Berlin to the people of the country. *[7 lines of source text not declassified]*

[2 paragraphs (16-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Reverting to the idea originally suggested by Secretary Anderson, the President said that he did believe that it would be desirable to get Representatives and Senators on both sides of the aisle to make speeches to explain why we were proposing to provide our Allies with these atomic weapons. Such speeches should stress the defensive character of our proposed action.

Secretary Herter pointed out that the Joint Committee would have to approve the agreements by which these deployments were carried out. The President thought that if we made such agreements, there was bound to be a certain amount of revelation of atomic energy information.

Secretary Quarles was invited to clarify the understanding of what was involved in such agreements. Secretary Quarles said that the agree-

⁵ See Document 225.

ments which would have to be approved by the Joint Committee were not agreements which would allow us to put atomic stockpiles on the soil of our foreign Allies. The agreements which require the approval of the Committee were those which involved the exchange of atomic information which would enable our Allies to do what they have to do with these weapons once they were deployed. The matter of deployment of the weapons was a matter between governments, but as for the agreements necessary to provide our Allies with information essential to the use of these weapons, this was something which required the approval of the Congressional Committee. The Committee can consider such an agreement and hold it up for sixty days although Secretary Quarles did not believe that the Committee was required to consider the matter for the full sixty days.⁶

The Vice President observed that Secretary Anderson had made a good point in suggesting speeches by Congressmen and Senators about our position in the Berlin crisis. Nevertheless, as far as public opinion of this country was concerned, the President's speech on the Berlin crisis had been much the most effective statement thus far. Members of Congress, for example Senator Fulbright, have already talked a great deal about the Berlin crisis. In these circumstances the Vice President believed that Berlin might be the subject of the first public statement by our new Secretary of State. This would be bound to have a very considerable effect—much more effect than any speech by any member of Congress, however distinguished.

The President said he thought very well of the Vice President's proposal. Such a speech by Secretary Herter could well take the form of a talk to the people in a homely fashion. It should be designed to explain the continuity of our policy; it should avoid inciting to fear and instead stress the continuity of our firm policy with regard to Berlin.

Secretary Herter suggested that if he were to make such a speech, it should be made after he returned from the April 29 meetings in Paris but before he went back to Geneva for the Foreign Ministers' Conference opening on May 11. The Vice President commented that he thought well of the proposed timing. Mr. Allen Dulles suggested the Council on Foreign Relations as a good forum. The Vice President commented that his proposal for a speech by Secretary Herter did not of course exclude speeches afterwards on the floor of the House of the Senate.

At this point Mr. Gray summed up what he understood to be the action of the Council on these two papers.

⁶ It is uncertain whether Secretary Quarles' point is correct. It may be mandatory for the Joint Committee to withhold action for a period of sixty days after receipt of a proposed agreement made by the Executive Branch with a foreign government. [Footnote in the source text.]

The National Security Council:

1. Noted and discussed the two studies prepared at the direction of the President and enclosed with the reference memorandum for the President.

2. Noted that the President has previously approved the transmission of the studies to General Norstad for his use in preparing preliminary U.S. positions in the Tripartite Staff in Paris.

3. Noted the President's view that, with respect to the study of military measures, any advance planning regarding the alternative uses of force would necessarily be subject to review and decision in the light of circumstances as they develop.

4. Agreed that the studies in their present form should not be transmitted to our allies, and that any disclosures to our allies with respect to these studies should be deferred pending further study under 6-c below.

5. Noted the President's approval, subject to the above caveats, of the utilization of the study of alternative courses of action regarding use of force by the Department of Defense as a basis for the initial planning of measures to be taken on a national basis.

6. Noted the President's approval in principle of the studies for use in further planning under the coordination of a group to be chaired by Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, with representatives from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and, as necessary on an ad hoc basis, other agencies. Specifically, this group should, in the light of the discussion at this special meeting, coordinate such further planning, including:

a. The results of the planning by the Department of Defense pursuant to 5 above.

b. The development of general political, economic and military measures as outlined in these studies, with particular reference to selection and timing, referring major decisions for the President's approval as they become necessary.

c. Recommendations as to the disclosure to our allies of information contained in the studies.⁷

S. Everett Gleason

⁷ On April 29 Acting Secretary of State Dillon forwarded a memorandum to the President with the first recommendations of Murphy's group. These included use of the information in the nonmilitary measures paper in discussions with the Allies on contingency planning and the forwarding of both papers to Bonn. (Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/4-2959) Notations on the margin of the memorandum show that these recommendations were approved by the President. [text not declassified]

269. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, April 23, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Mr. Dillon, Mr. Merchant, General Goodpaster

The President, referring to the session earlier in the day on contingency planning for access to Berlin,¹ asked that thorough studies be prepared along the lines of the papers presented,² but that this be followed by a presentation of the gist of the matter for discussion out of which should then evolve a very short paper of "directive type." It is not too helpful to have long, analytical papers with conclusions scattered through them. In many cases, the use of charts and graphs is helpful. Mr. Herter agreed that where graphs could be used he would try to see that this is done.

Mr. Herter then reported that he is leaving Monday evening, the 27th, for the 4-power working meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers in Paris. He said that the working group which has been meeting still has a number of unsolved issues before it. He said he would like to come in again and see the President on Monday just prior to departing. A discussion of some of the issues still open then followed. The first is on German reunification. The Germans do not want to go as far as we do, apparently in part out of fear that elections would result in a victory of the Socialist party. The President said he is not so concerned about such considerations; the best we can do is leave it to the Germans to govern themselves.

Disarmament is the second issue. The French do not want to agree to force levels to which they have previously agreed. The President thought we should recognize their problem, which is undoubtedly linked to their difficulties in Algeria, and increased need for troops. The President asked whether we have a well-developed proposal for an inspection system for a disarmament agreement. Mr. Herter indicated that General Norstad has drawn up a good plan for this.

A third issue relates to the link between German reunification and European security measures. Until the weekend it seemed that the British were very weak on the necessity to keep an effective link; now it appears that they have come around to our point of view although they may shift again during the negotiations.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret.

¹ See Document 268.

² See Document 265.

The next issue relates to the possibility of restrictions on the deployment of IRBMs in Germany. The President thought there might be some gain to be made by agreeing not to put them forward to the Rhine inasmuch as militarily we would probably not think it sound to put them there anyhow. Mr. Herter indicated that Defense is nervous on this point, since a ban on deploying IRBMs in Germany might lead to a ban on their manufacture.

The next issue is really a question—as to what we should try to do concerning assurances against surprise attack. The President said that here his thinking is that any agreement that both sides can check on with confidence is all to the good, even though the scope of the agreement is very limited.

The next issue pertains to a possible role for the U.N. Mr. Herter said the French are almost psychopathic in opposition to this. Hammarskjöld, however, thinks that at some stage the conferees may want the United Nations to help in a solution.³ He pointed out that the United Nations has never had experience in supervising elections. They might be able to take on some task which is simple and definitive such as taking over the posts on the access routes from the Soviets. Mr. Herter said there is also some reason to think that holding a summit conference through the U.N. machinery may be helpful. The President commented, however, that although there might be some tie to the United Nations, on any question where we are hoping to get real agreement the fewer participants the better. For the summit meeting, he thought the attendance must be held down to the top four countries. The Security Council is too large and has too many extraneous interests.

The next issue is on tactics, and specifically whether there should be publicity in advance of the May 11th meeting concerning the Western “package” position, perhaps three or four days ahead of the meeting. The President said there is one danger in this—which is the danger of revealing your hole card in a poker game in advance of the play. He recognized that there are reasons on the other side—to carry world opinion—and thought that it would be good to put out a persuasive document stating our purposes and principles, and giving just a hint of the specifics. He thought we should not, however, be appearing to enter the negotiations on a “this or else” basis. Mr. Herter commented that we would be putting our statement out as the main elements of our initial position. Mr. Dillon suggested that this material could very well be put out in a speech by the Secretary on his return from the meeting on the

³ Herter met with Hammarskjöld from 11:20 a.m. to 2:45 p.m. April 23 at the Secretary-General's request. A memorandum of their conversation along the lines indicated in this paragraph is in Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/4-2359.

29th. He would be in position to speak rather freely—without the necessity of getting allied agreement on the text.

The next issue pertains to our plan for Berlin. The representatives of all four countries had agreed upon a unified Berlin with free elections, but the British and French are now indicating that they favor the status quo. The President said we are reaching the point where it becomes quite important to know what the Berliners really want. Mr. Merchant commented that the only thing that keeps the Berliners resolute is the presence of Western forces there. The President commented that it would be foolish to try to settle the Berlin issue by itself. We must seek an over-all German solution in which Berlin becomes simply an element. Mr. Herter confirmed that this is our stand, and we will seek to keep these linked.

The last issue raised is whether we should put forward the text of a peace treaty or just the principles for a peace treaty. Mr. Herter commented that our allies are showing some signs now of not wanting to put forward even the principles of the treaty, but he thought it was necessary to have something concrete to show our seriousness of purpose.

In commenting on the prospects for the 4-power meeting next week, Mr. Merchant said he thought we will come out with a less imaginative plan than we had hoped for, but even so, a very solid and constructive one. The President asked that the group be trying to think of some feature that would be new and striking. He mentioned as examples his "Open Skies" proposal at Geneva,⁴ and his idea of inviting 10,000 Russian youths to come to the United States for a year of schooling.⁵

The President also suggested dividing up the various topics, and assigning several to the individual Western leaders. For example, have Macmillan speak for the West on some particular points, etc.

Mr. Herter next raised the point of possible Congressional attendance at the Foreign Ministers conference on May 11th. He said that Senator Fulbright is opposed to this, as he is.⁶ The President strongly agreed that it is better to avoid this, particularly inasmuch as the meeting is not engaged in drafting a treaty that would subsequently have to go to the Senate.

⁴ Regarding Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal at the Heads of Government meeting at Geneva in July 1955, see Secto 63, July 21, 1955, *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 447–456.

⁵ Regarding Eisenhower's proposal to invite thousands of Russian youths to the United States, see vol. X, Part 2, Document 1.

⁶ Following the meeting with the President, Herter and Fulbright agreed that there would be no Senatorial representation at the Foreign Ministers meeting. (Memorandum of conversation, April 23 at 6 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/4–2359)

The President recalled that Khrushchev has said that he would be glad to go to Vienna or San Francisco. He reiterated that if the meetings were to drag out, he would have to drop out occasionally in order to keep up with the Executive work, in which case he would bring in Mr. Nixon to spell him.

Mr. Herter said he thought he would like to have Mr. McElroy, Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Merchant attend the Foreign Ministers conference with him. It might be best for Mr. McElroy to come in after the initial meetings had been held. He indicated he was contemplating that the meetings might run for something like three weeks in duration.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

270. Editorial Note

Acting on instructions from the Foreign Ministers (see Document 251), the Four-Power Working Group resumed its deliberations, this time at London, in an attempt to iron out the points among the four Western powers that were still unagreed. Hillenbrand, Laloy, Hancock, and von Baudissin continued as the heads of the United States, French, British, and West German Delegations, respectively. By April 22 an agreed draft report was completed for the Foreign Ministers as well as a summary report on the work of the group that was given to the North Atlantic Council on April 23. (Telegram 5520 from London, April 22; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-2259) For extract from the draft report, April 23, see Document 271.

The North Atlantic Council discussed the draft report at its meeting on April 27 (see Document 275) and the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom devoted four meetings to the report, April 29–30. (See Documents 280–282) A copy of the final report, comprising: 1) "The Phased Plan for German Reunification, European Security and a German Peace Settlement," 2) "Preliminary Draft Principles of a German Peace Settlement," 3) "Tactics at a Foreign Ministers Conference" with four annexes, and 4) "Berlin," is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1276. For text of the phased plan, which was submitted at the Foreign Ministers Meeting on May 14 as the Western Peace Plan, see *Documents*

on *Germany, 1944–1985*, pages 624–629; *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pages 55–60; or *Cmd. 868*, pages 218–223; for text of the draft principles, see *The New York Times*, May 20, 1959, page 15.

Documentation on the meetings of the Four-Power Working Group is Department of State, Central Files, 396.1, 396.1–GE, and 762.00.

271. Report of the Four-Power Working Group

London, April 23, 1959.

In fulfillment of the directions given to them by the four Ministers in Washington on April 1,¹ the Working Group has prepared:

1. a. A revision of the “Phased Plan for German Reunification and European Security and a German Peace Settlement”,
- b. Preliminary Draft Principles of a Peace Treaty,
2. Proposals on Berlin,
3. A paper on Tactics at a Foreign Ministers’ Conference,
4. A statement to the North Atlantic Council.

While the Working Group has reached a large identity of view, there are nevertheless certain questions in the attached papers on which an agreed direction must now be sought from Ministers.

1. Security and Disarmament

(a) In what terms should the connection be expressed between general disarmament on the one hand and European security and German reunification on the other hand? In particular, can a measure of general disarmament (overall force levels and arms reduction for the Four Powers) be introduced into the plan? Alternatively, should the plan provide for a parallel negotiation about general disarmament?

(b) Should provisions which are stated in general terms for measures against surprise attack allow for an alternative proposal limited to Europe and also for a specific proposal for ground inspection limited to a small area in Europe?

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–2359. Secret. The complete text including the papers cited below comprise 43 pages. Only the summary is printed here. Regarding the deliberations of the Working Group, see Document 270.

¹ See Document 251.

(c) Should a specific formula, for instance by reference to the Paris Agreements,² or general language be used for limiting the strength of indigenous military forces in a defined area in Europe?

(d) Should a prohibition against the stationing of I.R.B.M.s in a defined area in Europe be included?

(e) Should Hungary be included in the area in Europe in which special security measures would be applied?

(f) Can and should the area in Europe in which special security measures would be applied be identified in other than political terms?

2. *Berlin*

(a) What Berlin proposals should be made within the “phased plan”?

(b) In considering secondary solutions, i.e. solutions apart from the “phased plan”, could the Western Powers accept anything beyond the “agency theory”? Specifically, could they proceed from Solution C in the Berlin paper to Solution D.³ (Soviet-G.D.R. declarations?)

(c) Can a G.D.R. declaration of the type included in the final fallback proposal on Berlin be envisaged without moving too far in the direction of the recognition of the G.D.R.? If so, can the Western Powers take the initiative with the Soviets in obtaining this, or should this initiative suggesting such a G.D.R. declaration be left to the Soviet Union?

(d) What measures of United Nations participation, if any, can the Western Powers contemplate? Should the United Nations role include United Nations personnel to determine whether the declaration concerning free access and non-use of force are being fulfilled?

3. *Tactics*

(a) Should the Western Powers give any publicity to the “phased plan” prior to the May 11 meeting?

(b) Should the Western Powers introduce the “phased plan” (or an indication of it) at the outset or should they hold it in reserve until they have been able, to some extent, to probe the Soviet position?

(c) If (a) has not been done, should the “phased plan” be publicised, either textually or in summary, when it is introduced?

(d) Should the Western Powers fully explore the “phased plan” with the Soviets and decide on its final disposition before any separate

² See footnote 4, Document 263.

³ Solution C outlined various declarations that the four occupying powers and the East Germans might make to ensure access to Berlin. Solution D stated that the Western powers would say that they intended to maintain their rights in Berlin under existing agreements and trusted that the Soviet Union would not interfere with them.

discussion of Berlin? Or should they seek to have the Berlin question discussed before entering into a discussion of the phased plan?

(e) Should the Western Powers oppose any discussion of the Peace Treaty principles, permit only extremely limited discussion, or be prepared for a detailed discussion?

272. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, April 25, 1959, 8 p.m.

5639. Paris for Embassy, USRO and Thurston. On eve of Western Foreign Ministers Meeting Embassy believes it may be helpful offer general appreciation present UK Governmental and public attitudes toward Berlin and East-West negotiations. Embassy is mindful in this connection that recent diplomatic activity and public and private statements of Prime Minister Macmillan have enhanced speculation that British becoming "soft" in face Soviet threats and that "Munich mood" is at large in country. This is not, however, our assessment British attitudes either on part of government or general public. Certainly there is no parallel between emphasis given by Macmillan to negotiations with Soviet and Chamberlain's efforts at appeasement. Macmillan and British Government under no illusions about menace of Soviet imperialism or character of Soviet leaders, nor do they expect negotiations to yield immediate and far reaching results.

Point of departure in Macmillan's thinking appears to be his assessment of catastrophic consequences for humanity of nuclear war and his conviction that in present circumstances neither East nor West can or does contemplate deliberate resort to it. At same time actions of Khrushchev most notably over Berlin carry great danger of setting off chain reaction carrying world to brink. For UK with its small area, heavy population and proximity to Soviet military power possible consequences of nuclear exchange appear in sharp focus and explain in large part emotional content some of Prime Minister's recent statements about effect very small number hydrogen bombs dropped on British

Isles. British feel US with large land mass and greater distance from Soviet Union for moment not as vulnerable and consequently perhaps not as mindful of danger in present situation nor of imperative necessity attempting find some basis, even temporary, for coexistence Communist empire and free world.

Prime Minister's reasoning appears to be that if war is excluded because it is unthinkable in light character of weapons available to both sides, then it is incumbent upon both Soviet Union and West to seek *modus vivendi* through process of negotiation. Obvious that Macmillan considers principal achievement his Moscow visit was to persuade Khrushchev to agree to negotiate. He does not believe that either Adenauer or de Gaulle can be expected in present circumstances to make much of a contribution toward advancing objective of negotiations. US doubts regarding possibility reaching agreement with Soviets at Foreign Ministers or Summit meeting probably lead Macmillan to conclude we may be more interested in disabusing our Allies of their illusions about prospects negotiations than in pursuing patiently and assiduously any possible point of agreement. In these circumstances Macmillan obviously is convinced that he owes it to his own people, to Western Alliance and to history to bring his own talents to bear in finding road to peace. Equally obviously as politician as well as statesman, he is not unmindful of fact that his recent efforts have been applauded by all sections of British public opinion even though they have been viewed with varying degrees of suspicion and reserve in other Western capitals. This places him in a dilemma from which perhaps he can hope to emerge only in course of negotiations themselves.

Macmillan is on record as stating negotiations with Khrushchev offer sole prospect of useful results in dealing with the Russians. Therefore Foreign Ministers' meeting from his point of view has significance only because its complete failure, in view US attitude, would prejudice holding of Summit talks. Macmillan recently has expressed opinion that what is required is continuous negotiating procedure punctuated from time to time with Summit meetings. This is consistent with his belief that while basic East-West differences are not negotiable at present time, it may nevertheless be possible to arrive at limited agreements reducing danger of conflict and purchasing time. This brings us to additional point which apparently impressed Macmillan greatly during his visit Soviet Union, namely great advance in standard of living of Russian people since his last visit some thirty years ago. Macmillan sees in this improvement best long range hope for the West that aggressive, imperialistic character of Soviet Government will undergo internal changes causing it to become less of menace to rest of world.

Fundamental problem arising from Macmillan (also Lloyd) thinking as analysed above is, it seems to Embassy, that British pursuing traditional policies and tactics and fail to see desirability genuine confidence in nuclear deterrence to prevent war, although they profess concur in deterrent concept. Thus, as we see it, they are following traditional procedure of maximum negotiating effort with potential enemy and, also traditionally, are quite determined to be staunch in face of hostilities which may arise if negotiations fail or if enemy attacks. However the psychological imperatives of a massive retaliatory posture coupled with disposition to face up publicly to Soviets firmly in peacetime seem in fact to be beyond British grasp.

In Embassy's opinion we have many problems before us inherent in the present strong desire of Macmillan government to seek basis for agreement with Soviet Union and in sense of urgency which it brings to these endeavors. Undoubtedly we can anticipate differences to arise with UK during negotiations with Soviets. We do not believe, however, that these differences have their origin in weakened resolution or "Munich spirit" of UK. Furthermore there is no reason to believe that British Government has any doubts that fundamental basis of British security continues to lie in Anglo-American alliance nor that in final analysis UK, despite differences with U.S. on strategy and tactics, would permit such differences to override requirements Anglo-American partnership.

Whitney

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, April 26, 1959, 2 p.m.

2398. Eyes only Secretary. I saw Chancellor yesterday at Cadenabbia.¹ He asked me to communicate substance our discussion to you only.

Adenauer had informal agenda four items: (1) new situation Washington; (2) his candidacy for Presidency; (3) prospects at FonMin and Summit Conferences and, in this connection, remarks on the Working Group studies;² (4) situation in UK.

Re (1) In view Secretary's departure Washington Monday and inability Chancellor send him letter from Italy before that time, Adenauer wished me communicate to him his strong desire to establish constant and close relations with him. He will later initiate a regular correspondence with Secy. He expects shortly to send letters to President and Mr. Dulles [*Herter*] expressing his views on pending problems.³

(2) He had decided to be candidate for Presidency in order to assure orderly transfer of power in advance of 1961 elections which will be bitterly contested by SPD. He said he expected arrange matters so that his foreign policies would be carried on by his successor. (It was evident he is confident he will continue to dominate political scene here as long as he is in good health.)⁴

(3) He sees no prospect of any substantive agreements being reached at FonMin Conference or later at Summit Conference if such takes place. He thinks at both conferences the question of general controlled disarmament must be discussed. In regard to Working Group, I explained to him frankly the undesirable position in which his FonMin had found himself, as result repudiation in Washington by FedRep Govt of proposals initiated or agreed to by German Delegation Paris.

He answered he had not been informed of results of Working Group Paris⁵ findings until too late to act otherwise than he had. He was out of sympathy with positions taken by his delegation and therefore

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/4-2659. Secret; Priority; Noform. Transmitted in two sections.

¹ Adenauer was at Cadenabbia on vacation; his conversation with Bruce was held from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m.

² See Document 270.

³ Not found.

⁴ According to Bruce's diary the Chancellor also expressed some reservations about running for the Presidency and stated that he might continue as Chancellor. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

⁵ See Document 242.

had given to von Brentano for presentation to the other FonMins the orders with which you are familiar.

He has not yet seen papers prepared by Working Group London but his delegation there had been operating within framework of his instructions, and he has been kept generally informed as to what has transpired. He is seeing von Brentano on subject today in Cadenabbia, and he would appreciate if Secy would meet von Brentano Paris some time Tuesday.

(4) His chief preoccupation is over UK foreign policy. On April 20 Macmillan sent him summary of Khrushchev's personal letter to Macmillan.⁶ PM wrote Adenauer that this long document had as one objective driving of wedge between Allies, and that Khrushchev had tried to go further than justified in interpreting PM's conversations with him in Moscow. The main point of K's letter, according to Macmillan, was to propose a nonaggression pact between UK and USSR, having as its most important element agreement that US bases in UK should be maintained only limited period time.

PM thought maybe there was element of genuineness in K's letter and therefore wanted to continue their correspondence. PM asked for Adenauer's views on above.

Chancellor said at first he had been tempted to answer that K seemed to think UK might be induced to be disloyal to its allies, but had refrained from doing so, and would shortly reply to him and observe that if an exchange of letters between the two statesmen continues no good could be expected to come of it.

Chancellor spoke at length of his deep concern over UK foreign policy and especially what its representatives might say in debate at conference table. PM, in his eagerness for Summit meeting, has already thrown away good cards. The three Western powers have thus far missed opportunity to obtain standstill concession from USSR in return for summit, and Adenauer hopes they will nail this down before agreeing to such meeting. In his opinion PM is thinking in antiquated European balance-of-power terms, and does not realize strength in Europe engendered by continental unity thus far achieved. It is evident he has profound distrust of UK firmness or ability in dealing with Soviets. He said he thought in Moscow there must have been serious negotiations between PM and K which had given latter false impression of what might be done with West.

Miscellaneous remarks; I told Chancellor:

⁶ For a summary of the letter from Khrushchev, dated April 14, Macmillan's reply, and the summaries sent to de Gaulle, Adenauer (and his reply), and Eisenhower, see Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, pp. 652–656.

(1) Paris Working Group papers never contemplated making proposal on confederation.

(2) Special security zone was always linked with reunification but it is not yet apparent what UK will finally decide in this regard.

(3) As to tactics, we are puzzled by German Delegation in London insisting on talking about Berlin first, whereas we would like to use it as last resort.

(4) His repudiation of reunification issue has created a confused atmosphere.

(5) We have certain hesitations about UN association with Berlin matter, since there is some danger of UN, once sharing, going too far.

(6) I sought Chancellor's views on how he proposed answer most recent Soviet note.⁷

Chancellor answered:

(1) He understood we were opposed to confederation and was not worried about our position.

(2) He considered special security zone dangerous and does not like idea at all. It would mean a limitation on FedRep's full partnership with West, which is the single most important thing to maintain. Chancellor's military advisers have told him any special security zone must extend from Atlantic to Urals.

(3) and (4) German Delegation had been instructed to regard reunification as secondary question and to put Berlin at top of list because of distrust of UK policy. If our rights in Berlin were surrendered or diminished, there would be even less prospect of reunification. Also, we should continue to base our position there on conquest.

(5) He has no enthusiasm about the UN, but thinks some form of association might be acceptable if Western garrisons and guarantees remain and if UN exercises no command or executive functions.

(6) Adenauer believes we should not be deterred from going ahead with atomic stockpile agreements because of Soviet note or remonstrances. I told him of my conversation with General Norstad on Friday and Norstad's suggestion that NATO might answer the Soviet notes to US and FedRep.⁸ Chancellor said he would like to consider this carefully but offhand believed reply from US much more important

⁷ For texts of the Soviet note to the Federal Republic, April 21, concerning the nuclear arming of West Germany, and the Federal Republic's reply, May 9, see *Moskau Bonn*, pp. 543–548; for texts of a similar note to the United States and the U.S. reply, May 8, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 517–519 and 521–522.

⁸ Bruce was in Paris April 23 and 24 en route to his meeting with Adenauer. According to his diary he discussed with Norstad [*text not declassified*] high altitude flights to Berlin. On the latter Norstad agreed that they should not be continued until the Western Foreign Ministers had met. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

than one from NATO. However, it might be that both methods should be used.

Since I was with Chancellor for four hours, obviously there was much additional conversation, but none I think worth reporting at this time, although I will speak to Secy in Paris about Chancellor's confidence he can continue to dominate FedRep foreign policy if he becomes President.

Segni had visited Adenauer Friday. They have been good friends for some years, and he feels assured of Italy's backing for his present views. His evident liking for Segni has perhaps been strengthened by his having decisively beaten the Italian at his own national game of bowls in which Adenauer has become an expert. He has his own alley Rhoendorf and plays at night under arc lights. He said his relationship with de Gaulle was in every respect satisfactory.

One must not underestimate the depth of his settled suspicion of UK policy. It is affecting all his decisions and tactics. He regards Macmillan's trip to Moscow as the beginning of a decided veering away on the part of the UK from what should be the true objectives of Western Alliance.

Chancellor seemed in perfect health, except for intermittent cough. He receives many visitors and expects to have a group of his leading party politicians at Cadenabbia this week to discuss his candidacy for the Presidency and his successor as Chancellor.

Bruce

274. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Herter left Washington at 4:05 p.m. on April 27 for meetings with the Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom at Paris, April 29 and 30. He arrived at Orly Field the following day at noon, attended a luncheon at the Embassy at 1:15, and discussed the Foreign Ministers meeting with President de Gaulle at the Elysée Palace at 4 p.m. (see Document 277).

On April 29 Herter discussed the draft report of the Four-Power Working Group with Foreign Minister Brentano at 9:15 a.m. and with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville at 10, before attending the first and second quadripartite Foreign Ministers meetings at the Quai d'Orsay at 10:30 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. His business meetings concluded with a conversation with Foreign Secretary Lloyd at the U.S. Embassy at 5 p.m. For records of the first four meetings, see Documents 278–281. Memoranda of Herter's discussion of Middle East topics, Spain, and NATO, USDel/MC 4–7, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1271.

On April 30 the Foreign Ministers completed their meetings with sessions at 10:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. In addition to attending these meetings Secretary Herter met with Admiral Burke at 4 p.m. to discuss France and NATO and at 6 p.m. participated in a briefing for Secretary General Spaak on the results of the Foreign Ministers meetings. Only the record of the third Foreign Ministers meeting is printed (Document 282), while the fourth and the briefing for Spaak are summarized in footnotes to it. A memorandum of the conversation with Admiral Burke, USDel/MC/8, is *ibid.*, CF 1276.

On May 1, following a press conference at 11 a.m. and a meeting with Prime Minister Debré at 3:30 p.m., Secretary Herter left Paris at 7, arriving in Washington at 8 a.m. the next day. A transcript of the press conference was transmitted in Tousei 366 from Paris, May 1. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–159) A memorandum of Herter's conversation with Debré is printed in volume VII, Part 2, Document 109.

Documentation on Herter's trip to Paris, including memoranda of conversation, telegrams to and from the U.S. Delegation and to and from the Secretary of State, orders of the day, chronologies, and briefing papers are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1268–1277; a less complete collection of documentation on the trip is *ibid.*, Central File 396.1–PA; Ambassador Bruce's recollections of the meetings are *ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. A memorandum of the conference at Gettysburg at 11 a.m. on May 2 during which Herter briefed the President on his trip is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. An extract from this briefing is printed in volume VII, Part 2, Document 110.

275. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, April 28, 1959, 11 a.m.

Polto 3099. NAC meeting, private—April 27, 1959—Four-Power Working Report to NAC.¹

This telegram gives highlights of meeting. Full report follows.² Discussion centered on sections Working Group Report dealing with German reunification and security with some discussion peace treaty section. Virtually nothing said ref Berlin and tactics sections.

Main development discussion security section was German statement under instructions that his government has reservations concerning zone of inspection. It should not be limited by political borders in order not to discriminate against Germany. Also, inspection and control would prohibit arms production in FedRep and would give Soviets control of important segments of German industry. Furthermore Soviets could use inspection as device for spying on German industry and through it on Allied industry associated with the Germans in various European organizations. German PermRep said his FonMin would make this point in Foreign Ministers Meetings.³

Spaak commented it had always been clear West rejects zone of inspection limited to Germany alone but other aspects presented by German statement seemed new. Norway pointed out security arrangements only applied if Germany reunified. UK thought zones under consideration are those proposed earlier and included more territory than just Germany. He understood German concern related only to a small area. Thought it important to realize that, given Soviet attitude toward inspection as demonstrated most recently at Geneva,⁴ any inspection which included Eastern Zone would not be too strict.

Comment: Plain from remarks members other delegations both during and after meeting this German statement caused considerable concern and not clear yet in its implications.

Remainder of discussion security and disarmament sections revealed familiar Scandinavian concern lest West be too hesitant in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-2859. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin and pouched to other NATO capitals.

¹ See Document 271.

² Polto 3106 from Paris, April 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-2859)

³ See Documents 280–282.

⁴ Documentation on the nuclear testing talks at Geneva which began on January 20, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

undertaking (as distinct from merely proposing) practical measures of disarmament prior to agreement on entire package. Dutch statement (which they circulated)⁵ voiced familiar worries about limiting size of area of limitation of forces and application of measures against surprise attack. Dutch also insisted there be no variations from or spell-out of agreed NATO positions without NAC consultation.

Another principle subject discussion was meaning of phrase "indissoluble package". Canadians and Scandinavians expressed concern lest it meant no part of package could be extracted at some stage if West might gain by so doing. Spaak voiced fear that since Soviets would never accept free elections there would be no discussion on security if plan really indissoluble. Consensus of NAC finally was that plan as envisaged by Working Group indissoluble in sense that security measures and German reunification steps must proceed by stages together as outlined. Council understood Working Group envisaged necessity providing for possibility of discussion on Berlin alone. Recognized Western plan should be presented as solid package so as to discourage Russians from plucking specific parts out of it for negotiation. However, Spaak and others stressed presentation should not preclude possibility dealing separately with European security during negotiations.

Under German reunification some discussion of mixed committee, with Spaak expressing fears lest this went too far in direct recognition East Germans. However, most members seemed to approve of this device for going part way to meet Russian position and adding novelty to traditional Western proposal.

Ref peace treaty Spaak again voiced his doubts about wisdom of West tabling either treaty or principles and questioned why West should discuss peace treaty at all.

Only point brought up under Berlin and tactics sections was Italy's request, apparently under instructions, that NAC be given more information ref emergency planning for Berlin under conditions utmost secrecy such as meeting of PermReps only in Spaak's office. Also requested more precise information ref tactics.

Council plans to meet again afternoon April 29 for possible further discussion WG Report as well as other matters.⁶ Plans also meeting afternoon May 1 or morning May 2 in hope there will be report from Ministers at that time.

Burgess

⁵ A translation of the Dutch statement was transmitted in Polto G-987 from Paris, April 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-2959)

⁶ No record of any discussion of the report by the Council on April 29 has been found.

276. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, April 28, 1959, 4 p.m.

3961. Approach of French Government officials to Berlin problem and East-West negotiations has been that of followers, not leaders. In general, French have tended adopt extremely conservative view on extent to which Western proposals in negotiations with Soviets should go beyond those advanced at Geneva 1955 Conference. This attitude has led French into positions paralleling those of FedRep on numerous issues, although sometimes for differing reasons.

Unlike situation in U.K., there are no strong public pressures on French Government to negotiate settlement with USSR. French opinion is primarily concerned with Algerian war and domestic political problem. Berlin crisis, while widely reported in press, does not seem to have greatly aroused average Frenchman. Also, there has been little public interest in proposals for disengagement. French officials themselves do not seem to be haunted by specter of catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. Conceivably because of their own lack of experience with and understanding of nuclear weapons, this factor does not appear to loom very large in their thinking. This apparent absence of great concern ref nuclear war is concurrent with, and possibly related to, French conviction that Soviets will not go to war if West is firm in resisting Soviet pressures. De Gaulle has made clear that he feels best way of dealing with Soviets is to demonstrate unmistakable firmness, and that to yield to Soviet blackmail invites disaster.

We suggest that following additional elements influence French attitudes concerning East-West talks: (1) basic scepticism ref Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously for relaxation tensions, (2) belief that recognition of status quo in Europe on Khrushchev's terms will not result in stabilization of European political situation but will lend further impetus to Soviet drive to crack Western defenses, (3) fear that concessions to Soviets may have effect of affecting U.S. troop dispositions in Europe and lead eventually to withdrawal of our troops, (4) desire, particularly on de Gaulle's part, to work closely with Adenauer in interests of Franco-German rapprochement.

Another, usually unvoiced, factor in French thinking is lack of enthusiasm in France for cause of German reunification. De Gaulle, of course, contrary to views previously expressed privately, spoke

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-2859. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Berlin.

eloquently in March 25 press conference¹ of need for reunification, and some other far-seeing French officials appreciate dangers inherent in continued division. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to say that most Frenchmen would be content to leave situation as it is. In this, however, they would draw line short of recognizing GDR.

Embassy concludes, therefore, that, in forthcoming negotiations with Soviets, French will be firm, conservative, and hostile to concessions to Soviets. While this attitude is certainly to be welcomed, it is not unmitigated blessing. As already demonstrated in Working Group sessions, French may well be serious drag on efforts to present Western position in terms sufficiently reasonable to be appealing to public opinion.

De Gaulle's proposal for Summit agenda to include item on aid to undeveloped countries, and manner in which he has spoken on this subject in his recent speeches, represent attempt to raise sights on more idealistic plane. However, vagueness and impracticality this proposal make it doubtful that it will help counteract solid but essentially negative French stand in East-West negotiations.

Houghton

¹For a transcript of this press conference, see de Gaulle, *Statements*, pp. 41-51.

277. Telegram From the Delegation to the Western Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, April 28, 1959, 8 p.m.

Secto 4. Secretary met with de Gaulle for thirty-five minutes afternoon April 28. Talk devoted virtually entirely to Germany.

Secretary opened stressing need for Allied unity and expressed hope next few days would see progress in this regard. De Gaulle indicated belief that since Soviets had created crisis and asked for negotiations, we should not rush forward with proposals but should await Soviet ideas.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/4-2859. Secret. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Bonn, Moscow, and London. A memorandum of this conversation, USDel/MC/1, indicates that the meeting began at 4 p.m. and Ambassador Houghton was also present. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1274)

Secretary reiterated our position that Berlin not be discussed in isolation but rather as part of whole German problem. Therefore we should keep Berlin in that context.

De Gaulle expressed doubt anything definitive could be decided now but agreed we should keep on trying. De Gaulle added he thought Khrushchev's principal objective in summit meeting was to divide West. He believed that the more precise were our proposals to Soviets, the greater success Khrushchev would have in attaining his objective since West would never agree on all details. He thought we should not be intimidated on German problem because U.S. remains strongest world power and accordingly there is little Khrushchev can do under present conditions.

De Gaulle then outlined his view that we should meet Soviets on some new ground and abandon present ground (i.e., Germany) which was terrain on which Khrushchev desired to operate. Accordingly we should meet Soviets on ground which would embarrass them, along lines of common plan for developing under-developed countries. Soviets could be invited participate in such scheme along with other civilized countries. He suggested plan for Africa in this context. U.S. which had long and successful experience in this field would of course play important role. In response to Secretary's query, de Gaulle said his idea should be reserved for possible Summit meeting.

Secretary referred to May 11 conference and package which Working Group had put together. He had no illusions this package would be acceptable to Soviets but thought it had public appeal and responsibility for refusing it should be placed on Soviets.

De Gaulle then asked if Secretary believed we should go to Summit Meeting if Foreign Ministers' meeting produced nothing. Secretary replied in negative saying Foreign Ministers' meeting should produce as minimum *modus vivendi* for Berlin which would last for some time.

De Gaulle then referred to Macmillan talks here¹ and in Washington² and said British Prime Minister appeared somewhat affected (*marqué*) by his trip to Moscow and determined to find ground for negotiations. He thought this was element to bear in mind re the future. Secretary agreed Macmillan was somewhat more hopeful of having genuine negotiations with Soviets than we were. Also British believed we should jump to summit because only Khrushchev appears able undertake meaningful discussions. De Gaulle expressed view that if we met Khrushchev without some progress made by Foreign Ministers, and became engaged in a battle with him, result would be unfortunate.

¹ See Document 213.

² See Documents 234–241.

He thought Foreign Ministers' meeting important. Secretary said President had similar ideas and thought Foreign Ministers' meeting represented important probing operation.

De Gaulle added that French position on Germany already known. German settlement not currently possible in his view. German reunification might be achieved one day in future but this is not urgent matter for West, East or for Germany. In meantime we must hold firm. We should encourage practical contacts between two Germanies, not however to extent recognizing East Germany. Re German frontiers we must not change Oder-Neisse Line. Germany had lost war so it was normal she should pay certain price. Furthermore if we changed Oder-Neisse frontier, we should lose Poles, while finally there were few Germans in area anyway. France also believed there should be no special status for Germany as to armament limitations. Germany should have right belong to alliance of her choice.

Secretary referred to de Gaulle's statement on German frontiers, and said he thought West Germans might be willing make statement on this subject but wanted something in exchange. De Gaulle said in exchange they would get independence including freedom choose their alliances, what armaments they would have and later achieve unity.

De Gaulle added we must not accept neutralization of Germany as this would weaken Atlantic Alliance. Secretary inquired if de Gaulle meant this would weaken NATO. De Gaulle said it would weaken NATO but also would have wider meaning of weakening whole Atlantic Alliance. Secretary and de Gaulle agreed negotiations would consume many months and that there was no hurry.

In response to de Gaulle's inquiry on situation in East, Secretary indicated fear situation in Iraq moving towards communism, particularly in areas security and administrators. He expressed doubt Kassim³ able reverse trend. De Gaulle expressed view Soviets might make move during Geneva Conference on Germany in some other area of world. He also stated he felt Soviets' real interest not in Iraq but in Africa and present actions merely designed open corridor to that continent.

De Gaulle noted Warsaw Pact Meeting and asked our view on meaning of invitation to Communist Chinese.⁴ Secretary gave view Soviets under pressure from Chinese Communists to include latter in international gatherings.

De Gaulle said if meetings enlarged he believed Italy should be included, presumably if Poland and Czechoslovakia included. He

³ Prime Minister Abdel Karim al-Kassim of Iraq.

⁴ The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers met at Warsaw, April 27–28. Included in these meetings was the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.

avored maintenance four-power formula but said we should not forget Italy if others included. Secretary agreed saying U.S. position was that Italy should be added if anyone else were.

Secretary concluded saying we believe progress had been made in recent tripartite talks on Africa in Washington⁵ along lines which we believed General desired. He noted Working Groups set up to study specific projects, and believed this concept was advancing. De Gaulle had no comment whatever on tripartite talks.

In conclusion, de Gaulle asked after President and expressed regret at illness former Secretary Dulles.

Atmosphere of meeting excellent. General was lucid and unemotional in his presentation and appeared in good health.⁶

Herter

⁵ U.S.-U.K.-French talks on Africa took place at Washington, April 16–21.

⁶ Secretary Herter repeated these sentiments in a very short note to the President transmitted in Cahto 1 from Paris, April 28 at 8 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

278. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/3

Paris, April 29, 1959, 9:15 a.m.

WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Paris, April 29–May 2, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Hillenbrand

Germany

Dr. von Brentano

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1275. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Herter. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT

German Attitude Towards Report of Working Group

Dr. von Brentano began by saying he was grateful for the opportunity to see the Secretary privately. He had just had two days with Chancellor Adenauer in Italy,¹ who sent his greetings and indicated he was looking forward to seeing the Secretary as soon as possible. The Secretary indicated that he too hoped to see the Chancellor soon. Dr. von Brentano stated that he could not emphasize how important it was that the Foreign Ministers agree on basic principles during their meetings in Paris. Any split would be highly dangerous for the Geneva Conference. He said that he did not know what the Secretary thought of the Khrushchev letter to Macmillan,² but both he and the Chancellor regarded it as highly dangerous particularly since they had been given only a summary. They would like to know the contents of the other parts not included in the summary.

The Secretary noted that we had the same question in our minds. Up to now we had had no opportunity to discuss the Khrushchev communication with the British themselves.

With reference to the Working Group report,³ Dr. von Brentano said the Germans had had strong reservations against the intimations of measures against surprise attack in a limited area which the British had attempted to write into Stage II of the Phased Plan. Moreover, they were unable to accept the designation of countries by name in which special measures were to take place. In response to the Secretary's query, Dr. von Brentano indicated that the use of coordinates would be acceptable if the areas were designated as in the disarmament proposals of 1957.⁴

Moreover, he continued, any treatment of Germany which tended to make impossible Germany's continuing participation in NATO would be unacceptable. The Secretary said that we were not prepared to countenance anything which would exclude Germany from NATO. Our position was that security arrangements must be part of a complete package settlement. A unified Germany must have freedom of choice to join NATO.

Dr. von Brentano said he saw no difference in principle between us. He hoped that the German reservations to the security sections of the

¹ Adenauer was at Cadenabbia on vacation.

² Regarding Khrushchev's April 14 letter to Macmillan, see Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, pp. 652–656.

³ See Document 271.

⁴ Presumably Brentano is referring to the proposals submitted to the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2 and 29, 1957, which delimited by latitude and longitude an inspection zone in Europe. For texts of these proposals, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 837–839 and 868–874.

London Working Group report would not be misunderstood or lead to fear and mistrust. He said that any revival of Four Power control would have undesirable psychological effects, intimating that the restrictions on production of ABC weapons in Article 17 of the Phased Plan would have this result. The Federal Republic would be glad to guarantee that a unified Germany would voluntarily wish to perpetuate the renunciation of production of these weapons, but a system could not be tolerated which would let the Soviets into West German factories and lead to mass industrial espionage. The Federal Republic was willing to discuss production controls within the framework of general disarmament, and would not object to the inclusion of Germany within any generalized control system.

The Secretary said he was glad to have emphasized that the Foreign Ministers must reach an agreement during the Paris meetings. It would be highly undesirable to leave any loose ends hanging prior to Geneva. Whether it was considered practical or not, the Western Powers must keep their eyes on the goal of German unification. They must pull together on this basic point or the rationale of our entire position would collapse.

Dr. von Brentano said he agreed and that the Western Powers would deceive themselves if they thought that the political problem of German participation could be put aside while other matters were dealt with.

The Secretary noted that the Germans appeared to have two major objections to the security aspects of the report: a) the singling out of Germany by name; b) any type of inspection system which involved the possibility of industrial espionage by the Soviets.

Dr. von Brentano said this was correct, but he would like to put the matter somewhat more generally. The Germans would accept any control system on a broader basis if other countries were involved. However, he believed the British ideas of special controls for the Rapacki area were psychologically and politically pernicious. He wished to say frankly that he most sincerely felt that any solution which would give the opposition in Germany a chance to discuss disengagement and the Rapacki Plan would be disastrous. Public opinion in Germany was now fairly sound but would be weakened by such proposals. Germany must remain part of the Western Alliance system; otherwise neutralization would grow. In this connection he referred to recent SPD reunification plans⁵ which, he commented, must be rejected in their entirety. Not only the question of NATO membership was involved, but also Germany's

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 254.

role in the movement toward integration, for example, EURATOM and the Common Market.

In concluding, the Secretary said that he could repeat without equivocation that the U.S. had no thought of suggesting any arrangement which would alienate Germany from her European connections. He thought that these basic concepts might not be understood in the same sense by the British, particularly the need to strengthen the movement towards European integration.

279. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/2

Paris, April 29, 1959, 10 a.m.

WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Paris, April 29-May 2, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Houghton
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Lyon

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Monsieur Joxe
Monsieur Lucet

SUBJECT

Western Position in Geneva Meetings

The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville this morning at 10 o'clock for half an hour prior to the first formal meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

The Secretary indicated that he felt strongly that before the Foreign Ministers left Paris the various loose strings on matters which the Working Party had not been able to reach agreement should be disposed of and the four Allies should be in a solid position. The Secretary indicated

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1275. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lyon and approved by Herter. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

he felt that we all would be in a very bad position vis-à-vis the press and world opinion, if this were not the case. He said he hoped that the Foreign Minister would permit him to speak on this point at the opening when he intended to emphasize strongly the necessity for us to concentrate on the forest of our main objectives and not be confused by the trees of detail and disagreement.

In this connection, the Foreign Minister raised the matter of informing NATO next week and the Secretary explained that as he had so recently taken office he felt he would have to return to Washington next week where he had work to do and he hoped that Monsieur Couve de Murville would undertake the task of informing the NATO Council on behalf of the others of the results of this Paris meeting.

Presence of Secretaries-General of UN and NATO at Geneva

The question of Mr. Hammarskjold being at Geneva was discussed and Monsieur Couve de Murville said that the French agreed that he should be present to receive the Delegates and make an opening speech "but not on substance."

The Secretary raised Mr. Hammarskjold's suggestion of leaving at Geneva after his own departure an assistant to be available throughout the Conference.

The French Foreign Minister had reservations on this point since he felt that if this was agreed to before the Conference it would give the appearance of committing us to some UN participation in the solution.

The Secretary indicated that this was a point on which the United States did not feel as strongly as the French. Monsieur Couve de Murville laughingly remarked that this was a point on which the French were perhaps more in agreement with the Soviets.

The Secretary said that Mr. Spaak had discussed in the United States the possibility of his being at Geneva.¹

On this point also, the French Foreign Minister had reservations, saying "everyone seems to want to be at Geneva."

Military Representation at Geneva

The Secretary inquired whether the French proposed having military men in their Delegation. The question arose with us as to whether the Secretary of Defense should be a member of our Delegation. The Secretary indicated that in his opinion there might be some psychological

¹ A brief summary of Spaak's conversation with the President, Herter, and Merchant on April 24, during which he suggested, and the President and Secretary of State approved, the idea of Spaak being present at Geneva in an informal capacity, was transmitted in Topol 3548 to Paris, April 24. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/4-2359)

advantage in the Secretary of Defense being a delegate as it would indicate that we were in earnest.

Monsieur Couve de Murville said that the French would have with them a French colonel who had participated in the Working Group, but that he would act not as a member of the Delegation but rather in the capacity of an adviser.

The matter of military participation at the Summit Meeting was also raised and it was pointed out that in 1955 at Geneva Marshal Zhukov had been present.

Monsieur Joxe pointed out, however, that the Marshal was there not so much as a member of the Delegation as a former companion in arms of President Eisenhower, a card which the Russians were then playing but which had not worked out successfully.

German Position

In reply to the Foreign Minister's inquiry as to the German position, the Secretary explained that he had seen von Brentano this morning² and that the Germans appeared to be prepared to go along on everything except the Security Zone. They considered that any security zone should cover areas rather than countries. Also, they were against permitting any inspection in Germany since they felt that this would a) permit the Soviets to carry on espionage, and b) they were not prepared to grant the Soviets the right to monitor nuclear matters, which they have given us.

The Germans were willing to press forward on the matter of unification in the three proposed phases.

Security and Disarmament

Monsieur Couve de Murville said the whole matter of security and disarmament was very difficult and he wondered if a slightly different presentation would not be preferable, separating unification, security and disarmament. By this he meant something less precise on the matter of disarmament, but linked in the field of control with the matter of general European disarmament. The Foreign Minister said they favored this approach so as not to put the Germans in too difficult a position vis-à-vis Soviet control.

The Secretary indicated that we would be quite prepared to discuss these French views with them and suggested that the experts work out details on this matter. However, he emphasized our belief that the whole package concept was essential.

The Foreign Minister explained that the setting forth of exact numerical limitation of forces presented difficulty for France because of

² See Document 278.

Algeria. He also felt that no mention of nuclear disarmament from the general disarmament point of view was not good. He felt, moreover, that, at this juncture, the Soviets were sufficiently strong in nuclear weapons to be disturbing.

The Secretary indicated that for the present he believed we were stronger. The Secretary reiterated our belief that the package solution was attractive to the world, but if we diluted it it might be whittled away as were our 1955 proposals.

Both the Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that our present proposals were more attractive than those of 1955.

Some discussion ensued about participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia and it was agreed that our policy should be to resist the seating of Poland and Czechoslovakia as long as possible, but that if this proved impossible we were in accord that Italy should participate.

The Foreign Minister said he foresaw a difficulty as he believed that the Soviets were determined to seat the East German, Bolz, at the Council table.

There was discussion of the possibility of Rumanian, Dutch, or Yugoslav participation, and both the Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that every attempt should be made to limit the participation, particularly as a precedent for Geneva since a four-nation meeting might be manageable, but a 20-nation would be impossible.

The Foreign Minister asked whether the inclusion of a German representative at the Foreign Ministers meeting constituted a precedent for the Summit.

The Secretary said this was a matter which would have to be worked out at the Foreign Ministers meeting.

280. Telegram From the Delegation to the Western Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, April 29, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 12. Department pass Defense. Western Foreign Ministers' Meeting: April 29—morning session.

1. After Couve's welcoming statement, Secretary stressed need for resolving swiftly the many questions of substance left unsettled by

Working Group. Must develop effective Western position and not go to Geneva on Soviet terms with discussion limited to Berlin crisis which USSR precipitated. Western package must be attractive enough to arouse support throughout world, must be indissoluble and should contain proposals for an improved position for Berlin. Work must be conducted in realization that despite more conciliatory tone of recent Soviet pronouncements we are facing issues involving danger of war. Particularly distressing that newspaper speculations have created impression Western disunity. Vital to prevent spread of such impressions.

2. Selwyn Lloyd suggested Foreign Ministers agree to inform press their discussions confidential and to give no briefings until end of meeting. Generally agreed to give no information to press today and if possible withhold information until end of meetings.

3. Couve then began review of phased plan.¹ After US, French and British all pointed out that present composition of all-German Committee under paragraph 7 too heavily weighted against East Germans to seem appealing to public opinion, Brentano agreed to accept French suggestion to raise composition to 25 for the Federal Republic and 10 for GDR with three-fourths majority required. Couve pointed out this increase in size also decreased the resemblance of committee to a cabinet thus minimizing danger of committee appearing in role of executive body. Agreed to delete last sentence of paragraph 7² on ground this unnecessary limitation on selection of candidates. Words "representatives of" changed to "members from" at suggestion Brentano. Also agreed to refer to GDR as so-called German Democratic Republic in order to simplify paragraph.

4. Bracketed section of paragraph 10 referred to Working Group for redrafting with directive that language should be altered to eliminate any implication all-German Committee might give directives to governments or stand above the Government of FedRep. Brentano suggested as possible formula that proposals of committee could be implemented through respective legislative procedures applicable in each part of Germany. Considered this would be consistent with requirements of German basic law. Although Couve preferred to delete sentence did not object to referring problem to legal advisers.

5. Couve then suggested Working Group review reunification section of stage III to Polish language. In this connection Brentano sug-

¹ The Report of the Four-Power Working Group included a four-phase peace plan (see Document 270). For text of the phased plan as presented by the Western powers at the Foreign Ministers Conference on May 14, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 624–629, or *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 55–60.

² The last sentence of paragraph 7 reads: "They would not exercise any other public function during the period of their membership."

gested paragraph 24 be carefully examined to eliminate any possibility USSR might utilize it as pretext for extending its influence into FedRep, for example by stationing Soviet troops in West Germany. Secretary suggested problem might be met by providing that each of four powers would exercise reserved rights within its respective zone of responsibility. Agreed to refer reunification sections of phased plan to Working Group session in afternoon.

6. Foreign Ministers then turned to security sections phased plan. Agreed each would present general views on security measures before engaging in detailed review of phased plan by paragraph.

7. Germans opened by translating statement which they promised to table in English at afternoon session.³ This statement represented considered position of German Government and had been discussed with Chancellor. Although Federal Government agreed with general principle of establishment of security zones against surprise attack mentioned in paragraph 16 could not accept a more limited zone restricted to Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and possibly Hungary. Such an arrangement would have profound military, political and psychological disadvantages. It would place Germany in special status in NATO. Such special inspection system would probably entail withdrawal from German area of key types of defense installations. It would amount to discrimination against Germany. However, any inspection systems involving wide geographic areas would be acceptable. This especially pertinent in case of ground inspection. Suggested adopting Geneva formula regarding areas of comparable size, depth and importance on both sides of line of demarcation between reunited Germany and Eastern European countries.⁴ Also referred to 1957 proposals for inspection against surprise attack extending to 60 degrees east, or at any rate zone extending far into Soviet territory. Any zones for aerial and ground inspections should be identical.

8. German statement also took exception to paragraph 17. It was not possible to subject all-German Government in advance to prohibitions on production ABC weapons. Prohibition very different from prohibition contained in WEU Protocols which had been voluntarily accepted by Federal Government. Language paragraph 17 would result in large scale Soviet inspection of German industry and would be intolerable. Germans suggested paragraph 17 be rewritten to effect that all-German Government be invited to extend renunciation on ABC manufacture accepted by FedRep to all-Germany insofar as comparable

³No copy of this statement has been found.

⁴Reference here and in the next sentence is to the proposals referred to in footnote 4, Document 278.

waivers accepted by Soviet Bloc countries. Such arrangements thinkable only on basis of reciprocity and would require similar controls in USSR. This provision should be transferred to stage III since consent of an all-German Government would be required.

9. Germans also opposed to accepting commitment not to station IRBM's in security zone area. Such a commitment could have far-reaching consequences for Western defense planning and West should not tie its hands in advance on this matter. Therefore wished to see paragraph 18 deleted. German paper closed with reiteration opposition to any discriminatory provisions applied to Germany which would reduce her to special status in NATO and impair her development of close ties with West. FedRep could not accept any provisions which would worsen its legal position.

10. In further clarification of German position on security, Brentano pointed out that the Germans differentiated between two types of zones mentioned in the phased plan. Surprise attack zones should be defined by geographic coordinates, cover as wide an area as possible, and provide for identical coverage by aerial and ground inspection.

Stage II zone of inspection (paragraph 16) is unwise in German view because Soviets would have opportunity to spy on German industry. The Germans, of course, have no objection to the present WEU system of inspection and would be prepared to have this extended to an all-German Government when established.

11. Pointing out that these German reservations applied to stage II, Couve asked as to German attitude toward paragraph 27 in stage III. Brentano replied that while the Germans have no objection in principle to force ceilings, they are opposed to definition of area of their application in "Rapacki Plan" terms. In response to Couve, Brentano confirmed that formula used in paragraph 3 of the Geneva 1955 Treaty of Assurance⁵ (areas of comparable size, depth, and importance) would be acceptable.

12. With regard to paragraph 16, there seemed to be general agreement with the Secretary's view that since ground inspection would be difficult in Arctic zone, the provision for identical coverage for aerial and ground inspection should apply primarily to a European zone. Couve pointed out that it was important to include non-European inspection zones, since without some provision for inspection of U.S. territory, the Soviets could logically argue that the Western proposals were

⁵ For text of MFM/DOC/7, October 27, 1955, which included an "Outline of Terms of Treaty of Assurance on the Reunification of Germany," see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 529–532.

designed to open up Soviet territory without any adequate compensation.

13. Couve favored paragraph 17 (ABC weapons) as means of exploiting weakness inherent in the Soviet Bloc's position. Soviets, unlike West, have not prohibited manufacture of ABC weapons in the Soviet Bloc territory, and there would be considerable advantage in mentioning this as soon as possible in phased plan, preferably in stage II. In Couve's view, this should be more than a mere reaffirmation of FedRep's commitment. In order to meet German objection to area definition in "Rapacki Plan" terms, Couve suggested that ABC prohibition be extended only to so-called GDR. Brentano said he was in basic agreement with Couve's ideas and, while he would prefer area definitions along lines of Geneva 1955 formula, he believed the problem was one of language rather than one of substance.

14. Lloyd pointed out that if German recommendations accepted, only security provision left in stage II would be paragraph 13 (exchange of information). Even if, as Couve pointed out, first sentence in paragraph 16 were retained and paragraph 17 were revised to meet German objections, stage II would remain largely devoid of significant security provisions and public appeal aspects of package would be reduced accordingly.

15. In explaining French position on security and general disarmament provisions of phased plan, Couve pointed out that French objections were principally following: (1) French could not agree to force ceiling of 750,000 since they now exceed this level in order to meet Algerian commitments; (2) French oppose formulation of general disarmament proposals which do not mention atomic weapons. French are not convinced in any case of desirability of introducing general disarmament measures into "phased plan" and would be prepared to delete all reference to general disarmament if others agree.

16. The Secretary said that while he felt that elimination of specific force ceilings from general disarmament provisions would considerably reduce their popular appeal, he could understand French problem. Asked if French would be prepared to accept a ceiling of 1,000,000, Couve replied that while the French could live with this ceiling, it could scarcely be interpreted as a general disarmament measure since it represented a considerable increase over the publicly known 1957 ceilings. Lloyd suggested that since British forces are now below 1957 ceiling, it might be feasible to impose a combined ceiling of 1,500,000 on British and French forces. Couve doubted public acceptability of this formula and suggested instead that four powers be required to announce number of men each now has under arms and to declare their intention not to increase these levels. The Secretary cited disadvantage this formula in view of continuing German build-up and suggested that the problem

might best be met by use of general language which would not impose an intolerable ceiling on the French and, at the same time, meet desirable objective of introducing limitations on the Soviets; for example "the four powers would restrict or reduce their armed forces to maximum limits to be agreed, which, for example, for the United States and USSR might be 2,500,000 each". Similar general language could be substituted for the appropriate paragraphs in stages II and III. The Secretary's formula was accepted in principle.

17. Couve wondered if some mention might not be made in the general disarmament provisions of nuclear weapons. The Secretary replied that while United States experts had given much thought to the problem, they had been unable to come up with a satisfactory and adequate formula in view of the great multiplicity of modern nuclear weapons.

18. Lloyd withdrew British reservation to paragraph 4 and, while favoring retention of paragraph 5, agreed it might be unwise to make a permanent commitment not to station IRBM's in Germany (paragraph 18). In this connection, Brentano pointed out that retention of paragraph 18 might conceivably induce other NATO countries to cancel their commitments to permit IRBM's to be stationed on their territories, since in some cases these commitments had been made specifically contingent on acceptance by other NATO partners.

Herter

281. Telegram From the Delegation to the Western Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, April 29, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 13. Department pass Defense. Western Foreign Ministers Meeting—afternoon session April 29.

1. First subject for discussion was section of Working Group Report on draft principles of German peace settlement. Re paragraph II of this section, Brentano said FedRep did not favor deletion whole paragraph. He preferred principle set forth in US proposal (Proposal A) but had some difficulties with wording. It was agreed that paragraph II

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/4-2959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in three sections and repeated to London, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin.

would be based on US proposal, but that legal experts would consider revised wording to make acceptable to FedRep. (See Secto 10)¹

2. Couve questioned reference to “self-determination” in paragraph III and wondered what it meant. Brentano said it was intended to emphasize right of all-German state to choose its own internal system and its external relations; also, it would guard against Soviet desire to intervene in event social structures in East Germany are changed. Couve agreed, but went on to say that French objected to all of paragraph IV after word “settlement”. It was agreed to drop language after “settlement”, and to reverse order of present paragraphs III and IV. Legal experts would check language of both paragraphs in view of revised order.

3. It was agreed to drop second sentence of paragraph VIII re prohibition on Anschluss, and to add Austrian State Treaty at end of first sentence this paragraph.

4. French questioned necessity of including paragraph X re agreements FedRep and “DDR”, saying that it was obvious reunified Germany would be new state and that all agreements of both parts of Germany should be reviewed. Brentano said question was practical one and that it would be desirable to keep as many agreements on both parts of Germany as possible. Obviously, it would be most difficult to renegotiate all agreements made by both Germanies. He confirmed FedRep’s support of proposal A under paragraph X. It was finally agreed that this whole paragraph pertained to question of law and that it would be referred to legal experts for further review and recommendation.

5. Discussion then turned to section of Working Group Report on Berlin. First question was what, if anything, should go into overall, phased plan concerning Berlin. Secretary stated US believed phased plan should contain positive proposal on Berlin. Of two alternatives proposals under paragraph II of Working Group Report, US favored first alternative, since this proposed something which went beyond status quo. Secretary noted Soviets brought about present crisis, although we had been fairly satisfied with existing situation in Berlin. If we now say nothing and in effect accept status quo, we will really be going backwards. We should take step forward and make Soviets go on defensive.

6. Lloyd agreed with Secretary’s point and said it was important for presentational reasons that phased plan should have proposal in it concerning Berlin. Couve agreed, although he said French have reserves concerning points in first alternative re plebiscite on foreign troops and removal of DDR capital from East Berlin (sub-paragraphs (II) and (III)

¹ Secto 10, April 29, transmitted the text agreed by the legal advisers on the bracketed sections of the principles of a German peace settlement. (*Ibid.*)

under alternative A in recommendations portion of Working Group paper on Berlin). Couve thought proposal for plebiscite weakened our position, since it seemed to indicate we were not sure of Berlin opinion regarding troops; also, it weakened our legal position. On paragraph (III), he thought it might be going too far to suggest removal of DDR capital.

8. Brentano said he shared Couve's objections on these two points. He thought it would be better to delete (II) and (III). Secretary said that, if Foreign Ministers agreed to accept alternative A for inclusion in phased plan, then (II) and (III) could be dropped. This suggestion was adopted and Working Group will prepare new language. Foreign Ministers agreed that proposal along these lines for Berlin solution would be included in stage I of phased plan. Elections in whole of Berlin might take place in stage II.

9. Lloyd suggested that alternative B (status quo proposal) for Berlin solution might be used as fallback position on Berlin in discussion with Soviets of overall phased plan. Alternative B would not be included in plan at outset, but could be brought out in discussion. Secretary thought this would be feasible if Soviets agree to discuss Berlin in context of phased plan.

10. Foreign Ministers then discussed interim Berlin solution in isolation, if Soviets reject phased plan. Secretary emphasized dangers of having public receive impression through leaks that FonMins had agreed on fallback solution for Berlin separate from overall, phased plan. He thought, therefore, that it might be better for FonMins to reserve discussion of interim solution for Geneva in light of situation as it develops there. In meantime, FonMins would have problem in mind and there could be direct contact between FonMins. Secretary felt group was agreed on major part of proposed solution and that further discussion at this time would be unwise.

11. Other FonMins concurred with Secretary's views and it was agreed that discussion of fallback plan for Berlin in isolation would be removed from Western paper. However, it was agreed that initial Western proposal outside of package framework would be Western proposal contained in phased plan.

12. Lloyd opened discussion tactics section by asking what sort of meeting envisaged. Would it consist of plenary sessions every day with large delegations and much publicity, or would there be sufficient intervals between plenaries for private meetings, say Foreign Ministers with one advisor each, where real negotiations could take place. Thought latter arrangement by far the better and believed Soviets would adhere to such arrangements if they so agreed. Noted this point covered by paragraph 9 Working Group paper on tactics.

13. Couve agreed small meetings better, but this was difficult question to determine in advance. Past history showed large meetings with much publicity accomplished little whereas private meetings had shown some results as in 1954.² Soviets would want to make a show with their proposals to impress world, and this will probably take several days, not to mention ironing out question of participation Czechs and Poles and status of Germans at conference.

14. Secretary wondered if West could control problem but agreed small meeting best. There were indications Soviets will wish discuss peace treaty proposals paragraph by paragraph for effect on East Germans. There is also the question whether or not West should table proposals at outset. Furthermore, should we publish proposals beforehand in full or in summary and if so, how long before Geneva meeting opens. The question of public posture was tied in with report of Ministerial Meetings to NATO.

15. Couve thought proposals should not be published in advance. West should keep something for the conference. Soviets would publicize their proposals. We should keep our proposals as answers and counter-proposals to Soviets. Also wondered about security in connection with report to NATO.

16. Secretary replied that West had insisted Berlin be considered in context of German problem as a whole. If West tables plan, it takes initiative and puts burden on Soviets to reject. US position on this point not frozen but believe it important.

17. Lloyd did not see advantages of prior announcement. If there is prior announcement of Western position, loyal opposition in UK would immediately start picking holes in it, thereby helping Soviets. Brentano agreed with Lloyd since there was same difficulty with opposition in Germany. Suggested, however, summary of Western proposals be published when they are tabled. Lloyd added that he thought nothing should be published until Geneva meeting got down to business which would probably not happen until after initial period of procedural wrangling. Couve agreed and Lloyd noted that something might of course happen between now and May 11 to cause change in thinking and suggested summary be prepared. To Secretary's remark that plan would probably come up bit by bit anyhow, French replied this would not be same as formal announcement of entire plan. Secretary then said US willing to agree with others on this point in view internal political difficulties in UK and Germany.

² Presumably Couve de Murville is referring to the Geneva Conference on Indochina, May 8–July 21, 1954; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, volume XVI.

18. It was agreed that NAC should be given an oral report by Couve, as chairman, at end Ministerial talks.

19. Lloyd then suggested Ministers should run over questions posed by Working Group in first part of their report under paragraph 3 "tactics". It was agreed (a), (b), (d) have been covered and that the summary mentioned in (c) should be prepared. Concerning (e), Brentano thought principles could be discussed since they would have been stated. Furthermore, we had told Soviets in our notes we would consider Soviet proposals. Secretary remarked that if we begin by discussing principles, we'll never get beyond first one.

20. Lloyd thought it better not to try obtain agreement on formal agenda and should avoid wrangle on procedure. Should insist on discussion of our principles if Soviets wanted to table their treaty. Concluded by saying, "if they want to talk about a treaty, we should let them have it". The others agreed.

21. On participation of Czechs and Poles, Couve summed up present agreement that West preferred to confine talks to four powers. Would try to avoid admission Czechs and Poles, but if they had to agree, would insist on participation of Italy. Lloyd suggested that Soviets might not be averse to excluding Czechs and Poles but would wish find way to save face. Why not then propose at outset of conference that question of participation be postponed, perhaps for week?

22. On German participation, after Secretary had quoted agreed formula in Western notes³ which Soviets apparently had accepted, Couve wondered if soundings might be taken as to Soviet attitude by having Western delegation secretaries at their meeting next week casually raise problem of seating for Germans. Brentano said that while he would plan to be present in Geneva, he would not attend meetings. FedRep advisors would be led by Ambassador Grewe and would not expect to sit at table with Western delegations. It would not matter to him whether Bolz (East German Foreign Minister) chose to attend conference.

23. Ministers then recapitulated program of work of sub-groups as follows:

(1) Working Group would finish redrafting reunification, security and Berlin sections.

(2) Legal advisors would work on peace treaty section and coordinate with Working Group.

(3) There should be amendment to tactics section of Working Group report to take into account preceding discussion.

³ See Document 176.

24. Meeting ended with short discussion of how to handle press questions, with UK stressing need to give no indication Berlin fall-back positions left for later discussion at Geneva. Next meeting scheduled for 10:30 a.m. April 30 to review reports of Working Group and legal experts.

Herter

282. Telegram From the Delegation to the Western Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, April 30, 1959, 6 p.m.

Secto 16. Dept pass Defense. At meeting morning April 30, Foreign Ministers concluded their work subject to approval of drafting as detailed below later this evening and issued communiqué.¹ The Secretary, Lloyd, and Brentano will brief Spaak 6:00 p.m. tonight,² Couve being occupied with Parliament. Agreed Couve would present oral report (being developed by Working Group) to NAC on date to be agreed with Spaak, probably Saturday.³

Following is summary of action taken and highlights of discussion:

1. Adopted Working Group redrafts of certain paras of phased plan⁴ in accordance with instructions from Foreign Ministers resulting from yesterday's meetings. Discussion brought out the following:

(A) In para 16, Brentano wished to include reference to 1957 disarmament proposals area but finally agreed to identify as "such geo-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/4-3059. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹ For text of this communiqué, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, p. 643.

² A memorandum of the Foreign Ministers' conversation with Spaak, USDel/MC/10, in which the Secretary General was told the results of the meetings, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1276.

³ Couve de Murville reported to the North Atlantic Council on Saturday, May 2. In reporting on the briefing and the following discussion, Burgess commented that the "Council appeared extremely satisfied with report and with general approach to Geneva meeting. (Polto 3149 from Paris, May 2; *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-259)

⁴ For text of the phased plan as agreed by the Foreign Ministers and presented to the Foreign Ministers Conference on May 14, see *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pages 624-629, or *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 55-60.

graphical areas throughout the world as may be agreed by the four powers and other states concerned". Latter was suggested by Lloyd who said would have to disagree if language were to be limited to 1957 disarmament proposals.

(B) In discussion of para 25, Lloyd opposed reference to line of demarcation between reunified Germany and EE countries in determining area of foreign forces balance on ground this subject to 1955 criticism that it assumed German membership in NATO. To meet this problem as well as eliminate possibility of continued stationing of Soviet forces in Germany after reunification and before entry into force of peace treaty, Couve indicated willingness to drop any reference to limitations on foreign forces prior to peace treaty. The Secretary suggested formula providing that after peace treaty no foreign forces would be stationed in zone without consent of host country and that after states had expressed desires in this respect, there could be discussions on limitations of foreign forces on both sides of line of demarcation between reunified Germany and EE. Working Group to redraft para 25 in light of discussion for approval this evening.

2. Adopted revised draft statement of principles.⁵

3. Adopted Berlin proposal for inclusion in stage I in accordance with Ministers directions of yesterday (alternative A with subparas (II) and (III) deleted).⁶

4. Adopted Working Group paper on tactics, reflecting yesterday's decisions. Agreed this would be guide to delegations but saw no need to revise tactics annex of Working Group report which in any case expressed in alternatives.

5. Agreed to make no statements to press between today's communiqué and May 11.

6. Adopted and released communiqué based on U.S. draft.⁷

Herter

⁵ A copy of this paper is in the final report of the Working Group as approved by the Foreign Ministers. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1276)

⁶ The Berlin proposal was included in the report mentioned in footnote 3 above.

⁷ At the final quadripartite meeting at 5 p.m. the Foreign Ministers revised the language of paragraph 24 of the phased plan at Brentano's insistence. A memorandum of the conversation at this final meeting, USDel/MC/9, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1276.

283. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Paris, May 1, 1959, 11 a.m.

Cahto 5. For Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

"In yesterday's meetings with the Foreign Ministers,¹ we completed work on text of phased plan as well as reaching agreement on tactics to be used in the opening stages of the Geneva meeting. Such difficulties as existed were resolved in an atmosphere of determination to maintain unity and in the best of spirits. I will bring you the documents which are quite lengthy at Gettysburg tomorrow. While gratified over the results, I feel some basic difficulties with British were swept under the rug and are likely to reappear at Geneva. However, these are unlikely to be referred to any way publicly before Geneva unless the British themselves have political reasons to make some unfortunate statement. I am seeing Debre this afternoon² and returning tonight.

"Faithfully,

"Signed: Chris"

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-159. Secret; Priority.

¹ See Document 282 and footnote 7 thereto.

² See vol. VII, Part 2, Document 109.

284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, May 1, 1959, 8:08 p.m.

2626. Paris pass USCINCEUR Thurston and West. Berlin Contingency Planning. In meeting with British and French Ambassadors (Caccia and Alphan) May 1 Murphy called attention to difficulties Embassies at Bonn have encountered in developing recommendations for identification and checkpoint procedures (cf Bonn's 2349 and De-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-159. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Murphy and Vigdeman, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, and London and pouched to Moscow.

partment's G-474 to Bonn),¹ informed Ambassadors US is studying possibility of countermeasures outside Germany, and summarized progress in establishment General Norstad's tripartite staff.

Caccia explained view of British Ambassador Steel Bonn as being that, since we do not now submit to control by the Soviets but merely identify Allied movements to them, procedure which would involve least disadvantage in event Soviet withdrawal is continuation of present practices unchanged, particularly since we are conceding need for some form identification our traffic to GDR in any event. On other hand, Steel believes procedures such as use of identifying plaques would imply GDR has right to identification going beyond that presently made. Expressing his own views, Caccia said continuation of present procedures would be one way of identifying our movements to GDR personnel even if Soviets had not acknowledged agency relationship but probably not best way politically. Caccia agreed Embassies should recommend some new procedure for non-agency situation and indicated British willing to consider other suggestions. Alphand made no comments of interest. It was agreed Embassies at Bonn should be instructed take more flexible positions in developing recommendations re procedures.²

Re countermeasures outside Germany, Murphy cited as possible examples action against Soviet airlines and merchant vessels, termination of non-diplomatic contracts, and condemnatory resolution in UN. Said we should be thinking about these matters now, with view exercising leverage on Soviets in forthcoming negotiations. Soviets' awareness of this serious planning could be effective. US study at this stage is concentrating on examination of U.S. and Allied capabilities. Caccia appeared receptive to idea of such study, but will check Foreign Office. Alphand noncommittal but obviously wary of any action involving UN.

Re tripartite staff, Murphy gave Ambassadors orally gist of General Norstad's April 14 memo.³

Dillon

¹ Telegram 2349, April 19, reported that the three Western Ambassadors at Bonn had been unable to reach agreement on a common position on surface access to Berlin and that each would report back to his government. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/4-1959) Airgram G-474, April 25, reported that the Department of State was disturbed that no progress had been made at Bonn on contingency planning. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/4-2259)

² On May 4 Bruce reported that he met with the British and French Ambassadors that day, and since the French Ambassador had no instructions, he and Steel agreed to draw up contingency plans to cover East German officials acting as agents of the Soviet Union and to cover a refusal by the Soviet Union to recognize such a relationship. (Telegram 2461 from Bonn; *ibid.*, 762.00/5-459) On May 6 Bruce reported that agreement had been reached on a contingency plan assuming an agency relationship existed and transmitted the instructions covering it. (Telegram 2498 from Bonn, May 6; *ibid.*, 762.00/5-659)

³ Not found. Presumably this memorandum outlined the steps that Norstad had taken to set up the tripartite staff (Live Oak) at Paris.

285. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, May 6, 1959, 1 p.m.

2204. I believe Soviets will make strong effort at Geneva FM meeting to insure that Summit meeting takes place. Possibility exists they will endeavor to demonstrate reasonableness by reaching agreement on some specific subject. Most likely items would appear to be either Berlin question or atomic testing prohibition. Alternative approach might be to present some far-reaching scheme which would be full of bugs from our point of view such as withdrawal American troops from Europe but which would contain sufficient attractive provisions that we could scarcely refuse to discuss them at Summit. Suggest that at meeting Western FM's immediately prior conference might be useful to reach agreement that Ministers would refrain from any substantive comment on surprise Soviet proposals until Western Ministers have opportunity to study implications and coordinate their attitude.

While Khrushchev's indication to Montgomery¹ of his willingness forego separate peace treaty may have been merely effort split British from other Western powers, I suspect Soviets have had second thoughts about advisability separate treaty. Now seems less likely than before that they could obtain signature non-bloc countries such as India and Egypt. Moreover their position that following separate peace treaty with East Germany Western rights in Berlin would be extinguished could place them in difficult situation where any incident stirred up by East Germans could face them with demands to implement their Warsaw Pact commitment.

Thompson

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-659. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

¹ Field Marshal Montgomery visited the Soviet Union April 28–30 and discussed the Berlin situation with Khrushchev; see *The New York Times*, May 10, 1959, pp. 1 and 37.

286. Editorial Note

On May 7 Secretary of State Herter briefed the National Security Council on the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting. After tracing recent developments in the Western position since the NATO Ministerial Meeting, April 2–4, he outlined the phased plan for German reunification and indicated that there seemed to be evidence that the Soviet Union might make concessions at Geneva to ensure a Summit meeting. A memorandum of the discussion at the 405th meeting of the Council is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Later in the day the Secretary addressed the nation to explain the problems that resulted from the continued division of Germany on the eve of the Foreign Ministers meeting. After reviewing the course of events since the Soviet note of November 27, 1958 (see Document 72), Herter outlined the Western position on Berlin and then gave his views on the Foreign Ministers Meeting and the prospects for a Summit conference. For text of his address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 25, 1959, pages 735–739.

287. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, May 8, 1959, 4 p.m.

2508. Geneva for US Delegation. French Embassy showed us verbatim of formal conversation between Adenauer, Debre and the two Foreign Ministers on Wednesday, May 8.¹ Contrary to some press speculation, question Oder-Neisse territories not discussed. Chancellor made no reference to substance Western proposals forthcoming Geneva Conference but stressed repeatedly his concern at general British attitude and conception of way in which negotiations with Russians should be handled. French Foreign Minister said that conference had been very well, “perhaps too well”, prepared by Working Group. However fact

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–859. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Geneva.

¹ Debré and Couve de Murville made a State visit to Bonn May 7 and 8.

should be faced that there fundamental differences between British approach on one hand and French and German approach on the other. These differences consisted, first in British belief that persistent negotiation might entice Russians into acceptable agreement on conditions for European political settlement. Accordingly, British prepared offer concessions and compromises even in absence substantial evidence from Soviets they prepared negotiate realistically. Termed this state of mind dangerous for security of West which, on contrary, should be extremely firm at start and only make concessions in return for significant concessions by the other side. Second major reason for concern was British proposal for inspection zone in Central Europe. Couve said that although British had last week agreed not to press this proposal for time being, he was not reassured [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. Couve suggested that United States would probably have to play decisive role in maintenance Western unity. Chancellor echoed above sentiments and doubts and said he planned to speak to Secretary Herter on this subject Saturday.² Chancellor expressed thought important make sure fullest understanding reached with US Government. Chancellor said he feared not known just how far Macmillan and Khrushchev had gone in their conversations in Moscow,³ and that Soviet pressures on British must be expected which might prove dangerous. Chancellor and Debre agreed wrong assume Summit conference inevitable and that Western powers should take cold look at results Foreign Ministers Conference before deciding on Summit.

Chancellor asked who would be chairman four power secretariat for conference. French replied that since first chairman 1955 had been British and second chairman Russian, seemed turn of American. Chancellor said this desirable [*1 line of source not declassified*].

In conclusion, French Embassy officer, who present at formal talks and at some subsequent conversations, appeared extremely satisfied good personal relations Chancellor and Debre. Also said Chancellor clearly pleased by prospect Secretary Herter's visit.

Bruce

² See Document 288.

³ See Documents 183 ff.

288. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, May 10, 1959, 1 p.m.

2530. Geneva for US Delegation. Following uncleared summary 90-minute conversation Secretary with Chancellor and Von Brentano Saturday afternoon May 9th.¹

Chancellor expressed his gratitude for opportunity give Secretary his views before Geneva Conference and, speaking from hand-written notes, held forth for over one hour on following topics:

1. Assurance that should there be changes in high offices this summer in Federal Republic, German foreign policy would remain unaltered.

2. Extensive review and analysis Soviet policy, objectives and methods which German particularly qualified to understand. Chancellor produced statistics on treaties and agreements violated by Soviet Union. He recalled his conversations with Khrushchev and Bulganin in 1955,² and went into great detail on significance Soviet seven year plan, and problems inherent in Soviet relations with Communist China as expressed by Khrushchev, and confirmed to him last year by Mikoyan in Bonn.³ Said Khrushchev wants consolidate gains in Europe without war, and proceed with attempt catch up with economy United States, in hope that by eventually adding industrial resources Western Europe to those Soviet Union he would achieve decisive advantage over United States and win cold war. This why Soviet Union wants relaxation tensions.

With regard Germany, Soviet Union aims incorporate Federal Republic economy into its own. Political road to this would consist of SPD victory at 1961 elections, or via confederation two Germanies, which would constitute substantial move this direction.

3. Chancellor discussed Geneva and commented ironically on working group's exhaustive "even staggering" preparations. Said

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1343. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noform. Repeated to Geneva, London, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ A memorandum of the conversation, US/MC/un., which is almost identical with the record transmitted here, is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. During the quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting at Paris, April 29–30, Herter had arranged to see the Chancellor before going to Geneva. Herter departed Washington on May 8 and arrived at Bonn shortly after noon on May 9 for this meeting at 1:15 p.m. with the Chancellor. Following the meeting Herter flew to Geneva.

² For documentation on Adenauer's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 573 ff.

³ Mikoyan visited Bonn April 23–26, 1958.

Berlin most immediate and urgent question. Stressed necessity of “untying package” proposals at right time, lest issue Berlin be somehow left behind and lost in mass proposals and counterproposals other issues. Warned against danger creation new legal basis Western rights on access which would involve destruction existing rights derived from occupation. Latter obligate Soviet Union bring about reunification Germany, and this obligation would be eliminated if fundamental basis present rights destroyed. Expressed strong gratitude United States reaffirmation necessity German reunification in freedom in recent public address by Secretary.⁴ Federal Republic prepared increase technical contacts with so-called GDR, but most important achieve free movement persons between two Germanies, and end to current persecution 15 million Protestants and 2 million Catholics East zone. Reunification Germany can be achieved only via free elections and not by mingling Communist and non-Communist regimes. Federal Government would consider any proposal latter course action completely unacceptable.

4. Mentioned recent talks with French⁵ only briefly because “had reached complete agreement on all points”.

5. Dwelt at length on his concern with regard British attitude connected with Macmillan ten-day visit Moscow. “Basic change British policy” not due solely to worry about Labour Party and elections. Stressed necessity for European unity including United Kingdom for its own sake and that of rest of Europe.

6. Polish boundary question must be settled by peace treaty and not by “unilateral occupation”. Right of human beings recognized by United Nations Declaration Human Rights to live in their own homes must be respected. Federal Republic wishes strive for reduction and removal tensions with Poland, and development mutually beneficial economic relations. This important because Poland eastern-most country whose civilization and culture Western origin.

7. Chancellor turned to European security which he termed “empty concept and empty word”, since security can only be global. Traditional Soviet pressure toward Mediterranean endangers Turkey, Greece, Italy and constitutes southern jaw of pincer movement combined with pressure on Germany in north, seeking pick off all of Europe. Concept European security outmoded because of modern weapons. Chancellor attacked concept narrow security zone in central Europe not so much because discriminating against Germany but because involving inspection Germany industry by Soviets which unacceptable German people. Federal Government could never accept such scheme,

⁴ See Document 286.

⁵ See Document 287.

which aided by SPD victory, should this happen in 1961, liable wreck NATO. Chancellor asked we not forget merits general controlled disarmament which only real framework security and to which Khrushchev possibly receptive because he concerned with promotion his economic program requiring reduction armament expenditures.

In reply, Secretary stressed hope maintain same close relations with Chancellor as formerly the case with Dulles. Proposed we exchange data on Soviet treaty violations (Chancellor handed over his report to Merchant).⁶ Said we very conscious Soviet economic growth and informed Chancellor certain points discussion with Mikoyan⁷ which revealed latter's inability reconcile statistics Soviet agricultural labor requirements and productivity with high hopes of Soviet Government in economic field.

Secretary discussed British Trade Mission Moscow and credit terms to Soviets envisaged by United Kingdom Government.⁸ He said we had made strong representations to British on this point. Van Scherpenberg here stated he had that same morning called in British Ambassador and has expressed strong German reservations. Secretary said it seemed French had not done so, and Von Brentano appeared [take] note of this.

With regard to package proposals and Berlin, Secretary said we had no desire undermine present legal basis our rights. Possibly some additional elements might be superimposed, but on no account substituted for present basis our rights, which must not be impaired. We believe British now convinced soundness this position.

Turning to British position generally, Secretary said he would not comment beyond saying he believed we had reached complete agreement that none of three powers would make any unilateral proposals without previous agreement, and consultation with Federal Government.

Final comment by Secretary concerned Algeria and fact we disturbed because we had reservations with regard present course events and how things would work out. French had tried commit us and NATO to support their policy Algeria and North Africa. Our analysis factors Algerian problem and trend nationalist sentiment in world, together with traditional United States sympathy aspiration peoples to independence combined create reservations as to wisdom present French

⁶ Not found.

⁷ Documentation on Mikoyan's discussions in the United States in January on economic matters is in volume X, Part 1.

⁸ It was announced in April that a British Trade Mission headed by Sir David Eccles, President of the Board of Trade, would visit the Soviet Union. Eccles arrived in Moscow on May 13 and a 5-year trade agreement was signed on May 24.

course action, though we had officially abstained from injecting ourselves in problem which treated by United Nations as internal French problem in spite its manifest international implications. Secretary asked if Algeria discussed recently with French and if so was it among points on which complete agreement existed with Federal Government. Chancellor and Von Brentano stated no word was said about Algeria in recent talks with French. Chancellor added de Gaulle had brought up subject privately with him at Marly during Chancellor's Paris visit⁹ and had spoken optimistically as to outcome, because of development Franco-Moroccan relations; but had not discussed NATO [Algeria?].

Secretary said Debre, probably speaking for de Gaulle, had told him France could not approve armament 9 United States squadrons each of 25 planes unless we changed our position and agreed on certain things with French.¹⁰ Secretary said he had told Debre he could see no link between these problems. French attitude this respect had been surprise and created difficulties for us. Chancellor said French had said nothing of all this to him.

Secretary concluded by assuring Chancellor our awareness complexity and urgency Berlin problem, and need not to lose sight of Berlin if "package" had to be untied. He added he appreciated Chancellor's words with regard United States position on reunification.

Chancellor said he hoped we would exact as high a price as possible for summit meeting and give nothing away. He thought Macmillan was being too generous in offering Soviets two hundred fifty million pounds in credits and summit conference for nothing.

Bruce

⁹ See Document 203.

¹⁰ A memorandum of Herter's conversation with Debré on May 1 is printed in vol. VII, Part 2, Document 109.

289. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/3

Geneva, May 10, 1959, 4 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Gibson

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Mr. Joxe
Mr. Lucet
Mr. de Menthon

United Kingdom

Foreign Minister Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Wilkinson

Germany

Foreign Minister von Brentano
Mr. Duckwitz
Mr. Grewe

SUBJECT

Meeting Procedures and Western Coordination

The following conclusions were reached at the meeting:

(1) Mr. Lloyd as senior Foreign Minister will accept responsibility for calling meetings of the Western Foreign Ministers as seems desirable.

(2) A quadripartite coordinating group at the Deputy level will meet at 10:30 every morning to review the previous day's developments and prepare matters for the Ministers' decision.

(3) That in connection with the argument with the Soviets over the shape of the table, the point of substance is not recognizing the GDR to the degree of permitting their seating at the table.¹ Once this point is set-

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Max Krebs, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. The meeting was held in the Secretary's villa. Secretary Herter arrived in Geneva at 6:40 p.m. on May 9. On May 10 he discussed the Foreign Ministers Conference with Hammarskjöld at 11:15 a.m. and with Italian Foreign Minister Pella at noon. Memoranda of these conversations, US/MC/16–17 and 4–5, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1344.

¹ The shape of the table and the question of German participation had been under discussion since May 5 when it became clear that the Soviet Union would insist on full participation by the German Democratic Republic. Reports on these discussions were transmitted in telegrams 1436, 1444, 1454, and 1463 from Geneva, May 5–8. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–559 through 5–859)

tled the shape of the table is irrelevant and in those circumstances we could accept a round table. Mr. Lloyd at his meeting with Gromyko later in the day will make this point. Meanwhile it was confirmed that the UN will not issue passes to the Council chamber to either German delegation for the Monday meeting.

(4) After responding to Hammarskjöld's welcome address (assuring a procedural debate did not then arise), Mr. Lloyd as Chairman will go around the table enabling each of the other three Foreign Ministers to make their opening statements. It was presumed that this round would be all that would be covered in the first session.

(5) The four Foreign Ministers agreed to meet together immediately after the close of the Monday conference session.

(6) That in order to avoid the formality of the 3-to-1 ratio of speeches, Mr. Lloyd as Chairman on opening day would suggest that the chair recognize speakers who desired to speak during the course of the conference without regard to their position in the rotation.

(7) That advice would be sought from either German delegation during the sessions only by agreement of all four Foreign Ministers.

(8) That Palthey² should be told that he could come and go and remain in the Council chamber as his duties required and that a place would be made available for him to sit but not of course at the conference table.

² Georges M. Palthey, Deputy Director of the European Office of the United Nations at Geneva.

290. Record of Delegation Meeting

Geneva, May 11, 1959, 10 a.m.

FULL DELEGATION MEETING

The Secretary opened the meeting by thanking all of the delegation for their efforts in preparing for the conference. He said he hoped to hold a number of similar meetings during the conference. In the meeting

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1345. Confidential. Drafted by Alan G. James of the Executive Secretariat. The meeting was held in Conference Room 209 at the Consulate General Annex.

today he wished to bring the U.S. delegation up to date on recent developments in the "battle of the square vs. round table," which, he said, has serious overtones. Yesterday, the Western Foreign Ministers met in the afternoon¹ and concluded that the shape of the table was not in itself important but who sat at it was. He noted that the Soviets expect the Germans to sit at the table and to be full participants. The Secretary recalled that in the Western note to the Soviets we had suggested (and it had been agreed) that the Germans would be invited to attend and would be consulted.² The Secretary continued that the West has no intention of permitting the Germans to sit at the table. Yesterday, Selwyn Lloyd had been asked to convey the West's views to Gromyko. Lloyd reported that during his meeting with Gromyko at 5:00 p.m. yesterday the Russians had insisted on full participation by the Germans and their right to talk when they wished. In the matter of the shape of the table, the Russians seem disposed to compromise and would agree to a semi-circular table with tables at each end for the East and West Germans.³

The Secretary said that we opposed discussing procedural agreements with the Russians prior to the opening of the conference, preferring to discuss them officially in the Council Chamber. He concluded by saying that we will stand firm in our opposition to having the Germans as full participants; the West is agreed that the Germans will speak only when agreeable to all four Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Gibson commented that recognizing the Germans to speak would likely be a serious sticking point. The Secretary noted that in distinction to the 1955 conference in which the order of speakers rotated according to a set pattern, the chair, during the current meeting, will recognize speakers as it sees fit. This, it is hoped, will make the meetings more informal and enhance the possibility of fruitful negotiations.

Mr. Merchant noted that it is very likely that the Soviet delegates would approach members of the U.S. delegation offering invitations to social engagements. He suggested that all such invitations be coordinated by Mr. Reinhardt and that memoranda of conversation be written on all remarks by the Russians except pleasantries. The Secretary said he thought it desirable not to discourage contacts with the Russians. He hoped there would be full reporting on all contacts with the Russians.

The Secretary concluded the meeting by saying that we are not optimistic about the outcome of the conference. However, we will probe Soviet intentions and try hard to find areas where agreement might be reached.

¹ See Document 289.

² See Documents 176 and 244.

³ At 10 p.m. on May 9 Rumbold briefed members of the U.S. Delegation on the meeting between Lloyd and Gromyko. A memorandum of this conversation, US/MC/1, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338.

291. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 11, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 13. Paris pass USRO. Four Western Foreign Ministers met informally this morning to discuss impasse with Gromyko regarding shape of table, seating of German advisers and latter's right to speak during conference sessions. Lloyd reported talk he had with Gromyko previous evening (as representative of other Western Ministers) along lines agreed by them previous afternoon. Gromyko held out for horse-shoe table seating four powers with two German groups seated at tables representing in effect extension of open ends. On German right to be heard, Gromyko insisted it be unrestricted.

It was then decided Lloyd should return to Gromyko before lunch and propose (A) circular table for four delegations with separate small square tables for the German advisers close to main table and with table for Secretariat between and (B) German representatives could speak by application to chair in absence any objection.

Lloyd after seeing Gromyko reported to the Secretary and Couve at official lunch given by Swiss Foreign Minister that he made no progress with Gromyko. Before lunch ended three decided to invite Gromyko (each attended by one adviser) to Lloyd's villa to seek resolution. Meanwhile formal opening conference scheduled for 3:30 was postponed.

After considerable discussion of four Ministers at Lloyd's it was agreed (A) round table for four delegations with two separate square tables for two sets German advisers close to but not touching main conference table; (B) request of or for German advisers to speak would be communicated to Chairman who would respond "If no objection I call on, etc.", accompanied by private agreement with Gromyko that objection would not be made unless privilege being abused in which case any Minister so considering would raise point of order under which Chairman would call recess immediately for purpose four Foreign Ministers in restricted session determining how to correct abuse, and (C) opening session would be held at 6 p.m. today and confined by agreement to Hammarskjold's welcome and Lloyd's response on behalf himself and other three Foreign Ministers. Lloyd then to propose adjournment until 3:30 p.m. May 12. Gromyko gave clear evidence intention raise question Polish-Czech participation at opening Tuesday meeting which he will chair.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1159. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow.

Agreement satisfactory as meeting our main point of substance to maintain capacity DDR exclusively advisory.

Herter

292. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, May 11, 1959, 8 p.m.

Cahto 3. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

First session opened¹ nearly three hours late because of continuous unresolved wrangling during day over seating arrangements for German delegates and rules applying to their right to speak during conference deliberations. At times wrangle assumed ridiculous proportions, but major issue at stake was Soviet effort secure for East Germany full representation and equal rights with four responsible powers. Final agreements satisfactory to us were reached only after hassle with Gromyko on our insistence Germans sit at separate tables. Conference room finally set up when Gromyko agreed separate tables for Germans should be not more than six pencil widths apart from main table. In securing this exact measure, many pencils of many sizes were laid out but final exact measurement agreed to and conference allowed to proceed.

If today's haggling any indication of days to come, patience and then some will be a very necessary requisite.

Faithfully,

Signed: Chris"

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/5-1159. Secret; Niact.

¹See Document 294.

FIRST PART OF THE CONFERENCE, MAY 11–JUNE 20, 1959

293. Editorial Note

The major source for documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting, May 11–August 5, is Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1278–1288, 1296–1298, and 1309–1407. These folders contain briefing papers for the conference, orders of the day, chronologies, seating plans, telegrams to and from the U.S. Delegation, telegrams to and from the Secretary of State, U.S. verbatim records of the sessions, summaries of the verbatim records, press releases, memoranda of conversations that took place during the conference, conference documents, and various miscellaneous materials relating to the proceedings. A second Conference File: Lot 65 D 81, CF 1289–1295, contains press releases from the U.S. Delegation.

A second source for documentation on the conference is Department of State, Central File 396.1–GE, which contains nearly all of the telegraphic traffic between the U.S. Delegation and the Department of State, and Central File 762.00, which has copies of many of the telegrams from Secretary of State Herter. Several other files contain miscellaneous papers on the conference and these are indicated in source notes and footnotes as appropriate.

Two of the members of the U.S. Delegation recorded their impressions of the conference in diaries or notes. Bruce's recollections are *ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327, and Merchant's daily impressions of the meetings are in small notebooks in his papers at Princeton University.

Four publications also present additional documentation on the conference. Department of State publication 6882, *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May–August 1959, Geneva*; Washington, September 1959 (hereafter cited as *Foreign Ministers Meeting*), presents the major statements given during the sessions and papers and addresses dealing with the conference. The British Foreign Office also published a selection of statements and documents dealing with the conference, but *Conference of Foreign Ministers at Geneva, May 11–June 20, 1959 and July 13–August 5, 1959*, Cmd. 868 (hereafter cited as *Cmd. 868*) presents only official documents of the conference. Ambassador Grewe and West German Foreign Ministry Press Spokesman von Eckardt, who were members of the Federal Republic Delegation, recorded their impressions in *Rückblenden*, pages 402–410 and *Erinnerungen*, pages 566–589.

Because of the very extensive documentation on the conference the editors have limited the selection to the most significant documents illustrating the evolution of the conference. Where documents or statements are available in published editions, the editors have provided citations to these publications rather than reprinting them here.

294. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 12, 1959, 1 a.m.

Secto 14. Paris pass USRO. First Session Foreign Ministers Conference called to order by Selwyn Lloyd 6:25 p.m. after twenty minute delay regarding seating of East Germans. East Germans had been allotted six seats at small table to left of Soviet Delegation. Before the meeting Soviets pressed for increasing number of seats for East Germans on the floor to ten comparable to number of chairs for British, French and Soviet Delegations. After delay six East Germans took their places and meeting began with opening speech of welcome by Secretary General Hammarskjold. Selwyn Lloyd responded with brief speech expressing gratitude to UN, seriousness of task facing Foreign Ministers, hope of making some progress toward mutual understanding. After receiving approval to sending letter of thanks¹ on behalf of four delegations to Swiss Government for its hospitality Selwyn Lloyd proposed meeting be adjourned until 3:30 tomorrow. Soviets will be in chair tomorrow. Verbatim texts follow by pouch.

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1259. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VR/1 (Corrected), May 11, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1345.

¹ A draft of this letter is included in the verbatim record. A copy of the letter as sent on May 12, which is slightly different from the draft, is *ibid.*, CF 1280.

295. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 12, 1959, 8 p.m.

Secto 22. Paris pass USRO. At meeting Secretary, Couve, Lloyd, Brentano and handful advisers noon May 12, Ministers agreed (1) to title

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1259. Confidential. Repeated to London, Bonn, Paris, Moscow, and USUN.

“western peace plan” for package plan¹ to be tabled, and (2) each Minister would retain latitude to determine if East Germans were abusing speaking right at any time in conference thereby justifying raising point of order which would result in chairman promptly recessing conference and few minutes later assembling in restricted meeting four Foreign Ministers to deal with problem. General agreement excessively long or frequent speeches by DDR or use intemperate language or proffering advice on subjects where it was not relevant (such as procedures) would all constitute obvious abuse DDR speaking right.

Herter

¹For text of the Western Peace Plan, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 55–60; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 218–223; *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 624–629; or *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1, 1959, pp. 779–781.

296. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/7

Geneva, May 12, 1959.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Irwin

U.S.S.R.

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Malik
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Pervukhin

SUBJECT

Prospects for Foreign Ministers' Conference and Nuclear Testing Agreement

Immediately following lunch the Secretary and myself were herded into a corner by Mr. Gromyko who indicated that he wished to

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter. The conversation took place at the Soviet villa following lunch at 1 p.m.

have some serious conversation. He started off by asking how the Secretary thought the conference would go. The Secretary replied that the Soviets had made certain proposals with respect to Berlin and a peace treaty. We would present early in the conference comprehensive proposals covering not only Berlin and a peace settlement but reunification of Germany by stages and attendant security measures. He felt that this proposal when the Soviets examined it would be found to meet many if not all of the points on which they had expressed concern and that he was hopeful they would study it carefully to see if it was not a basis for agreement. Gromyko said they would study it and then gave the usual line on Berlin and the treaty as being ripe for settlement now.

There was considerable discussion back and forth with no ground given on either side. Gromyko did mention that Khrushchev had told him before departure that he wanted him to do all possible to reach agreement at Geneva. He also acknowledged in principle the desirability of ultimate German reunification. The Secretary concluded this aspect of the conversation by stating that if we can reach agreement on reunification as an attainable objective then it will be relatively easy to solve on an interim basis Berlin which disappears as a problem when the unity of Germany is achieved. He added that the United States has no territorial or other ambitions. Its sole interest and the fundamental basis of its policy is to secure an enduring and just peace. Gromyko immediately professed an identity of aim for Soviet foreign policy.

The Secretary then raised the question of the nuclear test talks by saying that he understood a recess had been agreed¹ and that Ambassador Wadsworth would be returning to Washington for consultation unless Gromyko intended to raise this subject in the present Foreign Ministers conference. Gromyko said that he thought it would be well for Wadsworth to remain here for the next two weeks since he thought it useful to discuss this matter with Lloyd and the Secretary. The French, he said, are obviously not concerned. (Subsequently a date for such discussion was made for Thursday, May 14.) Gromyko said that they were all pleased and encouraged in Moscow by the President's latest letter² on this subject to Khrushchev. They thought it very constructive and that the gap between us had now become very slight. In fact he said the only outstanding problem was to decide on the number of tests which would not be automatic in the sense that justification for them would have to rest on some objective evidence from instruments.

¹ Documentation on Phase III of the conference on nuclear weapons tests, April 13–May 8, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

² For text of Eisenhower's letter to Khrushchev, May 5, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 1309–1310.

The Secretary said there were other matters than the question of number of inspections which stood between the Soviets and ourselves. The veto, for example, has not been clarified and is of course unacceptable to us. He said also there was considerable scientific data which the experts would have to study. He expressed the hope, however, that progress could be made rapidly toward agreement with adequate inspection provisions. He referred to the difficulties inherent in detection of underground explosions and shots remote in space.

Gromyko said that he was prepared to sign the treaty while they were here in Geneva. He said if the Secretary was not prepared to go that far then he would suggest that he and the Secretary and Lloyd initial an agreement in principle with the details to be left to the experts to be worked out to the extent that they were still unagreed. The Secretary again expressed a desire to achieve agreement as soon as possible but gave no indication that he thought it could move as fast as Gromyko seemed to think.

The Secretary at this point said that he had a 3 o'clock engagement which he must meet.³ Neither Gromyko nor the Secretary raised any substantive or procedural points relating to the afternoon's forthcoming session of the conference. Throughout the conversation Gromyko seemed at great pains to establish a conciliatory and even friendly atmosphere.

³ Herter was scheduled to meet with Brentano, Couve de Murville, and Lloyd at 3 p.m., presumably to prepare for the second Foreign Ministers meeting at 3:30. No record of the four Western Foreign Ministers meeting has been found.

297. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 12, 1959, 8 p.m.

Secto 23. Paris pass USRO. Second Session Foreign Ministers Conference began 3:30 p.m. May 12 with Gromyko in chair, and devoted entirely to question Polish and Czech participation.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1259. Official Use Only. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Paris. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session US/VR/2 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/2, May 12, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1345 and 1349.

¹ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/1, May 13, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 18–21.

Gromyko raised question, referring Soviet position as already stated in diplomatic notes, legitimate interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia on questions relating to Germany, including Berlin and preparation peace treaty, already recognized by all of us, though decision on participation deferred to Conference itself. Gromyko maintained not merely point of procedure involved but one of considerable political importance.

Question of importance for success of Conference and also elementary justice to governments concerned. Admittedly other governments also have legitimate interests, as recognized by Soviet position re participation peace conference. But precisely Poland and Czechoslovakia most entitled participate at present stage discussions. Gromyko dismissed suggestion that they participate merely as observers by pointing out that their people had hardly been just observers in struggle against Hitler aggression and occupation. Poles and Czechs have won right to participate and nobody else can represent their interests in discussions re Germany. Since war's end they have repeatedly had occasion to state their view on German problems and have also extended a hand of peace, which, however, had been grasped only by one part of Germany—DDR. Gromyko rejected view it would be fair to deny their participation on grounds that authorized balance of Conference might thereby be changed, pointing out that Conference decisions would not be achieved in any case by merely counting votes.

Secretary then gave US position (full text transmitted Secto 20²). Couve presented French view as follows:³ question involved more general than mere participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and others than “we four” certainly involved especially as regards German peace treaty. This is not new issue and already raised in connection post-war “satellite” peace treaties with Italy, etc. Solution then was to seek views of others concerned for Foreign Ministers deputies to consider, and certain powers then additionally invited to appear before Conference to present views, as Yugoslavia in case of Italian Treaty. And after four powers had formulated their drafts, peace Conference held with others present. Admittedly Polish and Czech question now arises in somewhat different light, fourteen years after war and not just question of peace treaty involved. But in French viewpoint not yet reached where we will be drawing up peace treaty and therefore calling on powers for their views.

² Dated May 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1259) For text of Herter's statement, which stated that the conference should be limited to the four powers at its outset, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 21-23.

³ For text of Couve de Murville's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/35, June 10, see *ibid.*, pp. 23-27.

At present stage main responsibility lies on four powers involved in administration Germany. This particularly true for Berlin where we four bear special responsibilities. Berlin and German unification are questions involving squarely responsibility of four powers. This not new point and at 1955 Geneva Summit⁴ we all recognized our fundamental responsibilities. Certainly Poland and Czechoslovakia and particularly Poland have legitimate interests in peace treaty. But others are also concerned, as Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, and are entitled be consulted in due course, Italy also. But at outset and at this stage only we four should be involved. This both best procedure and also appropriate since problems before US include some which are exclusive and primary responsibility of ours. Therefore, best to postpone further consideration this question.

Lloyd said he would be brief⁵ since UK views already largely expressed by US and France. He hoped Soviet would not persist with matter which premature now. Conference issues would not be decided by counting of heads, as Gromyko himself had admitted, and there are practical considerations, including consideration that smaller the conference more likely we are to achieve results, and question of principle also involved since others also have legitimate interests, including certainly Italy.

Thus, if we should accept either of two Soviet criteria (geographic proximity or victim of Hitler aggression) where could we stop? Therefore, better to postpone problem and get on with practical work of Conference.

Gromyko restated Soviet position,⁶ admitting that while others besides Poland and Czechoslovakia suffered from Nazi aggression, some nations suffered more than others, and especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. Claimed no convincing arguments had been put forth to justify postponement this issue, adding that if Poland and Czechoslovakia had right to raise question, what right did we have to postpone decision. Thirdly, Gromyko rejected US suggestion that better to proceed with matters of substance, claiming that Conference would be "acting lightly" if it treated question as procedural one. Soviets, Poland, Czechoslovakia and many other governments "attached great importance to matter".

⁴For documentation on the Geneva Summit Conference, July 18–23, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 119 ff.

⁵For text of Lloyd's statement, as taken from the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 27–28.

⁶For text of Gromyko's statement, as taken from the U.S. Delegation record, see *ibid.*, p. 28.

Gromyko invited further comments by others but all three indicated no desire speak further. Gromyko then declared that matter could not be left here and could not regard discussion this point as closed, suggesting adjournment until tomorrow. All agreed and meeting adjourned about 5:00 p.m.

Herter

298. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/8

Geneva, May 12, noon.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

U.S.S.R.

Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Thompson

Mr. Soldatov
unknown Russian

SUBJECT

Seating of Iron Curtain Country Delegations

Mr. Soldatov said that Mr. Gromyko wished to avoid any procedural wrangle in today's meeting and, therefore, wished to reach an understanding on what would happen at the meeting today. Yesterday Mr. Gromyko had made a brief reply to the remarks of the Western Ministers on the question of Polish and Czech participation but these were preliminary remarks and he wished to make a considered reply at the meeting today.

Mr. Merchant said that Mr. Herter had a general statement he wished to make but he would open the meeting by asking if any other Minister wished to speak and would, of course, recognize Mr. Gromyko if he so desired. Mr. Soldatov then remarked that Mr. Gromyko should be inscribed on the list of speakers.

Mr. Soldatov then said he wished to discuss the question of Polish and Czech participation. We had mentioned that this matter could be taken up later but it was not clear what we meant by the word later. Was it one or two days?

Mr. Merchant said that our position was that this would depend upon developments at the Conference. Our position was that we wished a serious discussion which we thought could best be handled by a meeting of the four powers. We would put forward proposals which included questions in which other powers did not have responsibilities. If the discussion went well, it was conceivable that in 10 days or two weeks it might be appropriate for Mr. Gromyko to raise the matter again. If, for example, we had reached agreement on reunification of Germany and the formation of an all-German Government, it might be appropriate to enlarge the Conference considerably.

Mr. Soldatov said we had mentioned the possibility of adding other countries but a number of countries had been named and he wondered if we had any specific thought in mind. Ambassador Thompson pointed out the difficulty of shutting the door once it had been opened at all as had been pointed out by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd yesterday. Mr. Merchant indicated that we had no specific suggestions to put forward at this time.

Mr. Soldatov then raised the question of the seating of the German Delegations and said that while they did not wish to raise it to the level of Ministers, Mr. Gromyko had asked them to take up the question. They had been annoyed at the way the Secretariat had handled this problem. There had been agreement between the Ministers that the Germans would have ten chairs at the table but the Secretariat had placed only six. Mr. Merchant pointed out that he had been present¹ but there had been no agreement on the number of chairs for the German Delegations. Mr. Soldatov said Mr. Gromyko was very emphatic that there had been such an agreement. Mr. Merchant mentioned there had been some discussion of passes and Mr. Soldatov said that this had been satisfactorily agreed. Mr. Merchant said there appeared to be a misunderstanding, which should be cleared up, and he undertook to consult Mr. Herter about the matter. Ambassador Thompson pointed out that neither the British nor French Delegations had understood that any agreement had been reached by the Ministers on the number of German chairs. Mr. Merchant made clear that in attempting to resolve the misunder-

¹ Presumably this was the meeting described by Herter in his message to the President on May 11, (see Document 292), but no record has been found concerning the number of chairs to be placed at the table.

ing, he did not mean to indicate that more chairs could be added. He said he thought the Soviets had come out very well on this matter as he had been reading the Soviet press of yesterday. Mr. Soldatov said he had not read these accounts. The matter was left that Mr. Merchant would consult Mr. Herter and then speak to Mr. Soldatov privately.²

After speaking to the Secretary, Mr. Merchant tried unsuccessfully to call Mr. Soldatov before lunch and finally reached him at 2:45 p.m. Mr. Merchant said that further to the discussion this morning he had spoken to the Secretary as he had said he would. Mr. Merchant said that Mr. Herter's recollection was clear that there had been no agreement nor even discussion on the question of number of chairs for the German advisers during the course of the meeting at Mr. Lloyd's house Monday. He said that the Secretary would not consider changing the existing arrangements and hoped that Mr. Gromyko would not feel it necessary to raise this matter. He concluded by saying that he had also spoken to a member of the British Delegation who was present at the meeting in question and that his recollection was identical with ours.

Mr. Soldatov replied coldly that he would report this to Mr. Gromyko and the conversation closed.

² At the Western Deputies coordinating meeting held at 10:30 a.m. Rumbold reported that a similar approach had been made to him by Malik at 10 that morning. (Memorandum of conversation, US/MC/9; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338)

299. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 14, 1959, 4 a.m.

Secto 33. Paris pass USRO. Third Session Foreign Ministers Conference began 3:30 p.m. May 13. Secretary, who was in chair, offered floor to Gromyko to make statement, which he had previously indicated he wished to do. Gromyko remarks devoted to question of Polish and

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1459. Official Use Only. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VR/3 (Corrected), and summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/3, May 13, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1345 and 1349.

Czechoslovakian participation.¹ He reviewed all points made in his statements yesterday² and endeavored rebut Western positions on participation question. Gromyko said attempt postpone decision concerning participation was only thinly veiled effort to side-step it indefinitely.

Western representatives made clear their positions remained as set forth previously. Gromyko thereupon expressed once more his belief that Poland and Czechoslovakia have legitimate right to participate from outset in Conference. He regretted there was still no decision to this problem, but he was sure that decision would be forthcoming within next few days.

Secretary then made his formal opening statement (text reported separately by USIS).³

Lucet, who substituted for Couve de Murville (who has flu), made brief statement⁴ which highlighted central importance of German problem. No real security and stability in Europe can be attained until German problem is settled. French Government believes there is hope that progress can be made in this direction, although it may take time. If progress is realized, way will be opened to Summit, which will confirm arrangements agreed on at Foreign Ministers Meeting and will discuss "vaster problems."

Gromyko's opening statement⁵ was long but relatively mild for Soviet representative. He stressed peaceful aim of Soviet Union. On Germany, he welcomed fact that representatives of "two German states" were present at conference, and emphasized only way to solve German question is through direct negotiations between representatives of two German states.

Gromyko repeated familiar arguments in favor of conclusion German peace treaty and "normalization" of dangerous situation in West Berlin through ending occupation regime there.

He said Soviet Government is encouraged by similarity of views existing between governments on several questions. He cited as examples

¹ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/4, May 14, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 29–33.

² See Document 297.

³ Herter's statement, in which he reviewed developments since the last Foreign Ministers meeting in 1955 and noted that the present session had three objectives: (1) reach agreements over as wide a field as possible, (2) narrow the differences on other points, and (3) prepare proposals for a Heads of Government meeting, was circulated as RM/DOC/2, May 13. For text, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 34–37; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 1–2; or *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1, 1959, pp. 775–776.

⁴ For text of this statement, circulated as RM/DOC 3, May 13, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 37–38 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 2–4.

⁵ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/5, May 14, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 39–47 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 4–11.

communiqué following Macmillan–Khrushchev talks,⁶ de Gaulle’s statement on German frontiers,⁷ and “more realistic approach to German problem” shown recently by statements of leading U.S. officials. Gromyko also noted warmer relations between U.S. and USSR resulting from Mikoyan’s visit to U.S. and Nixon’s forthcoming trip to Moscow.⁸

Gromyko went on to say that other actions, such as establishment U.S. atomic-missile bases abroad and atomic arming of Bundeswehr served only to increase the differences between states. They could “make difficult if not impossible successful outcome present talks.” Moreover, Soviet Government, if it wished, could also present its partners in talks with accomplished facts in political as well as in military fields. But Gromyko said this was not desired by Soviet Government, which wished to narrow difficulties between states rather than expand them.

Gromyko expressed concern at reports that West will attempt to link all political elements concerning European settlement into one bundle which will be impossible to untie.

Gromyko said it would not be feasible to solve all problems at one sitting. Therefore Soviet Government proposes for consideration only conclusion of German Peace Treaty and normalization of West Berlin.

Foreign Ministers Conference, Gromyko stated, will also have to agree on time, place and agenda of Summit Meeting. He emphasized importance Soviet Government attaches to Summit and he hoped such meetings could be held on regular basis. He therefore welcomed view of Macmillan that Summit meeting would mark beginning of period of talks between East and West.

Lloyd’s remarks were brief and informal, largely devoted to comments on points made by Gromyko.⁹ He said Western powers do not share Soviet view concerning existence two sovereign German states and likewise do not believe that way to solve German problem is through negotiation between Germans.

Referring to Gromyko’s remarks re linking of political problems together, Lloyd said that, of course, it must be recognized that problems are interrelated. Lloyd also noted that Western powers were not

⁶ For text of the Khrushchev–Macmillan communiqué, March 3, see RIIA, *Documents on International Affairs, 1959*, pp. 11–14.

⁷ Not further identified.

⁸ Regarding Mikoyan’s visit to the United States in January, see Documents 121 and 135–137; regarding the Vice President’s trip to the Soviet Union, see Document 466.

⁹ For text of Lloyd’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/6, May 16, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 47–49 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 11–12.

“forcing pace” on arms modernization program, but were fulfilling program decreed on sometime ago.

Lloyd echoed hopes of others that present meeting could make progress on at least some issues and that way could be opened to Summit.

Meeting adjourned about 6:00 p.m.

Herter

300. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, May 13, 1959, 10 p.m.

Cahto 4. For the President from the Secretary.

“Dear Mr. President:

Little to report on progress since yesterday and today were spent on the question of seating the Poles and Czechs, with formal statements by each delegation head today. We hope to present our package tomorrow and then start serious negotiations.

Gromyko invited me to lunch yesterday and tried to probe our general ideas on the course the conference would take.¹ He emphasized his instructions from Khrushchev to do everything to try to make the negotiations fruitful.

On the nuclear testing talks, he suggested the possibility of our initiating an agreement here with details left for further discussion by the existing negotiating teams. I told him I saw no possibility of doing this in view of the importance of many unresolved matters which would still take considerable time to adjust if at all. He asked for a session with Selwyn and myself tomorrow which we will attend, but Selwyn agrees with me fully regarding the impossibility of any such short-cut as Gromyko suggested.² The latter has indicated there is only one real

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/5-1359. Secret; Niact.

¹ See Document 296.

² Herter and Lloyd reached this decision at a meeting at noon. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a brief summary of this meeting in Secto 30 from Geneva, May 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1359)

question at issue: namely, the number of inspections, and that this was a political question we could settle quickly. On the whole, Gromyko's attitude was relaxed and genial. I would suspect this is only an opening of a conference atmospheric posture.

Couve de Murville's illness may prove to be a real handicap for our side, so I am hoping for his quick recovery.

Faithfully, (signed) Chris,"

Herter

301. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, May 14, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING

PRESENT

The Secretary	Mr. Smith
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Sullivan
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Becker	Mr. Krebs
Mr. Berding	Mr. James
Mr. Irwin	
Mr. Reinhardt	

Daily Analysis of Soviet Positions at Conference

1. The Secretary asked that a daily analysis be prepared of the Soviet presentations at the Conference for rebuttal purposes. Mr. Reinhardt, in coordination with Mr. Becker, will make arrangements for the production of such an analysis.

Liaison with Other Delegations

2. In reply to the Secretary's inquiry, Mr. Reinhardt explained that certain officers have been assigned to keep in touch with the British, French, German, and Soviet Delegations in Geneva.

Tactics at Conference

3. There was general discussion of the chairmanship of the session this afternoon. It was noted that the French are scheduled to be in the

chair today, but that with Couve ill a problem has arisen. Mr. Merchant asked whether the Secretary thought it important to encourage the French to hold the chair. The Secretary said he did not attach great importance to the French being in the chair today. It was agreed that the matter would be worked out in the Deputies Coordinating Group.¹ There was agreement, however, that it would be important to have a Western Foreign Minister in the chair on Friday.²

There was discussion about whether the Western Peace Plan³ should be distributed to the delegations as a Conference document or read by the Secretary. Mr. Merchant suggested that it would be desirable for the Secretary to read the Plan. He pointed out that this would consume time and, since France and the UK are expected to follow our presentation with short supporting statements, the West would probably get a clear press tomorrow.

Timing of Subsequent Sessions

4. The Secretary inquired whether the Russians would want time to study our Peace Plan. Ambassador Thompson thought that Gromyko would probably seek full instructions from Moscow before making any significant reaction to our proposals. Mr. Merchant thought it desirable not to meet on Saturday and to try to adhere to a five-day week, at least at the outset of the Conference. The Secretary suggested that if there were no meeting on Saturday, that that day might be the best time for him to visit Rome.

NATO Consultation on Geneva Conference

5. Mr. Merchant noted that the report of yesterday's private meeting of the North Atlantic Council had brought out no adverse criticism of our proposals.⁴

Czech-Polish Participation

6. Ambassador Thompson thought that the Russians would probably return to the question of Czech-Polish participation, possibly urging the participation of the Poles alone. He thought that we should begin to develop a position on participation by the Poles alone.

¹ At the Deputies Coordinating Group meeting at 10:30 a.m. Merchant, Rumbold, Lucet, and Grewe agreed that the French would retain the chair even if Couve de Murville could not attend the session. (Memorandum of conversation, US/MC/11; *ibid.*, CF 1338)

² May 15.

³ See footnote 1, Document 295.

⁴ A report on the discussion of the Western Peace Plan by the North Atlantic Council on May 13 was transmitted in Polto 3256 from Paris, May 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1359)

Press Reaction to Conference

7. Mr. Berding said that press coverage in Western Europe and the United States has been mainly a preview of our presentation. Keen interest has been shown in the Czech-Polish issue. The Secretary's opening statement received good play. Mr. Berding noted that the *New York Times* today had carried our official summary of the Plan, and he suggested that it had been given to the *Times* in Washington. He noted that the Russian briefing officers are singling out the French for criticism on their attitude toward the Conference.

302. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/30

Geneva, May 14, 1959, 11 a.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Irwin
Ambassador Wadsworth
Mr. Akalovsky

U.S.S.R.

Mr. A. A. Gromyko
Ambassador Tsarapkin
Mr. Soldatov
Interpreter

United Kingdom

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Michael Wright
Mr. Hugh Morgan

SUBJECT

Polish and Czech Representation

After a detailed discussion of nuclear test suspension negotiations,¹ Mr. Gromyko turned to the subject of enlarging the participation in the

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Secret. Drafted by Alexander Akalovsky, the interpreter, and approved by Herter. The meeting was held at Herter's residence. A summary of the part of the conversation on Czech and Polish participation was transmitted in Secto 39 from Geneva, May 14 at 10 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1459)

¹ A memorandum of this part of the conversation, US/MC/31, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338; a summary was transmitted in Secto 40 from Geneva, May 14 at 9 p.m. (*Ibid.*)

Foreign Ministers' Conference. He said that almost twenty-four hours had passed since his statement yesterday² and that he was expecting new views to be presented by the West.

Both the Secretary and Mr. Lloyd pointed to difficulties in limiting the number of participants once the number was enlarged beyond the present four. They indicated that some other countries, such as Belgium, were already insisting on being admitted as participants if Poland and Czechoslovakia were included. Mr. Lloyd said that it would be better to try first to explore the situation and see whether a prospect of agreement on broader issues exists. The Secretary observed that if the number of participants in the present conference was enlarged, this would create a precedent for broader participation in a summit meeting.

Mr. Gromyko said he could not agree that the smaller the conference the more effective it is. He recalled larger conferences in the past, such as the conference on Indochina,³ claiming that the broadening of participation in a conference does not necessarily create difficulties. He expressed hope that the West would agree to the Soviet proposal on this subject and pressed for specific counter-proposals from the Western Powers. Mr. Gromyko said Western arguments against enlarging the participation in the present conference were not convincing and expressed confidence that a solution which would satisfy everybody could be found. As to participation in a summit meeting, he said that admission of other powers to a foreign ministers' meeting could not be taken as a precedent for a summit meeting and that the question of participation in such a meeting should be considered separately. He also indicated that he would again raise this question in one of the meetings.

² See Document 299.

³ Documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference on Korea and Indochina, April 26–July 20, 1954, is presented in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, volume XVI.

303. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 15, 1959, 1 a.m.

Secto 43. Fourth Session Foreign Ministers Conference began 3:30 p.m. May 14. Couve de Murville, who was in chair, stated US representative had requested to speak, as well as representatives East Germany and of Federal Republic. He suggested latter two could be heard after Secretary's statement and any comments thereon others wished to make.

Secretary then spoke, giving introductory statement on Western peace plan and then reading plan in full. (Text of Secretary's remarks and plan sent separately by USIS.)¹

Couve and Lloyd in their turn stressed that peace plan was effort of all three Western powers and they associated their governments with plan and with Secretary's remarks thereon. Lloyd urged Soviets to regard plan as serious effort to meet Soviet views and to bridge gap between us.

Couve then gave floor to Dr. Bolz. Bolz stated he spoke "on behalf GDR, her govt and her people."² At several points he stressed he was speaking as representative German people. He said German people want peace and claimed GDR has no revanchist aims. GDR wants to work for peace and to end division of Germany. Preparation of peace treaty is best and shortest way to end division of Germany and to bring two Germanies closer together. Also, peace treaty cannot overlook solution of Berlin problem.

Bolz said GDR plan includes confederation of two German states and envisages conversations between the two German states, which Bolz said "are inevitable."

Bolz stated two delegations from two German states now are seated at similar tables and are on similar footing at conference. GDR Delegation is ready to discuss with Delegation from Federal Republic all measures concerning peace treaty and creation unified Democratic German state.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1559. Official Use Only. Also sent to Berlin and USUN and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Paris. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VR 4 (Corrected), and summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/4, May 14, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1345 and 1349.

¹ For Herter's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/8 and 7, May 14, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 50–60; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 218–223; or *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1, 1959, pp. 776–781. Regarding the Western Peace Plan, see footnote 1, Document 295.

² For text of Bolz' statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/1, June 4, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 564–565 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 177–178.

Dr. Grewe then spoke for Federal Republic.³ He expressed warm support for Western peace plan which he said Federal Republic had helped to shape. Grewe stressed that reunification of great German people is indispensable prerequisite to any settlement of German problem, which cannot be made in isolation.

Federal Republic supports concept of freely negotiated peace treaty, which requires freely elected all-German Govt.

Grewe agreed with Gromyko's statement yesterday that normalization of situation in Berlin and in Germany is necessary. This is also aim of Federal Republic. However, Federal Republic cannot agree with Soviets when they say that division of Germany must be recognized as realistic fact. This is unnatural situation; German people must be reunited, must determine own form govt, must have self-determination.

Grewe said that West has made concession to Soviet viewpoint in presenting plan in which German elections are postponed. Federal Republic agreed to this with certain apprehension, but did so in order to make positive contribution to solution of problem.

Secretary then spoke, referring to statements by Gromyko and Bolz re existence of two states in Germany. Secretary emphasized that, in US view, there is only one govt in Germany entitled to speak for the German people. This is Federal Republic of Germany, which rests on mandate of free elections. US agreement to presence and statements by representatives so-called GDR can in no way be construed as recognition by US of GDR. Representatives latter are at conference only as advisors. Gromyko rejoined that, whether US likes it or not, there are two German states—GDR and FedRep—and this cannot change no matter what title is given to representative of GDR at conference.⁴ After Couve supported Secretary's statement re non-recognition GDR,⁵ and Lloyd said he had nothing further to add to his previous remarks on this subject, meeting adjourned at 5:45 p.m.

Herter

³ For text of Grewe's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/6, June 6, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 533–535 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 179–181.

⁴ For text of Gromyko's statement as recorded in the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 61–62.

⁵ For text of Couve de Murville's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/36, June 10, see *ibid.*, p. 62.

304. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/13

Geneva, May 14, 1959, 10 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State

Mr. Becker

Mr. Wilcox

France

Mr. Charles Lucet

Mr. Jean Laloy

Mr. Jacques de Beaumarchais

United Kingdom

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

Sir Anthony Rumbold

Mr. P. F. Hancock

Mr. Simpson

U.S.S.R.

Mr. A. A. Gromyko

Mr. V. A. Zorin

Mr. Y. A. Malik

SUBJECT

The German Problem

Last night following Mr. Lloyd's dinner¹ for members of the French, Russian and American Delegations, there took place a general discussion of problems before the Foreign Ministers Conference. Some of the high points included the following:

Mr. Lloyd emphasized strongly the significance of the Mixed German committee idea in the Western Peace Plan.² He pointed out that the 25-10 ratio was very favorable to the East Germans and that through the 3/4 majority requirement the plan contained a built-in veto. Nothing could be done without the agreement of both sides. This was a new proposal, he said, something quite different from anything that had been advanced in 1955 and he hoped very much the Russians would be willing to accept it. Their acceptance of this idea would offer the basis for a broader agreement which would inevitably follow.

Gromyko's reaction to Lloyd's comments was completely wooden. It was apparent the Russians were not reacting to the details of the plan or to its merits; they merely recited their old arguments. Let the two Ger-

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Secret. Drafted by Wilcox and Becker and approved by Herter. The meeting was held at Mr. Lloyd's residence.

¹ The dinner took place at 8 p.m. on May 14.

² See footnote 1, Document 295.

man Governments settle the whole business, said Gromyko. Let them agree on the steps that should be taken. If they can sit down and work out their future, then the four occupying powers should be willing to accept whatever decisions they might make.

The Secretary replied that this would be a possible procedure if *the people* of the two areas were permitted to decide their future. The only way they could do this was by the process of free elections. As things stood now only one of the German Governments had the right to speak for its people; the other did not.

The Secretary then asked why the Soviet Union had emphasized the problem of European security in 1955 and was not now saying anything about it. If it were so important *then*, why had it lost all its significance *now*?

Gromyko replied that the Soviets have not changed their attitude about this problem; the importance of European security remained. No one would question that. However, the Soviet Union believed it was better to reach agreement in Geneva on a limited area such as the problem of Berlin and the conclusion of the peace treaty. In this connection, Gromyko also repeated the Soviet argument that it was a serious mistake to tie up disarmament with the German problem. The latter was hard enough to solve anyway. The experience of the past few years had proven the complexity of the disarmament problem and when we injected that into the Western proposal, it became infinitely more difficult to reach agreement. And Mr. Gromyko emphasized the Russians really wanted to get agreement. They are willing to be reasonable and would go along with any kind of meetings whether they be informal discussions, formal discussions among the four, meetings with other states present, etc. Any method or technique by which agreement might be reached would be agreeable to them.

At one point Mr. Lloyd suggested the desirability of more informal discussions of the type that was taking place last night. The Secretary expressed the view that it would be better to go ahead in formal sessions permitting Mr. Gromyko to put forth his proposal. This would be followed by comments on the two proposals. After that, he said, we might resume the informal discussions among the four. Mr. Gromyko indicated that it was his intention to submit a lengthy statement today in the nature of a proposal with the probability that he would make another statement rebutting the Western Peace Plan on Monday.

Mr. Lloyd commented at some length on the undesirability of bringing Poland and Czechoslovakia into the meetings, following up some remarks to the same effect which he had made at dinner. If we accepted the Soviet criteria, he said, then other countries like Denmark, Holland, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, as well as Italy and Canada would have to be invited to the table. This would make it much more

difficult to get agreement. It would be far better, he said, to settle the problem among the four. At this time, Mr. Gromyko's answer was in general terms, but, at dinner, when Mr. Lloyd had referred to several possible participants, Mr. Gromyko interjected, "Do you make proposal?"

In response to Mr. Gromyko's comment that the Soviet Union had no ulterior motives in its desire to solve the German problem, the Secretary asked why the May 27 deadline had been imposed. Had not the Soviet Government threatened the conclusion of a separate peace treaty which would in effect be an attempt unilaterally to abrogate the rights of the four powers in Berlin? Mr. Gromyko replied that he was sorry that we had raised the May 27 issue—that he had not intended to raise it until the end of the conference. The Secretary then pointed out that there would be no Summit Conference if this meeting of the Foreign Ministers ended on a threatening note. Certainly the United States would not go to a Summit meeting as a result of any ultimatum of this kind.³

So far as the writers of this memorandum are concerned, the main impact of the meeting was that the Soviets were repeating over and over again in different ways the same old refrain: why can't we pick out two or three things that we can agree upon and forget about the rest?

³On May 15 Herter cabled President Eisenhower a summary of this conversation and quoted in full this paragraph. Herter went on to say that he wanted Gromyko to be absolutely clear that if the Conference failed the Soviet Union could not force the President to a Summit meeting. Herter's summary was transmitted in Cahto 7 from Geneva, May 15 at 5 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-1559)

305. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 16, 1959, 8 a.m.

Secto 55. Paris pass USRO. Fifth Session Foreign Ministers Conference began 3:31 p.m. May 15. Lloyd, Chairman of session, gave floor to Gromyko.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1659. Official Use Only. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, USUN, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session US/VR/5 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/5, May 15, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1345 and 1349.

Gromyko made lengthy, formal statement largely devoted to exposition Soviet peace treaty proposal.¹ He noted that lack of peace settlement with Germany was great source tensions in world. Division of Europe into two armed camps, for which creation of military grouping of Western powers is responsible, has deepened. Tremendous armaments in possession Western European states menace not only Soviet Union but other states as well since third world war would have no limits. If peace treaty had been concluded with Germany at proper time, there would be different situation today. In that event, one could not imagine inclusion of Federal Republic in NATO, supplying of Bundeswehr with atomic weapons and missiles, and revanchist statements of Western Germans. Also, outmoded occupation status of West Berlin creates dangers and results from absence of peace treaty. Gromyko claimed Soviet Union had always done everything possible to contribute to peace settlement and had helped implementation Potsdam decision in East Germany. In contrast, Nazi influence still important in Western Germany and militarization of Federal Republic undermines European security. Foreign policy of Federal Republic also increases tension and Federal Republic interferes with all attempts tending toward resolution of difficult international problems.

Gromyko noted that important contribution to peace had been made with signing of treaties with former allies of Hitler. Austrian Peace Treaty also had been concluded. Now it is necessary to continue work and solve most important problem remaining from war, i.e., peace treaty with Germany. Although Soviet Union and Western powers have different approach to German problem, both should be united in same aim, which is to prevent resurgence German militarism.

Gromyko said basic objection of those who opposed peace treaty with Germany is that there is today no government which can sign treaty for all of Germany. This is formalistic juridical argument, however, which ignores factual situation in Germany, where two independent sovereign states now exist. Presence in conference room of official representatives of governments of these two states is convincing evidence of this reality.

Gromyko claimed that to wait for all-German Government to be formed before signing peace treaty means postponing peace treaty for undefined time. Also, he asserted that efforts of Federal Republic to interfere with cooperation between two German states was poor augury for reunification process.

¹ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/10, May 15, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 63–74 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 17–26.

In present situation, Soviet Government believes only possibility is to conclude peace treaty with two German States, and, in addition, with German confederation if such is formed at time of signing of treaty. To refuse to sign treaty today would mean deepening of differences between GDR and Federal Republic.

Gromyko then criticized Western powers for not recognizing GDR. He said USSR had recognized Federal Republic, not because it liked Federal Republic policies, but because USSR believes that no progress can be made in resolving German problem without Federal Republic as well as GDR. Although reunification Germany concerns Germans primarily, peace treaty affects interests of many peoples in Europe and elsewhere. Reunification of Germany is very important and Soviet Union supports solution of this question on peace loving and democratic basis. However, if Federal Republic is not ready to agree with GDR on solution of this question, then only possibility is to wait until Federal Republic adopts more realistic position.

Peace treaty is different question however. Its postponement would harm interests of peace. Therefore, Soviet Government believes that Foreign Ministers Conference should concentrate principal attention on question of peace treaty.

Gromyko then commented in some detail on various provisions draft Soviet peace treaty enclosed with Soviet note January 10.² (Text draft Soviet peace treaty³ tabled subsequently.)

Gromyko's remarks concerning peace treaty contained nothing essentially new. He sharply attacked military preparations in West Germany, such as installation missile launching pads, and claimed people of Germany did not wish this fate but wished opportunity follow peaceful life. This would be provided for in Soviet peace treaty. Of course, there would be some restrictions on German national armed forces, and Germany would not be permitted to produce atomic arms or means of delivery of atomic arms. However, Gromyko noted, these restrictions would not go further than restrictions already contained in Paris Accords between Federal Republic and Western powers.⁴

Gromyko also spoke of Soviet plan for withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, by states if necessary. While Western powers claim that withdrawal of foreign troops would hurt Western security, this is not true and Soviet proposal demands nothing from West which

² See Document 124.

³ For text of the Soviet draft treaty, circulated as RM/DOC/11, May 15, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 74–88 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 223–235. See also *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 629.

⁴ For texts of the agreements signed at Paris on October 23, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1435–1457.

not also demanded of Soviet Union. Also, fear that Soviet armed forces would be nearer to German borders than Western forces, after withdrawal, is unfounded, since armed forces of France, United Kingdom, Belgium and other NATO countries would be just as close to Germany as Soviet forces.

Gromyko repeated that USSR is ready withdraw its armies not only from Germany but also from Poland and Hungary if NATO countries withdraw their forces within national boundaries and liquidate military bases in foreign territories. Gromyko noted that eastern boundaries Germany were decided by Allies during war and that peace treaty should confirm this decision. So far as Berlin is concerned, Gromyko outlined Soviet proposal for transforming West Berlin into free demilitarized city during transition period before German reunification. USSR is prepared to work out with other interested governments necessary guarantees for protecting new status of West Berlin.

Turning to Western plan⁵ presented by Secretary at yesterday's session, Gromyko said this plan covered many problems and he observed that it had been presented as an inseparable unit. Gromyko recalled that he had already indicated his objections to method which consisted of tying complicated questions together in manner which made their solution virtually impossible. If this path is followed, it could only lead into impasse. However, Gromyko said Soviet Delegation would present more detailed views at later date concerning propositions contained in Western plan.

Gromyko terminated by emphasizing once again importance of conclusion peace treaty with Germany and expressing hope that others would cooperate in making achievement such treaty possible.

Lloyd then made several comments⁶ concerning Gromyko's statement, although he said that if he did not respond to all of Gromyko's points it should not be thought that his silence meant that he accepted their validity. Lloyd stated that we have our own views concerning who is responsible for division of Europe, and do not agree with Gromyko on this point. Also, Lloyd said he did not share Gromyko's views concerning Federal Republic and did not agree with his accusations against Federal Republic policies.

Lloyd went on to say that he wished to provide further explanation of Western peace plan tabled yesterday. He hoped that Gromyko would take this plan seriously and would not discard it out of hand.

⁵ See footnote 1, Document 295.

⁶ For text of Lloyd's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/12, May 15, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 88–93 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 26–30.

Lloyd said plan deals with many Soviet objections made to Western proposals in 1955. Lloyd then proceeded to enumerate differences (in accordance with approved Western background paper)⁷ concerning process of German reunification and European security. He also spoke briefly in support of Western transition plan for Berlin and stressed that all of these problems are related. While we may discuss them separately, they cannot be settled in isolation. All are linked and this is reason for their presentation in phased manner in Western plan.

No other representatives wished to speak following Lloyd's remarks, and meeting adjourned at 5:35 p.m.

Herter

⁷Not further identified.

306. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, May 15, 1959.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Extract—1-1/2 pages of source text not declassified.]

307. Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers did not meet on Saturday May 16 or Sunday May 17. Secretary of State Herter took advantage of this hiatus to fly to Rome on May 16 for conversations with Prime Minister Segni and Foreign Minister Pella. During the course of a meeting at the Villa Madama from 1:30 to 4:30 p.m., Herter briefed the Italian leaders on the first week of the Foreign Ministers Conference and explained the Western Peace Plan in some detail. A memorandum of this conversation, US/MC/24, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1350.

308. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 18, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 67. Secretary met with Lloyd (U.K.) today re Soviet refusal technical discussions capabilities detection and identification seismic events and technical criteria for inspections. Following is approved summary conversation: Lloyd mentioned three points: (1) Whether we should continue to press Gromyko on acceptance technical talks as requested in discussion with him; (2) Whether we should agree to technical discussions on high altitude alone, and (3) Extent of further discussions nuclear testing at Foreign Minister level during this conference.

Secretary stated Gromyko owes us an explanation because in discussion on May 14¹ he seemed to go quite far toward accepting wide-range technical talks.

With respect to high altitude alone, Secretary stated he did not think we should accept at this time. Secretary and Lloyd agreed that there should be no extensive talks with Gromyko on nuclear testing during Foreign Ministers Conference. Secretary pointed out that it could be Gromyko's intention to use minor concessions on testing during Foreign Ministers Conference as basis necessary progress for summit.

Lloyd briefly discussed status U.S.-U.K. positions outstanding issues. It was agreed much work remains to be done by both U.S.-U.K. staffs in developing respective positions and in developing jointly-agreed positions outstanding issues. It was agreed Secretary would approach Gromyko for meeting at noon May 19 to again seek agreement for technical talks high altitude, capabilities detection and identification seismic events and technical criteria for inspections. It was agreed that if Gromyko accepts, U.S.-U.K. scientists should meet London or Washington several days before technical talks with U.S.S.R.

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1859. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Moscow.

¹ See Document 302 and footnote 1 thereto.

309. Memorandum of Conversation

US/Del/MC/26

Geneva, May 18, 1959, noon.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Berding
Mr. Merchant

Germany

Foreign Minister von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Duckwitz

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Laskey

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Mr. Lucet
Mr. de Beaumarchais
Mr. Baraduc
Mr. Laloy

SUBJECT

Lloyd's Report of May 18 Talk with Gromyko and General Discussion of Tactics

This meeting opened with Mr. Lloyd giving a report on his meeting earlier in the morning with Mr. Gromyko. Mr. Gromyko came to Mr. Lloyd's villa at his own request, representing it as a return of Mr. Lloyd's courtesy call on him eight days earlier.¹ At the outset Mr. Gromyko said that he could see three solutions for Berlin: (a) all Western troops leave and West Berlin becomes a free city, (b) Soviet troops join the Western forces in West Berlin, or (c) neutral troops replace Western troops in West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko said that he assumed our proposal for Berlin was merely a tactical opening position. Mr. Lloyd replied that he assumed this was an accurate description of Mr. Gromyko's three proposals. He then asked Gromyko what really troubled the Soviets about West Berlin. Gromyko replied that the situation was such that it might lead to incidents. Mr. Lloyd rejoined that the arrangements had operated tolerably for the past ten years and there had been no incidents.

Gromyko then told Mr. Lloyd that he was prepared to listen but not to talk about German reunification. He made critical remarks concern-

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter. The meeting was held in the U.S. Delegation Office.

¹ See Document 291.

ing the Western package plan² and noted that the Soviet peace treaty³ if desired could be amended to permit the two German states to remain for an interim period in their present alliance systems.

Mr. Lloyd said that he failed to understand Gromyko's objection to our package proposal since the Soviet proposals were likewise a package containing exactly the same four elements. There was in it a peace treaty, certain of whose articles constituted security arrangements. There was a provision for reunification of Germany by the efforts of the two German states or some sort of confederation, and finally there was an interim solution for Berlin. Mr. Gromyko had no rejoinder to Mr. Lloyd's point.

Gromyko said that he planned to speak today at length and that Bolz would also speak. He then asked how Mr. Lloyd foresaw the conference developing. Gromyko said that he thought after two or three more days of formal presentations and rebuttals this phase of the conference would be ended. Mr. Lloyd asked might it not then be well to move into private meetings? Gromyko apparently was noncommittal.

At this point Couve de Murville said that he thought it was a mistake to show any apparent anxiety or interest in private meetings. After all the West, even if it is not perfectly satisfied with the existing situation in Europe, at least is reconciled to it. It is the Soviets who are seeking to upset the status quo. Under these circumstances it should be left to the Russians to take any initiative or make any counter proposals. After all if the conference ends in a deadlock, that reflects the existing situation and we could all go home.

Mr. Lloyd said that he could agree with most of what Couve had said but he thought we must steer a middle course.

The Secretary said that we must remember that Khrushchev from the outset has been saying that the Foreign Ministers can do nothing, with the implication that a Summit meeting could do everything. He said that he felt that Gromyko should know that if no progress is made in the Foreign Ministers meeting, then there will be no Summit conference. There was general agreement expressed with this statement.

The meeting then turned to a discussion of tactics for the afternoon's session on which agreement was reached.

In closing the Secretary said that he was expecting Mr. McElroy to be arriving in the next two days or so. He said that he had been an original member of the Delegation but had been detained in Washington by reason of Mr. Quarles' sudden death.⁴

² See footnote 1, Document 295.

³ See footnote 3, Document 305.

⁴ Quarles died on May 8.

310. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 18, 1959, midnight.

Secto 68. Paris pass USRO. Sixth session Foreign Ministers Conference May 18 lasted three hours and devoted to East German outline objections to Western proposal and support Soviet views, US rebuttal Soviet Peace Treaty proposal, and lengthy (50 minutes) Soviet rejection Western peace plan.

Chairman Gromyko recognized East German representative Bolz who gave preliminary GDR views Western proposals at same time lauding Soviet views re peace treaty and Berlin.¹ Bolz regretted Western plan does not contain draft peace treaty and surprised that West Germans also failed mention this matter so urgently desired by German people, in order end consequences World War, normalize German relations and restore German sovereignty. Urgency heightened by efforts German militarists. Treaty would permit all Germany enter onto path democratic development, free West Berlin of occupation regime, make civil war impossible and help bring about German reunification.

Bolz admitted GDR had previously supported all-German elections before situation so complicated and division of Germany so deep as at present. He contrasted conflicting trends two parts Germany, with Hitlerite elements, revanchist attitudes, etc., Western Germany, and peaceful anti-Fascist army without atomic or rocket arms in GDR where all concentrating on building socialism. Therefore, impossible to “unify mechanically” now. Unification only possible through getting together of two Germanies, and to prepare GDR proposed confederation with all German council based parity principle. Unification not something this Conference can usefully tackle. Bolz also emphasized unity, economic and social growth GDR, plus its relations with other states which include one-half of mankind. Four powers could, however, help if they wish re peace treaty.

Berlin problem also urgent, with situation in West Berlin abnormal, danger to peace and only territory in Europe still constituting occupation regime. Attack being waged from West Berlin on GDR and also basis for cold war against other countries. Dangerous situation could lead

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1859. Official Use Only. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VR/6, May 18, and the summary of the verbatim records, US/VRS/8 (rev 1), May 20, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1345 and 1349.

¹ For text of Bolz' statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/2, June 4, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 565–570 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 181–186.

to war. Hence, GDR proposal for “free city” West Berlin, which GDR prepared to accept even though West Berlin “on territory of GDR”. GDR could not accept Western proposal to submit democratic sector of Berlin to occupation regime once more, which would violate GDR territory and sovereignty.

Western proposals contain no appropriate basis for conclusion German treaty or solution West Berlin problem and Western plan contains artificial links between matters not properly related. Peace treaty conference should be convened soonest.

Secretary then criticized Soviet Peace Proposal tabled May 15 meeting (full text Secretary statement transmitted separately USIS—IPS—P/181815).²

Gromyko’s attack Western peace plan followed.³ Soviets believe in solving separate problems separately and clear that Western plan unrealistically ties different problems together. Gromyko referred Khrushchev’s May 16 speech⁴ charging Adenauer real author Western plan, whose policies at variance interest peace.

Gromyko said Soviets unwilling discuss in detail section Western plan dealing German unification, since this subject not for conference to discuss or four powers to implement. United Germany only possible through agreement two German states. Referring all German committee, Gromyko admitted some all German body necessary but this must be decided by Germans themselves. Present four power contribution to German problem lies in conclusion peace treaty. Gromyko said wished correct Western misrepresentation re 1955 summit directive,⁵ when as matter of fact Heads of Government did not reach agreement German unification but only ordered study by Foreign Ministers. Gromyko claimed Soviet not against German elections as such but decision belongs to two German governments. Western plan not peace plan as claimed but attempt substitute German unification for necessary peace treaty discussions.

Therefore Western plan cannot in any way serve as basis discussion this conference. Clearly unacceptable and unrealistic. Soviets do not say Western plan contains elements that cannot be discussed, for example,

² Not found. For text of Herter’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/13, May 18, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 94–98; *Cmd. 868*, pp. 30–33; or *Department of State Bulletin*, June 8, 1959, pp. 819–821.

³ For text of Gromyko’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/14, May 18, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 98–112 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 300–301.

⁴ For text of this statement, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 300–301.

⁵ For text of the summit directive, July 23, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 527–528.

disarmament and European security elements. Real objective Western plan clearly to delay peace treaty settlement indefinitely. And Western plan fails provide for elimination foreign military bases on German territory and lacks proposals to prevent resurgence German militarism.

Gromyko discussed Berlin in terms similar those used Bolz. West's proposal completely unacceptable since designed maintain occupation regime West Berlin, spread same to all Berlin, destroy GDR's capital and socialist system East Berlin, which intolerable in terms elementary sovereign rights GDR. Soviets hope West will show greater readiness consider Soviet proposals re Berlin.

Gromyko criticized West's European security proposals since conditional on solution other problems above all German unification. Charged their main aim to maintain Western troops and occupation regimes Germany and other countries. Soviets ready to consider sound European security proposals at appropriate time including some of those in Western plan. Gromyko also criticized disarmament provision Western plan for being made dependent on solution other questions.

Gromyko closed by demanding that conference focus urgent problems peace treaty and Berlin, though hinting that forthcoming summit meeting might consider other security and disarmament ideas to lessen tension.

Herter

**311. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union
(Thompson) to Secretary of State Herter**

Geneva, May 18, 1959.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

I have serious doubts whether we should really attempt to solve the Berlin problem at this Conference. There is some possibility that the Soviets would agree to a solution based on the agency principle. Even if

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1282. Secret. Sent through Merchant and initialed by Herter. The source text bears the following handwritten notation by Merchant: "David [Bruce], Fred [Reinhardt], Tommy [Thompson], Gerry [Smith], Loftie [Becker], & I agree on this memo."

this were accomplished, however, our position at the Summit meeting would have been undermined to some extent by the implied acceptance of the DDR. There is a greater possibility that if we indicated here a willingness to settle on the basis of the agency principle, the Soviets would merely pocket this concession by saying that the matter had to be settled at the Summit unless their proposals were accepted.

It would seem to me better for us to stand firm on Berlin at this meeting but avoid the dangers of possible Soviet action regarding Berlin by agreeing to a Summit Conference which would make unlikely any dangerous Soviet move before such meeting. Even if the present meeting is abortive, it seems unlikely that we could long avoid a Summit Conference, particularly in view of the British position. The difficulty of this solution is to find some action which could be taken at the meeting which would justify holding a Summit Conference. If we are firm on Berlin, the Soviets are likely to cooperate in finding some justification for a Summit meeting. It seems likely that a settlement of the atomic testing problem could be found in the course of this Conference. This, together with a reasonable Soviet attitude on the agenda for a Summit meeting might be sufficient justification.

It might be possible to probe Soviet intentions in order to find out whether they would be willing to settle the Berlin problem at this meeting but I suggest that this should be done privately. It might be best to have Selwyn Lloyd do this, particularly as he is apt to do so anyway, and if the British knew that we were prepared to agree to a Summit Conference, we could probably persuade them to take a stronger position on Berlin.

LE Thompson

312. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, May 19, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING

PRESENT

The Secretary	Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Smith
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Sullivan
Ambassador Bruce	Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Becker	Mr. Krebs
Mr. Berding	
Mr. Irwin	

*Conference Tactics*¹

1. Mr. Merchant said that the first summary of the Verbatims prepared under Mr. Becker's direction appeared today and that it will be distributed daily to the other three Western delegations. He noted that Mr. Smith had prepared a time-table for the next three-week phase of the conference.² As far as today's meeting was concerned, Mr. Merchant said that Couve, Gromyko and Lloyd have statements which they will read. Mr. Merchant also reported that last night Sir Anthony Rumbold indicated to him that the British are uneasy about the aura of suspicion that surrounds them.³ Rumbold said that he agreed completely with Couve that the West should take no initiative in seeking restricted meetings with the Soviets.⁴ The Secretary commented that he was not favorably disposed toward restricted meetings of the six delegations but that a restricted meeting with the four principals would be satisfactory to him. The Secretary indicated that at this time we should adopt a reticent attitude about restricted sessions.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1352. Secret. Drafted by James. The meeting was held in Conference Room 209 at the Consulate General Annex.

¹ At a meeting at 9 a.m., Bruce discussed tactics with Smith, Becker, Reinhardt, Merchant, and Thompson, all of whom thought the West could not extract a standstill agreement on Berlin from Gromyko in exchange for a summit conference, since if the Soviet Union was asked, it would demand concessions on high altitude flights and arming the Bundeswehr. Bruce did not agree. (*Ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

² Not found.

³ A memorandum of this conversation, US/MC/21, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338.

⁴ Couve de Murville made this point to Herter following the sixth session of the Foreign Ministers on May 18. (Secto 66 from Geneva, May 18 at 8 p.m.; *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1859)

Von Brentano Interview with Die Welt

2. Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Merchant called attention to the interview von Brentano gave to *Die Welt* as reported today in the *Journal de Geneve*. In this interview von Brentano is alleged to have said that if the Soviets accept the Western Plan the Federal Republic would talk with the GDR. He was also quoted as saying that later in the week the West would present principles to govern a peace treaty with Germany. The Secretary asked Ambassador Bruce to see von Brentano and ask him to clarify the matter. (Ambassador Bruce did so later in the day, and a record of his conversation is contained in MC No. 23.)⁵

Contingency Planning for Berlin

3. Mr. Wilcox read the text of a telegram (Secto 71)⁶ to the Department he had drafted on Berlin Contingency Planning. The Secretary indicated his concurrence. The Secretary added that he thought it important to be prepared on exactly how and when we might take the Berlin question to the Security Council and what we would say at that time.

Briefing on Geneva Meeting for President's Press Conference

4. Mr. Berding said that we are preparing answers to several questions about the Geneva Conference for possible briefing of the President for his press conference tomorrow.

Press Reaction to Conference

5. Mr. Berding thought that this week the press may concentrate on those elements of our plan which Gromyko has indicated might be the subject of individual agreements.

Secretary McElroy

6. Mr. Berding asked for guidance on Secretary McElroy's joining the delegation tomorrow. The Secretary thought we should say that McElroy had been originally selected by the President to go to Geneva and had planned to come at the same time as the rest of the delegation. However, the death of Deputy Secretary Quarles had delayed McElroy. Now that conditions permitted McElroy to be absent from Washington, he planned to join the delegation. The Secretary said we should stress that McElroy's coming to Geneva at this time had no particular significance.

⁵ Dated May 19. In both this memorandum and in his diary Bruce recorded Brentano's categorical statement that the account printed in *Die Welt* was untrue. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1352 and *ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

⁶ Secto 71, May 18, reported that the delegation had never believed discussion of Berlin at the United Nations would be confined to lobbying for support as opposed to formal consideration. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1859)

Press Guidance

7. Mr. Reinhardt suggested that we might take the following line with the press: (1) This week we will spell out to the Russians the elements of the Western Peace Plan in order to make sure they fully understand it; and (2) we will offer more comprehensive criticism of the Soviet proposals.

Discussion of Separate Points in Western Plan

8. The Secretary inquired whether we had identified the points that Gromyko is expected to pick out of our Plan for separate discussion. Mr. Becker said that he would have a paper for the Secretary on this today. Mr. Merchant observed that we might take the same line as Mr. Lloyd, namely that a distinction should be drawn between the possibility of discussing the particular items separately and the question of negotiating or applying them individually.

**313. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, May 20, 1959.

Secto 81. From the Secretary. Department pass Defense. I met May 19 with Lloyd and Gromyko again to seek Soviet agreement for technical discussions on capabilities detection and identification seismic events and technical criteria for inspections. Pointed out if scientists are to meet prior to June 8 resumption Nuclear Test Talks, decision needed as soon as possible. Gromyko was completely intransigent, denied any area of agreement in our discussion of May 14¹ except high altitude.

Gromyko stated he wanted position of Soviet Union made clear, that there is no relationship between the number of "suspicious events" and the number of inspections. He stated number of inspections is a political matter. He repeated this point several times and posed a direct question to both Lloyd and me as to whether we agree there is no connection between "suspicious events" and the number of inspections.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1311. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Moscow.

¹See Document 302 and footnote 1 thereto.

Lloyd and I both took the position that Soviet Union can use any basis it wishes for determining number of inspections. I stated that while ultimately a decision on the number of inspections would be made by appropriate policy officials in the U.S. Government and that although the Soviet Union can use any basis it wishes to determine the number of inspections, the U.S. decision on numbers of inspections will be made after considering all factors, particularly the findings and advice of our scientists.

We emphasized to Gromyko that no agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing can possibly be reached until there is agreement on the criteria to be applied to inspection of unidentified events. We spent greater part of meeting trying to explain this point to Gromyko, who expressed view we were only trying to justify more inspections.

Gromyko recited usual Soviet line expressing concern that our proposal for technical talks represents a step backward from agreement already reached and that Soviet Union would oppose any attempt to disavow findings technical experts last summer. We pointed out to Gromyko that we were not trying to disavow findings of experts but to improve the scientific basis upon which an agreement on nuclear test cessation can be reached.

Lloyd suggested that Gromyko give us his views on this matter in writing, particularly after Gromyko seemed to imply that if we accept the Soviet position that there is no relationship between “suspicious events” and the number of inspections we might find some basis for technical talks. Gromyko at first agreed to submit his views to us in writing, then seemed to back away from this approach as not being particularly productive since he felt that our views on this subject were so far apart.

If Gromyko presents us an unacceptable paper on this subject, it is my intention to inform him that I see no point in further discussions and after registering disappointment at the Russian attitude on this subject, will inform him that we will have to see what progress is made after the testing negotiations resume on June 8. I shall also point out to Gromyko that if his attitude is an indication of the way the Soviet Union will cooperate in an agreement on the suspension of nuclear testing, the situation does not look promising.²

Herter

² Lloyd and Gromyko discussed this question further after dinner on May 19. The Soviet Foreign Minister outlined his position on what the experts would do, but Lloyd replied that it would be difficult for him to go into details in the absence of Secretary Herter. (Memorandum of conversation, undated; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1352)

314. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 20, 1959, 9 a.m.

Secto 76. Paris for USRO. Seventh Session (3:30 to 6:55 pm)—Secretary Herter, Chairman. Couve de Murville pointed out¹ while West charged with “sin of package,” Soviet plan is itself package of provisions West required accept. Western plan in part complex because it endeavored meet Soviet objections earlier proposals. While Germany remains divided there are few real problems not associated with reunification. Western frontier questions have been or are in process of being negotiated. None exist with Czecho and Denmark. Presumably Soviet Union not dissatisfied with present situation on eastern frontier.

When unification attained peace treaty will follow naturally and any remaining difficulties can be resolved.

Grew pointed out² Soviet draft treaty amounts to abandonment German reunification, establishment three Germanies in discriminatory status. Allegations West German militarism disproved by recent West and East Berlin May Day demonstrations and 1956 East German acknowledgement armed forces of 120,000 while Fed Rep had less than one tenth that number. Fed Rep unwilling enter discussions with East Germans for fundamental reasons, but continuing press campaign vilification should be noted as element. Peace treaty must be negotiated with all German Government responsible to people if it is to be of lasting moral effect. West’s plan provides best means.

Lloyd said³ Soviet plan itself shows interdependence of problems and refutes argument four powers not competent discuss reunification. German entity exists in international law. Peace treaty with two Germanies would preclude German unification. Gromyko misrepresented Khrushchev–Macmillan communiqué⁴ when he implied they agreed peace treaty conclusion was matter of urgency. Actually reference was

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2059. Official Use Only. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VR/7 (Corrected), May 19, and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/7, May 20, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1352.

¹ For text of Couve de Murville’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/5, May 19, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 113–121 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 45–51.

² For text of Grew’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/7, June 6, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 535–539 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 186–190.

³ For text of Lloyd’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/16, May 19, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 121–124 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 51–54.

⁴ For text of this communiqué, March 3, see RIIA, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1959, pp. 11–13.

to whole complex of German problems. Soviet Peace Treaty would have to be imposed by "diktat". This unrealistic in present circumstances.

Gromyko denied⁵ Soviet Plan a "package," countered assertions West's plan represents concessions to earlier Soviet objections. Precedents exist for conclusion peace treaty with states successors to one which initiated war, while there is no evidence of existence of so-called German "entity". West prepared sign agreements with West Germany re atomic armament Bundeswehr⁶ but pleads incompetence of Federal Republic when it comes to peace treaty. Proof of Soviet desire for reunification of Germany lies in support of East German confederation plan and advocacy urgent signature peace treaty with two existing German states which makes provision for later confederation. Re charge of discrimination in military restriction clauses, treaties with Austria, Italy and Japan which are not considered discriminatory have similar provisions. Soviet draft makes adequate provision for legitimate German defense forces and only prevents weapons of mass destruction, means of aggression. Meanwhile Soviet Draft Treaty is only one on table. Soviets awaiting comment are glad there has been discussion of concrete issues and refuse be so pessimistic as to believe all possibility for discussion on specific articles is exhausted.

Detailed report by airgram.

Herter

⁵ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/17, May 20, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 129–143 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 54–62.

⁶ Presumably Gromyko is referring to the Agreement for Cooperation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense, signed at Bonn on May 5.

315. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, May 19, 1959.

Cahto 12. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

De Gaulle's refusal to attend a Summit meeting in the United States but his apparent willingness to let Debre attend as head of Government

has raised questions here regarding the site for a possible Summit Conference. The British apparently dislike Geneva but the French are of course insistent that Geneva is the best place. I have stated that we do not attach too much importance to the place of the Summit and would like to accommodate others if strong feelings are expressed. However, I believe that, in spite of the de Gaulle position, we could be the determining voice in the selection because of the very valid excuse of your Constitutional problems as head of State and head of Government, and the sitting of Congress through the better part of the summer. I would appreciate knowing whether you have any thoughts on this subject so I can steer things quietly in that direction.¹

There has been no real progress to date at the Conference. The statements by both sides are essentially negative to the other's position. This sparring will probably continue the better part of the week and we tactically are not indicating overeagerness to put forward new proposals, hoping the Soviets will do so first.

Faithfully. Signed: Chris."

Herter

¹ On May 20 the President replied that the location of a summit meeting made little difference to him and that Herter should feel completely free in making the decision. (Tocah 28 to Geneva; *ibid.*, Central Files, 110.11-HE/5-2059)

316. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/38

Geneva, May 20, 1959, 11 a.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. H. von Brentano, German Foreign Minister
The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. W. R. Tyler

SUBJECTS

Peace Treaty Principles; Security Zones; Meetings with Soviets

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Tyler and approved by Herter on May 21. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

The Foreign Minister said he wished first of all to raise two questions:

1. He said he expected that the Secretary had been informed that the subject of the draft Principles of a Peace Treaty¹ had been raised by journalists in the press, but that he had not mentioned it to them. However, the press was interested in this question, and as he was going to be seeing other journalists in the course of the day he would like to know what he should say in answer to the question whether the West intended to table these Principles.

The Secretary said he could only reply personally, but that he had no enthusiasm for raising this matter at this time. To do so was likely to involve us in an article by article discussion with the Soviets who would try to extract an agreed draft, and then conclude a separate Treaty with the GDR, on the grounds that it was an approved text. The Secretary commented that today's *New York Times* had published the Principles of a Peace Treaty. The Foreign Minister said he had also heard this, and had been told that the leak had occurred in Paris. The Secretary went on to say that before discussing a Peace Treaty at all, we should know whether such a Treaty would apply to a reunited Germany or not.

The Foreign Minister agreed and said that the Soviets should fulfill the preliminary condition of agreeing to the reunification of Germany before the Principles of a Peace Treaty were discussed with them.

2. The Foreign Minister said he wished to raise a second point, which was giving him some concern: he had been informed that a Western Four Power working party had yesterday discussed the implementation of paragraphs 16, 17 and 25 of the Western Peace Plan, which deal with the subject of security zones. He understood that the working party had proposed that these zones should be discussed internally among the Four, and be defined. He personally had no particular objection to the discussion of paragraphs 16 and 17, but he had serious reservations about the discussion of paragraph 25 which was to be implemented under Stage 3. He was afraid that discussion now of this paragraph would lead in the direction of discussing some variant of the Rapacki Plan. The Secretary said he was not informed about what the working party had discussed, but that there was no authority for lifting the subject of security zones out of the rest of the Plan. Such zones should only be discussed within the context of the Western proposals. He added that he had been somewhat worried about the British attitude with regard to this subject, and that the Soviets would certainly like to lift it out of the Plan and discuss it separately. The Secretary proposed, and the Foreign Minister agreed, that this matter should be discussed on Thursday by

¹ See Document 270.

the Four Western Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Minister added that he was afraid of leaks, if the subject were discussed even internally, and that this would provoke the Russians to raising the issue. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] it was essential to make it clear beyond any doubt that security zones would not be discussed outside the framework of the Western Peace Plan.

The Secretary said there were only two subjects which might possibly be discussed separately:

1. A modus vivendi on Berlin;
2. The resumption of talks on general disarmament in an appropriate form.

The Foreign Minister said he agreed with the Secretary.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister whether the Federal Government would be interested in the possibility of setting up the Mixed German Committee independently of the acceptance by the Soviets of the Western Package. The Foreign Minister reacted sharply against this idea. He said he wished to make it quite clear that he had agreed to the Mixed German Committee only if the conditions of basic agreement by the Soviets to discuss German reunification had been met. If the Soviets insisted on the maintenance of the two German regimes, it would be highly dangerous to agree to the formation of the Committee, and the Soviets would do everything possible to confer on it functions and recognition which would serve the purposes of their policy.

He went on to say that he was leaving for Bonn on Saturday² to talk things over with the Chancellor and with members of his party and, therefore, he had felt it would be useful to have this exchange of views with the Secretary. The conference was being followed very carefully in Bonn and not without some apprehension.

The Foreign Minister said that in his last statement, Gromyko had attacked the Federal Government, and the persons of the Chancellor and of Defense Minister Strauss very sharply. The purpose of this was clear: to brand the Federal Republic as a disturber of the peace. He had it in mind to instruct Ambassador Grewe to state clearly at one of the next sessions, that the Delegation of the Federal Republic was participating in the conference as Advisers, that it was prepared to cooperate but that this was being made difficult because of these intemperate attacks. He added that he would like to know the Secretary's feelings as to whether this would be a good thing to do, as otherwise he would not wish to press the matter.

The Secretary questioned whether this would not be grist to Gromyko's mill. If Gromyko felt that he had struck a sensitive nerve by

²May 23.

these attacks, would he not be likely to exploit this further and to increase them? Ambassador Bruce suggested that the Four Western Foreign Ministers might discuss this point, and that it would perhaps be appropriate for one of the other Western Foreign Ministers to make a rebuttal and term such attacks distasteful. It was agreed that the Western Foreign Ministers should discuss the matter on Thursday.

The Foreign Minister said he had last week called on Gromyko, who had not yet responded to his visit. If he should not hear from Gromyko this week, he thought he might go to see him again next week, after his return to Germany, and wanted to know whether the Secretary had any objections to his so doing. He said that it would not be difficult for him to do so since the Federal Republic has official relations with the Soviet Union. Gromyko did not like his visits, and the GDR hates them, which was a good reason for their taking place. The Secretary said he had no objection whatever. Ambassador Bruce commented that Gromyko might pull the trick of having Bolz present when von Brentano arrived. The Foreign Minister said that in this case, he would tell Gromyko that there had obviously been a mistake since he was already busy, and he would ask for another appointment on the following day.

317. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/32

Geneva, May 20, 1959, 1 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Mr. Merchant

USSR

Ambassador Malik
Mr. Soldatov

SUBJECT

Geneva Negotiations; The German Problem

Ambassador Malik gave me lunch at the Perle du Lac. Soldatov was there when I arrived and also remained for lunch. The early part of the conversation was light with both of them exerting maximum effort to be friendly and agreeable.

A number of points came up, not necessarily in the following sequence.

They both made a routine play for the participation in the conference of the Czechs and the Poles. I said that this was obviously a matter which was not ripe for solution. They laughed and dropped it.

They asked my guess on the duration of the conference and I said that based on the Berlin and last Geneva experience¹ I thought about three to three and one-half weeks. In reply to my questions, Malik guessed four weeks and Soldatov three and a half.

They asked me what our ideas were on a solution for Berlin and when were we going to make a proposal. I said that we already had made a proposal and one which seemed entirely logical. They attacked it on usual grounds and pointed out that they had made several suggestions. I asked if they planned to make a formal proposal at the conference. They looked at each other and then Soldatov said, "That is a matter still to be decided by our Delegation." They kept asking when the West would be making counter proposals. I said we were awaiting their considered reaction which we hoped would differ substantially from their initial reaction to the Western Peace Plan. They said there was nothing new in it. I pointed out some of the major changes from our 1955 proposals. They asked again about counter proposals and I said we were looking to them as after all it was "their" conference. At no time did they drop any hints or express any overt interest in starting private talks.

The bulk of our luncheon time was used for a discussion of Soviet and United States policy with respect to Germany. I took the offensive by saying that we were frankly bewildered by the Soviets' pursuit of a policy which to us would almost certainly lead to disaster in ten, twenty or thirty years. They reacted indignantly and accused the United States of seeking to use Germany as the spearhead of a military threat to Russia. I pointed out that our policy for the past decade had been designed to knit the Federal Republic into the fabric of Western Europe. I pointed out that NATO by its structure and nature could only operate defensively and that the Russians should be grateful that the United States played a major military role in NATO thereby removing any possibility of any future adventurism or independent action by Germany. The

¹ For documentation on the Berlin Conference, January 25–February 18, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 601 ff. For documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, October 27–November 16, 1955, see *ibid.*, 1955–1957, vol. V, pp. 537 ff.

argument was vehement and prolonged with Soldatov losing his temper on two or three occasions. The conversation, however, ended on an even key.

After saying goodbye Malik followed me out to the car to urge as the most practical way of making progress that we should go over the Soviet piece treaty article by article. He insisted, as both of them had on a number of occasions during the lunch, that they had come to Geneva with a genuine desire to negotiate and to reach agreements. They thought a Summit conference was very important. They expressed doubt as to whether or not we were in the same frame of mind. I assured him that we were but added they would understand that their proposals as presented were totally unacceptable to us.

The net impressions left on me were (1) the Soviets want a Summit conference this summer and Gromyko has been instructed to make this possible; (2) they believe our statements that without some progress at the Foreign Ministers Conference there will be no Summit; and (3) they are not themselves sure in what area the requisite progress can be achieved.²

²Merchant also discussed McElroy's joining the U.S. Delegation and air transit routes to Moscow. Memoranda of these parts of the conversation, US/MC/33 and 34, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338.

318. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 21, 1959, 1 a.m.

Secto 86. Paris pass USRO. Eighth Session (3:30 to 6:40 p.m.)—Couve de Murville, Chairman.

Secretary reviewed respective positions second week conference (complete text sent Secto 82)¹ recalling United States prepared go to

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2159. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Tyler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VRS/8 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/8, May 20, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1353.

¹Dated May 20. (*Ibid.*) For text of Herter's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/18, May 20, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 135–141; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 62–67; or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 8, 1959, pp. 821–825.

summit if justified by developments here "otherwise not." Summarized events leading to present conference. Defended Western peace plan and refuted Gromyko's criticisms, rejecting charge plan intended create difficulties and preclude agreement. Charged Soviet approach essentially formula for avoiding free election. Summarized Western concessions and dwelt on reasons for Western link security to reunification which Soviets themselves recognized in 1955. Justified provisions for resumption general disarmament discussions although these not linked to reunification either as condition or in point of time. Asked why Soviets rejecting plan and insisting peace treaty with two Germanies. Said West had gone as far as possible short of compromising with principle. Stated Soviet proposals "long step backward from 1955" and ended with plea for serious negotiation.

Selwyn Lloyd then spoke² and made four major points:

- 1) Both Western and Soviet proposals constitute essentially packages with interconnected elements;
- 2) All four powers have special responsibilities settlement German problem;
- 3) Will of people Berlin should be permitted prevail;
- 4) Both sets proposals contain certain security provisions. Concluded stressing security proposals Western plan can only be worked out with government freely united Germany and must be freely accepted.

Gromyko then made following comments³ various statements last two days by Western delegations:

- 1) Some positive aspects discussion because Western spokesmen touched upon certain concrete issues which also included in Soviet Peace Treaty;
- 2) Rejected charge Soviet Government wishes perpetuate division Germany, which not in accordance with facts or Soviet policy;
- 3) Peace treaty with Germany would mark final termination Second World War, would reduce tension Germany and Europe, would bar road to German militarism and nuclear armament Germany, would eliminate or reduce concern Germany's neighbors and security and would furnish good basis bring together two Germanies. Main idea behind Soviet proposal Germany should be free foreign troops and bases. However, since differing opinions on this, Soviets prepared, as already announced, accept provision each Germany should for certain period

² For text of Lloyd's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/19, May 20, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 141–145 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 67–70.

³ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/23, May 26, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 146–157 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 70–79.

time continue adhere existing military alliances. Thus cannot be said Soviets' aim withdrawal Federal Republic NATO.

4) Soviet proposal good basis solution problem West Berlin. Would regret if Western powers took negative position but hopes possibility would remain seek solution and Soviet Government retains will to try.

5) Soviet attitude elections clear and incorrect attempt find inconsistencies or contradictions Soviet statements past and present. No reason why four powers should run elections for Germans who adult and mature people. Foreign supervision elections insult German people. Soviet Government has always insisted Germans carry out elections themselves.

6) Lloyd and Grewe had stated peace treaty can only be signed with all-German Government. Soviets had tried convince Federal Government and Adenauer correctness proposals for reunification and elections which rejected by them for which they to blame.

7) Nonsense charge Soviet proposals would isolate Germany. These directed re-establishment German authority over whole German territory.

8) Soviet proposals permit Germany benefit rights and obligations Article 51 UN Charter.

9) Totally untrue claim Soviet Union not interested European security, which however should not be linked to preliminary solution number European problems. Objected putting on same footing problems not on same plane.

10) Lloyd completely unjustified claiming Soviet proposals attempt impose "diktat" Germany; on contrary, Soviets object Western powers attempt impose diktat.

11) Couve had claimed no problem exists either peace treaty or Berlin. If this true what are we doing here? Problem peace treaty exists and this fault not Soviet Union but Hitlerite Germany.

12) Couve expressed surprise Soviet rejection Western plan and said this totally unexpected but why should West be surprised since, even before proposals officially received, Soviets knew about general approach and had expressed its position.

13) Couve claimed articles 3, 4, 22, 23 and 24 Soviet proposals unnecessary and represented no contribution solution German problem but what was wrong with these articles. Perhaps West has better formulations for these principles which stress need for peaceful and democratic evolution Germany. If so Soviet Government would like consider them.

14) Grewe said one defect Soviet proposals would impose economic restrictions Germany. This not true, but matter could be exam-

ined further if desire exists retain two Germanies within present economic areas.

15) Grewe said Soviet proposals would result elimination all political parties Federal Republic. Did he mean that all other parties "revanchist". Certainly SPD did not agree.

16) Grewe had concluded differences should not be emphasized but should seek every means bringing positions closer together. If we all share same determination, Gromyko believed we have real opportunity achieve useful work here.

Herter

319. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Representative to the United Nations (Lodge)

Geneva, May 20, 1959.

DEAR CABOT: While there isn't a great deal to report from here in addition to what you have read in the press, I thought you might like to have some first-hand reactions.

At the moment it looks as though both sides were pretty well dug in. We are in the process of explaining in detail our Western Peace Plan, while the Russians will no doubt continue to debate the merits of their proposal. Rumors are flying thick and fast that the Western Powers are ready to break open their package plan in order to see whether the Russians might take a portion of it. We are holding to the line, however, that the comprehensive plan which we have put in is the only logical and equitable solution to the German problem.

Generally the Russians are doing their best to leave the impression that they have come here in a friendly and cooperative spirit and are really interested in coming to an agreement. Indeed, at a dinner the other night Gromyko commented that Khrushchev had sent him to Geneva for that purpose. Just what kind of an agreement they have in mind is certainly not clear up to this point.

My own conviction is that they will do their best to get enough of an agreement to justify a Summit conference. No doubt they will do their best to get the bare minimum. It is even possible that they will argue that some kind of agreement on the nuclear testing matter should suffice for going to the Summit.

We are all very pleased with the way Mr. Herter is handling his new job. He always appears relaxed and goes about his business with a certain air of assurance. He apparently does his homework for he always seems well briefed. And, I must say, he has made quite a hit with the people here in Geneva as a friendly, understanding individual who knows what he is about.

I went to a small dinner at Mr. Lloyd's house the other night with the Secretary. I remarked to Mr. Zorin that I did not know very much about the Russian language. Since I had heard the word "Nyet" so very much, I did recognize that. He laughed and replied that he hoped we would be hearing the word "yes" a great deal more in the future.

Meanwhile I am attempting to do a few things in connection with the Specialized Agencies and our Mission here in Geneva. As you know, this place is getting to be an international center, second only in importance to New York. This means that we must do what we can to strengthen the mission so it will be equipped to handle numerous conferences of various kinds.

I am also taking the opportunity to visit the Specialized Agencies in the area and to demonstrate in every way I can our interest in the work of these organizations.

In the first nine days of the conference I have heard very little about the United Nations. If the time should arrive when we get into any detailed discussion of the Berlin question, it is probable that various U.N. contributions will be examined. On the other hand, I do think it is a helpful experience for me to be here in a number of ways, and it is probably good to have someone on the Delegation who will keep the interests of the U.N. in mind.

If any additional thoughts occur to you in connection with this problem, or if you have anything you would like to have me do while I am here, please don't hesitate to let me know.

With warm personal regards, I am

Cordially yours,

Francis O. Wilcox¹

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

320. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, May 21, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

FULL DELEGATION MEETING

Soviet Note on "Subversive" U.S. Radio in Berlin

1. Mr. Merchant noted that the Russians yesterday delivered a note¹ to Embassy Moscow alleging U.S. operation of a radio station in Berlin sending "subversive" broadcasts to the Soviet Union. He commented that it was in general moderately worded. The Secretary asked that the facts be ascertained regarding the Soviet allegation. Mr. Hillenbrand expressed the opinion that the activities alleged in the note were not in fact going on at this time.

Conference Tactics

2. Mr. Merchant explained that Western speaking assignments for the next two days call for statements by the Secretary on security, by Grewe on the confederation concept, by Lloyd on reunification, and by Couve on Berlin. It is hoped that these four speeches will refocus the Conference discussion on the Western Peace Plan. There was agreement that it would be desirable for the Secretary not to make his statement on security until Friday by which time State and Defense would have had an opportunity to work out an agreed position. The Secretary inquired whether it would be desirable to make a reply to Gromyko's suggestion that the Soviet draft peace treaty be taken article by article,² and thought we should say something to take the initiative away from Gromyko. Mr. Merchant said that yesterday Malik had urged to him that the Soviet draft be reviewed article by article.³ The Secretary made it clear that the West should not talk about a peace treaty until we get agreement on the principle of German reunification. Ambassador Thompson suggested that the West not force the issue but go ahead with the elaboration of our own proposals; Ambassador Thompson continued that at the end of this week it would be important to decide where we go from here. The Secretary noted that the Western Four were meeting here today and will meet again on Monday to plan for the third week's work.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1354. Secret. Drafted by James. The meeting was held in Conference Room 209 of the Consulate General Annex.

¹ A translation of this note was transmitted in telegram 2331 from Moscow, May 20. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 962A.40/5-2059)

² Gromyko made this suggestion at the seventh session on May 19; see Document 314.

³ See Document 317.

Ambassador Thompson wondered whether it would be desirable for the West to table a paper on an interim solution for Berlin. The Secretary thought that we might do so in the case of Berlin but that we should leave to the Soviets the tabling of proposals on other subjects.

Soviet Criticism of West Germans

3. The Secretary said that it was desirable for the West to rebuke the Russians for the abusive language they have been using about the West Germans. He indicated that we should have material available to show that the East Germans are guilty of the charges the Russians have been making against the West Germans. In this connection Mr. Freers pointed out that Ulbricht's speech on Sunday⁴ in Rostock contained a passage on Soviet-DDR plans for communization of West Germany which had been omitted from the press accounts. He suggested that this could be exploited in our refutation of attacks on the West Germans. Mr. Reinhardt thought that one of the most effective refutations of German remarks yesterday would be to get to the press the communization of West Germany section of Ulbricht's speech. The Secretary indicated that he thought this should be done at once.

Press Reaction to Conference

4. Mr. Berding said that there is a great deal of press interest in the dinner the Secretary is giving tonight. The Secretary said that the line to take was that it was simply a courtesy dinner.

Mr. Berding noted the press coverage of the Conference is declining in volume and interest and that the press is expressing the hope that secret sessions will soon be held which will produce new developments. Mr. Berding noted that the Soviet briefing officer had praised the Secretary and Lloyd's approach to the conference and indirectly attacked the French for an unrealistic attitude. The Soviet briefer also said that the Soviets are not in favor of secret meetings, claiming that they have nothing to hide.

⁴ A summary of Ulbricht's speech was transmitted in telegram 976 from Berlin, May 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/5–2059)

321. Memorandum of Discussion at the 407th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 21, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-4.]

5. The Geneva Conference

Mr. Gray stated that Secretary Dillon had agreed to make any pertinent observations he might have on developments at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva.

Secretary Dillon observed that all he really wanted to say was that what had been happening at the Conference had been fully reported in the public press and there was practically nothing of any significance which was not known publicly. He added that there was the impression in the State Department that we had got past the preliminary hurdles at Geneva more rapidly than had originally been thought possible. On the other hand, in the course of the last week we had run into the expected Soviet stone wall. Perhaps, thought Secretary Dillon, next week would provide signs of more significant negotiations especially with respect to Berlin. If so, these negotiations would probably be private in character. Meanwhile, the U.K. had been playing very good ball with the U.S.

Secretary Dillon stated that we had had some difficulty with the very large number of representatives of the press in Geneva. In the absence of any very significant real news, the reporters had been reduced to manufacturing stories from very flimsy evidence.

Secretary Dillon added the thought that there had been a couple of fairly significant developments at the private dinner meeting of the Foreign Ministers.¹ In the first place, Secretary Herter had informed Gromyko that the U.S. would never consent to a Summit Meeting under threat. Secondly, there had been a flop in the matter of the nuclear test negotiations. The sudden hope of progress in this area had ended abruptly almost as soon as it had been born. If the Soviets do not retreat from the position recently taken by Khrushchev² who had stated a willingness to study only high altitude test suspension, the prospects for any real agreement seemed to Secretary Dillon to be very slim.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason.

¹ See Document 304.

² For text of Khrushchev's letter to the President, May 14, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 1311-1313.

The Vice President inquired whether Secretary Dillon meant to convey that the Soviets would not agree to the suggestions on test suspension made in the President's recent letter to Khrushchev.³ Secretary Dillon said that they would not agree to these suggestions.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that the visit of two reliable American individuals recently to Moscow had eventuated in a visit with Mikoyan who had informed these individuals that Khrushchev had liked the President's letter. Mr. Dulles confessed that he could not estimate the significance of this report.

Secretary Dillon pointed out one other interesting piece of intelligence. Apparently, he said, the Soviets have extended the lease of their villa in Geneva from the 8th of June until the 8th of July.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Acting Secretary of State on significant developments at the Geneva Conference.

[Here follow agenda items 6–8.]

S. Everett Gleason

³ For text of this letter, dated May 5, see *ibid.*, pp. 1309–1310.

322. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 22, 1959, 1 a.m.

Secto 94. Paris pass USRO. Ninth Session held May 21, Lloyd Chairman, lasted 3:30 to 6:45 p.m.

Couve de Murville criticized briefly several points from Gromyko statement yesterday.¹ Points raised included: questioned categoric

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2259. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/9 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/9, May 21, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1254.

¹ For text of Couve de Murville's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/37, June 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 158–164 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 80–84.

nature of Soviet rejection plan and asked whether Soviet position meant compromise possible only on basis Soviet proposals; rejected Gromyko efforts draw West into discussion Soviet peace treaty articles, claimed conference not yet at stage which would justify such discussion.

Lloyd spoke briefly² on unification, emphasizing three points on which Soviets and West evidently hold similar ideas and on which compromise should be possible: Agreement on desirability German unity; acceptance principle all-German elections; and agreement that four powers must play part re unification. Lloyd stated this should provide sufficient scope for Ministers discuss unification and endeavor reach agreement. Also further elaborated on advantages Western plan and ways it endeavors meet Soviet views.

Grewe's speech³ mainly solid criticism Soviet confederation proposal. Recalling previous Gromyko's reference to fact United States began as confederation, Grewe pointed out American confederation based fundamental principles of liberty, democracy, and human rights held in common by all members, in contrast to which Soviets propose confederation between free democratic Federal Republic and tyrannical, oppressive GDR. Grewe said impossible confederate "system of freedom with system of bondage." Grewe also mentioned German experience with 19th century confederation, which, however, had proved extremely weak and inadequate. German history therefore regarded that form of government as reactionary.

Grewe alleged confederation involving opposite political ideas would result in organization incapable of action, adding that indeed confederation concept contained inherent veto right each member re common institutions. Pointed out unsatisfactory recent experience such veto principle, including Control Council Germany and UN Security Council. Suggested aim confederation proposal really to paralyze Federal Republic while not permitting similar paralysis GDR. Also attacked parity idea asking whether votes 52,000,000 people on par with those 17,000,000. Therefore concluded confederation proposal will not contribute to German unification but to its postponement and prevention, and moreover to political paralysis Federal Republic.

Grewe closed by expressing hope certain Gromyko statements yesterday indicative positive ideas. He mentioned: Soviet suggestion two parts Germany might not have to withdraw existing defense pacts suggests Soviets now recognize German right in accordance Article 51 UN

² For text of Lloyd's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/21, May 21, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 164–167 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 85–87.

³ For text of Grewe's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/8, June 6, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 539–542 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 190–193.

Charter free decide membership regional defense arrangements; Soviet intention avoid imposing economic restrictions on future Germany welcomed if this means no Soviet objections membership in communities European economic integration; and hope that Gromyko statement yesterday meant does not regard Federal Republic political parties as “revanchist.” Finally Grewe warned that prospects resolving East-West differences still uncertain until Soviets change Article 2 treaty draft providing for negotiating with “two existing German states.”

Bolz then defended Soviet Peace Treaty proposal along established lines with particular reference to its urgency and benefits, militarism Western Germany, etc.⁴ Warned that division of Germany would deepen and unification become more difficult unless treaty accomplished, and claimed existing two German states constitute juridical successors former German Reich.

Rather longer Gromyko speech⁵ followed, ostensibly as comment on West statements made today. Virtually nothing new, again hammering on urgency peace treaty, revival militarism etc., Western Germany, dangerous Federal Republic and NATO policies. Said confederation details should not be discussed at conference since matter for German agreement and urged against wasting time discussing elections and unification.

Secretary closed with short statement⁶ criticizing accusations by Gromyko that NATO and Federal Republic arming for aggressive purposes. Pointed out justification Western defense measures and expressed hope that kind accusations and innuendos would cease. Otherwise he would be compelled to open the record.

Herter

⁴ For text of Bolz' statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/3, June 4, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 570–573 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 193–196.

⁵ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/24, May 24, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 167–172 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 87–91.

⁶ For text of Herter's statement, circulated as AR/DOC/22, May 22, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 173 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 91–92.

323. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/48

Geneva, May 21, 1959, 8 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Secretary Herter
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Merchant

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Mr. Laloy
Mr. Lucet

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Hancock

USSR

Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Soldatov

SUBJECT

Problems Relating to Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Both before and during dinner there was no general conversation, most of the talk being conducted in groups of two and three and in so far as I observed on a social rather than a serious basis.

After rising from the table at 9:45 and following coffee which most drank on their feet, the entire party ranged in a semicircle around the two love seats on which were seated the Secretary with Gromyko and Lloyd with Couve de Murville respectively. The conversation thereafter until about 10:55 when the guests left was substantially confined to the four Foreign Ministers with an occasional interjection by Zorin and Rumbold and intervention by Secretary McElroy.

The subject of Czech-Polish participation first came up, Mr. Lloyd introducing it by saying that he had discussed the subject exhaustively for an hour during dinner with Mr. Zorin but that neither had been able to convince the other. Gromyko clung tenaciously to his usual arguments and was rebutted by all three Foreign Ministers with equal vigor in the use of past arguments. Gromyko finally dropped the subject without, however, appearing unduly disturbed.

The question then turned to possible areas of agreement, with Mr. Herter seeking to pin Mr. Gromyko down to the propositions that the

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter. The meeting was held at the Villa Greta. A summary of this conversation along nearly identical lines was transmitted in Secto 101 from Geneva, May 22. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-2259) For McElroy's account, see Document 324.

Soviet Union agree that Germany should be reunified and that it should be done by free elections. Mr. Gromyko countered repeatedly by saying that the Soviet Union was “not against” reunification nor “against” free elections but that both these matters were exclusively for the two German states to work out.

This led to a warm discussion of the nature of the DDR, Mr. Herter maintaining that it was propped up by Russian bayonets and that its leaders could not conceivably be considered to represent the German people living in the Eastern Zone.

Gromyko countered with an attack on the atomic arming of the Federal Republic and appeared totally unimpressed by Mr. Herter’s and Mr. McElroy’s pointing out that under United States law the war-heads had to remain in United States custody. This discussion likewise was inconclusive.

Both during his arguments for Czech-Polish participation and toward the end of the evening Gromyko openly invited counter proposals from the West and the establishment of private talks, possibly even with a smaller group outside the Palais.

324. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, May 22, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SMALL STAFF MEETING

PRESENT

The Secretary	Mr. Berding
Secretary McElroy	Mr. Becker
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Wilcox
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Irwin
Ambassador Bruce	Mr. Krebs
Mr. Reinhardt	
Mr. Smith	
Mr. Sullivan	

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1355. Secret. The meeting was held in Conference Room 209 of the Consulate General Annex.

Conversation with Gromyko

1. Secretary McElroy mentioned three subjects he had discussed last night with Gromyko at the Secretary's dinner.¹ Gromyko spoke of Soviet concern about German rearmament, especially weapons of great destructive power. On disarmament, Mr. McElroy said he had noted to Gromyko that unless there were mutual trust there would be little progress. When Gromyko said he felt it was necessary for someone to break the circle of mistrust, Mr. McElroy suggested that the Russians make the first move. Finally, Gromyko indicated preoccupation with U.S. bases which he said showed aggressive U.S. intent against the Soviet Union. The Secretary asked Mr. McElroy whether Gromyko had developed the discussion on disarmament. Mr. McElroy added that Gromyko had indicated that he was not opposed to inspections with limits. Mr. McElroy thought that of the three subjects discussed, disarmament was the most likely field for further discussion with the Russians.

Conference Tactics

2. Mr. Merchant noted that there are two speeches scheduled for today, one by the Secretary on the security aspects of the Western Plan and one by Couve de Murville on Berlin. Mr. Merchant said that he thought we should not hand out the Secretary's speech to other Western delegations very much in advance of the time of delivery to avoid last minute "nit-picks".

Site of German Presidential Election

3. The Secretary said we should make proposals at the meeting of the four Western Foreign Ministers today in respect to the proposed holding of the German presidential election in West Berlin. Ambassador Bruce thought it should not be held in Berlin but that the West should not so go on record. In response to the Secretary's inquiry, Ambassador Bruce said that the British share our views.

Soviet Charges of West German Militarism

4. Ambassador Bruce said that he thought it important for us to refute East German and Soviet charges that West Germany has a highly developed military apparatus. In reply to an inquiry by the Secretary, Mr. Bundy said that the figures of Soviet troops in East Germany could be made public without compromising sources. The Secretary asked that a contrast should be drawn up on troop strengths in West and East Germany. Mr. Smith thought that since Western military strength in West Germany and Soviet troop strength in East Germany would generally balance out, the contrast should be confined to West German and East German forces.

¹ See Document 323.

Nuclear Test Talks

5. Ambassador Thompson reported that Tsarapkin told him yesterday² that we must hurry to reach agreement since the French are about to set off a nuclear explosion. The Secretary noted that during his talk with Lloyd yesterday³ agreement had been reached that (1) the Soviets would have to accept our memorandum on the terms of reference for a meeting of the technical representatives or there would be no further steps to arrange a meeting before the conference reconvenes; and (2) that progress in the test suspension talks alone would not be justification for holding a Summit meeting. Mr. Wilcox said that Tsarapkin seems to be extremely eager to conclude a test suspension agreement. The Secretary observed that we have an ally in Tsarapkin in our efforts to keep the test talks out of the Foreign Ministers' Conference.

Nuclear Cooperation with France

6. The Secretary cited a Department telegram (Tosec 92)⁴ suggesting that he raise with Couve de Murville the possibility of future nuclear cooperation with France. The Department wants to make sure the French understand that our legal requirement for receiving restricted data, namely, "substantial progress in weapons development," is not fulfilled simply by exploding one bomb. He indicated that we should think over our nuclear cooperation policy toward France.

Separability of Western Peace Plan

7. The Secretary said he thought that the only separable parts of the Peace Plan were Berlin and disarmament. If some progress were made on disarmament, this might be enough to justify a Summit meeting. Regarding Berlin, if we could isolate areas of agreement and disagreement, this might be a suitable subject for discussion at the Summit. In connection with Berlin, Ambassador Thompson mentioned that Mr. Becker is preparing two papers on our Berlin proposals which will spell out how they will work in the event we should be asked to do so by Gromyko.

Private Talks with the Russians

8. The Secretary indicated that since we do not seem to be able to make any progress at the Conference table, we would have to consider private sessions. How to set up these talks is, he said, a major procedural

²No further record of this conversation has been found.

³A brief memorandum of Herter's conversation with Lloyd at 3 p.m. on May 21, US/MC/50, at which this agreement was reached, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338.

⁴Dated May 20. (*Ibid.*, CF 1319)

question which would have to be discussed by the four Western Foreign Ministers. He noted that one difficulty was that the Soviets are not keen on formalizing informal discussions.

High Altitude Flights in Berlin Corridor

9. Mr. Merchant called attention to a telegram from the Department, being a draft reply to the Soviet note of April 29 on high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor.⁵ The draft essentially restates our position as contained in an earlier note. After some discussion, the Secretary thought we would have to study the matter carefully before commenting on the proposed reply.

Press Reaction to Conference

10. Mr. Berding said he thought that the Secretary's brief rebuttal statement at the conclusion of Thursday's session had worked very well, receiving wide coverage both here and in the States. He called attention to an editorial in the *New York Times* today in support of the Western Plan which he thought was evidence that we had successfully got the plan across to the public. He noted that USIA is planning a campaign to spread information about the Western Plan.

Secretary's Dinner for Foreign Ministers

11. Mr. Berding reported that the French, in briefing the press on the Secretary's dinner for the Foreign Ministers on Thursday, had said that there was a recapitulation of Conference discussions at the dinner. Mr. Berding said that Baraduc had explained to him that Couve de Murville said he saw no harm in saying this to the press. It was noted that the French had violated the agreement that the press would only be told that the dinner was purely a courtesy affair.

Views of Mayor Brandt on Berlin

12. The Secretary said he thought it would be important to keep posted on the views of Mayor Brandt on Berlin and to stay in close contact with him.

Harriman's Request to go to Communist China

13. Mr. Becker, after meeting earlier with the Secretary, stated that we intend to issue Governor Harriman a passport valid for travel to Communist China. He said that we agree with the Department that Harriman is a bona fide newsman and thus comes within present U.S.

⁵ The draft note was transmitted in Tosec 96, May 21. (*Ibid.*) The note under reference was delivered to the Embassy in Moscow on April 28 and a translation transmitted in telegram 2160 from Moscow, April 29. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762B.5411/4–1959)

policy. Mr. Becker said that the phrasing of the press release on the matter was very important and should be carefully worded.

Approaches by Unrecognized Governments

14. Mr. Becker noted that yesterday he had been approached by a representative of the Indonesian rebel government and by the Counselor of the DDR office in Geneva.

325. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/49

Geneva, May 22, 1959, 11:30 a.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. McElroy
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Irwin
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Hillenbrand

France

Mr. Couve de Murville
Mr. Lucet
Mr. Soutou
Mr. Froment-Meurice
Mr. Legendre
Mr. Baraduc
Mr. de Beaumarchais

United Kingdom

Mr. Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Wilkinson
Mr. Hope

Federal Republic

Dr. von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Duckwitz
Dr. Fechter
Mr. von Eckardt

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Herter on May 25. The meeting was held at Villa les Ormeaux. A summary of this memorandum was transmitted in Secto 105 from Geneva, May 22. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-2259)

SUBJECT

Problems Relating to the Conference

The meeting opened with an account by Couve of the conversation which he had just concluded with Gromyko. He said Gromyko had noted that not much progress was being made at the conference and that the two sides seemed far apart. Couve had agreed and pointed out that the Western Powers and the Soviets seemed to be talking about two different things. Both sides knew that the other side could not accept its proposals. He had indicated that he could not see any use continuing with a discussion of this kind, and if the conversations were to go on some different basis must be found. All the Western Powers asked was peace in Europe, free of incidents or threats of war. He had then said to Gromyko that, if he had any worries from this point of view, he should let the Western powers know and they could discuss it. Couve then had mentioned the proposed Western statements for this afternoon and had asked Gromyko what he thought would happen next week. Couve had added that if he had any ideas, we would be prepared to discuss them in any convenient forum. To this Gromyko had merely responded that the Soviets attached no importance to the forum but were prepared for discussions anywhere. Neither went further. During the conversation Gromyko placed great stress on German militarism with particular reference to the atomic armament of the Federal Republic. Couve said he had tried to explain that tactical rather than strategic weapons were involved and that all the warheads remained in American hands. Gromyko had replied that, while this might be true, how could one be sure that it would continue to be the case in the future. Couve commented that he had the impression that the question of the installation or non-installation of strategic weapons in the Federal Republic was an important matter to the Soviets.

In response to the Secretary's query, Couve said that he also had the impression that Gromyko was not willing to ask for a new type of meeting between the Foreign Ministers but was willing to accept Western proposals for different kinds of meetings.

The Secretary said he assumed that none of the Western Foreign Ministers would make any further reference to specific Articles of the Soviet peace treaty in their discussions. It seemed that this was going to be a waiting game from here on out, and that individual discussions with Gromyko would provide the best hope of making any progress. Perhaps an effort should be made to get Gromyko to talk about what he was willing to accept in our peace plan. If the Western powers attempted to have formal restricted meetings with him, even if on a small scale, the same problem of the East German advisers would arise.

Lloyd said that he had the impression from Gromyko that the latter did not want to use one of the formal rooms in the Palais for restricted

meetings of the Four, but might be willing to meet in one of the private offices. He would probably prefer to come to one of the private villas. Couve commented that it would probably be best to have private meetings in one of the villas rather than at the Palais.

The Secretary observed that, from conversations among ourselves, it was pretty well agreed that only two subjects sooner or later might evolve as a basis for some agreement: Berlin and disarmament. The immediate problem was one of tactics—how not to show too much eagerness. The question to be considered is how long the waiting game should go on. Should we wait for some move from the Soviets or attempt at some point to take the initiative? Whatever we said on Berlin, of course, must be understood to be within the framework of an interim arrangement pending eventual reunification of Germany.

Lloyd said his main concern was to avoid giving any impetus to the “disengagers” in the United Kingdom. Undue protraction of the Geneva Conference would strengthen such forces. Therefore he could not favor dragging things out too long.

Von Brentano noted he was inclined to think it too early to raise the Berlin issue in quest of some *modus vivendi*. Public opinion and the Soviets would interpret this as meaning that the West had dropped its entire Peace Plan.

Lloyd observed there was some truth in this. Perhaps the Western Powers should try to get Gromyko to talk about those elements which he found constructive in the Peace Plan.

The Secretary commented that Couve’s statement this afternoon would draw out Gromyko’s negative views on the Berlin proposals in the Peace Plan.

Lloyd said it would probably be a good idea to recess formal meetings for a day or two. On Monday Gromyko will presumably wish to reply to the Western statements this afternoon. What is required is a little more organization of the private talks; they should not merely consist of sitting around on sofas after a bountiful dinner.

After a brief noting of engagements for next week, it developed that the only scheduled social meetings with Gromyko were Couve’s invitation to have lunch with him on Monday and the invitation extended to all three Western Foreign Ministers to have dinner with Gromyko on Tuesday evening.

If there were going to be a recess for a couple of days, Lloyd then continued, the press should be adequately prepared. The point might be made that this was nothing abnormal, that daily meetings throughout the conference should not be expected. Western press officers might start hinting at this tonight.

The Secretary pointed out that he might have to go home for a few days, and might have to request a recess of the conference to enable this. He would take the opportunity to mention this possibility to Gromyko.

It was agreed that the Western Foreign Ministers should meet before lunch on Monday (Rumbold would represent Lloyd, who would not be returning to Geneva until 1:30). This would be in keeping with the general idea that the Western Foreign Ministers would attempt to concert their line prior to any individual meetings with Gromyko. It was also agreed that they would meet at 3:00 p.m. before the plenary session on Monday, and that the Coordinating Group would meet once before Monday to discuss tactics for next week, giving particular consideration to the question of how long the Western Powers should wait before taking the initiative.

Ambassador Grewe at this point reported briefly on the Coordinating Group meeting which had taken place earlier in the morning.¹ He said it had been thought that it would be good to try to introduce a more colloquial style into the meetings next week. It might likewise be desirable if, in a private conversation, one of the Western Foreign Ministers raised the question of a possible termination date for the conference. Couve said he had some apprehensions about attempting to fix a date for ending the conference. This would be sure to leak out and the West would be blamed for pressing for a premature end of the conference. The Secretary mentioned that there were certain little signs that the Soviets envisaged a somewhat lengthy conference. For example, Gromyko had, in discussing the nuclear test question, asked that a report be submitted to the Foreign Ministers. Since this could not be accomplished before June 8, the implication was obvious. Couve said that there was no question in his mind but that the conference was going to last a while yet. He should say two weeks.

Von Brentano said he had a matter to raise on a confidential basis. The presidential elections were due to be held in Germany on July 1. Last fall, prior to the receipt of the Soviet note on Berlin,² the president of the Bundestag had agreed to call the Federal Assembly (which elects the Federal President) in Berlin as had been done for the previous presidential elections. Chancellor Adenauer now had some doubt as to whether it was desirable to hold the meeting of the Federal Assembly in Berlin under present circumstances. He felt that such action might be construed as provocative, and would appreciate the views of the other Western Foreign Ministers. Von Brentano said he would see the Chan-

¹ The Coordinating Group, led by Merchant, Laloy, Rumbold, and Grewe, met at 10:30 a.m. A memorandum of their conversation, US/MC/41, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338.

² See Document 72.

cellor tomorrow and convey to him these views. If the decision were in the negative the fact that the Western Foreign Ministers had so advised would of course not be given as a reason for the decision against holding the meeting of the Federal Assembly in Berlin.

The Secretary said that he would agree that, if it could be so arranged as to not involve the Western Foreign Ministers, it would be preferable to call the Federal Assembly in Bonn rather than in Berlin. Couve expressed the same view, and mentioned he had already said the same during his recent visit to Bonn.³ Lloyd asked what reason could be given for the change. Von Brentano said that the Bundestag President could simply say that it was a matter of simplifying procedures and of other practical reasons such as avoiding the longer trip for the members of the Assembly. Everyone would know the real reason, of course. Lloyd then said that he likewise felt it would be better to avoid having the Assembly meet in Berlin.

Von Brentano said that it was clear the Western Foreign Ministers all proceeded from the assumption that the conference would have no final results, but as the Secretary had indicated, it was necessary to establish conditions for a Summit meeting. These conditions presumably should be some arrangement on Berlin and some arrangement on disarmament. How must such a Berlin arrangement work? He was of the opinion that, if the West were to be satisfied with a standstill, that is, a Soviet agreement to take no unilateral action before or during the Summit meeting, the Soviets could claim that this in effect authorized them to take such action if the Summit failed. He wondered whether the Allies should not insist on an unqualified acknowledgement of their right to stay in Berlin as a condition for going to the Summit. Lloyd said the German Foreign Minister had raised an important point, and the Western Foreign Ministers should discuss this early next week. It seemed partly a matter of presentation. The West must, of course, avoid giving any implied authority to the Soviets to change the situation in Berlin.

³See Document 287.

326. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington May 22, 1959.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Hammarskjold

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Hammarskjold
Ambassador Lodge
Mr. Dillon

From the conversation it appeared that Hammarskjold's primary purpose was to convince the President of the usefulness of a Summit meeting with Khrushchev. Hammarskjold spoke extensively of his talks with Khrushchev and indicated his belief that there was a possibility of making progress through Summit negotiations with him. Hammarskjold also indicated his belief that Khrushchev was now the absolute and sole ruler in the Soviet Union. He cited as an instance of this belief the fact that when it became known that he was going to see Khrushchev none of the other top leaders of the Soviet Union would discuss any subject with him which they thought might conceivably be the subject of a later conversation between him and Khrushchev. This indicated very clearly that none of them wished to have the slightest possible difference of opinion with Khrushchev. Hammarskjold commented on the unusual relationship between Khrushchev and Mikoyan in which Khrushchev treated Mikoyan as sort of a jester. Hammarskjold used the words "a Sancho Panza". But nevertheless, it was clear that Mikoyan had a great deal of influence with Khrushchev. Hammarskjold did not at any time say anything about holding a Summit conference under UN auspices.

Regarding the German situation, Hammarskjold said that he had gathered from Khrushchev that Berlin was not really of major importance to the Soviets but what was of supreme importance to them was the status of East Germany. Regarding a possible use of the UN in Berlin, Khrushchev told Hammarskjold¹ that he had no fixed ideas as to how this could be done and said that since he had accepted the principle of such a connection he thought it was up to the Western powers to indicate whether and how they would like this accomplished.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Dillon.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 246.

Hammarskjold thinks that Khrushchev does not consider the possibility of the use of the UN in Berlin in some form as a Soviet proposal, but rather as a Soviet concession to the West to make some sort of different regime more palatable.

Hammarskjold said that the Soviets were deeply influenced in their attitude toward Germany by their belief that no one, except possibly the United States, really desired the reunification of Germany. This was a cardinal tenet of their belief and was the reason they treat the subject of unification in such a cavalier fashion.

The major substantive comment by the President was a statement that while he does not believe in threats, and had never talked of United States or Western military power himself, he was determined to stand absolutely firm wherever he felt that we were fundamentally in the right. He said he was convinced that to show weakness in such situations would be very dangerous as it would only serve to encourage the Soviet appetite and thus the threat of future war. The President also expressed his strong belief in increased trade and increased exchanges of all sorts as a useful mechanism for reducing tensions and increasing Soviet understanding of Western ways of life.

327. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 22, 1959, 8 p.m.

Secto 108. Paris pass USRO. Tenth Session, May 22, Gromyko Chairman, short (3:30 to 4:43 p.m.).

Secretary commented on principal security aspects peace plan and on certain Gromyko remarks thereon (full text Secto 107).¹

Couve made statement² re solution Berlin problem in peace plan, saying no need mention Berlin in plan but Soviets have stressed it.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2259. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VRS/10 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/10, May 22, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1355.

¹ Dated May 22. (*Ibid.*) For text of Herter's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/20, May 22, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 174–178 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 92–95.

² For text of Couve de Murville's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/38, June 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 178–181 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 95–98.

Reviewed legal aspects which established Berlin as entity separate from four occupation zones and pointed out this separation preserved when FedRep established. Noted proposals re Berlin submitted as pre-figuration German reunification and adopted Austrian voting procedure which had worked well and gave Soviets measure of control.

Gromyko made short statement³ stressing importance of concluding peace treaty and offering to include new article in Soviet draft treaty to effect that treaty would not affect rights and obligations flowing from participation FedRep and GDR in economic organizations including regional ones. Question participation therein should be settled by competent German organizations.

Lloyd said first reaction to Gromyko's statement was no useful purpose served by discussing individual articles before fundamental principles settled, i.e., reunification of Germany.

Herter

³ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/25, May 25, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 182 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 98–99.

328. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, May 22, 1959, 5 p.m.

Cahto 24. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

I have just sent a brief summary wire to the Department covering our position at the present moment with the special request that it be forwarded to you. We have practically reached the end of the open session period with set speeches outlining our positions or rejecting those of the other side. I feel the only possible progress hereafter can be made through types of individual or informal four-power conferences such as I outlined in Secto 105.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files. 110.11–HE/5–2259. Secret; Niact.

¹ See the source note, Document 325.

Gromyko shows very little sign of giving in and all indications point to his expecting long-drawn-out discussions. I hope next week will give a glimmer of light, but feel patience must still be the watchword.

It must be terribly exasperating to you to read of our political exchanges, but this seems an inevitable part of negotiations such as these. Allied unity is holding firm and fewer stories are being circulated regarding divergence of views in the Allied camp.

I expect to be an expert Russian scholar before the end of the conference. Faithfully. Signed: Chris."

Herter

329. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/43

Geneva, May 22, 1959.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

U.S.S.R.

Ambassador Thompson

Mr. A.A. Soldatov

SUBJECT

US-USSR Relations

Soldatov asked me to dinner last night and it quickly became evident that his purpose was to indicate that Mr. Gromyko would like to have a conversation alone with Mr. Herter either at Mr. Gromyko's villa or Mr. Herter's. He was careful not specifically to ask for an appointment but said this would be the only way to get on with the Conference, that Mr. Gromyko would be in Geneva over the weekend, and that if Mr. Herter was interested I need only call Mr. Soldatov.

The rest of the evening was spent in a long philosophical discussion, the highlights of which follow: Soldatov outlined the intense desire

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Confidential; Limit Distribution. The source text indicates that the memorandum was drafted on May 22 so that the "last night" mentioned in the first sentence should be May 21. However, the U.S. chronology for May 22 shows the conversation taking place on May 22. (*Ibid.*, CF 1355)

of the Soviet Government for peace and an opportunity to build up their country, which he admitted would take longer than their slogans indicated. He asked me what I thought was the principal obstacle to improved United States-Soviet relations. I replied that I thought the root of the trouble lay in the ideology of international communism. Although they talked about coexistence they did not believe in it except as a temporary expedient. They believed in the inevitable struggle between the two systems and that eventually communism had to triumph. Their almost religious belief in their ideology led to complications and conflict in our relations. I pointed out, for example, that if East Germany did not have a communist regime, we could probably settle the German question very quickly.

Mr. Soldatov disputed some of my arguments but on the question of conflict between the systems remarked that we could not escape history by which he meant that communism was bound to win.

In discussing the German problem, Soldatov mentioned the special sensitivity of the Russians on this question because of their experience during the last two wars. He said, however, that if the United States and the Soviet Union could get together, there would be no difficulty in solving the German problem. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had any reason to fear Germany in itself. The Soviets were afraid, however, that Germany acting as the spearhead would drag the United States into conflict with the Soviet Union.

When Soldatov spoke of the United States and Soviet Union getting together, I said it seemed to me that even Soviets who had lived in the United States failed to understand that under our system of government, the President could not engage in big "deals". The President could lead his country within certain limits but Congress and public opinion had to be taken into account and imposed very definite limitations upon his actions. Soldatov said that Khrushchev was a realist and he was sure that he understood this.

Soldatov made many references to the bitter attitude of the American press toward the Soviet Union. Speaking of Africa, he said he had to laugh when he read accounts in American papers about the great Soviet influence there. He said he knew that such influence was virtually nonexistent.

Soldatov referred many times in the conversation to the great impression which the economic strength of the United States had made upon Mr. Mikoyan and himself during their trip. He also expressed their great pleasure at the visit of Mr. Nixon. He said he was convinced that Mr. Herter was a "good" man and he was optimistic that we could work out our problems successfully.

At one time Mr. Soldatov asked me if I thought it was possible for a radical non-peace-loving man to come to power in the United States. I gathered he had in mind someone like Hitler. I assured him that this was not possible but that even if it happened, it could make little difference in our foreign policy because of our system of checks and balances.

330. Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers did not meet on Saturday May 23 or Sunday May 24. However, at 10:30 a.m. on May 24 Secretary of State Herter discussed at length with Couve de Murville questions affecting U.S.-French relations. A memorandum of their conversation is printed in volume VII, Part 2, Document 116.

331. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter at Geneva

Washington, May 24, 1959, 8 p.m.

Tocah 48. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. I met with the President this evening and we discussed Secto 105.¹ President assumes it is your intention that Couve in his meeting Monday with Gromyko would simply sound out with him idea of private meetings for further discussion with subjects now before the Conference and would not explore with him possible requirements for a Summit meeting along lines third para Secto 105. The President indicated that while he is willing as he told Macmillan² to be generous in his definition of progress such progress should directly relate to Berlin situation which has been cause of crisis. In particular, he does not feel that an agreement by Soviets to recommence disarmament negotiations in an appropriate forum would be sufficient reason to accept a Summit meeting.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/5–2459. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dillon.

¹ See the source note, Document 325.

² Reference is to Eisenhower's discussion of Berlin with Macmillan, March 19–23; see Documents 234–241.

The President looks forward to getting first hand report from you on your return including opportunity to discuss future progress of conference.

Re last para of Secto 105 Dept points out that idea of assurance from Soviets that they would take no unilateral action with respect to West Berlin for a period of time was originally a German idea in which we have never seen much virtue. Therefore, Dept would prefer to see it dropped entirely if Germans are willing and rely instead on assumption that they would take no such action and your statement that the President would not negotiate under duress at a Summit Conference.

Dillon

332. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to Secretary of State Herter

Geneva, May 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Next steps in conference

MERCHANT FORECAST

In contemplating where we go from here we take the following as assumptions:

1) The Soviets will pay a price of some sort for the Summit meeting (because Khrushchev wants it and because he believes the United States is serious when it says some justifying progress will have to be made in the Foreign Ministers meeting).

2) No agreement with the Soviets is possible on either the Soviet draft treaty or the reunification of Germany for the foreseeable future.

3) Any divorce of security provisions from the reunification process in Western Plan is unacceptable.

4) Progress in the nuclear test negotiations would not in itself be acceptable to the West as a Soviet ticket of admission to the Summit.

Accepting these four assumptions it seems to us that the area of possible progress in this conference is confined to the following:

- 1) Berlin
- 2) Global disarmament
- 3) Agreement on time, place and agenda for a Summit meeting.

Our first cut at framing a position (which if approved by you would then require the agreement of our three allies) is the following:

1) With respect to Berlin, what we desire is (a) an acknowledgment by the Soviet Union that we are rightfully in occupation in Berlin and are entitled to unrestricted access thereto (including German civilian access), plus (b) some form of assurance by the Soviet Union that it will not attempt to do something (such as entering into a separate peace treaty with the GDR) in an effort to change the status quo respecting Berlin. We have considered some form of declaration or statement by the USSR that in any future treaty or arrangement between the GDR and the USSR, to which the Western Powers are not parties, explicit provision will be made (e.g. through designation of GDR personnel as agents, or otherwise) for continued exercise of the above-mentioned rights of the Western Powers, plus free and unrestricted access of German civilians to Berlin. We are not in favor of this suggestion, upon further consideration, upon the ground that it would be tantamount to an invitation to the USSR to enter into a separate peace treaty or arrangement with the GDR. We have drafted various forms of an agreement or declaration by the USSR giving guarantees by the USSR as stated above, but all of them are subject to the compelling objection that they amount to a total capitulation by the USSR as respects Berlin, without any compensating advantages to the USSR save a Summit meeting. This, in our view, constitutes an unrealistic evaluation of what the Soviet Union is prepared to pay for a Summit meeting, even assuming that it wants one. In our view, therefore, the best practicable approach to this problem would be an indirect one, namely, to formulate an agenda item for the Summit which will, in and of itself, constitute a guarantee containing the two elements of our desideratum. Accordingly, it is suggested that at an appropriate time (to be determined by agreement among the three Western Powers), we suggest a Summit agenda item along the following lines:

“Greater Berlin, access thereto, and the special responsibilities of the Four Powers with respect to Greater Berlin, and the methods through which they shall be carried out.”

The foregoing should be coupled with a joint communiqué—along the lines of an implicit standstill agreement—as follows:

“The Foreign Ministers reviewed the problems of Berlin. They agreed that this subject was one which could be referred to a meeting of the Heads of Government, and that pending such a meeting, none of the Four Powers would take any action designed to alter existing rights of occupation in Berlin and procedures for access thereto as they existed in April 1959”.

The above suggestion would afford protection to our rights and their exercise until the Summit meeting, but not thereafter, although it contains no admission that action thereafter would be legal or effective. If we desire to obviate this difficulty, we might phrase the communiqué in terms of a set period of time (e.g. two or five years) or (unrealistically) until the reunification of Germany or agreement among the Four Powers.

In connection with any "standstill" proposal such as the foregoing, we should foresee and have an answer to a Soviet inquiry whether it is our intention that the "standstill" be across the board. They will probably raise in this connection the installation of atomic weapons in Germany and the build-up of German armed forces.

2) Reach agreement with the Soviets to recommend to the Heads of Government the resumption of discussions on global disarmament, including surprise attack, in a forum or forums to be determined by the Heads of Government.

3) Reach agreement with the Soviets on the time and place of a meeting of the four Heads of Government (no German advisers, no other participants). This might be, for example, August 10 at Geneva. The agreed agenda should be as follows:

- a) Global disarmament.
- b) Greater Berlin, access thereto, and the special responsibilities of the Four Powers with respect to Greater Berlin, and the methods through which they shall be carried out.
- c) Nuclear testing.
- d) Consideration of a catalog of agreed and disagreed essential points relating to the reunification of Germany, measures of European security and the negotiation of a peace treaty with Germany. (In the consideration of this item at the Summit it might be proposed that there be established a Four Power body with German advisers attached for the continuing examination of these points of difference with a view to narrowing them.)
- e) Other business.

The United States should also seek to add to the agenda an item on the plight of captive peoples in Eastern Europe and an item providing for the discussion of the activities of international communism (it can be expected that the Soviets will reject these). It is also to be expected that the French will propose some grandiose scheme for multilateral contribution to a fund in aid of the under developed areas of the world (the United States should reject such an item).

Finally there should be explicit agreement that any Head of Government would have the right to raise at the Summit meeting any subject he desired to have discussed under the agenda heading of "other business".

333. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 25, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 122. Paris pass USRO. Eleventh Session, Secretary in chair expressed appreciation for colleagues agreement two day recess for funeral Mr. Dulles.¹ Followed by expressions sympathy and tribute memory Mr. Dulles by French and British Foreign Ministers. Gromyko expressed "again" his deep sympathy passing former Secretary State whom he had known some fifteen years. Ambassador Grewe expressed sentiments profound sympathy FedRep and overwhelming majority German people. GDR Bolz expressed sympathy "again" orally. Secretary expressed gratitude for statements uttered and said these would be conveyed to American people and Mrs. Dulles (texts being sent).²

Gromyko speaking first³ launched into long apology for Soviet peace treaty proposal, merely complete rehash his former speeches and Soviet propaganda. Brought up old themes German militarism, obstructionism by West, desirability two Germanies discuss reunification through confederation, and paid glancing compliment to SPD German plan. Only novel elements brought up by Gromyko were 1) willingness modify article 32 so as to authorize Germany engage activities connected with peaceful uses atomic energy, 2) reference Macmillan recommendation Moscow talks "gradual approach" solution outstanding problems and continuation discussion in series conferences, which met with Soviet approval, 3) emphasis that provision two Germanies remain "for certain time" [in neither?] NATO nor Warsaw Pact intended mean only "temporarily", 4) said he intended speak later and in greater detail on Berlin. Concluded discussions had so far only touched fringes Soviet peace treaty proposal and called on Four Powers state that FedRep and GDR should start talks together. Four Powers should draw up joint draft peace treaty embodying common language.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-2559. Official Use Only. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/11 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/11, May 25, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1357.

¹ Dulles died May 24. The funeral was scheduled for May 27.

² The texts as taken from the verbatim record were transmitted in Secto 129 from Geneva, May 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-2659) Texts of statements by Herter, Couve de Murville, Lloyd, and Gromyko are in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 15, 1959, p. 863.

³ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/26, May 25, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 183-185.

Secretary addressed himself to Gromyko's accusations German militarism (statement sent Secto 118).⁴

Couve de Murville said⁵ he did not wish discuss articles peace treaty since agreement on fundamental aspects not yet reached. West not hostile to idea peace treaty with Germany, which should seal political settlement European problems, but to Soviet approach. Two basic elements not yet settled: 1) Boundaries reunited Germany and 2) security elements. Associated himself with Secretary's rebuttal Soviet charge German militarism. Defended Paris Pacts. Questioned whether real Soviet objection was extension control over Western Germany without achieving reunification.

Gromyko counter-attacked charging Secretary with lack objectivity and missing point.⁶ Listed "unfavorable factors" which Secretary omitted such as violation post-war agreements for peaceful and democratic development Germany, armament Bundeswehr and installation atomic weapons and missiles FedRep territory, growing revanchist aspiration FedRep. Refuted Couve charge that Soviet Union aiming extend control which Gromyko purported he unable understand. Blandly pleaded abstain mutual accusations in order advance work conference.

Secretary agreed⁷ that discussions should lead to successful negotiations but issue raised by Gromyko required clarification. Secretary then made strong statement on militarism in East Germany, giving statistics GDR rearmament since 1945, and contrasted this with developments FedRep.

Lloyd supported Secretary's rebuttal⁸ militarism charges, suggested Conference look toward future, criticized Soviet peace plan and deplored trend of debate, saying Conference should consider what might constitute drawing together points of view.

Gromyko ironically found "sound elements" Lloyd's statement.⁹ Had mentioned past because necessary answer Secretary who had

⁴ Dated May 25. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1312) For text of Herter's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/27, May 25, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 195–198; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 108–110; or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 15, 1959, pp. 859–860.

⁵ For text of Couve de Murville's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/39, June 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 198–201 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 110–113.

⁶ For text of Gromyko's remarks as shown in the U.S. verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 201–203.

⁷ For text of Herter's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/45, May 25, see *ibid.*, pp. 203–205 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 113–114.

⁸ For text of Lloyd's remarks as shown in the U.S. verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 205–206.

⁹ For text of Gromyko's remarks as shown in the U.S. verbatim record, see *ibid.*, p. 206.

mentioned sports and youth groups GDR but had failed note FedRep rocket and missile bases. Session adjourned 6:50 p.m. until 2 p.m. Tuesday.

Herter

334. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, May 26, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

FULL DELEGATION MEETING

Conference Tactics

1. Mr. Merchant said that the Secretary is the only one of the four Western Foreign Ministers who will make a statement today. He added that it is considered important to get this statement, which is on Berlin, on the record before the recess.

Gromyko's Wish to Travel on the Secretary's Plane

2. The Secretary noted that Gromyko, after refusing our offer of one seat on the Secretary's plane for the trip to Washington, is trying to get his own accommodations to Washington to attend Secretary Dulles' funeral. The Secretary said it was important for the press to understand that we had offered Gromyko one seat on the plane on the same basis as the other Foreign Ministers. Ambassador Thompson thought that our handling the matter in the press should be such as to avoid any possibility that it might be built up as an aspect of the cold war.

Khrushchev's Charges of Western Buildup in Berlin

3. Ambassador Thompson called attention to a telegram from Bonn¹ reporting a conversation between the German Ambassador in Moscow and Khrushchev in which Khrushchev claimed that we had violated the understanding not to change the status quo in Berlin during

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1358. Secret. The meeting was held in Conference Room 209 of the Consulate General Annex.

¹ Telegram 2650 from Bonn, May 25. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-2559)

the present negotiations by sending new tanks and mines into Berlin. Secretary McElroy explained that this was part of the deliberate effort on our part during the Berlin crisis to take military measures which, while they would not alarm the general public, would be detectable by the Russians. The Secretary asked that the military keep us closely informed about developments in this matter. Mr. Smith said we should be careful not to give the impression that we are arbitrarily changing the status quo on Berlin. He added that we should be ready to offer evidence of Soviet military preparations in Berlin and East Germany.

Soviet Missiles in East Germany

4. The Secretary asked whether there had been any confirmation of a report that atomic capable missiles were being taken into East Germany. Mr. Bundy said that there had been no positive confirmation, although it was believed that other types of missiles had been introduced. Secretary McElroy said that there had been no observation of sites of ground-to-ground missiles in the DDR. Mr. Bundy agreed but pointed out that there had been sightings of covered equipment on flat cars with profiles similar to those of missiles paraded in Moscow. It was therefore thought likely that such missiles are in the DDR. Mr. Sullivan commented that Oncken of the West German delegation yesterday told him that there was atomic capable artillery in East Germany.

Press Matters

5. Mr. Berding said that there was much press interest in the figures the Secretary yesterday presented on the military strength of East Germany. Mr. Berding said that he had circulated to the press here copies of the Department's statement reacting to the Soviet note on atomic armaments in NATO countries.² Mr. Berding, in reply to the Secretary, said he understood that the statement was to serve in lieu of a reply to the Soviet note.

Hammar skjold's Meeting with the President

6. Mr. Wilcox suggested that the Secretary speak to Mr. Dillon about Hammar skjold's remark on Berlin at his breakfast with the President last Friday.³ The Secretary observed that the report of this talk indicated that Hammar skjold had repeated points he had made to the Secretary,⁴ namely, that Khrushchev is flexible on Berlin but concerned about bolstering the DDR.

² For text of this May 25 statement and the Soviet note of May 23, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1420–1422, or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 15, 1959, pp. 866–867.

³ See Document 326.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 269.

[Here follow paragraphs 7–9 on unrelated subjects.]

High Altitude Flights in Berlin Corridor

10. The Secretary noted that we had agreed here that our reply to the Soviet note of April 29⁵ on high altitude flights in the Berlin corridor should contain no indication of our willingness to take the case to the International Court of Justice.

⁵See footnote 5, Document 324.

335. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 26, 1959, 6 p.m.

Secto 132. Paris pass USRO. Twelfth Session held 2:05–3:25 p.m., French Chairman (with Zorin representing Soviets and Duckwitz FedRep, as result departure for Washington of Gromyko and Grewe).

Secretary gave statement on Berlin (full text transmitted Secto 130),¹ outlining details Western plan for unification city, and refuting Soviet assertion that Berlin part GDR territory.

Bolz then gave essentially rehash Soviet and GDR positions,² again with emphasis directed particularly to importance avoiding militarization Germany, particularly in this era of mass destruction weapons. Defended military and security limitations contained Soviet draft peace treaty. Again contrasted developments FedRep with those of GDR. Claimed U.S. May 25 statement on GDR military development to be erroneous, since GDR devoted peaceful democratic development and its

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2659. Official Use Only; Priority. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/12 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/12, May 26, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1358.

¹Dated May 26. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2659) For text of Herter's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/28, May 26, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 207–213; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 115–120; *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 635–641; or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 15, 1959, pp. 860–865.

²For text of Bolz' statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/4, June 4, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 573–576 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 197–200.

rearmament began only in response West German militarism. Re-emphasized importance peace treaty and that German unification primarily matter for two German states. Referred Ulbricht's recent suggestion for non-aggression treaty between FedRep and GDR.

French Chairman announced time next meeting would be determined later.

Herter

336. Editorial Note

Following the Twelfth Session of the Foreign Ministers Meeting, Secretary of State Herter returned to the United States to attend the funeral services for John Foster Dulles, which were held at the National Cathedral in Washington at 2 p.m. on May 27. The following day Herter, accompanied by the three other Foreign Ministers who had also attended the funeral, met with President Eisenhower to discuss the progress of the Conference. The Foreign Ministers departed Washington shortly after 3 p.m. on May 28 on Secretary Herter's plane, arriving back at Geneva just before 1 p.m. May 29.

337. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, May 27, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
Secretary Dillon
General Goodpaster

Referring to the Geneva meetings, the President said it has seemed to him that Mr. Herter is succeeding in what we have always wanted to do—to be firm without being nasty or offensive. Mr. Herter added that

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on May 28. A shorter memorandum of this conference, prepared by Herter, is Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2759.

he thought we have had a fair measure of success in accomplishing what Foster Dulles had always hoped for—that is to make clear to the world that our proposals are reasonable and constructive.

The President next mentioned the luncheon he was planning to have for the visiting Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers.¹ He asked that the State Department assure each individual invited that there is no obligation whatsoever upon them to stay for the luncheon unless they want to. He said he simply planned to say at the luncheon that he has asked them as a measure of courtesy to their governments and appreciation for their attendance at the funeral services of Mr. Dulles. He would offer a single toast to the memory of Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Dillon said that the State Department had, as the President requested, considered the idea of a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers, and thought that such a meeting would be of very definite value. The President said that what he had in mind was simply to ask them in and tell them that it is, in his judgment, ridiculous that the world is divided into segments facing each other in unending hostility. He felt that decent men should be able to find some way to make progress toward a better state of things. Mr. Dillon thought it would be advantageous to have it known, at least generally, that the President had taken this position. The President stressed that he wanted to make confidential the nature of the specific discussions. Mr. Dillon added that Gromyko had asked if he could call on the President. Mr. Dillon thought that the meeting the President spoke of would take care of this request. The President said he would bring out that he had been anxious to see the group, but didn't see how he could see them other than all together.

The President then referred to the question regarding the place of a possible summit meeting. His views were by no means fixed on this. He thought our willingness to accept any of several solutions might give us a little trading material. He is somewhat inclined against Geneva because it has a reputation for failure and frustration (he mentioned that one of Napoleon's criteria in selecting an officer for high command was "is he lucky?"). Mr. Herter said that the problem relating to Vienna is that the Russians are planning to have the "youth congress" there and this would preclude its use for anything else during August. The President mentioned his idea of inviting a very large group of Soviet students to attend American colleges for a year, as a one-shot proposition. Mr. Herter mentioned that the exchange of students has been a very sensitive point with the Russians. The President said he realized this, but felt a large scale offer might "break loose something." He said he would like

¹ President Eisenhower held a luncheon at 12:30 on May 28 for the Foreign Ministers and distinguished foreign dignitaries who attended Dulles' funeral.

Mr. Herter and Mr. Dillon to think the matter over. At the proper time, talks with key leaders in the Congress on a very discreet basis would be necessary. He added that he had talked with J. Edgar Hoover² about this and Mr. Hoover had thought the idea an excellent one and commented that it would not make his work more difficult.

With regard to the Geneva meeting, Mr. Herter said it had been mostly sparring thus far. The Soviets are insistent on two peace treaties for Germany. There is some fear that they are making a play for favor with the satellites by trying to set up the East German Republic. They are sensitive, however, on the issue of two peace treaties, since they try to call their proposal a "peace treaty with Germany" rather than separate treaties with two Germanies. Mr. Herter said that allied unity has been excellent so far, with agreement not to take moves in the conference without prior consultation. He said that Gromyko has maintained a very courteous manner, but is evidently operating under very tight instructions from Moscow. Mr. Herter said he hoped for something effective to come out of the plane trip back to Geneva. There will be no press present. Each person will have one assistant present to make notes. He hopes for candid discussions.

In general, Mr. Herter thought that the Soviets are trying to outwait the West in terms of offering modifications to their initial position. He thought that the time may come when he would want to state a deadline for positive results in the conference. The President agreed but said that we do not want to be too quick in setting such a deadline. Mr. Herter said he is trying to work away from the constant tendency of the press to report the conference in terms of who won and who lost on each particular topic. On the matter of disarmament, he thought that some progress could be made, for example in arranging a forum to consider the matter, and a time and a place for meetings. At present the eighty-two nations of the United Nations constitute a committee on disarmament. His hope is to see if the Soviets can be brought down to something reasonable. At this point he showed the President a letter from Adenauer³ which the President called "very good." The President went on to comment, however, that Adenauer's statement that only through agreement on disarmament can progress on other problems be made was too restrictive. He agreed as to its importance but he thought that many other measures must and could be taken in the interim.

² Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

³ Dated May 21. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials with Dulles/Herter) In it, Adenauer thanked Herter for visiting Bonn on his way to Geneva (see Document 288) and outlined his views on disarmament as summarized below.

The President agreed that the status of Berlin cannot be definitively settled except in the context of Germany as a whole. He therefore did not think that an interim agreement on Berlin could be accepted as the price to be paid for the summit meeting by the Soviets. He agreed that we should never be inflexible except on the two or three things that are basic to our whole position, the chief one being the rights and responsibilities in Berlin that we have.

Mr. Herter said that the allies are in complete agreement on the things they are opposed to, such as accepting a reduction of our rights in Berlin. They are not yet clear on the positive aspects however. He is inclined to feel that a temporary solution regarding Berlin may be possible, but he stressed the point of its temporary nature, since we cannot agree, in effect, to have three Germanies (the two now existing plus Berlin). He thought it is possible that we can deal with Berlin with the Soviets. They are pressing for recognition of East Germany. The West Germans are dead set against this, but are keen to make additional contacts with the East Germans. The President thought this was a hopeful sign. Mr. Herter said the West Germans, however, want us to sit in with them in any committees wherein they meet with East Germans; they are terribly afraid of being left alone with this Communist group, dominated by the Kremlin. Mr. Herter said there is a little something to work on and hoped to get Gromyko on the plane to say more clearly what the Russians have in mind. The President suggested that perhaps as a parallel to the committee, steps could be taken such that the newspapers of both East and West Germany could circulate freely each in the other's area.

Mr. Herter next raised the question of time, place and agenda for a summit meeting. The period of July and August he thought was difficult because we do not know what the Congress will do. The President commented that as at Geneva the Foreign Ministers would meet in the morning and the Heads of Government in the afternoon, largely to confirm what they had done. If the meeting continued for a while, he thought he could come back to the United States for a week, with the Vice President sitting in for him. The President added that perhaps it would not be too bad to have the meeting while the Congress is in session. This would tend to keep Congressmen out of Geneva, if that is where it is held. Also some things may come up wherein Congressional backing would be of value. He said he would accept August for the date of the meeting if the meeting seemed to show promise of being meaningful.

Mr. Dillon said that it is possible that de Gaulle and Khrushchev would leave the meeting when the President left, for prestige reasons. The President thought this problem could be eased through his saying that he would return. The President said he could go as early as the first of July. He wished to help Macmillan in the matter, and was therefore

willing to rule out September. Finally, the President said that any time consistent with the foregoing that Mr. Herter thought was all right would be acceptable to him.

Mr. Herter raised another point regarding the summit meeting. He had told Gromyko, when he kept pressing for Polish and Czechoslovakian participation, that this raised the question whether the Soviets wanted them to come to the summit. Gromyko replied, saying he was not raising that issue. Such a question would be taken up separately. Mr. Herter felt that a summit meeting must be limited to the four Heads of Government. The President agreed.

Mr. Herter said the French are extremely sensitive on the question of having nuclear testing as an agenda item since they are not involved in those negotiations. They would not object to the matter being discussed in "side conversations" by the other three powers, however, so long as it is not on the agenda. The President said that if he could get agreement on the question of testing at the summit he would certainly do so. Mr. Herter added that the British are taking a very stout stand in insisting with us that the quota of inspections that they have proposed must be decided upon on the basis of technical factors.

Mr. Herter returned to the question of "breaking Berlin out of the Western package." He thought we must do so, working for a solution which would be temporary in nature. The President said he agreed and had always thought so. Regarding the link between German reunification and the European security zone, Mr. Herter said the French and the Germans had always opposed the latter without reunification. The British may push us very hard on this, however. He did not think that we should pay such a price for a Berlin settlement.

The President said his thought has always been to link the European security zone with a larger security arrangement.

Mr. Herter asked how long he should plan to stay in Geneva. The President said it is hard to say; Mr. Herter could stay longer if some little progress was being made. If he comes to a brick wall, however, he thought Mr. Herter should set a day for stopping the discussions since they were getting nowhere and the Ministers might as well go home. The President recalled that both Macmillan and Khrushchev had made statements that if no progress is made in the Foreign Ministers meeting, a summit meeting is all the more necessary. The President said he utterly disagreed with this concept. Mr. Herter said he was in full accord with the President and he suspected that Selwyn Lloyd is, too. Mr. Herter said he hoped he would have something more to report after his plane ride with Gromyko.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

338. Memorandum of Conversation With President Eisenhower

Washington, May 28, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Secretary of State
U.K. Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd
French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

At this conference, no one was present to take notes, but this memorandum will, I think, serve to review the highlights of the discussion. At the outset, the President thanked the three Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and Soviet Russia for their great courtesy and thoughtfulness in making it possible for all of us to come to Washington for the funeral. He then said that he did not want to have any substantive discussion with respect to our negotiations, but that he did want to make it quite clear that he hoped we would make sufficient progress so that a subsequent Summit Meeting would be worthwhile. He emphasized the fact that he personally was willing to go anywhere at any time to talk with anyone if such talks would advance the cause of world understanding and peace but that he felt it would be a hoax on the hopes of mankind if a Summit Meeting should be held and end up in further disagreement without some progress being made.

There were some very amusing exchanges, with Selwyn Lloyd saying that before coming into the meeting with the President we had been discussing the question of having Mr. Gromyko thrown out of the plane unless we reached substantial agreement before returning to Geneva. It turned out that Mr. Gromyko had been giving some thought to this question, and decided it was not just a procedural matter but a substantive one in which a majority vote could not be binding, and that he felt he might be justified in using a veto. To Mr. Gromyko's delight, the President agreed with him thoroughly with respect to the use of the veto in this instance, and also suggested it might be well if our plane were to be refueled over and over again before Geneva on the understanding we would not return until agreement had been reached.

In expressing his own philosophy in respect to meeting with people and the desirability of direct contacts, the President said that from his point of view he found that people did not wear horns merely because of nationality, race or religion but because of their own innate qualities of cussedness. He went pretty far in emphasizing the desirability of people

talking to each other, including the East and West Germans. At this point, Mr. Gromyko called the attention of the other Foreign Ministers to what the President had said and expressed his own full agreement.

After the conversation, I suggested to the President that perhaps Mr. Gromyko might pick up this particular point and utilize it to his own advantage and that it would be desirable for the President at luncheon, when he would have the opportunity of talking with Dr. Adenauer, to make it very clear that his remarks were in no way a reflection on the West Germans reluctance to talk to the East Germans. The President said he would do this and reminded me that he had reassured Chancellor Adenauer the previous day¹ with respect to the real firmness of our Allied relationship.

The President concluded the discussion by showing us various paintings in his room as well as an album of photographs of paintings for which he himself was responsible. The whole atmosphere was most friendly and I think Gromyko appreciated it, particularly when President Eisenhower asked Gromyko to convey a courteous message to Mr. Khrushchev, and received through Gromyko reciprocal sentiments on behalf of Mr. Khrushchev.

C.A.H.

¹Chancellor Adenauer, who had attended Dulles' funeral, met with both the President and Allen Dulles on May 27. In the meeting at 11 with the President he reiterated his concern about British weakness at Geneva and the President tried to reassure him. (Memorandum of conversation; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries; see also *Eisenhower Diaries*, pp. 363–364) In the dinner conversation with Dulles, Adenauer repeated his concern, but also discussed the Middle East, the German economy, and domestic German politics. (Memorandum for the President, June 2; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

339. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/66

May 28, 1959, 8–9:30 p.m.¹

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Secretary Herter
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Becker

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville

United Kingdom

Foreign Minister Lloyd

USSR

Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Soldatov

SUBJECT

Berlin

Secretary Herter opened the conversation by stating that we would be very interested to hear the basis for the Soviets' dissatisfaction with the situation in Berlin. We understand that the Soviet Union wants a change in the situation. The Western representatives would like to have Mr. Gromyko discuss the problem of Berlin and they desire a frank and open discussion of the problem. We are willing to live with the present situation and desire to know what the Soviets want.

Mr. Gromyko opened by stating that he had tried to explain this several times and moreover Mr. Khrushchev had made a number of statements on the same subject. Mr. Gromyko would, however, be glad to repeat the substance of these statements. He noted at this point that it was his plan the day after tomorrow to speak at some length at the plenary on this subject.

Mr. Gromyko stated that the present situation in Berlin is unnatural. Berlin is an island surrounded by the territory of the GDR which has an entirely different regime from that existing in Berlin. Moreover, around West Berlin and Berlin are located Soviet troops and GDR forces, both the Soviet Union and the GDR being members of the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2859. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Becker and approved by Herter. Transmitted in Cahto 48 from Geneva, May 20, with unnecessary words omitted. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/5–3059)

¹ The conversation was held on board the plane carrying the Foreign Ministers back to Geneva.

Warsaw Pact. Now an island occupied by foreign troops—those of the Western Powers—located in the center of the GDR, created an unnatural situation. It was unnatural from the geographical point of view. Moreover, the present occupation regime in Berlin cannot be justified under present conditions. The Soviet Government recognizes that the Western Powers do have rights and that they have these rights under agreements to which the Soviet Union was a party. But fourteen years have elapsed and conditions have changed radically, including, among other things, the creation of two new sovereign states, namely, the GDR and also the GFR. To put it briefly, the occupation has outlived itself. That is the second consideration, aside from geographical considerations. Third, Mr. Gromyko went on to state, the present situation in Berlin is a dangerous one. There may be unexpected incidents, incidents which are not wanted by either side, by the Western Powers, by the USSR, or by the Germans. The Soviet Union does not want such incidents which would arise from the presence of Western troops in an occupation status in Berlin. Mr. Gromyko commented, you will say, of course, that nothing has happened for fourteen years. But all of us bear a great responsibility and it is not wise for us to continue to maintain a delicate situation. Mr. Gromyko then continued to his fourth point which he introduced by stating that it was not the most important one. West Berlin is a center for subversive activities, military intelligence activities on behalf of the forces of the Western Powers, also espionage, propaganda, radio stations. He believed that to some extent the West Germans were involved in this. You know better than I do, said Mr. Gromyko, what these activities are. As a passing example, he referred to the underground tunnel which had tapped the land lines of the Soviet Union forces,² but emphasized that this was only a past illustration. One cannot consider this situation normal. Mr. Gromyko went on, once again, to emphasize that this last point was not the most important of the considerations to have in mind regarding Berlin. If the Western Powers say that they can correct these things, the Soviet Union would answer that they do not constitute the essence of the Berlin problem.

Mr. Gromyko continued that if we understand our responsibilities and act in a responsible way, we will not continue an occupation having all of these dangers. Mr. Gromyko noted that the Western Powers would ask whether West Berlin under the Soviet proposals would fall to the Soviet Union or to the GDR. The Soviets do not need West Berlin. As to the question of whether the GDR will change the regime in West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko's answer was an emphatic no. He stated that the GDR

² Regarding the Berlin tunnel used to tap Soviet communications lines in 1956, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXVI, p. 551.

does not want West Berlin any more than does the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, he stated, wants to negotiate with you and is prepared to give guarantees for the continued status of West Berlin. It is prepared to permit West Berlin to keep the same social order. With respect to communications between West Berlin and the outside—i.e., West Germany—one of the most crucial problems—the Soviet Union is prepared to give guarantees. It will even call in the United Nations to take part. On this point the Soviets are open-minded. It could be a combination of the UN and the Four Powers. The Soviet Union has exchanged views with the GDR and the Soviet Union fully understands its responsibilities. The GDR is prepared to take part in the guarantees proposed by the Soviet Union and they will keep their word and carry out the agreement. When they sign they will carry out their agreement and the Soviet Union and others will also keep their word. The Soviet Union does not want to provoke tensions and it is extremely serious on this. With respect to communications, Mr. Gromyko went on, the guarantees should not be in a form inconsistent with the sovereignty of the GDR. Mr. Gromyko then emphasized that he was expressing his views very frankly.

Mr. Gromyko then stated that if you and your governments think that we are not sincere in our proposals respecting West Berlin, you will be making a great mistake. We mean what we say. If you believe us, we shall be able to work out a solution, not only of this problem but of other problems as well. Berlin is the first problem calling for a radical solution which would really be in the interest of lessening tensions. This can be done without sacrifice of principles or of the interests of the Western Powers regarding West Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko went on to state that the first and most radical solution of the Berlin problem was to have all troops withdrawn in the interests of lessening tension. If, however, the Western Powers are not prepared to agree to this, the Soviet Union would consent to having small symbolic units remain there. He noted that both the West and the Soviet Union knew that the troops in Berlin were only symbolic anyway. By leaving symbolic units there, there would be no affront to the prestige of the Western Powers and the Germans would be satisfied. The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss what number would constitute a symbolic unit. The Soviets are open-minded about this. He then referred to the possibility of mixed units in West Berlin and apparently suggested Soviet participation in the symbolic units to be left in West Berlin. He went on to repeat that the Soviet Union would prefer to have all troops out of West Berlin but would consider the second alternative that he had mentioned. A third alternative referred to by Mr. Gromyko was to have other "neutral" troops in West Berlin, "neutrality" not necessarily being determined on ideological grounds. They could be any non-participants in NATO.

Mr. Gromyko repeated that he did not mention the number of troops although he felt that the less the better.

Mr. Gromyko expressed the view that there is a possibility of a solution to this problem, because the Western Powers have so many choices. It should be possible for us to find a solution if we really wish to do so. The Soviet Union has given relatively flexible proposals and the Western Powers should not be rigid. It would be wrong to take that attitude. The Soviet Union desires to work out a solution at this time and will go as far as possible in attempting to do so although its very proposals had taken into account possible varying attitudes on the part of the Western Powers. Mr. Gromyko commented that Mr. Khrushchev had done the same in talking to Mr. Macmillan.³ He wanted to make a solution easier.

Mr. de Murville asked what would come next if we reach an arrangement at Geneva. Will you make a peace treaty with the GDR even though we reach agreement on West Berlin. You have repeatedly said that if we do not agree to a German peace treaty, you would enter into a separate peace treaty with the GDR. Mr. Gromyko's reply was to state that if we reach agreement on West Berlin, we do not have to face a situation where the Soviet Union is not performing its obligations. In that event there will be no complications. Moreover, the GDR will be a signatory of the agreement and will make no trouble. Secretary Herter inquired whether, if we Four Powers reach agreement, will the GDR separately give a declaration.

Mr. Gromyko answered that the GDR will sign the agreement or may make a separate declaration. Mr. de Murville asked whether the GDR and the Soviet Union would make an agreement noting that the Soviet Union already has an agreement with the GDR (referring to the Bolz–Zorin letters).⁴ Mr. Gromyko noted that in the 1949 agreement⁵ the Soviet Union had undertaken certain obligations and that in its agreement with East Germany it reserved these obligations. Now the Soviet Union is proposing to make a new agreement with respect to these obligations. Mr. de Murville pressed his point, again asking whether the Soviet Union would make an agreement with the GDR and Mr. Gromyko answered vaguely that they would make some agreement. Mr. de Murville then asked why the Soviet Union desired to give up its obligations. Mr. Gromyko answered that the situation was outmoded. They were unable to explain this to the GDR and moreover there were Soviet troops in the vicinity.

³ See Documents 183 ff.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 31.

⁵ For text of the final communiqué of the 1949 Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting at Paris, June 20, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.

Secretary Herter noted that some of the things which Mr. Gromyko had said were very important and we would like to have them in writing so that there can be no misunderstanding. We desire to study these statements very thoroughly.

Mr. Lloyd interjected that the basic difficulty was with Mr. Gromyko's second reason. The first one, geographical, was tiresome and could not be helped, and the others were more important. The third, relating to incidents, was not very important in that the Four Powers are really in control and can minimize incidents between East and West Berlin. With respect to Mr. Gromyko's fourth point, subversive activities, that could be discussed. The real difficulty was with respect to Mr. Gromyko's second point, namely, that the time has now come to end the occupation of West Berlin. It is the position of the Western Powers that this can end only when we reunite Germany. Failure to agree on reunification means a continuance of the interim period. We cannot sacrifice our rights in Berlin unless and until there is some agreement on reunification. Mr. Lloyd said that it was hard to stomach Mr. Gromyko's statement that the time has come to end the occupation without any agreement on reunification. There is no real difference of views on the question of whether West Berlin should continue to maintain its existing social system on access, etc. But why go into the doctrine of ending the occupation status. Mr. de Murville noted that the juridical basis of occupation did harm to no one and it did not change anything. Mr. Gromyko's retort was to say that the Western Powers were asking for something for nothing. Mr. Lloyd said that the Western Powers would be glad to examine the causes of tension in Berlin and on access and want to satisfy the Soviet Union on these points. Mr. Gromyko inquired whether or not the Western Powers were interested in continuing the social order in Berlin. Why, otherwise, are troops of the Western Powers situated there. Messrs. Lloyd and de Murville interjected at this point that such troops were symbolic. Mr. Gromyko answered that in that event they were there to maintain social order.

Mr. Lloyd said that if the Soviets desired to change the Berlin situation which had arisen as a result of the events of 1945, why were they not prepared to go back and give up to the Western Powers the territories that the Soviet Union had acquired as a result of that same set of circumstances. Part of the agreement through which the Soviet Union acquired these territories was the status of Western Berlin. He felt that the Soviet Union was being one-sided.

Secretary Herter then noted that Gromyko had made an important statement regarding our rights. We say leave them unimpaired. We desire to stabilize the situation within the framework of our rights. Mr. de Murville raised a question as to the existing status of West Berlin. It now is a government and sends people to the Bundestag who act as observers

and have no vote. Mr. Gromyko answered that the same system would apply under the plan offered by the Soviet Union. Mr. de Murville noted that the Socialists were in charge of West Berlin. Secretary Herter commented that East Berlin would also vote for Mr. Brandt if it had a chance, but Mr. Gromyko's only reply was to say that East Berlin is East Berlin.

Mr. de Murville inquired as to the relationship of East Berlin and the GDR. Mr. Gromyko answered that East Berlin is the capital of the GDR, whereupon Mr. de Murville asked whether East Berlin is a part of the GDR. Mr. Gromyko replied that it is the capital. Mr. Lloyd then noted that under the same line of reasoning, West Berlin is a part of West Germany and Gromyko's only reply was in the nature of "ugh".

Mr. Herter noted that all Berlin had the same status. Only if East Berlin is not a part of East Germany is West Germany not a part of West Germany. Mr. Gromyko insisted that West Berlin was in the center of East Germany, whereupon Mr. Merchant noted that Alaska is also situated in a way of speaking in the center of Canada.

Secretary Herter returned to the point that Mr. Gromyko admits that we have rights and we should be able to make an adjustment within these rights.

In answer, Mr. Gromyko noted that there are so many problems between us that we should not neglect an opportunity to solve this one. Mr. de Murville noted that we already agreed to discuss it. Mr. Gromyko's answer was to say that this can be a beginning. In answer to Mr. de Murville's question as to whether Gromyko had a draft of his Berlin statement, Mr. Gromyko replied that if understanding is reached, it will be easy to work out the details.

Mr. Lloyd noted that Mr. Gromyko had given us the Soviet proposal respecting Berlin. He inquired what was Mr. Gromyko's second position. Mr. Gromyko replied that the Western Powers are the rigid ones. The Soviet Union has demonstrated flexibility and given alternatives in advance. It did its very best to understand the Western position and gave alternatives to the Western Powers in order to make it easier for them to agree to a solution. It is not enough to say that the proposal of the Soviet Union is no good. The Soviet Union tried to make the position of the Western Powers easier and told them exactly why. Mr. Gromyko implied that the Soviet proposals were their last word, subject to willingness to negotiate on the points he had mentioned.

Mr. de Murville commented that Mr. Gromyko had emphasized that a number of incidents might arise from the existing situation in Berlin although this had not eventuated in fourteen years. Mr. de Murville felt that the absence of Western troops might well increase the likelihood of incidents because of the direct confrontation of the East and West Germans. Mr. Gromyko insisted that the Western Powers must

take responsibility. The Soviet Union and the East Germans will take the same position on this question.

Mr. Lloyd then commented that Mr. Gromyko said that the time had come to call off the agreements because they were outmoded. What assurance did the Western Powers have that, say in five or ten years, the Soviet Union would not say that the guarantees were outmoded. We, said Mr. Lloyd, believe that agreements should be kept but the Soviet Union denounces them unilaterally. How do we know that you won't denounce these new agreements. Mr. Gromyko replied that if he were talking about unilateral action, he would not be discussing these matters in the plane.

Mr. Lloyd noted that the Western Powers will do anything reasonable to relieve tensions, they were prepared to go far, but Mr. Gromyko replied that this was of secondary importance. Mr. Lloyd insisted that Mr. Khrushchev put the relaxation of tensions as of the first importance in the Moscow talks.⁶ Mr. Gromyko insisted that it was only secondary—the real question is the existence of an occupation regime in the center of the GDR.

Mr. Herter noted that Mr. Gromyko must know, from reports from his Embassy in Washington, that there was a strong U.S. public opinion on the points at issue. The American people are not prepared to give up their rights unless something is gained in replacement of them. They are unanimous on that—all parties and all points of view in the United States and France. Mr. de Murville concurred in this statement. Secretary Herter then continued that accordingly we should seek to work out a solution in the framework of existing rights. Mr. de Murville noted that the existing situation does not harm anyone as far as the juridical situation is concerned. Mr. Gromyko replied that he could not distinguish the juridical situation from the facts. You have troops in Berlin. Mr. McElroy noted that the Soviet Union had many troops in East Germany. In answer to Mr. de Murville's question of what was meant by "symbolic" troops in West Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that they were prepared to discuss this point. Mr. McElroy then sought to clarify the point as to whether or not Soviet troops would be included in those located in West Berlin assuming we were able to reach agreement on a symbolic number. Mr. Gromyko said that this would be the case only in West Berlin; East Berlin is the GDR. Secretary Herter then asked about our rights with respect to greater Berlin and referred to the agreements that had been made in this regard. Mr. Gromyko asked how long such agreements were to continue in force. There had also been a Potsdam Agreement. He insisted that time had somehow changed the situation and that

⁶ Presumably the Khrushchev–Macmillan talks; see footnote 3 above.

East Berlin was out of the picture. Mr. de Murville then commented that the Soviet Union could not, in that event, challenge the right of the Western Powers to give West Berlin to the GFR because that could be done on the same basis as that on which the Soviet Union purported to give East Berlin to the GDR. Mr. Gromyko's only answer was to insist that East Berlin was out of the question.

Mr. de Murville inquired as to the basis on which Mr. Gromyko proposed to station Soviet troops in West Berlin and Mr. Gromyko replied that he wanted some new basis there.

Mr. Lloyd said that Messrs. Gromyko and Khrushchev had mentioned rights of the Western Powers in West Berlin. What exactly did they mean by that. Mr. Gromyko replied that the situation had changed. Mr. Lloyd stated that the rights of the Western Powers stemmed from the defeat and occupation of Germany but Mr. Gromyko insisted that such rights were derived from agreements. Now the situation has changed. There are no longer occupation zones. There are two sovereign German states. Mr. Gromyko then went on to state that if the Western Powers are interested in keeping the social order in West Berlin, that will be guaranteed. If they are interested in access, that will be guaranteed. After all, why are the Western troops in Berlin. They have no military importance. Messrs. de Murville and Lloyd noted that they were symbolic. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union was, although reluctantly, prepared to accept troops. Mr. Lloyd insisted that in 1964 the Soviet Union might well again say that the situation had changed and that the agreement of guarantee was outmoded.

Secretary Herter inquired why the Western Powers could not ask the Soviet Union to give up some of its rights and give the Western Powers more rights. Gromyko did not answer directly, but said that if the Western Powers wished a guarantee of troops in West Berlin, even though there was no need for them, the Soviets would consider this, notwithstanding the fact that the situation was unnatural.

Secretary Herter inquired of Mr. McElroy whether Berlin had any military advantage. Mr. McElroy replied that it was only symbolic. The troops in Berlin couldn't support themselves if the Soviet Union took action but if the Soviet Union did act, our troops would be involved and we would be involved. He stated that he did not know how many troops make a symbol. He did note, however, in respect of number, that the situation in Berlin was stabilized and he could not conjecture as to the effect of any reduction in those forces. The reduction in forces there might provoke incidents. In any event, Berlin had no place in a war plan. The real problem is the unilateral feature of the Soviet proposal. The real answer to how long the situation should continue is how long it will take to reach another agreement.

Mr. Herter then commented that if there were agreement on unification, the situation might be different. Mr. Gromyko replied that the situation existing as a result of acceptance of the Soviet proposals would be temporary and only last until the reunification of Germany.

Mr. Gromyko then turned to Secretary Herter and asked if he had any ideas about European security. Mr. Herter replied that the Western Powers had outlined phased measures designed to maintain European security in connection with their peace plan involving reunification of Germany. Mr. Gromyko then said that he thought the Western Powers might have some more realistic ideas, some separate proposals which could be discussed. Secretary Herter then referred to the all UN disarmament committee and noted how difficult it was to accomplish anything with so many nations involved.

The conversation then lapsed into generalities although several times later in the evening Mr. Gromyko inquired when the Western Powers were going to recognize East Germany. Mr. de Murville also noted later in the evening that we were desirous of settling the Berlin problem but this would not be easy if the Soviet Union maintained its present position. Mr. Gromyko replied that it would be easy if the Western Powers were reasonable.

340. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, May 29, 1959, 2 p.m.

Cahto 43. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President

I think the Four Foreign Ministers Conference aboard the plane¹ served a very useful purpose. A very full text of the substance of our conversations is being forwarded to the Department and will of course be available to you, but some of the highlights will I know be of special interest. The conversations were arranged so that the eight of us aboard the plane were seated in two sets of four seats across the aisle with the four Foreign Ministers sitting on the aisle. This allowed the conversations to be heard by each of us without any voice straining. I opened up

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/5-2959. Secret; Niact.

¹ See Document 339.

the session by recounting briefly the events which had led to our meeting and the fact that it was the Russians who had expressed dissatisfaction with the situation in Berlin and that I felt Mr. Gromyko should talk to us frankly as to why the Russians were dissatisfied and what they felt might be done to remedy the situation. This led to a long exposé by Gromyko couched in moderate terms but with many of the old familiar arguments. There were of course interruptions with questions from time to time. When it came down to specific proposals and exchanges of views, Mr. Gromyko was quite explicit and at least from our point of view three favorable developments ensued:

1. That any arrangement with respect to Berlin would be considered temporary pending German reunification;
2. That the Russians would give very explicit guarantees with respect to the maintenance of the free order in Berlin both politically and economically and complete freedom of access to maintain that position, and that the Russians could assure that similar guarantees would be given by the East Germans either in adhering to the same document or in a separate declaration, and that the Russians would accept some form of recognition by the U.N. to observe and report on how they were being carried out;
3. That Allied troops together with some Russian contingent could remain in West Berlin as a token presence of the four responsible powers.

The completely unacceptable concept from our point of view of Gromyko's suggestions lays in two particulars. First that in any new agreement our occupational rights would be given up in favor of the new arrangements and, second, that a contingent of Russian troops should be stationed in West Berlin together with the troops of the three Allied powers. On the latter point, it is my guess that we can probably talk the Russians out of the Russian presence. With respect to the former, I think they may stand pat and it is possible that we could get a Berlin negotiation narrowed down to this one point for settlement at a Summit Conference. However, until the above favorable points have been firmed up through discussions of written documents, I have no certainty that they will stick.

The atmosphere of the talks was good and I feel that your own courtesies to Gromyko² as well as his inclusion with us aboard the plane have done much to at least relax tensions as between ourselves and may well be of very real importance in discussions to come.

Faithfully,
Signed: Chris"

Herter

²See Document 338.

341. Record of Conversation

Geneva, May 29, 1959, 5–7 p.m.

PRESENT

United States

Secretary Herter
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Merchant

U.S.S.R.

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Malik

France

M. Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Laloy

United Kingdom

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Hancock

Mr. Herter raised the question of the procedure which the Foreign Ministers should follow in their future conversations. He suggested that they should decide the relationship between private talks and talks in Plenary Session.

Mr. Lloyd said that in his view the present discussion should be regarded as a continuation of the earlier discussion in the aircraft.¹ As to future procedure, the Foreign Ministers should decide from time to time what suited them best. They should make procedure their servant.

Mr. Gromyko said that he would like a Plenary meeting on the following day, May 30. He wished to make a statement on Berlin replying to Mr. Herter's statement on the same subject.² The other Foreign Ministers were having dinner with him that night and private conversations could then be pursued. Mr. Gromyko thought that all methods and procedures should remain open. The Foreign Ministers could decide upon what suited them best at any particular time.

It was agreed that there should be a Plenary Session on May 30 and that further plans should be made at Mr. Gromyko's dinner that evening. It was further agreed that no statements should be made to the press about private meetings, except by agreement between the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Herter then summarised the conversations which had taken place in the aircraft. Mr. Gromyko had expressed concern about the abnormal situation in Berlin. He had said that it was necessary to

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1361. Secret; Limited Distribution. The meeting was held at the British Villa. Transmitted in Cahto 46 from Geneva, May 30. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/5–3059)

¹ See Document 339.

² See Document 335 and footnote 1 thereto.

normalise the situation by ending the occupation regime. The status of West Berlin could be safeguarded. The Soviet Government had no wish to change the social order of West Berlin. It was willing to give guarantees on access, the economic life of West Berlin, etc. The D.D.R. would give similar guarantees either as a signatory to whatever agreement was reached or by making a separate declaration or declarations. It would also be possible for the United Nations to take part in such guarantees. Exactly how this could be done was a matter for discussion.

As to the Western troops in West Berlin, the Western Foreign Ministers regarded them as symbolic of the protection of the West Berliners. All four Foreign Ministers had agreed that these troops were not of military significance.

As to the occupation rights of the Western Powers in respect of Berlin, Mr. Gromyko had admitted that they existed. But he contended that they should be replaced by a new contractual agreement. The Western Foreign Ministers, on the other hand, had made it clear that they regarded these rights as inalienable. Mr. Gromyko had rejected the idea that West and East Berlin were on the same footing. He had said that East Berlin was the capital of the D.D.R. He had, however, maintained that the Federal Republic was not entitled to the same rights in Berlin as those which in his view the D.D.R. enjoyed in East Berlin. Mr. Gromyko had said that a symbolic number of Soviet troops could be stationed in West Berlin. But he had not agreed that the arrangements for stationing troops of the Four Powers could be put upon an all-Berlin basis.

M. Couve de Murville said that, since it was the Soviet Government who had raised the Berlin question in its present form, it would be appropriate for Mr. Gromyko to explain his views. If the Foreign Ministers were to make progress on the Berlin question, they should continue to discuss it privately. The Western Foreign Ministers were ready for such discussions.

M. Couve de Murville thought that discussion might proceed on the following basis:

(a) The Soviet Government had expressed anxiety about the abnormal situation in Berlin which, it said, might give rise to incidents. The Western Foreign Ministers were ready to discuss what could be done to remove the possibility of such incidents taking place.

(b) Mr. Gromyko must accept the fact, arising out of historical events, that the Western Powers had a special juridical position in Berlin. This position could only be altered by German reunification and the conclusion of a German Peace Treaty, events which might be some distance away in the future. It must be understood that the Western position in these matters was absolutely firm.

Mr. Lloyd said that Mr. Gromyko had based his argument for altering the status of West Berlin upon four points:

- (a) the geographical situation of Berlin;
- (b) the abnormality of the continued occupation of Berlin;
- (c) the danger of incidents;
- (d) "subversive" activities, etc.

The facts of geography could not be altered. But points (b), (c) and (d) presented material for discussion. As regards the danger of incidents, Mr. Lloyd thought that it was reduced by the presence of Western troops. As he saw it, the crux of the Soviet position was the argument that the lapse of time had made the occupation of Berlin obsolete. This was not of course the view of the Western Powers, who could not accept that any one of the Four Powers could terminate Four Power agreements by unilateral action. This difference of view did not, however, mean that it was not possible or desirable to seek a *modus vivendi* or an interim solution pending German reunification.

Any unilateral denunciation of the Four Power agreements would strike at the basis of the confidence between the Great Powers and remove the possibility of lessening tension between them. The question at issue was how to take the heat out of the Berlin problem without striking such a blow at confidence and thus to make interim arrangements conducive to peace and security.

Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government was not proposing to take unilateral action. It had submitted its proposals for discussion. Otherwise he would not be at the Geneva Conference. The Soviet Government desired to reach agreement with the other Three Powers. Nevertheless, if no such agreement could be reached, the Soviet Government would be obliged to cease exercising certain of its functions in Germany, which would then certainly be taken over by the D.D.R.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd suggested that certain objectives were common to all four Governments, namely:

- (a) the West Berliners should have the social order which they themselves preferred;
- (b) there should be free access to West Berlin both for persons and for goods.

Mr. Gromyko indicated agreement.

Mr. Lloyd said that the question was how these objectives could be secured. The Western Governments said that only the presence of Western troops in Berlin could maintain the freedom and confidence of the Berliners. The Soviet Government had said that the Western troops should be joined by Soviet troops in West Berlin. Mr. Lloyd did not see the point of this proposal. Its logical counterpart would be the presence

of Western troops in East Berlin. If, as he understood, Mr. Gromyko considered that the presence of Western troops in West Berlin was symbolic, why did he object to them being there?

Mr. Gromyko said that he had explained in the aircraft what his views were on this question of the status of East Berlin. He had nothing to add.

Mr. Herter said that the presence of Soviet troops in East Berlin was symbolic, just as the presence of Western troops in West Berlin was symbolic. If the Soviet Government chose to withdraw their troops from East Berlin, there was no way of stopping them, but such a withdrawal would not alter the status of East Berlin.

Mr. Lloyd drew attention to the presence in Berlin of Four Power organs, e.g. Spandau and the Air Control Centre.

M. Couve de Murville asked what arguments Mr. Gromyko adduced in favour of his suggestion that Soviet troops might join Western troops in West Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko said that this proposal was intended to be a compromise. But the best solution in the view of the Soviet Government would be the complete withdrawal of all Western troops from West Berlin and the creation of a free and demilitarised city of West Berlin.

M. Couve de Murville argued that West Berlin was in practice already demilitarised. The United States, French and United Kingdom garrisons in West Berlin were small and symbolic. The Western Governments were prepared to say that these garrisons were not there for military purposes. There were no German forces in West Berlin. The city was governed by a German administration. The practical effect was that West Berlin was a free and neutral city. Did not these arrangements meet Mr. Gromyko's point?

Mr. Gromyko asked why, if this was the situation, it was necessary for the Western troops [*Powers*] to keep any troops at all in West Berlin.

M. Couve de Murville said that one reason why the Western Powers kept troops in West Berlin was because they had the undoubted right to do so.

Mr. Lloyd said that the Western Powers kept troops in the city because it preserved the confidence of the West Berliners and the maintenance of the way of life which they had freely chosen.

Mr. Gromyko said that so long as Western troops were kept in West Berlin, the occupation was continued. The strength of Western troops was irrelevant. Would not the Western Powers agree to replace their troops by neutral troops?

M. Couve de Murville asked whether, according to Mr. Gromyko's reasons, even the presence of neutral troops would not constitute occu-

pation. There was no question of Western troops interfering in the political life of West Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko said that the mere presence of Western troops constituted such interference.

M. Couve de Murville asked whether Mr. Gromyko thought that, if Western troops were removed from West Berlin, the present regime and social order in West Berlin would change. He also asked whether it was Mr. Gromyko's intention to suggest that a "free city" of West Berlin should be created by agreement between the Soviet Government and the three Western Governments.

Mr. Gromyko confirmed that that was his intention. There were, however, different forms which such an agreement could take.

M. Couve de Murville said that he considered that West Berlin already enjoyed guarantees from the Four Powers under the Quadripartite Agreements. At any rate, such guarantees continued to operate unless the Agreements were unilaterally denounced.

Mr. Herter said that the West Berliners were a free people. They had indicated by a free vote that they wished to preserve the symbolic presence of Western troops in West Berlin. The inconsistency in the Soviet position was the Soviet Government's denial of a similar choice to the East Berliners. The mere fact of this denial was a source of anxiety to the West Berliners.

Turning to the question of access to Berlin, Mr. Herter said that the Western Governments had accepted in good faith Mr. Gromyko's statement about the willingness of the Soviet Government to give guarantees on this subject.

M. Couve de Murville said that there was free access to West Berlin at present. It was therefore a question of how to maintain what already existed.

Mr. Gromyko agreed, but said that it was a question of working out the necessary guarantees. An agreement could be reached between the Four Powers for jointly guaranteeing access. The D.D.R. could be associated with such an agreement in an appropriate form.

Mr. Herter asked what would happen if the D.D.R. officials interfered with free access in any way.

Mr. Gromyko said that, in that case, it would be the joint responsibility of the Four Powers to restore the situation.

Summing up the conversation, M. Couve de Murville said that there were three main points of difference between the Soviet Government and the Western Governments:

- (a) the continuance of the occupation status;
- (b) the Soviet suggestion for stationing of troops in West Berlin;
- (c) the Soviet proposal for the creation of a "free city".

Mr. Herter raised the question of East Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko said that East Berlin was part of the D.D.R. There was no occupation regime there.

Mr. Herter said that an occupation regime existed in East Berlin even if the Soviet Government did not choose to exercise its occupation functions. He asked whether it was not a fact that, when the Soviet Union had made an agreement with the D.D.R., that agreement had provided for a different status for East Berlin. He did not see why it was necessary for the D.D.R. to have their capital in East Berlin. Why could they not choose Dresden or Leipzig?

Mr. Gromyko said that the D.D.R. had exercised its sovereign right to choose its own capital and had chosen East Berlin.

Mr. Couve de Murville said that the Soviet proposal for a "free city" was a proposal for making West Berlin an independent state. Was it the intention of the Soviet Government to create an East German state? If so, this was a concept which the Western Powers must reject.

Mr. Gromyko said that it was not a question of creating a third state. It was a question of interference or non-interference. When he spoke of the independence of a free city of West Berlin, what he meant was non-interference.

Mr. Lloyd asked whether there were any aspects of the relationship between the Federal Republic and West Berlin to which the Soviet Government objected. For instance, did Mr. Gromyko object to West Berlin being in the same currency area as the Federal Republic?

Mr. Gromyko said that he did not object to that. But he repeated that there should be no interference with West Berlin. He equated both the presence of Western troops and the continuance of the occupation regime with interference. If the Western Powers wished to have guarantees in respect of West Berlin, for instance as regards access, it was open to them to make suggestions.

Mr. Herter said that he thought it would be valuable if suggestions on this subject could be put down in writing as a basis for discussion.³

³ In Cahto 44, May 30 at noon, Herter cabled the following impression of this conversation:

"Private meeting at Lloyd's villa 5 to 7 p.m. May 29 continued aircraft discussion of Berlin. McElroy and Merchant with me. No progress made. If anything Gromyko hardened his line as contrasted to plane talk." (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-3059)

342. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, May 30, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 149. Paris pass USRO. Thirteenth Session held May 30, 2:30–5:05 p.m., Lloyd in chair. Gromyko opened with forty-minute statement on Berlin¹ containing no new points. Said: Important end abnormal situation West Berlin; change in situation since 1945 has eliminated basis for continued occupation; West Berlin cannot continue as base Western intelligence operations (Gromyko mentioned “subversive” activities RIAS); danger serious incidents arises through presence occupation troops in proximity to Russian and German troops; German rights should be reestablished in West Berlin and unlimited powers of three Allies must be ended (Gromyko quoted order of May 5, 1955,² enabling powers cancel acts West Berlin Council under certain circumstances); task of conference is to work out solution of West Berlin problem in furtherance peace and consistent with interests countries concerned. Concluded Western proposals completely unacceptable and asked how USSR, which ended occupation of East Germany, could be expected agree continuation occupation West Berlin and even extension to East Berlin?

After noting he had discussed Soviet position on Berlin in Geneva and on plane back from United States, Gromyko reviewed Soviet proposals for “free city,” arguing they take account of different social order this enclave in GDR and furnish firm legal basis for West Berlin. Said USSR ready to exchange views on way UN could be drawn in and GDR ready to guarantee West Berlin status and free access to West. There would be supervisory standing committee of four powers and GDR. Stated USSR wished improve economic situation West Berlin by furnishing food and raw materials in exchange for manufactures but wished no monopoly. Alleged economic development West Berlin lags well behind rest of Germany as compared with 1936.

Soviet proposals not detrimental to interests or prestige of states concerned. Not true, as alleged, that USSR will seize or blockade West

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–3059. Official Use Only; Priority. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/13 (Corrected), and summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/13, May 30, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1362.

¹ For text of Gromyko’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/29, May 30, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 214–225; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 120–128; or *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 641–650.

² For text of the Declaration on Berlin, May 26, 1952, which entered into effect on May 5, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1246–1248.

Berlin. Establishment free city not ideal situation which would be extension GDR sovereignty to West Berlin. Hence acceptance by West not a concession to USSR. Free city would exist only until reunification of Germany and would assist in rapprochement between GDR and Federal Republic.

Lloyd, in twenty minute rebuttal,³ pointed out abnormal situation Berlin only reflection of abnormal situation Germany which could be ended by Western peace plan. Re Soviet contention presence Western troops increased tension, Lloyd stated troops there not for warlike purposes but as symbols Western interest and Berliners overwhelmingly desired continued presence as evidenced by results latest elections. East-West tensions not caused by Berlin and in fact it good example peaceful coexistence with no serious incidents in ten years. Re Soviet contention West Berlin a NATO spearhead, Lloyd contrasted ten thousand Allied troops with twenty times that number Soviet troops in East Germany alone. Dismissed Soviet picture of economic bliss in East Germany as compared with West Berlin penury as mere propaganda. Observed Soviets say they are disturbed by "subversive" activities in West Berlin but West has complaints on that score also. Remarked that no doubt Gromyko maintained agreement to "free city" proposal would not be concession by West in order introduce light note in discussions.

Lloyd could not see why Soviets dissatisfied with present situation since Soviets profess to desire maintenance West Berlin social and economic way of life. Presence Western troops necessary to reassure West Berliners. Since West cannot agree to Soviet proposals and Soviets reject Western proposals re interim solution for Berlin which advanced to meet Soviet concern, then present basic situation should continue with some improvements.

Couve supplemented Lloyd's rebuttal in twenty-minute statement.⁴ Said Soviets contend situation Berlin a cause of tension. However, present situation seriously disturbed once in fourteen years, i.e., blockade. This not result of local incident or agitation but of Soviet action. Soviets abruptly raised Berlin question six months ago and several times since although no previous Soviet démarche that Berlin was threat to peace. At same time, Soviets made "free city" proposal they also threatened turn over their responsibilities re access, etc. to GDR and we still hear this threat, although not from Gromyko. Would appreciate clarification. Couve said Soviets should know West does not agree with Soviet premise Berlin occupation must be concluded. West has not re-

³ For text of Lloyd's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/30, May 30, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 225–229 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 128–132.

⁴ For text of Couve de Murville's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/40, June 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 229–233 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 132–135.

quested change in situation but willing in true spirit of compromise to listen to Soviet proposals. But "free city" proposal would create third German state which would eventually be absorbed by GDR and behind GDR is USSR. In this connection Gromyko remark that best solution would be absorption by GDR was food for serious thought.

Since nobody else wished speak, Chairman stated next meeting would be at time to be decided by Ministers.

Herter

**343. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, May 30, 1959, 7 p.m.

Secto 148. From the Secretary. After plenary session today I met with Lloyd, Couve and von Brentano with two or three advisers each. I presented following to which all agreed.

"After dinner tonight with Gromyko I think we should go back at Gromyko on our plan for uniting Berlin and also re-emphasize that we are still talking within the framework of the Western Peace Plan which contemplates only an interim solution for Berlin pending reunification.

I think we should also summarize the situation along the following lines.

The three Western powers jointly make the following points:

1. They will not give up their rights of occupation in Berlin with unhindered access thereto.
2. They will not withdraw their military forces from West Berlin.
3. They have no intention of recognizing the DDR.
4. If the Soviets unilaterally break their existing agreements with the Western powers or assert that they can transfer their obligations to the DDR or otherwise impair the legal rights of the Western powers, then it would seem futile for the Western powers to enter into any agreement in future with the Soviet Union on any matter where the agreement was dependent on good faith rather than being completely

self-enforcing. With respect to West Berlin, under such circumstances, they will retain and exercise their rights which cannot be impaired by any such unilateral action.

5. There are other aspects of the Berlin situation which are negotiable on a basis of reciprocity. We would welcome arrangements which would reduce the Soviet expressed fear of 'incidents' and clarify the terms under which our rights are exercised, including in particular normal civilian intercourse for goods and people between West Berlin and the Federal Republic by all modes of transport.

Obviously the introduction of even 'symbolic' Soviet forces into West Berlin would be unacceptable. If 'symbolic' Soviet forces are to remain in Berlin, the place for them is East Berlin."

Herter

344. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/67

Geneva, May 30, 1959.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Thompson

U.S.S.R.

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Malik
Mr. Pervoukhine
Mr. Soldatov
Mr. Groubyakov

United Kingdom

Mr. Lloyd
Sir Gladwyn Jebb
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Laskey

France

M. Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
Ambassador de Jean

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Herter on June 1. The meeting was held at Gromyko's residence following a dinner given by Gromyko at 8 p.m. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 57 from Geneva, June 1. (*Ibid.*, CF 1327)

SUBJECT

Discussion of Soviet-Western Differences Concerning Berlin

Mr. Gromyko opened the discussion after dinner by stating that in the talks on the plane returning from Washington and at the private meeting held the day before he had done most of the talking. He would like now to hear more of the views of the other Ministers. The Secretary pointed out that Gromyko had said he could not talk about certain proposals we had made. There were certain things that we could not discuss. Where did that leave us? The Soviets had raised the question of Berlin and we had in good faith made proposals which Gromyko now said he could not even discuss.

Gromyko interrupted to state that there were some things we could discuss later on. He had already mentioned two or three points. These included: (1) disarmament; (2) a zone; and (3) a non-aggression pact. In describing his list, he at one point mentioned a commission whereupon Pervoukhine and Soldatov immediately said "no" in Russian several times. Gromyko continued that they could not accept our proposals on Berlin as a basis for discussion and they would not discuss the extension of an occupation regime to East Berlin. East Berlin was part of the GDR. The Secretary said then it was perhaps better to discuss what the Western Powers would not discuss and then we would know what area was left in which a possible agreement could be sought.

Gromyko said that he could not agree that everything was all right in West Berlin. The Western Ministers had spoken of improvements in the present situation. He would like to know specifically what they had in mind.

The Secretary said he was asking us to give up our rights in Berlin. We would not do this even if our troops there were only symbolic. If the Soviets tried unilaterally to deprive us of our rights, no treaty with the Soviet Union would ever be any good.

Gromyko said he did not understand the Secretary's logic. The Soviets had raised the question in order to discuss it. This was not unilateral action. He denied that he had threatened unilateral action.

The Secretary said that both Gromyko and Khrushchev had said that if we did not agree to Soviet proposals, they would take unilateral action.

Gromyko pointed out that they were now in the process of negotiation.

The Secretary replied that the Russians said our proposals were unacceptable and could not be discussed.

Mr. Gromyko said this was true when we talked about East Berlin. He asked if we wanted them to introduce an occupation regime in East

Berlin. The Secretary said that they had an occupation regime there now.

Mr. Gromyko denied this, stating that they were fulfilling certain functions between Berlin and West Germany and there were certain rudiments remaining from the time when there had been an occupation regime in East Berlin. They had a military commandant in East Berlin who was concerned with certain functions of liaison with the Soviet Army but had nothing to do with civilian authorities. They did fulfill functions in connection with communications. This was in the Western interest. The Secretary asked if this was not what the Soviets had agreed to do.

Gromyko agreed this was so.

The Secretary said they had then tried to destroy this with the blockade. We had lived in peace in Berlin for ten years, now they wished to change the whole regime. The Soviets had created the East German Government but it had no authority. Mr. Gromyko had undertaken to see what the East German Government would do if an agreement was reached. It was perfectly clear that the GDR was the child of the Russians. Mr. Gromyko said with some heat that he rejected the Secretary's words and asked him not to put such interpretation on words in his presence. It would be better to use them with respect to the West German Government. He had made his statement about East Germany because they had discussed the matter with the East Germans and knew what they were prepared to do.

The Secretary said that the East Germans and the Soviets were the same thing. There had never been any real elections in East Germany. The East Germans spoke for the Russians. It was better that the Russians spoke for both.

Gromyko said we had not come here to discuss elections but to discuss problems between us. He urged that we keep the discussion on this basis.

The Secretary said he had asked us to be frank and we were being so with respect to the GDR. The Soviets wanted us to recognize the GDR as a state.

Gromyko said that was up to us.

Malik interjected that we had not recognized the Soviet Union for 16 years. The Secretary said we were being frank in talking in realities. He asked if it were not true that the Soviets wanted us to recognize East Germany as a state.

Gromyko pointed out that East Germany existed. This problem had many sides but a discussion of this matter could lead too far. He suggested we not talk about ideology or internal matters but about problems between us.

The Secretary inquired how long the East Germans represented at this Conference would last in office if they said or did anything contrary to Russian wishes. He agreed, however, to drop the subject. Gromyko again suggested that we not discuss ideological matters. He inquired whether we thought the Soviets could make concession after concession and the Western Powers going on saying that the occupation regime was all right. The Soviets had expressed their willingness to negotiate but this was perhaps not understood correctly. The Western position seemed to be to stand on the same position and wait without making any change.

Couve de Murville said the Western Powers could have taken this position but they had not. The Soviets had raised the question of Berlin and we had answered we were ready to listen and to try to understand and see what we could do to alleviate Soviet doubts and fears. The Secretary had said we could not give up our rights or remove our garrisons. Now what could be done?

Mr. Gromyko asked if this meant that everything was good in West Berlin. Couve said that we did not complain. Gromyko said the Russians did.

Selwyn Lloyd interjected to inquire what they complained of. He saw problems for them and for us as well. We must look to see what is practical. We cannot convince them and they cannot convince us. What could be done to improve the situation that lasted for ten years and was not too bad. Gromyko on the plane had said that certain things were of no great importance. In a speech today in full session, he had said they were very important. We also had complaints. The situation about our communications was not very clear. He asked Gromyko to believe that our approach was serious. We wished to know what could be done to improve the situation.

Gromyko pointed out that Lloyd and Couve had said the situation was not normal and could be improved (the Secretary had not said so). How could it be improved and how far would the West go? What did we mean when we said the activities of certain agencies could be changed? RIAS was not the principal question. Lloyd said we agreed the situation was abnormal and until Germany was reunited, we agreed on a number of things, such as reunification at some time, free elections at some time and a peace treaty at some time. He suggested we analyze the situation of Berlin. There were things to say on both sides. How could 10,000 Western troops be a threat? Were they a political threat to the USSR? If so, this could be examined.

Gromyko said Lloyd had mentioned political, military, propaganda and economic matters. He wanted to know what we had in mind.

Couve said we wanted to know what worried the Russians.

Gromyko asked if he had not said enough already. Lloyd said he had not done so specifically.

The Secretary said we could make progress if we could go forward with the Soviets admitting that we had rights flowing from the war which we retained and to examine matters within that framework. Within these limits we could talk about improvements. The Soviets wanted us to give up our rights.

Gromyko admitted we had rights that grew out of the war but said that 14 years had passed and certain changes had taken place in Germany. The West does not attach importance to these changes.

Lloyd said that speaking frankly and for himself, we wanted the Soviets to reaffirm our rights of access and the rights of the West Berliners to their own form of life. What he thought the Soviets had a right to expect from us was to examine Berlin to see if it is a political or military threat to the Soviets. Ten thousand troops were only symbolic. We were prepared to look at the propaganda and subversive aspects.

Gromyko replied that it was impossible to separate the political and military aspects. The occupation regime itself and the presence of troops was itself a political factor.

The Secretary inquired whether the Soviet troops in East Germany influenced the GDR.

Mr. Gromyko said if the Secretary insisted on this kind of talk he would have to raise the question of U.S. troops in the Federal Republic. He suggested they confine the subject of discussion.

Lloyd asked if Gromyko disputed what he had said.

Gromyko replied that his remarks were too general.

Couve inquired what was of first importance.

Gromyko replied that the occupational regime and the presence of Western troops was of primary importance.

Couve pointed out we had said we could not change that.

The Secretary observed that the Soviets wanted us to give up our rights. What did they offer in exchange? He suggested we talk upon the basis of the maintenance of Western rights.

Lloyd said the presence of troops was of no military threat. So far as occupation was concerned, we were committed to that until Germany was reunified. The point of substance was whether or not we could make things easier for one another.

The Secretary said we desired to lessen tension for a temporary period.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to be specific.

The Secretary said we could talk within the framework of maintaining our rights and retaining our troops, although the numbers of troops

could be reviewed. Lloyd suggested we look at the military and political aspects. The military were not a threat. He could see the possibility of a political threat.

The Secretary pointed out this worked both ways.

Gromyko said that whether there were 100 or 10,000 troops was not important and the presence of any troops was of significance. From a military point of view and in looking at the possibility of a military threat, the more troops we had in Berlin the better from the Soviet point of view, although they did not like to see this.

Lloyd observed that this then was the end of the idea that the three power troops were any military threat.

The Secretary pointed out that our troops were in Berlin only to give the Berliners assurance that they could continue to live as they wanted to live. Mr. Gromyko himself had said this and we agreed with it. Mr. Gromyko denied he had made such a statement. Gromyko said we did not need troops from a military point of view but kept them to maintain an occupational regime.

The Secretary asked if the Soviets wanted our troops out so that they could influence West Berlin. Gromyko said they did not want any interference from anyone in the life of West Berlin. No one could determine the internal system in the presence of foreign troops.

Couve pointed out that these troops were an insurance against incidents.

Gromyko asked why we kept troops if we were not worried about internal order in West Berlin. Gromyko asked if this meant that we wished to keep the present order unchanged. If so, this meant to maintain a constant threat.

Lloyd pointed out that Berlin was an island and this was the reason for our troops. The Berliners wanted them as a tangible sign that we would do what we said we would do.

The Secretary said he had a practical suggestion to make. We could meet on Monday and discuss what could be done to relieve Soviet fears and political tension in the context of Western maintenance of their rights and their troops. The Secretary said that Gromyko should also listen to our complaints.

Gromyko asked him not to raise questions of ideology.

The Secretary agreed.

It was agreed to meet at the Soviet villa at 3:30 p.m. on Monday, June 1.

345. Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers did not meet on Sunday, May 31.

346. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, June 1, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING

PRESENT

The Secretary	Mr. Irwin
Secretary McElroy	Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Smith
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Becker	Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Berding	

U.S. Activities in Berlin

1. Secretary McElroy said he thought we should evaluate the importance to us of our activities in Berlin that are offensive to the Soviets. Any yielding of our positions in Berlin should be clearly balanced by the Soviets' granting something more than the rights we already possess. Secretary McElroy thought it would be hard for us to work in Berlin with any general restraint placed on our activities. Mr. McElroy commented that Lloyd's ideas, if followed through to their conclusion, were "chilling." The Secretary said that this subject would be discussed at today's private meeting with the Soviets.¹ He noted that at the Sunday meeting at his villa² there had been a detailed discussion of our activities

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1363. Secret. Drafted by James. The meeting was held in Conference Room 209 of the Consulate General Annex.

¹ See Document 348.

² Herter met with Thompson, Merchant, Irwin, and others at 5 p.m. May 31 to discuss Western and Communist intelligence activities in Berlin and, in particular, the two papers referred to in footnote 1, Document 348. No record of this meeting beyond the notation in the chronology has been found. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1362, Chronology for May 30 and May 31)

in Berlin. In this connection he stated that Mr. Gufler will be coming to Geneva from Berlin tomorrow.

Approach by DDR Representatives

2. Mr. Merchant noted that representatives of the DDR had approached Mr. Becker this morning asking that he clarify for them certain legal points made by the Secretary in his presentations. Mr. Becker, Mr. Merchant said, had properly stated that he was unable to receive the East German representatives.

East German Attacks on Western Delegations

3. Mr. Merchant called attention to a pamphlet referred to in today's *Journal de Geneve* which apparently was improperly distributed by the DDR through Maison de la Presse and which attacked the Western Delegations. It was noted that the West Germans have made representations on this matter to Bern.

Tactics for Today's Meeting

4. At today's meeting of the Deputies³ there will be a discussion of the statement prepared for the Secretary on Berlin in which Communist charges of improper U.S. activities in Berlin are refuted by citations of Communist activities inimical to the West. The Secretary indicated his approval of discussing the paper with our allies but not giving copies to them.

Mr. Merchant suggested that the three Western Foreign Ministers rotate the responsibility of keeping von Brentano informed of the restricted sessions and the Secretary indicated his approval. The Secretary said that at today's private meeting he thought it important to refute Gromyko's charges that Western activities in Berlin are a danger to East Berlin. In response to the Secretary's inquiry, Mr. Bundy indicated that our data on Communist activities could be used without compromising sources. Mr. Bundy suggested that it might be desirable to avoid going into too much detail on intelligence activities in Berlin lest we open ourselves up to a Communist suggestion that there be a general agreement to stop all such activities. He thought that we could show in capsule form that the East is doing much more than we in the intelligence and espionage field. Ambassador Thompson said that he thought that in these meetings we should constantly keep going back to a discussion of Berlin within the framework of the Western Plan.⁴ Mr. Merchant said

³ See Document 347.

⁴ Reference is to the May 14 Western Peace Plan; see footnote 1, Document 295.

that a meeting of the Western Four at the French Villa had been arranged for 11:30 this morning⁵ and the Secretary indicated his agreement.

[Here follow paragraphs 5 and 6 on unrelated subjects.]

Berlin

7. Mr. Smith cited a telegram from Berlin,⁶ expressing the view that the Soviets appear to be primarily interested in the relationship of Berlin and the Federal Republic. Mr. Smith thought that we should give careful study to the possibility that the Soviets might make a satisfactory arrangement on access to Berlin while attempting to prepare the way for severing connections between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. In this connection Mr. Merchant thought that we might study the possibility of the three occupying powers' removing the suspense order which prevents West Berlin from being the tenth German *land*. Mr. Smith cited a report⁷ that Brandt had said present German civilian access to Berlin is a question to be regulated by the Germans working under the Four Powers. The Secretary commented that the West Germans endorsed the idea of a German commission, provided it is composed of representatives of the East and West Berlin city governments and not of representatives from the Federal Republic and the DDR.

Press Reaction to Conference

8. Noting that the press has picked up references by Lloyd and Couve to the "Free City" proposal of the Soviets for Berlin, Mr. Berding said that Western use of Soviet terminology is giving the impression that all the Soviets want in Berlin is a free city. He asked that different phraseology be used. Mr. Berding continued that Lloyd gave the impression in his speech Saturday⁸ that we are willing to make a number of unilateral concessions to stay in Berlin. As far as the propaganda field is concerned, this kind of talk is having a bad effect on the morale of RIAS employees. Since RIAS, according to Mr. Berding, indicates to many Berliners U.S. presence in Berlin even more graphically than U.S. troops, there is a feeling that if RIAS goes the U.S. will go too. The Secretary thought it would be desirable at the next plenary to go on the offensive

⁵ In a very brief report on this meeting the U.S. Delegation noted that it was agreed that Herter would "spell out" Western complaints about undesirable activities in East Berlin and press Gromyko to be more specific about his complaints on the dangerous situation in West Berlin. (Secto 153 from Geneva, June 1; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-159)

⁶ Telegram 1022 from Berlin, May 30, noted that recent statements by Ulbricht and other East German officials had stressed the free city of Berlin proposal, which seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union wanted to sever West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/5-3059)

⁷ Not further identified.

⁸ See Document 344.

and point out what the East is doing in respect to propaganda and to comment on the role of RIAS in West Berlin. He agreed that Lloyd had gone pretty far on Saturday in his speech. Mr. Reinhardt stated that the passages in the speech on possible discussion of Western propaganda activities in West Berlin had been kept in despite the advice of Hancock and Rumbold.

[Here follows paragraph 9 on an unrelated subject.]

347. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/68

Geneva, June 1, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Mr. Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Berding
Mr. Irwin
Mr. Becker
Mr. Hillenbrand

France

Mr. Lucet
Mr. Laloy
Mr. Baraduc
Mr. Froment-Meurice
Mr. Soutou
Mr. Legendre
Mr. de Beaumarchais
Ambassador De Jean

United Kingdom

Sir Anthony Rumbold
Sir Gladwyn Jebb
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Drinkall
Mr. Ledwidge
Mr. Hope
Mr. Wilkinson

Federal Republic

Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Duckwitz
Mr. Oncken

SUBJECT

Tentative Conclusions on Tactical and Other Conference Problems

The following recommendations were reached by the Four Power Coordinating Group:

1. The three participating Western Foreign Ministers in private talks with Gromyko will rotate the task of getting in touch with Von

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and concurred in by Merchant. The meeting was held in the French Delegation Office.

Brentano or Grewe to keep the West German Delegation informed. In view of the French-British dinner tonight, the United States will undertake the task today.

2. At this afternoon's private meeting the Western Powers will attempt to avoid having the discussion revolve further around the question of why the Soviets desire to change the basic status of West Berlin but instead concentrate on presentation of mutual complaints about "undesirable activities" in East and West Berlin. The Western Foreign Ministers should have in mind the desirability of avoiding seeming to admit guilt on our part as a trading point against some arrangements on access.

3. Since the Western correspondents are tending to pick up the Soviet phrase "Free City" as a description for the Soviet proposals on Berlin, Western spokesmen should avoid adding fuel to this tendency to use a term with rather inviting connotations. One possibility suggested was "Plan for a Third Germany".

4. After some discussion, it was agreed that it would be undesirable to raise the question of Western complaints on access this afternoon. An effort should be made instead to concentrate on complaints about the situation in Berlin itself.

5. If it seems appropriate in the light of the discussion this afternoon, the question of a Conciliation Commission for Berlin might be raised. However, if this is done, the initial suggestion should be limited to one for a Commission to be constituted solely by the Four Powers.

6. It was agreed that it would probably be desirable to have a further plenary session by the middle of this week, but it was felt that the timing could be best determined after this afternoon's discussion. At such plenary session, Ambassador Grewe would give a speech which he has prepared commenting on a number of points raised during the first weeks of the Conference.

7. In a statement which he said he wished to make in order to bring U.S. views to the attention of the other country representatives present, Mr. Merchant pointed out that we considered RIAS to be a major Western asset in Berlin. Since the time of the blockade, it had been identified in a unique way with free world resistance to Soviet attempts to end the city's freedom, and its demise would have great symbolic significance. Hence we did not consider RIAS a barterable object. Grewe supported these views.

348. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/69

Geneva, June 1, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Thompson

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Mr. Lucet
Mr. Laloy
Mr. Andronikov
Mr. de Jean

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. P.F. Hancock
Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Soldatov
Two interpreters

SUBJECT

Berlin

The meeting started informally with Gromyko's reference to the fact that in these informal meetings there was no Chairman.

The Secretary then said that he wished to speak on the subject of subversive activities and inflammatory propaganda originating in East Berlin and directed against West Berlin and the Federal Republic. He referred to the campaign of vilification which was being conducted by the official East German press and radio during the course of the conference. He said attacks were not confined to West German personalities and that he himself had not been omitted from attention in the slanderous and scurrilous attack. He then said that he would read a statement in which he would cite chapter and verse, adding that he could amplify if necessary and that it was his intention in a later plenary session to repeat his statement for the benefit of the public.

He then read the two attached statements¹ seriatim, interpolating twice during the reading. His first interpolation was to read the text of

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter on June 2. The meeting was held at Gromyko's residence. A brief summary of this conversation was transmitted in Cahto 59 from Geneva, June 1. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/6-159)

¹ Neither printed. The first was a four-page paper entitled "Talking Points on Communist Activities in East Berlin," May 31, and the second was a five-page paper that outlined intelligence agencies in East Germany and kidnappings of West Berliners.

Gufler's telegram of May 26, No. 36 from Berlin.² His second interpolation was to read certain extracts from the compilation of attacks on the Federal Republic and Dr. von Brentano in particular in the official DDR newspaper.

In concluding, the Secretary said that his statement supports the contention that there is a massive effort originating in East Berlin to increase tensions both between East Berlin and West Berlin and between the Soviet Union and the West. He said that we were willing to do our share to relax tensions but he thought that Mr. Gromyko would agree that it was not possible to lay all the blame for tensions on the doorstep of West Berlin.

Gromyko, who had sat stony-faced through the recital, seemed to a degree at a loss as to how best to reply. He opened by saying that our people who had worked on these papers had obviously done much work. As to these actions and statements which the Secretary ascribed to the East Berlin press and radio and certain DDR authorities, he was not in a position to speak for them. It was better that they should answer for themselves. He could not refrain, however, from recalling the old military axiom that the best defense is a good offense.

Gromyko continued that he did not want to suggest, however, in talking about West Berlin some were on the offense and some on the defense. He then asked rhetorically whether we should take this road down which Mr. Herter was attempting to lead us. Should Gromyko himself prepare and similarly read material from broadcasts and newspapers in West Berlin and the Federal Republic about the Soviets? Then we would see on whose side are the most striking facts. The question was should we stoop so low or act as statesmen and seek to reach an understanding. Gromyko said that he had no material at hand at the moment but promised that when he collected it it would be several times longer than Mr. Herter's list.

Gromyko concluded by saying that if we are to deal with these questions then when we summarize our talk on West Berlin we could say that both East and West Berlin should assume certain obligations not to do things to increase tensions. In conclusion he said that questions of propaganda and subversion were not one of the principal questions to be considered. This problem ranked in fourth or fifth or even sixth place.

The Secretary said that he had raised this matter because it had been Gromyko himself who had first raised the question and in public.

Gromyko replied that they do attach importance to it, to which the Secretary rejoined, "So do we."

² This telegram transmitted East German radio broadcasts that attacked Western leaders. (Department of State, Central Files, 962B.40/5-2659)

Gromyko then said that the Soviets had raised the matter in connection with the non-tolerance of subversive actions originating in Berlin but that it could be inferred from the Secretary's statement that he intended to broaden the subject of discussion to questions of ideology in which case no solution would be possible for any of them. The Secretary replied that he had raised nothing whatsoever of an ideological nature. Gromyko had said in previous meetings that there was a risk of incidents in Berlin. If, as Gromyko now says, this question rates only fourth, fifth or sixth place, then it were better to consider the more important areas where the risk of incidents existed.

Gromyko said that the main question and the main risk of incidents lies in the presence of Western troops in West Berlin. There is danger in the occupation status. Incidents arising from the presence of the troops are different from what might be "improper" broadcasts. It was true that there had been no incidents recently but everyone knows that an explosion is preceded by silence. It was necessary that the conference come to an agreement. He asked if the discussion could not now be returned to the main road on the exchange of views on the main problems. He reminded the Secretary that on Saturday night³ he had asked for an explanation of the Secretary's point of view on the matters we were discussing.

The Secretary rejoined that they had been on a bypath to which Mr. Gromyko had led them. Possibly the entire subject of subversion and propaganda should now be forgotten as of no importance. The Secretary then went on to say that on the main question we are prepared to talk within limits. These limits are, first, that we will not give up our rights, including the presence of our troops in Berlin, though it would be possible to talk about ceilings on them. Gromyko himself had agreed that they had no military significance. They were in Berlin as protection for the life of West Berlin. Secondly, the Secretary said we will not recognize the DDR. The third point is the question of access. On this we have an agreement with the Russians and Mr. Herter said that he assumed from what Gromyko had said in recent days the Soviets did not intend to act unilaterally with respect to this agreement. Within these limits we are ready and anxious to talk with a view to reducing differences and tensions.

Gromyko replied that there was constant repetition of the formula that the West would not give up its rights, but what was meant when they spoke of changes while retaining the rights. He pled for frankness.

The Secretary said we have made a fair proposal for all of Berlin which is a property apart from either East or West Germany. The occupying powers in effect hold it in trust for a future reunited Germany. We

³ See Document 344.

have rights there which the Soviets admit. You have a responsibility in East Berlin. You admit that Germany should be united and Berlin established as its capital. Nevertheless you say that East Berlin is now the capital of the DDR and it is impermissible to talk about it. Gromyko replied that he had nothing to add to what he had already said concerning the Western all-Berlin proposal. East Berlin is not Soviet territory and the Soviets do not intend to reintroduce an occupation regime.

Couve de Murville interjected that after two weeks' talk on Germany we had now been discussing Berlin but all that Gromyko wants to talk about is West Berlin. If this is the fact then here is the West's position on West Berlin. We intend to keep our present position in West Berlin both juridically and in so far as troops are concerned. If there is anything that worries the Soviets we are prepared to discuss it and see what can be done. We are agreed that the garrisons pose no military threat. Their presence is symbolic and psychological.

Couve went on to say that there appeared to be a misunderstanding. Gromyko had said that the West had not made its position or proposals clear but the Western Powers have nothing more in mind than what they have already said. They have been frank and open and are prepared to look at whatever troubles the Soviets.

Gromyko asked for further elaboration and Couve de Murville replied if there is no settlement on Greater Berlin then the three Western Powers will keep their rights in West Berlin with its autonomous regime and maintain their troops there. West Berlin is economically linked to the Federal Republic and must remain so. We have a Four Power agreement with the Soviets on access for both civilian movements and the garrisons. We think we must keep all of these and see what changes in practice are possible to meet whatever may be the Soviet concerns. Ceilings, for example, might be considered for the troops. Means of avoiding an East-West Berlin war of subversion and propaganda could be discussed. On the matter of access no question really arises since there is an agreement in force and established practice. We think, however, that Gromyko himself has in mind making changes with respect to access and at one time he mentioned a possible Soviet agreement with the DDR. We are ready to consider and examine whatever the Soviets want to put up.

Gromyko came back with the statement that what Couve said made it appear that the West would propose no changes in West Berlin in fact. They wanted their troops to remain and then they wanted guarantees on the access routes. He said, "You speak of meeting our wishes but in actuality you want to gain further advantages for yourselves."

Couve de Murville replied that we are asking nothing. Gromyko had said that we sought no change and that was perfectly true. Until Germany can be reunified there was no reason why we should abandon

our own rights and duties. West Berlin admittedly must remain *sui generis* until Germany was reunified. Why then should the three Western Powers abandon their position in this interim period? They had asked no new commitments. Nevertheless Gromyko seemed to desire to make some change but we were in the dark as to what it was or why. When we are told we will look at it. Meanwhile we are satisfied with the present access situation.

Gromyko then attempted further to elicit from the French Foreign Minister what changes in the situation he visualized. He said that the situation of West Berlin was abnormal and could not be maintained; that the Soviets had come to Geneva to reach an understanding with us but that everything so far said by the West was vague and nebulous and the West's apparent satisfaction with the present situation was far removed from reality.

Couve de Murville reiterated that what the Soviets proposed with respect to West Berlin was unacceptable but that we will consider whatever further proposals the Soviets may have in mind.

Couve asked Gromyko why he considered the present access arrangements unsatisfactory or abnormal and Gromyko replied, "Because the Soviets still exercise outlived occupation functions."

Couve asked Gromyko if he was right in understanding that in this respect Gromyko referred exclusively to the access rights of the Western troops in West Berlin and Gromyko gave no reply.

The Secretary interjected that with respect to access the problem arose when Khrushchev spoke on November 10⁴ and followed it up with the first note⁵ on the subject which stated that on May 27 control over the access routes would be turned over to the DDR. This was what has created present acute tensions. We agreed to sit down and seek means of relieving these tensions but now Mr. Gromyko is suggesting that we are asking concessions in order to cooperate in removing tensions which the Soviets artificially created. It looks as though the Soviets wanted to take advantage of us. He then said soberly that he hoped the Soviets would not consider cutting off our access to West Berlin for the sake of their future relations with the United States and with many other countries. He concluded by urging that we see how the question of access could be improved and thereby lower tensions.

Mr. Lloyd then made his first intervention, saying that he did not consider that we were particularly satisfied with the present situation. The position of Berlin is abnormal and will remain so until German reunification. The problem is to see how the situation can be improved.

⁴ See Document 24.

⁵ See Document 72.

We for our part are ready to discuss the military side to prove that Western troops are purely symbolic. We are also willing to discuss propaganda and subversion and we are willing that West Berlin should continue to be politically neutral and no threat to another state (the Secretary interjected, "On a reciprocal basis," which amendment Mr. Lloyd accepted). Mr. Lloyd went on to say that over the last ten years the situation with respect to West Berlin had worked pretty well on the basis of our agreements with the Soviets and that it "was not consistent with the honor and dignity of a great nation to try and change an agreement unilaterally."

At this point Gromyko said that with respect to the free city proposal and the question of guarantees, the Soviet Delegation had now developed its ideas and reduced them to a document. Single copies of a proposed protocol on this matter⁶ were then brought in and distributed. Mr. Gromyko stated that it had been prepared after full consultation with the DDR. He added that he presumed that other Ministers would wish to study it before commenting on it.

Mr. Gromyko then said that Mr. Lloyd had touched on three points, the military aspects, the subversive aspect and the matter of free access but this was done in very general terms. Exactly what changes did Mr. Lloyd have in mind specifically?

Mr. Lloyd said he had really nothing to add to what he had already said. He inquired what are the Soviets' complaints? He repeated that we would be willing to consider troop and equipment ceilings and on the political side evidence of tension created in Berlin by propaganda and subversion. He then said that there was one matter which had not been mentioned in our discussions which could be discussed and this was the question of refugees (Gromyko neither then nor later commented on this remark). On access, Mr. Lloyd continued, there is some unfinished business going back to the 1949 agreement.⁷ It seemed possible that supplementary agreements could be worked out here which would avoid future disputes and arguments.

Gromyko continued his old tactic of commenting that Mr. Lloyd's statement was far from clear. He then repeated that the danger of incidents in West Berlin comes from the presence of Western troops there. Whether they were ten or twenty thousand or even only five thousand they represented the real danger.

Mr. Lloyd argued that the presence of Western troops in fact are a safeguard for peace and confessed his failure to understand Gromyko's

⁶ Document 349.

⁷ For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949, see *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.

reasoning. Mr. Lloyd went on to point out that the allied troops in Trieste made for stability until a political settlement had been reached. He had no doubt that kidnappings in West Berlin would soar overnight were there no Western troops there. He then said that even a modest agreement arising from this conference could prove the turn of the tide in East-West relations. Then the four Heads of Government could go on to consider the big problems such as disarmament and European security.

Mr. Gromyko made some noncommittal almost inaudible comment.

The Secretary said that we had offered comprehensive proposals to deal with the whole German problem and that the Soviets had rejected them. He reminded Mr. Gromyko that there had been no incidents in West Berlin except for some minor ones on the routes of access.

Gromyko said he agreed that we were both talking about a temporary settlement for Berlin pending the reunification of Germany.

Couve de Murville then said that he had glanced at the paper distributed a few minutes before and, in connection with Gromyko's statement that Western troops in West Berlin caused tensions, had been struck by the Soviet proposal that the four occupying powers plus the DDR form a commission to control the operation of the agreement for West Berlin. He asked what greater possible cause of tension could be devised than such a commission interfering daily in all of West Berlin's affairs.

Gromyko said that the commission's role would be observation and that interference in domestic affairs was contrary to Soviet policy. Couve de Murville commented that it was really a commission designed to interfere so as to ensure no interference.

Gromyko asked Mr. Lloyd if he had had a chance to read the paper. He replied that he had read it three times and had found no more virtue in it on the third reading than on the first. He suggested that all study it overnight and meet privately again the following day.

Gromyko with a straight face suggested that the Ministers meet again informally and privately but add the Germans, or alternatively meet in plenary session. There was considerable discussion in which the Secretary made clear that the East Germans would not sit in his house and likewise that he had never agreed to private meetings with the Germans present.

After some further discussion it was agreed that there would be held a plenary session at 3:30 at the Palais and a private session of the four Foreign Ministers at Villa Greta at 9 o'clock the same evening at which it was agreed the Soviet protocol proposal would be considered. Meanwhile it was agreed to keep its contents confidential.

349. Proposal Submitted by the Soviet Delegation

Geneva, undated.

PROTOCOL ON THE GUARANTEES OF THE STATUS
OF THE FREE CITY OF WEST BERLIN

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the United States of America and of the Republic of France for the purpose of ensuring the observance of the status of the Free City of West Berlin have agreed on the following:—

Article 1

The States Parties to this Protocol jointly guarantee the status of the Free City of West Berlin.

Article 2

For the purpose envisaged in Article 1 of this Protocol the States Parties to the Protocol shall maintain on the territory of the Free City of West Berlin on the parity basis small military contingents with the total strength up to . . . men.

(A variant: the States Parties to this Protocol agree that small military contingents [with the total strength up to . . . men]¹ may be maintained by neutral States on the basis of an agreement among the Parties to this Protocol.)

The presence of the said military contingents on the territory of the Free City of West Berlin should in no way be considered as occupation of that territory.

The military contingents shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Free City of West Berlin.

The legal status of the military contingents shall be determined by a special arrangement between the four States Parties to this Protocol and the authorities of the Free City of West Berlin.

Article 3

The States Parties to the Protocol agree to establish a Permanent International Commission composed of the representatives of the States Parties to the Protocol and of the German Democratic Republic.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1384. No classification marking. Handed to the Western Foreign Ministers by Gromyko at their private meeting on June 1; see Document 348. A Russian text of the proposal is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1363.

¹ Brackets and ellipses in the source text.

The functions of the said Commission shall be to supervise the observance of the status of the Free City of West Berlin and the ensuring of the City's independence. The Commission shall pay a special attention to the observance of the status and, in particular, to that which pertains to the demilitarisation of the Free City, to the prohibition to carry out there hostile activities directed against any State and also to the non-interference in the internal life of the Free City of West Berlin.

For the purpose of discharging the functions of the Commission its members and its officials shall enjoy on the territory of the Free City of West Berlin such privileges and immunities as are necessary for an independent performance of their functions.

The Commission shall establish its rules of procedure.

The authorities of the Free City of West Berlin shall render every assistance to the Commission in the performance of its functions.

Article 4

The Permanent International Commission shall annually submit to the Parties to this Protocol and to the German Democratic Republic as well as to the Security Council an information report on the results of the supervision it carries out under Article 3 of this Protocol.

Article 5

The Permanent International Commission shall inform the Parties to the Protocol of all cases of violation or a threat of violation of the status of the Free City of West Berlin.

The States Parties to the Protocol shall, upon consultation with each other, take in such cases appropriate measures which may be considered necessary to ensure the observance of the status of the Free City.

Article 6

This Protocol shall come into force from the day of its signing. It shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

350. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 1, 1959, 8 p.m.

Cahto 58. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

Sorry to say there is little to report on today's session. Because of Gromyko's statement in plenary session that propaganda and subversive activities from West Berlin created dangers for East Germans and Soviets, I took occasion to point out in great detail subversive activities carried out from East Berlin which made any activities from West Berlin look puny. Also quoted from juicy bits recorded from recent East German radio broadcasts which alleged von Brentano and I engaged jointly in homosexual activities with even worse references to von Brentano, which I think shook Gromyko up a bit. His reply was that these activities East Germans were really of 4th, 5th or 6th relative importance and arrangements might be found whereby both East and West German activities could be softened. When both Couve and Selwyn Lloyd later indicated perhaps some reciprocal arrangement possible, he began losing interest in subject and we may hear very little more about it.

Near end of meeting, he handed us typewritten suggested draft protocol¹ for West Germany [*Berlin*], text of which being sent Department, which obviously completely unacceptable but on which discussion deferred until tomorrow. Tensions created by Russian threats regarding access rights to Berlin being transferred to East Germans discussed briefly and background laid for further discussion.

Sorry nothing more constructive to report. This is still a waiting game with some evidence that Russians so eager for summit that acceptable modus vivendi for West Germany possible.

London *Times* article indicating Selwyn Lloyd near end his tenure as Foreign Minister causing much speculation among delegations.² It has placed him most uncomfortable position but he has not discussed it with me.

Faithfully,

Signed: Chris."

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/6-159. Secret.

¹ Document 349.

² For text of this article, see *The Times*, June 1, 1959, p. 10.

351. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, June 2, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

FULL DELEGATION MEETING

Tactical Matters

1. Mr. Merchant reported that he had briefed Ambassador Grewe¹ last night on yesterday's private meeting. He said he had left no documents with Grewe although he had promised to give him a copy of the protocol² that Gromyko introduced at yesterday's private meeting. Mr. Merchant said he was disturbed by press leaks about the private sessions. Mr. Berding thought that the West Germans may have disclosed to the press what the Secretary intended to say yesterday about Communist activities in East Berlin.

Mr. Merchant continued that as far as the plenary today was concerned, the "so-called Dr. Bolz" and Ambassador Grewe would speak. Grewe has what Mr. Merchant described as a good speech rounding up conference developments. The Secretary noted a protocol problem concerning the chairmanship. He said that Gromyko wants to be in the chair today even though a private session was held at his residence yesterday. Mr. Merchant said he thought the chairmanship of the plenary sessions should rotate solely on the basis of prior plenary sessions without regard to private meetings. The Secretary indicated agreement.

Possible Limitation on Troops in Berlin

2. Ambassador Thompson called attention to a Berlin telegram (to Geneva 54)³ containing a memorandum by General Hamlett concerning the dangers to free access inherent in any limitation on troop strength in Berlin. The Secretary thought General Hamlett's point was well taken and that any limitation on Western troop strength might make possible undesirable Soviet inspection activities. Mr. Smith thought the Soviets would wish to avoid establishing a precedent in Berlin which might work against them at some future time in respect to gen-

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1364. Secret. The meeting was held in Conference Room 209 of the Consulate General Annex.

¹ No further record of this briefing has been found.

² Document 349.

³ Dated June 1, it transmitted General Hamlett's views on the impact of limiting the number of Allied troops in West Berlin. After noting that no matter how many troops were in the city, Berlin was militarily indefensible, Hamlett stressed that the Soviet interest was only a "political gimmick" to permit them further control on access to the city. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6-159)

eral disarmament arrangements. Ambassador Thompson said that the Soviets do not want the West to have rights in East Berlin; therefore, if they pursue the matter and insist on limitations in West Berlin we must insist on a ceiling for forces in East Berlin. Mr. Gufler pointed out, however, that the Soviets could withdraw a few miles into East Germany and then willingly submit to inspection in East Berlin.

Terminology of Meetings

3. Mr. Boerner reported that last night the Soviet briefing officer had stated that the private meetings of the Big Four were "unofficial" meetings designed to speed up the work of the conference, adding that the official meetings are those attended by the six delegations at the Palais. The Secretary noted that we are not using the term "restricted" meetings which implied meeting with the two German adviser delegations and that there are in our view two types of meetings; i.e. the plenary, and "informal" or "private" sessions.

Assessment of Berlin Situation

4. At the invitation of the Secretary, Mr. Gufler gave an assessment of the current situation in Berlin. Berlin morale, he said, is "amazingly good." He noted that after Gromyko's attack Saturday on RIAS, the morale of RIAS employees had improved and many had informed the Director that they would not resign at this time to take other jobs as they had planned. The attitude of the city in general is good. Underneath there is a certain nervousness, however; the trust the Berliners show in the U.S. is almost embarrassing. Berliners, Mr. Gufler continued, have three paramount concerns; (1) that if Berlin be made a free city, it not have its own currency but remain tied monetarily to West Germany; (2) that the U.S. not agree to any limitation on troop strength but retain their sovereign right to decide what troop strength to keep in Berlin; and (3) that we not give up RIAS or agree to any limitations on propaganda activities. Berliners feel that to do so would be the beginning of the curtailment of their right of free speech. Mr. Gufler continued that Berliners are apprehensive lest agreements be reached which balance out rights in East and West Berlin; their feeling is that they would not come out even since they are free and East Berlin is not. In response to an inquiry by the Secretary, Mr. Gufler said that there has been improvement economically this year over last year due largely to aid furnished by the West German Government and by large West German concerns to their Berlin subsidiaries.

Activities of Working Group

5. Mr. Hillenbrand said that the working group met yesterday and discussed formulae concerning access to Berlin.⁴ He said that there was a consensus that it was premature to try to reach agreement on specific language. It was agreed that each delegation would refine its own language and have it ready for such time as the matter might be under discussion by the Foreign Ministers.

President's Press Conference

6. Mr. Berding noted that the President would be holding a press conference tomorrow and said that he planned to formulate a series of questions and farm them out among the U.S. delegation for preparation of answers.⁵ The Secretary interjected that he thought the President could play a very important role in determining the course of the conference by what he said tomorrow and he thought that we should frame our comments to the White House as recommendations rather than as suggestions.

Press Backgrounder by Secretary

7. The Secretary agreed with Mr. Berding that it might be wise to schedule his backgrounder for American correspondents for Thursday rather than tomorrow in the light of the President's press conference and a background news conference that Selwyn Lloyd intends to give on Wednesday.⁶

Possible Press Briefing on Communist Activities in East Berlin

8. Mr. Berding suggested that in view of the intense press interest in our presentation on Communist intelligence activities in East Berlin, it might be desirable to give the press on a background basis a sanitized version of our data on this subject. The Secretary thought that this might

⁴ Documentation on the working group, which had been meeting in Bonn to discuss specifics of the agreed tripartite contingency plan (see Document 255), is in Department of State, Central File 762.00.

⁵ The questions and suggested answers were transmitted in Secto 164 from Geneva, June 2 at 9 p.m. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/6–259)

⁶ The transcript of Secretary Herter's backgrounder for U.S. correspondents at 10 a.m. on June 4, in which he stated that no agreement had been reached on withdrawal of troops, screening of refugees, or curtailment of intelligence activities in Berlin, was transmitted in Secto 175 from Geneva, June 4. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/6–459) For a transcript of the President's press conference at 10:30 a.m. on June 3, in which he stated that progress at Geneva had been insufficient to warrant a summit conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 425–435. A summary of Lloyd's press conference on June 3, in which he indicated that the West was considering troop reductions and screening of refugees and that Berlin should be dealt with in a report to the Heads of Government and at a summit meeting in July, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1366.

be a good idea since he said he did not intend to use publicly this material unless the Soviets return to the charge that Western activities in West Berlin were a danger to East Berlin. Ambassador Thompson, supported by Mr. Merchant, thought it would not be desirable to do this. He thought we ran the danger of being accused of leaking information about the private sessions.

[Here follows paragraph 9 on an unrelated subject.]

London Times' Article on Lloyd

10. Mr. Reinhardt said he had learned from British sources that yesterday's *London Times'* article about Lloyd's possible resignation had been stimulated by Duncan Sandys.

**352. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State
Herter and Foreign Secretary Lloyd**

Geneva, June 2, 1959, noon.

I spoke to Selwyn Lloyd about the fact that I was cabling the President¹ suggesting he make a pretty strong statement at his press conference to the effect that nothing that he had seen coming out of Geneva would in any way justify a Summit Conference. To my great surprise, he thought this was an excellent idea and that it might have great influence in changing the atmosphere here so as to give us more hope of reaching some agreement that would justify a Summit Conference.

C.A.H.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1364. Secret. Drafted by Herter. Two other memoranda of conversation, in addition to Documents 353 and 354, covering the *London Times* article and Hungarian credentials at the International Labor Organization are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1364.

¹ See Document 355.

353. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Geneva, June 2, 1959, noon.

I spoke to Selwyn Lloyd in regard to his having raised the refugee problem in Berlin as a possible area in which we could make a concession to the Russians. I told him that inasmuch as the Russians had not raised the question, it would be better to leave it alone since there was no point in our offering concessions on points about which the Russians had not complained. He said he would not himself bring the matter up again.

I also told him of the difficulties that might be involved if we reached an agreement with the Russians on the limitation of troops in Berlin since this would at once give the Soviets or the East Germans an opportunity of examining everything in connection with our convoys or personnel going by air as a necessary check on our troop numbers. He agreed that this was a valid point and that if we decided to limit troops this would be done by a declaration on our part rather than any agreement.

C.A.H.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1364. Secret. Drafted by Herter.

354. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Geneva, June 2, 1959, noon.

I took up with Selwyn Lloyd the possibility of the three Western Foreign Ministers going to Berlin this Saturday for a very brief look around and not for the purpose of making any statements. I told him

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1364. Secret. Drafted by Herter.

that Gufler had urged this strongly. Mr. Lloyd told me that he had received an invitation some time ago from Willy Brandt to go to Berlin and, since he had never been there, wanted very much to accept. He planned to do this between the time of the end of this conference and a possible Summit Conference. I told him that this was entirely tentative and he said he would like to think it over until tomorrow. (Subsequently, I discussed the matter with Couve de Murville and his feeling was that for us to go at this juncture might be seriously misinterpreted, and that we would do better to wait until the end of the conference.)

C.A.H.

355. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 2, 1959, 2 p.m.

Cahto 62. For the President from the Secretary.

“Dear Mr. President:

I believe the time has come when you could give us a very real assist at your press conference Wednesday¹ in connection with our negotiations. Up until now, there has not been a single indication from Gromyko with respect to any of our proposals or with respect to the modification of his own proposals which would appear to justify a summit meeting. In addition, Khrushchev has made threatening noises from Albania² in his references to our negotiations which have been far from helpful. Extracts from these statements are being conveyed to Jim Hagerty by CIA.

If you could make it clear during your press conference that developments to date in Geneva do not encourage you to feel a summit conference has been justified, this would, I think, give a real impetus to the possibility of our securing some progress on the Berlin situation which,

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/6-259. Secret. Drafted by Herter.

¹ June 3.

² For extracts from Khrushchev's speeches at Tirana, May 26 and 31, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 303–305 and 306–310.

in turn, might justify such a conference. The private talks to date have gotten us very little further than the public talks except that I think the Russians are now beginning to believe that we will not give up our occupation rights or access rights. A statement by you along the lines suggested in a separate telegram Andy Berding is sending Jim Hagerty³ might well force them to discussions within the limitations we have set.

I have told Selwyn Lloyd that I was wiring you along the foregoing lines and he expressed hearty concurrence.⁴

Faithfully,

Signed: Chris."

Herter

³ See footnote 5, Document 351.

⁴ See Document 352.

356. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, June 3, 1959, 1 a.m.

Secto 166. Paris pass USRO. Fourteenth Session held June 2, 3:30 to 6:35 p.m., Gromyko Chairman.

Bolz opened with short statement¹ consisting generally presentation arguments contained Soviet statement May 30.² Emphasized ur-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-359. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Morris. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/14 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/14, June 2, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1364.

¹ For text of Bolz' statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/5, June 4, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 577–580 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 200–204.

² See Document 342.

agency liquidating occupation regime West Berlin, dangerous situation with espionage, sabotage, etc. against GDR and other states and links with aggressive elements FedRep. Claimed both EAC and other Allied documents showed Berlin not intended be fifth occupation zone but rather part Soviet Zone and therefore now GDR territory. Though geographically, economic and legal considerations all justify making West Berlin part GDR, latter does not wish force change social system and therefore supports Soviet free city proposal. GDR ready to guarantee status West Berlin as such plus its freedom to access.

Grewe spoke 30 minutes,³ mainly criticisms Soviet position re Germany, particularly argument that peace treaty be concluded with two German states. Pointed out inconsistencies with previous Soviet record and rejected Gromyko arguments that "times have changed." Recalled stated Soviet opposition 1946 to splitting up Germany as well as fact that Soviet claimed 1947 that impossible discuss peace treaty until clear that all-German government could comply with its obligations to Allies. Grewe claimed truth is that Soviets have now established unrepresentative regime eastern Germany. Also emphasized peace treaty can be concluded only with state with which one involved in war, and that if this international entity, i.e., Germany, incapable of action, formation all-German government constitutes first requirement. Mentioned Ulbricht's May 22 frank statement indicating contacts between GDR and FedRep premature in absence further progress towards communization western Germany. Said only way solve present impasse, in which each side claimed one German government unrepresentative, was to hold all-German elections. Claimed Soviets proposals "only sham concession which evade decisive question of division Germany".

Grewe also spoke briefly re Berlin, rejecting Soviet plan for division of Germany into three parts and ridiculing Soviet charge that West Berlin constitutes NATO bridgehead. Claimed population convinced of desirability presence Western troops and cited August 7, 1958 incident Steinstucken⁴ as example what GDR police likely do in absence such Western protective forces. Suggested no point in detailing slanderous agitation poured out from East Berlin thus far during conference and pointed out December election clearly showed rejection Soviet free city proposal by people West Berlin.

³ For text of Grewe's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/9, June 6, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 542–549 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 204–211.

⁴ See Document 17.

Secretary briefly criticized Bolz statement, suggesting particularly that Bolz study basic surrender documents before trying to instruct Western powers on their Berlin rights.⁵

Gromyko then gave thirty minute essentially propaganda rehash⁶ further defending Soviet proposals on Berlin and rejecting Western views. Branded Secretary's May 26 statement⁷ as "dictation" to people of Berlin under conditions foreign occupation and also said fails recognize rights of GDR on whose territory Berlin located. Claimed occupation has become artificial and obsolete though Soviets don't consider Western troops presently there illegally. Charged West using contradictory arguments to justify troop maintenance and mentioned two Soviet "compromise" alternative proposals, either symbolic four power military presence of limited contingents from neutral states [*sic*].

Claimed Grewe statement today had confirmed previous Soviet view that FedGovt hampering conference.

Lloyd criticized briefly Soviet statements.⁸ Denied any contradiction in Western justification maintenance troops Berlin and criticized Gromyko for maintaining Western plan no basis for discussion. Said practical problem is extent to which present situation, based existing rights, might be improved.

Secretary proposed that in view lateness of hour private meeting scheduled this evening be postponed until Wednesday afternoon. This was agreed.

Herter

⁵ For text of Herter's statement as indicated in the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 234.

⁶ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/31, June 3, see *ibid.*, pp. 234–243 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 135–142.

⁷ Regarding this statement, see Document 335.

⁸ For text of Lloyd's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/32, June 20, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 243–244 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 142–143.

357. Memorandum From Ann C. Whitman to Acting Secretary of State Murphy

Washington, June 2, 1959.

The President would like the following message to be sent to the Secretary of State. (As I am sure you know, he always wants me to send such messages through the Acting Secretary.)

"Secret

"Dear Chris:

"Thank you for your periodic reports. I saw the press stories out of London concerning Selwyn Lloyd, as well as Macmillan's denial of their authenticity. It is my impression that Selwyn has grown very much in maturity and ability in his job. Personally I would hate to see him transferred. Such things are barred from public comment by us, but I am hopeful that the reports are erroneous. It was unfortunate that such gossip should be published at this particular time.

"I think that your rebuttal of Gromyko's charge that West Berlin propaganda and subversive activities create danger for the East Germans and the Soviets was both necessary and effective. Regarding Gromyko's typewritten draft protocol for West Germany,¹ it is a typical Soviet trick to advance a proposal that is completely unacceptable. They cannot conceive of a conference that must first of all be a test of patience and endurance. I do hope that Gromyko took my words seriously when I warned him² that no Summit meeting was possible except as some progress at the Foreign Secretary level would warrant it.

"With warm regard, As ever, DE"

Many thanks.

Ann C. Whitman³

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. The message was transmitted to Herter in Tocah 62 on June 2 at 3:51 p.m.

¹ Document 349.

² See Document 338.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

358. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/75

Geneva, June 3, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Thompson

U.S.S.R.

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Malik
Mr. Soldatov

United Kingdom

Mr. Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Hancock

France

Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Laloy

SUBJECT

Discussion of Western and Soviet Positions on Berlin

Lloyd opened the discussion by referring to the draft protocol¹ which the Soviets had submitted at the last meeting.² He would speak frankly as there was no use having private talks unless we were prepared to be frank. Making clear that he was speaking for all three Western Powers, he said the Soviet document put forward proposals which the Western Powers had already clearly said were unacceptable and it put forward no new proposals. The Western objections were briefly as follows:

1. The document seemed to extinguish allied rights in Berlin which existed by right of conquest.
2. The proposal would establish a third state on Berlin soil.
3. There was nothing in the document about East Berlin, therefore, it was no solution to the Berlin problem.
4. It provided for the introduction of Soviet troops into West Berlin with no corresponding provision in regard to East Berlin.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Herter on June 4. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 65 from Geneva, June 4. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/6–459)

¹ Document 349.

² See Document 348.

5. It associated the GDR with the agreement by including them in the proposed international commission, giving the GDR a kind of supervisory status and providing for reports to be submitted to it.

6. It made no provision for free political life and economic stability in West Berlin nor did it contain any provisions with regard to access. It also contravened the will of the West Berliners to which they had often given expression most recently in 1958.

7. The document constituted a wrong approach by putting forward something which we could not accept even as a basis for discussion. He realized that Gromyko had said the same thing about the Western proposal.

Gromyko said their document should be considered in connection with their proposals on West Berlin. The Soviet document related to guarantees. With respect to access, provision was made in the protocol for the conclusion of a special agreement on this question. He said the GDR was on the same footing as other powers since West Berlin was in the center of the GDR. He did not consider that the provision in the protocol regarding GDR participation should be considered a recognition of that government. This was a separate question but it was unjust to deny to the GDR the right of participation in the agreement. The Soviet proposal provided two alternatives with respect to Berlin, that is, there could either be the presence of troops of the four powers or of neutrals. He inquired whether there was anything unacceptable in the document.

Lloyd said there were some things with which we could agree. We agreed our purpose was the right of West Berlin to choose its form of society. We agreed that free access was part of the necessary arrangement for a free way of life. We agreed that our occupation was symbolic and we also agreed that there could be a commission of some kind. These were elements on which we could negotiate. However, a protocol which envisaged equal GDR participation, which dealt only with West Berlin, and which brought Soviet troops to West Berlin furnished no basis for negotiation.

Gromyko asked what kind of a commission we proposed.

Couve said a commission was important but it was to implement certain arrangements between us. It was first necessary to agree on principles and then see how they could be carried out in practice. A question that always came between us was that of the GDR. It was not possible to have a commission of the four of us and the GDR.

Gromyko agreed that the commission was not the important thing and that the main point was what kind of arrangement could be arrived at.

Mr. Herter said he agreed we should not start with the commission until we knew what it was to do. The Soviet protocol was based on premises that were unacceptable since it would start by wiping out our rights. We had made plain that we could not have those rights

extinguished unilaterally until there was agreement on the reunification of Germany. The framework had to be the rights that we now have. When Gromyko spoke of dangers we stated we were willing to talk about them. He said we also believed there were dangers to the people of West Berlin. If an agreement was carried out along the lines the Soviets proposed, we believed the people of West Berlin could be strangled. We had lived for some time with tensions—the present tensions that the Soviets had created. The position which the Western Powers had put forward today was a final one and we suggested that we start from this.

Gromyko said Mr. Herter had used the words “within the framework of our rights”. Could he give a definition of those rights?

Mr. Herter said that the rights were clear and were part of the agreements we had with the Soviets. The elements of tension had been created by the Soviets saying they would turn over access routes to someone we did not recognize.

Gromyko said that tension was created by the presence of Western troops.

Mr. Herter pointed out that for 10 years the Soviets had not referred to this as a danger. We had been prepared to talk in regard to Berlin and have presented a number of proposals in good faith. Both Mr. Gromyko and the head of the Soviet Government had said that our proposals were not negotiable. We were equally frank in saying the Soviet proposals were non-negotiable. We were agreed on only one thing, namely, that Germany should be reunified. We should begin our talks on the basis of our troops remaining in Berlin and our having free access to that city. Gromyko observed that Mr. Herter was now discussing the general question of Germany. He had thought we were discussing Berlin.

Mr. Herter said we were discussing Berlin as part of our proposals. He had brought the matter up in connection with the subject of tensions.

Gromyko said the Western Powers had not made any proposals to reduce tensions or to improve the situation. They had mentioned improvements but he did not know what they had in mind. Could they submit in writing what they meant by “within the framework of our rights”?

Couve said the Soviets had raised the question of Berlin on the ground of the dangers they saw there. The Western Powers were prepared to consider their views and proposals. First with respect to the views, he said he was not convinced by what Gromyko had said of dangers as he had produced no proof. Nothing new had happened requiring drastic measures to prevent incidents. It was up to the Soviets to make proposals. The Western Powers were not completely negative and had included Berlin in their proposals. Gromyko had rejected these. The Western Powers had the Soviet paper which they could not take as a

basis for discussion. They had repeatedly said they were prepared to see what could be done on the basis that there was no possibility at this time of a solution of the German problem. He said they had put on paper what they thought were lines on which the Soviet worries could be discussed. He emphasized these were Soviet worries, not Western ones. He then read the Western document³ and pointed out that the first paragraph answered the question Gromyko had put with respect to rights. He pointed out that there were three paragraphs on which we were prepared to discuss certain points in order to meet Soviet views. One of these paragraphs dealt with the level of forces. Another dealt with such matters as agitation, subversion and espionage. Then there was the question of access. After reading the pertinent paragraph, he said it had been framed in this way since we did not know what the Soviets wanted. Free access already existed in two ways. The most important was the access for civilian needs, such as traffic in goods, post and telegraph, etc. This right was reaffirmed in 1949 and is under supervision by the GDR at the border point. In the second place, there was freedom of access for Western military needs which was covered by special agreements between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. It was also covered or referred to in the Bolz-Zorin agreements⁴ in that the Soviets had not transferred this function to the East German authorities. The Soviets said they had no intention of interfering with these communications. The Western Powers did not know what Gromyko had in mind when he said he wished to change these arrangements. The last paragraph of the Western paper stated it would continue in force until German reunification. This was an idea which Mr. Gromyko himself had expressed. These were ideas and not expressed in treaty language.

³ This proposal reads:

"1. There can be no modification of the rights of the Western powers in Berlin on the basis of which various agreements have been concluded with the Soviet Union. Among these rights are the right to maintain troops there and the right of unrestricted access to Berlin.

"2. Under certain conditions the Western powers would be prepared to declare their intention not to increase the present level of the forces stationed in Berlin.

"3. They would similarly be prepared to consider ways in which, in the greater Berlin area and while respecting fundamental rights and liberties, arrangements which might be made to avoid illegal or clandestine activities which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the interests of the different parties.

"4. If the Soviet Government wishes to modify certain of the procedures regarding the present access arrangements, the Western powers would be prepared to examine its proposals.

"5. The various arrangements which might be agreed to would continue in force until the reunification of Germany." (Cahto 64 from Geneva, June 3; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-359)

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 31.

Gromyko said he wished to make certain preliminary observations. We had stated our position and the Soviets had put forward theirs. He inquired how this document could be considered as a basis for negotiation. This was impossible because it was one-sided. They had come to Geneva to reach agreement on all questions, including Berlin. If this was the Western position the outlook was very gloomy.

Mr. Herter said he found Mr. Gromyko's remark very strange since in this document the West had made all of the concessions and there were none called for on the part of the Soviet Union.

Gromyko inquired what concessions were made.

Mr. Herter mentioned as an example that we gave up our right to increase our forces. Gromyko said the Soviets had been talking about reductions.

Couve said we stated we could accept a limitation.

Gromyko said not one soldier was withdrawn—where was the concession? Mr. Herter said we had the right to increase our forces and were making a concession in offering to limit the number.

Gromyko said we were worried about guarantees.

Couve denied this and said we were not worried.

Mr. Herter said our only worry was that the Soviets might go back on their word.

Couve said that access was presently guaranteed. The Soviets wanted some change. We were prepared to examine their proposals.

Gromyko said the Soviets wanted to give up their functions. We were worried about access. The Soviets were prepared to give guarantees on this subject. Some 14 years had passed and they wished to put things in order. The Soviets had no occupation rights but they fulfilled some functions regarding access.

Couve said the Soviets had said they would take unilateral action to abolish their guarantees. We had protested this. Now the position was different in that he had not so far spoken of unilateral action. He had suggested that we look at the question of access which we were prepared to do but he was not specific. He merely said the GDR existed.

Gromyko said this was a substantial fact. With respect to unilateral action they had refrained so far from any such actions hoping they could reach agreement with the Western Powers. He would still like to hope but he could not understand when we represented paragraph 4 of our paper as a concession.

Mr. Herter said we had a right at present to increase our troops.

Gromyko said opinion differed on this. He did not see any willingness on the part of the Western Governments to facilitate a solution on a mutually acceptable basis.

Couve asked what he did not like about our proposals.

Gromyko said it was not a question of changing a few words. What was important was the direction in which our document led. The presence of Western troops constituted the danger. The West had ignored Soviet worries and their position.

With respect to paragraph 3 he pointed out that East Berlin was a part of the GDR. The Government of the GDR had made a declaration which constituted an obligation not to cause tension regarding East and West Berlin.

Mr. Herter said he would be glad to give Gromyko more illustrations of how the East Germans were carrying out their declaration.

Gromyko said he did not know on what date the declaration was made.

Mr. Herter said the illustrations he gave were of events that had taken place since this conference began.

Mr. Gromyko said he had spoken with the GDR representatives and they denied Mr. Herter's allegations. He could not say himself. In his opinion the main source was in West Berlin. He had a long dossier which gave dates and named names establishing what was being done in West Berlin but he did not think this was the best route to follow. He had made proposals in regard to access.

Couve observed that they were not precise.

Gromyko said he would think the matter over and perhaps could formulate them more precisely. He said with respect to paragraph 5 of the Western paper there was no question and that he thought on this point an understanding had been reached. With respect to paragraph 1, he had made many statements about the Soviet position on rights and so had Mr. Khrushchev. The Soviet position was clear and he inquired why this was raised in written form. Would the West consider that an agreement already existed and whether procedures should be worked out. There was another alternative which was to put aside the question of rights so that it would not interfere with the making of concrete arrangements. He stressed that these were preliminary views.

Mr. Herter said that the reason we attached importance to the reaffirmation of rights was that this question had arisen last November when the Soviets began by saying we had forfeited our rights by violating the Potsdam Agreement. Then, Mr. Khrushchev said we did have rights. We had been in some doubts until Gromyko now said these rights exist. It was, therefore, natural that we should raise the question.

Gromyko said that we should not ask him to undersign rights of occupation in Berlin fourteen years after the end of the war. The Western logic was that "since you do not like the situation in Berlin, please confirm it".

Couve said with respect to paragraph 3 that we had mentioned Greater Berlin. If there were a source of tension in Berlin from subversive and other activities, it was on both sides. Gromyko himself had mentioned the possibility of reciprocal arrangements in East and West Berlin. He knew that Gromyko considered the GDR responsible in East Berlin. If agreement were reached among the Four Powers on access, this meant that there would be some sort of agreement between the Soviets and the GDR. He had mentioned a declaration between the GDR and the Soviet Union. With respect to the subject of propaganda and subversive activities, we considered that the same basis could be used.

Gromyko said that he had in mind the declaration which the GDR had already made. In West Berlin nothing had been done.

Couve said that if we made an agreement between the Four Powers all of them would be responsible. The Western Powers could get in touch with the West Berlin Government and the Soviets could get in touch with the GDR or East Berlin but we would be responsible each to the other.

Gromyko pointed out that he was being expected to undersign an agreement maintaining the occupation of Berlin, maintaining our troops in Berlin, and a provision for Greater Berlin. This did not constitute a proposition and he could almost assume it had been put forward to make him angry.

Mr. Herter said quite solemnly that this was the very maximum to which the Western Powers could go and he was surprised that Mr. Gromyko had not been appreciative of this.

Mr. Gromyko said he was sorry the Western Powers were so critical of the Soviet Protocol. He remarked that they considered the idea of a Commission was useful.

Mr. Lloyd said he was not sure he understood Mr. Gromyko. Apparently he agreed with our paragraph 1 but was not prepared to say so. With respect to paragraph 2, the difference lay in whether or not Soviet troops were to be added to West Berlin. With respect to paragraph 3, Gromyko objected to the Greater Berlin area but he could not understand that Gromyko objected to doing something about propaganda and subversion. He had said nothing about paragraph 4. He said he agreed with paragraph 5.

Gromyko said, with respect to troops, the West had talked about symbolic reduction of troops but now talked about symbolic troops. The Soviets talked about symbolic presence.

Lloyd asked what about Gromyko's objections to the Greater Berlin area. Gromyko said he did object to such an idea but agreed it was good to cease this kind of activity. The Government of the GDR had taken such an obligation. He would inform us of the date of their declaration.

Lloyd asked if he agreed on reciprocity.

Gromyko said that when the Central Government took an obligation it was more important than an undertaking by local officials.

Couve said the important thing was not what they said but what they did.

Gromyko said he considered this activity was carried out by one side.

Mr. Herter said it would be interesting to see the GDR declaration.

Gromyko said the Western Powers had been more precise when they talked about this subject than they were in the document.

Lloyd asked Gromyko what his opinion was on paragraph 4.

Gromyko said he had made several observations on this and the position was clear.

Couve observed that it was clear but not precise.

Gromyko inquired in what aspects.

Couve said we did not see what would be the change a) in the civilian traffic or, b) in military traffic.

Gromyko said the functions which the Soviets fulfilled would be fulfilled by Germans. He pointed out that 90 percent of the traffic was already controlled by Germans.

Couve asked if for military traffic the Soviets would substitute German agents for Soviet agents.

Gromyko replied by saying, "Germans".

Lloyd asked if the Soviets would guarantee the rights and the Germans would carry them out.

Gromyko said that if agreement was reached the Soviets would guarantee.

Couve said we had agreements on military traffic and it was under Soviet responsibility. What we wished to know is would it remain under Soviet responsibility.

Gromyko said the Soviets would give a guarantee.

Lloyd asked if they would make some agreement with the East Germans.

Gromyko replied some kind of agreement with them would be necessary. The Soviets would cease to exercise certain functions. The Germans would take them over.

Couve remarked that the Soviets would have an agreement with the West and the Soviets would have an agreement with the GDR.

Gromyko said if we had an agreement the GDR would take part in assisting. If we did not want them to sign a document then they could issue a declaration. Then all four of us would take part in guarantees.

Mr. Herter asked what would happen if one day the DDR decided to stop our traffic.

Gromyko said this was an impossible example but pointed out that we would all be parties to the guarantee.

Couve pointed out that we had no power or responsibility in East Germany. The Soviets were responsible to us for access and the East Germans were responsible to the Soviets.

Gromyko said he could not accept the idea of the DDR as agents.

Lloyd said the four of us would guarantee freedom of access. The GDR would make a declaration and the Soviets would make their agreement with the DDR.

Gromyko said that they would make an agreement but it would be a simple one.

Mr. Herter asked if the agreement would establish the GDR as an occupying power.

Gromyko replied in the negative.

Mr. Herter said the Soviets proposed that they would turn over to someone else the responsibility that they had to us without consulting us. He inquired how we could guarantee the behavior of the GDR. If the GDR violated the arrangement, and this was a real responsibility [*possibility*], whose responsibility would that become?

Gromyko said if we did not believe in the GDR and in the capacity of the four powers then an agreement would be very difficult.

Lloyd asked what would happen if the GDR disagreed with the Soviet Union. As one of the participants would the Soviet Union be responsible.

Gromyko said that they would all look into it together. The Soviet Union had good relations with the GDR and was sure they would fulfill their agreements because they took this matter seriously.

Mr. Herter asked whom we go to if an American convoy was stopped on the Autobahn.

Gromyko said the first question was to determine in the agreement what should be passed—the number of trains, etc. Mr. Herter had raised a hypothetical situation and all of us would have to look into it.

Mr. Herter pointed out that differences do arise and inquired if we would be expected to go to a government we did not recognize.

Gromyko said the GDR would be participants whether their signature was on the same paper or not.

Mr. Herter said we have had some disagreements on access. Under this agreement to whom would we go?

Gromyko said we understood each other.

Couve said we understood each other but did not agree.

Lloyd said if he understood correctly there would be an agreement precisely on our access rights and a declaration by the GDR. If there was any difficulty we would go to the Soviet Union.

Gromyko said a system of guarantees could be worked out and these could all be in the same agreement or the Four Powers can sign an agreement and there would be a solemn declaration by the GDR and all parties would be responsible.

Couve said present obligations were clear. Our side carried out transport for the needs of a garrison with an obligation not to abuse this, for example, for commercial purposes. The Soviet obligation concerned transportation across the territory of their former zone—number of trains, etc. These arrangements could be confirmed or prolonged by agreement between the four of us. You tell us that your personnel are removed from check points and replace them with Germans. Then the Soviets make an agreement with the German authorities that they accept this responsibility. If difficulties arise we tell the Soviets in a form to be agreed upon and they arrange matters.

Gromyko said that Couve did not raise any new questions in his statement.

Mr. Herter suggested an alternative would be to have Germans at the check point responsible to the Four Powers.

Gromyko said this was not possible. As a sovereign state the GDR would undertake obligations. From the Western point of view it would be wrong to minimize their importance.

Couve said the GDR would take this responsibility in an agreement with the Soviet Union.

Gromyko said their agreement would be very simple. The Soviets would cease to perform certain functions and on a certain date, the GDR would take over the functions which they formerly fulfilled. This function was no longer that of the Soviet Union.

Lloyd said that it was a Soviet responsibility.

Gromyko remarked that this was for Four Powers.

Couve said that the GDR took over functions and responsibility. They were responsible to the Soviets.

Gromyko said he had already explained his position and did not accept that the GDR would be their agents.

Couve said that they would take over from the Soviets their responsibility and would be responsible to the Soviets.

Mr. Herter said it might be useful to seek in black and white what kind of agreement Gromyko had in mind to make with us and what kind of agreement with the East Germans.

Gromyko said it seemed to him that they had explained their position but we should all think together about the form of guarantees.

Mr. Herter said it was better to work from a piece of paper.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished to raise a new subject—that of the All German Committee. The Soviets had raised this in connection with the Peace Treaty and Dr. Grewe had mentioned it yesterday. The Western Powers knew the Soviet position on the All German Committee, namely that it should be established by Germans. However, he said that we here could recommend to them to create such a Committee on the basis of parity—not 25—10. He pointed out that there are two sides. They may discuss the question of reunification of Germany by stages. They might discuss the question of the principles of a Peace Treaty as well. It would be advisable to establish a certain period of time for the Committee to complete its work such as within one year.

Mr. Herter asked if the Committee disagreed, would they then submit their two proposals to elections.

Gromyko said no, that this was outside of his proposal.

Mr. Herter asked if the principles of a Peace Treaty were to apply after reunification.

Gromyko suggested that it be left to the Germans to decide this. Let them try for one year to undertake these tasks. The terms of reference would be (1) to discuss reunification by stages and (2) the principles of a Peace Treaty.

After an interval in which Gromyko raised the question of Polish and Czech participation but quickly dropped it saying he regretted the Western attitude on this matter and made clear he wished to keep the matter open, Gromyko said to Mr. Herter that the matter that they had been discussing today was, of course, within the framework of their Berlin proposals.

It was agreed to hold another private meeting on Thursday and a plenary session on Friday.

359. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, June 3, 1959, 9 p.m.

1040. Geneva for Hillenbrand. Paris for Embassy, USRO, CIN-CEUR Thurston & West. At today's informal monthly meeting with Commandants, Major Brandt gave his views on Geneva Conference. Brandt said his concern and that of Senate center on three points (and he made clear he most greatly concerned re third point):

(1) Brandt noted Gromyko had utilized plenary session to make detailed accusations against West Berlin propaganda and intelligence activities. He hoped West powers would utilize plenary session to set forth factual and detailed account of Communist intelligence and propaganda activities centered in East Berlin. He felt West should point out these activities directed against not only West Berlin and FedRep but other countries as well, such as Scandinavia. Brandt urged use of plenary session in order that exposé could be publicized world press.

(2) Brandt expressed concern lest in any understanding with Russians, West Powers neglect civilian access compared with garrison access. Brandt said he is having prepared on urgent basis a study of civilian access which would contain number new ideas and suggestions. Study will be forwarded to FedRep delegation Geneva. He mentioned also that Senator Guenter Klein would be returning to Geneva tomorrow.

(3) Brandt said it vital that DM West continue to be currency of West Berlin: "Should anything come between West German mark and the mark circulating in West Berlin" industrial and commercial life of Berlin would be jeopardized and he would "not wish to assume responsibility for consequences."

Speaking of current economic conditions, Brandt said present economic level West Berlin better than Senate had dared hope two months ago. He made specific reference to employment, production and orders. More tourists visiting Berlin now than at same time last year.

Of West Berlin morale, Brandt said he could speak with less certainty than of economic conditions. His impression was that morale had not basically changed from that of one month ago, but that two new factors had had effect: (1) relaxation following stirring events of May day and airlift memorial ceremonies, which all the more apparent now that May 27 safely passed; 2) apprehension engendered by world press speculation on possible Western "concessions" at Geneva.

Burns

360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, June 3, 1959, 8:10 p.m.

10647. Deliver following message to Prime Minister from the President. Advise date time delivery.

"June 3, 1959

Dear Harold:

I am glad that you have given Selwyn such firm support. Before your cable¹ arrived I had sent to Herter a message² telling him that I thought Selwyn had developed well in his post and that in my opinion he was doing a fine job. I think your statement should neutralize any damage done to his prestige by the *Times* article of June first.

This morning I shall be in a press conference³ and I shall undoubtedly be questioned closely about any discernible progress at Geneva and therefore the possibility of a Summit Conference.

As you know, I adhere to my position that a Summit meeting based on nothing more than wishful thinking would be a disaster. The world would interpret such a move as being a virtual surrender, while Soviet prestige would be enhanced.

On the other hand, we agreed in our conversations at Camp David⁴ that we could afford to make a rather liberal definition of progress. While I agree that a document formulating our two positions would be a useful document, I do think we must also have something recognizable as a specific accomplishment. For example there might be included as a prerequisite in your formula something of this sort: "Since the Geneva Conference is partially a result of the crisis of Berlin, created by the

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted at the White House and approved by Murphy.

¹Macmillan's message, June 2, was repeated to London at the end of Eisenhower's message in this telegram. Macmillan stated that he hoped there would be sufficient progress at Geneva to hold a summit meeting. In particular he thought that not very much progress was required, perhaps only an agreed formulation of the two positions would be enough. On June 3, however, Macmillan told Whitney that he doubted whether Khrushchev really was anxious for a summit meeting. The Prime Minister thought that the Soviet Union would break off the Geneva talks and sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, an eventuality that he believed the West was completely unprepared for. (Telegram 6338 from London, June 3; *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1/6-359)

²See Document 357.

³See footnote 6, Document 351.

⁴See Documents 234–241.

Soviet Union, there must be an agreement confirming the continuing status of Berlin pending the reunification of Germany." I do not see how any of us can with self-respect go to a Summit meeting unless such a statement has been issued by the Soviets or an agreement to this effect has been consummated.

While I shall not try to give at my press conference a full list of the things that would spell additional real progress at the Foreign Ministers' meetings, we might hope for a widening of contacts between the two sides of the Iron Curtain, particularly in the fields of press exchanges, books and travel by private citizens. Other ways in which progress might be achieved would be by some firm agreement for initial steps in banning of particular tests and control thereof.

I repeat that the production by the Foreign Ministers of a reasonable paper for us to work on at a Summit Conference, together with the assurance that there will be no further attempts to restrict our rights and privileges with respect to Berlin, constitute the very minimum that would justify a Summit meeting.

These are not new ideas; so far as I know, all of us are agreed on them.

With warm regard,

As ever, Ike"

[Here follows text of Macmillan's June 2 message to Eisenhower.]

Murphy

361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting

Washington, June 3, 1959, 10 p.m.

Tosec 189. Defense has provided us with copy of memorandum from JCS to SecDefense¹ on subject continuation of high altitude flights in Berlin corridors.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1321. Secret; No Distribution Outside State Department; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn and Berlin.

¹Not found.

Begin summary:

1. JCS concerned over State pronouncement that further high altitude flights not now planned in Berlin air corridors.

2. JCS recognizes importance political implications attendant on further high flights during Geneva discussions. Nevertheless JCS firmly believe flights should be reinstated at earliest possible time on regular and frequent basis without restriction to visual flight conditions. By halting flight, Soviets in position to exploit and proclaim correctness of statements that flights were instituted as provocative gestures without real operational requirement. US placed in position of explaining reasons for terminating flights, since we stated high flights operationally necessary.

3. C-130 is primary theater logistic support aircraft in Europe. It designed have most efficient operation of high altitudes. Present situation precludes efficient and economical use available transport resources. Theater commander denied latitude of selection of best means available to accomplish his support mission for Berlin.

4. JCS recommend subject be discussed with SecState at appropriate time in order obtain approval reinstatement high flights on regular and frequent basis. *End summary.*

Irwin has text of memorandum and will discuss with McElroy who may raise question with SecState.

Department recognizes force argumentation of JCS. Nevertheless, while present negotiations proceeding or future negotiations in prospect or proceeding, i.e.—high altitude flights would undoubtedly become subject of Soviet propaganda exploitation, using theme that US had unilaterally changed status quo, after having warned Soviets that Soviet action changing status quo would damage possibility fruitful negotiations, conceivable, however, that at some stage high altitude flights could have useful impact as demonstrating US firmness of purpose. This question of judgement to be appraised in light of developing circumstances.

If decision taken to make flights, British and French will expect to be advised in advance.

Dillon

362. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 4, 1959, 8:10 p.m.

Cahto 67. Uncleared summary private meeting June 4 follows (memo conversation being pouched):¹

Gromyko expressed following reactions: (1) Concerning access reaffirmed that what he had said day before on this point must be taken in conjunction with Soviet proposals on West Berlin; question was what type of West Berlin there was to be access to; (2) Any new arrangement reached could take form of agreement, protocol or declaration; (3) question of rights might not be mentioned and there might be simply an agreement reached on specific arrangements; (4) there was no question of new arrangements applying to both East and West Berlin; (5) he indicated symbolic troop units would be on order of platoon for each power.

Western Foreign Ministers again emphasized necessity of clearly acknowledging Western rights and attempted without success to get Gromyko to discuss para three Western paper (Cahto 64)² re subversion. At one point Lloyd suggested possibility of forum to hear complaints. Gromyko insisted upon talking only about arrangements in West Berlin alone to end activities he alleged being carried on there.

Greater part of meeting devoted to statements along familiar lines by each side regarding their positions. Secretary again emphasized importance reaffirming Western rights in view fact Soviets once said we had lost them and now spoke of turning over protection these rights to someone else without our knowing whether this someone would protect our rights. Gromyko insisted main question was status West Berlin and ending occupation there.

Secretary said Allied troops important reassurance to West Berliners, were symbolic and Soviets could take West Berlin tomorrow if they wanted unless it started world war. Lloyd expressed doubts neutral troops would remain indefinitely and Berliners would not have same confidence in them as in Allied troops.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1327. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Lewis and concurred by Thompson.

¹ US/MC/77, June 4. (*Ibid.*, CF 1339)

² See footnote 3, Document 358.

After meeting Gromyko asked Secretary what he meant by remark to effect Soviets could capture West Berlin but this would mean world war. Secretary replied he only stated the obvious but such Soviet move would have consequences he had suggested. Gromyko said not good to make threats and these did not frighten Soviets. He could make strong statements too but thought this would not contribute to reaching agreement.

Herter

363. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/80

Geneva, June 4, 1959, 8:15 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Merchant

France

Mr. Couve de Murville
Mr. Laloy
Mr. Lucet

United Kingdom

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. P.F. Hancock

USSR

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Soldatov

SUBJECT

Berlin

The conversation during dinner was nonsubstantive. The atmosphere was unstrained and Gromyko made a more than usual effort to be agreeable and witty.

After coffee the entire party settled down together and the Ministers launched into a discussion picking up where the conversation had ended in the afternoon.

In response to some remark of Secretary Herter's which I missed, I heard Mr. Gromyko say that the Soviet Union would naturally defend the GDR and its sovereignty as a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter on June 5. The conversation was held following a dinner given by Couve de Murville at Villa "La Barakat." A brief summary account was transmitted in Cahto 70 from Geneva, June 5. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/6-559)

The Secretary then said as he understood it the Soviets proposed to turn over their rights to the DDR.

Gromyko replied that the Soviets contemplated ceasing to exercise their functions which after the turnover would be exercised by the DDR.

The Secretary remarked, in apparent summary of their private conversation up to that point, that the Ministers seemed to be moving rapidly towards nothing.

Gromyko answered that the Soviets came to Geneva to negotiate seriously but if the Western Ministers put up proposals such as the ones submitted yesterday, then the Soviets gravely doubt that there is any desire on the Western part to negotiate seriously.

Couve de Murville said that there was nothing new in our position. As the Soviets know we will not give up our rights or the retention of our troops in Berlin but we are making an effort to meet the expressed worries of the Soviets.

Gromyko said that our proposals were no good for that purpose.

The Secretary interjected that it was the Soviets who had created the present tension and Gromyko countered by saying that it was Western troops in Berlin which created it. He added that we had also contributed to the present situation by what we had done in the Federal Republic of Germany and our earlier violation of the Potsdam Agreement.

The Secretary inquired who first broke the Potsdam Agreement and Gromyko replied that it would be a waste of time to argue points of past history. He said that the Soviets admit that the West have rights but that fourteen years have passed and there are now two states in Germany, which creates a changed situation.

The Secretary inquired directly if legal rights expire with time and Gromyko replied, "Yes."

The Secretary said that time had passed and wondered with the passage of time if Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, for example, should not now be free.

Gromyko reacted violently and asked why the Secretary was introducing matters which had no connection with Berlin for purely polemical reasons. He said that he also could mention other things.

The Secretary returned to the question of why the passage of time affected our rights in Germany and asked wherein the danger lay which the Soviets professed to see.

Gromyko reiterated that fourteen years had passed and the DDR now existed as a state. West Berlin was in the center of DDR territory but apparently it is our desire to discuss internal matters unrelated to Berlin.

Couve said that we recognize as a fact that there is a so-called DDR and that West Berlin exists. We recognize reality and are prepared to

adjust to it reasonably, to which Gromyko answered that he saw no evidence of any Western intent to adjust.

Couve repeated that the West would not change the status of Berlin nor withdraw its troops and that Mr. Gromyko should now realize this.

Gromyko inquired what proposals we had to make since those of yesterday obviously could not bring us closer to an agreement.

The Secretary remarked that he really didn't know where we went from here.

Gromyko exclaimed, "You want us to undersign your occupation regime!" to which the Secretary answered that all we wanted was the Soviets to admit our rights.

Mr. Lloyd interjected that in three respects we had proffered concessions. He said that Mr. Gromyko by now should realize that we would not accept his free city proposal and apparently he would not accept our proposal for uniting Berlin. Within the limits of this basic disagreement we had offered to consider improvements in the propaganda situation and to place a ceiling over our troops and to consider any Soviet proposals on access. He added that Gromyko had made no concession whatsoever. Selwyn Lloyd continued that in any arrangement which might be agreed would be the explicit understanding that it would last until Germany was reunified.

Couve added that in addition to those mentioned by Mr. Lloyd we had made a fourth concession, namely, our willingness to consider an interim arrangement for West Berlin outside the Western Peace Plan.¹

Gromyko said he saw no sign of any concession in what we had said. On troops we were merely abandoning what we do not now have and we were asking him to countersign our occupation regime. He then asked as a question, what would we say to an agreement which said nothing on our rights.

Lloyd replied that if the Soviets agreed not to question any such arrangements for six months or some other brief period, that was one thing. On the other hand if they agreed that any such arrangements were valid until Germany was reunified, that was another.

Gromyko asked why we could not discuss arrangements now and further asked what was wrong with avoiding any invocation of our rights but merely agree on arrangements.

Couve said that our difficulty is perfectly clear and of Soviet creation. He said the Soviets have disputed our rights and in fact in the note of November 27² had declared them null and void. This statement had

¹ See footnote 1, Document 295.

² See Document 72.

not been repeated by Mr. Gromyko at Geneva who had contented himself with saying that the Soviets do not like the present situation without disputing our legal position. Nevertheless the Soviets had originally raised the question of our rights in their notes and we are left wondering what would happen in the future.

Gromyko said we have so far reached no agreement on arrangements and suggested that that is what should be done.

Mr. Lloyd said that it was the Soviets who had sowed the seeds of doubts which now grew in our minds. Gromyko rejoined the doubts are not justified.

Mr. Lloyd added that we had thought the 1949 agreement³ was good but now the Soviets challenged it.

Gromyko said that he realized we were worried about our rights, "but let us eliminate them from the picture."

The Secretary noted that if we say nothing of our rights, would not the Soviets assume that we have given them up? He said that they had been challenged by the Soviets and their notes had denied their continued existence. He asked if the Soviets would publicly acknowledge our rights in a form, for example, such as Mr. Khrushchev had done in his Leipzig speech.⁴

Gromyko said that he suggested this question of rights be set to one side and agreement reached on arrangements.

Couve reminded Gromyko that the Soviet Government had spoken of concluding a separate peace treaty with the DDR thereby extinguishing our rights. This posed an obvious problem for us.

Gromyko answered that the peace treaty was another matter and that if we reach agreement on arrangements for West Berlin then each state involved in the agreement will continue to fulfill its obligations.

The Secretary then said that Gromyko had said that no arrangements were possible until the occupation status of West Berlin had been given up.

Gromyko asked what our ideas were on West Berlin. He said they had had nothing from the Secretary on this point.

Mr. Lloyd said that he was repeating himself but that he had noted three concessions we had offered and Couve had added a fourth.

Mr. Gromyko ridiculed the proposal on troop ceilings.

Mr. Lloyd reminded Mr. Gromyko that on the question of access procedures we had indicated the possibility of the Soviets using Germans, to which Gromyko replied, "After all it's their country."

³ For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, June 20, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.

⁴ For text of Khrushchev's speech at Leipzig on March 7, 1959, see *Pravda*, March 27, 1959; an extract from the speech is printed in *Moskau Bonn*, pp. 518–524.

The Secretary said after all the Soviets have obligations to us. Gromyko's reply was, "Our past obligations."

Couve then suggested putting matters another way. Gromyko had asked us what our concessions or proposals were and he now asked Gromyko what were his. The Secretary noted in an aside that every Soviet proposal so far involved taking away our rights.

Gromyko again asked what we proposed to him. He said that on the third point (illegal and clandestine operations) he saw a certain forward step and he was thinking along approximately the same lines but that this could not be separated from the other elements.

Mr. Lloyd said that he had thought there had been some progress in the talk yesterday about access arrangements.

Gromyko said that he had discussed that fully yesterday and had nothing to add. He saw our cause for concern and realized that this was an important matter for us. He thought that it was possible to find a satisfactory understanding on this point but that it could not be agreed apart from the other related points.

In reply to Lloyd's question as to what elements there were to be considered apart from propaganda, access and troops and Couve's companion question as to Gromyko's view on the troops, Gromyko answered that he had expressed himself many times. He understood that we wanted a guarantee on access but to require the Soviets to accept an agreement not to increase Western troops in Berlin was too much. He then asked how could we expect an agreement to be reached which involved maintaining the present situation in West Berlin.

Mr. Lloyd asked why the Soviets were worried over our symbolic troops in Berlin. Was it a question of prestige?

Gromyko did not reply directly but said that there was a physical relationship to the troops and the situation in the city and that whereas they might be only 11,000 or possibly 15,000, this number was worse than 50,000 Western troops in some other location in Europe.

Couve asked how many Soviet troops were in East Berlin and Gromyko said that he thought none. When Couve then asked how many Soviet troops were within a few miles of Berlin, Gromyko said that he did not know.

There was then some half serious talk about the rotating symbolic Four Power guard of Spandau Prison in West Berlin which was a Soviet military presence which Couve said we did not dispute.

The Secretary then said to Gromyko, "I would like to ask you if we were to sign a satisfactory agreement with no mention of our rights would you consider that we had given up all our rights?"

Gromyko turned aside the question by asking why it was being raised and referring to the fact that he had suggested that in any

agreement there be neither any positive nor negative indication with respect to our rights.

The Secretary said this would leave us in a position where we did not know where we stood. We might say we had maintained our rights and the Soviets would claim we had abandoned them. He then asked if our old agreements would still stand, to which Gromyko replied that they would not be involved.

Couve then said in other words our old agreements would stand if they had not been renounced.

Mr. Merchant then asked Mr. Gromyko as a hypothetical question what public reply the Soviet Government would make if, having reached an agreement on West Berlin making no mention of our rights, the three Western Governments were to declare concurrently with the agreement or immediately afterwards that the Soviets had acknowledged that we were legally in Berlin and had not disputed our rights of presence there and access.

Gromyko asked why anyone should say anything about rights since they would not be involved in the agreement and that it would be contrary to our agreement to mention them.

Both Mr. Lloyd and Secretary Herter pushed him on this point, pointing out that it would be impossible not to answer publicly questions concerning the status of our rights and noting that we had Khrushchev's public statement that we were legally in West Berlin. Gromyko kept insisting that the agreement would require that there be no mention of rights.

The Secretary said that it would be impossible for him to go home and face the Congress without being able to say exactly where our rights stood and Mr. McElroy noted that the challenge to our rights was the whole cause of the controversy and the reason for our presence in Geneva.

Mr. Gromyko was reminded that the Soviet note of November 27 had declared our rights null and void, to which he replied that we had given too narrow an interpretation to the language of the Soviet notes.

The Secretary said that the main question to be settled was the question of our rights and their acknowledgment.

Gromyko countered by saying that the main question was the presence of Western troops in West Berlin. For the fiftieth time he inquired what constructive proposals we had to offer, upon which unanswered question the meeting broke up at 11:20 p.m.

364. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, June 5, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SMALL DELEGATION MEETING

PRESENT

The Secretary	Mr. Reinhardt
Secretary McElroy	Mr. Smith
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Sullivan
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Becker	Mr. Krebs
Mr. Berding	
Mr. Irwin	

Possible Visit by Mayor Brandt to Geneva

1. Mr. Merchant said that Senator Klein of Berlin has returned to Geneva and told Hillenbrand this morning that Mayor Brandt was unhappy about the extent to which the German Foreign Office was keeping him informed about the Conference.¹ Klein said that Brandt would be happy to come to Geneva on Monday on his way to Paris for an engagement on Tuesday. Mr. Merchant thought it would be excellent if the Secretary were to invite Brandt to a lunch to be attended also by Couve, Lloyd and von Brentano. The Secretary said he thought this was a very good idea. Ambassador Thompson suggested, however, that, since Brandt might be expected to make some public statements on the Conference in Paris, it might be preferable to ask Brandt to come to Geneva after his visit to Paris. The Secretary indicated agreement.

Norstad's Views on Limitation of Forces in Berlin

2. Mr. Merchant called attention to a telegram from Paris² reporting General Norstad's concern over a possible agreement involving the reduction of allied forces in Berlin. Mr. Irwin observed that General Norstad was concerned about quantitative limitations on allied forces in Berlin and said it was not clear whether Norstad was referring to a ceiling on troop strength at present levels or to a reduction of forces.

Tactical Matters

3. Mr. Merchant said that as of last night neither Couve nor Lloyd had a prepared statement for today's plenary. There was some

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1367. Secret. The meeting was held in Conference Room 209 of the Consulate General Annex.

¹ A memorandum of Hillenbrand's conversation with Klein at 8:30 a.m., US/MC/78, is *ibid.*, CF 1339.

² Telegram 4469 from Paris, June 4. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/6-459)

discussion of the US draft of a common declaration on Berlin,³ Mr. Becker indicating that he thought it not desirable to discuss it at the Coordinating Group meeting today⁴ since it was essentially a fall-back paper. Mr. Merchant agreed, noting that the paper needed reworking. The Secretary observed that the reference in paragraph 1 of the declaration to reunification should be lifted out and made a separate paragraph. Mr. Merchant said it might be desirable to use the paper at the private session on Saturday, and the Secretary added that Couve hoped we could use it at that time.

Illegal Communist Activities in West Berlin

4. There was extensive discussion of the desirability of the Secretary making a statement at the plenary today on illegal communist activities in East Berlin. The Secretary thought that, if we could not add a great deal to what Berlin Interior Senator Lipschitz had said to the press yesterday about the Senat White Paper it might not be desirable for him to make such a statement. Mr. Berding expressed the view that it would be useful to put on the record our data on these activities, noting that to date only one side of the picture had been presented. Both Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Merchant indicated that they thought this material had been fairly well got into public channels. The Secretary then suggested that we might see how his draft speech dovetailed with the material made public by the West Berlin Government, particularly making sure that we do not appear to be echoing the Germans. The Secretary remarked that a decision had been reached two days ago for him to speak at the plenary on the subject but that this was before Senator Lipschitz's press conference.

Press Leaks

5. Mr. Berding said that Hightower of the AP had told him that he had had from "British and French sources" information about yesterday's private session. Mr. Berding also called attention to the AFP account in the *Journal de Geneve* of yesterday's private meeting. He emphasized that the US had scrupulously abided by the agreement on no publicity about the private meetings and said that British and French action made it much harder for us. Mr. Merchant said that we could not forget that we have a bludgeon to use on the British and French. We can say that the leaks have become so regular and accurate, and that we are so satisfied that the US is not to blame, that the only way for us to

³ For text of this draft, transmitted in Cahto 78 from Geneva, June 6, see Document 372, and footnotes 3 and 4 thereto.

⁴ A memorandum of the conversation at the Coordinating Group meeting at 10:30 a.m. during which the Deputies reviewed many of the points discussed here by the U.S. Delegation, US/MC/81, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1367.

proceed would be for the Secretary to deal with Gromyko alone. He admitted that this was a heavy stick, but he thought we should not forget that we have it in our closet. The Secretary observed that it was interesting that Gromyko had not directly asked to see him alone. Mr. Bundy noted that there have been certain indirect approaches in this respect.

[Here follow paragraphs 6 and 7 on unrelated subjects.]

UN Role in Berlin Settlement

8. Mr. Wilcox said he thought that if we reached the stage where we begin drafting a communiqué on the Foreign Ministers' Conference, it would be desirable to bear in mind making some reference to the UN. He thought it important to do so: 1) because of charges that the Administration pays only lip service to the UN; and 2) in view of the danger of the Berlin situation, prospects for lessening friction might be increased if the UN were to assume some kind of minor role in the area. The Secretary commented that the discussions to date have not lent themselves to consideration of a UN role. He thought Mr. Wilcox had a valid point and that if we had some agreement to be carried out, then we might draw on the UN. Mr. Smith agreed that it would be desirable to get across the point that the US would not object to some kind of international presence in Berlin. The Secretary pointed out, however, that the terms of reference were very important and indicated that mere generalization would not be desirable. The UN itself, he said, would not accept the role unless it knew exactly what was involved. Mr. Merchant suggested that if Gromyko were to pick up the declaratory passage in Stage I of the Western Peace Plan, then we might in the communiqué recite language of the UN Charter and induce the Soviets to reaffirm their Charter obligations.

365. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 5, 1959, noon.

Cahto 69. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

Informal discussions during the last 36 hours have centered entirely on talking points which we had put on paper representing our

views as to what should be included in a Berlin settlement. These were cabled to the Department in Cahto 64.¹ After complete rejection of our paper, Gromyko discussed it point by point and, in effect, has accepted our contention that any arrangement we make should continue until the reunification of Germany, and that there should be reciprocal East Berlin and West Berlin cessation of unlawful clandestine activities interfering in internal affairs of others. He has made a point of not mentioning our rights in any form and we are insisting this is the key to our position since the Soviets began the effort to deny these rights. He is likewise most anxious to have occupation forces reduced considerably and we are unwilling to go beyond a ceiling limitation within existing numbers.

I can sense rather than report some progress. Gromyko is obviously nervous and seems to be moving slightly in our direction. Your press conference² was a great help to us and all Allied Ministers agree that it struck exactly the right note. Many thanks.

Faithfully,

Signed: Chris."

Herter

¹ See footnote 3, Document 358.

² See footnote 6, Document 351.

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, June 5, 1959, 1 p.m.

2729. Department for Mr. Murphy. Adenauer has addressed letter to chairman CDU Bundestag faction saying that he will not run for presidency but will remain Chancellor.¹ Letter allegedly says this decision reached in light Geneva discussions and views of American Government made known to him on recent visit there.² Adenauer met with

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.11/6-559. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, London, and Geneva.

¹ Presumably the letter in Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 548-550.

² See footnote 1, Document 338.

Executive Committee CDU/CSU Bundestag faction this morning and he reaffirmed this position saying specifically again his decision based on views President Eisenhower that it important he remain actively at helm Federal Government especially in difficult period international negotiations ahead. Chancellor is now in meeting with Cabinet and will lead special faction meeting at one o'clock. It has not yet been possible reach faction leaders but Rasner, CDU whip who took part Executive Committee meeting this morning but did not have time discuss in detail, said "Chancellor remains Chancellor and Party Chairman and his decision is firm and will remain so."

There is unprecedented confusion and discouragement throughout CSU/DU faction where Adenauer's tactics are considered embarrassing and clumsy. Even among those at lower levels completely devoted Adenauer policies most frequent remark is that "this is case for psychiatrist." CSU leaders especially, but also others, express concern that Adenauer will have lost respect and authority in party, that stability and orderliness Federal Republic politics and CDU will be questioned everywhere abroad. Nevertheless, Adenauer is reported to have said to von Hassel who warned against these consequences that there would indeed be uproar but it would die down in few days. At least one CSU deputy, Kemmer, added that Adenauer's popularity remains unweakened and public would continue willing accept his decision as wise and necessary in any case.

Adenauer letter to faction proposed Etzel as presidential candidate and much of irritation in CDU is being directed at him for willingness be party to such disruptive measures. There are conflicting reports about his acceptance of nomination but it is widely believed he has agreed on condition faction willing. Whether this will be case will probably be determined this afternoon.

Bruce

367. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, June 5, 1959, 10 p.m.

Secto 188. Paris pass USRO. Fifteenth Session held June 5, 3:30 to 5:54 p.m., Secretary Chairman.

Secretary spoke first on Berlin and GDR subversive activities centered in East Berlin (text sent Secto 183).¹

Lloyd then made short appeal² to Gromyko to reconsider Soviet position re Berlin against broader background of world wide desire for easing tensions and make genuine effort to reduce world tensions by adopting Western suggestions. Emphasized Western purpose is to safeguard freedom West Berliners and therefore could not accept Soviet proposals for withdrawal Western garrisons, introduction Soviet troops or replacement Western troops by neutrals. Said he and Macmillan visited Russia in attempt improve East-West relations. Same purpose behind UK-Soviet trade and cultural agreements.³

Gromyko then said⁴ Soviets had clearly stated positions and did not accept interpretations of others. Denied Soviets planned annex West Berlin. Regretted statements like Secretary's accusations as lowering tone of discussion and said Soviets had large dossier on subversive activities in West Berlin—only it contained true facts. Puzzled that Lloyd asked Soviets review position. Did he want Soviets extend occupation to East Berlin? Concluded by asking West for clarification (1) declaration against use of force and willingness settle differences through negotiations, (2) some type of zone in Europe.

Secretary briefly answered Gromyko,⁵ saying that if Soviet attitude was correctly reflected by Khrushchev's statement⁶ that no elements

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-559. Official Use Only. Drafted by Lewis. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/15 (Corrected) and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/15, June 5, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1367.

¹ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-559) For text of Herter's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/34, June 6, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 245–254; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 143–150; or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 29, 1959, pp. 943–948.

² For text of Lloyd's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/33, June 5, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 254–256 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 151–152.

³ The trade agreement had been signed on May 24; the cultural agreement, on March 3.

⁴ For text of Gromyko's statement as recorded in the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 256–258.

⁵ For text of Herter's statement as recorded in the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, see *ibid.*, p. 258.

⁶ For an extract from Khrushchev's speech at Tirana, May 31, see *ibid.*, pp. 306–310.

Western plan acceptable, there seemed no point in providing clarification on certain proposals contained in it. Gromyko rejoined Khrushchev was speaking of Western proposals on Berlin and had said elsewhere there are elements in Western plan which deserve attention if not made contingent on other points like German reunification. Secretary said he assumed from this that Gromyko wished return to discussion peace plan and he was delighted. Gromyko ended exchange by asking facetiously if Secretary switching to Western plan to make Soviet delegation happy.

Bolz noted⁷ Gromyko had mentioned non-aggression pact. GDR welcomed idea and Ulbricht had offered conclude one with Adenauer. Bolz said he had told Brentano in Geneva he willing begin negotiations with Federal Republic any time. Negotiations between two German delegations would relieve conference of troublesome problems. Did not wish go into question subversive activities in West Berlin but had much information such as tunnel dug into East Berlin for espionage purposes.

Grewe, in short statement,⁸ noted Federal Republic's position clear re reunification and Berlin problem. Saw no reason add to facts given today on GDR subversive activities.

Secretary concluded meeting, saying time next meeting would be decided by Ministers.

Herter

⁷For text of Bolz' statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/10, June 6, see *ibid.*, pp. 580–582 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 211–213.

⁸For text of Grewe's statement as recorded in the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 580.

368. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, June 5, 1959, 8 p.m.

1053. Geneva for Hillenbrand. On return [from?] Geneva yesterday I requested appointment Mayor Brandt. He received me at his house late last night in usual friendly manner but stated he particularly glad

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6–559. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and also sent to Geneva and Bonn.

have chance talk at length because he had never been more depressed in his life and wished unburden himself. Principal causes his low state mind:

1. He is extremely upset over apparent decision not hold presidential elections in Berlin on July 1 particularly after it has been so frequently stated publicly that they will be held here. Furthermore five years ago previous presidential elections held here and precedent created. If it abandoned now, can only appear to Russians and Berlin population that West is beating retreat from Berlin. Brandt is convinced that such retreat will not favorably impress Russians but merely egg them on as favorable gestures to Russians are not appreciated by them but merely excite their derision. He added that SPD had learned through its Ostburo that after his colleague Ollenauer visited Khrushchev in Sov Embassy East Berlin¹ he and Socialist Party had been subject of derisive witticisms by Khrushchev, who had made fun of them as easy to fool. Brandt also depressed by circumstance that he unable ascertain who is responsible for decision not to hold presidential election here. In so far as he can learn everyone concerned disclaims responsibility and puts it on to someone else. Germans generally blame Allies and he had heard that Allies disclaim any responsibility.

His depression re this matter further increased by efforts being made by some circles even to prevent President Heuss from coming Berlin formally to take possession Schloss Bellevue which has been restored as official presidential residence here. He feels that if Heuss is forced to call off an already announced visit and rescind invitations already given out for dinner and reception on June 18 Berlin will really have been abandoned in eyes of world.

2. He had learned through German channels that Western Foreign Ministers had presented memorandum to Russians on June 3² which reportedly made major concessions with regard to Berlin and Allied rights to protect city. He had ascertained that German Delegation in Geneva had this memorandum and had requested to be informed concerning its contents. His request had met with flat refusal accompanied by explanation that paper was not one intended to be seen by Berlin's Mayor. He remarked with wry, bitter note that as chief magistrate of object to be altered he thought he had right to know what proposed to be done to him and his people—after all the Russians know.

I had already received Geneva's 45 to Berlin³ and was able assure him that Berlin had not been sold out. I did not tell him that I had seen

¹ This meeting took place on March 9.

² See footnote 3, Document 358.

³ Telegram 45 transmitted the paper referred to in footnote 2 above. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-359)

text but merely that I had learned in Geneva that Russians had been complaining in various ways that Western powers are maintaining troops in Berlin as threat to peace of Europe and are engaging in propaganda and various other activities further to aggravate threat. I added that Western powers had, I understood, decided make it very clear to Russians that they had no intention yielding any their rights whatsoever but that they were willing listen to any specific suggestions Russians might wish make as to what the Western powers might do, without infringing their rights, to meet specific Soviet grievances. Brandt seemed reassured.

Brandt grateful for information furnished him recently by U.S. Mission and asked me to send his personal thanks to Secretary Herter. He still feels very strong sense of grievance over incomplete information he is receiving through German channels and is therefore especially thankful for reassurance he has received through us that confusing and disheartening press reports have no factual basis.

I told Brandt I had been glad be able report in Geneva that Berliners were keeping up their spirits. He added that this was true, that morale was still good, but that he was receiving increasing reports to effect that people throughout city who had not hitherto shown interest in such things were giving more and more attention to discouraging press political reports. Brandt made it very plain that Berlin morale will be subject most severe strain when Berliners become aware that presidential election will not be held here and that some public gesture on the part of the West will be necessary to counteract bad effect of such announcement.

Brandt took up following additional points:

A. He would be leaving Berlin next morning to visit Copenhagen. After returning for weekend would leave Tuesday for a 2-1/2 day visit Paris. Some his colleagues have suggested that Western Foreign Ministers might be critical over his leaving city now. He asked me to report that he can be reached at any minute through German diplomatic missions in Copenhagen or Paris and that he felt it would be harmful for him put off his visits.

B. Brandt remarked parenthetically after his aversion to Khrushchev's reaction to Ollenaar visit that controversy which had arisen in SPD about SPD journalists' visits to Soviet Union was apparently resolving itself satisfactorily. I believe he inserted this remark to register opinion that controversy embarrassing to negotiations in Geneva was not likely to break out in the Social Democratic Party and that the pro-Western elements in party were gaining strength.

C. Brandt described as unfortunate Adenauer's announcement that he wished continue as Chancellor and would not be candidate for

presidency.⁴ It will greatly confuse political situation and not be conducive to Adenauer's own prestige while at same time continuation in Chancellor's office will subject him to physical and mental strain which might terminate his activity under circumstances that could further complicate situation. Brandt had not had time think over full implications of announcement but his initial reactions remarkably nonpartisan.

Re Brandt's complaint under heading (2) above, with telegrams [I am?] now receiving I can reassure him regarding what is not being done in Geneva. His discontent with his own people over their failure better to inform him and bad effect of their tactless remarks, such as that matters concerning Berlin are not matters about which he can always properly query them, present problem that unfavorably affect Allied interests but cannot be remedied without German corrective action.

Re Brandt's concern about presidential election, I recommend that we tell Germans go ahead and hold election here. If election is not held here we will be blamed. Resulting bad effect on Berlin morale will very likely be such that some extremely strong gesture from Western side will be required to repair damage—and such gesture might involve much more objectionable implications than holding election here.

Gufler

⁴ Adenauer's decision was announced on June 4.

369. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 6, 1959, 10 p.m.

Cahto 79. Bonn eyes only for Ambassador. London eyes only for Ambassador. Moscow eyes only for Chargé. Paris eyes only for Ambassador. Berlin eyes only for Gufler. Paris pass USSR—eyes only for Ambassador Burgess. Following is summary uncleared memorandum of private meeting at Lloyd's Villa 11 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. devoted to Berlin.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-659. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. A detailed 13-page memorandum of this meeting, US/MC/86, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340.

Discussion revolved around rights, troop numbers and separate treaty. We stressed need to know where we stood on rights. Gromyko repeatedly stated Soviets wanted no mention of rights in agreement. Under repeated pressing he still would not explain Sov position on what effect a new agreement would have on our rights.

Regarding access, he took position this could be easily settled if status of West Berlin agreed upon. He pictured our talking paper¹ as backward step, and as take or leave it approach and tried to elicit more details our position. In discussion of troop levels Gromyko denied they were interested in naming figure but said our proposal for ceiling was backward step. He then indicated that level of troops would be political not technical decision.

Pressed by Secretary and others for reaffirmation of Soviet recognition of Western rights in Berlin, Gromyko said that whatever agreement is reached will be observed fully until German reunification is achieved, that question of Western rights should not be involved and that, in fact, failure to raise this issue would be in interest of West. He would not say that this would preclude signature of a separate peace treaty with the GDR. Soviets were not, he said, suggesting either affirmation or denial of Western rights. An agreement reached among the four re Berlin would be observed regardless of any other agreements. Continued Western insistence on question of rights elicited only the response that Soviet Union does not deny the existence of such rights—but Gromyko continued to insist that any agreement on Berlin should contain no reference to them.

Herter

¹ See footnote 3, Document 358.

370. Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers did not meet on June 7.

371. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Embassy in Germany

Geneva, June 8, 1959, 11 a.m.

178. Eyes only Chiefs of Mission. Paris pass USRO eyes only for Ambassador Burgess and Thurston for Norstad. Reference Bonn's 125 to Geneva.¹

I have very much in mind Hamlett's views re limitation Berlin garrisons as well as Norstad's expressed concerns. In first place we have never considered specific agreement with Soviets on numbers since this would limit our freedom possible future action and open door to Soviet entrance West Berlin on claim rights of inspection. Hence any statement contemplated would take form unilateral declarative statement of intentions. Similarly all Western delegations are thinking in terms intention not exceed existing figures and not in terms any reduction in force unless in Western judgment future developments in Berlin should justify.

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-859. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, and the Department as Cahto 86, which is the source text.

¹ Telegram 125, June 6, agreed with the reservations that Hamlett, Norstad, and Brandt had expressed about limiting the size of the garrison in Berlin, but stated that if the West did agree to a limitation, this function would not be shared or exercised by the Soviet Union. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/6-659)

372. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 8, 1959, 10 p.m.

Cahto 90. Eyes only for Ambassadors Moscow, eyes only Chargé USRO and Berlin, eyes only for Burgess and Gufler. Paris pass USRO.

Private meeting today at Gromyko's Villa made no progress. Gromyko continued refusal to consider signing any agreement reaf-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-859. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. An eight-page detailed memorandum of the conversation, US/MC/88, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340.

firming our rights. Following paper (refinement draft contained Cahto 78)¹ earlier in day agreed by Couve, Selwyn, von Brentano and myself,² was given Gromyko who said he would study but preliminarily considered it "one-sided" and saw no change in substance Western position:

"1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the USSR have examined the question of Berlin in the desire to find mutually satisfactory solutions to the problems which have been raised and which derive essentially from the division of Berlin and of Germany. The four Ministers recognize that the agreements at present in force, which are based on the rights acquired as a result of the unconditional surrender of Germany, could be supplemented in certain respects without prejudice to the continued validity of the rights themselves.

2. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has declared the intention of the Soviet Government to withdraw its forces from Berlin. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that it is the intention of their governments not to increase the combined total of the forces they now maintain in Berlin. They further declare that they may be able to reduce such forces, but only to the extent, consistent with their responsibilities, that developments in Berlin permit.

3. The Ministers consider that measures could be taken consistent with fundamental rights and liberties to avoid in both parts of Berlin activities which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests of the different parties.³

4. The Ministers reaffirm on behalf of their governments the existing rights and obligations with respect to free and unrestricted access to Berlin by land, by water, and by air, including those of the French, United Kingdom and United States forces stationed in Berlin. These rights and obligations shall continue to be maintained for all persons, goods and communications. The procedures applicable shall be those in effect in April, 1959. These procedures, however, may be carried out by German personnel, it being understood that none of the existing

¹ Cahto 78, June 6, transmitted the draft printed below with the exceptions of the differences noted in footnotes 3 and 4. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/6-659)

² A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting at 2:45 p.m., US/MC/91, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340.

³ Paragraph 3 of the draft transmitted in Cahto 78 reads:

"The Foreign Ministers consider that measures should be taken in Berlin, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, in order to avoid activities which might either disturb public order or constitute an interference into the domestic affairs of others."

responsibilities are changed.⁴ The Ministers likewise reaffirm that free access shall continue to be maintained between East Berlin and West Berlin. All disputes which might arise with respect to access will be raised and settled between the four governments. The latter will establish a quadripartite commission which will meet in Berlin to examine any difficulties arising out of the application of the present paragraph and to facilitate their settlement.

5. The Ministers agree that the arrangements herein agreed to will continue in force until the reunification of Germany."

Herter

⁴ Paragraph 4 of the draft transmitted in Cahto 78 had certain minor wording differences, but only the following two sentences after this point in the paragraph:

"All disputes which might arise with respect to access will be raised and settled between the four governments. The Foreign Ministers reaffirm that freedom of movement shall be continued to be maintained between East and West Berlin."

373. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 9, 1959, 11 a.m.

Cahto 91. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

Today marks the opening of the fifth week of our conference and I have reached the conclusion that we are at a crossroads which requires a new initiative on our part. The situation today, as I see it, is that we have presented the Western peace plan and persuasively supported it in semi-public plenary sessions. We have also in same forum disposed of Soviet package. For past two weeks real dialogue has been in private meetings with severely restricted attendance.

These sessions have concentrated on possible nature of arrangements for West Berlin pending reunification, the latter an event probably years distant.

During last week of private meetings it has been accepted, I believe, by Gromyko that we will not consider his free city proposal. He has equally made it clear that Soviets will not consider our united Berlin proposal. Much underbrush has been cleared away. Significantly Gromyko has acknowledged that our present presence in Berlin is by right. He consistently refuses, however, to contemplate any reference to our rights in any agreement which might be reached here. He has not insisted on the DDR being a party to such agreement and he has accepted our reiterated refusal to accord DDR recognition. He affirms that any agreement reached here will be scrupulously adhered to by the Soviets until reunification and also by DDR who would accept obligation in bilateral collateral arrangement between Soviets and DDR or some comparable method which I think could be worked out satisfactorily to us.

Essence of the position as I see it today is that an agreement reached here on Berlin with Soviets which lacked any reference to our rights (and to variety of agreements and arrangements based on them during past fourteen years) would make it difficult in future to contest claim by Soviets on such future day as they choose to conclude separate peace treaty with DDR that all rights, obligations and arrangements not specifically covered in any agreement reached and recorded here at Geneva would from that day forward be extinguished. It is conceivable that some other way could be found to protect us on this point, such as a declaration by us which the Soviets would accept without denial, but I am dubious, particularly in view of Khrushchev's recent statement in Budapest¹ which Gromyko reflected in sterile private session.

As I said earlier, I believe a new attempt to break the deadlock is required. To be effective with the Soviets it must come from the United States. Otherwise we will not only waste time from now on but more important risk misinterpretation by the Soviets of the solidity of our basic position. Accordingly I would appreciate your guidance on the following course of action which I recommend. If approved by you I would then seek the agreement of Selwyn, Couve and von Brentano to my talking without delay to Gromyko alone along the lines I am about to suggest.

I would then plan to tell Gromyko:

(1) That the conference is clearly now getting nowhere though each side has usefully obtained a clearer picture of the other's position.

¹ At a press conference in Budapest on June 7, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union could not accept an agreement on Berlin that perpetuated the occupation regime. Extracts from the press conference were printed in *Pravda* June 8.

(2) That the Allied position on the following points is immovable and not open to negotiation:

(A) That any agreement reached here must reflect the fact that it is without prejudice to the continuation in force of our rights of presence in and access to Berlin.

(B) That we might ourselves consider in the future some modest reduction in the strength of our garrisons, depending on circumstances, but that we will not admit a Soviet detachment to join them in West Berlin nor reduce them to what he apparently considers "symbolic." In this connection I would emphasize that Gromyko has agreed our garrisons have no military significance.

(C) That we have no intention of recognizing the DDR. He accepts though he disagrees. Hence provision for the DDR to respect any agreement reached with Soviets is matter to be worked out between them and DDR in a form acceptable to us.

(D) That no agreement is in order on propaganda and similar activities since Soviets state they attach little importance to this. Each side, however, might undertake to exercise restraint in common interest of avoiding aggravation tensions.

(E) That clarification of access procedures would of course protect all civilian traffic as well as garrisons' needs and in effort to meet Soviets' expressed desires we could accept turnover by Soviet to DDR of 'functions' relating to military traffic on basis implying no Western recognition DDR and providing it accepted that in case of any future complaints on our part our recourse would continue to be to the USSR.

(3) I would plan to conclude by telling Gromyko that if agreement can be reached at this conference which takes into account the foregoing desiderata, then I believe you would be prepared to agree to a summit conference this summer or fall. I would ask him to consider my statement in all seriousness and add that I would be prepared to accept a brief recess if he desired to consult Moscow in light of what I had just told him. Finally I would suggest that the prolongation of a sterile conference would seem to add little to the relaxation of tensions which we seek and which purpose we assume Soviets share.

A word on the atmosphere. Gromyko remains relatively moderate in debate both public and private. He and his entourage are making considerable effort to give impression of friendly and serious effort to reach agreement, but are completely inflexible.

Couve is an excellent partner, articulate and forceful. Relations with the French Delegation which is large and well staffed with Soviet experts are excellent. The West Germans are on the whole quiet but solid. They stay in the background and in the last few days have been obviously disturbed by Adenauer's reversal of his decision on the presidency.

Selwyn has played the Allied game faithfully. He remains highly sensitive but I think our relations with him and his delegation are very good. Certainly they are far better than during the opening days of the

conference. In debate he is often too ready to inject a moderating remark and to profess to see points of agreement with the Soviet when in fact none exists. I now expect no real difficulty with sudden British initiatives. Indeed Selwyn has consistently hung back rather than tried to assume any role of leadership. I suspect British 'flexibility' will be held in reserve for a summit conference. This is not to say, however, that they do not very badly want a summit conference and if signs were to multiply that we will break up here without agreement our lines might not hold.

In sum, as I have written, I think the time has come for me to take a direct initiative with Gromyko in the effort to reach an acceptable agreement. I am satisfied that Gromyko will accept seriously what I say to him alone, whereas the same statement made in one of our private quadripartite meetings is likely to be interpreted by him as a negotiating position. There is a risk, of course, that this conference will end with no accomplishment and in this connection we are working very secretly on a contingency basis for a public presentation and posture to cover our disengagement. This risk, however, has been inherent since our acceptance of the conference and I believe the time has come to push the issue. I would appreciate your instructions. In light of Neil McElroy's participation in the Conference you may want to make a copy of this message available to him. Faithfully, Signed: Chris"

Herter

374. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 9, 1959, 11 a.m.

Cahto 92.

Dear Mr. President:

Last evening Selwyn and Couve dined with me at my Villa. Following dinner and bridge we talked with Merchant only other person present about state we now found ourselves in at conference. Couve is firmly convinced we are at dead end now confirmed at highest level by

Khrushchev's Budapest statement.¹ To him disengagement only question before us and he urged strongly that we close conference in next day or so with agreement that Foreign Ministers reassemble here in mid-July (incidentally Soviet press spokesman at open briefing last night contrary to fairly consistent earlier expressions of optimism stated that conference was drawing to close and gave as reason that four weeks about normal duration such affairs).

Selwyn strongly opposed Couve's view though agreed some action needed to indicate to Soviets our disquietude over their intransigence. He said he had considered at close of yesterday's session refusing to agree to meet today but decided against doing so on grounds newspapers would blow it up into crisis. Selwyn's prescription is that we should state we desire recess of four or five days to reflect and consult. He is already planning to spend weekend in London and this would extend his period there. It would also enable him to attend a Cabinet meeting which otherwise would have to be set for Sunday, evoking memories of last Sunday Cabinet meeting at height Suez crisis.

Selwyn's main argument, however, was concentrated on increased desirability of summit meeting, believing we had now reached point on matter of our rights which only heads of government could resolve. He believes West Berlin civilian population susceptible insidiously slow strangulation in absence of reaching new agreements with Soviets on access. Agreement he optimistically believes would ensure freedom and economic life West Berlin until day reunification comes. Question of rights in his mind becoming almost theological point. As I followed his argument he would seek detailed terms of agreement here which would then be presented to summit conference with preface pointing out West had one view on continuing validity its basic rights and Soviet another. Heads would then decide which basic view would prevail and he based expectation favorable decision on combination Khrushchev's vanity and your persuasiveness. He was unmoved by argument Khrushchev's Budapest statement had internally and externally nailed Khrushchev's personal prestige to the mast and that public backdown at summit hence improbable. (At one point he characterized Khrushchev's statement as impetuous inadvertence rather than calculated pronouncement.) He referred to risks of war and at one point stated that he considered Khrushchev a madman like Hitler capable of anything.

I did not commit myself to either view though I think it was obvious I found Selwyn's arguments in good part unacceptable. I told them that I would have to await instructions in reply to a message I was despatching to you giving my estimate of where we now stood.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 373.

At Selwyn's suggestion we will meet again today at noon privately at my villa without the Germans or advisers. Incidentally neither Selwyn nor Couve at any point suggested that I talk to Gromyko privately in effort to break deadlock. I suspect you will shortly be receiving a message from Harold urging decision along lines Selwyn proposes.

Faithfully yours,
Chris."

Herter

375. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 9, 1959, 1 p.m.

Cahto 93. Eyes only for Ambassador Moscow, eyes only for Chargé Berlin and USRO, eyes only for Gufler and Burgess. Paris pass USRO. From the Secretary.

In yesterday's private meeting as reported last night we presented revised talking paper contained Cahto 90.¹ Gromyko asked clarification on some details but said overall impression was that points represented no change in substance from previous Western positions. Ensuing discussion revolved about status of our rights, Soviet attitude toward its commitments and fate of people of West Berlin.

When I made point that there was hardly any use talking if we did not know where we stood on our rights, he seemed very anxious to move on to discussion of other elements, particularly the question of troops. None of us rose to the bait. When pressed to the corner on rights his remarks made it clear that there would be no legal basis for the new agreement they want other than right of occupation and the only justification would be that it would improve the situation (as they see it). The statement by Khrushchev in *Pravda* of June 8 which was read at meeting clearly worked to harden Gromyko's attitude on rights from

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-959. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Moscow, Paris, and London.

¹ Document 372.

his frequent assertions on Saturday² that while they wanted no mention of rights in the agreement, they did not take a negative stand toward them. Gromyko did say the question of rights could be dealt with after the character of arrangements on the other points was determined but he made clear that his position, like Khrushchev's, is that the occupation regime in West Berlin must be terminated. Couve and Lloyd were firm maintaining Western position on rights.

I do not know if it is significant but at our private meetings Gromyko has steadily been increasing numbers his delegation present. For first two meetings in accordance the understanding reached to which rest have adhered, he arrived with only Zorin, Soldatov and interpreter. Thereafter he brought Malik with him in addition and yesterday Soviet Delegation composed of Gromyko, Zorin, Malik, Smirnov, Soldatov and two interpreters. Another point possible interest was that for first time in private meetings he spoke most of time in Russian (obviously desiring his non-English-speaking colleagues to hear his statements) though heretofore in private meetings he has spoken exclusively in English.

Herter

²See Document 369.

376. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 9, 1959, 9 p.m.

Cahto 95. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

I met this noon at my villa with Couve and Selwyn as agreed last evening.¹ We continued discussion of the best next step in the light of the present conference deadlock. Couve reiterated the belief that the West should take the initiative in suggesting adjournment until

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 10.11-HE/6-959. Secret.

¹See Document 374.

mid-July. Lloyd after overnight consideration seemed inclined to agree. He referred to the election element in the British picture but said the important thing was to decide on the best course and then accept the domestic consequences. He and Couve agreed a month's recess was preferable to closing the conference without setting a resumption date. I indicated the clear belief that some action was necessary to impress Gromyko with our seriousness but said I desired to reserve expressing an opinion on the various alternatives open to us until I had heard from you which might be tonight or tomorrow. We agreed to maintain the secrecy of our discussions and to meet again as soon as I received your expected message.

Couve reported de Gaulle's lack of interest in a summit conference destined for failure as he believed would be the case as matters stand today.² Selwyn indicated continued willingness to grasp at any excuse to move on to the summit and reverted with no encouragement from either Couve or myself to his suggestions of last evening that we work out the details of an agreement on Berlin which would only come into force after the heads of government have decided what happens to our rights.

Faithfully, Chris."

Herter

² Herter met privately with Couve de Murville at 11:45 a.m. and the French Foreign Minister, who had visited Paris over the weekend, explained General de Gaulle's views on a summit meeting. A report on this meeting was transmitted in Cahto 96 from Geneva, June 9. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1327)

377. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 9, 1959, 9 p.m.

Cahto 97. Eyes only for Ambassadors; Moscow, Berlin and USRO eyes only for Chargé, Gufler and Burgess. Paris pass USRO.

At private meeting today at Secretary's Villa Gromyko presented set of new proposals described as taking into account Western positions

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-959. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. A detailed nine-page memorandum of this meeting is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340.

expressed in recent meetings. He said Soviet Union would not insist on immediate complete abrogation of occupation status of West Berlin. It could accept temporary maintenance of certain Western occupation rights in West Berlin for one year period. During this period an all-German committee of GDR and GFR on parity basis should work out problem of reunification; agree on principles of a peace treaty; and facilitate development and broadening of contacts between each other. One year limit would be fixed for successful completion of negotiations in order prevent West Germany from delaying peace treaty indefinitely.

Soviet Union would agree to temporary one-year recognition of certain occupation rights in West Berlin on basis following conditions:

1. Western powers to reduce the level of forces and armaments to symbolic number.
2. Hostile propaganda against GDR and other Socialist countries from territory of West Berlin to be stopped.
3. All organizations in West Berlin engaged in espionage and hostile activities against GDR and other Socialist countries to be liquidated.
4. Western powers to assume obligation not to station atomic or rocket installations in West Berlin.

If these conditions accepted, USSR ready to maintain communications between West Berlin and outside world as now exist.

All above would constitute provisional status of West Berlin. This status would be guaranteed first by four powers, on basis of protocol of guarantee submitted by Soviet Union; secondly, by government of GDR which has expressed in principle its willingness to respect agreed status of West Berlin. Soviet Union willing to make access commitments either in general agreement on West Berlin status or in separate document as Western powers desire. Documents would be registered with UN.

If understanding reached making West Berlin free demilitarized city in conformity with Soviet proposals as put forward at this conference, access commitments would be maintained until reunification of Germany.

In view of Soviets, there should be four power supervisory commission to watch out for violations of agreements and to take appropriate measures to ensure fulfillment agreement without touching sovereign rights of GDR.

Gromyko said if Western powers would not agree to above, he wanted to stress that Soviet Union will not give consent that present regime in West Berlin be continued. If Western powers or West Germany hampered achievement of peace treaty within time limit, Soviet Union with other belligerents in war with Germany would be compelled to sign own peace treaty with GDR.

Gromyko refused to furnish paper on proposals to other Ministers but indicated he would put his proposals forward at tomorrow's plenary meeting.¹

Gromyko claimed time limit on work of All-German Committee similar to time limit we set for All-German Committee. Secretary pointed out their action at conclusion of committee's work if agreement not reached would be unilateral peace treaty step, our action would be making progress on reunification by submitting both plans to the German people for vote.

Lloyd commented that Soviet offer was really accompanied by threat. Couve remarked that we were being asked to accept 95 percent if not 100 percent of Soviet demands and being given one-year's grace with curtailed rights to accept it. Secretary stated this amounted to postponing May 27 ultimatum to one-year from beginning of All-German Committee work.

Gromyko denied threat of signing peace treaty was really threat. It had long been discussed in Soviet statements and mentioned often here at Conference. This was different from West's action on such agreements with GFR as Paris Accords and on atomic weapons and missile bases.² Soviets were merely stating how they understood situation. If they signed peace treaty without warning this would be "fait accompli." West had in past taken position if Soviets would not agree on method of reunifying Germany, then they would proceed (as in fact they did) with agreements rearming GFR in NATO. He claimed we had told Soviet Union in San Francisco in 1951 that if they did not join us we would conclude separate peace treaty with Japan and then did. When it was pointed out we had preserved Soviet rights, he said Soviets had been interested in Japan becoming peace loving country posing no threat to anyone but instead rights had been granted for foreign military bases and foreign troops. In answer to Lloyd's question as to what would be position of our troops after Soviets signed peace treaty with GDR, Gromyko first sought to evade answer by saying Soviet desire was to reach negotiated agreement. He finally said in effect that GDR would then become sovereign nation to which occupation rights would not be applicable.

Herter

¹ See Document 381.

² For texts of the Nine- and Four-Power Agreements, signed at Paris, October 23, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1435–1457; for text of the agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense, signed at Bonn May 5, 1959, see 10 UST 1322.

378. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter at Geneva

Washington, June 9, 1959, 8 p.m.

Tocah 90. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. After our telephone conversation¹ I discussed Cahto 91 and 92² with the President and gave him your brief report on today's meeting. The President asked me to answer your telegrams and to tell you that in view of the rapidly changing circumstances he felt that final decision should be left in your hands.

He agrees with the idea of a private talk with Gromyko provided Couve and Selwyn are agreeable and provided the situation still permits such a conversation. The President was in accord with the general line of your suggested *démarche* to Gromyko. We talked of the question of our rights and the President indicated that he would be satisfied if we maintained them by any means that you found satisfactory. Specifically he saw no objection to your thought that it might be possible to preserve them by a unilateral declaration not objected to by the Soviets. The President also indicated his hope that there might be some agreement at Geneva to increase individual contacts between East and West Germany as he feels this could only redound to the advantage of the West.

I then showed the President some excerpts from Khrushchev's speech at Budapest, in particular Khrushchev's remarks regarding a possible summit conference. The President reacted strongly and said that we should make clear that we could not allow a break-up of the Foreign Ministers Conference without results on any theory that the Ministers lacked authority to reach agreement and that only heads of government were competent to make agreements. He pointed out that in the case of the US and the other Western powers the Foreign Ministers are the official representatives of the governments and can make decisions on their own within the broad outlines of governmental policy. The President suggested that you might tell Gromyko this and in particular say to him that you as Secretary of State have the President's full confidence and are authorized to make agreements which will be backed up by the United States. To imply otherwise and to deny the competence of Foreign Ministers would be to deny the validity of the whole diplomatic process. The President thought you might bring this view out in public at anytime you felt it would be useful.

Should there be a breakdown we in the Department feel that there is considerable merit in Couve's suggestion of a thirty-day cooling-off

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1331. Secret; Niact.

¹ No record of the telephone conversation has been found.

² Documents 373 and 374.

period. The President agreed that this might be a practicable course provided you and your British and French associates feel it desirable. The main burden of the President's views was that in view of the rapidly changing situation he thought that you should feel fully free to take whatever action you thought best at tomorrow's plenary.

Dillon

379. Delegation Record Meeting

Geneva, June 10, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SMALL STAFF MEETING

PRESENT

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Becker
Mr. Berding
Mr. Irwin

Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Smith
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Krebs

Secretary's Evaluation of Conference Outlook

1. The Secretary said that today would be crucial in view of the Russian ultimatum given to us yesterday at the private meeting.¹ He then outlined the substance of the Russian proposal commenting that it took us back to November 27; we have retrogressed seriously. He noted that Mr. Merchant had prepared a good draft of a statement² for him to make at the plenary session today. The Secretary continued that Gromyko had refused to give us a paper embodying the Russian proposal. He observed that Gromyko for the last two days had spoken in Russian and that there were more Russian advisers present. No doubt, the Secretary surmised, Gromyko was speaking for their benefit. He thought Gromyko would publicize the Russian proposal at the plenary

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1371. Secret.

¹ See Document 377.

² Presumably this is the statement circulated as RM/DOC/43, June 11, which is printed in *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 267–271 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 157–160.

today. Obviously, he continued, we are at the break-off point if Gromyko puts up his proposal today. The Secretary then suggested we might consider recessing until July 20. The French feel this is the best thing to do now and that the British, although hesitant at first, appear to think it is the best move. The Secretary said it was necessary for us to point out that the Russian proposal is an ultimatum. He concluded by saying that we have reached a serious point in negotiations and the prospects are not cheery.

Conference Tactics

2. Mr. Smith thought that there was an important difference between this ultimatum and the ultimatum of November 27 which, as he argued it, seemed to lie in the fact that the present proposal would not become a threat unless or until we accepted it. He suggested that we should guard our flank against Gromyko saying at the plenary session today that what he was putting forward was a proposal and not an ultimatum. Mr. Becker expressed the view that we should publish the Common Declaration or Communiqué we gave the Russians on June 8³ in order to bring out as soon as possible our position if the conference should break up. The Secretary thought that since this is really our minimum position there would be disadvantages in disclosing it at this time. Mr. Merchant suggested that if the Soviets refuse a recess and break off the conference, we should then publish our offer.

Ambassador Thompson suggested that the Secretary not propose a recess at first; a private session could be held. Afterwards we might propose a recess. The Secretary said that we made it clear yesterday to Gromyko that this proposal is a threat. He thought it interesting that Gromyko refused to give us the text of his proposal, but instead said he wished to do so at the plenary session. The Secretary digressed to comment on the dangers that faced the Alliance. He thought that the Russians may very well be acting tough because they think that NATO is about to break up (viz. the French attitude) and that there are internal strains in the UK (viz. recent criticism of Lloyd).

Press Matters

3. Mr. Berding said that we should create the impression in the press that the present situation has been produced by the new Soviet move and that the conference has really been thrown back to November 27 last. Mr. Irwin said that he thought an abrupt recess would cause concern all over the world and he thought it important to place the onus for this directly on the Soviets. In this connection Mr. Merchant noted Mr.

³See Document 372.

Hillenbrand is preparing a question and answer guidance for Mr. Berding.

Possible Recourse to UN on Berlin Issue

4. Mr. Becker expressed the view that the Russian proposal may have been calculated to force us to break off negotiations and thus open the way for the Russians to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany within two or three days. Mr. Wilcox agreed that this might be a deliberate move. If a treaty appeared to be in prospect, we should consider moving into the UN as soon as it was signed. The Secretary said there was no question about this and asked Mr. Wilcox whether he had prepared a draft resolution for the Security Council. Mr. Wilcox indicated that he had done so⁴ and that the problem was being studied in Washington this week. Mr. Wilcox said that if there is a recess followed by signature of a peace treaty, we must be sure that our case is as clean as is possible. We must be able to say we did all we could to continue the negotiations. Mr. Merchant said that we would be covered by having suggested a recess. If the Soviets act unilaterally, during this time it will be they who will bear the onus.

Briefing on Private Meeting for Germans

5. Mr. Merchant said that the British had agreed to brief Grewe on yesterday's meeting but wanted to defer doing so until this morning. Grewe came into the Delegation Office last night at 11 o'clock asking to see Mr. Merchant to get a run-down of the private meeting. Mr. Merchant said that he had given Grewe a sanitized version of the private meeting to be transmitted only to von Brentano.⁵

Stand-by Plane for Secretary

6. Mr. Merchant expressed the view that it would be wise psychologically and otherwise for the Secretary to order a plane to stand by. (See attached telegrams—Cahto 100 and Tocah 92.)⁶

⁴ The draft resolution has not been found.

⁵ A seven-line memorandum for the record of Merchant's briefing of Grewe is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1384.

⁶ Cahto 100, June 10, requested that a plane be put on standby. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 110.11–HE/6–1059) Tocah 92, also June 10, reported that a plane would be on 4-hour alert beginning June 11. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1331)

380. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 10, 1959, 2 p.m.

Cahto 99. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. I am most grateful for message from President contained Tocah 90.¹

I met this morning with Couve and Selwyn² and read them paraphrase your cable and then read draft statement I had prepared overnight³ totally rejecting Gromyko's proposal if he repeats it as expected at this afternoon's plenary.

We three agreed:

(1) Best not to break off conference but propose recess until July 15.

(2) Request no meeting tomorrow but plenary Friday, at which time one of us (supported by other two) would make statement persuasively presenting and explaining five-point proposal given Gromyko in private session June 8,⁴ thus leaving public record in best possible condition should conference in fact be terminated by Gromyko refusal to agree resumption date.

(3) At session today we would give no hint of any request for month's recess. This would be done at Friday's plenary.

(4) Meanwhile it was agreed that I should see Gromyko alone tomorrow afternoon when both Couve and Lloyd will have received as they expect their governments' authority to propose recess.

We recognized this delay may enable Gromyko to fuel his proposal sufficiently to make its unacceptability less clearcut but believe this risk outweighed by desirability obtaining opportunity to deliver well prepared statement Friday re West interim solution for Berlin. Importance latter accentuated by recognition Soviets might move suddenly on DDR peace treaty thereby increasing likelihood reference Berlin to UN.

Von Brentano then joined us and we went over substantially same ground with his concurring in our conclusions. He stated positively that Gromyko proposal of yesterday would have no resonance in Germany even with SPD. He felt recess rather than end conference far best course since otherwise spotlight would be focused on possible summit which under present circumstances he considered would be fatal.

The four of us then agreed that we would each communicate to our own press correspondents terms of Gromyko's proposal (which have

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/6-1059. Secret; Niact.

¹ Document 378.

² At 10:15 a.m.

³ See footnote 2, Document 379.

⁴ See Document 372.

been given out right and left by Gromyko and Bolz to Communist reporters who in turn have leaked to other members press corps) and characterize it as unacceptable as well as very possibly designed to break up conference. There was no dissent from expressed view that it would be worse than futile to continue conference on present basis. Choice was between termination and recess. Suggestion was made which found general favor but no definitive agreement that Deputies to Foreign Ministers be asked meet in Geneva July 8 to prepare ground for reopening Ministers meeting week thereafter.

Lloyd speculated on possibility Soviets genuinely thought yesterday's proposal a concession. This view was not shared, Couve characterizing it in terms "Bolz won out over Gromyko". We briefly discussed joint visit for few hours to Berlin en route home but no decision taken. I am hosting luncheon here Friday for Brandt with von Brentano, Lloyd and Couve attending.

I emphasized to my colleagues that overriding consideration was maintaining the unity of our alliance in face Soviet maneuvers and I mentioned possibility Gromyko might have been deceived into thinking us weak and potentially divided by reason of certain regrettable internal developments in some of our countries. I can honestly say that I do not believe my relations have ever been as good with my three colleagues as they are today. We are all in good spirit.

Herter

**381. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, June 11, 1959, 9 a.m.

Secto 220. Paris pass USRO. Sixteenth Plenary Session held June 10, 3:30–6:30 p.m., Couve de Murville, Chairman.

Gromyko opened with twenty-minute presentation devoted new Soviet proposals on West Berlin (identical proposals advanced June 9

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/6–1159. Official Use Only; Priority. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/16 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/16, June 10, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1371.

private meeting).¹ Charged main obstacle any agreement on Berlin results from West's insistence maintain at all costs outmoded occupation regime. Soviets therefore taking important additional step to contribute success of conference by new proposals providing for temporary maintenance of certain Western occupation rights West Berlin for limited period one year. During this year, All-German Committee to be established basis parity for FedRep and GDR to promote greater contacts between two Germanies, prepare for German unification and consider peace treaty. Gromyko stressed parity basis essential for negotiations between equal partners. Re West Berlin, claimed Soviets entitled to require certain steps be taken in agreeing to continue temporary occupation rights. Gromyko stipulated four requirements West Berlin: reduction Western forces and armaments to token levels; termination of hostile propaganda against GDR and other Socialist countries; liquidation all organizations for espionage and subversion against GDR and other Socialist countries; and ban on atomic or rocket installations. If four conditions accepted, Soviets willing continue present communications between West Berlin and outside world.

Above provisional status West Berlin to be guaranteed by four powers as well as GDR. And if agreement reached on Soviet "free city" proposals already made, guarantees re West Berlin's communications would be maintained until Germany unified. In addition, there should be four power supervisory commission to assure fulfillment of agreement, without, however, infringing upon sovereign rights GDR.

Gromyko warned that if West refuses carry out these proposals for West Berlin, Soviets not prepared to permit continuance occupation rights, and that if West blocks carrying out of agreed measures within year's time, Soviets and others would feel compelled to sign peace treaty with GDR.

Secretary replied with strong twenty-minute rebuttal Gromyko's proposals (text sent Secto 218).²

Lloyd commented very briefly,³ expressing surprise and disappointment Soviet statement, particularly against background previous indications some agreement or détente possible. Pointed out Soviet

¹ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/41, June 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 260–266 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 152–157. An extract is printed in *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 659–661. Regarding the Soviet proposals of June 9, see Document 377.

² Dated June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 386.1-GE/6-1059) For text of Herter's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/43, June 11, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 267–271; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 157–160; *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 661–665; or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 29, 1959, pp. 948–951.

³ For text of Lloyd's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/42, June 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 271–272 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 161.

statement smacks of threat and if so, Soviets mistake character Western powers. Lloyd emphasized had come to Geneva to negotiate and explore areas possible agreement, and wondered whether Gromyko's speech indicated desire to end conference. Supported Secretary's statement and said would wish give more considered UK views at later meeting.

Bolz spoke briefly,⁴ saying nothing really new in addition to his support for Gromyko's new proposal. Also emphasized parity requirement for All-German Committee.

Couve de Murville gave fifteen-minute comment on Gromyko's proposals, also expressing dismay and surprise, both re manner and contents Soviet proposal.⁵ Pointed out latter quite different from what conference had been discussing privately for last two weeks, and also criticized substance, including particularly threats contained therein. Agreed with Secretary that Soviets seemed to have gone back, perhaps even to November 1958, and concluded that very serious situation had now developed at Geneva. Concluded would reflect and study Soviet views, adding next few days would presumably reveal outcome conference.

Gromyko commented,⁶ in essentially fatuous manner, briefly on statements by Secretary, Lloyd and Couve de Murville. Denied Soviets had caused Berlin crisis or that Soviets using pressure tactics.

Grewe ended debate with very short statement,⁷ referring his previous criticism of All-German Committee idea and agreeing with Western contention that negotiations impossible under threat. Said would study Soviet proposal and speak further on same later.

Re next meeting, all agreed to US suggestion for Friday 10:00 a.m. June 12, in order to help those who might wish return their capitals for weekend, for which suggestion Lloyd expressed gratitude.

Herter

⁴ For text of Bolz's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/11, June 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 582–585 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 213–215.

⁵ For text of Couve de Murville's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/44, June 11, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 272–275 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 161–164.

⁶ For text of Gromyko's comments as recorded in the U.S. verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 276–278.

⁷ For text of Grewe's statement as recorded in the U.S. verbatim record, see *ibid.*, pp. 550–551.

382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State at Geneva

Washington, June 10, 1959, 1:27 p.m.

Tocah 93. Following message for the Secretary from the President.
"June 10, 1959

Dear Chris:

Yesterday was one of my busiest days, starting at seven and, without respite, ending at 11:30 as I arrived back at the White House from Atlantic City. Because of my preoccupations I could not personally answer your cable asking for certain decisions,¹ and I suggested to Dillon, after a personal conference with him, that he do so on my behalf. I am sure that he reflected my views accurately.

Of course we stand firm on the conclusion that I cannot attend any so-called Summit meeting unless there is sufficient progress in your present meeting to give some hope of accomplishment at the projected later meeting. I continue to believe that it would be not only a mistake but a great disservice to the world to go to a Summit meeting that would be barren of promise.

In this connection I suggested to Dillon that you might find it useful to remind your colleagues at the Conference that the United States does not send her Secretary of State to an international conference to act as an errand boy. Consequently, from our viewpoint, there is no validity to any argument that a Summit meeting would be certain to bring about some beneficial results, while a Foreign Ministers meeting would be certain to show complete failure. Within the limits of policy approved by the President, the Secretary of State has considerable latitude as to tactics and substantive detail. Incidentally, this demand for so-called Summit talks is a rather modern development. The history of the meetings that have been held does not impress me as presenting a record of brilliant accomplishments.

With respect to the matter of assurances on our rights and responsibilities in Berlin, I have little concern as to the manner of its accomplishment so long as there can be no possible mistake of our common understanding, including the understanding of all other governments.

I rather concur in the thought that a recess might be a better tactical move than complete cessation of the meeting. If, of course, there were some unexpected break and some clear and definite progress should be

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/6-1059. Secret. Drafted at the White House.

¹ See Document 378.

accomplished, then the entire situation would be changed. The present outlook for such accomplishment seems to be indeed dim.

I cannot tell you how pleased I am with the obvious skill with which you have conducted these difficult negotiations on the part of our government. Your combination of firmness and correct deportment and conciliatory attitude is commanding the respect of all thoughtful readers.

With warm regard,
Sincerely, DE"

Henderson

383. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting

Washington, June 10, 1959, 9:52 p.m.

Tosec 242. Secto 212, Tosec 181.¹ We are informed Secretary will be briefed June 11 re Gerstenmaier's views on question holding election Federal President Berlin. These views made known to us and lead to following observations:

We confronted with dilemma which intensified by hectic German political conflict triggered off by Adenauer decision remain on as Chancellor. Our views and actions must reflect developments in Geneva conference taking place over next 48 hours.

We continue believe we must leave burden of decision whether Berlin to be site of election to Germans, and that failure to hold election in Berlin could be heavily damaging blow to Berlin morale at crucial point in East-West relations.

We gave our tacit approval to holding Presidential election Berlin in 1954. Bundestag has been meeting Berlin since 1955. If Germans

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/6–1059. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Vigderman and Kohler. Repeated to Bonn and Berlin.

¹ Tosec 181, June 2, expressed concern at German efforts to move the site of the election from Berlin. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/5–2359) Secto 212, June 9, reported that the question of the site for holding the election of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany had not been raised recently by von Brentano. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/6–959)

decide on Berlin for 1959 election, Western powers, as occupiers Berlin, should assure members of Federal Assembly that we will underwrite the security of their presence in Berlin, and their ability to travel to and from Berlin. This assurance should go long way to reducing absenteeism which Gerstenmaier concerned about.

We assume that on July 1 the conference will either be standing in recess or adjourned sine die. Under these circumstances Allied initiative to veto holding Presidential election in Berlin or failure to assure protection to movement of Federal Assembly members to and from Berlin could cripple morale in Berlin, and cause serious deterioration confidence of Germans and others in firmness Allied purpose. Election of Federal President in Berlin has elements of symbolic importance, particularly as relating to aspirations to reunification, which should not be overlooked.

East German threats to retaliate if elections held in Berlin presently emerging from low level. If it discerned that Western powers retreating in face of these threats, East Germans and Soviets will undoubtedly be encouraged to make further efforts to prove out their pretensions that West Berlin part of territory of GDR. Should be noted 1954 elections and annual Bundestag Meetings have not excited any similar actions or threats.

We appreciate problem of absenteeism caused by holding elections in Berlin, and whether Berlin votes made to count, could make outcome of election problematical now that Adenauer has withdrawn his candidacy. Factor in this problem is whether CDU can be rallied round new candidate.

Secretary will be hearing very firm views Brandt this question. Seems important not to dishearten Berlin leader on whom we depend, although we appreciate this must be weighed against displeasure of Adenauer that Western powers unwilling to take this decision for him. He undoubtedly looks to us to take the action which will settle issue the way he wants it settled. We judge Adenauer not giving primary consideration effect on Berlin morale of transfer of site of election, but sees problem more in coldly partisan light hurtful effect on CDU chances of holding election Berlin.

Henderson

384. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 12, 1959, 1 a.m.

Cahto 105. I called on Gromyko at his villa at four this afternoon as arranged. I had Merchant with me. Gromyko was attended by Soldatov and an interpreter who incidentally is extremely poor.

Just prior to this call I had met with Couve, Lloyd and Grewe at which meeting we had agreed that I would not propose recess but would confine myself to impressing on Gromyko seriousness with which we took last two days' developments with particular reference to ultimative aspect of proposal he had introduced Tuesday in private session and then insisted on making public at Wednesday's plenary. Abandonment proposal to Gromyko today of three or four week recess was in large part based on Lloyd's communication to me during morning of Macmillan's objections and fact that Couve had July commitments which made difficult establishment resumption date for conference.¹

Gromyko received me in serious but friendly manner. We talked for nearly two hours but he insisted on speaking Russian himself and having my remarks translated to him in Russian despite his fluency in English. Apart from reiteration his disclaimers any intent to pose threat or ultimatum (which disclaimer he authorized me to announce to press) there was little of real significance which emerged from our talk. He rehearsed at length previously expressed arguments for Soviet proposals over past month with particular emphasis on free city. I gained distinct impression he was stalling probably in absence any reaction from Moscow to what he must have reported last night concerning strength of Western reaction to his proposal. In any event he gave no serious indication of regarding this, my first private bilateral talk with him, as welcome initiation of series US-Soviet dialogues. We meet tomorrow at ten in plenary and we agreed to resume private meetings Monday with my parting emphasis on fact that results such private meetings for first three days of next week would determine fate of conference. Detailed report of conversation follows.

Secretary opened by stating he had certain matters on his mind relating to justification for continuing negotiations. He said Gromyko's

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1328. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Merchant.

¹Merchant talked with Lloyd at 11:45 a.m. and the Foreign Secretary told him that Macmillan was opposed to a lengthy recess in the conference. Lloyd suggested that it would be better not to raise the question with Gromyko until he had a chance to raise the question at a British Cabinet meeting on Monday, June 15. (Memorandum of conversation, US/MC/94; *ibid.*, CF 1340)

proposal presented at private meeting² to us had been so disturbing as to result in his requesting that aircraft for return to Washington be placed on four-hour alert. His impression was that, as confirmed at plenary yesterday,³ Soviets in effect were putting up ultimatum for solution Berlin and conclusion treaty with DDR which made it almost impossible to contemplate continuation present negotiations. He realized that Soviet spokesman previous evening had asserted no dictate was intended but wording of proposal seemed to place it on take it or leave it basis giving no indication that it was document subject to negotiation. Furthermore had suggested strangulation access to Berlin when separate treaty was signed.

The Secretary said that he came to Geneva with authority from President to negotiate agreement. There were however certain principles approved by the President which underlay US position as follows: (1) no negotiation under threats presence of which would of course make Summit impossible; (2) allies have certain rights and Soviets certain obligations with respect to Berlin which cannot be unilaterally abrogated but only modified by consent of parties; and (3) West Berliners view us not as occupiers but as their protectors against surrounding hostile forces.

The Secretary went on to say the President had reaffirmed to him after Khrushchev's Budapest statement that as Secretary of State he speaks for US Government with authority enter into agreements, within broad policy guidelines, which US Government will honor. In absence such authority diplomatic process breaks down and if Foreign Ministers can make no progress how can Heads of Government expect to.

Secretary said his purpose in call was not to negotiate but to avoid misunderstanding by making clear that progress at conference was necessarily within limits of what US could agree to and by securing clarification of apparent ultimative aspects of Gromyko's proposal of day before.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he sought to satisfy himself that Gromyko's statement constituted proposal for negotiation and not fixation of conditions with time limit accompanied by announcement specific actions would be taken at end of specified time limit. If progress was to be made hard work and frankness were required. Unhappily previous day's plenary session has turned us back to last November.

Gromyko then asked if the Secretary's time permitted the use of an interpreter and, upon the Secretary's agreement, the conversation was thenceforth conducted through him.

² See Document 377.

³ See Document 381.

Gromyko opened by stating formally that he considered bilateral exchange of views between Ministers useful as well as Conference sessions. As to substance, he said that when he had outlined new Soviet proposal on Tuesday he had clearly stated it was not to be considered as a threat or ultimatum. He had repeated this at the plenary session and hence failed to understand why this question should again be asked. It must be assumed, he said, that Soviet Government would be obliged to act as stated in event no agreement reached. He complained over Western tendency to place false interpretations on Soviet proposals and look in every corner for evil motives.

Gromyko then said he understood US and allies would not negotiate under threats and he repeated that in his proposal there were no such threats or ultimatum.

Gromyko then turned to Summit Conference, which he said Secretary had linked to Foreign Ministers Conference. To Soviets, he said, a Summit Conference is too important to be made an object of bargaining, and he added that he had understood President to say at White House when four Foreign Ministers saw him⁴ that a Summit Conference could turn the tide and end cold war if mutual desire existed to attain positive results. He said if US interested in peace then it was unthinkable to bargain over Summit Conference. "We think if one or another state such as US raised artificial barriers to Summit or series of Summits by referring to unsatisfactory results at Foreign Ministers Conference then such state assumes very heavy responsibility."

Gromyko said Secretary should understand Soviet reaction when told Summit depended on Ministers' talks, which in effect meant Soviets must pay concessions to secure Summit. In fact he said it made Soviets think in terms of ultimatum being put to them.

Gromyko resumed with reference to Secretary's second point, which he described as Allied occupation rights and regime in West Berlin. He said Soviet position clear it could not agree to occupation regime for indefinite period of time notwithstanding apparent Western satisfaction with present situation. Soviets and DDR do not like it and believe West Berlin source of daily friction. He then detailed inconsequential incident of recent chase of Algerian by two French military policemen across DDR border, concluding with statement that such incidents frequent and will not all be insignificant.

Gromyko then reverted to earlier Soviet proposal for Free City and repeated in detail arguments already used in its support. He did however place emphasis on variant involving symbolic quadripartite troop contingents which he said would create "new qualitative status" with

⁴ See Document 338.

access thereby assured as well as guarantees for regime. He said he considered this "good way out for Western allies" and asked why we were frightened of this proposal.

Gromyko went on that, having met wall of resistance, Soviet decided to submit its last proposal, which provided for a short period of continuation occupation status on curtailed basis. This was linked with establishment all-German committee toward which he had been surprised Western Ministers had not on previous day reflected positive attitude.

The Secretary interrupted Gromyko at this point to say he had no desire to retrace history of previous month but had called to talk on (1) the threat or ultimatum aspect of Soviet proposal, and (2) prospect for Summit Conference. On first point, Secretary said he hoped for precision from Gromyko on denial ultimative appearance. Conditions posed for continuing occupation were humiliating, almost insulting. Threat was that at year-end rights would be extinguished and both civil and military access placed in hands of DDR with power strangulation without reference our rights or Soviet obligations. The Secretary said he trusted this threatening element would be removed and that Soviets would make clear proposal was put forward for negotiation and not as threat, which reminded him of past history of Hitler's dictats to inferiors.

On Summit Conference, Secretary noted, Gromyko had said in effect no relation existed with Ministers' Conference. Secretary could not share this view and recalled that during entire exchange of notes emphasis was placed on purpose of Foreign Ministers to prepare way for profitable Summit which could discuss broader issues and decide narrowed points of issue. He reminded Gromyko that President had said on occasion referred to (as he had often stated publicly) that he would go any time anywhere to Summit if he felt it could achieve agreements and thereby lessen tensions. Hence Ministers' task is to prepare for such a meeting. Secretary added that President had set no single specific precondition but that Ministers must provide some hope that a Summit could achieve some positive result and thereby avoid failure which would increase tensions. Definite relationship existed between present Conference and Summit but no element of ultimatum.

Secretary then reverted to necessity removal Gromyko's implied threat in order to resume negotiations. He hoped after five weeks' exchange of views groundwork was laid for some agreement. Secretary concluded by saying he hoped by hard work and long hours in first three days of next week, and assuming removal any ultimative aspect, it would be possible reach sufficient agreement to record real progress.

Gromyko then angrily challenged Secretary's reference to Hitlerian tactic in connection Soviet proposal and asked if intent was to aggravate situation or to provoke sharp exchange.

Secretary retorted he had given his own reaction to proposal and was not attempting pass judgment on Soviet intent.

Gromyko then said he would confine himself to substance and had nothing to add to past statements on subject threats or ultimatums. He said he interpreted Western position as making proposals and then saying if they were not accepted there could be no agreement. This was faulty method negotiation and induced Soviet belief we had no serious intention of reaching agreement. Moreover Soviets would never agree to undersigning indefinite continuation of occupation regime of Berlin.

Secretary replied he thought we could agree on term "indefinite." West had no desire to keep troops in Berlin or retain occupation status forever. We sought interim agreement until reunification Germany. Since both Soviets and we agreed on this object matter could be discussed further though we could not accept Soviet position that matter exclusively for Germans themselves to decide. He reminded Gromyko West had made proposals going long way to meet expressed Soviet desiderata and had proposed thirty-month period for conclusion agreement on modalities with provision lack of agreement would result in Germans themselves freely expressing their desires. However he had no desire to negotiate at this meeting but wanted to make clear we ourselves have given no ultimatum but have stated firmly that our legal rights cannot be unilaterally extinguished. On free city proposal we had expressed ourselves. Secretary then said that Gromyko had been clear on absence any intended threat or ultimatum in his proposal and asked if he would have any objection to Secretary telling press after meeting that Gromyko had made statement to this effect.

Gromyko replied that on Tuesday, Wednesday and again today he had said that it was incorrect to represent Soviet proposal as form of dictat and that he had no objection whatsoever to the Secretary so stating to the press.

The Secretary then commented that if Gromyko had used the word "indefinite" instead of "one year" the entire presentation of this proposal would have left a different impression.

Gromyko with a three quarter smile asked the Secretary not to expect any changes today in the Soviet proposal. He then observed that in the Western press there had been growing pessimism, starting a few days ago with homeopathic doses but ending today with an elephantine dosage.

The Secretary said that he shared that pessimism.

Gromyko said we must now both look for an agreement which the Soviets sincerely sought. More than Soviet good will was needed however and there was no point in continuing to force our own proposals on him. He then made a joking reference to fact he had not ordered up a plane for himself, to which Secretary replied that his considered interpretation of last Soviet move had been that it represented intention and desire to end conference.

Gromyko said this was the wrong interpretation and in fact proposal had been designed to meet our desire to retain occupation status in Berlin. He then referred to Secretary's earlier mention of three days of private talks and said that Soviets were prepared to work long hours with no deadline set for conclusion their efforts.

Secretary said he considered next few days would enable arrival at conclusion as to whether any agreement was possible. In leaving Gromyko noted that US-USSR relations were not satisfactory, not due any lack of desire on Soviet part but because of apparent absence such desire on part US.

Secretary said we had expressed ourselves on this matter many times. Need now is to agree on practical measures which would lead to improvement and that he hoped present negotiation would not prove futile. Secretary then left, interview having lasted nearly two hours.

From Gromyko's villa Secretary drove to Lloyd's where he reported conversation in detail to Lloyd, Couve and Grewe. Thereafter four agreed on common line to be taken with press.

Herter

**385. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, June 12, 1959, 6 p.m.

Secto 232. Paris pass USRO. Seventeenth Plenary Session held June 12, 10 am to 12:55 pm, Lloyd Chairman.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-1259. Official Use Only; Priority. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/17 (Corrected), and a summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/17, June 12, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1373.

Lloyd, in twenty minute statement¹ traced course conference to date, noting Western Peace Plan put forward after much thought and designed meet Soviet criticisms of earlier Western proposals. Said conference had concentrated during past fortnight on limited proposals re Berlin and he had thought there had been some signs of limited progress on limited front until Soviet proposals made public June 10 put us back to situation at time of Soviet note November 27. These proposals contained no new element and were presented under double threat that if not accepted Soviets would turn responsibilities over to GDR and would do so in any case at end of one year. Soviet all-German committee proposal simply revival of idea peace treaty must be negotiated by two Germanies.

Lloyd then gave background against which Soviet proposals must be viewed. West had two sorts of rights—those flowing from basic fact Nazi surrender and those based on specific agreements. Quoted Khrushchev's March twentieth statement² that West had legal rights in Berlin but these would be extinguished by signature Soviet-GDR treaty. Lloyd said West maintained such unilateral action would be illegal and a blow at mutual confidence.

West could not agree, as Soviets suggested, to say nothing re rights because no guarantee question would not again be raised by Soviets or, in Soviet view, extinguished by signature treaty with GDR. However, West still believed there are ways to solve this problem. Re situation in Berlin, which both sides agree abnormal, conference has considered three facets (1) presence Western troops (2) various activities (3) free access. Re (1) and (2) Lloyd reviewed Western proposals, saying re (2) that if Soviets object to our formulation that arrangements would cover "greater Berlin," we would define them as covering East and West Berlin but they must be reciprocal. Re (3) maintained Soviets cannot unilaterally tear up agreements but West thought it possible to work out way to satisfy Soviet wish to give up some of functions they now exercise. Lloyd concluded by noting Gromyko had asked what sort of Berlin there would be access to. Answer was one (a) that posed no military threat (idea suggested by Gromyko that West would place nuclear arms or missiles in Berlin was ridiculous); (b) where troops did not interfere with life of city; (c) where there would be freedom and no violence or subversive activities directed against its neighbor.

¹ For text of Lloyd's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/46, June 12, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 279–284 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 164–168.

² The statement was made at a press conference at the Kremlin on March 19 and printed in *Pravda* on March 20. For an extract from the press conference, including the statement mentioned by Lloyd, see *Moskau Bonn*, pp. 534–538.

Secretary then (Secto 229)³ noted earlier comments by himself and Couve on threats contained in Gromyko's proposals and called on Gromyko to repeat in plenary what he had said the day before on subject in meeting with Secretary.

Gromyko, in thirty-minute statement,⁴ reiterated past assertion that Soviet proposals contained no threat or "diktat" and hoped such terms would no longer be used. Soviets put forward proposals for temporary Berlin regime, to facilitate liquidation outdated occupation regime. West says occupation would last only until German reunification. But reunification impossible under Western proposals. West must realize Soviets, GDR and other states do not like occupation regime and desire new arrangements satisfactory to all states concerned. West says troops are no danger to Soviets and must stay in West Berlin to guarantee social order there, but why are guns needed to support an order which no one wishes to change? Re Western objection to one-year time limit for work of all-German Committee, West itself proposed two-and-one-half year limit and thus accepts principle. If one year too short, why not propose another? Re parity, Dr. Bolz has shown this is only arrangement compatible with facts and international law. West says membership should depend on population but this not so in UN or at this conference. Gromyko accused West of threatening Soviets by insisting on maintenance of occupation regime in West Berlin.

Gromyko then turned to Summit conference, saying it cannot be approached on basis of deal that it depends on progress at Geneva. If powers really desire find solution for problems, then Summit, or series of summits, could bring about lessening of tensions and strengthening of peace. Anyone who sets "artificial obstacles" on road to summit would accept "grave responsibilities".

Re Lloyd's statement that Soviet proposals old, maintained two new elements were one year time limit and linking of Berlin proposals with activities of all-German committee. Re statement Soviet suggested ban on missiles and nuclear weapons ludicrous said what is ludicrous is attempts to minimize this issue and West should have no trouble accepting Soviet proposal. Ended by reiterating Soviet desire reach agreement but repeated Soviets could not sign agreement which perpetuated occupation regime.

³ Dated June 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-1259) For text of Herter's statement as recorded in the U.S. verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 284 or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 29, 1959, p. 951.

⁴ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/47, June 12, see *ibid.*, pp. 285-291 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 168-173.

Grewe said⁵ that after carefully considering Soviet proposals he could only conclude they designed to end private talks which attempting find limited solution Berlin problem. Soviet proposals only increase tension by linking questions which may be soluble with those which are not. Connecting all-German committee established on parity basis with proposals on Berlin is merely device for shifting to Federal Republic blame for failure this conference. Federal Republic agreed to an all-German committee on understanding it would operate within framework of Western proposals for German reunification and its membership would be based on relative populations of two Germanies. Soviet proposals re all-German committee would perpetuate split because GDR representatives would be able prevent any reunification on basis of freedom. Denied there any universal rule supporting parity principle, saying even in UN some states have certain rights not possessed by others and Soviets themselves had assigned differing role as among states they propose take part in drafting and signing treaty with two Germanies. "Free city" proposal unacceptable because would establish three Germanies and would leave West Berlin open to arbitrary interference by GDR. Finally, Grewe noted time limit in peace plan not linked to announcement unilateral measures would be taken at its expiration.

Couve said⁶ he felt discouraged and concerned at present serious situation of conference. Noted Soviets objected to continuation of West Berlin occupation but had proposed as one alternative stationing of token forces of four powers. Where was difference in legal basis for presence of troops of four powers as against three?

Lloyd, in short statement,⁷ reiterated that West saw threat in Soviet proposals because of contents and fact Gromyko had made them public. Also noted Soviet denial there was threat. Regretted certain of Gromyko's statements today which might be taken as barring door to further progress. Suggested conference could resume plenary or private session in afternoon or adjourn until Monday, June 15.

Gromyko said⁸ Lloyd had reproached him for making proposals public on June 10 but he had told Western Ministers in private session the day before he would not do so if West agreed to continue discussions in private session with representatives of both Germanies present. Mr. Herter, however, had wanted plenary.

⁵ For text of Grewe's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/12, June 13, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 551–553 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 216–218.

⁶ For text of Couve de Murville's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/48, June 15, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 291–293 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 173–175.

⁷ For text of Lloyd's statement as recorded in the U.S. verbatim record, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 293.

⁸ For text of this statement, see *ibid.*, p. 294.

Secretary, to set record straight, noted⁹ he had suggested plenary because only alternative was private session with Germans present. This was type of meeting Ministers had never held and, he thought, would not hold.

Lloyd denied⁹ he had reproached Gromyko, had merely noted facts including Soviet denial of ultimatum.

It was agreed next meeting would be private session at 3:30 p.m. June 15.

Herter

⁹ For text of this statement, see *ibid.*

386. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/97

Geneva, June 12, 1959, 11:45 a.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Mr. Hillenbrand

West Berlin

Mayor Willy Brandt

Senator Guenther Klein

SUBJECT

Berlin Problems

At Brandt's request, Mr. Hillenbrand saw Mayor Brandt this morning at his hotel. He seemed tired after what he described as his hectic two days in Paris, but reasonably relaxed although he said he had been harassed by journalists ever since his arrival in Geneva. He wondered whether he should keep the schedule of meetings with journalists which his press officer had already arranged. Mr. Hillenbrand suggested maximum discretion in dealing with the press, particularly with reference to any subject which might be discussed with the Foreign Ministers during lunch. There was always the possibility that, if he created too much of a stir in Geneva, the Soviets and East Germans might decide

they wanted to send Mayor Ebert of East Berlin here to make a personal appearance.

In response to Mr. Hillenbrand's query, Brandt said that he was now reasonably satisfied with the arrangements to keep him informed. The Federal authorities were making their daily reports available to him through the Foreign Office representative in Berlin. Moreover, Mr. Gufler's briefings had been helpful. He said he had had a long talk earlier this morning with von Brentano during the course of which he complained about the refusal of the German Delegation to show to the Berlin representative in Geneva, or to him, the text of the proposal made by the Western Powers on June 3, 1959.¹ It had seemed absurd to plead secrecy as a reason for not keeping the Mayor of Berlin informed when the Soviets obviously knew all about the proposal anyway.

At this point Senator Guenther Klein entered the room and joined the conversation. Mayor Brandt said he was seriously concerned about the situation which had developed in connection with the presidential elections. If the Federal Government had some months ago decided that it was unwise to have them in Berlin and had taken normal measures to hold the elections elsewhere, such action would have been deplored but it would not have become a major issue. However, the whole situation had been handled with maximum stupidity, and failure to hold the elections in Berlin would now be interpreted only as a sign of Western weakness by the Soviets and East Germans. He said everyone in Bonn seemed confused and was giving different reasons for not having the elections in Berlin. Von Brentano had dwelt at some length on the necessity of avoiding any action which could be criticized as a Western attempt to sabotage the process of negotiations. On the other hand, Dr. Gerstenmaier who, as President of the Bundestag, had to make the ultimate decision as to where the Federal Assembly would be convened, [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Personally, Gerstenmaier had said, he favored being firm on this, but he could not contemplate being responsible for a situation in which the entire German Bundestag as well as many other leading German politicians might be stranded in Berlin. If he could be assured that the U.S. Air Force would guarantee to fly the political leaders out should access be hindered, that would make a difference.

Mayor Brandt showed Mr. Hillenbrand a letter which he had written to Dr. Gerstenmaier, dated June 11, in which he had stressed the various arguments in favor of holding the Federal Assembly in Berlin. In this letter he emphasized the unfavorable effect on the Soviets, as well as on the Western negotiating position at the conference, which such an

¹ See footnote 3, Document 358.

evident sign of Western weakness would have. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Mayor Brandt said that Dr. Gerstenmaier would have to make up his mind in the next day or so, but was more or less committed not to do so until he (Brandt) had returned from Geneva and spoken to him tomorrow. Brandt said that he had seen a memorandum of conversation drawn up by the German Delegation covering the May 22 meeting at which von Brentano had first raised the question of the Presidential elections with the other three Foreign Ministers.² It was quite clear to him from this that, while the Western Foreign Ministers had expressed preference for holding the elections elsewhere than in Berlin, they had certainly not made the kind of specific recommendations which the German Foreign Office had alleged, nor had they taken the initiative in raising the question in the first place, as von Brentano had apparently informed certain correspondents. (In a brief subsequent conversation with Senat Press Chief Hirschfeld, Mr. Hillenbrand was informed that Sidney Gruson of *The New York Times*, who is one of the correspondents to whom von Brentano had allegedly said this, was filing an article today asserting that von Brentano had deliberately deceived him as well as other Western correspondents as to who had taken the initiative in this matter.)

Both Mayor Brandt and Senator Klein talked at some length about their concern at that "failure" of the Western Powers during the conference to drive home the point that Berlin's associations with the Federal Republic, both political and economic, must be maintained. Brandt admitted that he, as a leading proponent of the "Hauptstadt Berlin" movement, which supports greater use of Berlin as the capital of the Federal Republic, had advocated action which went considerably beyond that which the Western Allies had considered practicable. However, he felt it somewhat unfortunate that the emphasis in the conference had been so completely on Three Power responsibility with nothing much said about the de facto relationship with the Federal Republic which had grown up. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that freedom of access, as well as maintenance of the right of Berlin to choose its own social system, obviously implied continuation of the links with the Federal Republic, if the Berliners desired to maintain them. This was so implicit that failure specifically to underline it on every occasion did not mean it was not in the minds of the Western Ministers.

²See Document 325.

387. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, June 12, 1959, 10 p.m.

Secto 234. Following Secretary's lunch for Brandt June 12, von Brentano brought up as expected question of Berlin as site for convening Federal Assembly in July. He distributed to Couve, Lloyd and Secretary copies of letter he had received previous day from Gerstenmaier,¹ substance of which was that unless Western powers objected he would incline to selection Berlin. Discussion was prolonged with Brandt emphasizing failure to select Berlin would lower city's spirits and encourage Soviets and DDR to believe that West retreated under threats. The Secretary, Couve and Lloyd all made clear their unhappiness over opinions attributed to them arising out of discussions this subject several weeks ago with von Brentano. Three Western Ministers refused express opinion and insisted that as purely domestic matter for German decision it was none of their affair. During the conversation the Secretary made clear his own view now for attribution that if Berlin were selected it was entirely acceptable to him.²

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/6–1259. Secret. Repeated to Berlin and Bonn.

¹A translation of this letter is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1384.

²In a subsequent telegram the U.S. Delegation noted that the discussion during and after the luncheon was on conference developments, and that Brandt reported West Berlin spirit was excellent. (Secto 236 from Geneva, June 12; *ibid.*, CF 1314)

388. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 12, 1959.

Cahto 106. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President: I cabled a full account of my private talk with Gromyko yesterday to the Department.¹ Unfortunately it contained

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1328. Secret. Drafted by Herter.

¹See Document 384.

little of substance except his repeated denials that his recent proposals were either an ultimatum or a dictat and his statement that the holding of a Summit meeting was not related to the outcome of our negotiations here. Both Merchant, who was present, and I felt Gromyko was stalling for time in the absence of any word from Moscow resulting from the strong reaction of the Western Ministers to Gromyko's proposal.

Because of Macmillan's strong objection to a recess for more than two weeks and previous engagements which would keep Couve away in the event of resumption, we agreed not to recommend a recess but to try early next week in three days of intensive talks to see if any material progress could be made. I am afraid that Macmillan made a commitment in Moscow to press for a Summit meeting regardless of the outcome here and that this is making Selwyn's position very difficult. In my opinion the outlook is still dim.

Faithfully,

Signed: Chris."

Herter

389. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 12, 1959, 8 p.m.

Cahto 107. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

I had a talk with Selwyn today. We were both in a somewhat depressed frame of mind because we were unable as yet to see anything coming from this conference which would justify your going to a Summit meeting. I know Couve de Murville feels the same way.

Selwyn was particularly disturbed because he felt this might mean a break between the three of us since he knew Macmillan was committed to a Summit regardless of the outcome here. On the spur of the moment, I tossed out the suggestion that perhaps Macmillan's best way of accomplishing his end would be to issue personal invitations to yourself, Khrushchev and de Gaulle to come to London and join with him for

conversations on matters of mutual concern without an agenda. I added that I had not talked to you or anyone else about this thought so that it could certainly not be considered a suggestion from my government. I pointed out that if Macmillan wanted to do this, it would save all the embarrassments connected with fending off many other nations which would want to attend a formal summit and might appeal to you if Macmillan could be persuasive enough in his expression of confidence that such a meeting would be productive. Selwyn seemed to be greatly taken with the idea as being one which might be tremendously helpful to Macmillan in his forthcoming political campaign.

My guess is that if we find we can make no headway next week Gromyko will then discuss a Summit conference. He today repeated in the plenary session¹ that there could be no bargaining here in Geneva with respect to what would justify a Summit conference, completely ignoring statements made by the three powers in the exchange of notes leading up to this conference. I think we should be firm in not discussing a Summit if nothing is accomplished here. If Selwyn, on his return Monday, should come back to question me on my off-the-cuff suggestion, I would greatly appreciate your views. I have not told him that I was communicating with you.

Faithfully,

Signed: Chris."

Herter

¹ See Document 385.

390. Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers did not meet on June 13 or 14.

391. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)

June 13, 1959.

The President telephoned from Gettysburg to refer to Cahto 107 of June 12¹ and asked what I thought about it. I told him that Mr. Dillon and I had discussed the message late last evening and that we were both puzzled about the apparent inconsistency of the suggestion that Macmillan issue an invitation to the President, Khrushchev and DeGaulle to come to London and join with him for conversations without an agenda and the statement made later in the message that we should be firm in not discussing a Summit, if nothing is accomplished in Geneva.

The President said that he agreed that this would be an unacceptable proposal and that he was rather startled by it for the simple reason that everyone would regard such a meeting as suggested in London as a Summit meeting. He failed to see any difference. I said that we thought that in the light of the public position that the President has taken on this problem that the present suggestion could hardly be accepted. The President said that he was not bothered so much because he had taken the position publicly, as he was over the feeling that no other position could reasonably be taken. He was turning over in his mind whether it might not be wise at this stage for him to send a personal message to Khrushchev in effect saying that, while the President would be ready to agree that final agreements perhaps could only be made at some form of Summit meeting, an impossible situation is created when it is asserted on the Russian side that the Foreign Ministers can only be regarded as errand boys and incapable of concluding any agreement of substance. It would be suggested that some kind of a concession on the Berlin and German problem would be essential.

I said that I would discuss this with Mr. Dillon, but that it seemed to me a rather good approach, subject to what the Secretary's reaction might be at Geneva. I mentioned that both Couve de Murville and Selwyn Lloyd are absent in their capitals over the week end, and that it might be well to send an urgent message to the Secretary seeking his

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/6-1359. No classification marking.

¹ Document 389.

reaction. The President agreed, saying that he would contemplate that the message to Khrushchev be drafted in conciliatory terms. He also asked that the Department try its hand at a preliminary draft of such a message, pending the Secretary's reaction. He thought this could be telephoned to him at Gettysburg.²

RM

² At 3 p.m. Dillon summarized this conversation in Tocah 102 to Geneva and asked for Herter's reaction to the idea of sending a message to Khrushchev. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1332) Four hours later a draft of the message was transmitted to Geneva in Tocah 104. (*Ibid.*) On June 14 the U.S. Delegation informed the British of the President's negative reaction to Macmillan calling a meeting in London. In Cahto 111, June 14, Herter cabled that he approved the idea of sending a communication to Khrushchev, but not until the Western powers had seen Gromyko's position in the meeting on June 15. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 110.11–HE/6–1459)

392. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 15, 1959, 2 p.m.

Cahto 112. For Acting Secretary from the Secretary. We meet with Gromyko in private session at 5:30 this afternoon at Couve's Villa and will telephone Murphy results. At 3:15 von Brentano, Couve, Lloyd and myself are getting together, Selwyn being due to arrive at three from London after attendance this morning's Cabinet meeting.

This morning¹ I called on Couve who had returned last evening from Paris. He is serene and as I had expected confirmed in his tough and I think realistic line by his talks over the weekend with Debre and de Gaulle.

In reviewing together situation as it now stands we were agreed likelihood Lloyd will return with instructions to continue conference in indefatigable effort to assure summit meeting this summer. Both Couve and I are completely satisfied that if Gromyko continues to insist on discussing his new proposal and refuses in effect to return to negotiating

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6–1559. Secret; Niact.

¹ Merchant and Herter met with Couve de Murville at noon.

position as it existed last Monday then it is not only futile but probably productive of increased tensions to continue this sterile dialogue. Under such circumstances we both favor recessing this conference until mid July. This however will go hard with Lloyd and may well be rejected by Gromyko who has been confirming our estimate that he is seeking to drive us to a summit conference by the crisis route rather than by any significant agreement here. British fascination for a summit for summit's sake of course probably contributes to Soviet belief that this maneuver will be successful.

Couve reported that de Gaulle remains absolutely adamant on un-wisdom of a summit conference on such a basis. This, as Couve said, is "more for reasons of prudence than prestige" since an unsuccessful summit would have such serious consequences. Couve added (and please protect him) that de Gaulle had said that if there were a summit meeting under such circumstances he himself would refuse to go even if President attended. Couve and I agreed that this afternoon and if necessary tomorrow we would resolutely seek to return Gromyko to discussion of our old five-point paper,² possibly indicating orally if course of conversation so warranted that in first paragraph we could accept clear implicit treatment of our rights rather than explicit language.

We talked a little of incomprehensible West German timidity over thought of any dealings with East Germans and Couve remarked that such dealings bound to come and would be better started under Adenauer if he could be persuaded than by his successor.

I told Couve in extreme confidence that President was giving some thought to possibility of a message to Khrushchev to be despatched in next few days. This seemed to appeal to him. I indicated that if this were the President's decision I would be talking to him and Lloyd about it.

Interestingly enough Couve's parting remark was that he rather imagined the final outcome of the process in which we are all now engaged would be a Khrushchev visit to Washington.

Herter

² See Document 372.

393. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/108

Geneva, June 15, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Freers

France

M. Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Soutou

United Kingdom

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Sir Frank Roberts
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Laskey

Federal Republic

Dr. Von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Kuesterer

SUBJECT

Problems Relating to the Conference

Mr. Herter opened the meeting by saying that he had not heard a word from Gromyko over the weekend. US reaction to the Soviet proposals had been unfavorable and even indignant. It now seemed impossible to go back to the discussions before the presentation of the latest Soviet plan.

Couve mentioned that the French had had a Cabinet meeting on Saturday and had agreed the Gromyko plan was unacceptable. He also saw difficulty in going back to the discussions since there did not seem to be much to talk about. The best thing now would be to break off for a recess. (However, it might put us in an unfavorable position to take the initiative on this and we should try to put the burden on the Soviets.)

Lloyd said the British agreed that the Soviet plan was not a basis for discussion. The question was how to deal with the present situation. There should be one more effort to get some agreement at the conference on Berlin. In any event, there were two things that had to be worked out. One was to formulate our proposals on Berlin in a new document which would have public appeal and represent our actual negotiating position. The Berlin proposals in the Western Peace Plan had

admittedly been an opening tactical position. The second thing was to decide on our position concerning a summit meeting. The British were concerned that Khrushchev might take the initiative himself and invite heads of government to such a meeting on the grounds that the Foreign Ministers could do nothing. The British position on this would be to give an affirmative answer. They did not want a rift with their Allies but they were not prepared to lead their people into a dangerous situation without one last effort toward settlement. Under these circumstances, they would prefer the initiative for a summit meeting to come from the Western Powers. They did not agree with the appraisal that Khrushchev no longer wanted a summit meeting.

Mr. Herter said any discussion of the summit here would revolve around time, place, and agenda. President Eisenhower had made the U.S. position on a summit meeting clear and there had been nothing here to justify holding one. We would not go to a Summit unless the threat of pressure on Berlin were removed. If the Foreign Ministers could not work out anything in all this time here, how could the heads of government succeed?

Lloyd said the problem of a summit meeting would be discussed here whether or not we all wanted such discussion. If the question is raised by the Soviets, we should ask for 48 hours recess to make our replies.

Mr. Herter pointed out that Gromyko had said he wouldn't bargain about a summit meeting. Perhaps he would not talk about it.

Couve thought it might ease the situation if the Western Powers took the initiative on a recess. We could then ask the Soviets what basis they thought there was for a summit meeting.

Lloyd remarked that if no summit were agreed on, there would be no pressures on the Russians but there would be every sort of world pressure on us. The Russians would seem to be cooperative while we were negative.

Mr. Herter said Khrushchev had created the present crisis. We had gone some distance in an effort to reduce tension. Khrushchev wanted to get rid of the tension by demanding further things from us. Public opinion had not been fooled and Khrushchev had miscalculated.

Lloyd said he believed that the two sides had substantially narrowed their differences here at the conference. He believed that we had the makings of an agreement. The Soviets apparently would not object to our own reassertion of our rights, even though they did not subscribe to them nor accept them. The question was whether they would be expressed or not, in any agreement. There was agreement between the two sides, more or less, on troops, atomic weapons, espionage and propaganda activities in Berlin, a declaration by the GDR, and a commission

procedure for dealing with the GDR. The heads of government could come to agreement along the lines laid out there. Khrushchev could not go away from a summit meeting without some agreement.

The Secretary said he doubted we were near agreement. Gromyko had said that we had only changed a few words and commas in our position.

Lloyd repeated he thought we had the makings of a bargain. There was agreement on the need for a temporary arrangement on Berlin to last until reunification. The Summit could start where we left off.

(Couve's remarks at this point were not audible to the reporter.)

Lloyd said when President Eisenhower had indicated he would not go to a summit meeting without a Berlin settlement, this constituted some pressure.

When Khrushchev sees within what limits we will make agreement and until he is confronted by our position, he won't believe that we cannot be squeezed. (This remark by Lloyd is as recorded by the reporting officer.)

(Couve's remarks at this point were also inaudible to the reporter.)

Mr. Herter said we seem to be back at the beginning.

Mr. Herter said a new formulation would be a question of drafting. We might be willing to discuss with Gromyko our formulation but the time limit and changes as proposed are completely unacceptable.

Couve wondered what we would talk about if Gromyko did in fact agree to go back to the earlier two papers.

Lloyd thought we could not just simply ask the Soviets to forget their new proposals, we would have to make a positive offer.

Mr. Herter remarked that Gromyko had made the point in his private talk with Mr. Herter last week¹ that we could not expect him to change his proposals, although he did endeavor to minimize the threat associated with them.

Couve suggested that the Western Powers might propose a recess under the circumstances.

Lloyd thought that we should recess for 48 hours to develop our final presentation to be made at a Plenary Session on Wednesday. If the Soviet reactions then were negative, there would be no point in going on. The other Ministers agreed.

Von Brentano suggested that the new presentation of our Berlin proposals be accompanied by a statement expressing our regret that the Soviet Union had not been prepared to contribute toward the success of the conference nor had been willing to make any concessions. We

¹ See Document 384.

should say that, consequently, the Western Foreign Ministers had thought it better to recess the meeting. Von Brentano then suggested that the question of a summit meeting be referred to a resumed Foreign Ministers Meeting following the recess. He thought it would be extremely dangerous to move on to a summit meeting from the present position which could be construed as being based on the latest Russian proposals. The Russians would be able to develop their proposals in world public opinion and generate pressures from all sides. If we reacted to pressure to go to a summit meeting, this would tempt the Russians to increase pressures upon us at the summit meeting itself. There would always be part of the world press and public opinion for the meeting and for some agreement regardless of what it might be. The recess could be used to see how it would be possible to come to a summit meeting.

The Ministers then talked about tactics for the meeting with the Russians later in the afternoon.

It was agreed Mr. Herter would open the discussion on the basis of the second half of Lloyd's speech at the Plenary Session,² calling for a return to the type of discussions going on before the latest Soviet proposals.

Von Brentano commented that we should not expect any new proposals from Gromyko. At dinner Friday night Gromyko had been quite tough and a hot discussion had ensued, during which, Von Brentano said, he had traded blow for blow with Gromyko.³ He and his colleagues at the dinner all agreed that the Soviets were in a rigid posture and were not prepared to make any concessions.

Mr. Herter stated that if the outcome of this afternoon's meeting were completely negative, President Eisenhower might want to make a direct communication to Khrushchev. This would represent a special effort which went along with the general British viewpoint. This was merely under consideration and the other Ministers would be informed if it were decided to make this move.

² See Document 385.

³ Grewe briefed Hillenbrand on Brentano's dinner with Gromyko at 1 p.m. on June 13. The German Ambassador reported that nothing had emerged from the dinner that might indicate Soviet intentions or suggest a way out of the impasse in the conference. (Memorandum of conversation, US/MC/99; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340)

394. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 15, 1959.

Cahto 115. Paris pass USRO (eyes only Ambassador Burgess). The private meeting on June 15 lasted for two and one-half hours. It was inconclusive. The conversation was concentrated on the subject of Berlin with no discussion on the basis of the Soviet proposal of June 10 although Gromyko stated clearly that his proposal was on an equal footing with the Western proposal as a basis for continuing discussion. At the very end of the meeting Gromyko suggested that the Ministers or their representatives might consider recommendations which could be made to the UNGA for dealing with the problem of disarmament. The Western Ministers made no direct response other than indicating their recognition of the importance of the subject and a willingness to discuss it. The Ministers then reverted to the Berlin problem with the discussion following familiar lines. At its conclusion it was agreed that they would meet again in private session on Wednesday afternoon.¹

Herter

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1328. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin. A detailed 11-page memorandum of this conversation US/MC/103 is *ibid.*, CF 1340.

¹ At 9:15 p.m. (Geneva time) Herter called Murphy and repeated that the private session had been inconclusive. He also suggested various changes in the proposed message to Khrushchev. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-1559) Dillon then called the President and the final draft of the message (see Document 395) was agreed upon.

395. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, June 15, 1959, 11 p.m.

2117. Observe Presidential Handling. Following is text letter dated today from President to Khrushchev for immediate delivery to Foreign Office. Confirm delivery Department and Secretary at Geneva.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-1559. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. Regarding the drafting of this text, see footnote 2, Document 391, and footnote 1, Document 394. The letter was delivered to the Foreign Ministry at 12:30 p.m. Moscow time on June 16.

“June 15, 1959

Dear Mr. Chairman: The point seems to have been reached in the discussions among the four Foreign Ministers in Geneva at which I feel impelled to address to you this personal and private note. I shall give it no publicity whatsoever unless you should desire otherwise.

It has been my sincere hope that the progress at the Foreign Ministers meeting would be such as to justify a summit meeting at which final settlements of some of our problems could be reached. This note is a personal effort to explain to you why I feel that recent developments at Geneva imperil the achievement of this objective.

The Soviet Delegation, while unwilling to discuss in a serious way the broad peace plan which we put forward, has now, after some weeks of both private and plenary sessions, put forward proposals with respect to Berlin which are from our viewpoint a clearly unacceptable challenge to our position in that city. At the same time Mr. Gromyko has stated that ‘in the opinion of the Soviet Government there is no foundation for any link between the results of this conference and the convening of a summit meeting.’ Because of your original acceptance on March 30 of my March 26 proposal¹ with respect to the current negotiations between us, I had come to believe that we were coming closer together in this important matter. You will probably recall that in part of my March 26 proposal I said, ‘The purpose of the Foreign Ministers Meeting should be to reach positive agreements over as wide a field as possible and in any case to narrow the differences between the respective points of view and to prepare constructive proposals for consideration by a conference of Heads of Government later in the summer. On this understanding and as soon as developments in the Foreign Ministers Meeting justify holding a summit conference, the US Government would be ready to participate in such a conference. The date, place, and agenda for such a conference would be proposed by the meeting of Foreign Ministers.’

You in your March 30 reply then stated: ‘The Soviet Government expresses the hope that all participants of the conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs will make their positive contribution to the work of this conference and that it will be an important step in the cause of creating a firm peace in Europe. The Soviet Government, on its part, will do everything possible to assist in the attainment of this goal.’

I sincerely hope that both you and I continue to hold to the spirit of this understanding and will do what we can in assuring that the Foreign Ministers’ talks will produce satisfactory results.

¹ See Document 244.

It seems to me, unfortunately, that the latest Soviet position at Geneva as presented by Mr. Gromyko creates an impossible situation for the United States in that it implies the convocation of a Summit Meeting without prior progress of any kind.

I am quite prepared to recognize that final agreements on the critical questions affecting world peace could probably be best concluded at a meeting of the Heads of Government. However, I want to say very earnestly that our Secretary of State has gone to Geneva with full authority from me and from the US Government to engage in serious negotiations of the type contemplated in the exchange of communications between us which led to the holding of the Foreign Ministers conference. I have no way of knowing, of course, Mr. Chairman, to what extent your own Foreign Minister is empowered by you to negotiate with this same degree of flexibility within the framework of what I thought was a firm understanding between you and me. But I do assure you that our purpose in the Foreign Ministers meeting has been to clear the way for a fruitful or at least hopeful meeting of Heads of Government.

I hope you will urgently consider the situation as it now stands. I write to you in no sense of attempting to bargain or to establish conditions. It is my thought only to see whether we will be able to achieve some greater measure of understanding between ourselves and eventually to reach settlements in some of the issues that divide us. Only thus, I think, can we bring about a real relaxation of the present tensions in the world. It would give me great satisfaction if we could meet later this year for that purpose.

I add only that if such a meeting were to offer hope of success it would certainly have to take place in an atmosphere in which neither side was posing a threat to the other and on the basis of such preparatory work by our Foreign Ministers as could give us reason to believe that the Heads of Government would be able to reach agreement on significant subjects. Anything less, it seems to me, would be a betrayal of the hopes of men everywhere.

Sincerely yours,

Dwight D. Eisenhower."

Observe Presidential Handling.

Dillon

396. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 16, 1959, noon.

Cahto 116. Eyes only Ambassadors, Gufler, Burgess and Moscow Chargé. Paris pass USRO. From Secretary. Following break-up at 8 pm last night of private Foreign Ministers meeting with Gromyko, I met for an hour with Couve and Lloyd. Lucet, Rumbold and Merchant were also present. We were agreed that discussion with Gromyko had taken step backward rather than forward and basic conflict was now clear, i.e. that we would not relinquish our rights in Berlin and Soviets were determined sooner or later to achieve removal of our presence from West Berlin.

We agreed that Deputies should meet this morning rapidly to revise five-point paper given Gromyko June 8 with view to closer approach to our basic position and with principal eye on its appeal for public opinion.¹ Chief concession contemplated was finding language implicitly protecting maintenance our rights without explicit spell-out. Both British and French also desire insert in it offer to declare intention promptly to reduce combined garrison strength in West Berlin to figure 10,000. We will firmly resist this on grounds any reduction would seriously affect morale West Berliners.

Four Western Foreign Ministers will meet 3 pm today to consider draft emerging from Deputies with view conveying copy to Gromyko this evening or Wednesday morning in advance scheduled Wednesday afternoon private Foreign Ministers meeting. Brentano was not present this talk but Couve undertook to brief him last night and he will be present as indicated at this afternoon's meeting.

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6–1659. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Bonn, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

¹ A memorandum of the conversation at the Deputies Coordinating Group meeting at 10 a.m., US/MC/104, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1376; a copy of the French draft from which they worked is *ibid.*; for text of the paper as presented to Gromyko later that day, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 312–313; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 237–238; or *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 665–666.

397. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 16, 1959.

Cahto 120. Re Tocah 108.¹ This morning Gromyko asked to see me privately and by arrangement came to my villa at three p.m. He was accompanied only by Soldatov and interpreter. I had with me Thompson, Merchant and interpreter. He opened by asking my view as to where conference now stood. I told him that we had been literally shocked by his proposal of last Tuesday. I told him that we had asked for today's recess in the knowledge that the President was sending a personal letter to Khrushchev which I then read to him.² I concluded that I was gloomy as to the prospects for the conference. Gromyko thanked me for the courtesy of informing him concerning the President's message but said he would not comment on it since his Prime Minister would make an appropriate reply.

We then went back and forth over the old harrowed field of past discussions on Berlin. If anything he made even more clear than on any past occasion Soviet intention to get us out of Berlin. I told him that more than two million West Berliners counted on us for their safety and future and that we would not abandon our protective role. Gromyko stressed his disappointment over our negative reaction to his all-German committee proposal which he asserted had been largely borrowed from our plan and which he alleged was blocked by Federal Republic intransigence. Incidentally he made plain that in Soviet view German reunification was so distant in future that tying interim Berlin solution to reunification was tantamount to perpetuating occupation regime indefinitely.

Gromyko then brought up certain other subjects, namely, a denuclearized zone in Europe, the nuclear test talks, global disarmament and a nonaggression pact or declaration. He said that all of these had been mentioned at one time or another and said that Soviets were ready to exchange views if we were interested. I told him I thought we might exchange views on possible procedural steps to restart disarmament talks. A security zone in Europe, however, I said was inextricably tied to reunification and hence did not seem to me subject to discussion in light of Soviet rejection of any progress toward reunification. Nuclear test talks, I said, while going slowly were under negotiation in another

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1328. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Merchant. A detailed memorandum of the conversation at this meeting, US/MC/107, is *ibid.*, CF 1340.

¹ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, CF 1332)

² See Document 395.

forum and to my mind not suitable for injection into Foreign Ministers conference. On non-aggression declaration I said I did not object in principle but that it seemed to me counter productive since it would duplicate provisions in UN Charter to which we had both solemnly subscribed. I asked if his real purpose was to achieve a sort of recognition for the DDR by having it co-signatory to any NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty. He said if this were only obstacle way might be found around it.

I concluded by suggesting that we be practical in assessing where we were and expressed hope Khrushchev would make prompt reply to President's message. I told him that by early tomorrow we hoped to give him a draft of what we considered a fair interim solution for West Berlin (contained in following telegram).³ If this was unacceptable to him (as the present conversation seemed to indicate it would be) and in light of the Soviet obvious desire to force us to give up our rights, then I thought that it was impossible to reach any agreement, in which case my personal view, I said, was that we should set a future date to meet again. Gromyko remarked that he would see what we produced in the way of a new draft but added that to date he was very pessimistic.

Throughout conversation Gromyko was friendly in manner and temperate in expression. It was apparent, however, that he was strictly on fishing expedition and if he has instructions giving him any leeway there was no evidence whatsoever to this effect.

Herter

³ Cahto 121, June 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1659)

398. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower

Undated.

DEAR FRIEND: Selwyn has told me of your message to Khrushchev.¹ I hope that it will be salutary and that the Foreign Ministers may be able to bring their meeting to a close with agreement on a Summit Meeting.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Attached to a June 16 note from Caccia to the President, which stated that he had been asked to deliver the message as soon as possible. It was received at the White House during the afternoon of June 16. According to the President Caccia came to the White House that evening and the President inquired about this note. For his account of this conversation, see Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 401–402. No other record of this conversation has been found.

¹ See Document 395.

This, however, is the favourable view, and the discussions so far give small grounds for optimism. It is at least as likely that we shall find, after the next few days, that the Foreign Ministers can make no further progress on Berlin and are reaching a deadlock. What will happen then? Mr. Khrushchev may at once make a public declaration that, as the Foreign Ministers have failed to reach any agreement, the Summit Meeting should be held without delay. Indeed, it is likely that he will publicly propose a date and place for such a meeting. We shall then find that we are, in effect, summoned publicly to a Summit by Mr. Khrushchev—in circumstances in which we shall find it equally difficult to justify to public opinion either an acceptance or a refusal. This will present us with a very embarrassing dilemma.

We must, I think, avoid that situation. We could do so if we forestalled Mr. Khrushchev by ourselves proposing that the Heads of the four Governments should meet to consider the situation arising from the deadlock in the Foreign Ministers' meeting. What I have in mind is, not that we should have the formal Summit Meeting which has been envisaged, with a throng of official advisers, and assessors from the two Germanies, and arguments about the Poles, the Czechs and the Italians, or even with an elaborate agenda; but that the Heads of the four Governments should meet informally (with their Foreign Ministers and a minimum of advisers) to talk over the situation and try to find a way through the difficulties. If we want an agreement—and surely we do—this, I am convinced, is the way to do business with Mr. Khrushchev.

The Foreign Ministers cannot go on much longer at Geneva; and, if in the next few days deadlock on Berlin appears to be inevitable, I believe that the wisest course would be to suggest as a next step a meeting of the kind indicated above. If you were prepared to suggest this yourself, and to invite the other three to come to meet you in the United States, this would make a great impact and I am sure that your initiative would be widely welcomed and regarded as eminently justified. But, if for any reason you do not wish to take this initiative yourself at this stage, I would be willing to make the first move and to suggest a meeting in London—or, if there were a general preference for meeting on neutral ground, at Geneva or at any other suitable place.

We must be prepared for the possibility of a breakdown at Geneva; and I feel most strongly that, if this happens, we must be ready to make a fresh move and to do so without any delay. We have managed to maintain our public position so far but if after a breakdown we allow the initiative to pass to the other side our public position may rapidly deteriorate. Certainly in this country—and I believe in the free world generally—public opinion will expect the Western leaders to do something. It seems to me that an initiative either by you or by me is the least that we could do.

I feel that this may be an important turning-point in this long struggle, and I want to be sure that the free world by its clear demonstration of nobility and idealism is recognized as acting rightly, thus bringing the greatest influence on the uncommitted nations and on moderate opinion generally.

All except the first paragraph of this message was drafted before I knew of your message to Khrushchev. No doubt your answer will depend upon the answer you get from him but I thought it right to let you have my thoughts. Since, alas, we cannot talk it over as at Camp David,² this sort of message seems the only way.

With warm regard,

As ever

Harold³

² See Documents 234-241.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, June 17, 1959, 12:13 a.m.

10996. Please deliver following message from President to Macmillan immediately. Advise time delivery.

"June 16

Dear Harold:

I shall probably want to write you further as soon as we know Khrushchev's reaction to my letter of June 15.¹ As you probably know, it was a most urgent suggestion to him to reconsider the Soviet position at Geneva, which has in fact retrogressed in recent days, and to live up to

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. A preliminary draft of the message with the President's notations is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series.

¹ See Document 395.

his own pledge to us last March that the Soviet Government would do everything possible to make a positive contribution to the work of the Foreign Ministers Conference. As to his reaction to my message I am not particularly sanguine but I also do not believe that we have yet necessarily reached an impasse.

As respects the question of a Summit meeting, I reiterated to Khrushchev the formula that we agreed to at Camp David last spring and made it clear that such a meeting 'would certainly have to take place in an atmosphere in which neither side was posing a threat to the other, and on the basis of such preparatory work by our Foreign Ministers as could give us reason to believe that the Heads of Government would be able to reach agreement on significant subjects.'

From this statement I could not and, in my opinion, should not retreat. One reason for this conviction is that if I should agree, in the absence of the stated prerequisites, to go to a Summit meeting, such a reversal on my part at this time would seriously impair any influence that I might hope to exercise with Khrushchev. Moreover it would be interpreted here as a dangerous exhibition of weakness, as indeed I would interpret it myself.

Frankly, it seems to me that any encounter of the three Western Heads of Government with Khrushchev would, in fact, be a Summit meeting. I think the public would see no difference between an informal and a more formal gathering and I can't see what advantage there would be in the 'informal' formula for us. As you say, we would certainly want our Foreign Ministers. They would want at least a few selected advisers. Adding the clerical housekeeping and security personnel, we would willy-nilly have a full-fledged Summit conference on our hands with world attention focused on it. The presence of a thousand representatives of the press would be the frosting on the cake.

I fully agree that public opinion is a factor of greatest importance and realize that you have some particular difficulties in this respect.

However, I do believe that should Khrushchev face us with a call of a Summit meeting, we are not necessarily limited to a yes or no answer. I think, for example, that we would be in good posture to demand that the Foreign Ministers Conference be resumed after a few weeks recess. Possibly in some way or another we might find an opportunity to impress upon him personally the seriousness with which we regard any failure to bring about a resumption of that conference. For instance, if Khrushchev should decide to replace Koslov in visiting the Soviet Exhibit in New York later this month, I would be ready, assuming no objection on the part of our allies, to meet with him in an effort to get the Foreign Ministers Meeting back on the tracks. While such an occurrence would seem most unlikely, yet it is the kind of thing that could be done without pre-

senting the picture of a 'summit' meeting. It would indeed represent only a fortuitous circumstance of which advantage could be taken.

The essential element is of course the continued unity of the West. Above all this applies with special force to our two governments. I am therefore letting Chris Herter know that I believe the Western Foreign Ministers should take no initiative to break up the conference finally but, if necessary, should seek a recess of a few weeks during which we could develop an agreed allied position as to our next moves. I hope you might make similar suggestions to Selwyn.

As I said in the beginning of this letter, I shall want to write you further as soon as we hear from Khrushchev. Meanwhile, I should be glad to have your reactions to the foregoing.²

With warm regard,

As ever,

Ike"

[Here follows text of Macmillan's June 16 letter to the President.]

Dillon

²On June 17 Macmillan replied that he agreed if no progress were made the best solution would be to have a short adjournment of the conference until about mid-July. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

400. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter at Geneva

Washington, June 16, 1959, 10 p.m.

Tocah 114. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. Last night after discussing details of letter to Khrushchev¹ the President indicated that in view of the real possibility of an early impasse on Berlin we should consider necessary action to ensure complete solidarity of Western powers at the highest level. I inquired from him what he would think of the possibility of a Western Summit meeting with himself, Macmillan, de

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1332. Secret; Niact.

¹See Document 395.

Gaulle and Adenauer which would have as its objective the clearing away of the underbrush of minor disagreements among the Western powers and the establishment of firm agreement on basic policy versus the Soviet Union. He wondered whether you would consider that such a meeting might be helpful from a public relations point of view and as a means of impressing the Soviets with the reality of Western unity of purpose.

I suggested that if such a meeting were held in London it might be of some help to Macmillan in the event a Summit Meeting with Khrushchev did not come off. I also suggested it would give a useful opportunity for the President to have a bilateral talk with de Gaulle. The President readily agreed and said he would be glad to go to London if it should be decided to have such a meeting and would then be willing to fly to Paris for a short visit with de Gaulle.

I would appreciate your views on this in case the matter should come up again prior to your return. In view of the tentative nature of the thought the President wants it held very closely, with no mention of it to the British, French or Germans at this time, or indeed to any except your most senior advisers.²

Dillon

²In Cahto 123 from Geneva, June 17, Herter replied that a Western summit might indicate that the solid front achieved at Geneva was not as solid as it seemed although an early meeting between the President and de Gaulle was most desirable. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/6-1759)

401. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 17, 1959, 6 p.m.

Cahto 126. For the President from the Secretary. I have just returned from a very brief private Foreign Ministers' Conference at which Gromyko was asked to comment on our paper given him last night.¹ He

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/6-1759. Secret; Niact.

¹The meeting took place at 3:30 p.m. A detailed four-page memorandum of the conversation at the meeting, US/MC/109, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340. For text of the paper, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 312–313 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 237–238.

said that he would only make a few preliminary remarks but that he would be prepared to go into further detail tomorrow. His preliminary remarks covered only two points: 1) That there seemed little new in our proposals and that we and the Soviets had had different approaches to the Berlin problem; 2) That in his view symbolic troops in Berlin would be in the number of 3,500 to 4,000. I suggested we meet tomorrow morning but he asked for the afternoon.

Just prior to the meeting, Zorin had been optimistic in talking to the press as to possibilities of agreement based on our proposals. The previous night, Malik, a member of the Soviet Delegation, had been most pessimistic.² We do not know which position is correct, but at least it looks as if your letter to Khrushchev was leading to new instructions. Your press comments³ as so far received here are most helpful.

Faithfully, signed: Chris.

Herter

² A memorandum of the Western Foreign Ministers meeting at 11:30 a.m., at which Rumbold reported Malik's pessimism when presented with the Western paper, US/MC/106, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340.

³ For a transcript of the President's press conference at 10:30 a.m. on June 17, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 460-470.

402. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, June 17, 1959, 4 p.m.

6595. I called on Prime Minister this morning at my request to discuss generally his current assessment developments Geneva and his thinking re future prospects.

PM anticipates Khrushchev will show his hand within next few days, particularly in view President's letter.¹ He had not seen letter, but Caccia had described it as "hortatory". I would say he was glad of letter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/6-1759. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Geneva as telegram 174, which is the source text.

¹ See Document 395.

since it helped West keep initiative which he greatly fears losing to Khrushchev. He believes the President to be the one who can, and really the only one who can give the lead. "I am not in least anxious to lead myself for my own ends," he added, "and I'm sure the President knows this."

Re further steps to maintain initiative, PM said one way would be for President to see Khrushchev alone, but PM regards that as dangerous for reasons he did not specify. He considered meeting between President Eisenhower, de Gaulle, and himself in Washington would be useful, and would anticipate such meeting with pleasure. He toyed with idea that perhaps the Queen might summon him to Canada when the President was there, but did not pursue the matter further.

If Sovs propose postponement Geneva meeting for week or ten days, PM would regard development as good sign. On contrary, if they propose adjournment of say four months, such proposal would be bad in that, in Macmillan's view, during those four months (1) West would be torn by barrage of nagging public criticism and public tirades against H-bombs, etc., and (2) it would be PM's guess that Khrushchev would make peace treaty.

Finally in summarizing his thoughts on current prospects for West, Prime Minister said he pins his hopes on possibility that we can persuade Khrushchev to agree to a provisional settlement of the Berlin situation for say three years, in which the juridical argument would be shelved by formula perhaps involving agreement to disagree on "rights". If so, he still has some hope that progress can be made in other areas through a more general discussion at a summit meeting.

Whitney

403. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, June 17, 1959, 9 p.m.

2570. Observe Presidential Handling. Geneva for Secretary. Kornienko, Acting Chief American Section MFA, summoned me at 1700 today and handed me Khrushchev's reply dated June 17 to President's letter of June 15. The following is text:

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1378. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Geneva as telegram 145, which is the source text.

“Dear Mr. President: I received your kind message and highly esteem your concern to find a path for the liquidation of the tense situation between States and to introduce calmness into the world.

The Soviet Government on its part has never spared efforts in order to attain this goal and to create a situation of confidence and mutual understanding between States. When we received your message in February¹ which touched on the question of convoking a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, we, as you remember, immediately gave a response² and set forth our conceptions concerning what the Foreign Ministers should concern themselves with and what might be expected from this conference. In our messages agreement was expressed that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs should consider the problems which await decision. At the same time we emphasized that the current international situation is very complicated and has so many difficult problems that a decision on all questions appears beyond the powers of the Ministers and such a nut can be too hard for them. Therefore we did not hide our opinion that for the solution of ripe international problems, such forces should be included which have greater plenary powers and rights, that is, the Heads of Governments and of states.

I should like to remark that the question of a meeting of the Heads of Governments was also touched upon during the talks in Moscow with the Prime Minister of Great Britain, H. Macmillan. Mr. H. Macmillan expressed then the just opinion that one meeting of the Heads of Governments may prove to be insufficient, that the Heads of Governments will not decide immediately all problems in view of which a first meeting may mark only a beginning and several meetings of the Heads of Governments will be required for the achievement of the necessary success.

It is impossible not to take into account that the peoples expect from the leading state figures that there should be taken without delay measures for the lessening of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and governments are obliged to reckon with this.

Having agreed with the proposal for the convocation of a conference of the Foreign Ministers, the Soviet Government, of course, hoped that this Conference will bring its useful contribution to the matter of the preparation of mutually acceptable, positive agreements. Sending its Minister of Foreign Affairs to Geneva, it empowered him to take all possible measures for obtaining the success of the Conference. It seems to us that despite the divergencies and difficulties which have appeared in Geneva, that work, which has already been done by the Ministers, has a

¹ See Document 176.

² See Document 194.

certain positive significance. The conference has permitted positions of the sides on a number of questions to be better clarified, to define the degree of the existing disagreements and to try in some measure to draw nearer the viewpoint of the sides on separate aspects of actual international problems.

The situation which has developed at the Geneva Conference of Ministers has impelled the Soviet Government to introduce recently new proposals taking into account the position of the Western powers and the real situation. At the same time we were anxious that the Conference of the Ministers would be as productive as possible and that it would take some step forward in the direction of the solution of such of the most acute contemporary questions as a peaceful settlement with Germany, the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, the rapprochement of the two German Governments with the aim of the achievement of the reestablishment of German unity. Of course, all this would clear the way and would create more favorable conditions also for the solution of other ripe international problems.

We consider that the Soviet proposals which were introduced in Geneva provide a good basis for agreement of the sides because they take into consideration the position of the Western powers and proceed from the necessity to concentrate attention on what can reasonably be decided already now. We consider that once an agreement in principle exists between our governments in relation to the necessity for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and a solution of the question of West Berlin, then the way can and must be found to work out a concrete formula of agreement on each of these questions.

Unfortunately, the US Secretary of State, supported by the Ministers of England and France, refused to discuss the substance of the proposals which give a basis for the gradual liquidation of the abnormal situation in West Berlin and Germany, and for the sides coming to an understanding without harm to anyone's interests or prestige. At the same time they persistently seek to foist on the Soviet Union an agreement by which the preservation of the occupation regime in West Berlin would be confirmed for an indefinite time and which would also put off further the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

As the main argument against the Soviet proposals, the US Secretary of State advances the question about the period of operation of a temporary agreement on West Berlin and about the all-German committee. I should like to think that such an evaluation of the Soviet proposals is based on a misunderstanding or incorrect understanding.

What is the essence of our proposals? Since the Western powers at present are not ready to come to an immediate and complete abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin, the Soviet Government gave instructions to its Minister not to oppose the preservation in the course of a

definite period of the occupation rights of the three powers in West Berlin. We proposed to work out an agreement on a temporary settlement of the question of West Berlin which would operate in the course of this period. During that time the all-German committee should work out concrete measures for the preparation and conclusion of a German Peace Treaty and the unification of Germany. Thus the essence of the proposals of the Soviet Government consists in gradually liquidating the abnormal situation in West Berlin and in preparing a peace treaty and measures for the unification of Germany.

The question about the period for us is neither the main one nor one of principle. It surprises us that this question is represented now as the main obstacle to the attainment of agreement. Indeed also in the so-called "comprehensive plan" of the Western powers it was proposed for example to limit the work of the all-German committee by a definite period; however, we did not consider such a proposal about a period as an ultimatum. Naming a period from our side, we proceed from the fact that it is impossible endlessly to drag out a peaceful settlement with Germany and to preserve the occupation regime in West Berlin. It is impossible to permit such a situation so that the world would find itself in a state of tension because of the uncompromising position taken, let us say by the Government of Adenauer. Can one fail to take into account such statements of Adenauer in which he openly declared that if any kind of organ for consideration of German questions will be created, then it will be possible to carry on negotiations in it for many years. In this time under the cover of such an organ the policy of militarization of West Germany and the policy of preparation of war would be continued.

The establishment of a definite period will serve only peaceful purposes, will answer the vital interests of the peoples. If the one-year period named by the Soviet Union does not suit the Western powers, then it is possible to agree on another period, acceptable for all interested sides. Both sides have named periods; now it is necessary to seek to find something in the middle (chto-to sredneye) and to reach an agreed decision. We are sure that if we will have agreement on the main, fundamental questions, then no difficulties will be met in agreement on the necessary periods.

I agree with you, Mr. President, that the situation in the Geneva Conference is now such that it demands of all its participants efforts in the direction of drawing together the points of view. The Soviet Government has given the necessary instructions to its Minister and we expect that similar steps will be undertaken also by the governments of the Western powers.

On the other hand, if the Ministers also do not succeed in reaching the necessary understanding, then in our opinion a Summit meeting

will become even more urgently necessary. We cannot, taking into account our responsibility before the peoples, fail to use all means for attainment of an easing of tension and strengthening of peace.

I would like to say that I consider this exchange of personal letters on an unofficial basis useful and we agree with you that these should not be given publicity.

With profound respect, (signed)

N. Khrushchev"

Davis

404. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State

Geneva, June 18, 1959, 11 a.m.

Cahto 130. This morning before meeting of four Western Foreign Ministers, von Brentano called on me at his request. Purpose proved to be to express his deep concern over trend conference in past few days. He believes we are steadily losing public support which rallied to West when Gromyko's unacceptable proposal of June 9 was rejected on June 10.¹ He is fearful of position we will find ourselves in if conference continues longer on present course.

I expressed agreement and then read him Khrushchev reply² to the President's letter.³ He characterized it as "grotesque" and not containing even a hint of any concession from position which Gromyko has set forth. He agreed that prompt recess of about a month was best unless Gromyko reveals today unanticipated flexibility.

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/6-1859. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Merchant.

¹ See Documents 377 and 381.

² See Document 403.

³ See Document 395.

405. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 18, 1959, 5 p.m.

Cahto 131. I met with Western Foreign Ministers at noon today. As usual Couve had with him Lucet and Laloy; von Brentano had Grewe and Duckwitz plus interpreter; Lloyd had Rumbold, Hancock and Laskey; and I had with me Thompson and Merchant.

I opened by reading Khrushchev's reply¹ to the President. All agreed Gromyko's position as already exposed would now be frozen since Khrushchev did not advance a single thought not already incorporated in Gromyko's proposals.

Lloyd asked what our position should be if Gromyko were to accept our agreement² in toto except for duration provision which he would then offer to set at two years with understanding four powers would examine position at expiration that period. No one present felt it likely that Gromyko would accept all other paragraphs. I pointed out that as now drawn the paper constituted minimum position from which we could not afford to be whittled.

Lloyd then asked if Gromyko proved negative at private meeting this afternoon should we not suggest an immediate recess for a month. Von Brentano and Couve emphatically agreed as did I. It was further agreed that Lloyd would broach this to Gromyko at lunch he is giving him today placing suggestion on legitimate grounds Couve's engagements.

Assuming Gromyko accepts recess after consulting Moscow, we were agreed [it] desirable to avoid final plenary but would accept if Gromyko asked for it. In any event the text of the Western proposal would be given out publicly before recessing. We will meet again following private session at Gromyko's villa this afternoon.

Since dictating above I have received word from Lloyd that Gromyko asked for postponement today's private meeting until tomorrow afternoon. Lloyd was unsuccessful in advancing meeting until morning. Subject of recess was not broached at lunch.

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-1859. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Merchant.

¹ See Document 403.

² Regarding the Western proposal of June 16, see footnote 1, Document 396.

406. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State at Geneva

Washington, June 18, 1959, 7 p.m.

Tocah 129. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. Following confirms your telecons with Murphy and me today¹ and supplements Tocah 127.² We appreciate force of your argument that discussion has reached such an impasse that indefinite prolongation risks result of chipping away of our position. However, it seems to us that there are real vulnerabilities in Khrushchev's artful letter of June 17 which it might be useful to probe further with Gromyko in the next few days thus avoiding necessity of a substantive reply from here. I am listing below series of questions which we think might be put to him, in private meeting such as suggested Tocah 124,³ and you will think of many others. Gromyko's postponement of session today also leads us to think he might be expecting new instructions conceivably going beyond blandly unyielding position of Khrushchev's letter.

We would not expect this exercise to go on for any length of time though we could envisage it might extend into next week. If Couve has to be absent wouldn't it be possible for him to leave a deputy behind if this proved necessary?

Following are suggested questions:

1. How can Khrushchev's statement that a Summit meeting becomes more necessary if the Foreign Ministers do not reach meaningful understanding square with the understanding concerning the terms of reference of the Foreign Ministers conference reached in the exchange of letters dated March 26 and March 30?⁴
2. What does Khrushchev mean when he stated that the "main obstacle to attainment of agreement" is merely a question of the time pe-

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1332. Secret; Priority.

¹ Herter called the Department at 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. Washington time on June 18. In the first call he told Murphy that he found nothing helpful in Khrushchev's reply (see Document 403), and that the four Western Ministers were in agreement to seek a recess of the meeting. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, June 18; *ibid.*, Central Files, 600.0012/6-1859) No record of the second conversation has been found.

² Tocah 127, June 18 at noon, informed Herter that the President would not accept a Berlin solution that carried a time limit, but that a troop reduction in Berlin was acceptable if the other elements of the solution were satisfactory. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1332)

³ Tocah 124, June 17, reported that the President was impressed with the conciliatory tone of Khrushchev's message and suggested that Herter meet privately with Gromyko to see if he had received new instructions. (*Ibid.*)

⁴ See Document 244.

riod? Has he not been informed that the question of recognition of Western rights to be in Berlin pending German reunification is the central point of contention?

3. Khrushchev states that it is "possible to agree on another period" than one year. Does this mean that the Soviets are prepared to recognize Western rights in Berlin for the period prior to German reunification? Why should any period be fixed in terms of time when clearly should be in terms of goal on which we all agree?

4. What is the "certain positive significance" in the work of the Foreign Ministers which Khrushchev sees?

5. The letter equates the time period in the Western Peace Plan with the Soviet ultimatum for the surrender of Western rights in Berlin in the course of one year: has the Soviet Prime Minister not been informed that, unlike the Soviet proposal, the Western plan would involve no unilateral action against Soviet rights as in case Soviet proposals?

6. The letter states that the Soviet proposal would entail no "harm to anyone's interests." Is it the Soviet position that the surrender of Western rights in Berlin would not damage Western interests? Or the security and well-being of the West Berliners?

7. If, as the letter states, the question of the duration of Western rights in Berlin is "neither the main one nor one of principle" can the Soviet Union not agree to the maintenance of those rights until German reunification?

8. What does Khrushchev mean by stating that the Soviet proposal would "concentrate attention on what can reasonably be decided now"?

9. Khrushchev states that the Soviet Government has instructed the Foreign Minister to bend his "efforts in direction of drawing together points of view." Does this signify Soviet willingness to negotiate on Western proposals on Berlin or on Western "Peace Plan"?

10. Does not the four powers "responsibility before the peoples" to use all means for easing tensions obligate the USSR to negotiate seriously at the Foreign Ministers' Meeting as well as at a summit meeting?

11. Does Khrushchev's statement that the solution of important international problems is "beyond the powers of the ministers" not contradict Soviet note of March 30 which said the four powers have "reached agreement to start solving urgent international questions at a Foreign Ministers conference and a summit meeting"?

12. What "measures for obtaining the success of the conference" does the Soviet Foreign Minister consider he has taken when the latest Soviet proposals only reiterate Soviet positions advanced and rejected as a basis for negotiation prior to the conference?

13. As the letter refers to better clarification of a number of questions, could the Soviet Foreign Minister clarify what worries the USSR in the existing situation in Berlin?

14. Does Soviet Government advance seriously proposals the “essence” of which consists in “gradually liquidating abnormal situation”, i.e., Western position in West Berlin?

Dillon

407. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/114

Geneva, June 19, 1959, 2 and 5:15 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Freers

United Kingdom

Mr. Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Morgan

France

Mr. Couve de Murville
Mr. Lucet
Mr. Laloy
Mr. Andronikov

Soviet Union

Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Malik
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Soldatov
Mr. Martinov

SUBJECT

Revised Soviet Proposal, Western Reaction; Conference Recess

Gromyko opened by remarking that in spite of the differences and difficulties, the work of the Ministers had had certain positive aspects. The exchange of views had allowed a clarification of the issues and made it possible to specify the degree of difference on the various points. It represented an effort to bring views closer together. The Soviet Delegation, taking account of the position of the Western Powers and of the actual situation, had submitted new proposals on June 9 and 10 on the burning questions—Berlin and an all-German committee. They

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340. Secret. Drafted by Freers. The meeting was held at the Soviet Villa. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Cahto 139 from Geneva, June 20 at 1 a.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/6-2059)

regretted that we had taken a negative stand on these proposals. They had taken into consideration our main objection, which concerned the time limit relating to the Berlin question and to the all-German committee. Gromyko said we had based our objections on a misunderstanding of the essence of their proposals. Since the Western Powers were not at present ready to agree to the immediate and complete abolition of the occupation regime for West Berlin, the Soviet Government had expressed the position that it would not object to the continuation of certain rights in West Berlin for a certain time. The Soviets had proposed working out an agreement for a temporary arrangement on West Berlin to remain in force for a certain period while an all-German committee would work out specific concrete measures concerning the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and concerning reunification of Germany. Thus the essence of their proposals was to work toward gradually liquidating the abnormal situation in West Berlin, and to prepare a peace treaty, and to make arrangements for the reunification of Germany. His next remarks, in verbatim, were:

“On the basis of the exchange of views held at our Conference and taking into account the considerations put forward by the Western Powers, the Soviet Government believes that it is quite possible to find an acceptable basis for agreement on the Berlin question and on the question of an all-German committee.

“An agreement on an interim status of West Berlin should, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, include agreement on the following:

“Reduction of the occupation forces of the Western Powers in West Berlin to symbolic contingents;

“Termination of subversive activities from West Berlin against the GDR and other socialist states;

“Non-location in West Berlin of atomic and rocket weapons.

“These are the measures relating to West Berlin that we should agree upon in the first place.

“The question of a time-limit of that agreement is a matter neither of major importance, nor of principle to us. The Soviet Government is proceeding from the premise that it is impossible to delay a peace settlement with Germany and to preserve the occupation regime in West Berlin ad infinitum. If the time-limit indicated by the Soviet Government does not suit the Western Powers, then we can agree upon another time-limit acceptable to all sides concerned. In the course of the Conference the Western Powers have indicated a definite time-limit for the functioning of an all-German committee, namely, two and a half years. We have indicated a one year time-limit. Now we should try to find something of a medium nature and to reach an agreed decision. We believe that it would be possible to agree upon a one and [a] half year time-limit. We are convinced that if agreement is achieved between us on main questions of principle no difficulties will arise in agreeing on necessary time-limits.

“During the period agreed upon between the parties to the agreement the two German states will carry out measures relating to the establishment and activities of an all-German committee composed of the

representatives of the GDR and the FRG on a parity basis. The committee should promote extension and development of contacts between the GDR and the FRG, discuss and work out concrete measures for the unification of Germany and consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

"If during the agreed period no solution of the questions of a peace treaty with Germany and the unification of Germany can be reached within the framework of an all-German committee or otherwise, then the participants of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers of 1959 could resume the consideration of the West Berlin question.

"Should we have to renew the discussion of the West Berlin question after the expiration of the said time-limit, such discussion should undoubtedly be conducted with due regard of a situation obtained by that time.

"For the duration of the agreement the communications of West Berlin with the outside world will be preserved in their present shape.

"As it has already been pointed out in the proposals of the Soviet Government of June 9–10, a supervisory committee composed of the representatives of the United States, the USSR, Great Britain and France is proposed to be established to supervise the fulfillment of the obligations of the parties arising from the above-mentioned agreement on an interim status of West Berlin.

"The above proposals of the Soviet Government meet the views expressed by the Western Powers and constitute a good basis for mutually acceptable agreement on the Berlin question and on an all-German committee."

[After setting forth the above, Gromyko remarked that the Ministers had, of course, not narrowed differences all the way. There were still great differences on certain questions, particularly on the question of troops.]¹ (After the meeting the Soviets released the verbatim text of *all* of Gromyko's remarks up to this point—with the exception of the bracketed sentence above. The press release did, however, contain the following paragraphs which were not expressed by Gromyko at this meeting:

"The Soviet delegation takes also cognizance of the fact that in the course of discussions at the Conference the position of the Western Powers and that of the Soviet Union were brought closer together on many questions touched upon in these proposals. This applies among other things, to the reduction of armed forces and non-location of atomic and rocket weapons in West Berlin, the termination of subversive activities, as well as to the necessity of setting up an all-German committee to facilitate a rapprochement of the two German states and to make easier their reunification and to the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.

"The Soviet Government hopes that the Governments of the USA, Britain and France will approach with due attention the said Soviet proposals and a mutually acceptable agreement will be reached.")

¹ Brackets in the source text.

Lloyd asked if it were Gromyko's intention to give us a piece of paper on the points he had just made. Gromyko then circulated a document containing the above proposals, in Russian and what he called unofficial English translation, and asked that it be considered only as a talking paper. Lloyd asked whether it would be published and Gromyko replied that it would not be published today.

The Western Ministers then asked for a recess in the session.

The second afternoon session began at 5:15 p.m.

Mr. Herter said that, acting for the Four Western Foreign Ministers who were in complete agreement on the situation and had reduced their views to writing, he would read a statement. He then read the following statement which was translated into Russian by Martinov immediately thereafter.

WESTERN STATEMENT OF JUNE 19

"The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have examined the statement made to them this afternoon by Mr. Gromyko. This statement was clearly timed to coincide with Mr. Khrushchev's speech today² in which the Western proposals of June 16 were characterized as 'groundless and unacceptable'. Mr. Gromyko's statement does not differ in any important aspects from the Soviet proposal of June 9 on which the Western Ministers clearly expressed their views in the meetings of June 10 and 12.

"Although the latest Soviet statement extends the time limit of the proposed agreement from one year to a year and a half, it reserves to the Soviet Union freedom of unilateral action at the expiration of that period. Moreover it is clear that it is the Soviet intention that the Western Powers upon signing such an agreement would acquiesce in the liquidation of their rights in Berlin and the abandonment of their responsibility for maintaining the freedom of the people of West Berlin.

"It is true that there is provision for a resumption of the consideration of the Berlin question by the Four Powers during or at the end of the year and a half period. But if no agreement has been reached in the meantime the Western Powers would enter into any negotiation at the end of that period without any rights at all so far as Berlin or the access to it were concerned.

"In the light of these fundamental objections the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have concluded that the latest Soviet statement constitutes no change in the previous Soviet position. They consider that in the circumstances the wise course is to recess the Conference for a period. They accordingly suggest that the next meeting be postponed until July 13, 1959. This interval would give the Soviet Government the opportunity of considering the Western proposals further. It would give the Western Governments the opportunity to consider the position in relation in particular to Mr. Khrushchev's

² For an extract from Khrushchev's June 19 speech, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 316–328 or *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 667–670.

statement of today and its connection with the future course of negotiations.”

Gromyko remarked that Mr. Herter described the prolongation of the time limit as representing no change. The Soviet proposals had referred to a year and a half, but he recalled that he had told us they did not foresee any difficulties about the duration of the period. We had named one period of time. They had named another. The year and a half represented something in between. This was not the main question nor was it a question of principle, as far as they were concerned. As to the matter of unilateral action, the Western statement charged that the Soviets in their proposals reserved their freedom to take unilateral action, as purportedly was indicated in Khrushchev's statements in the Soviet Union and Gromyko's here. As we knew well, their proposals provided that if the all-German committee reached no agreement within the period prescribed, a conference of the same participants as this present one would be convened to discuss the whole question again. This made the whole question a subject of negotiation and it was not understandable why the matter of unilateral action was raised now. We said that during the period concerned or at the expiration of the time limit or even when the period was entered into, we were without rights. We were free to draw such conclusions but they were not bound to agree to them. They had made no special statements with regard to rights. These were our statements. They had hoped for a favorable response on their proposals. He realized that our reaction was the result of a first acquaintance with these new proposals. He urged that we give them serious consideration. The Soviet Government had not submitted these proposals to complicate the question but in order to facilitate negotiation. As to a recess, they preferred to continue the present talks and reach a positive result at this meeting. If their partners did not want to continue, they could do nothing but take this into account.

Mr. Herter said Gromyko's remarks about our not having understood their proposals added to his conviction that a recess was desirable. The U.S. would give serious thought to the Russian proposals and we were ready to be persuaded that we were wrong. He suggested July 13 as the date for reconvening the Foreign Ministers Conference.

Lloyd remarked that this date takes into account the fact that Couve could not be here any earlier.

Gromyko said that the problems of all the Ministers should be taken into consideration. He would prefer a two weeks' recess, for example.

Mr. Herter said this would be difficult for him. He had already been here six times as long as he had been in the State Department himself since taking over as Secretary. A three weeks recess would be the shortest period he could contemplate.

Gromyko insisted that his problems should be taken into account as well as others.

Both Mr. Herter and Lloyd said they had tried to shorten the time but Couve had a serious problem.

Gromyko would not consider a resumption beginning with the deputies. He asked Couve to share the inconvenience on an equal basis. He suggested July 9 or 10.

Couve said he could make it on the afternoon of the 13th at the earliest. Gromyko accepted and they both thanked each other for their respective accommodating attitudes.

Gromyko suggested a Plenary Meeting to wind up this phase of the conference. The Four Ministers agreed to a Plenary Session tomorrow at 11:00 a.m. which would be purely a formality and at which no speeches would be made.

Gromyko then produced a draft communiqué in Russian which read as follows:

"The exchange of views at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, which began its work on May 11, significantly facilitated a mutual clarification of the positions of the participants of the conference on the questions discussed, which makes easier their further examination. The Foreign Ministers of the USSR, U.S., U.K. and France agreed to take a recess in the work of the conference and to resume the conference on July 13, 1959."

Couve said he could subscribe to the second sentence in this draft. Gromyko said they thought the exchange of opinions had been useful, but if we did not, that was a different matter. We ought to agree anyway on something to say to the press today. The Ministers then agreed to say that two private meetings had been held today and the Ministers had agreed to hold a Plenary Session on June 20 at 11:00 a.m.

408. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/110

Geneva, June 19, 1959, 2:45 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Berding
Mr. Freers

France

M. Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Baraduc
M. Beaumarchais

U.K.

Mr. Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Hope

Federal Republic

Dr. von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Duckwitz
Mr. von Eckhardt
Mr. Koesterer

SUBJECT

Discussion of June 19 Soviet Proposals and Western Statement

The Ministers discussed the proposals just presented by Gromyko at the private meeting at his Villa.¹ All agreed that they should be considered together with Khrushchev's speech,² the first part of which had just come over the ticker.

Lloyd said he thought it would not be wise to take definite action on the basis of a fragmentary report of the speech. He said also that the extension of the time limit on negotiations to a year and a half would be considered a Soviet concession by much of world opinion, and particularly the population in Britain.

The other Ministers all pointed out that the main element in these proposals remained the same as before, that our rights in West Berlin would be eliminated either at the end of the period or sometime during the period. It was a clever paper.

Lloyd agreed that it was time for a recess.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Freers. The meeting was held at the French Villa.

¹ See Document 407.

² See footnote 2, Document 407.

A short discussion on the various unacceptable aspects ensued. This involved the all-German Committee (and on a parity basis); the discussion of a peace treaty by the Germans instead of by the Four Powers; the difference in status at the end of the time limit envisaged by each side; and the absence of reciprocity with regard to subversive activities in Berlin.

Lloyd thought we ought to point out that the Soviets had called our proposal absolutely groundless and unacceptable and throw this charge back at them with regard to theirs.

Ambassador Thompson suggested we propose signature of a peace treaty with West Germany as a counter to their call for a separate peace treaty for the GDR. Lloyd remarked that this had already been done in a sense in the Paris agreement.

The Ministers decided to draft a statement which would give the Western attitude with regard to the Soviet proposals and include provision for a recess.

Mr. Merchant submitted a draft which was discussed and revised by the Ministers. (The final text appears in the memorandum on the private meeting at Gromyko's Villa.)

It was agreed that this paper would be read by Mr. Herter on resumption of the afternoon session with Mr. Gromyko.

The Ministers then proceeded to Gromyko's Villa. They returned at 6:45 p.m. following this session.

Lloyd suggested we should all say to our own peoples that we had said that we wanted negotiations with the Russians; that we had realized that negotiations with them were long and difficult; and that we were ready to go on to seek some agreement. Gromyko had said nothing about a Summit Meeting. If questioned by the press, we ought to say that what has happened here neither makes a Summit Meeting harder nor easier.

The Ministers agreed that the Western paper just read to Gromyko³ should be released at 7:30 this evening whether or not the Soviet proposals had been made public by then.

Lloyd suggested that when the deputies meet tomorrow to draft a joint communiqué with the Russians, we should avoid having just platitudes. There should be some statement about the Ministers regretting that agreement was not reached—since this would strike a responsive chord with public opinion.

Mr. Herter told Dr. von Brentano that he would not be going to Berlin as he had considered doing. It was better not to do so, now that a recess had been agreed upon.

³ See Document 407.

Couve invited the other Ministers to meet with him at lunch on July 13 preceding the scheduled afternoon meeting to reopen the conference.

At the suggestion of the other Ministers, Couve agreed to report on the conference to NATO next Monday.

Von Brentano said he thought the Four Ministers should do something between now and July 13 in order to prepare for the resumed negotiations. Couve thought the deputies might meet on Saturday, July 11. Mr. Herter said that there would be much to do through diplomatic channels. Lloyd thought a working group might be needed. Nothing was decided.

409. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, June 20, 1959, 4 p.m.

Cahto 142. Bonn, London, Paris, eyes only for Ambassador. Moscow eyes only for Chargé. USBER eyes only for Burns. Paris pass USRO eyes only for Burgess. From the Secretary.

I had Gromyko to lunch today returning his hospitality to me. He was accompanied by Zorin and Soldatov. I had Merchant and Thompson. We went over much of the ground covered by the Conference¹ with no change of position on either side. Gromyko stressed the importance which he attached to the change in their latest position from their earlier proposals in that at the end of the period of one and one half years the Foreign Ministers would meet to discuss the situation. I pointed out that the rest of the paper he had given us² made quite clear that when the Foreign Ministers met at the end of the fixed period Western rights in Berlin would virtually have been extinguished.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-2059. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin.

¹ At the eighteenth plenary meeting at 11 a.m. the Foreign Ministers agreed to recess the conference until July 13. For text of the final communiqué and Gromyko's statement at this session, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, p. 295. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a brief summary of the meeting in Secto 282 from Geneva, June 20 at noon. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-2059)

² See Document 407.

I said I hope that during the period the conference was in recess nothing would be done to aggravate the situation. In this connection I pointed out that our high altitude flights were not intended to be provocative but merely the result of the new planes we were using which could only fly efficiently at high altitudes. Gromyko merely reiterated the Soviet position on this question.

Herter

**410. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State
Herter and Foreign Secretary Lloyd**

US/MC/112

Geneva, June 20, 1959, 3 p.m.

Selwyn raised the question of where we stood on the conference. I told him that as long as a time limit was placed on us either with respect to occupation troops in Berlin or possible studies by some all-German committee, we could not reach agreement. However, I said I would be discussing in Washington the possibility of a time limit of at least 2-1/2 years (which would carry the period beyond the German domestic elections) provided it were coupled with a clear-cut statement that a Foreign Ministers conference scheduled at the end of that time could discuss further possible arrangements without prejudice to the presently existing and continuing rights. Selwyn told me that he had talked to both von Brentano and Couve de Murville at lunch time and that they were in agreement that in place of an all-German Committee we could properly advance a Big Four Committee with German advisers, the Big Four Committee having authority to request or instruct the German advisers to study between themselves (a) the bettering of interchanges between the two Germanys, (b) principles of a peace treaty, and (c) the reunification of Germany, bringing their conclusions to the representatives of the Big Four, still as advisers. I said I would give that suggestion considerable thought as it coincided very closely with my own feeling that this would be a desirable provision from the Allied side.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340. Secret. Drafted by Herter. The meeting was held at Villa Greta. A memorandum of another conversation that took place at the same time as this one and the one in Document 411, describing a conversation on nuclear test suspensions, US/MC/111, is *ibid.*

I mentioned to Selwyn that the British press had been saying a great deal about the possibility of a Western Summit meeting. I asked Selwyn whether he had discussed this matter with Macmillan and he said that he had not. He added, however, that he personally felt that it would be a great mistake to hold such a meeting before our coming talks in Geneva since it would be regarded by the world as a panicky reaction and a sign of weakness rather than strength. He then repeated his personal satisfaction that we had been able to maintain such an effective united front in Geneva.

Christian A. Herter¹

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

411. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and Foreign Secretary Lloyd

US/MC/113

Geneva, June 20, 1959, 3 p.m.

We discussed the present status of contingency planning. I raised the question of the possible admissibility of German guards at check points in the light of the paper which we presented to the Russians.¹ We both agreed this should be restudied for contingency planning purposes since it would be much simpler to insist on the continuance of present procedures with German guards than to make the issue one of the type of stamping now being done by Russian guards. With respect to probes, Selwyn Lloyd said that the British preferred Norstad's second alternative for the initial probe and that they were unwilling to make final commitments with respect to a military probe of reinforced battalion or divisional strength, feeling that the matter would undoubtedly be before the United Nations at that stage. We also agreed that the matter should go before the UN immediately upon the signing of a separate peace treaty between Russia and East Germany.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340. Secret. Drafted by Herter. The meeting was held at Villa Greta.

¹ For text of this June 16 paper, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 312–313; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 237–238; or *Documents on Germany, 1944–1945*, pp. 665–666.

On the matter of harassment, Selwyn felt strongly that economic measures were not good enough and, in the case of the British, would lead to their biting off their nose to spite their face. He did, however, feel that overt military preparations by each of us would be the most effective method of harassment.

Christian A. Herter²

²Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

412. Editorial Note

Following the recess of the Foreign Ministers Conference on June 20 each of the participants issued major statements summing up his perception of the first segment. For texts of these statements, made between June 20 and 28, 1959, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pages 335–360.

JUNE 21-JULY 12, 1959: CONFERENCE RECESS

413. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, June 22, 1959, 3 p.m.

2875. As Embassy has reported, the embittered relationship between Chancellor and Erhard reached new peak last week, when Adenauer, during journalistic interviews, after terming his Vice Chancellor "very talented man" proceeded to say he did not possess qualities and abilities requisite for Chancellorship.

Having already made Erhard eat one dish of crow, he now seems ready to prescribe it as steady diet. Whether Adenauer's relentless attacks are dictated by vindictiveness or by policy cannot be determined, but probably by both. Although accusation is made they result from senility, no one close to him has observed any changes in his customary mental acuteness or physical vigor. In fact, he seems, at least outwardly, to enjoy the fight he had precipitated.

But from standpoint parliamentarians and general public, his prestige has undoubtedly suffered greatly. Even if he can again bring Erhard to heel, he will have suffered in common estimation, have afforded opportunity for denunciations his undemocratic methods, and have left permanent scars on his own party's body.

Jealousy and dislike of Erhard's popularity, and his consequent capacity to take independent action, may well have influenced Adenauer. However, I suspect a stronger factor is his belief Erhard is not a good European in the Chancellor's sense, and particularly might not carry on the Franco-German rapprochement policy so obsessively dear to the old man.

I have refrained from seeing Chancellor recently. I feel if I did so, regardless of substance of conversation, action would be widely and variously misinterpreted. In my opinion, U.S. officials should abstain from comment on this domestic affair, despite its foreign repercussions. It may become even more prickly. Adenauer has compounded his original error over the presidential succession by other mistakes of judgment and in his present mood is likely to make additional ones. Critically compromised as he is, it must be remembered he is self-assured, more of a man than any of his adversaries, and will probably continue to dominate them but with diminished authority.

Bruce

414. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and Secretary of Defense McElroy

Washington, June 22, 1959, 12:35 p.m.

Secretary McElroy telephoned with regard to overflights in Berlin to say the President thinks we should renew these flights on a regular basis when it is the right time to do so. McElroy said it occurred to him it might be a good thing to undertake very soon as an indication of firmness on our part in connection with the Geneva negotiations. CAH said he had talked to the President at some length about the whole situation and that among other things the President didn't want CAH to use provocative language in his speech tonight.¹ CAH said in light of this he would have some hesitation about renewing overflights although he would have none if negotiations broke down. McElroy said if negotiations broke down anything we did at that time would be considered provocative and also that if things broke down and they try to make things difficult, a precedence of overflights before that might be useful. CAH said what was really key to his mind was whether Defense really thinks these overflights are important technically. McElroy said this was the aircraft they would want to increasingly use for transport into Berlin; that it will take the equivalent of 6 or 8 other planes; that this is not for exercise; there is a real reason for this. CAH said he would give it careful thought.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers. No classification marking.

¹ Presumably a reference to Herter's report to the nation given on June 23 not June 22. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1959, pp. 43–45 or *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 342–346.

415. Letter From the British Ambassador (Caccia) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, June 23, 1959.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY, The Foreign Secretary has asked me to send you the enclosed message,¹ with a copy of a separate message which the Prime Minister has addressed to the President.²

At the same time he has asked me to speak to you on the following lines. In doing so, he wishes me to stress that he is not trying to put his thoughts into a very concrete shape, but is sending them to you as quickly as possible, since there is not much time to lose. With that in mind, I am putting this oral message on paper to you, in the hope that you will see me as soon as you can to give me your comments.

When you parted in Geneva last Saturday you agreed that the fullest use would have to be made of the interval before July 13 in order to concert a Western position before the next round. In view of this he has been taking stock of the situation and reflecting in particular about the developments on the last Friday.

It seems to him that what happened was this. The Western side gave Gromyko a paper³ which had the effect of preserving their own essential requirements while at the same time not explicitly requiring Gromyko to put his signature to what he had declared to be fundamentally objectionable, i.e. the perpetuation of the occupation regime. On June 19 Gromyko performed the same manoeuvre in reverse. That is to say he gave you a document⁴ which secured what the Soviet Government has hitherto stated to be its essential requirement, i.e. the end of the occupation status, while not requiring us, at least outwardly, to subscribe to this. Just as there was a catch in the Western paper from his point of view, so there was in his paper from our point of view. The catch for him in our paper was that the arrangements which it described would unless modified by Four Power agreement continue in force until the reunification of Germany. This spelt for him "the perpetuation of the

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that it was delivered to the Secretary of State at 9:55 a.m. on June 24.

¹ Not printed. This brief note told Herter that Lloyd was asking Caccia to explain to the Secretary of State his ideas on what should be done during the recess of the Geneva Conference.

² Document 416.

³ Regarding the Western proposal of June 16, see footnote 1, Document 411.

⁴ For text of this paper, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 329–331; *Cmd. 868*, pp. 238–239; or *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, p. 667. The verbatim remarks by Gromyko at the June 19 meeting (see Document 407) are essentially the same as the paper cited here.

occupation regime". The catch in his paper from our point of view, particularly when it was read in conjunction with Khrushchev's speech,⁵ was of course the reverse. There was the implication in the last sentence but two that at the end of the period of the provisional agreements, communications with Berlin would not necessarily continue "in their present shape". Khrushchev rubbed in the element of the concealed ultimatum contained in this phrase when he said that if the All-German Committee failed to reach agreement, the Soviet Government would sign a separate peace treaty with the D.D.R., and that this would automatically end the foreign occupation rights in D.D.R. territory. There were of course many other divergencies between the two approaches, but this was in the view of the Foreign Secretary the principal one.

On Friday evening, however, Gromyko was off on a slightly different tack. He released a statement to the press⁶ saying by way of comment on the statement which you had made to him in the afternoon that if no agreement were reached within the All-German Committee during the specified time limit, the Soviet Government proposed that the four Foreign Ministers should resume their consideration of the West Berlin question and "make this question a subject of negotiations similar to those which we hold here now". As the Foreign Secretary told you that Saturday afternoon, he had pressed Mr. Gromyko earlier in the day to explain exactly what he had meant when he released this statement to the press. He asked him what would happen at the end of the period if there had been no agreement in the All-German Committee, and whether the status quo as regards access would continue after the end of the period. Gromyko replied that he had not implied that there would be any unilateral action. The Soviet view was that if there was no agreement in the Committee, there should be a conference on the same basis as the present one. He confirmed that there would be no unilateral action during this conference. In short, what Gromyko seemed to be trying to do before the recess was to remove the flavour of ultimatum. It is true that he did not go so far as to say that if the conference which met at the end of the period failed to reach agreement, the procedures would go on as before. But he made it clear that during that conference nothing would happen. In fact what he was really saying was that the position would be exactly as it is today. We are, as it is, confident that the Soviet Government will not take unilateral action until the end of the present conference. But we cannot be certain that they will not do so if the present negotiations fail to result in Four Power agreement. In other words,

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 407.

⁶ For text of this statement, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 332–334 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 176–177.

on Gromyko's above explanation we would be no worse off during the conference which would convene at the end of the period than we are during the present conference.

The Foreign Secretary suggests we have seriously to consider what, if this is the position, are the merits of a moratorium of the kind which the Russians have proposed. The alternative course is to continue to press them for an explicit re-affirmation that the procedures concerning access would continue indefinitely unless modified by Four Power agreement. This would have been the effect of the West's June 16 proposal, if they had accepted it. But of course they did not accept it, saying that the theme of occupation status ran all through it. Our proposal of June 16, if the Russians had accepted it, would in effect have constituted a new contract between the Four Powers guaranteeing free access to Berlin until reunification. This would have great advantages, but we cannot conceal from ourselves that it is very doubtful whether the Russians could be brought to conclude a contract of this character. Moreover, it could be argued that even if they did, there are many ways that could be taken to eat into it and almost nullify it by indirect pressures. It seems therefore that we should carefully examine the idea of a moratorium for say two and a half years, provided it is expressed in acceptable terms. One argument in favour is the point that we are more likely to be able to negotiate this with the Russians. Also it would leave us in fact if not in theory in as strong a position at the end of the interim period as would any agreement of a more contractual character apparently designed to last longer.

In order to get a moratorium on acceptable terms it might of course be necessary to agree to some modifications in the existing situation, e.g. in relation to "activities" in Berlin, the operation of the "procedures" by Germans if it is found that the Russians want this to be done at once, and even perhaps in relation to the level of Western troops.

The great virtue of a moratorium is that a great deal can happen during the period which it covers. Things may not necessarily run against us everywhere. If we can get some sort of system of contacts going between the two parts of Germany, the result may even be that we should be better placed at the end of the period than we are at present.

A major difficulty would of course be to decide what we should agree to have happen during the period as far as these contacts between the two parts of Germany are concerned. Gromyko has proposed a Committee composed of representatives of the two "states" on a parity basis. There is also the idea which was at one point privately advanced by the United States Delegation to the British and the French of a Four Power Commission to be set to work during the period of a moratorium. Perhaps some compromise between the two could be found. In this connection it was perhaps interesting that Brentano told the Foreign

Secretary on Saturday that if a Four Power Commission with German advisers were established, he would not in the least bit mind West German advisers meeting alone with the East German advisers, provided they did so in order to discuss subjects remitted to them by the Commission itself. There may be the germ of a compromise idea in this remark of Brentano's.

As to the period of a moratorium, the Foreign Secretary would suggest we might go for two and a half years, as this would carry us over the German elections. Gromyko might object on the ground that his one and a half years was itself a compromise between the one year period which the Russians originally proposed and the two and a half years suggested by ourselves in quite a different context in our peace plan. In the last resort we might settle for two years, since this would bring us to the eve of the elections, and the summoning of the conference might without difficulty be postponed for a month or two. But in the opinion of the Foreign Secretary we should certainly start by asking for two and half years if we hope to get two.

The Foreign Secretary has asked me to explain that what I am conveying to you are thoughts and not formal proposals. We have not spoken to the French or Germans along these lines, and should hope to have your comments before we do so. May I ask you to let me know as soon as it would be convenient for me to see you?

Yours sincerely,

Harold Caccia

416. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower

London, undated.

DEAR FRIEND, I have been trying during the last day or two to take stock of the Geneva position. It is not very easy to follow developments there from a distance. I am now much clearer in my own mind after

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. This message was an enclosure to Document 415.

hearing Selwyn's explanation of the developments during the last few days before the conference recessed. I was very glad to learn how closely Chris Herter and he have been working together throughout. I thought that Herter's general exposition of our case upon his return to Washington was admirable.

We shall never know for certain why on June 10 Khrushchev appeared to revert to the method of ultimatum and repeated it in his speech of the 19th. Gromyko's latest paper of June 19 is obscure. Read in conjunction with Khrushchev's speech it could still contain a concealed ultimatum insofar as it implies that the Western presence in Berlin is only tolerated on sufferance, and by reason of an interim agreement, and might cease to have any justification at the end of the interim period or when a peace treaty had been signed with East Germany. I think, however, that it is meant to be slightly more accommodating towards us. This may well be a sort of clumsy response to your initiative with Khrushchev.¹ I believe he was in fact impressed by what you said, and made an effort at least to appear to meet your conditions for a Summit. His intemperate speech may, on this hypothesis, have been a tactical move to cover his retreat.

The question now is, what are we to do next. I have read Selwyn's messages to Chris Herter, and agree with them. It seems to me that we have some fundamental questions to consider. Are we likely to get a settlement of the Berlin question now, which we can expect to last until "the reunification of Germany"? I do not think myself that there is any chance of the Soviet Government actually underwriting our occupation rights. In any case, the Russians have many physical and geographical advantages where Berlin is concerned, and could always exert economic and other pressures which it would be difficult to pin-point. Brandt, for example, told Selwyn that if there were 200,000 unemployed in West Berlin, the high morale there would rapidly disappear.

I wonder therefore whether there is not a good deal to be said for aiming now at some interim settlement which will be relatively easier for the Russians to accept and which they will be likely to honour. This at any rate would gain us substantial time. A settlement of this kind must, of course, be such that at the end of the interim period we are no worse off than at the beginning, in the sense that there must then be a new negotiation about all the topics in dispute. Moreover, it would have to be such that, while the new negotiation was on, no unilateral action would be taken by the Soviets. The Russians must not therefore be able to point to any phrases in an interim agreement which imply that at the end of the period we should have less justification for keeping our

¹ See Document 395.

troops in Berlin than we had at the beginning. We must not expressly or impliedly seem to set a term to our position in Berlin. The interim settlement must be a pause—though a prolonged pause—in the negotiations.

If the idea of an interim arrangement were accepted in principle, there would of course be argument about its duration. But this, not being a matter of principle, ought to be capable of negotiation. We ought also to be able to negotiate without much trouble a final formula about the use of West Berlin for propaganda or subversion, the exclusion of atomic weapons and the level of troops. The main difficulty about an interim settlement is whether we can devise some means by which contact between the two sets of German representatives can be arranged under acceptable conditions. If we could find an appropriate form for such contact, I doubt if we have anything to fear from the substance of the discussions. I should have thought there were quite a lot of subjects on which the West Germans could well take the offensive, e.g. religious freedom, free press, exchange of information, human rights and all the rest.

Perhaps I can add some general thought. We must maintain a public posture in which we can rally our people to resist a Russian attempt to impose their will by force. All the same, it would not be easy to persuade the British people that it was their duty to go to war in defence of West Berlin. After all, in my lifetime we have been dealt two nearly mortal blows by the Germans. People in this country will think it paradoxical, to use a mild term, to have to prepare for an even more horrible war in order to defend the liberties of people who have tried to destroy us twice in this century. Nevertheless, there is a double strain of idealism and realism in these islands to which I believe I could successfully appeal if we had first demonstrated that we have made every endeavour to put forward practical solutions and that the Russians were unwilling to accept any fair proposition. The corollary to this is that we and our allies should do and should be seen to do what ordinary people would think reasonable. For instance, it would not seem reasonable to ordinary people that West Germans who profess to desire closer contacts and reunification with the East Germans should refuse absolutely to discuss these matters in any forum with the East Germans.

I wish of course that we could meet and talk. It is so difficult to put on paper all that one feels. I hope therefore you will not mind my sending you these frank thoughts. Do tell me what you think.

With warm regards,

As ever,

Harold²

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

417. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, June 25, 1959, 2 p.m.

2653. Eyes only Secretary. Re Embtel 2637.¹ Following is verbatim text of Thayer's notes of that portion of Harriman's conversation with Khrushchev relating to Berlin and Germany.

"You may tell anyone you want," Khrushchev said in some heat, "that we will never accept Adenauer as a representative of Germany. He is a zero. There is a current joke in Russia that if you look at Mr. Adenauer naked from behind, he shows Germany divided. If you look at him from the front, he demonstrates that Germany cannot stand.

"We will not agree to your taking over Western Germany. We will not agree to a united Germany that is not socialist. In fact, no one wants a united Germany. De Gaulle told us so; the British have told us so; and Adenauer himself when he was here said he was not interested in unification. Why, then do you insist on talking about it?

"You state you want to defend the two million people in West Berlin. We are prepared to give any guarantees you desire to perpetuate their present social structure, either under the supervision of neutral countries or under the UN. However, we are absolutely determined to liquidate the state of war with Germany. It is an anachronism. Furthermore, we are determined to liquidate your rights in Western Berlin. What good does it do you to have 11 thousand troops in Berlin? If it came to war, we would swallow them in one gulp. We will agree to your maintaining them for a limited period but not indefinitely. If you do not agree to a termination of the occupation, we will do it unilaterally. Furthermore, we will put an end to your rights in Berlin. If you want to use force to preserve your rights, you can be sure that we will respond with force. You can start a war if you want, but remember it will be you who are starting it, not we. If you want to perpetuate or prolong your rights, this means war. You recognized West Germany on conditions contrary to those agreed upon during the war. We do not recognize the right of Adenauer to determine our position in Germany. If you continue to operate from a position of strength, then you must decide for yourselves. We too are strong and we will decide for ourselves."

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2559. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Charles Thayer who accompanied Harriman to the Soviet Union. Harriman met with Khrushchev at 1 p.m. in his office at the Kremlin. For Harriman's account of the meeting, see *Life* Magazine, July 13, 1959.

¹Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2459)

Governor Harriman pointed out that this position was appallingly dangerous and suggested that the great achievements and the internal development of the Soviet Union would be sacrificed by any war.

Mr. Khrushchev retorted that this was his position and that Mr. Harriman could tell Mr. Eisenhower. Mr. Harriman replied that he would carry no messages to Mr. Eisenhower as he was a private individual. Mr. Khrushchev retorted that "If I see Mr. Eisenhower, I will tell him just as I have told you." Mr. Harriman expressed a hope that Mr. Gromyko would prove more amiable with the Foreign Ministers' Conference reconvened on the 13th of July in Geneva. Mr. Khrushchev retorted that Mr. Gromyko was reflecting the views of the Sov Government and that if he did not, he would be fired and replaced, and the views of the Sov Govt were what he had just said. "We have had German troops twice in the Sov Union and we know what it means. This the United States does not know nor has it experienced the tears that the Ukraine suffered under occupation." When it was suggested that Russia brought the Germans on them by the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact, Mr. Khrushchev scornfully rejected the argument as a "cheap" question. "We know England and France wanted to turn Hitler against Russia. Stalin did right in making a pact with Hitler and we would do it again. History", he said, "may not repeat itself, but the day may come when Germany will turn against the West." "Are you sure," he asked, "that they won't? Of course, Adenauer could not, but maybe Strauss or some other German would. West Germany knows that we could destroy it in ten minutes. If Germany faces the question of whether to exist or not, its decision may be different from that of today." When it was suggested that Moscow and Leningrad were equally susceptible to destruction, Khrushchev retorted that Leningrad is not Russia. Irkutsk and other Siberian cities would remain, but "one bomb is sufficient to destroy Bonn and the Ruhr, and that is all of Germany. Paris is all of France; London is all of England. You have surrounded us with bases but our rockets can destroy them. If you start a war, we may die but the rockets will fly automatically."

Governor Harriman suggested that if the Sovs hindered the legal rights of supply of our troops in Berlin, it would be dangerous.

Mr. Khrushchev replied heatedly that "We would do just that. We would liquidate your rights. We will permit the troops now there to remain but not any troops to enter. If you speak from a position of strength, we will answer with the same strength." Governor Harriman stated that the American determination to support two million Berliners should not be underestimated. "We will never permit their being sacrificed," he stated.

Mr. Khrushchev answered, "Don't think that the Soviet Union is all ill-shod (lapki) as it was when the Czars sold Alaska to you. We are

ready to fight. We are not aggressive," Mr. Khrushchev said. "We will let Berlin have its social structure and guarantee it. We don't need West Berlin. What are two million people to a bloc of 900 million people? If we took West Berlin, we would simply have to feed it. We would rather let you feed it." Governor Harriman suggested that Soviet decisions with regard to Berlin should not be taken too lightly. Mr. Khrushchev replied that it had all been carefully thought out. "Don't you think otherwise," he said. "Your generals talk of tanks and guns defending your Berlin position. They would burn," he said. "We don't want war over Berlin. Perhaps you do if you want to prolong the current position." Mr. Harriman stated that West Berliners were now perfectly satisfied. Why change the situation? Mr. Khrushchev replied that he would guarantee the situation in West Berlin in any manner we saw fit, "but we must end the state of war and the consequences of war and not interfere in the internal affairs of Germany." Mr. Khrushchev said, "We cannot tolerate the condition any more and this is a historic fact. Furthermore," he said, "Adenauer is the most unpopular man in Germany." Mr. Harriman pointed out that there had been many possibilities to throw out Adenauer but the Germans had not done so. On the other hand, there had never been any possibility to throw Grotewohl out. Khrushchev retorted, "What you and I think about freedom and slavery is quite different. We, for instance, consider the choice of Rockefeller impossible to understand, but we will let you decide for yourselves in the United States. You may have millions, but I have grandsons."

Thompson

418. Memorandum of Conversation With President Eisenhower

Washington, June 25, 1959.

I met with the President this morning at 8:30 to discuss the communication which he had received from Harold Macmillan¹ and the one that I had received from Selwyn Lloyd² dealing with the negotiations on Germany at Geneva.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/6-2559. Secret. Drafted by Herter.

¹ Document 416.

² See footnote 1, Document 415.

At the outset the President showed me a telegram from Moscow³ outlining Averell Harriman's conversation with Khrushchev. The President was really concerned by the state of mind that Khrushchev was apparently indicating, although he was not certain whether this was an additional effort to threaten us into a Summit Conference or whether it represented genuine views.

I then showed him the draft of a letter⁴ we had prepared as an answer to Macmillan. I asked the President not to pass on this until he had had a chance to think over the draft of a proposed communiqué in which we had outlined some positions which might be taken at the forthcoming meeting in Geneva (copy attached herewith). The President read through the paper with great care. He said that he felt that if we reached such agreement as appeared in the paper, even though the number of troops to be stationed in Berlin and the number of years that the arrangement should last were not specified, it would warrant going to a Summit meeting and that perhaps those two matters might be settled there. I said the paper had originally been drafted with that very thing in mind and actually specified that the blanks should be resolved at a meeting of the Heads of State but that I had then asked for a redraft so that it would come to the President, in the first instance, as a Foreign Ministers' agreement. I told the President that the paper was not an agreed paper of the Department in that several of our senior advisers, including Mr. Murphy and Mr. Kohler, had serious doubts as to whether the mention of any deadline would be considered an excessive weakening on our part. I explained to the President that whether deadlines were mentioned or not, we were actually under the threat of a deadline all the time and that part of our draft represented a moratorium for X period of time. I said I felt that the President should consider alternatives, the last one of which would, of course, be allied unity on the question of going to war, a unity it would be hard to achieve in the light of Mr. Macmillan's last letter unless a Summit Conference had been held and all remedies exhausted. I also told him that the draft we had prepared followed very closely Selwyn Lloyd's thinking, although we had reached our points of view somewhat separately. The President said he would give the matter further thought and that we would discuss it again. In the meanwhile he was going to try to redraft the answer to Macmillan and try to be a little more forthcoming than we had been in our suggested draft.

C.A.H.

³ Document 417.

⁴ Printed as attachment A.

Attachment A⁵

**Draft Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister
Macmillan**

DEAR HAROLD: I was glad to have your letter assessing the situation at the close of the present phase of the Foreign Ministers Conference and suggesting a line which we might take when the Conference resumes on July 13.

We too have been considering where we go from here. We are working very hard on the issues which the Conference has developed. Chris will be touch with Selwyn on the thoughts which the latter has conveyed to him. I hope that we may be able to work out a concerted position in time to consult with the French and Germans before July 13th. The issues are so large and the time so short that this may not be possible. However, we shall do our best.⁶

Attachment B⁷

**Draft Communiqué Containing Agreed Recommendations of
Foreign Ministers**

The Foreign Ministers of the French Republic, UK, USSR and the United States of America met in Geneva from May 11 to June 19, 1959 [and] from July 13 to ———, 1959.

⁵ Secret.

⁶ On June 27, the President replied to Macmillan with a note incorporating these two paragraphs and adding the following three:

"I agree with you, of course, that our tactical position in Berlin is indeed weak in that the Russians have many physical and geographical advantages. Their opportunity to exert economic pressure against the Western part of the city is obvious.

"Because Chris is, as I say, communicating to Selwyn our current thinking for an ad interim arrangement, I think it would be futile for me to try to get into details at this point. I can say only that I have studied his paper and agree generally with it.

"Yesterday Mamie and I spent the day with the Queen and Prince Philip. The Prime Minister of Canada was of course present. I noted with some interest that he repeated what I believe has been an earlier suggestion of his—that Quebec might be a nice place to hold a summit meeting if one should ever become practical. I merely replied that the place would be most convenient from my viewpoint, but the location and time made very little difference to me." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

⁷ Secret.

The meeting was convened to consider questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany, and Berlin. The discussions which were carried on in the course of the meeting regarding Germany established that the Foreign Ministers all agreed that Germany should be reunified, that there should be free elections held for this purpose, and that there should be a final German peace settlement at the earliest practicable time. The Foreign Ministers were unable to agree upon procedures for achieving these ends.

In order to further the solution of these questions the Foreign Ministers have agreed to recommend to their respective Governments the following proposals:

(a) That a four-power commission be established to continue the discussion of the German problem and to examine questions connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

(b) That the four-power commission make appropriate arrangement for the cooperation of German advisors, who would be requested to discuss and propose concrete measures for the reunification of Germany, with free elections at an appropriate stage in the process, and to propose agreed principles for a peace treaty with Germany. The advisors would also be requested to transmit proposals for the extension and development of technical contacts between the two parts of Germany and the free movement of persons, ideas and publications between the two parts of Germany.

(c) Unless agreement has been reached on plans for reunification and for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany at an earlier date, the Foreign Ministers will reconvene at the end of _____ years to continue their discussion of these subjects.

The Foreign Ministers will further recommend to their respective governments consideration be given to alleviation of tensions in Berlin by adoption of measures along the following lines in the light of the existing situation and agreements at present in force:

(a) The Western Powers would establish a ceiling upon the combined total of their armed forces in Berlin which would be in the neighborhood of _____ troops.

(b) The Four Powers would continue to arm their forces in Berlin only with conventional weapons.

(c) Access to Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin, would be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959. All disputes which might arise with respect to access would be raised and settled between the four governments except that a resident four-power commission would be established in West Berlin which would in the first instance consider any difficulties arising in connection with access and would seek to settle such difficulties. This commission would make use of German advisors as necessary.

(d) Measures would be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties to avoid within or directed at Berlin activities which might

either disrupt public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or aim to interfere in the internal affairs, of others. A representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, supported by adequate staff, would be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city for the purpose of monitoring propaganda activities in the light of the foregoing principles, and to report to the Secretary General any such activities in Berlin or directed at Berlin which appear to be in conflict with such principles. The four governments would consult with the Secretary General in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken in respect to any such report.

The Foreign Ministers will also recommend that the arrangements specified in sub-paragraphs (a) through (d) above will remain in effect until reunification of Germany provided that, in the absence of reunification, or agreed plans for reunification, the Foreign Ministers will meet at the end of _____ years to review these arrangements.

419. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 25, 1959.

SUBJECT

Resumption of the Geneva Conference

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
The Secretary
Mr. R.W. Jackling, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Foy D. Kohler—EUR
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

The Secretary handed a letter to Caccia for Selwyn Lloyd¹ in reply to a message received from the British Foreign Minister on June 24 through the Ambassador.² The Secretary said that his letter would give the British some idea of how far along we were in preparing for resump-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/6-2559. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Herter on July 7.

¹ Not printed. It stated that Herter had discussed post-Geneva policy with the President and would reply the following week on the U.S. position. A summary of Harriman's conversation with Khrushchev (see Document 417) was attached to the letter. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Dulles/Herter with UK Officials)

² See footnote 1, Document 415.

tion of the Geneva Conference. He then read to Caccia excerpts from the preliminary report received from our Ambassador in Moscow of the Harriman conversation with Khrushchev to supplement the summary of this conversation attached to the Secretary's letter.³ In response to the Secretary's query as to whether the Harriman report would be published, Mr. Kohler indicated that, since Harriman was seeing Khrushchev as a former ambassador to the Soviet Union and not in his capacity as journalist, it would presumably not be published.

After Caccia had stressed the urgency of moving ahead with the Western preparations for resumption of the Geneva Conference, the Secretary said he had gone over at considerable length with the President certain ideas similar to those expressed by Lloyd in his message. While there might be some possibilities in the moratorium concept, the Secretary indicated, we must have assurance that Western rights would not be diminished at the end of the given time period.

Caccia noted that the difficulty was in determining the basic Soviet position in view of the different statements made by Gromyko to Lloyd, to the press and to individual journalists. The Soviets should be smoked out in the conference room, so that the West would know where it stood. If a satisfactory agreement could be reached on a moratorium period, the question would arise as to just what might be accomplished during the interval. The Secretary said that von Brentano had shown a certain receptivity to the idea of German advisers putting their heads together under cover of a Four Power commission. He noted that, in the Khrushchev statement to Harriman, the campaign of invective against Adenauer continued. Caccia commented that the question about this most recent Khrushchev effusion was whether it represented genuine conviction or was merely a case of play-acting. The Secretary added that, when Gromyko presented the Soviet "ultimatum" proposals at Geneva, this was interpreted by some as an effort by Khrushchev to frighten the West into the Summit and thus to enter it on his part in a strong tactical position.

In response to Caccia's query as to what he might say about United States thinking on the possibility of a moratorium, the Secretary said that we were trying to reduce the concept to a more precise form in order to see its full implications. The President had a draft in front of him,⁴ but no decision had been made and we could not be sure what would finally emerge. If agreement were reached on some formula, we might be in a more advantageous position than the British to take it up with the French and the Germans. We would try to have something more precise

³ Not further identified.

⁴ See attachment B to Document 418.

by Tuesday or Wednesday of next week. Caccia agreed that United States support of any proposal would carry more weight with the French and Germans than primary advocacy by the British.

Caccia noted that, despite exaggerated press accounts, Prime Minister Macmillan had tried to be careful yesterday in the Commons relative to a Summit meeting.⁵ He had expressed the hope that the resumed Geneva Conference would permit a Summit meeting to take place. Obviously the British Government still wanted such a Summit meeting, Caccia continued, but it also wanted to avoid any open break between the Western Powers on this subject. On the assumption that the optimistic interpretation of Gromyko's press statement of June 19⁶ was warranted and would be reflected in the Soviet position when the Geneva Conference resumed, the British were wondering how tactically the subject of a Summit could best be handled. Caccia suggested that it would be desirable if the United States could take the initiative and not leave it to the Soviets to propose a Summit meeting. Perhaps the questions of a precise time period and of the level of troops might be left for decision at the Summit. The Secretary commented that all this depended on the actual progress made by the Foreign Ministers.

Both the Secretary and Caccia agreed that it would be better if the Italian proposal for a NATO ministerial meeting prior to the resumption of the Geneva Conference were dropped. The Secretary made the point that the NATO ministers always seemed to want to know what the Western fall-back position is. As soon as this is discussed it tends to become public property. He believed that a factor at Geneva was that the Soviets had heard so much about Western fall-back positions that they could not believe we had none. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Caccia again stressed the urgency of preparing a Western position for Germany. It was desirable, he said, to get something to Couve before he left for Madagascar in order to avoid any feeling that the United Kingdom and the United States were "plotting behind his back" while he was away on a trip. The Secretary noted that one problem was how much Couve could agree to which the Germans would not accept. It was possible that some tight arrangement existed between the French and Germans to support each others' views in all respects. The Secretary added that we must make clear that a decision on a moratorium, which would be a big decision to take, must involve a careful evaluation of Western interests in terms of possible alternatives.

⁵ For text of Macmillan's statement to the House of Commons, June 24, see 607 House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, cols. 1027–1028.

⁶ For text of this statement, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 332–334 or *Cmd. 868*, pp. 238–239.

Caccia expressed the opinion that, if agreement on the Summit could not be reached as a result of the Foreign Ministers' meeting, Khrushchev would then put on pressure and demand a Summit under crisis conditions. Under such circumstances, the British would be strongly impelled to accept.

Caccia said that he was taking the line with the Press that his call on the Secretary was to have a general tour d'horizon since it was their first meeting after the Secretary's return from Geneva. In order to make this line an honest one, he wished to raise briefly a number of other subjects (covered in separate memoranda of conversation).⁷

⁷The only other memorandum of conversation between Caccia and Herter on June 25 that has been found is a five-line memorandum on Laos. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

420. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, June 26, 1959, 2 p.m.

2665. Fol luncheon for Harriman yesterday he, Khrushchev, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Gromyko and I had nearly two-hour discussion which centered mostly on Germany and Berlin. Following are highlights; full text by despatch.¹

Khrushchev was serious but genial and repeatedly asserted his desire for a peaceful settlement of their differences with us. He suggested we should draw appropriate lessons from history which US did not appreciate as much as Soviet Union which had twice been invaded by Germany. I replied historic lesson we drew was that we should not repeat error following First World War of giving Germany grounds for thinking she was being mistreated. Khrushchev said he was not impressed by this argument. He expressed his contempt for Adenauer who had tried to flatter him and was trying to stir up trouble not only between Soviet

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Paris, Bonn, and London.

¹Despatches 739 and 741 from Moscow, June 29. (*Ibid.*, Harriman Trip)

Union and West but also between Western allies, particularly France and Britain. I said our experience with Adenauer had shown that he genuinely wanted to prevent a recurrence of German militarism and had wholeheartedly supported plans for European integration which would prevent this. He said we must face German problem seriously and recognize that Ulbricht and Adenauer could never agree. West would never consent to a Communist Germany and he would never agree to Adenauer's absorbing East Germany. Best plan was to conclude a peace treaty and liquidate remains of war. When I pointed out we had recognized present situation by providing for a phased plan he said we had allowed 2 and one-half years whereas he would prefer 250 years. When Gromyko pointed out our plan based on elections Khrushchev said West would not allow Vietnam to be absorbed through free elections and how could we expect Soviet Union to allow Adenauer to absorb far more important area of East Germany. It was clear that a reunited Germany would join NATO. West wanted them to allow greater population of West Germany to decide issue. He had no good answer to my argument that our plan provided for possibility separate vote in two parts of Germany. Khrushchev asked me if we would ever allow West Germany to opt for socialism. I said he would doubtless not believe me but I was sure that if West Germany took such a decision in a supervised election that was not under pressure of threats, we would abide by the decision. Khrushchev said I had best be careful and was I so sure that this might not one day happen after Soviets had continued to improve their own economic position and standard of living in East Germany had been raised. He said that Adenauer did not want German reunification for fear Germany would go socialist.

Khrushchev said it was clear German question could not be settled now and he had therefore put forward his Berlin proposal. He had developed the free city solution personally although his associates agreed with him. He was prepared to give almost any kind of guarantee for the free city. He emphasized importance that Soviet Govt, which came to power after death of Stalin, attached to keeping its word and that it would faithfully fulfill any guarantee given. We should know that when discussions were resumed in Geneva we should not expect change in Soviet position as they could not go beyond proposals already put forward. He understood our position to be that if there was no agreement in Geneva there would be no summit conference. If this were so, very well, but he would then conclude separate peace treaty and our occupation rights would cease to exist. He kept his temper when I inquired how he could reconcile this statement with his previous remarks about the importance the Soviet Govt attached to keeping its word. This led to a long and inconclusive argument about who was to blame for breakdown of four power cooperation in Germany. He pointed to our conclu-

sion of separate treaty with Japan. When I said we had reserved Soviet rights he replied that they had been kicked out of Allied Council and we had established military bases in Japan. Mikoyan interjected they would give us same deal on Germany as we had given them on Japan.

Khrushchev asked what was wrong with Soviet proposal. He emphasized that West Berlin and its population were of no importance to Soviet Union. I said I could believe this but Berlin was clearly important to East Germans who wanted to absorb it and Soviet proposals seemed to us clearly designed to facilitate this objective.

Khrushchev referred to Secretary Herter's speech² which he characterized as an incorrect statement of the position. Gromyko had not intended to make public statement but would now be obliged to put record straight.

I referred to his earlier statement that Soviet Union had made its maximum offer and said I thought same was true of West although various combinations of essential elements of our offer were possible. He then suggested that perhaps we should cancel the meeting. I replied that I was not conducting negotiations with him but merely trying to explain my understanding of my gov't's position. I explained this in some detail referring to Soviet action in disposing of East Berlin and now trying to move in on West Berlin. When I outlined the concessions we had made and the distance we had gone to meet his position he said he had carefully examined our proposal which did in fact contain many constructive elements. It was not bad except for one fact and that was that it was to operate until German reunification which was completely unacceptable. It might be all right as an interim arrangement to operate until a peace treaty could be drawn up and concluded.

I referred to a remark he had made that our troops in Berlin had no military value and that even if we had 100,000 there they would be wiped out immediately in the event of war. I asked why was he then so anxious to get rid of them. He replied that while they would have no military value in the event of war they did have a military value now. Gromyko explained that subversive organizations in Berlin operated under the protection of Western troops. If peace treaty were signed they could no longer fulfill this function. I said this indicated that Soviet Union or GDR would decide which organizations were legitimate and which were not. This would constitute interference in internal affairs of Berlin and showed clearly where Soviet proposals would lead. Khrushchev said this was an exaggerated interpretation.

² For text of Herter's address to the nation on June 23, see *Department of State Bulletin*, July 13, 1959, pp. 43–45 or *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 342–346.

I also referred to the lack of reciprocity in Soviet proposals on propaganda etc. Khrushchev said it was obviously impossible to control activities in East Germany and allow Bonn to be free to continue them. I said we recognized this and were prepared to deal with it but could not accept arrangements on this matter that applied to West Berlin but not East Berlin.

Khrushchev referred to holding of presidential election in West Berlin as a provocative act but not in any manner suggesting Soviets intended to do anything about it.

Khrushchev then told anecdote to illustrate theses I was merely repeating old arguments.

Harriman emphasized strongly that both parties in US supported President's position on Berlin. Khrushchev suggested that while political parties might be in agreement some of our people were not but he recognized they had to deal with our govt. Khrushchev concluded conversation by saying we should work out an interim arrangement that would lead to a peace treaty and he suggested this could be done in a way to avoid any aspect of an ultimatum.

Unless Dept perceives objection I propose inform my French, British and German colleagues of this conversation.

Thompson

421. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, June 29, 1959, 4 p.m.

1179. Ref: ourtel 915 to Bonn, 1028 to Dept. ¹ In telegrams to CINC-USAREUR (rptd CINCEUR) Gen Hamlett evaluates military consequences any reduction strength Berlin garrison. Pertinent extracts follow:

(1) "Size of garrison has little bearing on over-all picture in military sense under all out war conditions. Under lesser conditions of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6-2959. Secret. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ See footnote 3, Document 351.

hostility or various stages of civil disorders, size of Berlin garrison important and vital. Under conditions limited hostilities or civil emergency, garrison must be capable of providing for security US personnel, property, units and agencies in Berlin."

(2) "Requirements for military forces in event civil disturbances probably single most important military factor in strength of garrison. Soviets and East Germans have capability creating and directing civil disturbances which would be serious threat to security West Berlin even if present combined capability of Allied military and West Berlin police brought to bear. Even threat such action would require employment large part military force initially to protect property such as airport (for evacuation personnel), depots, barracks, sensitive installations, dependents quarters and accesses thereto. Present carefully considered and agreed Berlin Allied plans, under plausible conditions civil disorder, require employment entire West Berlin police force and military garrisons. This concept recently proven in comprehensive joint CPX in which Allied military and West Berlin police actively participated."

(3) "Furthermore there danger if size of Allied garrisons curtailed to level where aggressiveness on part of Soviets and/or East Germans is encouraged or to extent where quick coup could wipe out or subdue entire garrison and face Allies with 'fait accompli' in Berlin."

Reftel describes predictable Sov effort to audit our troop strength by control measures if garrison levels fixed by agreement.

From political and psychological point of view, reduction in garrison levels at this time—even voluntary—would have deleterious effect on Berlin morale. Fact of reduction itself would be judged by many Berliners as evidence Allied weakness foreshadowing eventual phase-out Allied physical presence in city.

Burns

422. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 1, 1959, 10–11:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

Mr. Kozlov's Call on the Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
 Mr. Murphy
 Mr. Merchant
 Mr. McSweeney
 Mr. Akalovsky (Interpreting)

USSR

Mr. Kozlov
 Ambassador Menshikov
 Mr. Soldatov
 Mr. Sukhodrew (Interpreting)

Mr. Kozlov noted that he had spent a couple of days in New York and Washington and that so far it has been a very useful visit.

The Secretary expressed the opinion that Mr. Kozlov had had very good reception everywhere he had gone and that he must be tired of seeing his picture in the papers.

Mr. Kozlov recalled his visit to the construction site of the U.S. atomic ship *Savannah* and said that American engineers were very much interested in the Soviet atomic ice-breaker *Lenin*, a model of which is exhibited in New York. He also recalled seeing the full-scale model of the reactor that is to be used in the *Savannah*. He said that American engineers showed great interest in the Soviet reactor model that is on display in New York; they would like to see it and exchange experiences with Soviet technicians so as to eliminate the deficiencies that might exist in their designs. Thus contacts had been found between the engineers of our two countries, in the most important, even cardinal area, of modern technology. It was now up to the diplomats to render assistance to such contacts.

The Secretary remarked that help from the other side would be needed too, and that both sides should display willingness to reach agreement if any success was to be reached in international negotiations.

Mr. Kozlov, referring to the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva, stated that the Soviet position was clear and that the West had

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1409. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by Herter on July 10. The conversation was held in Herter's office. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 14, July 1. (*Ibid.*) Documentation on the background for Kozlov's visit and his discussion with other U.S. officials is in vol. X, Part 1, Documents 78 ff.

failed to give a reply to that position. The Soviet proposals were a real basis for improving the relations between our countries. The abcess in Central Europe must be removed—this would immediately bring about a healthier situation in that area.

The Secretary said that he wanted to speak frankly and reconstruct the history of the Geneva discussions. He said that the Soviet Union apparently felt that the situation in Berlin was displeasing to it and that it was fraught with danger, danger which is rather difficult for us to understand. As a result of this feeling, the Soviet Union, instead of taking diplomatic or other steps, took a very severe line and said that the Western powers should get out of Berlin and that if they didn't get out of Berlin within a certain period of time certain things would happen. The first indication of Soviet dissatisfaction had almost been in the form of an ultimatum.

Mr. Kozlov replied that he believed that Mr. Herter himself is displeased with the situation in Berlin. After all 14 years have elapsed since the war and both sides should think out ways of changing that situation. Also speaking frankly, Mr. Kozlov said, the Soviet proposals were in no way an ultimatum—such an interpretation was an artificial one. The Soviet Union proposes that for one year or some other period of time an all-German committee should work and if that work should produce no concrete results new negotiations should be initiated. The Soviet proposal was for negotiations and thus was not an ultimatum. As to the period of time to be allowed for the work of an all-German committee, this question could be discussed again so as to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable time limit. The question of the time limit is not a question of principle; however, the question of liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin is a question of principle, since the situation in West Berlin is abnormal. The people themselves dislike it and the parties concerned should agree to terminate that situation 14 years after the war.

The Secretary rejoined by saying that if Mr. Kozlov, in mentioning the people, wanted to say that the population of West Berlin was unhappy and wanted a change, then he should remember the fact that last December that population had had an opportunity to express its will in free elections and had indicated its preference for the continuation of the present situation. The U.S. is also of the opinion that the situation in Berlin is an abnormal one and that the Berlin problem should be resolved; however, as far as the time limit is concerned, the U.S. took the position that the time limit should be the time of the unification of Germany. The Western peace plan¹ had been put forward in good faith and it provided for an all-German committee which would have to work out an electoral

¹ See footnote 1, Document 295.

law. Mr. Kozlov had mentioned the wishes of the people—the U.S. has no desire to go against the wishes of the people, but it knows of no way to learn about these wishes other than free elections. The Western powers had proposed that if no decision were reached by the all-German committee then two alternatives should be placed before the German people. If the German people, in a free vote, expressed themselves for separate solutions for the two parts of Germany, the Western powers would respect that wish. On the other hand, we had hoped that if the German people expressed themselves for a unified solution, that the Soviet Union would respect that wish too. However, the Soviet Union rejected all these proposals.

Mr. Kozlov said that no harm would be done if the two Germanys were given an opportunity to sit down, argue, and try to resolve their problem. Both sides would assist them in their work, but the main thing is for the Germans to sit down and to decide on the conditions for unification. If a solution is found, then the West Berlin problem will be resolved also. This would be particularly true in view of the fact that the Soviet Union has proposed that the West Berlin population select its own social system. The Soviet Union never has and never will insist on changing that social order, although there had been false statements to that effect. If the West Berlin population wanted to continue having their present social order, that would be all right with the Soviet Union. Access to the city would also be free. As far as the question of troops in West Berlin is concerned, it had been also constructively outlined in Soviet proposals. The Western powers say, Mr. Kozlov continued, that they cannot abandon to the Soviet Union's mercy 2.2 million people—but the Soviet Union doesn't want that at all. If the West Berlin population likes Mayor Brandt, that is all right with the Soviet Union. However, the occupation regime can no longer be tolerated and especially so in view of the fact that the occupation regime includes propaganda against East Germany and the USSR. Adenauer also speculates on the present situation and uses it for his own purposes; recently he took a step that the Soviet Union could not call a very good one. The Soviet Union wants to change this entire situation peacefully, through negotiation. Referring to the Secretary's remark that the West Berlin population had expressed itself in favor of the present order, Mr. Kozlov said that the Soviet Union had nothing against that. True, the Soviet Union would never recognize Adenauer's claim for West Berlin, but it would never disregard the will of the population, who should select their social order themselves. The Soviet Union is of the opinion that never, in any area of the world, can a social order, socialist or capitalist, be imposed from above by force. As for West Berlin, the Soviet Union would gain no advantage, political or economic, from a change in the social order there. The Soviet Union is prepared to give guarantees to world public opinion

that it would fulfill its commitments with regard to West Berlin and the G.D.R. has also expressed its readiness to do the same.

The Secretary said he wanted to comment on one particular point. Mr. Kozlov had said that in no area of the world could socialism or capitalism be imposed by force. The Secretary stated that Mr. Kozlov would probably realize that he would question that statement, particularly as far as East Berlin or East Germany was concerned. The Soviet Union has complete control over these areas and it was our hope that it would allow the people in these areas to express their will freely. The Soviet Union has some 27 divisions in East Germany and the people in that area have had no opportunity to speak.

Mr. Kozlov said that the German people had voted more than once for the existing social order and that Mr. Ulbricht and other East German leaders had been approved by the German people and had been elected to the Reichstag, as representatives of the German people, even earlier, under the capitalist system that had existed before Hitler.

The U.S., however, should realize that there are two German states in existence now and that they should decide themselves with regard to the basis for the unification of Germany. East Germany and West Germany should work on this problem together. Two wars, in 1914 and 1941, had been fought because of the Germans, and it was now up to them to resolve their own problems. As far as Soviet divisions are concerned, they are stationed in that area under the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, just as U.S. divisions are stationed in various areas under certain agreements, but that of course was the U.S.'s own business.

The Secretary stated that he wanted to raise a point which had been discussed in Geneva several times but had never been clarified, although the Soviet delegation had given many indications as to its position on it. At one point in the course of negotiations the Soviet delegation stated that the Western powers had legal rights in West Berlin and that they had certain rights with regard to the access to Berlin. This was reflected in the Zorin-Boltz letters.² However, at the same time the Soviet delegation indicated that if the Western powers tried to defend their rights the Soviet Union would take certain steps which might lead to war. The Secretary said that he wanted to know whether his understanding of the Soviet position was correct.

Mr. Kozlov answered that of course force would be met by force but that the Soviet Union was against force. There should be no talk about force—there should be negotiations on the elimination of the occupation regime in West Berlin. Misunderstandings that have accumulated during the past 14 years should be removed through negotia-

² See footnote 5, Document 31.

tions so as to improve the general international situation. The Western position with regard to a reduction in the number of troops in West Berlin and with regard to non-stationing of atomic armaments in that city was also a basis for negotiations, because they were "rational seeds" which should be cultivated.

The Secretary stated that he could not understand how the Western decision not to station atomic weapons could be considered a basis for negotiation. The Western powers had clearly stated that they had no intention of stationing nuclear armaments in West Berlin.

Mr. Kozlov replied that this was a "rational seed" which could be cultivated and developed into something bigger.

The Secretary stated that in Geneva the Western powers had presented a paper on West Berlin³ which, they believed, went a long way to meet the Soviet point of view. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union rejected that paper. The paper, the Western powers believe, was a clear-cut document and it met the point of danger that the Soviet Union had been referring to. The Western powers hoped that this paper could be again discussed when the conference reconvenes in Geneva.

The Secretary noted that Mr. Kozlov had not answered the point he had raised earlier in the discussion and it is quite disturbing to the Western powers. The Soviet Union admits that the Western powers have rights in West Berlin and with regard to access to West Berlin, yet it says that if there is no success in negotiating then it will take unilateral steps which would render all agreements relating to that area invalid. It is difficult to believe that the Soviet Union, which is a great power in the world, would take a unilateral action, because no great power can renounce unilaterally one agreement without casting doubt on the validity of all other agreements.

Mr. Kozlov replied that if the negotiations on the West Berlin question should fail the Soviet Union would be forced to conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic with all the consequences ensuing from that fact. He recalled that the U.S. itself had contracted unilaterally a peace treaty with Japan in spite of the fact that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had been brothers in arms in World War II. So the Soviet Union would be compelled to do the same, but, Mr. Kozlov said, he wanted to emphasize that the Soviet Union is not in favor of negotiations.

The Secretary stated that as far as the peace treaty with Japan is concerned, the U.S. had reserved completely all Russian rights with respect to that treaty. In this connection he wanted to recall the fact that the

³ See footnote 1, Document 411.

Kurile Islands have been under the Soviet occupation regime for 14 years.

Mr. Kozlov replied that the Soviet Union could also reserve all rights of all states, including the United States, in the event that a separate peace treaty was signed with East Germany.

The Secretary remarked that of course this could be done very easily and that this was the import of the Zorin–Boltz letters, but that in the talks in Geneva the U.S. had gained a different impression.

Mr. Kozlov observed that impressions may be different. In this connection he wanted to state that the statement made by the Secretary after Geneva had been disappointing.⁴

The Secretary said he was sorry if the statement was disappointing to the Soviet Union but it was based on the conclusions reached as a result of six weeks of negotiations. Many things that had been said and proposals that had been made in Geneva gave no alternative for conclusions. The Secretary said that he wanted to cite the following example. The Soviet delegation presented a paper on the status of a free city of Berlin;⁵ this paper left the future of the city completely at the mercy of East Germany. Mr. Gromyko at one point stated that the best solution for West Berlin would be its incorporation in East Germany. Therefore, we believed that this was what the Soviet Union had in mind.

Nevertheless, the U.S. is going back to Geneva with hope, but if agreement is to be reached, more give will be needed. The Secretary recalled that any Western proposals, excluding that regarding atomic armaments in Berlin had been rejected outright by the Soviet Union; nevertheless, the U.S. will go back to Geneva in good faith and with the hope that mutually satisfactory agreement will be reached.

Mr. Kozlov stated that Mr. Gromyko had said that the incorporation of West Berlin and East Germany was the best solution, but that he had not said that it was the only one. The Soviet Union realizes that it must take into account the views of the other side; it was for this reason that the Soviet Union had proposed the creation of a free city of West Berlin. The status of the Free City could be ensured by neutral troops and also guaranteed by the United Nations, if the U.S. so desired. However, during the next round in Geneva the negotiators must proceed from the actual situation; they should proceed on the basis that the occupation regime in West Berlin should be eliminated and that West Berlin should be made a free city. Mr. Kozlov said he wanted to emphasize once again that the social order for the city would be chosen by the

⁴ For text of Herter's address to the nation on June 23, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 342–346 or Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1959, pp. 43–45.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 415.

population itself, and that no pressure should be exerted on it from either side.

The Secretary said that he realized that Mr. Kozlov had to leave for another appointment and that if Mr. Kozlov wanted to continue the conversation he had set aside some time tomorrow. If Mr. Kozlov thought that there were any points for further discussion, the Secretary said, he would be glad to meet with him again.

Mr. Kozlov replied that unfortunately this would be impossible in view of his busy schedule. He said that he would like to have another discussion with the Secretary because he liked his approach to problems. He suggested that perhaps at the end of his tour he might meet with the Secretary again.

The Secretary observed that he was to leave on the morning of July 11 and that if Mr. Kozlov could return from his tour about the U.S. by that time, he could meet with him again.

Before the meeting broke off, the Secretary and Mr. Kozlov agreed that they would say to the Press that they had discussed the problems before the Geneva conference and had exchanged views with regard to the positions the two respective Governments hold.⁶

⁶ Following the meeting with Herter, Kozlov talked with the President from 11:15 to 12:30. Although this conversation dealt largely with other topics, Kozlov reiterated the Soviet view that the occupation regime in Berlin should be terminated. A memorandum of this conversation is in vol. X, Part 1, Document 79.

**423. Memorandum of Conversation Between President
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, July 1, 1959, 12:15 p.m.

I remained with the President after his interview with Mr. Kozlov¹ in order to continue our earlier discussion of the paper I had left with him outlining the proposed U.S. position on Berlin.² The President expressed general approval of the suggested approach but was doubtful about the advisability of distributing a specific paper even to the British since we would then have to give copies to the French and Germans, thus leading inevitably to publicity about alleged new Western offers. The President felt this publicity would be highly undesirable from a tactical point of view, with which I said I entirely agreed.

The President said he had no objection to my suggestion that I go over the substance of our thinking with Caccia but emphasizing that we wanted to be able to say there was no paper in circulation. In this connection, he authorized me to allow Caccia to read but not retain the actual paper under discussion.

The President went on to say that tactically he felt the Western Powers should begin at Geneva by probing the Soviets to find out whether there had been any change in their position during the recess. We agreed that the Western Foreign Ministers could talk about the development of their position after they had reassembled in Geneva, thus avoiding possible leaks which would give the impression that the Western Powers were making concessions from the beginning of the resumed talks. With respect to the two blanks in the paper, the President agreed that these might be left for the Heads of Government to fill in at a Summit conference.

With respect to the type of arrangement to which we could finally agree, the President expressed the view that the cut-off point as to what we could accept would be what those people directly affected by the agreement might be willing themselves to accept, perhaps in a referendum.

C.A.H.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret. Drafted by Krebs.

¹ See footnote 6, Document 422.

² See attachment B to Document 418.

424. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 1, 1959.

SUBJECT

Kozlov Visit and Preparations for Resumption of the Geneva Conference

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
Mr. R.W. Jackling, Counselor, British Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant—EUR
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

In response to Ambassador Caccia's inquiry, the Secretary said that Kozlov had nothing of particular interest to say this morning on the subject of Berlin.¹ He repeated his lines just as though he were a phonograph record; every one of the usual Soviet arguments was trotted out. At the White House² he did emphasize that he could assure the President that the Soviets wanted to negotiate, not only on the subject of Berlin but on any other outstanding problems. Kozlov also led up to the possibility of the President's meeting with Khrushchev after a discussion of their mutual interests in agriculture. There was no suggestion, however, of any specific meeting.

The Secretary went on to say that he had had an opportunity to talk with the President after his last meeting with Caccia.³ While the President had in general approved the approach suggested, both he and the Secretary were doubtful about the advisability of distributing a specific paper. If it were given to the British, it would likewise have to be given to the French and Germans. This would almost inevitably lead to publicity about alleged new Western offers, which from a tactical point of view would be *highly* undesirable. There was no objection to going over the substance of our thinking with Caccia, but we wanted to be able to say there was no paper in circulation. The Secretary reiterated the point that the Western Powers were handicapped at Geneva because of prior talk about fallback positions which the Soviets could not believe did not really exist.

Ambassador Caccia said that his understanding of the situation was that the Soviets seemed to have given some indication of their fall-

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Herter on July 7.

¹ See Document 422.

² See footnote 6, Document 422.

³ See Document 419.

back position, and the task of the Western Powers now was to find out with some certainty what this was. As he understood it, the Secretary was suggesting that, tactically, the Western Powers should begin at Geneva by probing the Soviets. The Secretary agreed, and added that the Western Foreign Ministers could talk about the development of their position after they had reassembled in Geneva. This would help to avoid giving the impression through leaks that the Western Powers were making concessions right from the beginning.

The Secretary handed to Caccia (for perusal but not retention) the paper which he had discussed with the President.⁴ He noted that there were two blanks in it which might be left for the heads of governments to fill in at a Summit Conference.

The Secretary commented that the President had introduced a new thought when he said that the type of arrangement we could agree to when dealing with people who were not our own was something which they themselves could accept. The cut-off point as to what we could accept would be what they themselves might be willing to accept, perhaps in a referendum.

Caccia asked whether the United States draft communiqué precluded a turnover at the check points by the Soviets to GDR officials. The Secretary indicated that this would probably not be a sticking point, but was not directly relevant to the proposal in question, since this envisaged a moratorium. The Secretary pointed out that, in his recent Moscow statement, Gromyko had made no reference to civil access in Berlin.⁵ Any agreed position on access bringing this within the scope of a Four Power commission would be a net gain for the West. The present draft essentially contained only two new things: (a) substitution of a Four Power commission with German advisers for the all-German committee proposed by the Soviets and (b) introduction of the UN on a reciprocal basis for both sections of Berlin to monitor certain propaganda activities. Relative to the latter item the Secretary said he did not believe the Soviets could accept this, but the burden of responsibility for refusing it would be on them and this would be an advantage from our point of view. The most difficult aspect for us was acceptance of a time limit. This would require, of course, that at the end of the period negotiations would be within the framework of unimpaired Western rights.

The Secretary indicated that he was somewhat surprised to learn that the French, without consulting either the United States or the United Kingdom, had invited the Italians to a dinner party in Geneva on

⁴ See attachment B to Document 418.

⁵ For text of Gromyko's statement on June 28, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 349–360.

July 12. Caccia said that Lloyd could get there in time for dinner but no earlier. It would be up to Couve to take care of the other arrangements. The Belgian Minister Wigny was on the warpath. The Secretary pointed out that Luns was likewise certain to be irritated. Mr. Merchant noted that Luns would be in Geneva on July 12–13. The Secretary and Ambassador Caccia agreed that the further arrangements for Sunday were essentially Couve's responsibility.

Caccia said that he had received a message from Prime Minister Macmillan in response to a previous inquiry as to whether the British had any items they might wish Vice President Nixon to take up in Moscow later this month.⁶ The Prime Minister had indicated that it seemed too early to make any specific suggestions, since these would be dependent on developments at Geneva. Lloyd would, of course, be in touch with the Secretary, and if the British had anything to suggest, this presumably could be done at the last minute.

In response to a query, the Secretary confirmed that he planned to depart from Washington early on July 11, although his travel plans were still somewhat contingent on the type of plane which could actually be used. Caccia said he would like to see the Secretary once more before his departure for Geneva, but thought it would be better to limit his visits in order to avoid giving the impression that something was cooking.

⁶See Document 466.

425. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 3, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Frol Kozlov, Deputy Prime Minister, USSR
Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR

[Here follow four paragraphs discussing unrelated subjects; for text, see volume X, Part 1, Document 81.]

Kozlov then raised the question of Berlin and said that we were totally wrong in claiming that the Soviet Union wanted to annex West Berlin. I said that we had never claimed this but that we had pointed to

Khrushchev's statement repeated by Gromyko that the most logical and correct solution for West Berlin was for the East German regime to absorb it. He said that this was entirely true given the geographical facts but that statesmen cannot always achieve the most logical solution of a problem; they must in fact seek what is possible.

Kozlov then launched into a standard tirade on the folly of reunification which he said the British did not want, the French did not want and even Adenauer did not want. I told him that I thought he was incorrect in this but that in any event the United States would not cease to seek the reunification of Germany by peaceful means since we were satisfied that in the long run it would be disastrous for everyone if Germany were to be kept divided. I said that with a country located where Germany was with an industrious and nationally minded population, long-continued division would almost inevitably lead to irresponsible leadership. I said what really puzzled us was the failure of the Russians to understand our desire to see Germany reunited while moderate leadership was still available and when a reunified Germany could be established under such leadership on terms where it would never be a menace to any of its neighbors. I said that we, like the Russians, had fought two wars against Germany in my lifetime and that it was impossible for us to understand why the Soviets did not share our point of view on a point where it seemed that both our interests were identical.

Kozlov launched into a personal attack on Adenauer. I said that we could not accept such views and that Adenauer was not only a friend but we felt a wise statesman. He said, "I am warning you Adenauer will turn against you and if not Adenauer then his successor. You will recall this warning of mine of July 3." I said he was wrong. He then said that a future West Germany might turn against the West just as Hitler had signed the pact with Stalin in 1939. He said that Russia had signed that pact because the United States and the West were seeking to direct Hitler against the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union had taken the historically correct decision in the circumstances. I said that there had been no such desire or intention in the West and that in point of truth the Soviet pact with Hitler had been responsible for World War II because it gave Hitler the encouragement to attack France and the United Kingdom. He continued to argue the point and I finally said that I thought we could agree sooner on past history—even his version of the War of 1812—than we could on modern history. He said that he would remind me again of his "warning of July 3."

At this point Ambassador Menshikov came up and the plane was towed up for boarding.

I said goodbye to Kozlov, wishing him a pleasant and an enlightening trip through our middle and far west. I said that we should continue our conversation at some point and that I thought it would last several days since he had not convinced me and obviously I had not convinced him.

The conversation was conducted throughout in good temper and Kozlov made a point of cordiality in saying goodbye.

426. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, July 7, 1959, noon.

55. For Secretary from Bruce. Deptel 2.¹ I saw Foreign Minister last night.

1. He said he had met with Couve and Lloyd at Geneva on June 20. He had explained to them what limits were on German Government action regarding question raised first paragraph reftel. Neither he personally nor Federal government was prepared to agree to all-German commission as long as that commission does not have definite task assigned to it, that is, something within stipulations Western Peace Plan.

2. He had gone on to tell his British and French colleagues that he could imagine one could revert to some of the ideas suggested by Ambassador Grewe during preparations for the conference. These envisaged establishment of a 4-power commission to consider problems connected with reunification of Germany. There would be no objection to German experts being called in in advisory capacity, provided they would have no executive or legislative powers, and further provided their functions were clearly defined by the 4-power commission so that they would act merely as an auxiliary to that commission. In such case, said the Foreign Minister, no question of parity between two Germanies

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-759. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

¹ Telegram 2, July 1, asked Bruce to seek West German views on the possibility of a four-power commission on Berlin with German advisers and for any further information the Embassy had on a proposal that Eckhardt made at the end of the first part of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting. Presumably the proposal is that in Eckardt, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 580–582.

would arise, since it would not be an autonomous organization. Hence, the number of experts would not matter.

3. On July 3 Foreign Minister had discussed above with Grewe and Duckwitz and will take it up today with Chancellor. Thereafter, he will inform the Allies of the German position in this respect, if possible before the Geneva Conference reconvenes. However, he is not certain he can meet this deadline.

4. Re second paragraph reftel, Foreign Minister said in last days of conference, von Eckardt had submitted a paper on his personal initiative, to the German delegation. Foreign Minister had not been in agreement with some of his ideas, but is continuing to consider his proposals. He said he was unhappy that an informal private paper submitted by a non-member of the Foreign Office had been brought to the Allies' attention. I told him, in defense of von Eckardt, that this Embassy had no copy of the proposal, nor did I believe the Department had ever received one. Additionally, I said I had recently mentioned the matter myself to von Eckardt, who answered that the paper was purely a representation of his private views.

5. I did not tell Foreign Minister that two days ago von Eckardt had said to me he intended to renew his suggestions to the Chancellor and Foreign Minister.

6. I think at this point it would be mistake for Department to mention von Eckardt's proposals. He will have more of them and some of them may be worth consideration, but only if they are put forward with approval of Foreign Minister.

7. Foreign Minister expects to arrive Geneva Saturday night.

Bruce

427. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 8, 1959.

Mr. Murphy, Mr. Merchant and I met with the Secretary today to review questions connected with Berlin contingency planning. The following are the principal points discussed and decided:

1. The Secretary reviewed his conversation with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd in Geneva last month¹ which had led the British to believe that there was some change in the U.S. position on the question of access identification and checkpoint procedures as worked out by the Embassies in Bonn. Specifically, that we might be prepared to reconsider the acceptability of East German stamping. The Secretary made it clear that he had been talking with Selwyn Lloyd not within the framework of the contingency planning at all but within the context of a possible arrangement with the Soviets which would retain responsibility and amount to an agency relationship between the Soviets and the East Germans. The Secretary authorized us to take the necessary action to clear up the British misunderstanding on this point.

2. We discussed the question of the planning with respect to possible recourse to the UN in the event of the breakdown of negotiations and unilateral action on the part of the Soviets. The Secretary confirmed his agreement with the procedures contemplated in the contingency planning paper on this subject.

3. We discussed with the Secretary preparatory and precautionary military measures which had been taken under the President's authorization to undertake such measures "of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence." We said that we feared that the measures taken so far had been relatively innocuous and had not made a measurable impression on the Soviets. We accordingly raised the question as to whether the President's authorization should not be sought to move into a more advanced phase of preparatory measures of a kind which might cause a certain amount of public uneasiness, short however of creating an atmosphere of crisis. We were not ready to suggest specific measures but if the President approved in principle, we would work these out together with the Pentagon and in consultation with the British and French. The Secretary agreed with this proposal and asked that a paper be prepared for him for the purpose of discussing the question with the President on the following day after the NSC meeting.

FDK

¹ See Document 411.

428. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McElroy

JCSM 264-59

Washington, July 8, 1959.

SUBJECT

Reduction of the Berlin Garrison

1. At a meeting of the Coordinating Group, Berlin Contingency Planning, on 22 June 1959,¹ Mr. Murphy, Under Secretary of State, indicated that Allied force ceilings in Berlin should be examined as an area by which the United States might induce a concession by the USSR which would justify a summit meeting.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a minor "symbolic" reduction of the Allied Berlin garrison would not significantly affect the capability of the force to retard Soviet Bloc aggression. However, even such a "minor" reduction would be morally and psychologically damaging to Allied interests. Furthermore, the current site and composition of the garrison have been carefully tailored to the mission assigned and cannot be reduced without a commensurate readjustment of mission responsibilities. Any significant reduction of the forces in Berlin would compel the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the evacuation of U.S. dependents from Berlin because their protection during Communist fomented civil disturbances could no longer be insured.

3. In a full-scale military engagement the Soviet Bloc forces, vastly superior in numbers, could overwhelm the Allied garrison forces. On the other hand, the garrison forces, in conjunction with the West Berlin police, could resist Soviet aggression long enough to capture free world attention and to facilitate Allied decision on the implementation of forceful counteraction, including the substantial use of military force and, if necessary, preparatory measures for general war.

4. Another danger in formally agreeing with the Soviets upon any restriction or reduction in the size of our Berlin garrison is that the Soviets thereafter will undoubtedly use such agreement to impose further controls and harassments upon the exercise of Allied rights in Berlin. This would probably result in Soviet insistence upon their right to insure through detailed checks at their control points that the Allies were not exceeding the numbers and types of U.S. military personnel agreed for the Berlin garrison.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/7-1359. Secret. Attached to a memorandum of transmittal to the Secretary of State, dated July 13.

¹No record of this meeting has been found.

5. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following views be transmitted to the Secretary of State:

a. A reduction of the Allied Berlin garrison should not be effected as long as East Germany remains under Communist domination.

b. A reduction of the Allied Berlin garrison should not be tendered as a concession to the Soviet Union in the current (recessed) Geneva discussion.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

429. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 9, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter came in to see the President to discuss with him his outlook toward the negotiations resuming in Geneva on July 13th. He said he proposed to probe the Soviets immediately on one item to which they have shown some sensitivity. He recalled that Gromyko at once responded at length after Mr. Herter had referred to the two-year deadline as an ultimatum, including that Mr. Herter had misinterpreted the nature of the Soviet proposal. Mr. Herter said that if the Soviets are willing to leave the matter that allied rights will not be terminated at the end of such a period, even though they do not formally recognize allied rights, he thought there was a basis for negotiation.

The President said that it must be clear that our rights stand until we adopt some more acceptable arrangements. In the meantime, we could cut our forces in West Berlin, agree that neither side would interfere with economic activities, cut down on propaganda from both sides, etc. In the meantime we would undertake to confer with our associates to see what further steps might be instituted.

Mr. Herter said he thought that, if negotiation seems to move satisfactorily, the two items of the length of any agreement and the total number of troops to remain in West Berlin might be left blank, for determination at a summit meeting. He said that State is now thinking that a summit meeting on honorable terms is desirable.

The President referred to a phone call he had made to Mr. Herter. He said what he is thinking of is suggesting to Khrushchev that he visit the Russian exhibit in New York and spend a day or two here in Washington. The President would then visit the U.S. exhibit in Moscow and have a day or two's talk with Khrushchev. Really what he would have in mind saying is that we would like to negotiate improved arrangements and relationships but we could not ever do so with a gun pointed at our head. He would recall that the United States and the USSR had won the war together and had jointly taken on obligations thereafter. Under our obligations, we cannot and will not abandon two million West Berliners or the West Germans.

Mr. Herter said he saw reason for such a course of action. Although the public around the world does not seem much concerned, it is evident that in the "chanceries" a feeling of tension and uneasiness is arising. A conversation between the President and Khrushchev would do no harm and might do some good. The key point is to find a way of doing it without appearing to be kowtowing or weakening. Timing will have to be very carefully studied.

Mr. Herter next referred to the nuclear test talks. These are at a difficult point. The Soviets are insisting upon the acceptance of the principle of quota, leaving the exact number to be haggled over as a political question. It is clear, and becoming clearer, that inspection against underground tests is a very uncertain and expensive operation. Mr. McCone and many others would much rather start with a ban of atmospheric tests only. He added that the inspection systems being discussed would be very costly and of doubtful efficacy. Within the State Department there is division of opinion regarding the continuation of the talks. He thought there was a consensus, however, that they should not be broken off. We then come to the question, "how long should they be allowed to drag on?" He said the British are so anxious for an agreement that they would sign almost anything.

The President reverted to the question of a talk with Khrushchev. He indicated he was prepared to say he was ready to negotiate on any subject, but had to make it very clear that we would not let down our friends. He commented that the creation of the feeling that these issues can only be decided at summit meetings plays into the Soviet hands, since they can exploit the flexibility available to a dictator.

Mr. Herter said he would be leaving on Saturday, and would of course stay in very close touch with the President. The President said he

thought there had been complete success between himself and Mr. Herter in exchanging views during the earlier session so that each knew the thinking of the other. He said he tries to avoid holding press conferences at times when they could embarrass Mr. Herter's negotiation. In addition, he strives to make clear that Mr. Herter has real authority to negotiate.

With regard to the summit meeting, Mr. Herter said there are two related questions to be considered. One is the timing of the possible visit with Khrushchev. The second is a meeting of the President with de Gaulle. Regarding the latter, diplomatic channels have just about been exhausted in doing anything constructive.

The President said that the itinerary he was thinking of would be Paris (where he could see de Gaulle), Moscow, Karachi, New Delhi, perhaps Japan, and then home. Mr. Herter said he understood that Khrushchev would be invited here on an informal basis. The President confirmed this, stating that the meeting would be without agenda and without communiqué, unless they happened to come to some agreement. Mr. Herter said there is a feeling worldwide that no one in the world other than President Eisenhower would have so much influence on the situation, and this would seem to be an effective plan to bring that influence to bear.

The President said he would like to see some study as to the sequence of events. Mr. Herter said that the British are very anxious to have the summit meeting before the election—which seems to mean late August or early September for the summit meeting. He doesn't fully understand this, since it would seem that a promise of holding a summit meeting shortly after the election might in fact be much better than one which turned out to be inconclusive. The President said he could go to Moscow about the first of August, and then to the summit about the first of September. He would be in Moscow about a week after the Vice President under this plan. In any case, the President said Khrushchev could be told that if he were to come over here for two or three days, the President would return the visit some time later in the year. Mr. Herter said there might be a good possibility of having the summit meeting in Quebec, with Khrushchev coming to the United States a day or two in advance. The President asked Mr. Herter to think about the matter and visit him in the Mansion late in the afternoon on Friday if he came up with any ideas.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

430. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, July 9, 1959, 8 p.m.

49. Paris for Embassy, USRO, CINCEUR Thurston & West. In informal meeting with Commandants this afternoon, Mayor Brandt made following points re Geneva:

He thought there possibility Sovs might accept Western paper of June 16¹ as basis for discussion and would then offer "improvements" interpreting Western proposals in Sov sense. Brandt thought in that case it necessary for Western powers be prepared immediately counteract Sov proposals by tabling interpretations of their own.

Brandt's thoughts on Western plan being sent to Bonn on von Brentano's request. Brandt most concerned with points relating to access and curbing of activities against public order mentioned in Western paper. Re access, he not satisfied with words "wie bisher" used in formulating demand for continued free and unrestricted access in German version of Western paper. Brandt said "wie bisher" might conceivably also include blockade period.

Re curbing of certain activities, Brandt said that phrase "measures should be taken consistent with fundamental rights and liberties" likely lead to interminable wrangling between East and West since Communist interpretation of what constituted fundamental human rights quite different from Western. West Berlin newspaper article criticizing USSR might be considered by Sovs as violation of Berlin agreement. Senator Lipschitz had suggested language specifying that activities which violate recognized penal codes in both parts of Germany be curbed, but Brandt not entirely satisfied with this definition either.

Brandt felt perhaps most dangerous point of Western proposal related to limiting Western troop strength but he refraining from commenting formally on this point since not within his competence. Expressing his personal opinion he certain any commitment which would give Sovs an opportunity introduce controls over Allied troop strength would be dangerous. Should West Berlin be exposed to concerted infiltration attempt by Communists, Allied troop levels would make a real difference because West Berlin police morale would be affected if Allied garrisons reduced to a point where police recognize Allied troops could no longer be effective in supporting police action.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-959. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Heidelberg.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 411.

Brandt expressed personal belief that minor Allied troop reduction would not be considered by Sovs as meaningful concession and would gain us nothing. Serious reduction would call into question concept "trip wire mechanism." Handful of Allied troops might simply be "arrested" without being able offer meaningful resistance in which case it could not be clearly established that act of aggression had been committed.

In reply to question from British Commandant whether troop reduction would affect morale of West Berlin population as a whole, Brandt said there was danger it would be regarded as first step toward Allied evacuation and could therefore have strongly negative effect on Berlin morale.

In reply to another question from British Commandant as to whether Allied force reduction of 2 to 3,000 could be compensated for by increase in West Berlin police, Brandt said two issues not directly related. If people were afraid that Allied policy over long run was to evacuate Berlin, police reinforcements would do nothing to dispel such fears; in addition, decline in police morale occasioned by troop reductions might offset increasing police numbers. Reinforcing police should be considered in any event.

Brandt repeated to Commandants his dissatisfaction with Fed-Rep's failure to keep him informed of Geneva developments, either through von Mettenheim at Geneva or through FonOff Bonn. He had discussed this matter last Monday with Chancellor and von Brentano and they had agreed to rectify situation. Brandt told Commandants he hoped they would support with other governments the inclusion of Berlin's representative at Geneva as a technical adviser to any working group which might be concerned with formulation of proposals directly affecting Berlin. (Presumably FedRep has indicated to Brandt it willing to make such proposal.) Brandt felt such technical advice would be of great benefit.

Brandt said he or Senator Klein prepared to go to Geneva at any time if their views or advice on technical points might be deemed helpful. Added that commencing July 21 he would be vacationing near Munich and could get to Geneva on a few hours notice.

Burns

431. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 10, 1959, 6 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Herter, Dillon, Murphy, Merchant, General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter began by saying that the group had considered very carefully the President's idea of talking with Khrushchev and thought that this was a very worthwhile thing to do. To this end they suggested that the President send word very confidentially to Khrushchev, through Kozlov who is leaving in the next day or two, that if there are results at Geneva sufficient to justify a summit meeting, he would propose that it be held in Quebec and that Khrushchev come down to the United States for a few days in advance, seeing the President at Camp David. The President would then plan to go to Moscow in October and on to India. The idea would be for Mr. Murphy to see Kozlov very quietly in New York on Sunday to put this matter to him.

The President said if he went to Moscow at that time he would have to skip Western Europe since if he stopped in one place he would have to stop in many. Mr. Herter said he and his associates also thought there would be value in the President going to Paris for about two days just ahead of the summit meeting to hold a "Western Summit" and have one day of conversations with de Gaulle.

The President commented that one reason he had thought of having Khrushchev over within the next couple of weeks was that this might do some good at the Geneva sessions which are being resumed on the thirteenth. Mr. Herter said he and his associates felt that sending the message now to Khrushchev would have much the same effect. One reason he is taking advantage of Kozlov's return is that Khrushchev is planning to go to Poland early next week with attendant possibility that he might make provocative public statements there.

The President then considered a draft of a letter to Khrushchev and a draft of a "talking paper" which Mr. Murphy would use.¹ He suggested changes to make it clear that this is not a pressure tactic on Khrushchev. He also suggested as a reason for Quebec as a site the problem he may face in late August or early September arising from the windup of the Congressional session.

Mr. Herter asked what the President would think about telling the British and the French of this, and specifically about mentioning it to

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret.

¹ Neither of these drafts has been found, but see footnote 3 below.

Selwyn Lloyd. The President thought that he should go no further than to say that we are discreetly inquiring whether Khrushchev would like to make an exchange of informal visits. Mr. Herter said he would like to broach the idea of Quebec to the British and the French, since they will be studying the summit problem.

The President said that Mr. Murphy might mention the possibility of Khrushchev visiting a few other places in the United States—such as the agricultural station at Beltsville and other points of interesting economic activity.

The President next referred to Khrushchev's meeting with Harriman² and his comment that there is going to be trouble if the Western allies do not leave Berlin and that he would say the same thing to President Eisenhower when he met him. The President said a meeting of himself with Khrushchev would be useful for one thing. If Khrushchev were to threaten war or use of force, he would immediately call his bluff and ask him to agree on a day to start. Mr. Herter felt that such a direct answer would be most useful in our dealing with Khrushchev, who seems to have, or to be trying to create, the impression that we will not stand up to him. Mr. Herter said that Mr. Harriman had given him in utmost confidence his impression that Khrushchev is quite uncertain as to the effectiveness of the ICBMs. While he seemed to be quite confident of Soviet ability to devastate Western Europe, his attitude on longer range weapons was quite different.

Mr. Herter said it would have to be made clear that this is not a social or ceremonial visit but is a business trip for the purpose of informal discussions. The President agreed with this but recalled that the Russians are great ones for ostentation and formal display at social dinners, etc.

It was agreed that the State Department group would revise the documents along the lines suggested by the President and send them over to him Saturday morning.³

G.
Brigadier General, USA

² See Documents 417 and 420.

³ Copies of the revised draft letter and the amended talking paper were transmitted to the President on Saturday, July 11. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series) The following day Murphy saw Kozlov in New York, just prior to the latter's departure from the United States, and handed him the two-paragraph note suggesting an exchange of visits. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/7-1359)

432. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Herter left Washington at 10 a.m., July 11, to return to Geneva. He stopped at Ottawa from 11 a.m. to 6 p.m. on July 11 to brief the Canadians on the Conference and discuss questions of mutual concern. Memoranda of his conversations with Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Minister of External Affairs Green are in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secretary Herter arrived at Geneva at 9 a.m., July 12, and spent most of the day in consultations with the U.S. Delegation before meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Pella at 4 p.m. and Dutch Foreign Minister Luns at 5 p.m. Memoranda of these conversations, US/MC/123–125 and 117, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1341. The part of the conversation with Pella, dealing with European regional problems, is in volume VII, Part 2, Document 240.

**433. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 13, 1959, noon.

Secto 298. Paris pass USRO. At Couve's dinner for Pella last night little of great importance emerged. Other guests were von Brentano and Lloyd, all Ministers with two advisers. I had Reinhardt and Merchant with me. Pella with bulging briefcase took post-prandial working meeting seriously.

As this was first opportunity for me to see other conference participants we spent some time on tactics for opening session today.

Von Brentano following general lines German tactics paper¹ made available Dept just prior my departure strongly urged Western Ministers return to problem of Germany as a whole and disarmament rather than pick up Berlin where we left. Couve objected and I supported him.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1359. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, and Paris.

¹Translations of the three West German papers, "Tactics at the Opening of the Second Phase," "Tactics for the Event of a Renewed Failure of Negotiations," and "The Negotiation Situation Following the Conclusion of the First Phase of the Conference," were transmitted to Geneva in agram G-01, July 11. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-GE/7-1159)

Lloyd then raised what he termed defect in our June 16 Berlin proposal which was absence any provision for dealing on continuing basis with problem of Germany as a whole. He asked tentatively what his colleagues would think of embellishing our memorandum with proposed establishment four-power commission with German Delegations attached. Couve objected on grounds this would play into Soviet hands by adding to stature GDR and embarrassing FedRep. I disagreed with Couve and urged we consider Lloyd's suggestion seriously.

Pella then took over conversation for prolonged period. He opened with plea for more formal and enduring association of Italy with conference and its staff work. In this connection he referred to importance Italy's position in Alliance particularly with respect to atomic risks to which it was now exposed. He indicated Italy while pessimistic over prospects for sufficient present progress to justify summit was nevertheless anxious one be held. He referred to fragile character Italian public opinion and narrow parliamentary margin on which government operates. He then proposed some new dramatic solution for Berlin and unveiled a proposal that occupying powers turn West Berlin over to FedRep retaining temporarily their forces in city under invitation from Senat pending ICJ ruling on legality transfer of sovereignty. He promised to submit detailed memorandum on this proposal and expressed fervent hope opportunity for prolonged consideration of it with his colleagues in days ahead.

None of us commented substantively as hour was growing extremely late but I suspect Pella with Straneo and Pansa who attended him are settling down for once.

During course general conversation prior Pella discourse Lloyd described in classically British form essentiality summit irrespective result of this conference. I agreed with some of his argumentation but pointed out our task was to insure achievement sufficient progress to justify it. Couve somewhat to my surprise and in contrast pre-recess attitude agreed we should search for minimum agreement with Soviets which would warrant summit and said interim solution on Berlin seemed obvious arrangement to attain this purpose. Von Brentano interjected no objection this trend of thought at this point.

Just before break-up Lloyd informed colleagues he had torn up proposed reply to Soviets on Balkan atom free zone² prepared by his experts and dictated own draft which would be despatched today (presumably without consultation in NAC).

² For text of the Soviet proposal of June 25 on a nuclear-free Balkan and Adriatic zone and the U.S. rejection of the proposal, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1423–1426 and 1434–1436; regarding the British reply, see 609 House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, cols. 26–27.

He said he took more forthcoming position to effect regional zone of character proposed by Soviets made no sense except in larger context global disarmament measures safeguarded by adequate inspection system. Lloyd also said UK had received no assurances from Soviets during recess as some press reports indicated.

We agreed Deputies' Coordinating Group would meet early this morning and Western Foreign Ministers at noon.

Herter

434. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 13, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 301. At meeting of Western Foreign Ministers this morning, after agreeing procedure to be followed in today's plenary session, following topics which had been raised in coordinating group¹ were discussed by Ministers: (1) German proposal to admit Poles and Czechs to conference to set stage for GFR unilateral declaration or possible offer of non-aggression pact to those two countries; (2) German suggestion that Western powers propose creation of four-power commission, to which German experts could be attached, to study problems East-West contacts, reunification and peace treaty during interim of temporary agreement on Berlin.

Although US, UK and French FonMins agreed that idea of GFR offer of non-aggression pact to Poland and Czechoslovakia was interesting and merited study, they were unanimous in their view that Poles and Czechs should not be admitted to conference for reasons advanced at beginning of conference and which were still valid. Furthermore they agreed that Geneva conference was not best forum for such a proposal if eventually made by FedRep. In these circumstances von Brentano said he would not insist on his suggestion but would circulate to Ministers German draft declaration² which he hoped they would study.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE-7/1359. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant and Reinhardt.

¹ A record of the Coordinating Group meeting at 10:30 a.m., US/MC/116, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1341.

² Not found.

Von Brentano then urged German point of view as set forth in their working paper (entitled "Western tactics during second phase of conference" available in Department)³ that in reconvened conference Western FonMins should put primary emphasis on overall German questions and referred to German proposal for four-power commission. Couve described his strong objection to proposal first because it created link between Berlin problem and that of Germany as a whole, and secondly because it would create what would in effect be a permanent body which afforded Russians means to interfere in internal affairs of Federal Republic. This would facilitate Soviet objectives of strengthening GDR and weakening GFR. Thirdly he saw danger in having identical terminal date for Interim agreement on Berlin and work of four-power commission. This would provide Soviets with convenient leverage to create crisis and pressure on Berlin problem.

Von Brentano replied linkage was originally Western not Soviet idea. The object was to insure that discussions of German question would continue.

Couve contended that Western powers did not establish link but had said that they would not accept any change in status of Berlin outside process of reunification. He considered it dangerous now to accept link which made it implicit that status of Berlin would change without reunification.

Secretary observed that Couve's position posed serious problem since he and Lloyd viewed German proposal favorably. Furthermore, he understood Couve had some suggestion how Berlin problem and all-German issue could be separated.

Accordingly he proposed that Ministers formulate their views over night and meet July 14 at 10:30 a.m. in effort to resolve issue. This was agreed.

Agreement was reached to seek private meeting July 14 at plenary today. General approval was also expressed of Lloyd's suggestion that probe of Gromyko's position (with particular reference to his June 28 statement⁴ re status Allied rights at expiry any period agreed for temporary Berlin agreement) could be conducted without accepting Soviet proposal of June 19⁵ as basis for discussion by comparing subject by subject its points common with those of Western proposal of June 16.⁶

Herter

³ Regarding the three draft West German papers, see footnote 1, Document 433.

⁴ For text of Gromyko's statement, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 349–360.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 415.

⁶ See footnote 1, Document 411.

JULY 13–AUGUST 5, 1959: SECOND PART OF
THE CONFERENCE

435. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 14, 1959, 2 a.m.

Secto 303. Paris pass USRO. Following is summary of Nineteenth Plenary Session July 13, 3:32 to 7:20 p.m. with Secretary as Chairman.

Secretary opened meeting with twenty minute statement summarizing work of conference to date and suggesting future talks be in private sessions (Secto 302).¹ Couve and Lloyd followed with short statements² agreeing suggestion re future talks and briefly reviewing aspects of first phase of conference.

Gromyko, in thirty minute statement, repeated Soviet June 19 proposals.³ He argued for them and attacked West for opposing. He said nothing new in process and remained obscure re status Western rights in Berlin. When discussing necessity curb "subversive activities" in West Berlin, cited as example of "provocative action" the holding there of presidential election. Secretary denied this was provocative, noting that decision hold election taken nine months ago and followed precedent of 1954 which caused no Soviet protest.

Bolz followed with attack on FedRep "militarism and revanchism" stressed widespread German desire for peace treaty and reaffirmed GDR support for Soviet Berlin proposals.⁴ Grewe denied allegations in Gromyko and Bolz statements and reserved right to comment later. Maintained Western Peace Plan is best solution.⁵

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1459. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Lewis. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/19 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/19, July 13, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1386.

¹ Dated July 14. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1459) For text of Herter's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/49, July 13, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 381-386; *Cmd.* 868, pp. 240-244; or Department of State *Bulletin*, August 3, 1959, pp. 147-150.

² For texts of Couve de Murville's and Lloyd's statements, circulated as RM/DOC/52 and 50, July 13, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 386-389 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 244-246.

³ For text of Gromyko's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/51, July 13, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 389-400 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 246-254.

⁴ For text of Bolz' statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/13, July 13, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 585-589 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 329-333.

⁵ For text of Grewe's statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/14, July 15, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 554-555 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 333-334.

At end meeting, after Secretary suggested time of next meeting be decided later, Gromyko, recalling suggestion that future meetings be in private, said Soviets could not agree unless "all participants" (meaning Germans) included. Commented, however, it would be for any participant to decide whether or not he wished participate in private meetings. After Lloyd asked why change system which had worked well in first six weeks, Gromyko recalled Soviets had suggested German participation in private sessions during first phase of conference. Secretary noted West considered as participants only four Foreign Ministers. Germans were advisers. Couve then suggested next meeting be plenary and all agreed with Secretary's suggestion it take place July 15 at 3:30 p.m.

Full report follows in separate cable.⁶

⁶Secto 304 from Geneva, July 14 at 2 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1459)

436. Memorandum of Meeting With President Eisenhower

July 13, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

[Here follow paragraphs 1–3 in which Gray reviewed unrelated subjects.]

4. I then indicated to the President that I wished to discuss three matters which involved Berlin, and to some extent, the Foreign Ministers conference in Geneva.

The first related to the level of troops in Berlin and his request that a study be made of what the number might appropriately be. I indicated that I had levied a request on Mr. Murphy and the answer had not been forthcoming, largely because he had difficulty getting a coordinated Defense view. I reported to the President that the JCS had just completed a review and were opposed to any reduction. However, it appeared that Defense was taking a less obdurate view and that I hoped within a few days there would be an answer for him.

I also reported that I was informed that General Norstad and the military in Washington were concerned about a limitation without

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Staff Memos. Top Secret.

inspection and verification as a precedent which might be bothersome in later and broader disarmament negotiations. The President indicated that he did not have in mind that there would be any limitation but if there were to be a reduction it would be unilateral and not necessarily permanent.

The second problem concerned the inadequate results in tripartite planning for surface access to Berlin. I reported to the President that in the tripartite planning the UK had, in a sense, taken over, asserting the position that if the initial probe fails this would necessarily mean an all-out nuclear war, if the Berlin position is to be maintained. They tended to ignore the intermediate steps contemplated in the planning position put forward by the US. This appears to be an effort to force a Summit meeting. The President said that this coincided with the message he had had from Mr. Macmillan¹ and seemed to be a part of the pattern.

I reported to the President that as late as July 10 in a tripartite meeting,² the UK was not willing to give government approval to the planning paper although at civilian and military staff levels it had been agreed to. The question largely hinges around how much we would let the East Germans operate. The UK is prepared to go much further than our agency concept. As justification for the UK position, Ambassador Caccia cited a conversation between Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Herter in Geneva,³ in which Mr. Lloyd maintained Mr. Herter's views did not coincide with the planning documents.

I expressed to the President my view that this was a matter of the most serious implications. He agreed and asked me to request Acting Secretary Dillon to present a summary of this situation at the NSC meeting on July 16.

The third item had to do with the Department of Defense's concern that the State Department was materially weakening the US position with respect to Berlin. I indicated to the President that the JCS had concluded that our negotiating position, from a military point of view, would be stronger now than two and half years from now, and that this was also the conclusion of an ad hoc committee consisting of State, Defense, JCS and CIA. The President found this hard to believe. In any event, I pointed out to him that on the basis of a State Department paper,⁴ which had been made available to Defense, Defense felt against the background at this time, the State Department was proposing a two and a half year moratorium with respect to Berlin; or alternatively,

¹ Document 416.

² No further record of this meeting has been found.

³ See Documents 410 and 411.

⁴ Not identified further.

proposing a "guaranteed free city" or a UN trusteeship for Berlin. Either of the latter courses was felt by Defense to demonstrate a retreat by the US. I pointed out to the President that this matter had been brought to my attention on Saturday afternoon by the Defense Department and they were somewhat concerned that there was a Presidentially approved paper which they had not been privileged to see. I told the President that I had discussed this with Mr. Murphy and that he felt that Defense was unduly excited and if they fully understood the situation, their cause for concern would disappear. The President then asked me who really was raising the issue and I pointed out that it was Defense. He commented that negotiations with respect to Berlin were primarily a State Department matter and that for purposes of this sort Defense was not a policy-making body but an operating body. I responded that I nevertheless felt it my duty to bring to his attention major differences of view in matters of such supreme importance.

He then summoned Mrs. Whitman and asked her if she had a copy of the "talking paper" which he had approved for Mr. Herter's use in the resumed conferences.⁵ She did not have such a copy but the President told me that it contained a number of positions which Mr. Herter felt he might be forced to take if there were to be any progress at all towards a basis for a Summit meeting.

[Here follows paragraphs 5 and 6 in which Gray reviewed unrelated subjects.]

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

⁵ Presumably the President is referring to the draft communiqué; see attachment B to Document 418.

**437. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 14, 1959, midnight.

Secto 311. Western Foreign Ministers met this morning and again this afternoon. They agreed:

1. Not to pursue Gromyko regarding private meeting but to have plenary sessions tomorrow and Thursday. Couve, who is having

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1459. Secret; Limit Distribution.

Gromyko to lunch on Friday, offered to convert luncheon into private session if developments should make this desirable.

2. Couve to make principal speech at tomorrow's plenary session directed at questioning Gromyko on Soviet all-German committee proposal, analysis of Gromyko's July 13 speech¹ and emphasis on Western Peace Plan.

3. Coordinating group will meet tomorrow morning. Large part of discussion turned around Couve's concern that if West discussed Berlin question and all-German committee proposal together as Gromyko wished, we should be negotiating both issues under Berlin threat and run risk of having to make concessions on both counts. In his view Russians should be told that West prepared discuss both questions, but not together, and that if Berlin question resolved then discussion of all-German committee could be taken up. He thought that if West wanted to go to summit meeting having removed Berlin threat then it must accept time limit on interim Berlin arrangement. There was, however, no reason and it would be highly dangerous to accept concurrent time limit in respect to broader German questions which would then be brought as well under Berlin threat. This would provide Russians with convenient lever with which to interfere in Western Germany. Although Ministers reached no definitive decision on this question of tactics which will be dealt with further, discussion revealed large measure of agreement with Couve's analysis.

At outset of meeting at Lloyd's suggestion British Ambassador Reilly reported on his talk in Moscow with Kuznetsov, which was described in today's *NYT*. He said that although Kuznetsov's remarks had not seemed to him to contain anything new, he had filled in his French and German colleagues and would have informed Thompson, if time had permitted.

Brentano was visibly upset at leaks in French press of German working paper and report that full text would appear in tomorrow's *NYT*.² He had been queried by Adenauer in this connection. He requested his colleagues to return the copies that had been provided him so he could assert the paper did not exist and made impassioned plea for greater security saying he was conducting investigation in his own delegation.

Herter

¹ See footnote 3, Document 435.

² See footnote 1, Document 433.

438. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 14, 1959, 8 p.m.

Cahto 143. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

As you will have gathered, we are off to a very slow start. Gromyko's opening speech added nothing and his balking at informal meetings without the presence of the East Germans is likely to slow things down. I have had two good sessions with the Western Foreign Ministers¹ which, while they indicated considerable divergence of views at the beginning, ended with complete agreement since divergence was on tactics rather than principle.

The general feeling here, including Couve de Murville, is that a summit conference some time this fall is inevitable. I wish I could be as optimistic that we will have achieved sufficient progress to allow such a meeting to be held in reasonable atmosphere. I will keep right on plugging.

Faithfully, signed: Chris."²

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1459. Secret; Niact.

¹ See Document 437.

² For an extract of Eisenhower's reply, see Document 439.

439. Editorial Note

On July 15 President Eisenhower replied to Secretary Herter's message of July 14 as follows:

"I am interested in your observation about the general feeling at Geneva, to the effect that a Summit Conference some time this fall is inevitable. The existence of such a feeling must mean that our Allies are convinced that there will be sufficient progress at Geneva to justify such a meeting on the part of the Western Powers. Unless they do have this confidence in some progress, then they must be assuming that the West will surrender to pressure from the other side.

“You and I have long ago agreed that we have no idea of being either belligerent or unnecessarily rigid. But we have stood and intend to stand on principle. Moreover, we have made it abundantly clear that we are ready to interpret progress at Geneva in a liberal manner. It would be most unfortunate if our associates should assume that regardless of the absence of progress, this government will consent to attend a Summit Conference. For us this would be such an unacceptable retreat that it would virtually spell surrender. This we will not do. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/7–1559)

440. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 15, 1959, 10 p.m.

Secto 321. Paris pass USRO. *Begin summary*—Plenary Meeting July 15th consisted series of exchanges between Gromyko and Western Foreign Ministers seeking clarification of respective positions. Discussion centered on Soviet interjection of all German committee into interim solution of Berlin problem with West seeking explanation why Soviets had unnecessarily reopened overall German problem in this manner and Gromyko insisting upon logical connection between interim Berlin arrangement and all-German committee. Meeting ended inconclusively with Secretary proposing conference take up all open issues re interim Berlin solution and Gromyko replying that all German committee proposal could not be left out of consideration. *End summary*.

Meeting opened with Couve pointing out Soviet proposal of June 9, as modified on June 19, combined issue of all German settlement with distinct problem of separate solution Berlin matter in manner stultifying prior work regarding separate Berlin solution.¹ Couve requested Soviets explain why such action taken and why action did not reopen all prior differences regarding general settlement German problem.

Gromyko replied with series of questions directed to why West had not given concrete answers to latest Soviet proposals on all German

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1559. Official Use Only. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/20 (Corrected), is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1388.

¹ For texts of the various statements given at this session, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 404–418.

committee and provisional status of Berlin in view of fact West had first suggested all German committee and fact proposal met previously expressed Western concern. Added Couve's statement had not clarified situation.

Secretary stated Gromyko should reply to Couve's questions as Soviet had introduced all German committee into Berlin discussion. After further interchange re who should answer first Gromyko stated vital link between Berlin settlement and all German committee was fact if committee succeeded in task Berlin question necessarily solved; added Soviets did not intend reopen question reunification which German matter.

Couve pointed out Soviets on basis our reference all German committee in Western Peace Plan expected West to accept entire Soviet position on Germany. Lloyd added no logical link between interim Berlin settlement in all German committee. Lloyd attempted debating point re inconsistency Soviet position on reunification with Article 22 Soviet Draft Peace Treaty² which Gromyko fielded. Gromyko then deprecated West position on reunification shedding crocodile tears on its injustice to Germans.

Lloyd and Couve both commented on fact course of discussion in meeting demonstrated that Soviet all German committee proposal necessarily reopened previous sterile debates on settlement of overall German problem. Following exchange in which Gromyko inquired why if the West so strongly advocated free elections in Germany they would not leave the matter for decision by the Germans and Couve pointed out answer is to be found in Western Peace Plan. Secretary made the suggestion regarding taking up open points on an interim Berlin settlement one by one reported above and Gromyko voiced the position that as question all German committee had been raised it could not be ignored. Agreed another plenary meeting will be held tomorrow afternoon.

Herter

²See footnote 3, Document 305.

441. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting

Bonn, July 15, 1959, 1 p.m.

8. Ref Geneva 5 to Bonn; rptd Dept Secto 308.¹

1. McCloy in Essen today, tonight Frankfurt, tomorrow Stuttgart, then Munich, accompanied by family party of four persons, departing for US early August.

2. I saw him yesterday after his talk with Adenauer. He reported as I remember:

A. Chancellor's chief concern seemed possibility Western disunity due appeasing tactics British. Said he liked Lloyd and distrusted Macmillan. He had confidence Secretary Herter, but felt there were elements in US too amenable to British influence.

B. There should be meeting of Western chiefs of state before any summit meeting.

C. At summit meeting, chief topic for discussion should be disarmament.

D. Thinks US should alter attitude toward France which under de Gaulle leadership has again become strong power. US does not seem realize extent recent favorable changes in France he emphasized great importance he attaches to good Franco-German relations which are unpalatable to British, who still cling to anachronistic policy of balance of power on continent through division.

E. Deep suspicion of British was recurrent theme. McCloy told Chancellor he did not share his estimate of Macmillan, who was strong and capable man. Moreover, when chips were down, British are best of Allies, etc. McCloy did not know if his defense of British had made impression. He advised Adenauer to have personal talk with Macmillan. Chancellor said he intended to do so at suitable time.

F. McCloy did not mention any discussion of Geneva proceedings.

Bruce

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1559. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department as telegram 129, which is the source text.

¹ Telegram 5, July 14, asked for a report on McCloy's conversation with Adenauer. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-GE/7-1459)

442. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, July 16, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SMALL STAFF MEETING

PRESENT

The Secretary	Mr. Smith
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Irwin
Mr. Reinhardt	Mr. Stimpson
Mr. Berding	

Khrushchev's Health

1. After a discussion of reports about Khrushchev's health, it was agreed that Mr. Reinhardt would ask British Ambassador Reilly his impressions. Ambassador Reilly, who is now in Geneva, had apparently seen Khrushchev on July 9.

Conference Tactics

2. With regard to today's plenary session, Mr. Merchant said that we must not overlook the fact that these are primarily propaganda operations. He suggested that the Secretary attack the All-German Commission concept of the Soviets and recapitulate the Western Peace Plan more thoroughly than Couve de Murville had done yesterday. He might highlight the basic differences between the Western Peace Plan and the Soviet All-German proposal. The Secretary said that he did not want to focus on the Soviet plan, and pointed out that we had not yet discussed our plan for a four-power commission with German advisors. He thought today might be a good time to introduce the proposal to have the UN monitor propaganda activities in Berlin, emphasizing the reciprocal aspect of this proposal. There appears to be an impression that we are making a unilateral concession in this regard and we should correct this impression. The Secretary noted that Selwyn Lloyd wanted to go even further than we did as he wished to have the UN police the access routes to Berlin. The Secretary said that he was convinced that Hammarskjold would not accept the proposal since it would involve executive responsibility for the UN which Hammarskjold does not want. After further discussion it was agreed:

- 1) that Mr. Smith would undertake to prepare a speech for the Secretary in which the UN proposal would be the principal part;
- 2) our allies would be asked in the coordinating committee this morning to agree to this type of speech; and
- 3) provided allied agreement is obtained, Hammarskjöld would be notified prior to the Secretary's speech of the intention to mention the UN monitoring proposal.

Selwyn Lloyd Optimistic

3. Mr. Merchant said that in a conversation last evening Selwyn Lloyd had been "incredibly optimistic" about developments in the conference.¹ He appeared to believe that agreement had been virtually achieved and that the conference could end in several days.

German Situation

4. Mr. Merchant said he had been asked to lunch by German Ambassador Grewe tomorrow. Grewe had indicated that he wanted to discuss frankly some of the difficulties the Germans are facing.

American Club Speech

5. Mr. Berding confirmed that the Secretary's speech at the American Club of Geneva today would be informal and would not deal with any matter of policy. The Secretary said that he intended merely to say a few words. There will be no release of his remarks.

¹No record of this conversation has been found, but it presumably took place at a dinner given by the French at 8 p.m. on July 15.

443. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/126

Geneva, July 16, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Mr. Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Becker
Admiral Dudley
Mr. Hillenbrand

Federal Republic

Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Duckwitz
Mr. Fechter
Mr. Oncken
Mr. von Hase

United Kingdom

Ambassador Reilly
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Ledwidge
Mr. Hope
Mr. Drinkall

France

M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Froment-Meurice
M. Baraduc

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Coordinating Group

The following were the principal points made at today's meeting of the Coordinating Group:

1. At today's plenary meeting, after Gromyko has been given an opportunity to speak, the Secretary will make a statement re-presenting and analyzing the Western proposal on Berlin of June 16.

Mr. Merchant noted that the Secretary hoped during his presentation to be able to raise the possibility of requesting the Secretary General of the UN to provide a representative to report on propaganda activities. The views of the other delegations were requested on an urgent basis so that Hammarskjold could be told before this afternoon's session, as a matter of courtesy, that the Secretary was going to raise this possibility. The British indicated on the spot that they were agreeable. Both Grewe and Lucet said they would have to consult with their Foreign Ministers before giving an answer.

2. If Gromyko chooses to speak at the outset of the meeting and, as seems indicated, again stresses the importance of the All-German

Committee, the Secretary would open his remarks by stating that he felt this subject had been disposed of by the Western Foreign Ministers yesterday, but that some of his colleagues might have some further comments to make. He himself preferred to go ahead along the lines which he had indicated as desirable in his closing remarks yesterday. If it seemed desirable, Couve would then follow with a further rebuttal of Gromyko's statement.

3. Ambassador Grewe indicated that he likewise had a short statement prepared rebutting the Soviet position on the All-German Committee which could be used if it seemed desirable.

4. The French distributed the final version of the semiweekly report¹ to the NAC on developments at Geneva, but there was no discussion of the text. Mr. Merchant indicated that the American Delegation, whose turn to prepare the report came next, would complete its report on Friday to include the proceedings of that day. This could then be distributed to the Council in Paris on Saturday morning.

5. Mr. Merchant noted that Gromyko had invited the Secretary either for dinner on Friday or lunch on Saturday, with or without his wife, with or without aides, and with or without their wives. The Secretary was indicating to Gromyko that he would accept for lunch on Saturday for himself and Mrs. Herter alone.

6. At the request of the British press officer, Mr. Hancock stated that British journalists were becoming increasingly unhappy, particularly in view of the length of the meetings so far, about the procedure being followed at the Maison de la Presse for distribution of texts of speeches. Under quadripartite agreement such texts were only distributed at the conclusion of the Plenary Sessions each day. The Russians had been cheating in that they were releasing the texts of speeches immediately after their delivery in Moscow but had observed the agreement here in Geneva. In any event, representatives of British papers were finding that they could not meet their late afternoon deadlines under the present system. They therefore requested that the necessary arrangements be made so that speeches could be released immediately after delivery at the Plenary Sessions. The French Press Officer, who was present at the meeting, said that some journalists had actually requested that the Plenary Sessions be moved up to 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon and he believed the Russians would favor such an advance of the meeting time. After further discussion in the Coordinating Group, it was agreed that the Western press officers should approach the Soviets noting the unsatisfactory state of affairs under the present system for Western

¹ Transmitted in Secto 346 from Geneva, July 17. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1759)

correspondents and suggesting that agreement be reached so that speeches could be released immediately after delivery. In this connection, consideration might be given to pointing out to the Soviets that their present practice was to release Gromyko's statements in Moscow immediately after delivery here. If the Soviets should not agree to this proposal, but suggest that the meetings be advanced to 3:00 p.m., this would be a question which would have to be decided by the Western Ministers.

7. There were three reports given of recent conversations with Soviet officials: (a) Ambassador Reilly, who had dined with Malik yesterday evening, indicated they had had a long and discursive discussion. Malik's attitude was one of discouragement and pessimism. He particularly complained about the sharpness of the exchanges yesterday afternoon between Lloyd and Gromyko. Ambassador Reilly told him that Gromyko's speech of July 13 had seemed to imply a stiffening of the Soviet position. Malik was particularly firm on the subject of the All-German Committee and its necessary link to any temporary arrangement which might be agreed for Berlin. In effect, he said that if the Western Powers could not accept the All-German Committee, then there could be no agreement reached in Geneva, and the Soviets would have to go ahead and sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. Malik also placed some stress on the issue of reducing Western troops in Berlin, particularly emphasizing the subversive activity which he alleged was carried on under cover of the occupation as well as the creation of tension which the Allied forces in Berlin occasioned. On the subject of private meetings, Reilly said he had expressed disappointment about developments on the opening day of the conference. Malik said that the private meetings between the four had always been unsatisfactory to the Soviets and had not been very fruitful anyway. After further prodding by Reilly he finally took the position that there probably would have to be three kinds of meetings during the present phase of the conference: Plenary sessions, smaller sessions at the UN Palais with six countries present and quadripartite luncheons, dinners and teas.

(b) Laloy reported on an exchange which he had had yesterday with Groubyakov. Groubyakov had likewise attached great importance to the All-German Committee. He indicated that the Soviets might be flexible regarding the time period and perhaps even on the question of parity, but the creation of an All-German Committee was indispensable.

(c) Hancock reported on a discussion which he and Rumbold had had with Malik yesterday at the Palais. Malik said he had been drawing up a paper comparing the Western and the Soviet positions. Hancock indicated that the British were likewise preparing such a paper. Malik's reaction was "Splendid, why don't you give me a copy of it." Hancock indicated that he thought that this might provide a basis for a fruitful

exercise, but noted that Malik had not offered to provide the British with his paper. (After some discussion in the Coordinating Group, the general consensus was that provision of such a paper to the Soviets probably involved more disadvantages than advantages, particularly because it would put the Soviets in the position of being able to split the differences between the two extreme positions.)

8. The British Delegation distributed two papers: (a) A comparison of the Western and Soviet positions, and (b) Some questions which might be put to Mr. Gromyko in connection with this comparison.² There was some discussion of these papers and a number of changes were suggested by the American, French and German representatives present.

9. The Germans distributed a new paper³ which the Ambassador described as a summary of the ideas of Foreign Minister von Brentano as reformulated in the light of discussions of the past few days (he did not mention any discussions with the Chancellor as being among those which had contributed to this reformulation).

² Neither found.

³ Not found.

444. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 16, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 336. Paris pass USRO. Twenty-first Plenary Session July 16, 3:40–7:05 pm. Lloyd Chairman.

Begin summary. Secretary opened with detailed examination West-ern proposal of June 16 re Berlin and request that Soviets discuss it seriously (Secto 331).¹ Lloyd then assessed respective West and Soviet

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–1659. Official Use Only. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/21 (Corrected), July 16, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1389.

¹ Dated July 16. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1659) For text of Herter's statement and the other statements referred to below, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 419–438, 555–559, and 589–592. Most of these statements are also printed in *Cmd. 868*, pp. 262–275 and 335–342. Herter's statement is also printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, August 3, 1959, pp. 150–153.

positions on elements on interim Berlin agreement. Asked Gromyko to correct him if wrong in describing Soviet position.

Gromyko regretted lack of Western support for Soviet proposals re Berlin and discussed Soviet June 19 proposals along familiar lines. Said Lloyd had apparently summed up on basis what Gromyko had not said rather than what he had said.

After Couve noted Gromyko had answered his questions of yesterday re all-German committee and expressed his concern at answers, Bolz stated Soviet proposals re Berlin had full support of GDR and argued along familiar lines for all-German committee.

Grewe attacked linking of all-German committee and Berlin settlement and pointed out differences between Western proposal for mixed committee and Soviet all-German committee, again stating latter would perpetuate division of Germany. Bolz concluded meeting by replying to some of Grewe's points. Date of next meeting left for later agreement. *End summary.*

After Secretary had spoken, Lloyd supported his statement and chided Gromyko for unwillingness discuss Western June 16 proposal which had been put up three days before Soviet proposal. He noted both sides agreed on interim arrangements for Berlin provided these satisfactory. He then gave respective West and Soviet positions re: a) force levels; b) armaments in Berlin; c) activities; d) duration of interim arrangements; e) access; f) situation at end interim arrangements. Lloyd said he understood that during interim period a) no unilateral action would be taken by either side; b) if agreement not reached, four powers would resume discussions and pending results such discussions, situation would remain unaltered. Noted West maintains four powers could continue negotiate in some forum or through diplomatic channels during duration of interim arrangements. Understood Gromyko had said that if either of two Germanies found all-German committee unacceptable, some other way could be found to carry on discussions between two Germanies. Concluded there seemed some elements of flexibility in Soviet position and of agreement between Soviets and West.

Gromyko said conference should discuss concrete matters. Regretted lack Western support for "free city" and June 19 proposals. Emphasized Soviets could not accept perpetuation occupation West Berlin. Reaffirmed that duration interim arrangements relatively unimportant but said Soviets attach importance to reaching agreement on level forces and curtailment subversive activities. Re all-German committee, considered link between it and Berlin problem logical. Confirmed Lloyd's understanding other forum possible but he gathered from press that Federal Republic opposed to any conversations between two Germanies. If this so, all should seek persuade Federal Republic such

conversations necessary to reduce tension and further cause of peace. Gromyko also repeated familiar Soviet position re subjects all-German committee should consider. Could not agree with Secretary that Berlin crisis instigated by Soviets. Re role of U.N., Soviet "free city" proposal contemplated U.N. participation in guarantee of city's status and Soviets could only consider U.N. participation in concrete context. Would wish to know in what U.N. would participate.

[Here follows section 2, not found in Department of State files.]

Herter

445. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 16, 1959, 4 p.m.

Cahto 148. For Dillon from the Secretary. I am disturbed at possible misunderstandings in Defense and State with respect to our negotiating position here owing to fact that position paper¹ which I had discussed with President and which he had approved in general terms had not been discussed with all elements State and Defense. Matter somewhat further confused by analyses from Defense of working paper transmitted by State which I had never seen and which indicated certain alternative fall-back positions which had never received my approval.²

In light this situation, believe it would be desirable have conference between yourself, McElroy and, if possible, President so that clear understanding will be reached among us as to what we conceive our negotiating position here to be.

The position paper in form of draft communiqué given to President shortly after my arrival Washington contained three substantive changes from the paper submitted to the Soviets as the last Allied proposal on June 16. These were:

1. The utilization of a representative of the Secretary General of the UN to report to the SYG on propaganda activities directed at either East

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1659. Secret; Niact.

¹ Attachment B to Document 418.

² Not further identified.

or West Berlin which could be considered interference in internal affairs. This change obviously desirable from our point of view.

2. The creation of a four power committee with German advisers to carry out discussions regarding a German peace treaty, the reunification of Germany, and facilitating interchanges between East and West Germany. This new proposal would have been a counterproposal to the Russian all-German committee. It was approved orally by von Brentano before leaving Geneva and appeared in written form in German working paper³ submitted to three Western Foreign Ministers just before re-assembling here. This item now under cloud because of possibility its being repudiated by Adenauer and French desire that it not be tied in with temporary Berlin settlement but considered as entirely separable item. If the Soviets accept this proposal (which they almost certainly will not) I believe that our position would be strengthened by this reaffirmation of four-power responsibility for German reunification and by bringing to bear West German influence on the East Germans however lacking in confidence in themselves the former may be.

3. A time limit on temporary arrangement regarding Berlin in lieu of latter carrying on until reunification of Germany. In discussing this last point with the President, no specific time was fixed upon but in Russian proposal for time limit Russians when pressed suggested first one year, then year and a half, then said time limit neither important nor matter of principle.

With respect to above changes, there appeared to be question in some people's minds as to whether matters of principle sacrificed or occupational rights forfeited. In discussion with our Allies here, we have made language this paper conform almost identically with wording our offer of June 16. If our language accepted, both our Allies and we convinced no such rights forfeited nor any sacrifice of principle. We are unanimous in conviction no further concessions should be made and are sticking to this.

I also discussed with the President leaving the troop figure blank for summit decision. For negotiating purposes here there would be no acceptance of any reduction, the tactic being to use the present figure of 11,000 or some similar formulation and as a concession agree to leave a blank for consideration by the heads of government.

If there are any doubts as to propriety or wisdom our negotiating position as indicated above, would like to be advised soonest as I am most anxious there should be perfectly clear understanding and agreement on line we are taking.

Herter

³See footnote 1, Document 433.

446. Memorandum of Discussion at the 413th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, July 16, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. *Berlin*

Mr. Gray indicated that Secretary Dillon would report to the Council on the progress, or lack of progress, in Tripartite Berlin Contingency Planning.

Secretary Dillon comments that with respect to such planning a great deal of work has been done. On these plans there has been a wide area of agreement at the working level but very few final agreements. The most serious problem was planning with respect to surface access to Berlin. On this subject the British have had second thoughts based on a conversation that Foreign Minister Lloyd thought he had had with Secretary Herter. In any event, the British had not approved the basic paper on this subject at the governmental level. There had likewise been no approval on the surface access plan by the French but we believe this was simply that President de Gaulle had been away from Paris for some time.

Secretary Dillon also indicated that we had undertaken negotiations with Pan American Airlines to provide war risk insurance which could come into effect if the Soviets withdrew their personnel from the Berlin Air Safety Center. Similar negotiations are being undertaken by the U.K. authorities with the British European Airways and by the French with Air France. In this connection Secretary Dillon briefly explained the various proposals for communicating flight information to the East Germans without becoming involved in direct communication with them. In this context he noted that there had been no recommendations as yet from General Norstad's "Live Oak" with respect to this problem.

Turning to the so-called Quiet Precautionary Measures, Secretary Dillon said that a number of such measures had been initiated but so far without much effect on the Soviets. The U.S. has accordingly proposed

additional measures, but there has been no response from the U.K. and France on these additional measures. The British did not seem to want to plan for further eventualities until after the obvious failure of the initial probe of Soviet intentions in blocking Allied access to Berlin. On the other hand, the Three Powers had reached an agreement as to action in the United Nations.

With respect to the so-called Economic Counter-Measures or Counter-Harassments, a Tripartite study had reached the conclusion that none of these proposed measures was likely to be effective.

In sum, Secretary Dillon found the situation somewhat unsatisfactory. The British were apparently convinced that there was going to be a summit conference and were therefore much inclined to drag their feet with respect to contingency planning.

Expressing surprise, the President inquired whether a summit meeting was supposed to guarantee a satisfactory solution of the Berlin problem. He stated that he could not understand why the possibility of a summit conference should be permitted to stop contingency planning on Berlin.

In reply Secretary Dillon said that the British apparently felt that the Soviets would not take any unilateral action with respect to Berlin prior to a summit meeting and the British also seemed to feel that a summit conference will manage to accomplish something which will prevent such unilateral Soviet action.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that this discussion reminded him that he had intended to comment briefly on the state of Premier Khrushchev's health. The intelligence community has concluded that Khrushchev is very tired but that he comes back quickly. There was doubt, therefore, if anything dramatic was likely to happen to the Soviet leader.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Acting Secretary of State.

Marion W. Boggs

447. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, July 17, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SMALL STAFF MEETING

PRESENT

The Secretary	Mr. Smith
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Irwin
Mr. Reinhardt	Mr. Stimpson
Mr. Berding	Ambassador Bruce ¹
Mr. Becker	Rear Admiral Dudley

Luncheon Meeting Today

1. In preparation for the luncheon meeting of the four Foreign Ministers today, Mr. Merchant said that it might be necessary at the meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers this morning to slow down Selwyn Lloyd who wants to plunge ahead. Mr. Merchant also recommended that we try to get agreement that the wording in any document refer to "not increasing" troop strength in Berlin and only as a last concession agree on leaving this blank. The Germans, both here and in Bonn, now seem agreed on the plan for a Four-Power Commission with German advisors. However, Mr. Merchant continued, as far as we know, the French are still opposed and we should try to get Couve's agreement to such a commission.

The Secretary agreed with Mr. Merchant's recommendation that after the meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers today the revised version of the Draft Communiqué² should be sent to Washington. The Secretary speculated that the French may wish to check whether the second German paper³ (given us on July 16) represents Adenauer's views.

Developments in Germany

2. Ambassador Bruce recommended that the Secretary have a frank private discussion with von Brentano in the next few days with the fewest advisors possible present. The Secretary agreed this would be a useful step.

Mr. McCloy had told Ambassador Bruce that Adenauer was irritated with Macmillan because it had been reported that Macmillan had called him "a tiresome old man." Ambassador Bruce added that the British think the Germans are relying too heavily on the blocking power of the French in Geneva.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 350, CF 1390. Secret. The meeting was held in Conference Room 209 of the Consulate General Annex.

¹ Bruce was in Geneva for consultations July 16 and 17.

² See Document 453.

³ Not found.

Visit to Berlin

3. Several possibilities were mentioned regarding the timing of the Secretary's visit to Berlin but no agreement was reached. Ambassador Bruce recommended against a stop in Bonn on this trip. He added that the Berliners are apprehensive that we will make concessions here beyond those they believe we have already made.

Press Developments

4. Mr. Berding said that Soviet briefer Kharlamov had said that five of the six participants yesterday had displayed a better understanding of the problems facing the conference. Dr. Grewe was the exception. Kharlamov called attention to what he described as a new point in the Secretary's statement, namely, that we were willing to discuss all methods of unification including the Soviet proposals. He described Lloyd as showing more flexibility.

There was a general discussion of Mr. Berding's proposal that something be said to the press after each private meeting of the Ministers, including today's luncheon. The Secretary expressed the view that any statements on substance might wreck the private meetings. He thought a background press conference might occasionally be useful.

Occupation Rights

5. Mr. Irwin was disturbed by Gromyko's clear statement yesterday that the Soviets would, under no circumstances, accept the perpetuation of the occupation regime in Berlin. He believed it would be futile to reach agreement on details, such as troops and propaganda, and then be faced with a denial of our basic rights. The Secretary thought this point might be discussed at the meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers today, noting that it will become acute when we get down to discussing the actual wording of any document. The Secretary was skeptical of the possibility of reaching an agreement on troop strength in Berlin or on propaganda control, the latter because the Soviets will never accept a reciprocal agreement in this regard. The Secretary agreed with Mr. Merchant that it was interesting that Gromyko had not mentioned the most important question of all—access to Berlin.

In a discussion of the question of the control of propaganda, Mr. Becker said that the British and French have now accepted the use of the phrase "in and about Berlin", but the British have only done so as a bargaining point.

The Secretary hoped it would be possible to get Gromyko to discuss point by point our June 16 paper, something he has avoided doing thus far.

**448. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 17, 1959, 2 p.m.

Secto 338. Moscow for the Ambassador. Four Western Foreign Ministers met this morning to discuss tactics for today's luncheon meeting with Gromyko. It was agreed to endeavor to direct conversation to Western June 16 paper, but not to bring up proposal for four power commission. Lloyd said he would like to pick up his statement of yesterday comparing Western and Soviet positions. Couve stressed importance of concentrating on principal issues which he listed as time limit, situation at end of period and all-German committee in order to avoid appearance of West blocking an agreement almost achieved. In discussion of relative importance of several issues, Secretary pointed out that question of access, although it might seem less important an issue in interim agreement than it would be if separate German peace treaty were signed, was in fact particularly important on civil side. In fact it offered only opportunity we might have to improve Berlin situation from our point of view.

Grewe reaffirmed Bonn's unwillingness to agree to any arrangement which called for direct discussion between East and West Germans but reaffirmed Bonn's support of proposal for four power commission. Couve, however, demonstrated reluctance to accept even this formula and took up willingly Lloyd's idea that thought should be given to a possible formula for keeping present conference in being in some form as alternative to four power commission proposal. Lloyd undertook to prepare something along this line, and it was agreed that four power commission proposal would not be raised with Gromyko until Ministers reached a decision concerning possible alternatives.

Baraduc (French Press Officer) reported that Kharlamov (Soviet Press Officer) had asked him at what time he should appear at French residence following luncheon in accordance with past practice at private meetings. It was noted that this revealed Gromyko's decision that today's luncheon would in effect mark resumption of private meetings.

Couve and Grewe reported that correspondents were talking about a new US draft. It was agreed to tell press that there were many papers and to deny that any specific paper, US or otherwise, was subject of particular attention of Ministers.

Herter

449. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 17, 1959, 10 p.m.

Secto 345. Eyes only for Ambassadors at Moscow, Paris, London and Bonn; and eyes only for Gufler Berlin. Subject: Private session.

After lunch today with Couve there was two-hour discussion with Gromyko which proved to be totally unsatisfactory.¹ Secretary was accompanied by Merchant and Reinhardt; Couve by Lucet and Laloy; Lloyd by Reilly and Hancock; and Gromyko by Zorin and Soldatov. Conversation was entirely in English and Gromyko while completely intransigent was amiable throughout.

Gromyko made perfectly clear that Soviets now insist on Western agreement to some form of all-German negotiations as condition for interim Berlin settlement. He consistently parried all attempts by Couve, Lloyd and Secretary to elicit clear statement as to Soviet reason for link between these two matters by stating, as he has in plenary sessions to date, that link is logical and real.

He stated that while Soviets are prepared to consider other forms of all-German collaboration it is essential that German negotiations be conducted independently and not to "control or protection" of four powers. He invited West to submit alternative proposals re negotiating body if Soviet suggestion for all-German committee unacceptable.

Gromyko rebuffed repeated efforts, particularly by Secretary and Lloyd, to ascertain correct interpretation of duration aspect of Soviet June 19 proposal by insisting that Soviet statements in this connection perfectly clear and only Soviet interpretation should be relied on. At one point, Lloyd repeated his summation (given July 16 plenary) of his understanding of Soviet and Western positions on various aspects of possible interim Berlin settlement—troop levels, weapons, activities, duration, and access. With regard to duration, he gave as his interpretation of Soviet position that end of fixed period FonMins would resume negotiations and that pending result thereof situation would remain unchanged and neither side would take unilateral action; he then put specific question to Gromyko as to whether this a correct interpretation. Gromyko brushed off latter inquiry by saying Soviet position was as expressed (as he did throughout meeting) and re other aspects said no

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1759. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ A detailed seven-page memorandum of this conversation, US/MC/133, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1341.

understanding existed except possibly on weapons. In any case, he added, all aspects interlinked and impossible for Soviets to take position on one without reaching understanding on whole package. He then dismissed subject by reverting to his oft-repeated demand for discussion of all-German negotiations.

Gromyko agreed to Lloyd's suggestion that FonMins lunch with him Monday and hold plenary Tuesday.

After Gromyko's departure Secretary discussed with Couve and Lloyd the significance of present Soviet intertransigence. Couve's reaction was that we should not subject ourselves further to such insulting treatment by Gromyko and that we should bring negotiations to a close. He said it was perfectly clear to him now that the Soviets are interested solely in German question and are exploiting West's concern over Berlin in order enhance status of GDR by bringing two Germanies together on an equal basis. In his view if we should agree any such arrangement we would inevitably contribute to the weakening of West Germany which would mean a real danger of war which does not exist now. Lloyd, obviously somewhat disturbed by Couve's reaction, suggested Ministers should ponder on it overnight and meet tomorrow at 11 am in an effort further to assess the significance of the present Soviet position and estimate where to go from here.

Herter

450. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) and the German Ambassador (Grewe)

US/MC/130

Geneva, July 17, 1959, 6:30 p.m.

**MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959**

SUBJECT

Four-Power Commission

Grewe came to see me last night at his request. His main point was that he thinks it essential Mr. Herter should at the first opportunity and

in strong terms reject the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee. He feels the Soviets are under the impression that we have an open mind on this. He also feels that the Soviets may misunderstand the relative politeness and moderation of the Western Foreign Ministers in their conduct of debate with Gromyko. He confirmed that the Germans will accept (Adenauer has specifically approved yesterday) the concept of a four-power commission with German advisers attached. It was clear there is the proviso, however, that this should not be merely a device to lock the two German delegations in a room together. I said my own concept was that on reunification and the principles of the peace treaty the four-power commission would formulate their views, calling on the two delegations of advisers to speak or submit memoranda as the four powers considered helpful, and that remissions to the advisers by the commission for joint proposals should be confined to such technical matters as freedom of movement, etc. In any event, I said that if the Soviets accepted a four-power commission proposal, which I greatly doubted, I did not think it would be necessary here to get into a debate on the exact terms of reference of the commission. I referred to the difficulty we have in feeling that there is any consistency or reliability in positions taken by the German delegation here. He was guarded in what he said, but he did not disguise his own unhappiness or the source of the difficulty.

451. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 17, 1959, 8 p.m.

Cahto 149. For the President from the Secretary.

“Dear Mr. President:

I feel you should know that the conference today has taken what I consider a serious turn for the worse. This may of course be standard Soviet tactics or Gromyko may have instructions to stonewall until some particular scheduled event in Poland or even the Vice President’s arrival in Moscow. There is no doubt however but that the Soviet position has hardened since the recess. This afternoon Gromyko was not only obstructive but objectionable in the talk we had in private session following Couve’s luncheon.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1759. Secret; Niact.

¹ See Document 449.

All three of us did our best to pin him down on what our position would be with respect to our rights at the expiration of any temporary agreement on Berlin. All that Gromyko was interested in talking about was the all-German committee which he had proposed, or some variant of it which would maintain its essential features of forcing the Federal Republic to deal directly with the DDR as an equal, thereby enhancing the latter's prestige and in fact taking the first step toward the type of confederation which the Soviets advocate.

Every time (and it must have happened a dozen times) Selwyn or Couve or I asked Gromyko in what respect was the interpretation which we had placed on his statements on our rights incorrect Gromyko gave us one of two replies. Either he said without acknowledging the question "Let us now discuss the all-German committee" or he said "The Soviet Union has made itself entirely clear on this matter." Although his manner was polite and almost genial the net impression was close to insulting. Couve feels that we are approaching the break-up of the conference which does not unduly distress him and Selwyn is depressed. I think myself it is too early to judge but I did want to send you a word of warning on the way things seem to be going. Mac and I are lunching alone with Mr. and Mrs. Gromyko tomorrow and we will have another quadripartite luncheon meeting on Monday after which we should know more. We also have agreed to a plenary for Tuesday afternoon.

Faithfully, signed: Chris."

Herter

452. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter at Geneva

Washington, July 17, 1959, 5:23 p.m.

Tocah 151. Re Cahto 148.¹ I discussed reftel with McElroy who first pointed out in friendly fashion that neither he nor anyone in Defense had had any knowledge of position paper which you had discussed with the President.² He expressed the hope that in future the mechanism

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/7-1759. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dillon and cleared by Murphy, Kohler, Calhoun, and Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

¹ Document 445.

² See attachment B, Document 418.

for State–Defense coordination would work more effectively through the normal channel of Irwin or Knight. He then said he had no difference with substantive portions of reftel but would like to point out in connection with Item 3 that in deciding whether to agree to any moratorium, and if so of what duration, we should bear in mind JCS views regarding relative situation at end of moratorium.³

This morning after Cabinet McElroy and I discussed matter briefly with the President and informed him of JCS views regarding situation at end of a possible moratorium. There was full agreement that this JCS view should not be considered overriding and that since other considerations pointed to a moratorium as probably the best that could be gotten at this stage it should be considered an acceptable result.

We have some trouble with your paragraph 3 because time limit on the Russian proposal and the time limit on ours seem to be blended in a manner which could be misleading and in the end justify a Russian pretension that they relate to an agreed time limit on our rights.

All interested elements in Dept otherwise in full agreement with reftel on the understanding that time limit referred to in para 3 refers to our suggestions of moratorium at end of which there would be no diminution in basic rights rather than to original Soviet proposal regarding a time limit which we consider to be a horse of quite a different color.

Also with respect to second section of paragraph 3, you say that in discussion with our Allies we have made language in this paper conform almost identically with wording our offer June 16. We, of course, are not able to comment on this, as we have not been provided with the changes of text.

Dillon

³ The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the strategic situation would be less favorable for the United States in 1961–1962 than in 1959.

453. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 18, 1959, 3 p.m.

Secto 350. Following is current version of draft communiqué prepared in Department prior departure of delegation including changes made as result discussions here in Western Deputies Coordinating Group. Draft not approved by Foreign Ministers. While copies distributed to coordinating group, all of these collected at end of meeting. Although existence this document has apparently become known to press, knowledge its contents still being tightly held. *Begin text*—

I. The Foreign Ministers agreed on the following proposals:

(A) That a Four-Power Standing Commission be established, which will make arrangements for the cooperation of German advisers, to continue the discussion of the German problem.

(B) That the Commission discuss concrete measures for the reunification of Germany, with free elections at an appropriate stage in the process, and principles for a peace treaty with Germany. The advisers will be requested to prepare proposals for the extension and development of technical contacts between the two parts of Germany and the free movement of persons, ideas and publications between the two parts of Germany.

(C) Unless agreement has been reached on plans for reunification and for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany at an earlier date, the Foreign Ministers will reconvene at the end of (blank) years to continue their discussion of these subjects.

II. With respect to Berlin, the Foreign Ministers recognized that, pending reunification, the existing situation and the agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respects and have consequently agreed upon the following:

(A) The Soviet Foreign Minister has made known the decision of the Soviet Government no longer to maintain forces in Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that it is the intention of their governments to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the present figure (approximately 11,000) and to continue to arm these forces only with conventional weapons. The three Ministers further declare that their governments will from time to time consider the possibility of reducing such forces if developments in the situation permit.

(B) Free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western powers stationed in Berlin, will be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959. Freedom of movement will continue to be maintained between East and West Berlin. All disputes which might arise with respect to access will be raised and settled between the four governments. The latter will establish a Quadripartite Commission which will meet in Berlin to examine in the first instance any difficulties arising in connection with access and will seek to settle such difficulties. The Commission may make arrangements to consult German experts as necessary.

(C) Measures will be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in or about Berlin which might either disrupt public order or seriously affect the rights of others. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be requested to provide a representative, supported by adequate staff, to be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city for the purpose of reporting to the Secretary General any propaganda activities in or about Berlin which appear to be in conflict with the foregoing principles. The four governments will consult with the Secretary General in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken in respect to any such report.

(D) The arrangement specified in sub-paragraphs (A) through (C) above will remain in effect until reunification of Germany provided that, in the absence of reunification, or agreed plans for reunification, the Foreign Ministers will meet at the end of (blank) years to review these arrangements. *End text.*

Following is possible alternative formulation along lines original communiqué draft for last three sentences paragraph II (B) dealing with access: *Begin text*—

(All disputes which might arise with respect to access will be raised and settled between the four governments except that a resident four-power commission will be established in Berlin which will in the first instance consider any difficulties arising in connection with access and will seek to settle such difficulties. The commission may make arrangements to consult German experts as necessary.) *End text.*

Herter

454. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 18, 1959, 7 p.m.

Secto 353. Eyes only for Ambassadors at Moscow, Paris, London, Bonn and eyes only Gufler Berlin. Western Foreign Ministers met this morning at Villa les Ormeaux to discuss present state of conference and tactics for next meetings. It was agreed to submit at earliest plenary session proposal for extension of present Geneva Conference under no time limit as counter-proposal to Soviet all-German committee plan. It was also agreed ultimately to accept time limit of not less than two and a half years in interim arrangement for Berlin.

At outset of meeting Secretary expressed his concern at appearance West was abandoning overall German problem as well as his concern at Gromyko's implied interpretation that US was not squarely opposed to all-German committee. The Secretary expressed his desire to make firm statements on both counts at next plenary session. In discussion of problem posed by Gromyko's apparent adamant stand on all-German committee, Lloyd observed that conference could not be permitted to break down on question of contacts between Germans and submitted draft of possible Western proposal¹ to counter Soviet position. Couve saw no purpose of trying to do anything with respect to elements interim Berlin settlement until this preliminary question was solved. He thought that if conference failed, it would be on this point and not on such questions as propaganda in Berlin or level of troops there. Issue was simply that under Berlin threat Soviets were trying to force on us their solution for Germany as a whole.

It was agreed that this problem of linkage and all-German committee was both important and difficult from public relations point of view and that therefore proposal should be tabled in plenary session as soon as possible. To this end it was also agreed to seek Gromyko's agreement to advance next plenary from Tuesday to Monday (Gromyko subsequently agreed). Lloyd's proposal as amended by Ministers reads as follows: "The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers as at present constituted shall continue in being for the purpose of considering the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1859. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

¹ Lloyd's draft has not been found.

German problem as a whole. It should also consider questions relating to the extension and development of contacts between the two parts of Germany. For these purposes the conference shall meet from time to time at such level and at such place as are agreed. The conference may also make special arrangements for the consideration of particular questions arising out of its terms of reference as defined above."

Couve thought it was highly important to clarify Gromyko's understanding of Western position not only on question of Germany as a whole but also on the issue of linkage and of a time limit for interim Berlin solution. He pointed out that Ministers were compelled to take decision on this question of time limit since otherwise it was not realistic to endeavor both to deny linkage between interim Berlin solution and German problem and to stick to terms of July 16 paper which called for interim period to run until reunification. Accordingly, he asked whether Ministers were prepared to accept time limit on interim Berlin solution. Secretary replied he was prepared provided agreement was completely clear that at end of period Western rights in Berlin would not be impaired. He thought period should not be less than 30 months and that for bargaining purposes we should probably start with figure of not less than five years. It was noted that public opinion had already pretty much accepted the concept of time limit for Berlin interim solution. Secretary observed that drafting of language to cover second Berlin phase would be particularly difficult.

Secretary raised question of his visit to Berlin for purpose of dedication street to John Foster Dulles and said he was considering making a visit on Saturday, July 25, if convenient and agreeable to his colleagues. There was no objection.

Couve announced that he would be absent in Paris Wednesday morning for Cabinet meeting but would return to Geneva by 2 p.m. There was some discussion of problem of reporting to NATO latest developments and Ministers welcomed Lloyd's offer to accompany Couve to Paris on Wednesday and appear before NATO Council that morning.

Herter

**455. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 18, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 352.

After social luncheon today Gromyko took me into separate room and said had one or two matters discuss. Before he started I raised with him two questions:

1. Moving forward plenary session from Tuesday to Monday at 4:00 p.m., so that it would follow our private luncheon session. This suggestion followed his own thought we should wind up talks and get down to concrete cases. (Western Foreign Ministers had agreed best to have plenary Monday afternoon in order advance time of formal tabling of proposal for continuation Foreign Ministers talks at lower level reported in Secto 353.)¹

2. I then mentioned possibility my going Berlin this coming Saturday saying trip to be in connection with dedication Foster Dulles Street. Gromyko volunteered that such a trip would be considered provocative and would certainly be understood as political gesture having bearing on present discussions, however, he said if I were determined to go nothing he could do about it. I told him I would probably go but no final decision had been reached but would advise him when decision made.

Gromyko then raised the question to which I tried to get an answer at conference yesterday, namely, an understanding that if temporary agreement reached in Berlin and were followed by further session Foreign Ministers none of existing rights or obligations under quadripartite occupation would have been abrogated by interim arrangement Berlin. Gromyko said that he would try to give as clear an answer as he could, namely, the following: Soviet Government would sign no agreement of any kind which would perpetuate occupation rights Berlin. However, Soviet Government on its part would not require any statement on part Western Foreign Ministers that such rights abrogated by temporary agreement. In other words, rights as such should not be mentioned. However, as Foreign Minister talking to Foreign Minister, he could assure me no unilateral action would be taken during interim arrangement nor during negotiations following such arrangement. This was as far as he authorized to go. Am now consulting legal talent delegation to see how above is interpreted. Would be glad to have Department's views.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1859. Secret; Limit Distribution.

¹ Document 454.

Gromyko then raised question all-German committee. He again expressed himself vehemently on fact Adenauer refusal discuss German problems with East Germans. He said only US had influence with Adenauer and could persuade him to change his mind. He said he laid such store in necessity of agreement for all-German talks that he doubted whether any Berlin interim agreement could be reached without satisfactory understanding this point. He then said he would, of course, await with interest what Western powers had to suggest since we had told him yesterday we would consider possible alternatives. I gave no indication of nature alternate proposal we had discussed this morning. In addition to his insistence on all-German committee, he repeated his now familiar arguments on necessary link between time limit for all-German committee to report and time limit on temporary status Berlin arrangements. With respect to this latter point, he was not as vehement as in talks yesterday.

My impression is that Gromyko would like to have extended his bilateral conversations covering entire area matters under previous consideration at the conference. I felt this impossible without my Western colleagues and so begged to be excused after some forty-five minutes conversation.

Herter

456. Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers did not meet on Sunday, July 19.

**457. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 20, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 362. Eyes only Ambassadors. Berlin eyes only Gufler. Subject: Private Session.

In hour-long informal discussion after Lloyd lunch today for four Foreign Ministers, Lloyd took lead in giving Gromyko preview of

Western proposal for dealing with problem of Germany as a whole (text Secto 553 [353]).¹ While reserving final judgment pending opportunity examine text, Gromyko expressed view proposal unacceptable since it provided for continued four power responsibility on reunification. This concept, Gromyko said, is contrary to Soviet position that this must be worked out only by Germans themselves, a position which is supported by present factual situation. Lloyd and Couve argued that acceptable solution could not prejudice either side's fundamental positions and that West proposal, with its built-in flexibility on negotiating procedures, met this requirement. Gromyko, however, denied this, pointing out that essence of West proposal is to preserve four power responsibility for reunification which unacceptable to Soviets. The Secretary commented that Gromyko's attitude means basic change in Soviet position since 1955 when Bulganin recognized four power responsibility for reunification by signature of heads of government directive² and asked what had changed in situation to warrant this reversal of Soviet position. Gromyko replied that Soviets and West placed different interpretation on directive and this an old story. The Secretary then asked if, as apparent from Gromyko's remarks, agreement on this point depends on West's acceptance of Soviet position and if Soviets, as Gromyko said in Friday's private meeting, refuse discuss elements of interim Berlin solution until agreement reached, is it Gromyko's view that we should terminate discussions? While not directly responsive to Secretary's inquiry, Gromyko's reply that "He was not saying this" could be interpreted (and was so interpreted by Lloyd) that Soviet position re discussion of Berlin situation perhaps now somewhat less intransigent than appeared Friday. This was only positive result of meeting, if it can be so described. Lloyd and Couve accepted Gromyko invitation to lunch tomorrow. Secretary declined because previous Red Cross commitment but will join others after lunch. Merchant and Reinhardt will however attend lunch itself. It was also tentatively agreed next plenary will be Wednesday.

Herter

¹ Document 454.

² For text of the Heads of Government Directive to their Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 527–528.

**458. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 20, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 361. Paris pass USRO. Twenty-second Plenary Session July 20, 4:02 to 6:55 pm. Gromyko Chairman.

Begin summary. Secretary opened with statement presenting new Western proposal for continuation Geneva conference (Secto 358).¹ Couve and Lloyd supported it. Lloyd reviewed conference to date, reasserted West must have clear statement re situation at end interim period, voiced objections to all-German committee and noted advantages new Western proposal.

After Bolz emphasized necessity GDR participation in negotiations on basis full equality and supported all-German committee proposal, Grewe said FedRep supported new Western proposal.

Gromyko, in uncompromising statement, emphasized basically different approaches of Soviet and Western proposals and thought new Western proposal unacceptable because its basis entirely different from that of Soviets. Again stated Soviet willingness consider forms for discussions between two Germanies other than all-German committee which were agreeable to all parties but not subject to four power surveillance. Reserved right comment further. Secretary appealed for consideration of principles, not forms of discussions.

Next meeting July 22 at 4 pm. *End summary.*

After Secretary's statement and Couve's very short statement in support, Lloyd briefly reviewed conference to date. Noted both Western proposal June 16 and Soviet proposal June 19 for interim Berlin settlement dealt with same general subjects, e.g., force levels, activities, etc. Important point was fact Gromyko not willing say clearly what would be situation at end interim period. West could not accept blank check on this point. Also said it unreasonable to expect West accept Soviet contention that agreement on all-German committee must precede discussion other points interim Berlin settlement. However, new Western proposals represent attempt go some way to meet Soviet position. Lloyd objected to all-German committee on following grounds: (A) Juridical—would involve de jure recognition of division of Germany;

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2059. Official Use Only. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/22 (Corrected), is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1397.

¹ Dated July 20. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2059) For text of Herter's statement and the other statements described below, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 439-456, 559-560, and 592-596 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 276-289 and 342-346. Herter's statement is also printed in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 672-676, and *Department of State Bulletin*, August 10, 1959, pp. 191-194.

(B) practically no progress could be made if four powers abrogated responsibilities; (C) procedural—Soviet proposal would make possible use of threat and pressure on all-German committee members and on West Berlin people. Lloyd noted new Western proposal was flexible, did not shelve all-German question and provided (in its last sentence) for exploring different ways to make progress.

Bolz spoke next emphasizing necessity for GDR participation on basis full equality in negotiations concerning Germany and supporting all-German committee. Denied Secretary's statement that GDR regime is imposed on people. Suggested possibility establishing six power body, all participants having equal status, to consider concerted views of two other bodies consisting of: (A) Two Germanies; (B) four powers. Stressed necessity setting time limit for deliberations. Said reunification could not be brought about from outside as West proposed. Re contacts between two Germanies, meant fundamental political contacts such as agreement on renunciation of force, rather than technical agreements on railroads, etc.

After Grewe had given FedRep support to new Western proposal, saying it differed only in form from earlier FedRep proposal spoke for itself since position FedRep on peace treaty and reunification well known. Gromyko then said he would speak briefly on proposals Mr. Herter had just put forward, reserving right say more later. Said Western and Soviet proposals envisaged basically different approaches. Soviet propose four powers should assist two Germanies to reach agreement between themselves while West envisages settlement by four powers of German questions with assistance German advisers. Reunification only possible through rapprochement between two Germanies and Soviets proposed all-German committee as form of securing this which would be acceptable to all. Soviets willing consider other forms such as commencement in Geneva of negotiations between GDR and FRG without control or surveillance of four powers. Door not shut to other proposals but new Western proposal does not reflect desire find another acceptable form because its fundamental basis differs from that of Soviet proposal and does not contemplate equality and sovereignty for parties concerned. Gromyko appealed to West to be more flexible in taking into account Soviet views. If differences between social and economic structures of GDR and FRG did not exist there would be no problem of finding proper form of discussion. Therefore, should not dwell on these differences as Secretary had. Wrong to say as Lloyd did that Soviets underestimate importance of reunification. They merely favor realistic approach.

Secretary concluded meeting by noting Gromyko had talked of basic principles and asked for greater flexibility by West in connection with Soviet views. Hoped that principles themselves can be discussed henceforth, not just forms for working out principles.

Herter

459. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting

Washington, July 20, 1959, 2:17 p.m.

Tosec 343. Private sessions. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. Re Secto 352.¹ You certainly have our sympathy in your dealings with Gromyko. These are our comments.

(1) Gromyko's reaction to your reference to the possibility of your visit seems to be standard boiler plate. It is reminiscent of Soviet and GDR objections to West Berlin elections. We are glad you mentioned it in the context you did as this method would be as disarming as anything could. Obviously your trip is a political gesture and we would hope its effect on your present discussions would be useful. Gromyko's remarks seem to us to make visit mandatory.

(2) We find that Gromyko has surpassed himself when, after stating (Para. 2) the Soviet Government would sign no agreement of any kind which would perpetuate occupation rights, he adds "Soviet Government on its part would not require any statement on part Western Foreign Ministers that such rights abrogated by temporary agreement" then summarizes "in other words, rights as such should not be mentioned."

This statement illuminates further Soviet tactics to develop an accumulation of words out of which later will emerge as a result of repetition of distorted interpretation a false impression we have agreed on a terminal point for our rights. In view this, silence on subject seems clearly unacceptable.

It might be well to say to Gromyko that looking over your notes of this part of your conversation you believe you must have misunder-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1859. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Murphy and Kohler, cleared with Calhoun, and approved by Dillon.

¹ Document 455.

stood, or there must have been an error of translation if he spoke in Russian. You could add that surely he would not state this in terms of a Soviet requirement. We could not recognize that. We are discussing a matter of our rights. These we intend to mention whenever we consider it necessary. It would be in the general interest of both sides not to lend ourselves to equivocation.

In any event, Soviet position expressed by Gromyko makes us feel irreducible minimum would be explicit Western statement re retention of rights until Germany reunified and of continuing Western determination maintain these rights at any cost.

Re Secto 353² proposal for extension present Geneva conference seems to us a good move. Couve's analysis of problem (last sentence para 2) struck us as particularly simple, lucid statement of basic issue.

Dillon

² Document 454.

460. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/137

Geneva, July 21, 1959, 11 a.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Stoessel

France

M. Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand

SUBJECT

Discussion of Western Summit Meeting; British-West German Relations

The Secretary queried Couve as to his views concerning the desirability of a Western Summit meeting in the event that the present Ge-

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1341. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel and approved by Stimpson on July 23. In addition to the Summit meeting the Foreign Ministers also discussed Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. Memoranda of conversation for these topics, US/MC/138, 139, and 142, are *ibid*.

neva Conference adjourns or breaks up without positive results. Couve replied that such a meeting might be a good idea, but that it should not be held immediately following a breakup of the present conference. Perhaps it could be held just before the reconvening of the UN General Assembly on September 14. However, Couve did not know how this would fit into British planning concerning elections, and he realized that it also might present some difficulties for the President's schedule, particularly in connection with the termination of the Congressional session.

Couve went on to say that he thought a Western Summit meeting could be held in Paris and that this would be especially desirable since it would provide an opportunity for talks between the President and de Gaulle. Couve thought that such talks should be held before the fall and that they represent a means of beginning to get out of our present difficulties.

Couve added that Adenauer also would like a Western Summit meeting. Perhaps this would present an opportunity for a smoothing over of difficulties between Adenauer and Macmillan. Couve wondered what the basic reasons might be for the differences between the United Kingdom and Germany; he thought they might be based on personal divergence between Adenauer and Macmillan.

The Secretary suggested that economic considerations might be at the root of the problem. He said that British sensitivity with regard to economic actions which might affect their own existence is very great.

Mr. Merchant commented that an additional reason might be that the wounds left by World War II have not completely healed in Great Britain. This was particularly evident in the Heuss visit,¹ and politicians are quick to note such things.

Couve concluded the discussion by saying that economic considerations also affect French relations with the United Kingdom, but not to such an extent as pertains to the German-UK relationships. Couve was inclined to think that much of the trouble lay in the fact that Adenauer is an old man who is inclined to be very suspicious. Adenauer seems to believe that there is some secret agreement between Macmillan and Khrushchev. The French have tried to dissipate these worries on Adenauer's part, Couve said, but without success.

¹ President Heuss made a State visit to the United Kingdom beginning October 20, 1958.

461. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 21, 1959, noon.

Cahto 156. For the President from the Secretary.

Dear Mr. President:

Last Friday night I expressed in my message to you¹ my feeling that Gromyko's post-recess attitude did not augur well for any tangible progress at this conference. Results of yesterday's meetings confirm and deepen this impression. As you know, after a protracted period of coordination with our Allies we presented yesterday to Gromyko first in private and then in plenary our counter-proposal to his unacceptable all-German committee.² In essence it constitutes a continuing in being of this conference without time limit as at present constituted with German advisers and permitting appointment of Deputies to carry on negotiations. This basic formula is as far as we can go. Neither the West Germans nor we ourselves can contemplate according the DDR the type of recognition inherent in the Soviet proposal. Yesterday Bolz of DDR flatly rejected our formulation and Gromyko for all practical purposes did the same although he reserved his right to comment definitively after further study of our proposal.

In light Gromyko's continuing insistence we accept his all-German committee concept as condition precedent even to any further discussion interim Berlin arrangement. We face complete impasse unless Gromyko abandons his insistence on link between two problems or recedes from his all-German position sufficiently to accept our formulation or some variant of it which would still preserve our essentials on this point.

Of course even if Gromyko should shift his position on the all-German committee the negotiation on Berlin is still in a completely unsatisfactory position. As you will recall Gromyko since we returned to Geneva has repeatedly refused to answer our questions concerning the position of our rights at the end of any agreed interim period. His "Foreign Minister to Foreign Minister" assurance to me at my lunch with him Saturday is of course worthless.³ Moreover apart from the question of rights he has given no indication of agreeing with any of our other basic positions on Berlin other than the continued arming of our garrisons only with conventional weapons.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2159. Secret; Niact.

¹ See Document 451.

² See Documents 457 and 458.

³ See Document 455.

Under these circumstances I plan if you approve to say to Gromyko privately in the next day or two after informing Couve, and von Brentano and Selwyn that in light his attitudes end of road for this conference now clearly in sight and ask his views on how we can quickly bring sterile meeting to adjournment in fashion which would minimize resultant and inevitable increase in tensions. If in fact Soviet position adamant then I consider it in our interests to move rapidly to orderly conclusion. In self-respect we cannot continue this performance indefinitely and to do so for more than a few more days in conference's existing posture carries in my judgment serious risk that Soviets will interpret our inexhaustible patience as evidence of weakness and anxiety. On other hand if Gromyko is maintaining stonewall attitude for tactical reasons my contemplated approach to him would I believe be equally well designed to produce some movement on his part. Germans and French I am sure will enthusiastically support such an initiative by me. Selwyn will express serious doubts but I do not think that in the end he will oppose it.

I recognize complication in timing of my proposed approach to Gromyko and Vice President's trip.⁴ However if we do not make some such move promptly I believe Gromyko is likely to stall here until after Vice President's departure from Russia in belief Nixon despite public statements to contrary will in fact bear message from you affecting proceedings here. My approach to Gromyko I believe could be usefully reinforced by Vice President in first substantive discussion with Khrushchev impressing on him firmness of our position and seriousness of our intent to wind up conference if present Soviet positions at Geneva are in fact their last words.

Needless to say if this combined approach produces no change in present Soviet position we will have no choice but to recess or terminate this conference with consequent effect on prospects of a summit conference and over British misgivings or objection. Subject of summit incidentally had never come up here in any discussions with Gromyko.

I would appreciate your guidance.

Faithfully yours, Chris.

Herter

⁴For documentation on the Vice President's visit to Moscow to open the U.S. exhibit at the Sokolniki Fair, see vol. X, Part 1, Documents 92 ff.

**462. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 21, 1959, midnight.

Secto 373. Embassies Moscow, Paris, London, Bonn—eyes only Ambassador. US Mission Berlin—eyes only Gufler. Subject: Private Session.

In almost two hour discussion after Gromyko's luncheon today, Foreign Ministers went over much the same ground as that covered in yesterday's private session. Couve again argued that Western proposal is not prejudicial to either side's position on responsibility for reunification, but had no visible effect on Gromyko. As at last session, Lloyd underlined the significance of last sentence of Western proposal as insuring possibility of procedural experiments for discussion of all aspects of German problem (contacts, reunification, peace treaty, European security) which could be stressed include negotiating procedures along lines of Soviet proposal for certain of these aspects if both German parties agreed. Gromyko continued adamant in his insistence that reunification could not be responsibility of four powers but must be reserved exclusively for all-German negotiations free of outside control or supervision. While he again called upon Western Foreign Ministers to suggest alternative proposals for Soviet consideration, it was clear from his remarks that such proposals to be acceptable must embrace Soviet concept of all-German responsibility for reunification problem.

Only new element to emerge from this afternoon's discussion was shift in Gromyko's previous position that discussion of all-German negotiations must precede consideration of other issues before conference (meaning Berlin). He now agrees to suspend consideration of German negotiations question and to discuss in "parallel manner" Berlin problem, but insists on returning to former question in due course. Despite persistent probing by the Secretary, Gromyko refused to make clear whether Soviet position now is that achievement of settlement on Berlin problem must be preceded by agreement on all-German negotiations question. The Secretary, seconded by Lloyd and Couve, put following specific question to Gromyko: "Can we infer from your remarks that no agreement is possible on Berlin problem without prior concurrence in Soviet demand that arrangements be made for negotiations between

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2159. Secret; Limit Distribution. According to a nine-page detailed memorandum of the conversation, US/MC/144, this meeting followed a 1 p.m. luncheon. Secretary Herter joined the meeting at 2:30 p.m., after a separate luncheon engagement, but participated in all substantive discussion. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1341)

two German states?" Gromyko replied that this may be Western interpretation of his remarks, for which he could not be held responsible; the Soviet position was as he had expressed it.

After Gromyko had resorted several times to these exasperating evasive tactics, Secretary said he saw little purpose in entering into discussion of Berlin question if on termination thereof Gromyko would then revert to insistence on Western agreement with Soviet position on reunification question before concluding interim settlement of Berlin problem. In short, Secretary said, perhaps we better agree to disagree. When pressed by Lloyd as to whether this also Gromyko's position, Gromyko merely replied this was Secretary's comment, not his.

At one point in conversation, Gromyko, questioned by Lloyd, said that if under Soviet proposal no agreement on reunification reached by Germans at end of prescribed time limit then four powers would meet to discuss peace treaty with two German states. He made clear that if German negotiations produced no formula for reunification within time limit, further discussion of reunification would be useless and world would be obliged to recognize permanent existence of two German states. The Secretary commented that, since there is no possibility that GDR would ever agree to free elections, Soviet formula would thus consign Germans to permanent division of their country without giving them any opportunity to express their wishes in the matter.

At Gromyko's request, Foreign Ministers will meet at plenary session tomorrow at 4:00 p.m.

Herter

463. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 22, 1959, 4 p.m.

Cahto 160. Von Brentano told me in extreme confidence last evening that he is returning to Bonn tomorrow to secure full Cabinet support for project which the Chancellor has already approved. This is offer to conclude bilateral non-aggression treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Timing such offer not yet settled but might be made in matter of days. Germans are clearly worried over warlike and obstructive

image of FedRep Soviets trying here to create and von Brentano indicated his project might be useful in connection with possible break-up this Conference with no result. When asked how FedRep would counter probable request by DDR for similar non-aggression pact he indicated such clearly out of question and any such suggestion could be met by reiteration pledges given by FedRep this general connection at 1954 London–Paris Conferences.¹ Von Brentano gave no clear answer to question as to relation contemplated offer would bear to establishment diplomatic relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia but indicated latter might follow but certainly would not precede treaty offer.

Herter

¹ For documentation on the London and Paris Nine- and Four-Power Conference in October 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. V, pp. 1294 ff.

**464. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State
Herter at Geneva**

Washington, July 21, 1959, 8:39 p.m.

Tocah 165. For the Secretary from the President.

“July 21, 1959

Dear Chris:

Thank you for your report.¹ You certainly are having an unproductive and difficult time with Gromyko. I quite agree that this cannot continue for long. However, I do feel that if we take any action to terminate things this week it would inescapably transfer the burden of negotiation to the Vice President during his meeting with the Soviets over the coming weekend. I see no reason on the other hand why you should not tell Gromyko privately, as I gather you have already intimated to him, that unless the negotiations begin to show more progress in the near future it will not be possible to continue. A two or three days' recess might possi-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/7–2159. Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by the President and approved by Calhoun.

¹ See Document 461.

bly serve to indicate publicly that we are considering terminating the farce. I have just been informed that Menshikov has been in touch with Murphy and apparently has some information to convey. Maybe this will have some bearing on our decision. In any event we should see things more clearly in about a week.

I thought your statement yesterday was excellent.

P.S.: I have just seen Ambassador Menshikov who has verbally given me a rough translation of Khrushchev's reply to my letter which was carried to him by Koslov.² The greater part of the letter is an expression of readiness and even a keen desire to exchange visits. He indicated he would prefer that his visit here should take place after the termination of the hottest part of our weather. However, when he discussed the condition I laid down—namely that there should be some degree of progress at Geneva which would justify a Summit meeting, he simply played the same old record. He thinks there is no virtue in our arguing that without such progress, meetings at the highest level would have no reason and no beneficial result.

Tomorrow the State Department will make a careful translation of the letter and we will start drafting a reply which will, of course, be sent to you for comment before dispatching. We will send it through Menshikov, but Thompson will be provided a copy.

Incidentally, in discussing a possible visit here, he mentioned a period of some ten to fifteen days and observed that it would make little difference to him whether the visit was formal or informal.

As of this moment no real progress is observable.

I think it is important that this whole matter be kept confidential for the time being.

With best regard,

D.E."

Dillon

² A more detailed record of Menshikov's meeting with the President at 6:45 p.m. is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. A draft of the President's letter and Khrushchev's reply, July 21, are printed in vol. X, Part 1, Documents 89 and 91.

465. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 22, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 378. Paris pass USRO. Twenty-third Plenary Session July 22, 4:02 to 5:33 pm, Secretary Chairman. *Begin summary.*

Gromyko rehearsed Soviet proposal for German committee and attacked Western proposal continuing FM conference.¹ Suggested four powers could, while seeking some acceptable form inter-German contacts, conduct parallel discussion Berlin arrangements. Promised no unilateral Soviet action during interim Berlin agreement and negotiations following such agreement.

Secretary attacked Soviet proposal linkage between German unity and Berlin (Secto 377).²

Couve attacked linkage too, and found no comfort in Gromyko's remarks today re what would happen after interim Berlin arrangement.

Next meeting plenary July 23, 3:30 p.m. *End summary.*

Gromyko stressed need for "two German states" coming together (I) to reach agreed German viewpoint re peace treaty, for which four powers bear main responsibility; (II) to discuss unity, which could not be achieved in any other way; (III) to promote inter-German contacts on more than technical problems. Attacked Western proposal for continuing FM conference with German advisers, as involving procedure for four power dictation to Germans on German questions, and as being put forward merely to evade discussion of Soviet proposal. Soviets still hope some method acceptable inter-German discussion can be found, e.g., two German Delegations could begin their contacts at this conference and try to agree on future procedures. Proposals of Dr. Bolz at last plenary³ are sufficiently elastic to create other possibilities, etc. While seeking agreed method of inter-German discussion, four powers could conduct parallel discussion of interim Berlin arrangements to clarify difficulties, possibilities of agreement and to realize such possibilities.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2259. Official Use Only. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/23 (Corrected), is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1394.

¹ For text of this proposal, made by Herter on July 20, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 672–676; Department of State *Bulletin*, August 10, 1959, pp. 191–194; or *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 439–444. For text of Gromyko's statement and the other statements described in this telegram, see *ibid.*, pp. 457–469 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 289–298. The latter does not include Lloyd's statement.

² Secto 377, July 22, transmitted the text of Herter's statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7-2259)

³ See Document 458.

Then said, referring past Lloyd and Herter questions, that during interim agreement on Berlin and during negotiations at Foreign Ministers conference following agreement, Soviets would take no unilateral action if Western powers observed agreement.

Secretary gave prepared statement attacking Soviet proposals for linkage between German committee's consideration of German unification and interim Berlin arrangement.

Couve also attacked relating discussion of all-German question to that of Berlin arrangement, since measures addressed to German question could not be tied to Berlin measures. Also said alternative means of inter-German discussion advanced by Gromyko involved no real difference all-German committee. Said Gromyko's assurance today re unilateral action did not answer question status Western rights after expiration interim agreement Berlin. Would be willing discuss all-German question next meeting.

Lloyd deferred comment Gromyko statement pending consideration.

Herter

466. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 22, 1959, 11:45 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President Nixon
Secretary Dillon
Major Eisenhower

[Here follow three paragraphs discussing various aspects of the Vice President's trip to Moscow; for text, see volume X, Part 1, Document 93.]

The President then described the note he had received from Khrushchev¹ last evening. In his own letter, delivered to Kozlov, the President suggested that if things go well at Geneva, a personal exchange prior to a Summit Meeting might be useful. Khrushchev's reply had

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by John Eisenhower.

¹ See Document 464.

allowed no link between results at Geneva and a Summit Meeting. The President advised Mr. Nixon, however, that he need not take this matter up unless Khrushchev does so himself. The President calculates that the answer to the Kozlov note will not arrive in Moscow before Mr. Nixon because he is studying the matter rather carefully prior to writing. It may arrive before Mr. Nixon leaves. He then read his draft reply to the Khrushchev letter in its present form.²

Mr. Nixon asked if the President desires to link the idea of exchange of visits with the idea of a Summit Meeting. The President said it was more important to link exchange of visits with progress at Geneva and agreed that the prospect of exchange visits is being used as a prod to progress at Geneva. The President's initial idea had been to meet with Khrushchev now to prod the foreign ministers. However, this had been discouraged by his advisors. He told Mr. Nixon that he could stress the adverse psychological effects in the United States of any scheme whereby the President would appear to go to a Summit Meeting under ultimatum.

Mr. Nixon then requested guidance in the event Khrushchev asks for the President's definition of the word "progress." The President said progress would mean assurance of our rights in Berlin, plus the setting up of machinery to study the overall problem. He admitted that this machinery could be amorphous in nature. As an example of the kind he has in mind, the President cited our proposal for a continuation of the meeting of the foreign offices with German advisors. This could be set up by the Foreign Ministers and confirmed that he would like to find soon a reasonable excuse for a Summit Meeting.

² Presumably an earlier draft of the reply referred to in footnote 4, Document 477.

467. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 22, 1959, 5:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Dillon and Murphy
General Goodpaster

Mr. Dillon and Mr. Murphy came in to discuss with the President the latter's draft of a reply to Khrushchev¹ concerning the possibility of

Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 466.

an exchange of visits by him and the President. Mr. Dillon commented that the draft implied that the same preconditions existed for a meeting of Khrushchev with the President as for a summit meeting. The President said this was automatic since his invitation had made such a visit incident to a summit meeting in Quebec.

Mr. Murphy said he had not understood that the two questions were tied together in this way and that in fact what had been conveyed to Khrushchev was an unqualified invitation. The President was extremely disturbed about this. He recalled that he had wanted to have Khrushchev make a quick visit right away, using as the basis a visit to his exhibition in New York, with a day or two of informal discussions thereafter; this would have occurred at a time prior to knowing the outcome of the Geneva discussions, and would have been independent of their success or failure. Mr. Herter and the State Department people had, however, said that it would help to obtain results at Geneva if the invitation were now issued, and he recalled clearly that it was tied to a Quebec meeting. He said that someone had failed to bring clearly to his attention that the invitation was being extended on some other basis.

Mr. Murphy said he by no means believed that failure at the Geneva conference is certain. Mr. Dillon said there has not been enough time for a decision by Khrushchev in light of the President's invitation to get to Gromyko in Geneva and reorient his stand.

The President said very strongly that we have insisted throughout that we would not have a summit meeting without progress at the Foreign Ministers meeting. Mr. Murphy said the holding of a summit meeting is still conditioned on such progress. However, he felt that the United States would get a lot of credit if the President were to see Khrushchev even without progress at Geneva. In fact, he felt that such a meeting would "bring along" summit prospects.

The President said he just did not see how he could have Khrushchev in the United States for ten days if there has been a break-down at Geneva. The President said that a two-day session at Camp David before the final outcome of the Geneva conference was known is one thing, and a ten-day visit under such circumstances is quite another. Mr. Murphy repeated that he thought there was a good chance that we would accomplish something at Geneva.

The President said, in response to a comment by Mr. Murphy that the Soviets may permit the factual situation in Berlin to remain "unchanged," that it will take more than that to warrant a summit meeting. We must have some kind of four-power arrangement relating to German reunification. He said he is staggered by the situation now presented to him, since he had had no thought of having an unqualified invitation extended to Khrushchev. He reverted to the point that he had thought of a different sequence of events, and in fact had asked the State

people to study most carefully the factor of timing. It was a surprise to him that his concept on safeguarding the invitation had not been observed.

Mr. Dillon suggested it is too soon to know just where we stand as regards an answer to Khrushchev. We need at least a few more days to let the matter "play out." The President showed to Mr. Dillon and Mr. Murphy a draft he proposed to send to Macmillan;² he felt some response was necessary because of the overly optimistic tone of Macmillan's message³ of suggestions for the Vice President. There was agreement that the rather somber tone of the President's note to Macmillan was appropriate.

Mr. Dillon showed the President an alternative draft of a response to Khrushchev on which some preliminary work had been done in the State Department.⁴ The President said it all boiled down to the fact that in light of the unqualified invitation that had been given, he would have to pay the penalty and hold a meeting he despised. In considering the matter further, he noted that Khrushchev had stressed that a great reception would be prepared for President Eisenhower in Russia. He thought he could make the point that he cannot order such a reception on the part of our people as can Khrushchev on the part of his. However, if the Geneva negotiations show some progress he would be able to evoke a fine reception for Mr. Khrushchev. He was thinking of a passage to the effect that if he and Khrushchev could meet in an atmosphere improved by clear evidence of some progress in easing world tensions, that would be far more fruitful in promoting the mutual understanding we seek than in the absence of such demonstrated improvement; and that so far as our own people are concerned, the President could not emphasize too strongly how hopefully they would look at a meeting between himself and Khrushchev if some such prior improvement had been clearly accomplished. The President said, however, that these developments leave him with a question in his mind as to just what purpose it is now felt that a meeting with Khrushchev would serve. He recalled that he had been trying to use such a meeting to get something accomplished at Geneva.

² The President's draft has not been found; for the agreed text as sent to Macmillan, see Document 468.

³ Macmillan's message was delivered to the President during the morning of July 22 and a copy was given to Herter in Geneva at 4:30 p.m. the same day. In the ten-paragraph message Macmillan stated that the negotiations in Geneva seemed to be going ahead "fairly steadily" and offered two suggestions to the Vice President for dealing with Khrushchev. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan with US Officials)

⁴ Not found.

Mr. Murphy said he would try to drive home with Menshikov, when the two of them meet, the need for some progress at Geneva.⁵

The President said he also had on his mind the question as to what we would tell our allies in justification of such a meeting. Mr. Dillon commented that it would not be a negotiating meeting like a four-power session, but would be to clarify our respective positions.

The President commented that he was troubled by the handling of this matter. He recalled that he and Mr. Dulles had always talked from ideas or topics and not from papers. Mr. Dulles would then put on paper the idea upon which they had agreed and send it to the President to correct and confirm.

The President asked for a draft that would bring out clearly the position of the State Department that progress at Geneva is not essential to a meeting of himself with Khrushchev, but that such progress would bring about a much more effective visit. This draft should make clear that he has asked Khrushchev to come and talk and see our country, and that he would be asking for the courtesy of our people. It must be clear that he is not revoking his invitation. We will continue to stand completely firm regarding a summit meeting; this will be a question of the two getting together for exploratory talks.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

⁵ Murphy talked with Menshikov the evening of July 23 and emphasized to him that Khrushchev's visit to the United States would take place in a much more favorable climate if "reasonable progress could be achieved at Geneva." (Tocah 188 to Geneva, July 24; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1333)

468. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, July 22, 1959, 7:16 p.m.

579. Following for immediate delivery is text of letter from President to Prime Minister replying to latter's letter contained Deptel Tocah 168, rptd London 567:¹

"July 22, 1959

Dear Harold:

Thank you so much for sending me, for the benefit of the Vice President, some of your impressions concerning Mr. Khrushchev. Dick came in to pay a farewell call on me a little while ago,² before departing for Moscow, and he read your memorandum. I am certain he will express his personal appreciation to you at the first opportunity.

From the tone of your message, I would conclude that you are much more hopeful than I am of any worthwhile result at Geneva. Unless there is an abrupt reversal in the Soviet attitude, it would appear to me that the accomplishment will be zero, or even a minus. I think that the only bright spot in the exercise has been the solidarity of the West on basic issues.

As you know, I have been quite ready to interpret progress in a most liberal fashion. So long as we could have the assurance of complete respect of our rights in Berlin and there could be agreed any kind of program that could be presented by the Foreign Ministers to Heads of Government for study and discussion, our own minimum criteria for the holding of such a meeting would be realized. Unless there is at least this much justification for a Summit, it is still my conviction that such a meeting would be a fraud on our peoples and a great diplomatic blunder.

I know that there has been some argument that the less the progress at the Foreign Ministers level, the more necessary a Summit meeting becomes. I am quite clear in my mind that such a feeling is not shared by the bulk of our people.

This may sound to you overly pessimistic. But you know that I have very much wanted to participate in a meeting in which there was even the slightest promise of a successful outcome. No one would be more thankful than I if my evaluation of the final Geneva outcome should be

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Presidential Handling. Repeated to Geneva as Tocah 171.

¹ Not printed, but regarding Macmillan's letter, see footnote 3, Document 467.

² See Document 466.

demonstrated wrong. But I am trying to be realistic, based on what we know of Khrushchev and his henchmen.

With warm regard,

As ever, Ike"

Observe Presidential handling.

Dillon

469. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Acting Secretary of State Dillon

Washington, July 22, 1959.

SUBJECT

JCS Views on Berlin

1. On July 18 Secretary McElroy telegraphed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a possible Berlin proposal to Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin, who is the Defense representative on the Geneva delegation, and instructed him to present them to the Secretary for possible use at the Conference.

2. The JCS proposes that the West should put forward "an initial demand for transferring to the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany a 100 mile-wide land and air corridor between Helmstedt and Berlin. Negotiating range would be between this demand and a final fallback position of a 60-mile-wide corridor, with control of Western traffic vested in the Western Allies". Mr. McElroy said he believed "that this proposal has considerable merit since it permits the West to take the initiative, and, if properly exploited, places us in a most favorable light in the forum of public opinion, regardless of the Soviet reaction." (A copy of the JCS proposal is attached at Tab A.)¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/7-2259. Secret. Drafted by Lampson on July 21; cleared by Vigdeman; sent through Murphy; and initialed by Kohler, Murphy, and Calhoun.

¹Not printed.

3. The proposal of a land corridor to Berlin under West German sovereignty was carefully considered by the planners in December and January. (It was often combined with the proposal that Berlin be made into an eleventh Land of the Federal Republic.) These proposals were not incorporated in the Western plans because it was considered that they were so obviously non-negotiable. (In this connection it should be noted that the 100-mile corridor to Berlin the JCS proposes would include about one-fourth of East Germany.) Although such a notion has been advocated by various people in the United States, it was never seriously discussed in Germany because it did not seem sufficiently realistic. Such a possibility was barely mentioned in the German press. In our opinion, it would be quite out of keeping with the development of the Conference and the Western approach to introduce such an idea at this stage.

4. I have written a letter of acknowledgment to General Guthrie who sent me a copy of Secretary McElroy's message.

5. In my opinion the delegation in Geneva is fully equipped to deal with the JCS proposal since it includes members who went through all of the Working Group exercises in which similar ideas were considered and rejected.

470. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, July 22, 1959, 9 p.m.

111. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Thurston and West. Geneva for Hillenbrand. Reference: Ourtel 37 to Geneva, 95 Bonn, 102 Department.¹ At informal meeting with Commandants and Deputy Commandants convened at his request, Mayor Amrehn presented at behest of Senat lucid statement of Senat's concern over extent to which Senat considered Western powers had departed from stand on Berlin taken in November

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/7-2259. Confidential. Transmitted in two sections; also sent to Bonn; and repeated to London, Paris, Geneva, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 37, July 21, reported that Amrehn himself wanted to brief the three Berlin Commandants on the results of the Berlin Senat meeting on July 18. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/7-2159)

and December and over apparent deterioration in Western determination to resist Soviet pressures. Amrehn's statement clearly the most pessimistic evaluation so far made officially even though couched in polite and reserved phraseology. Senator Klein told me personally Sunday morning that Saturday's Senat meeting was "gloomy" session.²

Amrehn statement follows in summary form:

Mayor Amrehn, speaking in English, stated he wished to inform Commandants of conclusions drawn by Senat in Saturday meeting during which Senat reviewed events since November and Geneva outlook. Senat confirmed stand taken in November that ultimatum must be withdrawn and that no concessions should be made without concessions in return. Senat wished Mayor Amrehn to emphasize to Commandants desire of Senat to maintain this strong position, particularly now when "some other opinions" are being revealed at Geneva. Geneva has left impression that Western position had deviated from the one unanimously accepted at beginning of crisis. In admittedly cautious statement Amrehn said June 16 proposals went "a little beyond" limit Senat would have approved and Senat would have made its objections known if consulted beforehand.

In commenting specifically on June 16 proposals, Amrehn said he was surprised to read that Western powers would be willing accept agent theory which would have been discarded months ago. Regarding Western proposal to agree no nuclear weapons in Berlin, Amrehn said this understandable proposal but Senat hopes that price will be required from other side for any such concession. He referred to views already expressed by Brandt on limitation or reduction size Allied troops and called attention to fact that Senat has good evidence that a policy paper prepared by GDR authorities includes plans for Soviet Zone German Communist directed and manned "revolts" in West Berlin which will have as targets police stations, radio transmitters, city hall, etc. Therefore certain number of Western troops vital to maintain public order. Proposals on prohibition certain activities in Berlin difficult carry out without jeopardizing constitutional rights.

Regarding second phase Geneva Amrehn noted that Gromyko in proposing all-German committee maintained that Berlin problem cannot be separated from all-German problem. Gromyko now gives appearance of having accepted original Western opinion, whereas Allies have only discussed interim Berlin solution. Amrehn agreed it neces-

²In telegram 113, July 22, Gufler reported that the outlook of Berlin's political and other leaders had reached the "gloomiest level since Berlin crisis began last November." He also noted that several observers who had returned to the city after prolonged absences were impressed by the decline in morale in the city. (*Ibid.*, 762A.00/7-2259)

sary to come to some interim agreement on Berlin to give time to discuss all-German problem. As indicative of change in atmosphere of discussion at Geneva which has caused Senat alarm, Mayor Amrehn cited recent article in *Le Monde*, reflecting semi-official view, which stated that Berlin is untenable and must be sold to Russians as expensively as possible and that Allies should facilitate evacuation of Berliners wanting to leave and construct "Chinese wall" along the Iron Curtain. (French Commandant afterwards explained that *Le Monde* not semi-official mouthpiece but that regrettably many were under impression it is.)

Amrehn then presented certain principles which in Senat view are essential: (1) West should not offer any concession without demanding counter-concessions. Amrehn suggested that weakness of June 16 proposals lay in fact that West did not say to Russians if you prepared grant free access, recognition Allied rights Berlin, ties of Berlin with FedRep, etc. (matters on which no concession by West should be made), we will discuss problem of limitation of troops, etc. (2) No solution should be acceptable in which date of expiration fixed short of reunification. As long as time period fixed, Russian threat to Berlin kept alive and Berlin remains hostage for Russian demands. (3) Any form of recognition GDR cannot be considered. No steps should be taken towards recognition or towards formation all-German committee. (Amrehn cited, as type of occurrence causing "sorrow" among colleagues, a July 20 London *Times* article reporting Lloyd attempt persuade von Brentano that FedRep should agree to some form East-West German talks.) Senat realizes certain technical conversations necessary of type already carried on (e.g. commercial talks); Brandt's proposal of inter-administrative commission provides for discussion between experts but only under responsibility four powers. (4) Because of impossibility of reaching agreed basis for restricting certain activities involving public media of expression, UN control would not be practicable.

Senat colleagues, Mayor Amrehn revealed, alarmed over fact that, because in second phase Geneva West started from June 16 proposals and Gromyko proposed all-German committee, a new compromise would be required going beyond June 16 proposals. Mayor Amrehn tried to calm colleagues by saying compromise might be sought on another plane by West's proposing UN control of traffic to Berlin. This would be consistent with Senat contention that any UN involvement should be additional to, and not supplant, Allied rights and responsibilities. Any UN control should be exercised by UN's own officials rather than by representatives of other countries.

Amrehn stressed importance of avoiding unclear formulations in any possible agreement, citing as example that should West agree accept GDR personnel as agents in "control" of access, "control" must be clearly defined as it has not been so far.

Amrehn confirmed that Senat paper on proposals for improvement in access field under preparation. Since proposals technical in nature and therefore not appropriate for discussion on FonMin level, they will not be forwarded to conference. Discussions on proposals will continue with FedRep representatives and paper will be readied for possible future need. Amrehn also touched on relationship Berlin to FedRep. Senat is of opinion that integration of Berlin into FedRep must continue in the future but main problem presently is that measure of integration already achieved be maintained. Small Senat committee will begin discussions in fall on problem of strengthening Berlin-FedRep relations. Mayor Amrehn also remarked that Berlin population remains calm and trusts fully in its own moral force and in protection of Allied authorities.

In closing, Amrehn stressed again Senat's hopes that policy of November–December will be continued and that West will remain as firm and strong as possible.

Gufler

471. Delegation Record of Meeting

Geneva, July 23, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SMALL STAFF MEETING

PRESENT

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Berding
Mr. Becker

Mr. Smith
Mr. Irwin
Admiral Dudley
Mr. Stimpson

Conference Tactics

1. Selwyn Lloyd has informed the Secretary that he wants to make a major speech today. The Secretary indicated that he would like to have a contingency statement available for his use.

Mr. Merchant thought it important that Vice President Nixon be up-to-date on the present status of the question of the future of our rights in Berlin when he sees Khrushchev, particularly in view of recent Khrushchev statements. To this end, Mr. Merchant has drafted a telegram which he said would be brought to the Secretary for approval. Mr. Merchant cautioned that we must not fall into the trap of accepting the idea that a separate Soviet-GDR peace treaty would wipe out our rights. We must continue to maintain that any unilateral action does not affect our rights. The Secretary said he strongly agreed. (See Cahto 164 attached.)¹

Mr. Merchant said he was also concerned with the danger of agreeing to a reciprocal freezing of actions concerning Berlin—a point which Selwyn Lloyd twice has mentioned. This would give the Soviets a convenient escape-hatch because almost any action we took relating to Germany could be used by them as a pretext for denouncing an agreement.

Mr. Smith and Mr. Irwin questioned the advisability of asking for a unilateral Soviet declaration that our rights would be maintained during a specified period. Mr. Irwin thought such a unilateral declaration unnecessary and dangerous, since it could leave the implication that our rights would be changed at the end of the specified period. In this connection, Mr. Becker called attention to the “valuable” statement by Couve de Murville yesterday that any agreement presupposed no unilateral action on either side. Couve indicated that a separate understanding on this point was unnecessary. Mr. Becker added that we want a reaffirmation of our rights, for otherwise our position legally, psychologically and politically will be weaker in several years. Mr. Irwin favored returning to the specific language in our June 16 proposal. Summing up, the Secretary said that we must be clear precisely what we want. We must stick to one formula and not be introducing variations.

Berlin Trip

2. Mr. Merchant said that a draft speech had been prepared for the Secretary’s use on his visit to Berlin Saturday. The Secretary said that he preferred that Mayor Brandt not ride on the plane with him from Geneva. He would rather devote time for a talk with Brandt while in Berlin.

Meeting with Selwyn Lloyd

3. The Secretary said that he would meet with Selwyn Lloyd tomorrow to discuss certain bilateral subjects.²

¹ Document 473.

² Herter and Lloyd met at 4 p.m. to discuss atomic testing and disarmament. The U.S. Delegation reported on this meeting in Cahto 168 from Geneva, July 23. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1329)

Press Developments

4. Mr. Berding said that Soviet spokesman Kharlamov was asked last night what would happen if agreement were reached on only one issue while parallel talks on Berlin and the all-German issue were being held, as Gromyko had proposed. Kharlamov reportedly replied that the two issues were "irrevocably linked."

Mr. Berding noted that *Newsweek* did not give great play to the article alleging State–Defense differences in our negotiating position.³

Correspondents in Geneva have apparently been receiving from British sources indications that we are adopting different attitudes from the British—that we want to break off the talks while the British do not; that we react in a harder manner to Gromyko's negotiating statements than the British; and that we got ourselves on a hook by stating that the conference was approaching its end unless Gromyko showed a better attitude. Mr. Berding said he was trying to find the source of these reports. The Secretary commented that Selwyn Lloyd always wanted to be optimistic. He added that Mr. Lloyd has behaved extremely well as regards tripartite cooperation here.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

³ Reference is to an article entitled "The Pentagon and Softness," which appeared in *Newsweek*, July 22, 1959.

**472. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 23, 1959, 10 p.m.

Secto 111. Paris pass USRO. Twenty-fourth Plenary Session July 23,
3:30 to 5:56 pm, Couve Chairman.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2359. Official Use Only. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this session, US/VR/24 (Corrected), is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1395.

Begin summary. Lloyd opened by outlining West's objections to Soviet all-German committee proposal.¹ Believed Gromyko's statement of yesterday had confirmed Lloyd's understanding re situation at end interim period and during any subsequent negotiations but had not dealt with situation at end these negotiations. Thought interim plan for Berlin now sketched out and agreement possible here or elsewhere. Urged Gromyko reconsider West's July 20 proposal.

After Secretary's statement (Secto 384)² Couve also attacked all-German committee and supported Western proposal. Stressed in reply to Gromyko's contention that reunification problem is one for Germans themselves to work out, that peace plan does in fact leave question to Germans in last analysis.

Gromyko then accused West of lack of objectivity toward all-German committee proposal and of obstructing conference. Said Soviets willing discuss anytime other questions re Berlin "in parallel" with all-German committee proposal.

Bolz spoke along familiar lines in favor of negotiations between two Germanies and attacked FedRep for policy of "force" and "militarism". Grewe denied Bolz's allegations.

Time of next plenary meeting to be decided later. (Following adjournment it was agreed to have private luncheon meeting tomorrow at Villa Greta.) *End summary.*

Lloyd listed Western objections to all-German committee as: a) would end four power responsibility for settlement German problem which necessary if reunification to be achieved; b) provides no incentives to GDR to make concessions since it would obtain recognition in event of deadlock; c) really provides for FedRep-Soviet negotiations without US, UK and France since GDR under complete Soviet control. Stressed necessity for free all-German elections. Traced progress negotiations to date. Thought interim agreement re Berlin now sketched out and though Gromyko had confirmed yesterday his (Lloyd's) understanding that Soviet position is that at end interim period if no agreement reached, negotiations would be resumed by present Geneva conferees, and, pending results these negotiations, the situation re Berlin would remain unaltered with neither side taking any unilateral action. Lloyd noted there is further point as to what happens at end these further negotiations and denied categorically that anything he had said

¹ For text of Lloyd's statement and the other statements summarized below, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 470–485, 560, and 596–598 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 298–309 and 346–349.

² Secto 384, July 23, transmitted the text of Herter's statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2359)

implied he agreed Soviets have any right take unilateral action re Berlin at any time. Concluded as noted in summary above.

After Secretary's statement Couve also attacked all-German committee proposal, noting especially it designed promote recognition GDR and would make reunification impossible since the two negotiating parties speak entirely different languages. Pointed out differences between all-German committee and peace plan's mixed committee. Soviet plan provides no recourse if two Germanies do not agree but peace plan leaves final decision to German people as a whole through free elections.

In addition points noted in summary above, Gromyko denied Lloyd's allegation GDR policy dictated from Moscow and said socialist countries rejoice in unity of purpose in their foreign policies which work for peace and in their common Communist internal organization. Sarcasically hoped Secretary's fear FedRep would be communized not based on flimsiness FedRep Government. Reiterated aims Soviet Government stated by its representatives, not foreigners who interviewed them. Agreed with Couve German reunification was for Germans to decide and noted Soviets had departed from this view by allowing four powers to assist them in solving problem.

Secretary said Gromyko had misinterpreted his statement re fear of communizing of FedRep. Recalled he had said GDR would never allow reunification unless FedRep went Communist. The basic weakness exists not in FedRep but in East German camp where people not allowed express selves in free elections.

Bolz, after alleging all Germans favor negotiations between two Germanies who are represented on equal basis in Geneva, accused Bonn of desiring use force to bring about reunification. Denied GDR desired communization FedRep and stated Germans wish avoid imposition on them of "revanchist" FedRep regime. Denied Lloyd's allegation re subservience to USSR and, re elections, asked what would be result in FedRep of plebiscite re socialization and re GDR proposals on elections which made before FedRep joined NATO and introduced universal military service. Alleged FedRep prefers remilitarization to reunification and noted question at President's news conference re possibility of rearmed Germany turning against West.³

Grewe denied allegations re militarism and policy of force, citing London and Paris Agreements and statements FedRep leaders.

Herter

³For a transcript of the President's press conference on July 22, at which he answered questions about a rearmed Germany and a blockaded Berlin, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 536–546.

473. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 22, 1959, 8 p.m.

Cahto 164. For Dillon from the Secretary. Your Tocah 171.¹ Message sent by President to Macmillan states minimum terms on which we would have to agree here before Presidential agreement to a summit. However, not clear just what words "complete respect of our rights in Berlin" mean. Believe it important obtain clarification this point. Also important that Nixon be advised our thinking against the possibility that Khrushchev raises this issue. All of following FYI for Nixon since we do not expect him to initiate discussion this subject.

In our June 16 offer to Soviets, no reference was made to rights, as such. Following phraseology was used:

"They [the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]² agreed that the best solution for these problems would be the reunification of Germany. They recognized, however, that, pending reunification, the existing situation and the agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respect and have consequently agreed upon the following: . . ."³

Later in our June 16 offer it was stated:

"The Ministers agreed that unless subsequently modified by Four Power agreement these arrangements will continue in force until the reunification of Germany."

There is no need that our rights be explicitly reaffirmed. These rights, which on a number of occasions have been recognized by the USSR as legitimate in origin and continuing in fact, derive from the war and from solemn postwar agreements ratified by the USSR. Nothing that the USSR is now being asked to state or do would add to or detract from these rights or from Soviet responsibilities. The only thing that is contemplated at this time is the modification of the agreements spelling out how these rights are to be exercised. Accordingly, under the formulation we are proposing, our rights will continue to exist even after a failure of the Foreign Ministers Conference contemplated at the expiration of any time period agreed for an interim solution of Berlin.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1329. Secret. Drafted by Herter, Merchant, and Becker and cleared by Reinhardt.

¹ See the source note, Document 468.

² Brackets in the source text.

³ Ellipsis in the source text.

Our present thinking of how to present at least initially such a time period is to add to the second paragraph quoted above the sentence:

“These arrangements can be reviewed at any time after blank years, if such review is requested by any of the Four Powers.”

This formulation of the time period would also leave our rights unaffected.

In summary, we here believe that it should be clearly understood that no arrangements or agreements which may be reached here shall be construed as affecting or modifying in any way the existing rights and obligations of the Four Powers in and relating to Berlin, except as specifically agreed by the Four Powers. Since these rights rest upon their own bottom, they will continue unaffected by the arrangements we propose, except to the extent that we are revising the agreements specifying how they are to be exercised. This, it should be noted, does not constitute a request on our part that the Soviets “perpetuate” our rights. They are not being asked to “reaffirm” the rights for the simple reason that such reaffirmation is not requisite to the continuing validity of the rights.

We also believe it important that the Vice President before talking with Khrushchev has latest understanding how this matter stands, particularly in light Gromyko’s statement yesterday that USSR would take no unilateral action during term any agreement on Berlin or during negotiations thereafter. Gromyko’s formulation, you will note, is no concession, because he leaves open question of what will happen if negotiations fail and by implication he is reserving right to take unilateral action, e.g., separate peace treaty with GDR, in that eventuality. We regard it as essential that in any agreement on Berlin we obtain the language quoted in second paragraph of this telegram.

Herter

474. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter at Geneva

Washington, July 23, 1959, 8 p.m.

Tocah 183. For the Secretary. Last evening we had a talk with the President¹ regarding the Khrushchev visit. We found him affected by certain anxieties, part of which concerned his thought of replying to

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CD 1333. Top Secret; Niact; No Distribution.

¹See Document 467.

Khrushchev's letter and in effect saying that both the summit meeting as well as the personal visit are conditioned on "noticeable progress" at the Foreign Ministers Meeting. We had to point out that the invitation extended to Mr. Khrushchev via Kozlov did not specify such a condition for the personal visit. The President was surprised and insisted at first that he had understood that it was so conditioned. We referred to the talking paper² which he had approved and in which he had in fact made some changes at the time in the language. After reviewing the paper it was evident to him that no such condition had been stated, although obviously there is a relationship between the personal visit and an eventual summit conference. He seemed to feel that under the circumstances, such a personal visit by Khrushchev to this country without minimum progress at Geneva might be badly received.

After threshing this about for a time, a calmer view prevailed. It was agreed that we would take a few days in which to prepare a reply on the understanding that the invitation to exchange personal visits had been extended and has been accepted.

It seems to us that if the Geneva talks collapse or end futilely and the President has not taken an initiative such as this, a most awkward situation arises. If the talks collapse and he can show he has taken this initiative, his worst enemies would be obliged to admit that he has exhausted every possible means to promote a peaceful solution. Furthermore, the invitation must be viewed in the context of the Geneva talks. We cannot see but what the invitation would have some favorable influence on the Soviet attitude. It is certainly not to be excluded that the invitation might promote the development of a formula in the days ahead which would be considered sufficient progress to justify a summit meeting. Then there is the additional factor of sentiment in this country and in Europe, which has been increasingly vocal in urging that Khrushchev be exposed to a greater knowledge of the power and resources of this country. In a way, we are inclined to consider a Khrushchev visit to this country of greater importance than a 4-power summit meeting. The President could do an effective job on Khrushchev. There is the added feature that all of this—that is, Khrushchev's visit here and the President's visit to the Soviet Union—would take the remaining edge off the crisis created by the Berlin issue, stretching it out and absorbing it in the context of these talks. Khrushchev would also become more conscious of public opinion in this country and its insistence on progress toward solutions, and perhaps be brought around to understanding the necessity of creating a better atmosphere by permitting a reasonable formula at Geneva prior to his visit to the United States. Against these considera-

²Not further identified.

tions, the prospect of a collapse of the Geneva talks without adequate results leaves nothing but a rather grim prospect.

The President, we believe, had a better feeling about this after our discussion. We certainly made it clear that the imposition of qualifications or conditions on the invitation to make a personal visit would hardly be wise under the circumstances.

At the close he fully and seemingly enthusiastically agreed to the concept that there should be no condition attached to reciprocal visits. He suggested instead that we find a way to make clear to Khrushchev that his reception in this country would be much better if there had been progress at Geneva. This is the line we are working on.

Dillon

475. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/143

Geneva, July 24, 1959, 11 a.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Mr. Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Berding
Mr. Becker
Admiral Dudley
Mr. Hillenbrand

FRG

Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Duckwitz
Mr. Fechter
Mr. Oncken
Mr. von Hase

United Kingdom

Sir Anthony Rumbold
Ambassador Reilly
Mr. Ledwidge
Mr. Drinkall
Mr. Freeland

France

M. Lucet
M. Laloy
M. Froment-Meurice
M. Baraduc
M. Beaumarchais

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1341. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and concurred in by Merchant. The meeting was held at Les Ormeaux.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Coordinating Group

The following were the principal points made at today's meeting of the Coordinating Group:

1. Ambassador Grewe reported on von Brentano's talk with Gromyko last night. The atmosphere was friendly and not as gloomy as the Germans had expected. Throughout, Gromyko was temperate in tone and manner. The conversations produced nothing concrete affecting the progress of the Conference. Gromyko put considerable stress on the Soviet desire to pursue disarmament talks. He asked von Brentano to put pressure on the Allies to resume these talks. He came back to this point several times, stressing that it was the fault of the Western powers that the talks were not going on. As far as the Geneva Conference itself was concerned, the arguments made were pretty much along conventional lines. Zorin took Ambassador Kroll aside at one point and made some obscure and mysterious remarks about how the West Germans would soon regret the policy they were pursuing. They would soon see how the Federal Republic would be completely isolated.

2. After considerable discussion, it was the consensus that, at this afternoon's private meeting, the Western Ministers should continue to pursue the all-German question, stressing the constructive features in their July 20¹ proposal and the unacceptable features of the all-German committee. However, there would be little point in merely repeating the same arguments made at the Plenary Session unless these seemed pertinent. The Western Ministers should try to make some progress in getting Gromyko to abandon the link between the all-German question and the Berlin question. It would be desirable to avoid getting into any substantive discussion on Berlin today.

3. The French Delegation would prepare the report to NAC² for dispatch tonight and distribution in Paris tomorrow. M. Lucet indicated that the French Delegation hoped to have draft copies available for distribution to other delegations later today.

¹ Regarding this proposal, see footnote 1, Document 465.

² Transmitted in Secto 392 from Geneva, July 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2559)

476. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 24, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 390. Moscow, London, Bonn, eyes only Ambs. Paris eyes only Ambs Houghton and Burgess. Berlin eyes only Gufler. Subject: Private Session.

At this afternoon's private meeting the Western Foreign Ministers began by reaffirming the complete unacceptability of the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee and the Soviet effort to link this to an interim Berlin arrangement. But Gromyko succeeded fairly quickly in focusing the talk on the seven points of Lloyd's July 20 speech.¹ The meeting was characterized by prolonged silences. At one point there was a warm exchange regarding procedure in which Gromyko, endeavoring to present himself as the victim of unfair treatment, demanded to be dealt with as an equal. It was quite apparent that he was in no hurry to go anywhere.

The Secretary started the discussion by underlining importance of clarifying relationship between question of all-German negotiations and interim Berlin solution, saying he saw little use in entering into detailed discussion of Berlin problem so long as Gromyko insisted on link. Couve, supporting Secretary, tried to focus attention on link problem by attempting to draw Gromyko into debate on question of duration of agreement.

Gromyko however would have none of this and insisted on proceeding with discussion on basis of order of items named in Lloyd speech of July 20 despite Lloyd's pointing out that sequence he used was purely arbitrary and of no significance. Notwithstanding Gromyko's repeated insistence on reaching understanding on troop levels (i.e., Lloyd's first point) before proceeding to discussion of other points, West Foreign Ministers did succeed in focusing some attention on other aspects. As a result following points were brought out:

1. *Troop Levels.* Gromyko was told that West considers present troop strength in West Berlin to be symbolic (11–12,999), but he violently disagreed stating that Soviet requirement for symbolic level could only be met by substantial reduction in present strength, at least 3–4,000 level. The Secretary pointed out that West agreement to limit Berlin

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2459. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. A 10-page detailed memorandum of the conversation at the meeting, US/MC/167, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1341.

¹ For text of Lloyd's statement on July 20, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pp. 444–449 or *Cmd.* 868, pp. 280–283.

troop strength to existing levels represents major concession since West has absolute right to raise troop strength to any level it feels appropriate or desirable.

2. *Armaments.* Gromyko could not agree with Lloyd's impression that agreement already reached on formulation with regard to non-stationing of nuclear and missile weapons. Referring to language of June 16 proposal, Gromyko insisted that reference to type of armaments appears as separate point and be more precisely stated in order to indicate restriction applies to West Berlin only since no Soviet troops in East Berlin. Secretary insisted that if this to be separate item restriction must apply to Berlin as a whole. Gromyko made quite an issue of need for isolating armaments as separate item in Berlin agreement, and it was consensus of West Foreign Ministers who exchanged views after Gromyko left that Soviets intend to exploit West's agreement to pilot Berlin atom-free zone as significant precedent for Rapacki, Balkan and Baltic zones.

3. *Propaganda and Subversive Activities.* Secretary vigorously asserted that West would never agree to restraints on activities in West Berlin except on terms of absolute reciprocity. Gromyko called this unacceptable approach since espionage and subversive activities to which ban would be applied are carried on only in West Berlin; he said agreement to prohibit such activities in East Berlin would simply misrepresent situation since no activity of this sort there. All Western Foreign Ministers sharply rebutted Gromyko by referring to Secretary's detailed account in plenary session several weeks ago of espionage, sabotage and other diversionary activities carried on in East Berlin.² Despite Gromyko's repeated insistence that there could be no mention of East Berlin, he expressed hope that language could be found which would be mutually acceptable, citing Soviet June 9 formula³ as model, but he took this attitude only after Secretary and Couve had reminded him that in discussions of this topic five weeks ago he had apparently agreed to reciprocity.

4. *Access.* The Secretary asked Gromyko if he would be prepared to accept idea of four-power commission for settlement access difficulties as recommended in Western June 16 proposal. Gromyko replied he saw no need for such commission since unlikely any difficulties would arise if agreement reached to maintain "present arrangements" with regard to access.

In sharp exchange with Gromyko on reasonableness of attitudes of two sides toward negotiations, Secretary criticized Gromyko for

² See footnote 1, Document 367.

³ See Document 377.

expecting West to make all the concessions while Soviets unwilling make any. He reminded Gromyko that Berlin crisis is of Soviet origin and since Soviets hold view, which West does not share, that Berlin is danger spot it was up to Soviets to make equal effort in removing source of tensions.

At one point in discussion Gromyko, responding to Secretary's inquiry, said he had open mind on question of nature of document for possible Berlin agreement; communiqué, recommendations to governments, or formal agreement would be acceptable to him.

It was agreed that Foreign Ministers would meet at Lloyd's Villa for private discussion Monday 5:30 pm. (Gromyko is lunching alone with Lloyd Monday.)

Herter

477. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 24, 1959, 11 p.m.

Cahto 169. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

During middle of plenary conference yesterday,¹ Selwyn Lloyd sent me some of his thoughts on the present situation here in letter form, and also enclosed a draft of a wire which Harold Macmillan proposed sending to you, but on which he had first asked for Selwyn's views.² Only the last sentence of Selwyn's letter is important and I quote it here-with:

'Furthermore, after what we have done together to try to keep a common position, I dread the possibility of our having to take up different positions in public.'

The draft message from Macmillan to you was an almost hysterical plea that you yourself call a summit meeting at once to take place in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2459. Secret; No Distribution.

¹ See Document 472.

² Copies of Lloyd's message and the draft wire from Macmillan are attached to US/MC/155 in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1395. In addition to the sentence quoted, Lloyd explained why the British believed a summit conference was necessary regardless of progress at Geneva.

Quebec about September 1, giving quite inaccurately items of progress at the meeting here which would warrant doing this. It was obvious that Macmillan's draft had been prepared before receipt of your letter to him dealing with your own views on the summit.³

I persuaded Selwyn to dissuade Harold from sending you such a wire and told him I would wish to discuss the matter with him further today.

After considering overnight and after receipt of two wires from the Department this morning bringing me up to date on the status of the Khrushchev visit,⁴ I decided to tell Selwyn where this matter stood since it, of course, has a real bearing on the various problems surrounding this conference and a possible summit meeting. You will remember that, with your permission, I had advised Selwyn in very general terms that you had been feeling out informally with Khrushchev a possible exchange of visits to Moscow and Washington. Selwyn showed great interest and began at once speculating on how such visits might affect summit. He at first put forward idea possibility your asking Macmillan and de Gaulle to join you for informal talks with Khrushchev at some time during latter's visit in U.S. But, after we pointed out the difficulties in arranging this type of informal meeting, he agreed it would probably be impractical. He then speculated on the possibility of your discussing with Khrushchev a summit meeting to be held late in November or December after your return from your Moscow visit. He thought possibly having such a summit agreed to in September would take care of both continuing discussions on Berlin and German problems as well as British election problem. He will be talking to Harold over this weekend and may have some thoughts on his return Sunday night.

We both speculated on possible effect contemplated September Khrushchev visit might have on negotiations here, visualizing two possibilities. First, that Khrushchev would keep Gromyko inflexible so that he, Khrushchev, could negotiate directly with you or, second, that Khrushchev would visualize desirability some agreement here in connection with public reception himself in U.S. No conclusion reached.

I am sending to Department some preliminary comments on suggested draft reply to Khrushchev which I will expect to supplement early Monday.⁵

³ See Document 468.

⁴ Tocah 183, Document 474, and Tocah 182, July 23, which transmitted the text of a draft reply to Khrushchev that had been agreed by the President and officers of the Department of State. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1333)

⁵ Transmitted in Cahto 165, these comments were that 1) the draft should be shortened, 2) the President should not get involved in negotiating over positions at Geneva, 3) the desirability of progress at Geneva if Khrushchev was to visit the United States, and 4) the exchange of visits should not be linked to a summit meeting. (*Ibid.*, CF 1329)

I have said nothing whatever to Couve de Murville in regard to this whole situation, nor shall I do so until authorized by you. However, if you feel that I could properly give him rough outlines of the situation as it stands, it would be most helpful.

Today's meeting at my house with Gromyko⁶ indicated some little advance on the Berlin problem. All-German committee question shelved by Gromyko and we reiterated in private what we had said in public that we would not accept a link between this and a temporary arrangement for Berlin. However, I am certain Gromyko will raise it again, probably in some new form. I feel slightly more optimistic regarding keeping the negotiations going, but there is still a hard row to hoe.

We all await with great interest results of Nixon–Khrushchev talks Sunday.

Faithfully,

Signed: Chris.”

⁶See Document 476.

478. Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers did not meet on either Saturday, July 25, or Sunday, July 26.

Secretary of State Herter took advantage of this break in the meetings to visit Berlin for the dedication of John Foster Dulles Allee. During his 6-hour visit on July 25, the Secretary of State reaffirmed the tripartite commitment that had been given to Berlin on October 23, 1954, and reiterated that Western rights in the city could not be terminated unilaterally. For text of his statements on this occasion, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pages 521–523 or *Department of State Bulletin*, August 10, 1959, pp. 198–200. For text of the 1954 tripartite declaration, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, page 1482–1483. Documentation on Secretary Herter's visit to Berlin is in *Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1384* and *ibid.*, *Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327*.

479. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva

Berlin, July 28, 1959, 9 p.m.

61. Bonn eyes only Ambassador. Urtel 30.¹ Gufler temporarily in FedRep on special business. General Hamlett has given us following which he believes is substance of subjects discussed Saturday morning at Ambassador's residence.

Secretary started discussion by asking Hamlett to comment on Russian proposal for reduction of forces. Hamlett answered in substance as follows:

Setting aside all political considerations and admitting that, in event Russian armed forces brought to bear, Allied garrisons in Berlin would be in effect only token force. Overriding reason for not reducing Allied garrisons Berlin is effect such a reduction would have on our ability to cope with large civil disturbances. We know that East German regime backed by Soviets capable of instigating mob violence in West Berlin of such magnitude that combined strength of West Berlin police force and Allied garrisons (at present levels) would be taxed to the extreme to provide security for all installations and neutralize the actions taken by galr [goon?] squads and mobs in various sectors of city. This assertion is not based on pure theory. We have an integrated Civil Defense Plan which has been war-gamed in a joint command post exercise involving the three Allied garrisons and West Berlin police. This combined exercise clearly indicated that the combined capability of the Allied garrisons in Berlin and West Berlin police force is already marginal for coping with large civil disturbances.

Mayor Brandt made several comments on Gen. Hamlett's statement. He said that it was known that Communists had plans for civil disturbances. He also stated that any reduction of Allied garrisons would, he felt certain, cause deterioration in the morale of West Berlin police since they feel that physical support of strong Allied garrison essential to security of West Berlin. He added that, if size of police force were increased, in event a reduction of Allied garrison occurred, the same feeling would prevail and in his opinion, would nullify the effectiveness of such an increase.

In answer to several general remarks made by others present concerning ways to provide West Berliners with arms for self-protection,

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1395. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

¹ Telegram 30 to Berlin (Secto 395 from Geneva), July 27, requested a record of this meeting. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2759)

General Hamlett stated that a plan was being studied to increase the size of the police force by organizing and training auxiliary police. Further, that this appeared to be only logical way to develop additional forces from local resources. Mayor stated he felt plan should not be implemented during Geneva conference. All present agreed.

General Hamlett asked Secretary if he felt Soviets really attached great importance to reduction of forces. Secretary replied that this seemed to be subject in which Gromyko intensely interested since he consistently brought it up at meetings. General Hamlett remarked it appeared to him that if Soviets so anxious for reduction they must certainly be considering instigating civil disturbances which made his reasons for not reducing size of Western garrisons even stronger.

Short discussion followed concerning number of effective troops in all three Allied garrisons. Mr. Merchant stated that detailed figures furnished by USBER available in Geneva (USBER's 25 to Dept).²

Secretary then asked Gen. Hamlett and Mayor Brandt to give their views on paragraph 1(b) of Western proposals of June 16.

General Hamlett stated that in his opinion this paragraph, if agreed upon by the four powers, would not cause the three Allied garrisons in Berlin any more trouble than they were accustomed to in dealing with the Soviets on access matters; that on access our arguments with Soviets usually involved meaning of word "control" and that arguments of this nature would continue under any agreement stated in broad terms. On other hand, he felt that agreement expressed in such broad terms would leave West Berliners and economy of West Berlin open to all types of harassments such as increased tolls on autobahn, interference with railroad shipments and movements of personnel or even prohibitive charges for canal traffic similar to those experienced last year. In his opinion, he felt that to protect people and economy of West Berlin an agreement on access should be spelled out so that harassment of this nature would be forestalled.

Mayor Brandt agreed with General Hamlett but added he not sure such a detailed agreement should be worked out by Foreign Ministers but could be evolved at lower level. Apparently Mayor Brandt intended to indicate that the broad agreement should contain a clause to provide for later working out of detailed arrangements.

Mr. Gufler commented that he felt very important factor concerning access arrangements (Allied or German) was provision for four power appeal commission of some type. He stated that failing provision

²Telegram 25 from Berlin, July 6, transmitted detailed figures on the strength and types of troops in the Berlin garrison. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/7-659)

for such four power commission we might find ourselves in Berlin with no one to negotiate with on local access problems.

At one point during discussion General Hamlett recalls—though he is not sure of exact wording—that Secretary asked Mayor Brandt what he felt would be results in event Soviets sign separate peace treaty with East Germans. Mayor Brandt made rather broad statement to effect that in such event Allies would have great deal more difficulty than West Berliners since East Germans already handling German access.

During course of discussion Secretary asked several questions indicating great interest in morale of the Berliners. Mayor Brandt assured him that the rank and file of Berliners were as strong as ever and that the healthy economic situation reflected optimism on part of businessmen and industrialists. General Hamlett stated that as an indication of morale of US garrison, including dependents and civilians, not one family had requested to be sent home from Berlin because of situation existing here, nor to his knowledge had any Department of Defense or statement [State] personnel arriving here as replacements made provision for maintaining their families in United States. He stated further that apprehension which we had reported from here (ourtels 43 and 45 to Geneva)³ in his opinion had developed in political circles and did not reflect general attitude of rank and file. Mayor Brandt made no comment.

Gufler

³ Telegram 43 is printed as telegram 111, Document 470. Telegram 45 is the same as telegram 113, which is summarized in footnote 2, Document 470.

480. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)

Bonn, July 26, 1959.

I had no opportunity to revert to what I discussed with Chris when I was last in Geneva,¹ namely, my estimate of a deterioration in the Western position. At that time the Secretary seemed to be in accord with

Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.

¹ Bruce was in Geneva July 16 and 17.

this view and was giving serious thought to breaking off the meetings. In this I think he would have had Couve's support, but obviously, as has been made all too apparent in public statements, the British Government is resolved to go on with these proceedings and to try to obtain a summit conference regardless of the lack of progress at Geneva.

Gromyko, viewing the differences between the U.S. and British viewpoints, has wisely contented himself by saying as little as possible and, when he is forced to be articulate, merely repeating what he has uttered on previous occasions. He is waiting, I think, for the Western crack to widen. It may be that when the House of Commons recesses the end of this week and Nixon has a last talk next Saturday with Khrushchev, the lines can be definitively drawn between East and West. Meanwhile, I only hope the Western Foreign Ministers will limit their statements and, under no conditions, make any new proposals. Once again, the Soviets have demonstrated the advisability of patience. To my mind, the Western position is being eroded in the process and the sooner there is a conclusion the better.

481. Memorandum of Conversation

Ogorevo, July 26, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Vice President Nixon
Dr. Milton Eisenhower
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Foy Kohler
Mr. Alexander Akalovsky

USSR

Chairman Khrushchev
First Deputy Chairman Mikoyan
First Deputy Chairman Kozlov
Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov
Mr. S.R. Striganov
Mr. Yuri Zhukov
Mr. Troyanovsky
Mr. Lepanov

[Here follows a 10-page discussion on unrelated subjects; for text, see volume X, Part 1, Document 99.]

The Vice President interjected that Khrushchev had said that he had hopes for success in Geneva.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1416. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and Akalovsky and approved by Kohler on August 31. The meeting was held at the Soviet Government summer house near Moscow. Vice President Nixon was in Moscow to open the U.S. exhibit at the Sokolniki Fair. For his account of this conversation, see *Six Crises*, pp. 268–271.

Khrushchev confirmed that, saying that otherwise the Soviets would have recalled Gromyko and their delegation. The key problem in Geneva, he went on, was liquidation of the state of war with Germany. The solution of this problem would lead to the solution of other problems—just like a knitted fabric, if one thread is pulled, the whole garment comes apart. Soviet proposals on this subject were formulated in such a way as to make clear that the Soviet Union was seeking no advantage for itself. As far as the legal position was concerned it was quite clear: the West had settled with West Germany without regard to Soviet interests. The Soviet right to reparations had been disregarded, a monetary reform had been introduced, and a trizonal arrangement had been made. The West also had recognized Adenauer's government. Soviet moves in East Germany were similar to those by the West in West Germany and they only followed later. Now the USSR had no claim against West Germany. The West had violated the Potsdam agreement not to rearm Germany; now it permitted Germany's rearmament, even with atomic weapons. What the Soviet Union wanted to do now was the same that the Western powers had done earlier—it wanted to liquidate the state of war with Germany. It had proposed reasonable solutions to this problem which were being refused by the West, which still insisted that German reunification was a four power responsibility. Khrushchev went on by contending that there was no document in which that responsibility was set forth. (The Vice President indicated that he wanted to respond but Khrushchev kept the floor.) Khrushchev then cited Viet Nam as a parallel example. He said that there were not two correct answers to these questions but only one and the whole world knew that. U.S. policy with regard to Viet Nam was not understood by the world: Ho Chi Minh wants elections while the U.S., contrary to the agreement reached over three years ago, opposes them. What was the reason for that? It was not just the refusal by Diem, since everybody knew that the West pulled the strings on him.

The Vice President interjected here that he was wondering who pulled strings in North Viet Nam—the people?

Khrushchev continued by saying that the three powers had signed an agreement regarding Viet Nam's unification, to which the U.S. had also subscribed, whereas in the case of Germany no such agreement had been signed. In any case historical progress was not determined by legal documents. In the Soviet Union the Soviet system had been established by a decree of their majesty the people—it had been the people who had decided whether Russia should be Socialist or bourgeois. The decision had been for socialism and the Russian people had thrown out of their country foreign troops, including American troops. Similarly, it was the German people who should decide the question of Germany's reunification, while the great powers must recognize the fact that now

there were two Germanies. In this connection, Khrushchev said, he wanted to refute reports in the Western press alleging that he had said in Poland that he was against a united Germany and was demanding that all of Germany go socialist. To this he could say the following, "You have no intention of making war over West Germany, neither do we; what you want is that all Germany be capitalist. Isn't it?" Yet all that the great powers can do is express their opinions, but the people themselves do not have to take those opinions into account. The present situation in Germany, Khrushchev emphasized, cannot be changed without war.

Dr. Eisenhower noted at this point that what the U.S. wants for the German people is what the German people want for themselves.

To this Khrushchev stated that the people in West Germany had pronounced themselves and that this was also true with regard to the people in East Germany. The fact is that a mother cannot control the birth of her child—and a father is even less capable of doing that—so why does not the U.S. let East Germany be socialist if the people there prefer that system?

The Vice President observed that he did not propose to rehash post-war history. The Soviets obviously had their views, we had ours, and we disagreed with what had happened in Viet Nam and East Germany. However, he said, he wanted to make a few points. First, he was glad to hear that Mr. Khrushchev agreed with the principle of free elections; but if Mr. Khrushchev was for elections in Viet Nam, why was he against elections in Germany?

Khrushchev claimed he had not said that; he was not against elections but simply wanted the Germans to decide this question themselves.

The Vice President resumed by saying that if the people were to express their views, then such views must be properly recorded. Yet North Viet Nam did not permit the International Control Commission to operate in its territory. Thus the reason for not holding elections in Viet Nam was the impossible conditions created by Communists in the northern part of that country.

Khrushchev interrupted the Vice President and said that he wanted to make an additional point regarding Germany. He said that the Soviet Government was concerned about the question of West Berlin; the prestige of the Great Powers was involved there and the Soviet Union did not want to be misunderstood in the world. As a lawyer, Mr. Nixon would understand that the strictly legal solution to this problem would be for the Western Powers to pull out of West Berlin, with West Berlin becoming a part of East Germany. The reason for that was the fact that the Potsdam agreement had provided for Berlin to be the capital of all Germany, with the Control Council meeting there and governing the

entire territory of Germany. The three Western Powers had not recognized this council and had formed Adenauer's Government, thus depriving the Control Council of its function. At that point Berlin ceased to be the capital of all Germany. Khrushchev emphasized that he was not trying to say who was right and who was wrong in this matter. What he was trying to say was that the logical development would have been for the West to pull out of West Berlin at that time, rather than to stay and create a divided Berlin. Yet the Soviet Union recognizes the fact of West Berlin's existence, it realizes that the capitalist system prevails there, and it wants to find a way to ensure that the will of West Berlin's population would not be violated. The best way to achieve that objective would be the creation of a free city of West Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev noted that the Vice President appeared to be smiling and said that this was a serious question. It was a hard nut that had to be cracked and the Soviet Union took a very serious view of it. To safeguard the prestige of the Western Powers the USSR had proposed the creation of a free city of West Berlin so that neither side would feel it had lost something. Yet the West accuses the Soviet Union of wanting to engulf West Berlin. In reply to such accusations the Soviet Union has proposed that an international force be set up to guarantee the integrity of West Berlin. The USSR would be willing to join such a token force under an agreement registered with the U.N. If the Western Powers did not want Soviet participation, then neutral forces should be stationed in West Berlin. (Mikoyan interjected that any forces would be acceptable except occupation forces.) Khrushchev went on by saying that retention of occupation forces meant maintenance of the state of war. Thus, in West Berlin the Western Powers were taking Molotov's line with regard to Austria. Mr. Macmillan and others had said that the West had 11 to 12 thousand troops in West Berlin. They would be of no military significance in case of war. The question arises why they are stationed there. He said he had told Harriman¹ that if the Soviet Union wanted a war it would want the West to have at least 100,000 troops in West Berlin, because the Soviet Army could liquidate them in one blow. In Stalingrad 90,000 German troops had been liquidated, so what could 11,000 do? Khrushchev emphasized that the Soviet Union would never agree to a perpetuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin and of the state of war with Germany. What they could do, in order not to embarrass either side and avoid injury to their prestige, was to put the brakes on this situation and have an interim arrangement for West Berlin. The West should tell Adenauer to enter into contact with East Germany and negotiate with it. The West should also tell Adenauer that the Great Powers have no intention of quarreling over the Germans and that they will accept any agreement worked out be-

¹ See Documents 417 and 420.

tween the two Germanys. If the West did the same, the Soviet Union would also pull out its troops. Khrushchev went on to say that he could see nothing unacceptable or offensive in this proposal, if the West sought peace. However, it appeared to the Soviet Union that by continuing the state of war with Germany the West was trying to prolong the cold war and perhaps turn it into a hot war. If this proposal were accepted, the center of friction, i.e., West Berlin, would disappear. The situation there was fraught with danger, because he, Khrushchev, could not give guarantee against some Red soldier pulling a trigger or engaging in some other irresponsible action. The same was applicable to the U.S. with regard to its troops, and as everyone knew, incidents had already occurred. The interests of the Soviet Union and the U.S. do not cross, they rather go parallel, and all the Soviet Union wants is peace. The U.S. could develop its own way, the Soviet Union its way; the United States wants to pray for the captives of socialism, but the Soviet Union does not do that for the captives of capitalism because they do not need it. Khrushchev then remarked jokingly that if men should fail to agree, then they should appoint their wives to settle their differences.

The Vice President pointed out that Khrushchev's observations had been answered many times and repeated that neither side was likely to convince the other of the correctness of its views. For example, one could argue endlessly as to who was responsible for setting up the West German or East German governments. The U.S. could point out that the West German settlement fully reserved the rights of the USSR. When Khrushchev refers to 11,000 troops in West Berlin, the U.S. can refer to 18 Soviet divisions in East Germany. It was also obvious that the two sides had different approaches to the unification of Germany. The Vice President stated that he had the impression that Mr. Khrushchev honestly believes that unification would not be practical in the foreseeable future and also that the Western Powers do not want it.

Khrushchev interjected that he was convinced that this was so, especially in view of the fact that representatives of the Western Powers themselves had made statements to that effect.

The Vice President continued by saying that Mr. Khrushchev, being a keen student of history, would realize why reunification is essential for peace. He should know that when a vital and strong nation is divided in two then seeds are planted for the emergence of a future leader who will seek to accomplish reunification. However, the Vice President remarked, he realized that here there were differences of opinion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Reverting to the question of West Berlin, the Vice President said that as far as the Soviet proposals for a revision of the situation in West Berlin was concerned, Khrushchev must admit that the present situation had been precipitated as a result of Soviet action rather than ours. This was a fact and not an accusation.

However, since there is a crisis in that area the great powers must seek ways and means to find a reasonable settlement. The Vice President said that he believed that Khrushchev himself would agree that the West and the USSR have common responsibility and interests with regard to Germany and Berlin. Under such circumstances no one power can say that the situation must be changed in a certain specific way and that all others must agree. The status quo in all respects must remain and any changes must be discussed and agreed. Khrushchev could not expect President Eisenhower, for example, to agree to attend a high level conference for the sole purpose of accepting the other side's proposals as to how the present situation is to be revised. Nor would the U.S. expect Khrushchev to do that. Where great powers are concerned each must go to the conference table as an equal, and all of them must be prepared to debate and discuss proposals put forward by any of them. Khrushchev would not want to attend a conference simply to sign Western proposals on the dotted line. As far as the present situation at the Geneva conference was concerned, it was apparent it could not end without progress at least as to the procedure for future give and take negotiations of these problems. Whatever the two sides may think of mistakes either of them may have made with regard to Germany, the American people and the American Government could not accept what in effect is a unilateral action in an area where vital interests of the U.S. are affected. Yet this did not mean, the Vice President continued, that no new arrangements could be made regarding West Berlin and Germany. It only meant that self- and mutually respecting nations cannot be committed in advance by the other side as to what they have to accept. Where big powers are concerned the climate must not be one of crisis and tension. The Vice President then invited Ambassador Thompson to speak in light of his own experience at the Geneva conference.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that complicated technical questions were involved, which he was not going to discuss in detail, but stressed that the Vice President had underscored the fact that this was a dangerous situation not of our making. The West had first submitted proposals for the settlement of the entire German problem, but after it had recognized that an overall settlement was not possible, it had now taken up a more limited area and made a number of concessions to meet the Soviet point of view on Berlin. Then the West had suggested that the present negotiations be prolonged so that the present situation would be discussed in order not to allow it to come to a crisis and bring dangerous consequences.

Khrushchev interjected that this was a proposal by Adenauer, who had even suggested a ten-year period. The Vice President observed that Khrushchev himself had earlier referred to postponement.

Ambassador Thompson emphasized that this proposal had been introduced by Secretary Herter and then went on to say that if this could not be done, a really difficult situation would develop. He said that it was necessary first to take measures to prevent the development of a crisis and then in the interim perhaps to make progress on such questions as atomic tests and disarmament. If progress could be made in these areas, other problems might be easier to solve.

Khrushchev agreed that the President could not be confronted with a situation of going to a conference only to sign proposals by the other side. However, he should go to a heads of state conference when there is a basis for agreement, but negotiations are needed to develop terms that would be mutually acceptable. He also said that the same was true as far as he was concerned: there would be no sense in his going to a summit meeting only to sign an agreement perpetuating the occupation regime in West Berlin. He would much rather go hunting and shoot ducks.

The Vice President reiterated that it was the Soviet Union which had created the present situation in Berlin. The Soviet Union wanted a change in the status quo. As Ambassador Thompson had pointed out, the respective proposals of the two sides could not be discussed here today. However, it was implicit that if a high level meeting were held its purpose must be to develop new approaches to this question. The position of the U.S. was not that Khrushchev should go to a summit meeting only to perpetuate the status quo.

Khrushchev protested that he could not understand the meaning of "status quo." He said he was wondering whether the Vice President meant by status quo perpetuation of the state of war. Such status quo could not serve the cause of peace. The Soviet Union favored the status quo but it was also for the liquidation of the vestiges of war. The Soviet proposals did not undermine the situation which had developed after the war: they would retain the present borders and preserve the existing social system.

The Vice President observed that in his remarks he had been referring only to Berlin. To this Khrushchev replied that the status quo in Berlin could be retained only by retaining the state of war.

The Vice President said that he wanted to repeat and emphasize that the U.S. could not accept an ultimatum situation where one side would predetermine in advance what the other side was to accept. The Soviet Union proposed that if no agreement was reached in 18 or 24 months the Soviet Union would take a unilateral action. Khrushchev would certainly not like being confronted with a similar situation. The problem involved must be discussed.

Khrushchev retorted that this was why the Soviet Union had suggested that a peace treaty be concluded with Germany and that it be discussed by all countries concerned.

Ambassador Thompson then summarized the basic differences as follows: the Soviet Union says it cannot agree to an indefinite prolongation of the occupation regime in Berlin; the West, on the other hand, says that it cannot agree to a perpetuation of the division of Germany, as would result from all Soviet proposals put forward—all of them provide for an East German government.

Khrushchev then suggested that the talk be frank. He said that the purpose of so-called free elections as proposed by the West was to engulf East Germany and make all of Germany an ally of the West. The GDR does not want the West German political system and does not want to become a member of NATO. Does the West want the Soviet Union to overthrow the present regime in East Germany and have there a regime which would be identical to that in West Germany? The Soviet Union could present the same sort of demand with regard to West Germany, but this would be absurd and the Germans in West Germany would not agree to that. The inexorable fact was, he continued, that there were two Germanys in existence. If the West is against recognition of the GDR, efforts should be exerted to find a formula whereby the West would not have to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Yet such a formula should make it possible for the Soviet Union to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and have a state of peace there. As far as West Berlin was concerned agreement could be reached that the social order in that city should be determined by the will of its population and access to that city could also be guaranteed. The Soviet Union recognizes that in the present heated atmosphere any document of this type could be detrimental morally to one of the sides. Consequently, agreement should be reached on the time when such a document could be signed and the source of trouble done away with. As to the provisional arrangements for West Berlin, the Western proposals contained some sound elements; the situation should be discussed on that basis and on the basis of Soviet proposals combined. Yet one should keep in mind that these would be only provisional arrangements.

The Vice President asked whether Khrushchev did not see the position that a time limit would put President Eisenhower in, to which Khrushchev retorted that the West also had put a time period of 2-1/2 years.

Ambassador Thompson clarified that the Western proposals provided for separate elections in East Germany. Nevertheless, the West had recognized that this was now impossible. The West was not satisfied with the present situation in Berlin and since it could not find a solution satisfactory to the Soviet Union it tried to find a situation which

would ensure peace and avoid the development of a crisis. It was important now to start moving step by step toward agreement. Yet if the Soviets forced a crisis, it would be difficult to understand how they could reconcile this with their words about peace. Ambassador Thompson suggested that this problem be put off and that the parties concerned try to solve other problems in the meantime.

Khrushchev, raising his voice, retorted that the Ambassador should be careful when using the word peace. What he had said sounded like a threat. The Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty and the West could declare war, if it wished. When peace was at stake the Soviet Union was very sensitive, and if the West chose to fight against a peace treaty everyone would recognize who was to blame. If the Soviet Union did not want negotiation, it would have signed a peace treaty with East Germany—this was its right and also the right of the states bordering on Germany. Khrushchev asserted that he was not stupid and that he could understand the real meaning of Ambassador Thompson's words.

Ambassador Thompson replied that what he wanted to say was that forcing a crisis would not be a step toward peace. No threat was implied, and it was the Soviets who were threatening to force a crisis.

Khrushchev said he wanted to know what was incompatible with Western interests in the Soviet proposals, if the West wanted peace. What steps did the West propose to take? If it wanted to ensure the present social system in West Berlin and if that system was favored by the population, this could be negotiated and there was no disagreement on that point. But the Soviet Union could never agree to a perpetuation of the West's occupation rights. Whatever time period is involved it logically follows that a peace treaty, whether concluded by both sides or separately, will end the occupation rights of the Western powers. This, Khrushchev said, was not an ultimatum but only the logic of the situation.

The Vice President pointed out that it should be recognized that vital interests of both sides were involved and that neither side should confront the other with an impossible situation.

Khrushchev interjected at this point, "We propose only peace—you yourself used the slogan today—what's wrong with that?"

Ambassador Thompson asked whether Mr. Khrushchev thought that such offers as troop limitation and non-stationing of atomic armaments were not peaceful.

The Vice President noted that Ambassador Thompson had mentioned two points that would change the present situation. Other suggestions had been advanced, too, but it was important that changes must be made by agreement. He said that he wanted to reiterate that

there should be no predetermined conclusions as to what the other side must accept. The Berlin situation may appear important but in the long run discussion by Khrushchev and the President of such broader matters as disarmament, nuclear tests, trade, etc., might be more important. Progress could be made in these areas, but only in a climate of calm, not of crisis. The Vice President said that it was most important to create as favorable a climate as possible for discussion and progress in these broader areas.

Khrushchev agreed that a calm atmosphere was needed, but suggested that the U.S. should not threaten the Soviet Union with war. Apparently the Vice President did not want to use this sort of language, so he had asked Ambassador Thompson to do so.

The Vice President replied that he had heard the Ambassador's statement. The Ambassador had said nothing more than Khrushchev himself had said, namely, that if he were confronted with an impossible situation he would have the means to do what was necessary about it.

Khrushchev tried to refute this statement by saying that he had never said that he would use military power. The Great Powers should accept what the Germans want. (Mikoyan interjected "confederation.") However, Khrushchev continued, he still wanted the Vice President to answer his question whether the U.S. sought to preserve its occupation rights or whether it was trying to preserve access to West Berlin and the social order prevailing there. If the U.S. wanted to preserve the occupation status, this might cause war, because, with U.S. troops stationed there, incidents might occur, U.S. aircraft might collide with Soviet aircraft in air corridors, etc. In fact, U.S. planes have violated Soviet air space, and all this could provoke war. If, however, the U.S. wanted to preserve the existing social order in West Berlin as well as full access to that city, agreement on that could be reached. If the U.S. wants peace there is no reason for it to retain its rights of occupation. Referring then to the question of disarmament and nuclear tests, Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union, on May 10, 1955, had presented as its own disarmament proposals² previously introduced by the West, but the West had renounced them. The Soviet Union was willing to discuss disarmament but not on the basis referred by the West where only one representative of the Soviet side would participate and all other participants would be members of NATO. Parity was necessary for such discussions.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

The Vice President then said that the discussions appeared to boil down to the following: there were broad possibilities for discussion of

²For text of this proposal, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1955, pp. 900–905.

these and other problems, between Khrushchev and the President or at a Heads of Government meeting, provided there was no atmosphere of crisis. In this connection the Vice President recalled Khrushchev's statement that the Congressional Resolution on captive nations³ had created an unfavorable atmosphere for the Vice President's visit. On the other hand, in the U.S. the Geneva conference had more significance to our people and leaders than one would normally expect. The President, of course, had authority as far as conferences and topics for discussion were concerned, but he, just as Khrushchev, must be responsive to public opinion. Because of its symbolic significance to the people of the U.S., it was important that the Geneva conference must not be allowed to fail. Some progress in Geneva would have a very favorable impact on our people and would create a much more favorable atmosphere for discussion of other problems than if the conference ended in failure.

Khrushchev pointed out that he had just spent ten days in Poland, where the problems under discussion at Geneva were of vital importance. However, he had not once during his visit mentioned Geneva publicly so as not to make Gromyko's work more difficult.

The Vice President observed that in the final analysis any results, positive or negative, at Geneva would be ascribed by public opinion not to the Foreign Ministers but rather to the Heads of Government. Under these circumstances, the Vice President continued, he believed that there were possibilities for reasonable solution. This was why he was happy to hear Khrushchev say that he was hopeful that Geneva could reach the success awaited by the whole world. This, however, did not mean that the U.S. demanded that the conference should solve all problems, and he personally was not authorized to present any specific proposal, but it was necessary that the climate be improved as a result of the conference.

Khrushchev replied that the latest Soviet proposals were flexible. They provided for new negotiations after 18 months if the two Germans failed to reach agreement between themselves. This does away with any reference to what the West calls an ultimatum. It also gives an opportunity for governments to explain to their peoples the reasons for a summit meeting. He said it was necessary to realize that to go any further would mean perpetuation of the occupation regime. In that case there would not be any need for a conference because that state of affairs was already in existence. He then said that Mikoyan had reported to him that President Eisenhower had told Mikoyan during his visit in the U.S.⁴ that the U.S. must also reckon with the German danger, since Germany

³ For text of this resolution, approved on July 17, see 73 Stat. 212.

⁴ See Document 137.

had broken the peace four times within the past hundred years. This appeared to be the position of the U.S. Of course, the French would prefer to see Germany divided into even more parts, perhaps three, while England would like to see Germany broken up into four or even more parts. Therefore the question arises why the U.S. follows Adenauer's line.

The Vice President replied that Khrushchev must realize that if the President of the U.S. and the Prime Minister of the USSR agreed that any nation must not threaten peace in Europe, then it could not. After all, the U.S. and USSR had fought together quite recently for the same cause and both of them were even more powerful now. Or was it that the Soviets were afraid of Germany?

Khrushchev replied in the negative but said that the situation now was different than that before the war. He said he did not want to brag or be disrespectful toward his high guests, but the fact was that during the period of Hitler's aggressions in Europe the Soviet Union had been the only socialist state and had been in isolation. The French and the British had been against the USSR and had had U.S. sympathy. Now, of course, Japan is defeated and in this connection, Khrushchev noted, it should be said that the U.S. contribution in the war against Japan had been the greater, although the Soviet contribution had not been very small either; after all, it had been the Soviet Army who had liquidated the Japanese forces in Manchuria. Italy was also a defeated country, while China had been united and covered the USSR's eastern flank. Half of Korea was socialist. In Europe the socialist bloc was united with the exception of Yugoslavia, which is neutral, but which, he believed, would fight on the Soviet side if the Soviet Union were attacked. Thus today there remained in Europe only England, France and Spain, while the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Belgium, do not count militarily. Oh yes, Khrushchev added laughingly, he forgot that Luxembourg could constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. In this situation could Germany threaten the Soviet Union? Yes, by provoking a war and drawing other countries into it. The Soviet Union has no doubt that it would destroy Germany, France, England and other countries the very first day of the war. The Soviet Union would, of course, suffer losses too. But the other countries would become deserts. This would be a calamity and we should not allow it to happen. We should not allow Adenauer to threaten all of us with conflict but rather we should try to build a better life for our children and grandchildren.

The Vice President said he wanted to ask one question, namely, whether Mr. Khrushchev thought there was any room for negotiation in the Soviet position. Mr. Khrushchev should imagine that the President was sitting across the table and, without going into any specifics, should say whether there was room for negotiation. The Vice President said

that Khrushchev himself would not want to come to a meeting if the President were not prepared to negotiate.

Khrushchev said that this was a fair question and that it would be easier for him to give a reply to it in terms of what the Soviet Union could not accept. President Eisenhower could then form his own judgment as to the Soviet willingness to negotiate. The Soviet Union could never accept a perpetuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin, regardless of whether there were a summit meeting or not. As to the solution of the entire Berlin problem, the Soviet position was flexible and fluid except on this one point of occupation status. There would be no point in meeting at the summit if the participants were to perpetuate a situation that already exists. The West could present to the Soviet Union any proposals to ensure the present social order in West Berlin and access to that city. As far as a peace treaty with Germany is concerned it could ensure the status quo of the two Germanys until time becomes ripe for the liquidation of military blocs. The treaty could contain the most liberal provisions and provide even for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany and Poland, perhaps a gradual one.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; see volume X, Part 1, Document 99.]

482. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 27, 1959.

Cahto 177. For Acting Secretary. After dinner last evening Selwyn Lloyd and Secretary with Ambassador Whitney and Merchant present began their talk which lasted until after twelve-thirty. Lloyd said he had with him long draft message from Macmillan to President.¹ He said it was result of many hours collaboration between Prime Minister and himself and that Prime Minister was prepared to dispatch it immediately himself or have it go forward to Washington as a message concurred in by Secretary or alternatively commented on concurrently by

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1329. Top Secret; Priority.

¹No draft of this message has been found; for the text as sent, see Document 484.

Secretary. Burden of draft was that matter of our rights in Berlin seemed to have been satisfactorily met by Gromyko and outline of an agreement was now clearly in sight. Under these circumstances Prime Minister thought that Foreign Ministers should wind up their work in two or three days by preparing paper setting forth points of agreement and disagreement for transmission to a Summit Conference to be called by President for August 20 or in any event not later than September 1. Prime Minister in his draft went on to make perfectly clear that from his point of view it would be a terrible mistake to have the exchange of Khrushchev visits unless firmly related to and dependent on a prior Summit meeting. He said that under former circumstances suspicions would be aroused among certain of our allies and his own position made extremely difficult.²

Lloyd supplemented his exposition of the draft with long explanatory commentary. When he finished Secretary first made point that he could not fail to resent implication that our allies could not trust us in a bilateral discussion with Khrushchev and that this came with ill grace from the British in light of their trip to Moscow last winter. This produced long discourse by Lloyd in which he disclaimed any lack of faith but emphasized that by the visits Khrushchev would attain everything he had been seeking without paying a price and that since negotiations would be impossible to avoid in such visits it would constitute new relationship on bilateral basis with our allies excluded from participation.

Pros and cons were discussed at great length. During course of conversation Secretary emphasized that whereas he was as anxious as President to find the grounds to justify convoking Summit Conference he could not in honesty as of now detect really any progress whatsoever. There had been clarification of positions and sharpening of issues but Soviets had made no concessions other than extending their original time period.

As to form of transmission Secretary said that he preferred Macmillan to dispatch that message on his own responsibility that same evening without any indication of concurrence or comment by Secretary himself. Lloyd was obviously impressed by Secretary's arguments. He emphasized time and time again that domestic politics constituted only minimal element in British view and in general re-emphasized well-known British arguments for Summit which would be on Western rather than Soviet initiative. At one point late in conversation the Secre-

²In Cahto 175, July 27, Herter characterized Lloyd's presentation as follows:

"It was obvious from Selwyn's rather nervous manner and quite long-winded exposition of the British position that he must have found Macmillan very much agitated and terribly anxious to impress us with the necessity of quick action leading to a Summit." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1329)

tary said that he was expressing thought which had just that moment occurred to him which was possibility of Canadians calling Summit meeting at Quebec City in light of inability of Geneva Conference to resolve Berlin issue. This obviously had great appeal to Lloyd and Secretary reiterated that it was an idea and in no sense a suggestion or considered thought.

Toward end of talk Selwyn Lloyd asked Secretary to read draft message which Macmillan planned to send to President. Secretary demurred for some time since he had expressed his views in general terms and did not want to be in position of making comments on the details of what Macmillan wished to say. When Mr. Lloyd insisted Secretary read over draft and to his surprise found that at very outset it predicated any recommendations to President on Summit on receiving from the Soviets the very concession which we had felt most important, namely, the acceptance of our wording regarding any temporary arrangements for Berlin contained in our June 16 offer. Mr. Lloyd said he was planning to talk to Macmillan on telephone and that he would give us the following day copy of what Macmillan finally decided to send.

At conclusion of talk it was agreed that at lunch Monday Lloyd would push Gromyko hard on the rights question in an effort to ascertain whether the formulation of this point in our document of June 16 was acceptable in its present form.

Herter

483. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 28, 1959, 1 a.m.

Secto 404. Eyes only for Ambassadors Moscow, London and Bonn. Eyes only for Ambassadors Houghton and Burgess. Eyes only Gufler. Subject: Private Session.

At Lloyd's working tea today two-hour discussion with Gromyko was for the most part repetition of the sterile performance to which we

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2859. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. A detailed eight-page memorandum of the conversation at this meeting, US/MC/158, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1342.

have become accustomed in our private talks since reconvening July 13. Virtually only progress, if it can be called that, was Gromyko's agreement to Lloyd's suggestion that each side spend tomorrow drafting its version of terms of a Berlin settlement for discussion possibly Wednesday morning. Also Gromyko may have intended slightly to relax his insistence on link between Berlin settlement and all-German negotiations although he continued, despite sharp probing, particularly by Secretary, to refuse to take clear stand on this issue. On other hand his adamance on need for Western agreement to reduce present troop strength in West Berlin remains as firm as ever, and this now appears to be Soviet sine qua non of agreement on other aspects of Berlin settlement.

Lloyd began meeting by reporting on his conversation with Gromyko who was his guest at lunch today. Gromyko had following reservations on "draft communiqué"¹ which Lloyd had discussed with him in general terms:

- (1) In preamble, Gromyko opposed any mention of "agreements in force," asserting that reference should be to existing situation only;
- (2) Gromyko opposed stipulating reunification as terminal point of arrangements; he insisted reference to duration of interim settlement should be confined to provision that Foreign Ministers' Meeting, as presently constituted, should reconvene after "x months" to discuss Berlin question.

After Lloyd's report, there was extended discussion of other aspects of possible Berlin settlement of which following were highlights:

(1) Re troop levels, Secretary again stressed extent of concession by West in limiting strength to present levels and made clear to Gromyko that this was final Western offer. Gromyko, however, insisted this represented no change in "existing situation" and was therefore totally unacceptable to Sovs. When pressed for explanation why Soviets attach so much importance to this question, Gromyko said Western agreement to reduce troop strength would be substantial proof of West willingness to cooperate with Soviets in reducing tensions and, furthermore, would dispel Soviet suspicions that West insistence on present troop levels connected in some way with secret plans for their use for certain sinister purposes, which, however, unknown to Soviets. Lloyd, on his own behalf, suggested this question could be left to heads of government, but Gromyko replied if Foreign Ministers couldn't reach understanding, he doubted if heads of government would be able to resolve question. (*sic*)

(2) Re ban on propaganda and subversive activities, all West For-Mins made clear there must be absolute reciprocity. Gromyko, more forthcoming than previously, said he would not exclude possibility of agreeing on formula which would provide for restraining GDR interference in internal affairs of West Berlin and, in any case, thought that

¹ See Document 453.

mutually acceptable formula could be worked out, but it must not place responsibility equally on both parts of Berlin.

(3) Re Soviet June 19 proposal for four-power supervisory commission, both Secretary and Couve underlined inconsistency in Soviet position which obligated West to accept Soviet commitment without inspection on access procedures but prescribed inspection of West commitments with regard to troop levels and armaments. Gromyko had previously made clear commission's responsibilities would be confined to troop levels, armaments, and activities but would not extend to access problem.

At Lloyd's suggestion, Gromyko, although first proposing a plenary session tomorrow, agreed to devote the day to preparation of papers on Berlin settlement to be discussed possibly Wednesday. Meanwhile, Couve and Lloyd will lunch with Secretary tomorrow to discuss Western paper, announcing subject is disarmament to explain Brentano's absence, and all three will meet with Brentano at 3 p.m. If Western paper cleared in time and Gromyko ready, Secretary may meet with Gromyko late tomorrow afternoon to exchange papers and give Secretary opportunity further to probe Gromyko on rigidity of his position re agreement on troop levels and all-German negotiations as sine qua non Berlin settlement.

Herter

484. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower

London, July 27, 1959.

DEAR FRIEND, I fully understand and share your anxiety about the maintenance of our rights in Berlin unimpaired by any interim agreement. In our agreeing to a moratorium it must be clearly understood that at the end of the period fixed our rights have not been affected and we return to a position of negotiation with our rights as they are now. Nor of course must either side take any unilateral action during the moratorium. In a word, my concept of the moratorium is like a period

that sometimes elapses between the acts of a play—"X" years pass, and when the curtain rises again the negotiation is resumed with us all, including the Russians, in the same position as we are today.

As I understand the latest exchanges in Geneva, that is the position which Gromyko is now accepting. If the formula of the Western proposal of June 16 is taken as a basis, that should be good enough for us. This I think could be called progress certainly when we compare it first with the ultimatum of November 27, 1958, and secondly with the Soviet proposals of the 10th and 19th June. In fact the discussions at Geneva have been useful and have served to narrow the differences and to provide the outline of at least an agreement for a moratorium over Berlin.

Now for the length of the moratorium. What I suppose we want is a period of at least two and a half years which would take us over the next German elections. It is a matter of judgment whether we are likely to get such a period at the Foreign Ministers Meeting or whether it would be better to leave it for the Heads of Government. The question is at which meeting the better bargain can be made. On the question of nuclear armaments in Berlin and the rights of military and civilian access during the moratorium, the Foreign Secretaries are already within a measurable distance of agreement. The level of our forces in Berlin is a very important point with regard to which we must remember the morale of the West Berliners. I feel this is a matter which can only be finally resolved at a meeting of the Heads of Government.

That leaves the question of how to discuss the whole German problem during the moratorium. The Russians' first position was to insist on an All-German Committee. Ours was a Four Power Commission. I believe that this is also a matter which could be left for discussion at the Meeting of Heads of Government, with a probability of some satisfactory intermediate formula being found.

The Foreign Secretaries have worked now for something like eight weeks, and I fear that if they go on talking much more things may begin to go backward rather than forward. So I hope you will feel that we should now proceed to tell the Foreign Ministers to prepare for a Summit on the basis of the progress already made. That being so, I have been extremely interested in what Chris told Selwyn of your approach to Koslov and Khrushchev's reply. You certainly gained a great deal out of this because although he is making these rather hostile noises publicly he is obviously anxious to visit the United States and to talk with you. The question which Chris has discussed with Selwyn is what should be the next step. Having regard to your plans and my preoccupations, the opening date for a Summit must either be during the last days of August or, at the latest, September 1, or postponed until some time to suit you at the end of October, or the beginning of November.

There are two difficulties about the later date. First it involves the Russians being willing to wait as long as that and secondly if Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States takes place, it would be difficult to avoid discussions of substance on the matters outstanding. You would probably find this embarrassing. It might cause considerable suspicion on the part of the French and Germans, nor would my public position be very easy to explain. I therefore would much prefer the earlier date.

This involves our bringing the Foreign Ministers Meeting to a very rapid conclusion. That still leaves the question of procedure.

As I understand it, you now owe Khrushchev an answer to his message about your invitation. I would suggest that in view of all these considerations you should in your reply couple the idea of his visit to the United States with a proposal for a formal Summit Meeting in Washington or Quebec, towards the end of August. To give a choice of place might be easier for de Gaulle. At the same time as you issue this invitation you might issue similar invitations to a Summit to de Gaulle and myself, and inform Adenauer of what you were doing. I assume that there would be no fixed agenda for the Summit but after dealing with these German questions, we could perhaps pass on to other questions, for instance, in what forum a substantive discussion on disarmament might best take place.

At the same time as asking de Gaulle and me to come to a Summit, you might suggest a Western Summit including Adenauer to meet in Paris a week or ten days before.

If Khrushchev and I were to accept this plan, I do not see how de Gaulle could stand out in view of your most generous suggestion of coming to Paris beforehand.

With warm regard,
As ever,

Harold¹

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

485. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, July 27, 1959, 2:30–3:17 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dillon
General Goodpaster

The President had before him a series of message and dispatches, including a report from the Vice President,¹ a long letter from Macmillan,² and several messages from Mr. Herter reflecting the situation in Geneva.³ He spoke particularly of Macmillan's letter, proposing that the President call a summit meeting at the end of August or the first of September. The President said he saw no reason why he should propose a summit meeting. Long ago he and Macmillan had agreed that the Foreign Ministers should work out those plans. He said he has the feeling the British are trying to manipulate his activities with respect to an exchange of visits with Khrushchev, and a summit meeting, much too closely. He thought perhaps we should be more reserved in our discussions with the British—even so, we would not be "clamming up" as they did before Suez. He said it came with very ill grace from Macmillan to express reservations about his seeing Khrushchev before a summit meeting when we recall the circumstances of Macmillan's trip to Moscow.

In response to a question by Mr. Dillon, the President agreed that he could advise Secretary Herter that he could mention the discussions concerning an exchange of visits with Khrushchev to Couve de Murville—telling him only that the President has had an exploratory exchange with Khrushchev, but not going into full detail. Mr. Dillon thought that if we tell the French, we will be a long step toward telling the Germans, and then the whole thing will leak to the public. The President noted that Macmillan's letter seems to be drafted on the premise that Gromyko will accept the Western offer of June sixteenth. Of course, if he does that, and the Ministers agree on proposals as to how to advance reunification, then there would be the basis for a summit meeting.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on July 28. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Appointments Book. (*Ibid.*)

¹ Presumably the report from the Vice President on his conversation with Khrushchev (see Document 481) that was transmitted in telegram 320 from Moscow, July 26.

² Document 484.

³ Although the messages from Herter cannot be identified with certainty, one of them was Cahto 177 (Document 482).

He recalled that he had asked Secretary Dulles and Mr. Herter as well what harm would be done to us if the Soviets were to make a peace treaty with East Germany. He did not see that this would harm important U.S. interests.

The President commented that we seem to be getting close to the point of being forced to have a summit meeting. Mr. Dillon recalled that the idea of the State Department people originally was that Khrushchev should visit for a few days just ahead of a summit meeting in Quebec. He saw as a possible line of action announcing before holding the meeting with Khrushchev that a summit meeting would be held some time later this year.

The President asked Mr. Dillon and Mr. Murphy, taking the June sixteenth statement as a starting point, to work up a plan providing that until the start of 1962 there would be no change in Berlin except as unanimously agreed, and trying to spell out an agreement on how to go ahead on the question of German reunification—perhaps having the Foreign Ministers meet every six months with German advisers present, having other countries as well join the meeting once a year—such countries as Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Perhaps a package of this kind could be accepted by the Soviets.

Mr. Dillon said it really looks as though to meet Macmillan's proposal, the only way Khrushchev could make his visit prior to the summit meeting would be for him to come about August 15th, having the summit meeting on August 25th. The President said that Macmillan has apparently fixed a date in the last week of October for the election, and is now caught by these dates. Mr. Dillon recalled also the Vice President's report that Khrushchev had said he wants to have a vacation in August. The President added that Khrushchev had stressed he does not wish to come in hot weather.

Mr. Dillon said he has the impression that something is about to come out from the Russians at Geneva, and, if so, this might be a better light on the whole situation. The President said one other possibility would be to have Khrushchev stay for a few days after a summit meeting that might begin on August 25th. We would be very much in difficulty, however, if the summit meeting did not develop satisfactorily.

The President suggested that Mr. Dillon tell Mr. Herter that Macmillan's note seems to put us in a difficult spot. On the one hand we do not have any assurance of the progress necessary to justify a summit meeting. On the other, he makes the summit meeting prerequisite and preliminary to bilateral talks with Khrushchev. The President

commented that he certainly does not want to do anything that would prejudice Macmillan's position in his election.⁴

The President concluded by asking Mr. Dillon what he would have to do with Khrushchev in terms of state functions, should the latter come. Specifically, would he have to give a dinner for him. Mr. Dillon said that technically that might not be necessary, since Khrushchev is not a Chief of State, but practically he did not see how it could be avoided. The President also commented that in effect Khrushchev is the Chief of State of Russia.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

⁴ At 9 p.m. on July 27, Dillon transmitted to Herter a summary of this discussion with the President. Although recognizing that the United States would like some agreement for continued talks on the overall German problem, the Acting Secretary noted "that in view of the extreme pressure from the British it probably would be necessary to agree to a summit if the Soviets accept our view on rights for Berlin." (Tocah 194 to Geneva; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1333)

486. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 28, 1959, 11 p.m.

Cahto 179. For Dillon from the Secretary. Have just finished second private session today¹ with Selwyn Lloyd and Couve de Murville to try to formulate our joint ideas as to where we go from here both from a substantive and a procedural point of view. Both of them are glad that I have been committed to going to Santiago² since they feel that this will force a break not necessarily in continued negotiations but certainly in the type of negotiations which have been so fruitless in the past two weeks.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/7-2859. Top Secret; No Distribution.

¹ The sessions took place at noon and 3 p.m.

² The opening session of OAS was scheduled for August 12 at Santiago, Chile.

As I told you by phone,³ I found it was essential to advise Couve de Murville of the fact that Khrushchev might be coming to the U.S. I am very glad that I did so since it made it possible for the three of us to discuss possible procedures and timetables with this visit and the possible return visit by the President being a very important part of the whole picture. Selwyn, who as you know has tried to interpret every exchange of views with the Russians from the most optimistic angle, is now pretty well convinced that it will be impossible for us to find sufficient justification in the progress made here to justify a summit conference which would come within the time limits which the British have had to set themselves in relation to elections. While my natural instinct is to look on the optimistic side and my political inclination would have been to lean over backwards in order to make a summit possible, I just could not in good conscience have recommended an early decision on a summit with the situation as it now stands.

Tomorrow I am scheduled to lunch with Gromyko and to try to carry the ball for the Western Foreign Ministers since we are endeavoring the bilateral approach to see if it can move things along any better than the multilateral. I shall tomorrow try to do two things: first, ascertain whether there is any further give in Gromyko than there was before as a result of the Khrushchev invitation; second, what procedural steps we can now take to carry on our negotiations either with deputies or through a recess to some time such as the time of the Foreign Ministers attendance at the UN. I think Gromyko is going to insist that we keep right on talking and, if so, it will obviously have to be done at the deputy level.

One very interesting thing developed with regard to the attitudes of both Selwyn and Couve on the Khrushchev visit. Both for different reasons felt it was desirable that the coming visit be publicized at the earliest possible date. Selwyn felt that attention on the visit would take away from attention on a possible summit and might well give the British the talking point in that such a visit would ensure continuity of discussions. Both, however, felt early announcement with regard to the visit particularly if it came before a possible recess or break up next week would be very important in that it would not then be interpreted as having been arranged as a result of the breakdown of the Geneva Conference and as a result of the President's feeling that he could perhaps alone negotiate where the three powers had failed. I think the foregoing consideration is of real importance. Already the story has leaked out of Washington with regard to a possible Western summit meeting and we are frankly living in dread of a leak on the Khrushchev visit

³No record of this conversation has been found.

which would not be given the slant which would come from our making the first surprise announcement ourselves.

As I see possible timetable ahead, it would be this. End of August or early September meeting Paris Western heads of state around September 10, Khrushchev visit to US. Around September 20 (if British election dates allow) Foreign Ministers continue discussions New York. October 20, President returns Khrushchev visit with ensuing travel. November 5, Foreign Ministers again meet either to continue Berlin talks or if progress made arrange for summit meeting. End of November or early December, a summit meeting. In laying out above, I realize many considerations may intervene but it is important at least to have some type of schedule in mind to work toward.

Your suggested reply to Macmillan⁴ just received and will get you our reaction to that as well as report on talks with Gromyko tomorrow at earliest moment.

Herter

⁴The draft was transmitted in Tocah 196, July 28 at 12:31 p.m. and received in Geneva at 7:08 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/7-2759) For text, see Document 493 and footnotes 3 and 4 thereto.

**487. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 28, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 408. AmEmbassies Moscow, London, Bonn—eyes only Ambassador. AmEmbassy Paris—eyes only Ambassadors Houghton and Burgess. USBER Berlin—eyes only Gufler. Subject: Private Session.

At 5:30 this afternoon Merchant handed Soldatov slightly modified Western proposal on Berlin (Secto 410)¹ and Soldatov delivered Soviet proposal unofficial translation of which contained in immediately following telegram. (Secto 409)²

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2859. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, Berlin, and Bonn.

¹ Document 488.

² Document 489.

Soldatov read our proposal rapidly and commented he saw little or any change. Merchant replied careful study would reveal certain changes and pointed to acceptance Soviet language on atomic weapons and missiles which Soldatov shrugged off. Merchant then pointed to final paragraph and Soldatov smiled at reference to 5 years. Merchant pointed out Gromyko statement time period not matter of importance or principle.

Soldatov then said he was disturbed to note troop figure in our paper remained at 11,000. He said that we must now appreciate vital importance Soviets attached to agreement on a substantial reduction from 11,000 and asked earnestly what we had in mind in this respect. Merchant replied that 11,000 represented our firm position and as the Secretary had said yesterday³ willingness on our part to set this ceiling was in our view a very important concession to the professed Soviet concern over the size of the Western garrison in Berlin. He said that moreover growing Soviet concentration on an effort to achieve a reduction gave us increasing cause for suspicion as to what they had in mind. Soldatov dropped subject after repeating that Soviets attached the highest importance to this point.

Merchant inquired if Soviet inclusion of reiteration all-German committee proposal in working paper presumably on Berlin should be construed as interdependent link of these two subjects. Soldatov evaded by saying inclusion intended to give complete Soviet position and that Gromyko had repeatedly made clear his position on this point. Soldatov was reminded that on July 20 Western representatives had put forward their views on most appropriate method for continuing discussion of German problem as a whole.

In response to query Soldatov said Soviets had no present intention publishing their proposal and was told this reflected our intentions likewise with respect to Western paper.

Invitation was extended on behalf of the Secretary to Gromyko plus two advisers for private bilateral luncheon tomorrow with expressed hope long talk could follow. Soldatov promised prompt reply to invitation and made no reference to plenary or any other meeting for Wednesday.

Herter

³ See Document 483.

**488. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 28, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 410. Paris pass USRO. Following is text of paper agreed by four Western Foreign Ministers today and handed Soldatov by Merchant this afternoon:¹

"July 28, 1959

"Berlin

"The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have examined the question of Berlin in the desire to find mutually satisfactory solutions to the problems which have been raised and which derive essentially from the division of Berlin and of Germany. They agreed that the best solution for these problems would be the reunification of Germany. They recognize, however, that meanwhile the existing situation and the agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respects and have consequently agreed upon the following:

"(A) The Soviet Foreign Minister has made known the decision of the Soviet Government no longer to maintain forces in Berlin.

"The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that it is the intention of their governments to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the present figure (approximately 11,000). The three Ministers further declare that their governments will from time to time discuss the possibility of reducing such forces if developments permit.

"(B) The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States further declare that it is the intention of their governments to continue not to locate atomic weapons or missile installations in West Berlin.

"(C) Free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western powers stationed in Berlin, will be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959. Freedom of movement will continue to be maintained between East and West Berlin. All disputes which might arise with respect to access will be raised and settled between the four governments. The latter will establish a quadripartite commission which will meet in Berlin to examine

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2859. Secret; Priority.

¹ See Document 487.

in the first instance any difficulties arising in connection with access and will seek to settle such difficulties. The commission may make arrangements, if necessary, to consult German experts.

“(D) Measures will be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in it with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in the internal affairs of others. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be requested to provide a representative, supported by adequate staff, to be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city for the purpose of reporting to the Secretary General any propaganda activities which appear to be in conflict with the foregoing principles. The four governments will consult with the Secretary General in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken in respect to any such report.

“(E) The arrangements specified in sub-paragraphs (A) through (D) above can in the absence of reunification be reviewed at any time after five years by the Foreign Ministers conference as now constituted, if such review is requested by any of the four governments.”

Herter

489. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 28, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 409. Paris pass USRO. Following is unofficial translation of text Soviet proposal handed Merchant by Soldatov today:

Begin text.

The Conference of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva has considered the Berlin question in the desire to find a mutually satisfactory solution. The participants in the conference have agreed to implement, with the aim to change the existing situation in West Berlin, measures which will

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2859. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Paris, Bonn, Athens, Reykjavik, Rome, Luxembourg, The Hague, Oslo, Lisbon, Ankara, London, Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.

be of an interim nature—for a year and a half period and will comprise the following:

Reduction of Armed Forces

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the USA and France after the coming into force of the present agreement will reduce the strength of their garrisons in West Berlin and correspondingly their armaments to token contingents so that the total strength of these garrisons should not exceed 3,000 to 4,000 men.

Non-Location of Atomic and Rocket Weapons

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the USA and France shall not locate in West Berlin nuclear weapons or rocket installations of any kind.

Termination of Subversive Activities

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the USA and France will take measures not to allow the use of the territory of West Berlin for interference in the internal affairs of other states and for all kinds of subversive activities directed against the USSR, the GDR and other socialist states as well as for hostile propaganda against them.

(Also included is a reference to the relevant declaration of the GDR Government dealing with noninterference in the internal affairs of West Berlin and respect for the agreement on the interim status of West Berlin.)

Supervisory Committee

To supervise the fulfillment of the obligations stemming from the present agreement regarding agreed measures in West Berlin, and to take, in case of necessity, measures assuring the implementation of the arrangement arrived at, a committee composed of representatives of the United Kingdom, the USSR, the USA and France will be set up within a month of the date the agreement comes into force.

Access

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the USA and France take cognizance of the declaration of the Government of the USSR that for the duration of the present agreement the communications of West Berlin with the outside world will be preserved in their present shape.

Negotiations Between the Two German States

The Four Powers—the United Kingdom, the USSR, the USA and France have pronounced themselves in favour of setting up an all-German committee composed of the representatives of the two parts of Ger-

many, or holding negotiations between the two German states in some other form acceptable to them to consider questions related to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany which would also ensure a radical solution of the question of West Berlin, and to consider and work out concrete measures on the unification of Germany and the development of contacts.

It is understood that in the course of these negotiations all decisions will be taken by agreement between the sides:

If after the expiration of the year and a half period no agreement will have been reached on the questions under consideration within the all-German committee or otherwise, then the states represented at the Geneva conference will again hold negotiations on the question of West Berlin. *End text.*

Herter

490. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 29, 1959, 10 a.m.

Secto 414. In discussion yesterday by Western Foreign Ministers of text contained in Secto 410,¹ following qualifications made:

1) Lloyd reserved right to reopen for possible later deletion "and the agreements at present in force" in final sentence introductory paragraph. Other three Ministers all opposed deletion.

2) Foreign Ministers agreed declaration of intention in second part sub-paragraph (A) might, if necessary, be changed to direct declaration that governments would limit combined total of their forces, etc.

3) Foreign Ministers agreed that final two sentences of sub-paragraph (C) might be eliminated, if in course of discussion with Gromyko removal of quadripartite commission with respect access necessary to combat insistence by Gromyko on commission for other aspects of agreement.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2959. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.

¹ Document 488.

4) Germans reserved right to press later for elimination of language "or amount to interference in the internal affairs of others" in sub-paragraph (D).

5) Foreign Ministers agreed they would be prepared to drop "in the absence of reunification" in sub-paragraph (E) if necessary in course of negotiations.

Herter

**491. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 29, 1959, midnight.

Secto 418. Eyes only for Ambassadors at Moscow, London, Bonn; Paris Ambassadors Houghton and Burgess and Berlin Gufler. Subject: Private Session.

After lunch today, the Secretary and Gromyko, with advisers,¹ had two and one-half hour discussion of Soviet and Western July 28 papers.² Secretary probed hard on Soviet insistence on link, and Gromyko applied equal pressure for evidence of Western willingness to agree to troop reductions in Berlin. Our impression from discussion is that Gromyko is under considerable pressure to obtain Western concessions on troop issue and would be prepared to pay the price of dropping the link. In reply to repeated questioning by Gromyko Secretary indicated that Soviet concession on link could have some bearing on Western attitude toward reduction of troop levels, but he carefully eschewed language that could be interpreted by Soviets as a commitment. Secretary informed Gromyko he must leave Geneva next Wednesday to attend Santiago Conference and suggested, if no agreement by then, negotiations be continued at Deputy level or recessed. Gromyko rejected both suggestions on ground they would not be understood or accepted by world public opinion; he said only solution was to speed up tempo of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin. A detailed 10-page memorandum of this conversation, US/MC/163, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1342. The Foreign Ministers also discussed disarmament following the conclusion of their consideration of conference developments. A memorandum of this conversation, US/MC/164, is *ibid.*

¹ Herter was accompanied by Toon, Merchant, and Reinhardt; Gromyko by Zorin, Soldatov, and Martynov.

² See Documents 488 and 489.

negotiations in effort to reach agreement by Wednesday. His remarks on this point carried definite indication that he himself is anxious and probably under some pressure to bring negotiations to an early end.

Following additional points emerged from detailed discussion of Soviet and Western positions on various aspects of Berlin settlement as reflected by July 28 papers:

1. Preamble. Secretary objected to statement in Soviet preamble that objective of settlement is to change situation in Berlin on ground this seemed convey impression of liquidation of Western rights. Gromyko said he was prepared to drop entire preamble and substitute therefor a simple introductory clause reading: "Foreign Ministers have agreed on the following arrangements with regard to Berlin to be in force for 'X period'." The Secretary said he would consider Gromyko's suggestion.

2. Troop Reductions. In pressing for Western concession on troop level issue, Gromyko repeated his old argument that this would constitute proof of West's willingness to cooperate in reduction of tensions. Prodded by Zorin, Gromyko expressed view that a Berlin settlement without provision for reduction of Western troop levels would be "senseless". When queried by Secretary as to why Soviet July 28 paper extends reductions to armaments, as well as troop levels, Gromyko replied that this was a repetition of June 9 language and simply reflected logical assumption that if troops leave, their weapons go also.

3. Armament. Discussion revealed that misunderstanding on this point was one of language, not of substance. Gromyko made clear that Soviets have in mind only missiles (not rockets) which require ground installation for launching.

4. Activities. Despite Secretary's firm insistence on absolute reciprocity, Gromyko gave no indication he was prepared to have jurisdiction of Soviet-proposed supervisory committee extended to East Berlin. Nor does he see any merit in assigning responsibility in this field to UN. He pointed out that before Geneva Conference Soviets had made exhaustive study of problem in Berlin from which they concluded that the only subversive and propaganda activities carried on in East Berlin are those in direct response to similar activities emanating from West Berlin. In any case, Gromyko was hopeful that GDR declaration, not yet drafted, would satisfy Western preoccupation with need for reciprocity.

5. Supervisory Committee. As indicated above, Secretary made clear that responsibilities of supervisory committee must cover both parts of Berlin and extend to all obligations undertaken by all parties, including Soviet commitment with regard to access procedures. Gromyko pointed out that Western obligations envisaged by agreement were new commitments whereas Soviet declaration was simply

confirmation of existing responsibilities on access. In his view, therefore, there was no justification for treating obligations equally from standpoint supervision of their fulfillment. Secretary replied that agreement must be equitable; either all obligations should be subject to inspection or all should be in form of unilateral declarations.

6. Access. While somewhat evasive in his response to Secretary's probing, Gromyko gave impression that Soviet declaration with regard to access would mean confirmation that Soviet responsibilities extend to civilian as well as military access and that maintenance of present procedures applies to communications between East and West Berlin.

7. Duration. The Secretary asked if language on duration in Western paper was acceptable to Gromyko. The latter replied that five-year term is unacceptable, that "in absence of reunification" should be deleted as serving no useful purpose, and that "arrangements" should be replaced by "question of West Berlin" as subject of negotiations which would take place on expiration of interim settlement. He made clear that such negotiations would be on basis of present conference composition—that is, four powers with Germans in advisory capacity. When Secretary pointed out that deletion of reference to arrangements could be interpreted as meaning that interim settlement and all prior agreements would expire on eve of negotiations, Gromyko felt this question was academic since any participant would be free to raise any question for discussion so long as it pertained to the Berlin problem.

He reiterated Soviet pledge not take unilateral action during life of interim agreement and subsequent negotiations; as to what situation would be thereafter, he could not say since impossible predict outcome of negotiations. Secretary pressed Gromyko to accept principle of continuing validity of interim arrangements, unless altered or dropped by four power agreement, but Gromyko said this violates concept of temporary solution and therefore not acceptable.

In discussion of future meetings, Gromyko readily agreed to Couve's invitation, relayed by Secretary, to join other Foreign Ministers at lunch tomorrow and made no mention of desirability of meeting in plenary session as he has consistently at previous private meetings.

After Gromyko's departure, Secretary gave full report to West Fomins on discussion. All felt Gromyko's apparent anxiety to wind up negotiations could be exploited to West's advantage. There was general agreement also on need to avoid any indication of possible concession on troop issue until other questions satisfactorily resolved. Otherwise with troop issue in his pocket, Gromyko would stiffen position on all other aspects. Lloyd suggested might be advisable leave this question open until subsequent meeting, presumably summit.

Herter

492. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 29, 1959, 9 p.m.

Cahto 182. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

The full report of my conversation with Gromyko today¹ is going forward to the Department tonight. After my reporting on the progress made to the Western Foreign Ministers² they felt that it might be possible to reach an agreement by next Wednesday. The two points on which they based their optimism were: first, Gromyko's evident willingness to conclude negotiations by the time of my departure here and second, his indication we would drop the All-German Committee link with an interim settlement of West Berlin provided we made some concession on the total troop numbers. We all agreed it would be foolhardy to make such a concession. In advance of clear-cut agreement on other points since it has now become obvious that this is a matter on which he sets more store than any other as being a symbol of our willingness to recognize the abnormal situation in Berlin as well as our willingness to continue talking with the Russians about it.

I am not as optimistic as my colleagues are but feel there is an outside chance of our making some simple deal involving three principal points: (1) some troop reduction; (2) access to Berlin as at present for both military and civilian personnel; (3) duration of agreement with rights protected when negotiations resumed for something between three and five years.

Gromyko knows of Khrushchev invitation and advised me [he] considers matter of Khrushchev visit to US and your return visit a settled matter. I cannot emphasize too strongly my feeling desirability release some statement this matter before end of our conference so that the two will not necessarily be directly related in public mind.

Faithfully,

Signed: Chris"

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/7-2959. Top Secret; Niact; No Distribution.

¹ See Document 491.

² See the last paragraph of Document 491.

493. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, July 29, 1959.

DEAR HAROLD: Thank you for your letters of July twenty-seventh¹ to which I have given careful thought. In the first place, I am inclined to agree with you that we may have reached the point where little good can come from continuing the talks at Geneva much longer. I would propose that we aim at bringing them to a conclusion about the middle of next week. In any event, Chris will have to leave about then to prepare for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States which convenes at Santiago, Chile, on August twelfth to consider the explosive situation in the Caribbean.

The problem then is what next? The answer seems to me to depend on whether or not Gromyko will accept our position of June sixteenth on our rights in Berlin with provision for a reasonable moratorium period of at least two and one-half years. If he does so, I would agree that the minimal requirement for progress had been met and that the way would be open for the Foreign Ministers to agree on arrangements for a Summit. Indeed, they could even pass the final decision on the length of the moratorium to the Heads of Government.

Unfortunately, my interpretation of what has happened so far at Geneva is that there has been no agreement by Gromyko on our rights formula but only a certain clarification of positions and a sharpening of the issues.

This view, I may say, is fully shared by Chris, and he informs me that he has made this very clear to Selwyn. Therefore, barring a last-minute shift by Gromyko, which I do not entirely exclude, we are faced with an awkward situation where our minimum hope for progress has not been met. To go immediately to a Summit under these conditions would run the grave risk of spectacular failure or unthinkable capitulation.

It was with this in mind that I have been in communication with Khrushchev about a visit to the United States.² It seems to me that this

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Transmitted in telegram 765 to London, July 29 at 9 p.m. for Ambassador Whitney and to Geneva in Tocah 202. A copy was also given to Hood during the evening of July 29 for delivery to Macmillan.

¹ One of these letters is printed as Document 484; the other indicated Macmillan's preference for a Summit meeting September 1–10. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

² At 5 p.m. on July 29 Menshikov was handed the President's reply to Khrushchev suggesting that the exchange of visits take place in September and later in the fall. The President reiterated to the Chairman that progress at Geneva would facilitate the visit to the United States. See vol. X, Part 1, Documents 101 ff.

would be a logical next step. A ten-day tour by Khrushchev through the United States might be most helpful in giving him a better picture of our strength and of our way of life, and would certainly take the crisis edge off the Berlin situation. If, as I expect would be the case, I were to follow this up with a much briefer visit to Moscow, the stage might be set for further progress at the Foreign Ministers' level which could then lead to a Summit.

As you remember, one of the tasks assigned the Foreign Ministers was to arrange the date and place for a Summit Meeting once they had made adequate progress on substantive issues. I think we must stick to this arrangement. A sudden announcement of an "invitation" by me to a Summit would inevitably lend an additional air of crisis to the Meeting, the very thing we must strive to avoid if we are to achieve any worthwhile results at such a gathering.³

Khrushchev has expressed the desire to rest during August so I would envision his visit here taking place in mid-September with my return visit to Moscow to be later arranged. That would open the way toward a Summit some time in November or early December. I recognize of course that Adenauer and to a lesser extent de Gaulle might have some concern about such an exchange of visits. Therefore, I would propose to come to London or Paris for a Western Summit some time before Khrushchev's arrival here. This would also give me a long overdue opportunity to talk out some of our problems with de Gaulle. I would think that such a schedule would fully meet your preoccupations for the next three months. It would take the edge off the crisis and enhance the prospect of useful talks at the Summit.

I realize of course that there is a chance that Gromyko may suddenly give us what we want at Geneva. I had hoped that my exchanges with Khrushchev would lead to just this result. He must realize that his reception here would be far better if there had been at least a minimum of progress at Geneva. If we do have this helpful development, I would still think it desirable to adhere to my proposal to hold the Summit Meeting in November preferably in Quebec. This would enable me to talk with Khrushchev in the meantime and to do whatever I can to assure that his attitude during a Summit Meeting is based on maximum understanding of our Western attitudes, power, and resources. I don't want to overestimate the value of my conversations with and the impact on him of an exposure to the people and facts of life in this country. Nev-

³ On July 28 a draft of this letter was cabled to Herter for his comments. (Tocah 196 to Geneva; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1333) Other than minor textual changes only two major drafting revisions were made before the message was sent. The first one was moving this paragraph here from the end of the letter. See footnote 4 below.

ertheless, I cannot help but believe that the effect might be considerable and it might promote the very result at the Summit which you and I are so eager to achieve. This would be in line with your thinking, as I remember it, incident to your own visit to Moscow.⁴

Apart from the substantive considerations, there remains the risk of leakage. I would hope that this matter could be held most securely for a few days to permit determination of the Russian attitude at Geneva.

With warm regard,

As ever,

Ike⁵

⁴The second drafting change was the deletion of part of a paragraph at this point in the text and moving the rest, at the request of Herter; see footnote 3 above. The paragraph originally read:

"However if we should get an unexpectedly favorable reaction from Gromyko in the next few days, and if you feel that it is important to you to get the Summit over before September 10th, I will of course instruct Chris to join Selwyn in trying to work out such arrangements at Geneva. As you remember, one of the tasks assigned the Foreign Ministers was to arrange the date and place for a Summit Meeting once they had made adequate progress on substantive issues. I think we must stick to this arrangement and not face either our friends or Khrushchev with a sudden 'invitation' from me."

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

494. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 30, 1959, noon.

Secto 419. Paris pass USRO. In addition to those reflected in Secto 413¹ we have following comments on new Soviet proposal handed us last night by Soldatov.

New Soviet proposal is of course totally unacceptable and in some respects even more objectionable than June 19 proposal. Obligations which bind West are now spelled out in greater detail than in pre-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-3059. Secret. Repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, Paris, and Berlin.

¹Secto 413, July 28, transmitted a point-by-point comparison of the Soviet and Western proposals of July 28. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-GE/7-2859)

vious Soviet proposals. Furthermore all Western commitments under interim Berlin solution are in form of obligations whereas Soviet undertakings are expressed as unilateral declarations. Text of proposal reflects clear design on part of Soviets to enhance status of GDR through reference to conference participants as parties to agreement (which in Soviet view includes GDR), declaration by GDR on non-interference, and specifying desirability of negotiations "between German states".

We have following specific comments on text of new Soviet proposal:

1. In preamble objective is described to change situation on West Berlin. This, coupled with description of measures as of interim nature, would set stage for elimination of Western rights.

2. Extending concept of force reduction to armaments could be claimed to imply Western commitment to restrict forces in West Berlin to light weapons. Might also provide basis for Soviet or GDR claim to inspect military cargo moving to Berlin.

3. Specifying "rocket installations of any kind", a broader definition than heretofore, could mean Western agreement to eliminate all rocket weapons, such as bazookas, from arsenal available to West Berlin force.

4. With regard to activities, West is obligated to ban in West Berlin interference in internal affairs, subversive activities, and hostile propaganda directed against all Communist states, whereas other side's undertaking is limited to non-interference in internal affairs of West Berlin and this is simply in form of unilateral declaration by GDR.

5. By including in definition of supervisory committee's responsibilities the taking of measures to insure implementation of agreement, Soviet proposal could be interpreted as according executive authority to committee. Joint press spokesman has indicated jurisdiction of committee could extend to access although, if this then case, question arises why access clause follows committee clause.

6. In provision dealing with all-German negotiations question, use of phrase "have pronounced themselves in favor of" may reflect Soviet sensitivity to Western criticism that original Soviet proposal for all-German committee embodies element of coercion on two parts of Germany. Furthermore, link between all-German committee and Berlin settlement appears to be maintained, although Soviet press spokesman intimated last night this not necessarily the case.

Herter

495. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State

Geneva, July 30, 1959.

Secto 433. Private Session. In two and one-half hour private discussion following Couve's luncheon today, Foreign Ministers went over much the same ground covered by Secretary and Gromyko at their bilateral talk yesterday¹ except that today's discussion was focused on Western paper.² Western Ministers deliberately avoided mentioning link on assumption that Secretary had elicited from Gromyko as much clarification of Soviet position as can be expected at this stage. Possibly for similar reasons, Gromyko refrained from pressing Western Foreign Ministers on troop level question. Despite persistent questioning, particularly by Couve, Gromyko refused to clarify what the situation would be at the end of interim agreement, resorting as in past to bare statement that during life of agreement and ensuing negotiations, Soviets would take no unilateral action. He continued to insist that Western commitments on troop levels, arms, and activities must be supervised but that West should rely on Soviet pledge alone with regard to access. He again rejected Western five year duration proposal and insisted that formula for duration must represent compromise between Western two and one-half year period (which Couve said was totally irrelevant to Berlin problem since it prescribed time within which all German free elections must take place) and Soviet one year proposal.

Thus, Gromyko's position on all fundamental points remained unaltered except possibly for slight movement toward West requirement for reciprocity re activities ban reported below. Virtually only change in situation as result of today's discussion was agreement with Gromyko's suggestion to appoint quadripartite working party for purpose attempting work out agreed language on various aspects of Berlin solution for subsequent consideration by Ministers. All Ministers, however, including Gromyko, doubted whether working party could profitably discuss anything but weapons and access formulas since differences on all other points remain deep and fundamental.

Following points in addition to those brought out in yesterday's bilateral meeting emerged from today's discussion:

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1316. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Bonn eyes only Ambassadors and to Paris eyes only Houghton and Burgess and to Berlin eyes only Gufler.

¹ See Document 491.

² See Document 488.

1. Troop levels: Gromyko saw no justification for including statement of Soviet intention no longer to maintain forces in Berlin in view of West's refusal to withdraw their troops.

2. Armaments: While there was general agreement that no misunderstanding existed on this point, Gromyko expressed his position in somewhat different terms from yesterday when he said Soviets had in mind missiles requiring ground installation for launching. He now says that while Soviet formula referring to "rockets" covers weapons only, it is not confined to ballistic weapons.

3. Activities: Gromyko conceded that Soviet-proposed Supervisory Committee could hear complaints on activities in both East and West Berlin. He made clear that Soviet preference for specific language and objection to Western formula was based on Soviet suspicion that latter would allow such broad latitude of interpretation to West Berlin authorities that all activities could be encompassed in fundamental liberty reservation and there would be no change in situation. When Secretary suggested that best solution might be for each side to declare intention reduce activities in both parts of Berlin without requirement for supervision, Gromyko replied Soviets could not commit GDR whereas West, as occupation bosses in West Berlin, could order Brandt to comply.

4. Supervisory Committee: In re-stating Western refusal to permit supervision of Western obligations on troop levels and armaments, Couve pointed out that Governments would be directly responsible for implementation of these obligations whereas this would not be true of obligation to effect reduction propaganda and subversive activities. Any complaint, therefore, of failure to carry out such obligations would be a matter for discussion between Govts and not by any commission.

5. Duration: In discussion of this point, Western Powers attempted to pin Gromyko down on what would be situation at end of agreement. Couve saw only two possibilities: either status quo ante with lapse of obligations undertaken by parties to interim agreement—that is, present situation; or prolongation of agreement—that is, present situation as modified by agreement. Gromyko gave stock evasive reply that in negotiations to follow expiry of agreement any party could raise any question relating to Berlin.

It was agreed that Quadripartite Working Party would meet tomorrow at 11:30 and Ministers would meet at Gromyko's for "Working Tea" at 4:00 p.m. Gromyko again made no mention of desirability of holding early plenary session.

Herter

496. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, July 30, 1959, 9 p.m.

Cahto 183. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

Western Foreign Ministers talk with Gromyko today¹ made clearer that three major unresolved points will make agreement very difficult. The first deals with the continuation of Allied rights in Berlin on which we feel it essential to get some language which in light of past Russian statements and threats will give us strength in any renewed negotiations after possible moratorium for few years. The second is the Soviet increasing insistence on some reduction in troop levels in Berlin which to them appears to be almost a sine qua non in order to show: a) that they have made tangible progress in changing status quo Berlin; b) this beginning of liquidation of occupation rights; c) such a shock to morale Berliners as to begin a psychological deterioration of real importance. Third, the linkage of direct all-German talks with the time limit to be put on any temporary moratorium agreement on Berlin.

We consider the first point a practical necessity. Couve agrees but Selwyn very wobbly. On second point, all my advisers here as well as Ambassador Bruce and military, including commanding officer Berlin, Norstad, and Pentagon, strongly opposed any reduction beyond present levels but willing to place ceiling at that point.² Von Brentano and Mayor Willy Brandt bitterly opposed any reduction not so much for military reasons as for psychological reasons. I am personally terribly reluctant to make any concessions this point. Couve feels we could get agreement at level somewhere between 8,000 to 10,000 and would favor this if it were last sticking point towards agreement. Selwyn takes same position as Couve but insistent this be kept as very final concession. On third point, impossible accept all-German committee in form proposed by Soviets since impossible to get West German concurrence and hence pledge by us no value. All three of us feel we cannot go beyond substitute four-power committee with German advisers which we have offered and believe Soviets would as last resort accept this rather than nothing. Also feel Soviets likely to drop linkage if they can get concession on point 2.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-3059. Top Secret.

¹ See Document 495.

² These conclusions were made in a July 29 paper that included the comments of Hamlett, Norstad, the JCS, CIA, and the Department of State. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1282)

Remembering Foster Dulles' own feeling which as I recall you shared that troop numbers in Berlin were negotiable point, I would deeply appreciate your personal reaction on this and the other two points mentioned.

It is just possible of course that we could not reach agreement because of rights issue and that troop levels might not come to decision. However, we must be prepared on this point, since it might even become quid pro quo for acceptance wording assuring our rights.³

Faithfully, signed: Chris."

Herter

³On July 31 the President replied:

"I agree with you that it is essential to obtain agreements satisfactory to us on points one and three Provided we have obtained firm agreement on these two items, I would be prepared to accept a unilateral statement by Western powers that they would limit their forces in Berlin to a figure such as that mentioned by Couve. In my opinion this is clearly a political and psychological matter and has no military importance. A modest reduction of this order should not cause lasting discouragement in Berlin. If such a modest reduction in forces becomes necessary we should make every effort to put it in its true light to the Berliners and the West Germans and be willing to accept some temporary discouragement as the price for a sound agreement on the issues of basic importance to us." (Tocah 219 to Geneva, July 31; *ibid.*, Central Files, 110.11-HE/7-3159)

497. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, July 30, 1959, 4 p.m.

580. Geneva for Secretary. Deptel 765 sent Geneva Tocah 202.¹ I called on Prime Minister this morning at his request. He was in relaxed mood and had already received and studied President's message reftel and had begun to draft reply.

Most significant of his comments to me seemed to be acknowledgment, albeit unenthusiastic, that he now realizes impracticality endeavor-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/7-359. Top Secret; Presidential Handling; Limit Distribution.

¹See Document 493.

oring to prepare for and hold full “summit” meeting prior to September 10. I am not sure, however, that his reply will clearly make this point.

Although, as I expected, he expressed doubts regarding idea of Khrushchev’s meeting meanwhile with President, he believes it important that we press forward with earliest possible announcement regarding “summit” and meanwhile make every effort, before Foreign Ministers’ discussions wind up in Geneva, to take as practical positions as possible, especially in view of invitation outstanding. I did not find his reservations regarding Khrushchev’s meeting with the President very sound, and argued that we would be following in his footsteps and performing service for and with full approval of the Alliance.

Whitney

498. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower

London, July 30, 1959.

DEAR FRIEND, I was glad to get your message of July 29.¹ I agree that the talks at Geneva must be brought to a conclusion within the next days. The latest reports from there suggest that there is now a chance of making some further last-minute progress. Gromyko seems to be showing signs of wanting to do business. I hope we shall not discourage him. After all, we are not at this stage aiming at more than an interim settlement on Berlin. And, if we are asking for a moratorium, we cannot expect that our rights should be guaranteed beyond the end of the renewed negotiations. That surely is what a moratorium means.

We may therefore get within the next few days a conclusion at Geneva which you could regard as progress. On further reflection however I agree with you that even if that happens it would not be wise to try to proceed at once to a Summit meeting. A later date would now be more convenient for us all.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 204. Top Secret and Personal. Attached to a transmittal note from Hood to Murphy dated July 30. A copy was also delivered directly to the White House on July 30.

¹ Document 493.

Therefore I am in broad agreement with the timetable which you now have in mind:

- (1) A Western Summit before the end of August;
- (2) Khrushchev's visit to you and your return visits during September and October; and
- (3) A full Summit meeting in November. Quebec would suit me very well. I am very happy to know that in your journeys you will be able to include a visit to us.

I am not sure whether it will be necessary to interpose a further meeting of Foreign Ministers between (2) and (3). If the Foreign Ministers make substantial progress over the next few days they may be able to take up, before they recess, their duty of discussing arrangements for a Summit meeting. Indeed it may be difficult for us to decline to do so if Gromyko raises the question; for, as you yourself say, it was one of the tasks remitted to them. They may themselves be able to recommend a date in November. On the other hand, if this is not possible the time and place could be arranged during Khrushchev's visit to you. In any case it does not seem likely that there will be much further progress which the Foreign Ministers could make at an adjourned meeting in the autumn before a Summit.

I hope therefore that we can get agreement between all the Western Powers on the following programme for further negotiations in the coming months:

- (1) We should aim to secure that the Geneva meeting is recessed next week either with a Summit fixed or on a basis which will enable us to claim that some progress has been made and that we can look forward to further negotiations.

- (2) We should hold a Western Summit in Paris before the end of August, at which the Heads of the Western Governments would review the results of the Geneva meeting.

- (3) This would be followed by a period of personal contacts between yourself and Khrushchev during which exploratory discussions would continue.

- (4) As a result of all these preparations, a full Summit before the end of the year, not in an atmosphere of crisis, but with a prospect of success based on these intermediate stages of negotiation and discussion.

I do not believe that we can present a firm Western position to public opinion unless we can say that the process of negotiation will continue over the coming months and culminate in a Summit meeting before the end of the year. Certainly for opinion here it is of first importance that we should make it plain as quickly as we can that there will be a Western Summit before the end of August and that a full Summit will follow later in the year.

I hear that de Gaulle is doubtful about the need to hold a Western Summit before Khrushchev's visit to you. I do not understand why he is

taking this view. For my part I should welcome the opportunity for consultation before you see Khrushchev and I think it very important that this should take place. It really is essential that the Western Governments should be able to take stock of the position and clear their lines before Khrushchev's visit. Moreover, I know that you also want to talk to de Gaulle about other matters and I am sure that this is most important and urgent. I hope therefore that you will feel able to press de Gaulle very strongly to fall in with your plan for a Western Summit in Paris in August. In the last resort, if he proves obdurate, I would prefer to hold a Western Summit in London with France represented by Debre rather than defer it until after Khrushchev's visit.

I believe that you and I are pretty well at one on a plan for continued negotiations in the months ahead. There is, I think, only one real difference between us. You are reluctant to say now that there will be a Summit meeting, though I believe that you recognize that it is in fact inevitable. I, on the other hand, should like to get it settled and announced now that there will be such a meeting before the end of the year. This is not because I want a Summit for its own sake. I have never wanted that. What I have wanted is a settlement, and I have always believed that a settlement could only be reached by negotiation between Heads of Government. Nothing that has happened at Geneva has made me revise this opinion. Indeed it has confirmed me in the view that if we are to reach a settlement we must do so at a Summit meeting.

With warm regards,
As ever,

Harold²

²Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**499. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 31, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 442. Secretary saw von Brentano this morning at latter's request. Foreign Minister expressed concern over recent developments at Geneva, particularly alleged trend on part Western powers towards

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-3159. Secret; Limit Distribution. A detailed six-page memorandum of this conversation, US/MC/162, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1342.

making additional concessions. He argued that breakup of conference would be preferable to further concessions which would only increase Soviet appetite. Could not see how in face of continuing Soviet intransigence, there was any possibility of agreement in last few days before departure of Secretary.

Secretary pointed out that Western position was not weak but continuingly firm on basic issues. West would stand fast on preservation of rights and unacceptability of all-German committee. Issue of troop levels had acquired psychological as well as purely numerical aspect. Western powers agreed they would only discuss this if it were last outstanding item and there were compensatory advantages in rest of arrangements agreed. Secretary said he considered it highly unlikely we would reach this point in discussions or that agreement could be attained by Wednesday. Such agreement would require significant change in Soviet position.

Secretary noted that Gromyko was undoubtedly creating impression that Soviets were willing continue negotiating and that any breakdown of conference was due to Western powers acting under pressure from FedRep. Impression would be particularly bad, Secretary noted, if through pessimistic press accounts, such as had been appearing during last twenty-four hours in German newspapers, impression were created that West Germans were applying pressures on other Western powers to strengthen determination against making unacceptable concessions.

Von Brentano said he agreed such impression would be most unfortunate and intimated he had not come in effort exert pressure on Secretary but merely to obtain privately benefit of his views as well as to express his personal concern over developments of last few days. He noted that Gromyko was undoubtedly aware of heavy pressures from Prime Minister under which Lloyd was working and took this into account in calculating strength of Western position. Von Brentano urged that Secretary assert himself more clearly as spokesman for West even though this might mean offending certain sensibilities.

At initiative von Brentano luncheon hastily improvised for today to give Secretary opportunity talk with Governing Mayor Brandt who arrived in Geneva yesterday evening on invitation German Foreign Minister.¹

¹The U.S. Delegation reported in Secto 443, July 31, that Herter and Brandt went over the same ground in their conversation following the lunch at 1:15. p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-3159)

**500. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, July 31, 1959, 10 p.m.

Secto 441. American Embassies Moscow, London, Bonn—eyes only Ambassador. American Embassy Paris—eyes only Houghton and Burgess. US Mission Berlin—eyes only Gufler. Private Session. Two hour meeting of experts this morning and two and one-half hour private discussion of Foreign Ministers this afternoon at Gromyko's "working tea" were unproductive.

Foreign Ministers devoted most of afternoon to persistent probing on what juridical situation would be at the end of an interim agreement but their efforts succeeded only in eliciting from Gromyko virtually the same evasive and unresponsive statements which he has repeated untiringly since private sessions began. Only variation in Gromyko theme was his statement that at end of interim period a "certain situation" would obtain, but he refused to define what this would be. In other respects, his replies were identical with past responses—i.e., that agreement would expire at the end of the prescribed period, that negotiations at which participants would have right to raise any questions pertaining to Berlin would then begin, and that during negotiations Soviet Union would refrain from unilateral action. Gromyko characterized persistent efforts by all three Western Foreign Ministers to ascertain if Soviet position was that situation at end of agreement would revert to status quo ante as efforts to raise troublesome questions of rights and future of occupation regime which could only serve to complicate negotiations. Western Foreign Ministers he said are suspicious of Soviet motives and have no justification for being so. He called upon Western Foreign Ministers to concentrate on discussion of concrete interim arrangements on which agreement seemed feasible rather than focusing their attention on questions—meaning Allied rights—on which agreement impossible.

The other subject discussed by Ministers was question of activities, particularly procedure for ensuring compliance with obligations to be undertaken by both sides. While stressing that Soviet Union, unlike Western powers which "occupation bosses" of West Berlin, could not undertake commitments in East Berlin on behalf of GDR, Gromyko offered to consult East German delegation on nature of commitment GDR would be willing to assume with view toward producing new Soviet

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-3159. Secret; Limit Distribution. A detailed eight-page memorandum of this conversation, US/MC/167, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1342. The U.S. Delegation record also noted that the experts meeting at 11:30 on July 31 had been unproductive.

language embodying principle of reciprocity on which West insisting. He again made clear however that proposal containing language on fundamental rights and liberties would be unacceptable since this would be exploited as at present to justify continued West Berlin subversive and hostile propaganda activities.

Although confirming that four power supervisory committee would be entitled to hear complaints on activities in both East and West Berlin, he now implied commission must discuss any required corrective measures directly with GDR authorities. In other words, Soviet element on committee would not undertake responsibility for East Berlin as Western elements would be expected to for West Berlin. Meanwhile Gromyko continued to insist that responsibilities of four power supervisory committee must also extend to supervision of Western commitments on troop levels and armaments but not to Soviet responsibilities with regard to access.

It was agreed that Secretary and Gromyko who lunch together tomorrow would discuss arrangements for future meetings. Meanwhile Deputies could arrange meeting of experts if any side has new proposals to offer.

Herter

501. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, August 4, 1959, 2 p.m.

Cahto 204. Eyes only Ambassador. Herewith (1) our translation of letter from Adenauer to Secretary delivered by von Brentano July 31, and (2) Secretary's reply to Adenauer handed von Brentano Aug 3:

1. *Begin text*

Dear Mr. Herter: Federal Minister Lemmer has officially reported to me the conversation which you had with him in the presence of

Mayor Amrehn during your visit to Berlin.¹ From his description of this conversation I am forced to assume that you are not correctly informed about my position on the question of reunification. To make this position clear I am accordingly making the following remarks.

In the Soviet view, as has become clear recently in the statements of the all-powerful leader Khrushchev, any liberation of the Germans in the Soviet Zone from Soviet hegemony is as little likely at the present time through political means as is the liberation of the population of the satellite states from the same regime. The Soviet Union would approve the reunification of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone in the foreseeable future only under conditions which would insure the dominance of communism in West Germany. Such a reunification I refuse; since through it the seventeen million Germans in the Soviet Zone would not be helped and since the fifty million Germans who have been free up to the present would be enslaved, merely to comply with a formalistic conception of reunification. It would be evidence of lack of understanding of the character of a totalitarian regime if one were to suppose that, through linking a communistic with a democratic system in a single state, a mere equilibrium of forces could be achieved. Even under better conditions, to name just a few examples, the democratic systems in the Baltic States or in Czechoslovakia, could not endure, although the overwhelming majority of the populations was not communist. I must therefore maintain my reserve against all proposals which in order to achieve reunification would endanger freedom. I therefore also reject the "German plan" of the SPD² and similar proposals. Only when the free West through its policies has achieved a condition under which the Soviet Union no longer regards the Soviet Zone of Germany as an important strong-point in the conflict between the East and the West and therefore abandons the maintenance of the Communist system in the Soviet Zone, will reunification and freedom become a political possibility. Under such conditions, in my view, reunification must be achieved as quickly as possible without regard to the internal political consequences which would result or to the economic sacrifices which might be involved for the population of the present Federal Republic.

You told me when taking over your office that you would like to have develop between you and me the same official and friendly relationships that existed between John Foster Dulles and me. This is also my wish. The relationships between Mr. Dulles and myself rested upon fullest mutual frankness and truthfulness. I believe that my frank explanation should dispel any lack of clarity about my position and should

¹ See Document 478.

² See footnote 3, Document 254.

serve to deepen our relationship. With this motive in mind I send you the present letter. Signed Adenauer.

End text.

[Here follows the text of Secretary Herter's August 3 reply to Chancellor Adenauer. The reply is printed as Document 505.]

Herter

**502. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, August 1, 1959, midnight.

Secto 450. Moscow, Paris, London, Bonn, Berlin eyes only Ambassador and Gufler respectively. Private Session. Following lunch today Secretary discussed rights question with Gromyko for almost three hours. Despite persistent and concentrated grilling by Secretary with aim of eliciting clear statement that Soviets acknowledge interim agreement does not affect juridical situation, Gromyko's response was essentially verbatim repetition of position expressed at yesterday's private meeting of four Foreign Ministers.¹ As result of Secretary's repeated stress on fundamental importance West attaches to clarification of rights question, Gromyko now should clearly understand no agreement is possible without explicit understanding that rights remain unimpaired.

Secretary began discussion by informing Gromyko that what West seeks is not Soviet acknowledgment of permanency of occupation rights but simply statement that Gromyko agrees juridical situation at end of interim agreement will be exactly same as now. Clarification of this question, Secretary said, was essential for West especially in view of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/8-159. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin. A detailed seven-page memorandum of this conversation, US/MC/166, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1342. Following the discussion of conference matters Herter and Gromyko briefly discussed disarmament. A report on this conversation was transmitted in Secto 451 from Geneva, August 2. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 600.0012/8-259)

¹ See Document 500.

² See Document 377.

past Soviet statements, for example those in June 9 proposal,² that Soviet intention is to extinguish Allied rights. It would meet West's requirement in this respect if Soviets were prepared to include in text of interim Berlin settlement a statement that agreement in no way involves the question of rights.

Gromyko could not agree that text should include such a statement since this would oblige each side publicly to express its position on rights question and this would only complicate situation. West's position is that occupation regime should be continued indefinitely; Soviet position is that occupation regime is outmoded and should be ended. Best way to forestall public expression of such sharply conflicting positions would be to avoid any mention of rights in text of temporary agreement. It should be confined to definition of agreed concrete arrangements for prescribed period in Berlin. Secretary should understand that Soviet June 9 proposal was superseded by June 19 proposal which prescribes not end of occupation regime but beginning of negotiations when interim agreement expires.

Secretary pointed out that if, as Gromyko maintains, occupation regime does not automatically end at expiration of interim agreement then presumably Allied rights would remain valid. While this appeared to be logical implication of Gromyko's position, his refusal to make clear statement to this effect raised question in Secretary's mind as to real Soviet intentions. It is precisely to remove the suspicion that the Soviets regard an interim agreement as a first step toward ultimate liquidation of Allied rights that West must have unequivocal understanding that Soviets agree juridical situation would remain unchanged.

Gromyko replied this was impossible request to put to Soviets. He would be prepared to say that question of rights was not raised in connection with negotiation of interim agreement; but he could not agree to inclusion in text of agreement of statement that agreement does not involve rights. Latter would be construed as Soviet endorsement of prolongation of occupation regime which would be directly contrary to Soviet position. Secretary then said he must be completely frank with Gromyko. He should understand that so long as any doubt exists in Secretary's mind as to Soviet intentions with regard to Allied rights no interim agreement of any kind would be possible. Despite Gromyko's repeated assurances that West's suspicions are unfounded, Secretary could not avoid feeling that his evasive behavior during recent days' discussions of rights question means that Soviets do in fact regard interim agreements as significant step toward ultimate liquidation of Allied rights. The Secretary said that the longer this discussion went on the more convinced he became of this.

As the Secretary left, he asked Gromyko if, in likely event of failure to reach agreement by Wednesday, he would be willing to agree to re-

cess negotiations until September when all Foreign Ministers would be in US for GA Session. Gromyko said he did not favor recess "without some results", but indicated he would be prepared discuss subject further.

No quadripartite meetings scheduled, but Lloyd lunches with Gromyko Monday.

Following meeting, Western Foreign Ministers reviewed situation at Villa Greta. They agreed that question of rights was absolute sticking point. It was also agreed that Western coordinating group would meet tomorrow to review positions in order to be prepared in improbable eventuality that Gromyko at last moment might give on rights issue.

Herter

503. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Geneva, August 3, 1959, 5 p.m.

Cahto 199. For the President from the Secretary.

"Dear Mr. President:

After my Saturday talk with Gromyko¹ and a somewhat similar one Selwyn Lloyd had with him yesterday, it seems probable that we shall spend the next two days trying to find a satisfactory method of disengaging. We are hoping this can be done by agreement, but Gromyko appears to want a complete end to our talks. Selwyn Lloyd is sounding him out on this now. While none of us are happy that after such a long period of time we could not have come up with a better result, the one cheering thing is that all four Western Foreign Ministers are in complete agreement with respect to our position as of now. Selwyn is being very stout even though his backing from home is wobbly.

I hope it will be possible for me to see you Thursday afternoon soon after my return.

Faithfully, signed: Chris."

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-HE/8-359. Secret; Niact.

¹See Document 502.

**504. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers
Meeting to the Department of State**

Geneva, August 3, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 457. Moscow, London, Bonn, eyes only Ambassador. Paris eyes only Houghton and Burgess. Berlin eyes only Gufler. Private Session.

Selwyn Lloyd lunched with Gromyko today and at subsequent meeting of Western Foreign Ministers reported that there has been little discussion of substance other than a short exchange on the subject of rights. Gromyko had floated a suggestion that agreement might be reached on language which read "these arrangements with respect to Berlin do not deal with rights" but he did not press this proposal when Lloyd replied negatively.

Lloyd then handed Gromyko the following text of draft communiqué which had been agreed by Western Foreign Ministers: "The Foreign Ministers of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America met in Geneva from May 11 to June 20 and from July 13 to August 5, 1959, to consider questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. They endeavored to narrow the differences between the respective points of view on these questions but despite frank and comprehensive discussions were unable to reach an agreement.

"The Foreign Ministers have therefore agreed to report the result of their discussions to their respective heads of government and to recommend that the date and place for the resumption of the discussions should be settled through diplomatic channels."

Gromyko did not take particular exception to the draft but said he would prefer a longer document. Lloyd had replied that it was too late to try to work out a long document and that it was better to fully agree on something brief.

Lloyd suggested that the final plenary could be held Wednesday morning, thus allowing time for it to run over into the afternoon if necessary. Gromyko did not take exception but said he would like to think it over. Asked if he wanted a private meeting tomorrow, Gromyko showed no particular interest but said he would be glad to come to lunch if invited. Western Foreign Ministers agreed to lunch with Gromyko at Lloyd's house. It is expected that the conversation will deal principally with the problem of the communiqué.

Herter

505. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Chancellor Adenauer

Geneva, August 3, 1959.

DEAR DR. ADENAUER: I appreciated receiving your frank expression of views¹ on the question of German reunification. As you indicated, such frankness is a necessary ingredient of the kind of relationship of mutual trust and friendship which, I know, we both wish to have develop between us. This is something which I not only personally desire, but which I believe to be essential to the fullest harmonization of the policies of our Governments.

It is impossible to disagree with your realistic view that the Soviets will not permit the reunification of Germany, except on terms implying the communization of the entire country, until a possible point has been reached where they are willing to consider abandoning the communist system in the Soviet Zone because they no longer regard this area as significant in the conflict between the East and the West. This has been amply evidenced by the position taken by Mr. Gromyko on reunification during the course of the current Geneva Conference. I need not tell you, however, that constant pressure from the West in advocacy of reunification is required to keep before the eyes of the world and the German people the harsh reality of Soviet obduracy which lies at the bottom of the continued division of the country.

I regret very much if my luncheon remarks to Federal Minister Lemmer gave the impression that I was not fully aware of the basic agreement in our thinking in this matter. You will undoubtedly have received from Foreign Minister von Brentano full reports of the position consistently taken by the Western Powers at Geneva in rejecting the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee. Through the instrumentality of such a body, the Soviets presumably would hope to move towards their dual objectives of enhancing the status of the so-called German Democratic Republic and maximizing the influence of communism throughout the Federal Republic without contributing in the slightest to the achievement of that reunification in freedom which can be the only kind of reunification acceptable to the West.

With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter²

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and handed to Brentano on August 3 for delivery to the Chancellor.

¹ See Document 501.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

506. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/168

Geneva, August 4, 1959.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Toon

U.K.

Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Sir Patrick Reilly
Mr. Morgan

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
M. Lucet
M. Laloy
Mr. Andronikov

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Zorin
Mr. Malik
Mr. Martynov
Mr. Pervukhin (Gromyko's
residence only)
Mr. Ilichev (Gromyko's residence
only)

SUBJECT

Private Discussions of Final Communiqué

A. *At Lloyd's Villa*

Before proceeding to a discussion of the Western draft communiqué which Lloyd had handed Gromyko on August 3 (Annex A),¹ the Ministers exchanged views on how the conference should end. Gromyko said that the Ministers should decide whether the conference would end on August 5 or should remain in session. Lloyd pointed out that practical considerations made it desirable to agree that the conference would terminate on August 5. In the first place, as Gromyko was aware, the Secretary would have to leave on August 6 in order to attend the Santiago Conference. Secondly it would be useful to have an interval for careful examination of the two sides' positions on the questions before the conference since despite long and intensive discussion there remained fundamental differences between the two sides on important issues of substance.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1342. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Toon on August 6 and 7 and approved by Scranton on September 3. The meeting at Lloyd's residence was 1–3 p.m.; at Les Ormeaux, 6–8 p.m.; and at Gromyko's residence, 9:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.

¹ Annex A is not printed; for text of this draft, see Document 504.

Turning to the Western draft communiqué, Gromyko suggested the desirability of specifying areas of agreement and disagreement, including some reference to a Summit Conference, spelling out in greater detail the problems on which the conference in both plenary and private sessions focused. He could not accept the Western statement specifying the conference participants as the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers; while he would prefer to mention the six powers represented at the conference, he would be prepared to accept simply "the Foreign Ministers".

The Western Foreign Ministers concurred in the latter suggestion since this was the formula used in the recess communiqué. They believed, however, that Gromyko's general prescription for a final communiqué would involve lengthy and difficult negotiations. It would not be easy, for example, for the two sides to agree on language setting forth areas of agreement and disagreement. If this were done, the West would have to insist on making specific reference to the question of Allied rights; this alone would require going over much the same ground that had been covered in recent private sessions. With regard to a Summit Conference, the Western Foreign Ministers could not agree to Gromyko's suggestion that the communiqué reflect agreement on the desirability of a Heads of Government meeting since this decision should be reserved for the Heads of Government themselves in the light of reports by their Foreign Ministers. In the Western view, therefore, it was desirable to work toward a brief communiqué which could be easily and quickly agreed upon.

Gromyko continued to believe that the communiqué should attempt to spell out the problems on which some progress had been made and those which required further discussion. While he would not insist on referring to a Summit Conference in view of the attitude of the Western Foreign Ministers, he still felt that the communiqué should touch upon problems other than the Berlin settlement that were discussed during the negotiations. He had in mind, for example, such questions as a peace treaty, European security, and disarmament.

It was pointed out that even this amended formula of Gromyko's would involve points of sharp controversy on which it would be difficult to work out agreed language. If Gromyko were to insist, for example, on mentioning the peace treaty question, the Western Foreign Ministers would have to insist on mentioning the problem of reunification. With regard to disarmament, it was suggested that this be covered in a separate communiqué since the discussions of procedures for continuing disarmament negotiations had taken place outside the conference.

Gromyko agreed with the latter suggestion. He also agreed to produce a draft communiqué which would incorporate the points which he felt should be mentioned.

At Lloyd's suggestion, it was agreed that Soviet and Western draft communiqués would be discussed by deputies at a meeting at Les Ormeaux at 6:00 p.m. and that the Foreign Ministers would meet at Gromyko's villa at 9:30 p.m. to consider the results of the deputies' discussion.

B. At Les Ormeaux

Zorin tabled the Soviet draft communiqué promised earlier by Gromyko (Annex B). There appeared to be tentative agreement on a compromise formula to replace the first five paragraphs of the Soviet draft (Annex C). At the last moment, however, Zorin withdrew his agreement to the compromise language, and the Western deputies thereupon withdrew their tentative approval also. The Western deputies did not object strenuously to paragraphs 6 and 7, the sharp disagreement on fundamental issues which the discussions had revealed and that the problems of mutual interest mentioned in paragraph 7 would be difficult to define. They pointed out that paragraphs 8 and 9 related to disarmament which they understood the Ministers had agreed would be covered in a separate communiqué. The result was that no progress was made at the deputies meeting except for agreement on the first and last two paragraphs of the Soviet draft, and the Foreign Ministers at 9:30 faced the task of beginning the negotiations anew.

C. At Gromyko's Residence

The Foreign Ministers discussed paragraph by paragraph the Soviet draft communiqué and ultimately reached agreement on a version which was ultimately adopted at the Plenary Session on August 5 (Annex D).²

In the course of the discussion, Gromyko pressed hard for Western acceptance of language referring to an interim settlement without relating it to Berlin. But the Western Foreign Ministers would have none of this, however, and it was finally agreed not to refer to an interim settlement at all. The Secretary opposed including in the communiqué Gromyko's statement that the discussions had been carried on in an atmosphere of "complete candor". He pointed out that Gromyko's persistent refusal to provide direct answers to Western inquiries with regard to the status of Western rights at the end of an interim agreement was anything but candor on Gromyko's part. Gromyko finally agreed to limit the description of the negotiations to "frank and comprehensive".

² Annex D is not printed; for text of the final communiqué, see Document 507.

Asked how press inquiries on the meaning of "useful exchanges of views on other questions" should be handled, Gromyko suggested that the press be informed that such questions related to European security, non-aggression undertakings, and problems of a strictly bilateral nature.

Gromyko readily accepted the Western suggestion that the communiqué should specify that the Foreign Ministers would report to their respective Governments, not to Heads of Government. He remarked wryly, however, that the reference to Heads of Government had been included in the original Western draft and he felt this was again a case of withdrawal of a Western suggestion when it was accepted by the Soviet side.

After there appeared to be full agreement on the text of the communiqué, Gromyko questioned the use of the preposition "in" in the expression "participants in the conference". He insisted that the preposition "of" should be used since he was convinced that use of "in" altered the meaning of the phrase. He implied that the West's insistence on "in" was designed to prevent an interpretation that the East Germans had participated in the conference. In a rather sharp exchange, Lloyd said that he thought it was inappropriate for Gromyko to tell the Western Foreign Ministers how the English language should be written; after all, he would not attempt to criticize Gromyko's use of certain words in the Russian language. The hour-long controversy over the use of the words "of" and "in" finally ended on the understanding that the question would remain open until the following day by which time, Gromyko said, he expected to conclude his research on the problem. (Gromyko did not raise the issue again, and the communiqué which appears as Annex D was adopted at the plenary session on August 5.)

It was agreed that a plenary session should be held on August 5 and Lloyd suggested that it begin at 1100, pointing out he hoped to be in London before 1900. Gromyko disagreed, saying that the past practice of holding plenary sessions at 1530 should be continued. Lloyd suggested a compromise time, and Gromyko ultimately agreed to 1430.

Annex B³

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

Geneva, August 4, 1959.

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF 1959

1. The Conference of Foreign Ministers in Geneva conducted its work from May 11 to June 20 and from July 13 to August 5, 1959. The Conference considered questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the Berlin question.
2. As a result of the detailed and comprehensive discussion of questions relating to West Berlin the positions of the sides on a number of questions have come closer together and the possibility of agreement has materialized.
3. The results of the consideration of the above questions and the rapprochement in the positions facilitate the attainment through further negotiations of the necessary agreement between the parties concerned.
4. The participants in the Conference have agreed that the understanding, which would include these questions where the differences have not yet been fully removed, should be expressed in an appropriate interim agreement.
5. They agreed that further efforts should be made to achieve final agreement.
6. The participants of the Conference note that the work of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers proceeded in an atmosphere of candor and the desire to find such solutions as would correspond to the interests of easing international tension and strengthening peace, which is the unalterable aspiration of peoples.
7. Furthermore, the participants of the Conference had the opportunity to have a useful exchange of views on other questions of mutual interest.
8. During the work of the Conference a private exchange of opinions took place between the Ministers with regard to further negotiations on questions of disarmament. Agreement was reached on the necessity for setting up such a body as would appropriately promote the success of these negotiations.
9. The results of the exchange of opinions on this question will be announced within a matter of days.

³Secret. Unofficial translation.

10. The Foreign Ministers have agreed to report the results of the work of the Conference to their respective Heads of Government.

11. Agreement has been reached that the date and place for the resumption of the work of the Conference will be settled through diplomatic channels.

Annex C⁴

Proposal by the British, French, and United States Delegations

Geneva, August 4, 1959.

VARIANT FOR FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS OF SOVIET DRAFT COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS 1959

The Conference of Foreign Ministers met in Geneva from May 11 to June 20 and from July 13 to August 5, 1959. The Conference considered questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers set out their respective points of view on these questions. As a result of the detailed and comprehensive discussion of questions which might be included in an interim agreement relating to Berlin some of the differences between them were narrowed. They agreed that further efforts would be necessary to reach an agreement.

⁴ Secret.

507. Editorial Note

The 25th and final plenary session of the Foreign Ministers Conference was held from 2:30 to 6:55 p.m. on August 5, in the Council Chamber of the Palais des Nations with Foreign Secretary Lloyd presiding. Each of the Foreign Ministers, including both German advisers, made a concluding statement which was followed by the release of the conference communiqué. For texts of the final statements, circulated as RM/DOC/69-72, A/20 and 21, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, pages 486–511, 560–563, and 598–603 or *Cmd.* 868, pages 309–329 and 349–357. Herter's statement is also printed in *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pages 676–683, or *Department of State Bulletin*, August 24, 1959, pages 265–269. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of the final session in Secto 478 from Geneva, August 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/8-559) The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VR/25 (Corrected), is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1406. The final communiqué reads as follows:

"The Conference of Foreign Ministers met in Geneva from May 11 to June 20 and from 13 July to 5 August, 1959.

"The Conference considered questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

"The positions of the participants in the conference were set out on these questions.

"A frank and comprehensive discussion took place on the Berlin question.

"The positions of both sides on certain points became closer.

"The discussions which have taken place will be useful for the further negotiations which are necessary in order to reach an agreement.

"Furthermore the conference provided the opportunity for useful exchanges of views on other questions of mutual interest.

"The Foreign Ministers have agreed to report the results of the conference to their respective Governments.

"The date and place for the resumption of the work of the conference will be settled through diplomatic channels." (*Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, page 683, or *Department of State Bulletin*, August 24, 1959, page 269)"

Index

- Access (*see also* Contingency planning; German Democratic Republic access control), 23, 102
- Allied Political Advisers meetings, 3-6, 7*n*, 8*n*, 10*n*
- Berlin economy and, 70, 72
- British position, 3-6, 8*n*, 9, 29-30, 35
- corridor proposals, 108, 189, 1035-1036
- four-power commission proposals, 1050-1051
- free city proposal and, 150-152
- French position, 4, 9, 27, 29-30, 35, 592
- GDR access control and, 125-126
- GDR recognition and, 49-50
- FRG position, 19, 21-22, 143
- land *vs.* air, 1, 11, 228, 353
- legal basis, 11-12, 46, 54, 59, 263-264, 515, 536, 566-569
- military truck inspection, 27, 29-31, 35, 37-38, 79, 81, 99-101
- Babelsberg incident, 69, 71-75, 77
- Hodes-Zakharov discussion, 24-30
- Marienborn incident, 310-311, 316-317
- Soviet blockade, possible, 41, 102-103, 108
- Soviet document stamping, 3-6, 4-10, 8*n*, 9
- Soviet position, 4-6, 775, 787
- Soviet use of force, possible, 51
- U.S. assurances, 21*n*, 23, 39
- U.S. study team, 474-475, 500, 505, 525, 527-528
- waterway toll issue, 37, 77-78
- Adenauer, Konrad, 94, 340-341, 518, 607, 645-647
- Central Europe forces limitation, 679-680
- contingency planning, 104*n*, 194, 346
- de Gaulle meetings, 105, 136-137, 425-427, 460
- disarmament, 189, 309-310, 318-319, 327, 341, 531, 644, 680
- Dulles trip to Europe, 314-315, 336-351
- Adenauer, Konrad—continued
- Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 296, 313, 318-319, 327, 340, 350-351, 470, 678-681
- free city proposal, 136-137, 174
- German peace treaty, 256, 277, 307-309
- German unification, 258-259, 272-273, 308-310, 313, 421, 494, 538, 1103-1105
- Macmillan visit, 478-482, 484, 516-517, 530-531
- Macmillan visit to the Soviet Union visit, 336, 478-482, 606
- Mikoyan visit to the U.S., 254-255, 296
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 347-348, 404
- occupation statute abolition proposal, 93-94, 99, 110-111, 113-114
- Poland and Czechoslovakia, 234-235, 278
- political situation, 181, 494, 606-611, 618-620, 644, 848-849, 853-854, 877, 933
- Soviet attacks on, 363-364, 948, 966
- summit meeting, 469-470, 480-482, 493, 530, 990
- Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*), 106, 136-137, 180-183, 192
- Akalovsky, Alexander, 702*n*, 955*n*, 1057*n*
- Allen, George, 420, 626
- Alphand, Hervé, 138, 313, 317-318, 543, 616, 618
- contingency planning, 240-241, 243-244, 250, 262, 311-312, 370, 399-400
- GDR access control, 54*n*, 106*n*, 137, 312
- Alsop, Joseph, 283-285, 288-289
- Amrehn, Franz, 54, 55*n*, 56, 138, 1036-1039
- Anderson, Robert B., 424, 632
- Armitage, John A., 57*n*
- Austria, 16, 149, 151, 267, 507, 513-514

- Baraduc, Pierre, 1004
- Barbour, Walworth, 288-291
- Baudissin, Georg von, 529
- Becker, Loftus E., 224, 409, 446*n*, 474, 525, 706*n*, 718*n*, 773*n*, 871, 1044*n*
- Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 746-747, 799, 846, 870-871, 1003, 1040
- Beeley, Harold, 462, 464
- Belgium, 186, 214, 397-398, 551, 578
- Berding, Andrew H., 551, 702, 721, 737, 746, 764, 800, 815, 846, 870, 1003, 1041
- Berlin (*see also specific topics*):
- Dulles visit, 24
 - economic situation, 19-20, 70, 139, 181, 204, 353, 834
 - French policy towards, 589-595
 - FRG elections, 744, 750-751, 852, 854, 877-878, 889-891, 953, 982
 - FRG relations with, 23, 39, 107-108
 - Herter visit, 1003, 1014, 1053
 - morale, 444-445, 525, 599-600, 814, 834
 - NATO guarantees, 203, 567
 - 1954 tripartite declaration, 24, 53, 60, 70
 - OCB reports, 36-40
 - political situation, 58-59, 181, 204, 494, 956
 - Soviet occupation statute abolition proposal, 93-95, 99, 103, 105, 110-111, 113-115, 130, 149
 - Steinstuecken incident, 33-34, 39-40, 42
 - tripartite Foreign Ministers visit, 817-818
 - U.S. assurances, 21*n*, 23-24, 39, 44-45, 50-51, 53-54, 60-61, 129-130, 138-139, 182, 195-196
 - U.S. economic aid, 22-23, 39
 - Western forces in (*see also Central Europe forces limitation; force, use of under Contingency planning*), 146-147, 249, 637, 667-668
 - British position, 790, 796, 808-809, 817, 1096
 - French position, 569, 575, 806, 1096
 - FRG position, 144, 147, 189, 249, 974-975, 1037, 1054-1056, 1096
- Berlin—continued
- Western forces in—continued
 - Soviet position, 149-150, 153, 237-238, 280, 763-764, 773-776, 779-780, 782, 788, 796-797, 805, 825, 827, 866, 912, 952, 957, 1049-1050, 1081
 - U.S.-FRG discussions, 1054-1056
 - U.S. position, 163, 165, 813-814, 817, 856, 953-954, 970-971, 983, 1072
 - Western propaganda in, 163, 320, 736, 798-799, 802, 814, 822, 828, 866, 957, 1050, 1072-1073
 - Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC), 11, 14*n*, 38, 51, 64*n*, 103, 107, 475
 - Berlin Airlift (1948), 2, 15, 21, 100, 103, 122, 150, 174, 181, 240, 568
 - Bernau, Phyllis D., 81*n*, 85*n*, 118-119*n*, 249*n*
 - Blankenhorn, Herbert, 198-200
 - Boegner, Jean-Marie, 286
 - Boggs, Marion W., 1000*n*
 - Bolz, Lothar, 661, 704, 716-717, 741, 765, 813, 819-820, 851, 875, 982, 1017-1018, 1042-1043
 - Bonn Conventions, 561
 - Bowie, Robert, 510-512
 - Brandt, Willy, 16-19, 21-24, 39, 144-145, 189-190, 600
 - economic situation, 70, 834
 - Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 834, 845, 852-853, 888-890, 974-975
 - free city proposal, 144, 174
 - FRG elections location, 852, 854, 889-890
 - GDR access control, 54-56, 70-71, 128, 138-140, 143-144, 353-354
 - political situation, 38-39, 167, 494, 853-854
 - U.S. visit, 15-23, 305, 352-354
 - Western forces in Berlin, 974-975, 1054-1056, 1096
 - Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*), 145, 157, 204
- Brentano, Heinrich von, 203, 254, 348-349, 566-567, 656-658, 891, 1025-1026, 1096
- Central Europe forces limitation, 566, 656-657, 663, 727-728

- Brentano, Heinrich von—continued
 disarmament, 342, 558, 577, 663-664
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 342, 350, 721, 727-729,
 872-873, 899-900, 917, 929
 Western tactics, 554, 576-577,
 655-658, 661-672, 749-751,
 899-900, 978, 980-981, 986,
 1100-1101
 GDR access control, 93-95, 103-104,
 103-105, 144, 206-207
 German peace treaty, 560-561, 576,
 666-667
 German unification, 258-259, 555-557,
 559, 563-564, 581-583, 662-663,
 967-968
 Western Quadripartite Foreign
 Ministers Meeting (*December*
1958), 104, 156-157, 197-200,
 202-205, 209
- Brosio, Manlio, 66, 369-370
 Brown, Elizabeth, 446*n*
 Brown, L. Dean, 137*n*, 282*n*, 615*n*
 Bruce, David K.E., 24, 33-34, 195-196,
 254-255, 360, 363-364, 644, 718*n*, 744
 access, 1, 30-31, 35
 change in status of Berlin, 103, 105
 contingency planning, 1-3, 42-43,
 127-128, 220, 621-622
 force, use of, 144-148, 171, 195, 223,
 253-254, 405-407, 550*n*
 Dulles trip to Europe, 336
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 195, 360-363, 366, 622,
 676-681, 721, 1002-1003,
 1056-1057
 FRG position, 287, 644
 Western tactics, 646, 720*n*
 free city proposal, 136-137, 144-147
 FRG meeting request, 394-395, 402*n*
 GDR access control, 103-105, 128-129,
 143-144, 147, 148*n*
 German unification, 258-259, 364-366,
 373-375, 402-407, 583-584, 967-968
 Macmillan visit to the Federal
 Republic of Germany, 530-531
 Macmillan visit to the Soviet Union,
 478-482, 606
 political situation, 606-611, 644,
 848-849, 933
 summit meeting, 530-531, 644, 990
- Bruce, David K.E.—continued
 Western Four-Power working group,
 644-645
 Western Quadripartite Foreign
 Ministers Meeting (*December*
1958), 104, 136-137, 156-157, 194,
 220
 Bundy, William, 744, 764, 799, 847
 Burgess, W. Randolph, 80-81, 84-85,
 129-131, 164, 186-188, 396-398,
 649-650
 Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 261-262,
 970-971
 Burns, Findley, Jr., 69-74, 72, 90-92, 311,
 953-954
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 89-90, 834, 974-975
 GDR access control, 49-51, 54-56,
 70-71, 88-89
- Cabell, Lt. Gen. Charles P., 603
 Caccia, Sir Harold Anthony, 400,
 470-471, 674
 contingency planning, 106*n*, 250-252,
 251-252, 262, 399-400
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 469-471, 935-938,
 947-950, 963-965
- Calhoun, John A., 177*n*, 266*n*, 296*n*,
 356*n*, 408*n*, 446*n*, 1008*n*, 1019*n*,
 1035*n*
- Canada, 130, 187, 213, 397, 577-578, 650,
 978
- Canellopoulos, 579
- Central Europe forces limitation (*see*
also Disarmament; Germany,
 Federal Republic of (FRG), Western
 forces in), 318, 405, 489, 508, 511,
 537, 542-543, 565
 British position, 321-322, 324, 412,
 460, 479, 517, 526-527, 542-543,
 571, 665, 677, 979-980
 French position, 466-467, 537,
 542-543, 565-566, 571, 573,
 590-591, 613, 620, 665, 677
 Gaitskell plan, 591
 FRG participation in NATO and,
 663, 680
 FRG position, 460, 517, 543, 566, 577,
 591, 646, 649, 656-657, 660,
 663-664, 679-680, 727-728

- Central Europe forces
 limitation—continued
 German unification and, 535, 650, 758
 British position, 635, 646, 770
 French position, 557-558, 615
 global disarmament and, 565, 639
 IRBMs, 646-647, 664, 666
 NATO discussions, 573, 649
 Rapacki Plan, 80, 142, 146, 312, 341,
 507-508, 537, 571, 657
 British position, 460, 517, 526-527
 Soviet position, 82, 459, 598, 710-711,
 905, 979
- China, People's Republic of (PRC), 616,
 654, 746-747
- Clay, Gen. Lucius D., 19, 165-166,
 165-168, 263
- Conant, James B., 167
- Conciliation commission proposals, 802
- Congressional consultations, 265, 373,
 422-424, 428-438, 449-453
- Contingency planning (*see also* GDR
 access control):
 Ad Hoc working group, 101-102,
 161-162
 air access (*see also* high altitude
 flights *below*), 11, 40-42, 51, 89,
 180, 200-201, 219, 261, 1000
 force, use of, 195, 219, 242, 250, 501,
 510, 588
 air demonstration, 304
 airlift (*see also* self-blockade *below*),
 125, 475, 588
 Ad Hoc working group position,
 161-162
 British position, 64, 83, 87, 100, 226,
 231-232, 244, 251-252, 290,
 399-400
 communication to Soviet Union,
 284, 290, 304
 French position, 67, 131, 282, 286,
 312, 325, 329-331, 399
 FRG position, 70, 107-108, 144
 JCS position, 100, 175, 269, 423
 U.S. planning group discussions,
 441-442
 U.S. position, 2-3, 13, 91-92, 97, 128,
 166-167, 176, 219, 226, 242-245,
 251-252, 261, 320
- Allied guard substitution proposal,
 303-304, 357, 383, 399, 443, 587
- Contingency planning—continued
 Berlin Air Safety Center (*see also*
 airlift *above*), 11, 38, 51, 64*n*,
 76-77, 103, 107-108, 117
 British position, 38, 87, 106*n*, 135, 227,
 399, 496, 527
 dependent evacuation, 304, 306, 320,
 357, 424, 499
 economic countermeasures, 64, 72,
 96, 109, 169-170, 400, 498, 932,
 1001
 enclave protection, 34, 40, 42-43
 force, use of (*see also* pacific
 counter-blockade *and*
 preparedness measures *below*):
 air access and, 195, 219, 242, 250,
 501, 510, 588
 anti-Soviet reprisals (*see also* pacific
 counter-blockade *below*),
 628-629, 674
 British position, 82-83, 87, 102, 112,
 283-285, 292-294, 477, 547-548
 Clay proposals, 19, 165-166
 communication to Soviet Union,
 145, 165-167, 169, 171, 201, 226,
 250, 262, 295-296, 427
 Congressional consultations,
 432-434, 449-453
 Dulles press conference, 126-127
 free city proposal and, 145-147,
 159-160
 French position, 131, 191, 311-312,
 329, 344, 459, 465, 547
 FRG position, 55, 70, 107, 144,
 147-148, 195, 253-255, 263
 GDR access control and, 169, 195,
 223, 510-511
 general war (*see also* nuclear war
below), 253-254, 435, 459, 628
 British position, 159-160, 420,
 424, 479, 521
 JCS position, 265, 454, 476
 U.S. position, 44-45, 165-166, 195,
 220, 242-243, 301, 424, 435,
 450-451, 472, 501, 510, 512,
 515, 620, 631-632
 German unification and, 118
 Hammarskjöld position, 388, 390
 JCS position, 84-85, 119, 174-175,
 269-270, 301-303, 458-459

- Contingency planning—continued
 force, use of—continued
 land demonstration, 292, 500
 British position, 201, 225-229,
 240-244, 250-252, 260, 262,
 264, 284, 290, 292*n*, 321, 399
 French position, 250, 262, 282
 JCS position, 99-101, 116-117,
 259-265
 military truck inspection and, 74,
 99-101
 nuclear war and, 346-347
 photographic record, 476,
 498-499
 tripartite agreement, 357, 587
 tripartite discussions, 240-244,
 249-253, 551
 U.S. memorandum, 382-383
 U.S. planning group discussions,
 472, 476
 U.S. position, 75, 84, 161, 176,
 179-180, 218-219, 229-230,
 250-251, 301-302, 315-316,
 320, 498
 military planning (*see also* tripartite
 joint planning *below*), 38,
 545-547, 601-606, 624-634
 military risks, 101
 NATO role, 102, 424, 438-439
 nuclear war (*see also* general war
above), 346-347, 418-419, 434,
 452-453, 461, 651
 British position, 515, 521,
 641-643, 984
 U.S. position, 303, 405-407, 418,
 425, 434, 443, 452-453, 455,
 521, 550*n*
 public opinion, 264, 266, 292, 303,
 323, 334, 347, 422-423, 454-455,
 487, 515
 publicity, 283-285, 288-290, 626
 Soviet responses, possible, 101, 150,
 163, 626-627, 941-942, 958
 timing of, 501-502
 token force, 173-174
 U.N. appeal and, 528-529, 592-593
 U.S. planning group discussions,
 472, 476, 478
 U.S. position, 70, 81, 90, 97-98, 112,
 128, 292-294, 424
 warning proposals, 101
- Contingency planning—continued
 force, use of—continued
 Western Quadripartite Foreign
 Ministers Meeting (*December*
1958) and, 194, 212, 220
 French position, 132, 200-201, 219,
 302, 400, 552
 FRG information, 54, 65-66, 104*n*, 285
 FRG participation, 13, 64
 FRG position, 77, 79-80, 109, 192, 194,
 346-347
 high altitude flights, 475, 498, 500,
 533-534, 746, 765
 British position, 551-553, 622-624
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting and, 622, 836-837, 930,
 934
 U.S. position, 38, 41, 180, 621-622,
 746, 765, 836-837
 International Court of Justice appeal,
 185, 190, 462, 472, 474, 525, 765
 joint State-Defense study, 478, 500,
 533-539
 Khrushchev speech (*November 10,*
1958) and, 62, 65*n*
 legal aspects, 409
 NATO discussion, 66, 79-80, 129-131,
 369-370
 NATO participation, 64, 130, 295-296,
 650
 negotiation proposals, 108, 132, 135,
 192, 194, 227
 NSC discussions, 1000
 pacific counter-blockade, 413-417,
 420, 476, 501, 542
 preparedness measures (*see also*
 tripartite joint planning *below*),
 423, 432, 443
 British position, 232, 242, 320,
 460-461, 516, 552, 932
 French position, 330, 344, 516
 JCS position, 316*n*, 442, 454-455,
 458, 476, 499
 NATO general alert, 231, 242
 NSC discussions, 1000-1001
 planning, 384-385, 473
 Soviet reactions, 763-764
 tripartite agreement, 357, 584-585,
 587-588
 U.S. memorandum, 382-383

- Contingency planning—continued
 preparedness measures—continued
 U.S. planning group discussions, 472-473
 U.S. position, 223, 230-231, 243, 301, 306, 319-320, 330, 442-443, 541-542, 969
 press conference, 121-122, 125-127
 public opinion, 472, 477
 publicity, 370, 443-444, 633
 revision proposals, 161, 172-173, 177-180, 185, 191, 194, 200-201, 220
 self-blockade (*see also* airlift *above*), 70, 90-92, 97-98
 British position, 35, 226, 569
 U.S. position, 2, 71-72, 219, 226, 477, 541
 summit meeting and, 984, 1001
 supply levels and, 146*n*, 154, 252, 302, 320, 330
 traffic suspension, 548
 travel instructions, 116-117, 128-129, 132, 161
 tripartite agreement, 356-359
 tripartite discussions, 64, 240-244, 249-253, 462-465, 490-491, 551, 673-674
 Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*), 138
 tripartite joint planning, 399, 478, 495-497, 527-528, 585, 589
 tripartite paper, 547, 584-589
 tripartite participation, 14-15, 38
 U.N. appeal (*see also* International Court of Justice appeal *above*; U.N. guarantee/observer proposals), 383, 416, 472-473, 502-503, 631
 British position, 399, 462-464, 490-491, 502, 525, 548-549, 573
 French position, 329-331, 334, 399, 463, 491, 502, 541-542, 592-593, 612, 614
 GDR access control and, 474, 503
 Hammarskjöld position, 388-390
 NATO discussion, 397-398, 420
 tripartite agreement, 357, 502, 587-588
 tripartite discussions, 462-465, 490-491
 use of force and, 528-529, 592-593
- Contingency planning—continued
 U.N. appeal—continued
 U.S. position, 301, 303, 306, 319, 329-330, 332, 338, 376-377, 388-390, 406*n*, 420, 440, 446-448, 493, 969
 U.S.-British discussions, 931-932
 U.S. diplomatic relations breakoff, 476, 498, 631
 U.S. memorandum, 381-384, 398-400
 U.S. planning group, 441-444, 471-478
 U.S. position, 454-459
 Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*) discussion, 200-202
 Contractual agreement proposals, 535, 567, 580
 British position, 515, 518, 524, 535, 543, 567-568, 612
 French position, 543, 568-569, 612
 FRG position, 566-567, 600
 Cook, Don, 289
 Couve de Murville, Maurice, 105, 326, 333, 460, 560, 569, 592
 Central Europe forces limitation, 542-543, 557-558, 565-566, 571, 664
 contingency planning, 191, 200-201, 286, 325, 331, 541-542, 552
 force, use of, 219, 344, 547-548
 contractual agreement proposals, 543, 567-569
 disarmament, 565, 660-661, 664-666
 Dulles trip to Europe, 314, 325-328, 331, 333-334
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 326-327, 331, 669
 other countries participation, 540-541, 551, 661, 670, 692-693
 first part:
 plenary sessions, 692, 704, 724, 739-740, 753-754, 762, 790-791, 875, 887
 private sessions, 776-780, 784, 795-797, 806-807, 809, 824-830, 832, 840-844
 Western tactics, 541, 563, 572, 575-576, 658-670, 715, 748, 750, 861-862, 864-865, 896-899

- Couve de Murville,
 Maurice—continued
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting—continued
 second part:
 plenary sessions, 988-989, 997,
 1028-1029, 1042-1043
 private sessions, 1016, 1024
 U.S.-French discussions,
 1020-1021
 Western tactics, 978, 981,
 985-986, 1004, 1013
 GDR access control, 83*n*, 87, 326
 German unification, 557, 612-613, 662,
 665, 667
 Western forces in Berlin, 667-668,
 1096
 Western Quadripartite Foreign
 Ministers Meeting (*December*
1958), 190-191, 204-206, 208,
 218-219
 Western summit meeting
 proposals, 1020-1021
 Creel, Robert C., 7*n*, 8*n*, 10*n*, 22*n*
 Czechoslovakia (*see also* Four-Power
 Foreign Ministers meeting, other
 countries participation), 234-235,
 278-279, 1025-1026
- Dale, William N., 545*n*
 Daridan, Jean, 67, 141-142
 Davis, Richard H., 247-248, 913-917
 De Gaulle, Charles, 312, 329-330, 590,
 593, 652-655, 973
 Adenauer meetings, 105, 136-137,
 425-427, 460
 Central Europe forces limitation,
 466-467, 537, 590-591
 contingency planning, 302, 311-312,
 329, 465, 516, 651
 Dulles trip to Europe, 314, 329-334
 Eisenhower letters, 465-467, 488
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 312-313, 331-332,
 465-466, 652-655, 654-655
 German unification, 332-333, 651-654
 Macmillan visit, 460-461, 516
 summit meeting, 461, 480, 725-726,
 896
 De Vaucelles, 462-465, 491
 Debré, Michel, 329-332, 426, 459,
 612-613
- Defense, U.S. Department of, 101*n*,
 161-162, 475, 478, 500, 533-539, 535,
 602, 983-985
- Demilitarization. *See* Free city proposal.
- Denmark, 187, 213, 578
- Denny, Adm. Sir Michael, 229, 231, 244
- Dillon, C. Douglas, 752*n*, 757*n*, 910-911,
 1035
 contingency planning, 356-357,
 673-674, 836-837, 1000-1001
- Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting
 proposals, 1030-1033, 1045-1047,
 1076-1078
- Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 636-637, 738-739,
 868-869, 1008-1009, 1019-1020,
 1026-1027
 summit meeting, 757-758, 769,
 901-903, 913-917, 919-921,
 1076-1077
- Dirksen, Everett, 429-431, 436-438
- Disarmament (*see also* Central Europe
 forces limitation)
 British position, 565-566
 Central Europe forces limitation and,
 565, 639
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting discussion:
 French position, 326-327, 331-332,
 565-566, 591-592
 FRG position, 309-310, 318-319, 565,
 644
 French position, 565, 572, 591-592,
 635, 660-661, 664-666
 FRG position, 189, 341, 531, 558, 577,
 583, 656-657, 660, 663-664, 990
 German unification and, 309-310, 565,
 572, 583
 inspection and control (*see also*
 Central Europe forces limitation),
 639, 649, 657, 660-661, 663-665,
 983-984
 NATO discussions, 649-650
 nuclear testing, 343, 508, 690-691, 699,
 722, 745, 758, 760, 905-906, 972
 Soviet position, 390-391, 397, 649,
 690-691, 699, 707, 713, 722-723,
 901
 summit meeting discussion, 644, 760,
 768, 990

- Disarmament—continued
 surprise attack, 489, 636, 639, 656, 663-664
 Western Four-Power working group report, 565
- Disengagement proposals. *See* Central Europe forces limitation.
- Dittmann, Herbert, 255-258, 263, 266
- Dixon, Sir Pierson, 462-465, 490-491
- Dulles, Allen W., 421, 425, 429-430, 436, 478, 536, 538, 627-629, 739, 1001
- Dulles, Eleanor L., 7*n*, 8*n*, 10*n*, 15*n*, 22*n*, 65*n*, 154*n*, 352*n*
- Dulles, John Foster, 16-17, 80, 110, 124-125, 237-238, 569
 access, 11, 77, 81, 316-317
 Brandt visit to the U.S., 22-23, 305, 352-354
 Central Europe forces limitation, 321-322, 324
 Congressional consultations, 265, 437-438
 contingency planning, 14-15, 65-66, 77, 154, 161, 192, 200-202, 304
 airlift, 13, 125, 282, 304, 320
 dependent evacuation, 304, 306, 320
 force, use of, 81-84, 126-127, 195, 212, 220, 295-296, 302-303
 general war, 44-45, 220, 302, 346-347
 land demonstration, 85, 201, 218-219, 282, 301-302, 306, 316, 320
 public opinion, 266, 292, 323, 334, 487
 preparedness measures, 301, 306, 319-320, 330
 U.N. appeal, 301, 306, 319, 329-331, 334, 338
 death of, 761, 763, 766-767
 disarmament, 318-319
 Europe, trip to, 291-292, 312, 314-315, 317-351, 369
 Federal Republic of Germany, 336-351
 France, 325-335
 NSC discussion, 358-359
 United Kingdom, 317-324
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 272, 298-299, 302, 304-306, 332, 339-340, 349-351, 355
- Dulles, John Foster—continued
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting—continued
 date, 313, 317-318, 321, 349
 Geneva Conference proposals (1955) and, 318, 327-328, 332, 338
 free city proposal, 138, 142-143, 174, 210-212, 249, 275
 GDR access control, 68-69, 134, 299-300, 305-306, 312-313, 325-326, 337-338
 agency principle, 11-13, 78, 119-129, 138-141, 202
 French position, 137, 329-330
 GDR recognition and, 82-83, 118, 123-124, 173, 292-293, 320
 NATO discussion, 79, 84-85
 GDR recognition, 14, 245, 509
 German unification, 15-18, 245-246, 267-268, 271, 280-281, 318, 332-333
 illness, 164-165, 354-356, 359-360, 369, 432, 437, 439, 479-481, 607
 inter-German relations, 333
 Macmillan visit to the Soviet Union, 322, 324, 326, 336, 340, 411-412
 Macmillan visit to the U.S., 412, 438-439, 507-509, 512-515
 Mikoyan visit to the U.S., 233-239, 268-275, 296-297
 press conference, 121-129, 138-141
 resignation, 620
 summit meeting, 124-125, 486-487, 507-508, 514
 U.S. assurances, 39, 44-45, 129-130
 Western Four-Power working group, 333, 339
 Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*), 180, 193-196, 202-219
- EAC agreements, 11
- East Berlin. *See* Berlin; *specific topics*.
- Eckhardt, Felix, 967*n*, 968
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. (*see also* Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting proposals), 39, 85, 177*n*, 484*n*, 488*n*, 493, 535, 536-537, 822, 973
 Brandt visit to the U.S., 18-20
 Congressional consultations, 422-423, 428-437

- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—continued
 contingency planning, 128, 172-173,
 304, 424, 442, 498-500, 499, 534
 force, use of, 84, 301, 424, 465, 498,
 515, 625-634, 626, 633
 general war, 303, 425, 515, 521,
 550*n*, 631-632
 pacific counter-blockade, 413, 420,
 498
 summit meeting and, 984, 1001
 U.N. appeal, 420, 440, 493, 528
 De Gaulle letters, 465, 488-490
 disarmament, 635-636, 984
 Dulles, death of, 766-767
 Dulles trip to Europe, 291-292
 Dulles, illness of, 354-356
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 637, 771-772, 781, 891,
 1026-1027
 proposals, 176, 302, 304, 465-466,
 485
 publicity, 636, 815, 818-819
 recess proposals, 868-869, 876-877
 Western tactics, 526, 768-769, 847,
 858, 868-869, 892, 962, 971-973,
 1007, 1022
 free city proposal, 134, 142-143, 174,
 249
 GDR access control, 60, 118, 134,
 173, 175-176, 299-301, 422, 493,
 528
 GDR recognition, 420-421, 489
 German unification, 20, 421, 494, 524,
 538, 635
 Hammarskjöld meeting, 752-753
 inter-German relations, 488-489
 Macmillan visit to the Soviet Union,
 385-387, 392
 Macmillan visit to the U.S., 408-409,
 412, 421, 492-495, 504, 507-509,
 512-529
 Mikoyan visit to the U.S., 276-281
 moratorium proposals, 517, 938,
 943-945, 1073
 National Security Council Special
 Meetings, 420-425, 504-506
 occupation statute abolition proposal,
 113-114
 speech (*March 16, 1959*), 477, 491-492,
 599
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—continued
 summit meeting, 484-485, 493-495,
 636, 757-758, 835-836, 876,
 894-895, 987-988, 1001
 British position, 906, 1051, 1073
 conditions for, 1044-1045
 date, 517, 769-770
 Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting
 proposals and, 1076-1078
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting and, 518-519, 868-869
 Khrushchev correspondence,
 901-903, 913
 location, 726*n*, 767-768
 Macmillan correspondence,
 906-910, 1032, 1034-1035,
 1073-1075, 1090-1092,
 1098-1100
 Western forces in Berlin, 983, 1097*n*
 Western Four-Power working group,
 536-538
 Western Quadripartite Foreign
 Ministers Meeting (*December*
1958), 175, 192
 Western summit meeting proposals,
 910-911
- Eisenhower, Maj. John S.D., 134,
 172-177, 192*n*, 299-305, 305*n*, 419*n*,
 533-539, 1029*n*
 Congressional consultations, 428-437
 Eisenhower, Milton, 1059
 Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting
 proposals, 972-973, 976-977, 1027,
 1029-1033, 1045-1047, 1079
 British position, 1075, 1079-1080,
 1098-1099
 French position, 1079-1080
 Soviet position, 1068-1069, 1089
 summit meeting and, 1076-1078,
 1090-1092
- Elbrick, C. Burke, 7*n*, 52*n*, 53-54, 57*n*, 77
 Engle, Clair, 451-453
 Erhard, Ludwig, 609-610, 620, 933
 Etzel, Franz, 609-610, 618, 620, 849
 European Economic Community, 308
 European integration, 89, 308, 338-339,
 341, 375, 380, 657-658
 European security. *See* Central Europe
 forces limitation.

- Fedorov, 49
- Federal Republic of Germany. *See*
Germany, Federal Republic of.
- Fessenden, Russell H., 65*n*, 82*n*, 576*n*
- Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting
(*see also* Four-Power Foreign
Ministers Meeting proposals), 687,
691-694, 696-700
- adjournment proposals, 860-862,
864-865, 870, 1023, 1026-1027,
1056-1057
- Brandt position, 834, 852-853
- British position, 865, 935-938
- British-French talks, 612-613
- communiqué, 846-847, 926, 944-947,
964, 1010-1011, 1108, 1110-1116
- Congressional attendance, 637
- Congressional consultations, 430-431
- date, 313, 317, 321, 338, 349, 368
- French position, 312, 317-318, 331,
338, 353
- FRG position, 350
- Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting
proposals and, 1031
- first part:
- plenary sessions, 687, 691-694,
696-700, 704-705, 708-712,
724-725, 731-734, 739-741,
753-754, 761-763, 765-766,
789-791, 819-821, 850-851,
873-875, 884-888
- private sessions, 706-708, 742-743,
745-746, 748-749, 754-755,
771-788, 783, 792-797, 801-809,
823-833, 838-844, 854-858,
863-867, 901, 911-912, 921-926
- U.S. delegation meetings, 683-684,
700-702, 720-722, 736-737,
743-747, 763-765, 798-801,
813-816, 845-847, 869-871
- U.S.-Soviet discussions, 689-691,
694-696, 726-731, 755-757,
879-884, 891-892, 905-906,
929-930, 950-953
- Kozlov visit, 955-961, 965-967
- Western tactics (*see also* U.S.
delegation meetings *above*):
British position, 526, 541, 677
French position, 541, 651-655
- Four-Power Foreign Ministers
Meeting—continued
- first part—continued
- Western tactics—continued
- NATO discussions, 547, 549-551,
572-584, 649-650
- FRG position, 646, 1036-1039
- quadrupartite discussions,
553-573, 648, 661-673,
682-683, 685-686, 714-715,
747-751, 791-792, 801-802,
872-873, 897-900, 918,
927-929
- tripartite discussions, 546-553,
861-865, 872, 904
- U.S.-British discussions, 545-546,
892-893, 912-913, 930-932
- U.S. delegation meetings, 736-737
- U.S.-French discussions, 540-546,
615-618, 658-661, 895-896
- U.S.-FRG discussions, 655-658,
678-681, 917
- U.S. position, 526, 758-760,
768-769, 847-848, 858-861,
868-869
- Western Four-Power working
group report, 640-641
- working group report, 554-555
- format, 668-669, 684-686, 688
- French position, 653-654, 669, 862,
864-865, 898
- French-FRG talks, 676-677
- FRG participation, 669-670, 801-802,
871, 983
- FRG position, 644, 899-900
- GDR participation, 669-670, 688-689,
704, 983
- Hamarskjöld participation, 659
- high altitude flights and, 622, 836-837,
930, 934
- length, 544
- military representation, 659-660
- NSC discussion, 676, 738-739
- other countries participation, 469,
519, 523, 538, 573, 669-670,
691-694, 696-697, 701, 979-980
- British position, 550-551, 707-708,
742
- French position, 540-541, 563,
654-655, 661, 692-693

- Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting—continued
 other countries
 participation—continued
 U.S.-Soviet discussions, 694-696, 703
 publicity, 551, 554, 563, 571, 636-637, 669, 727, 768, 888-889
 British position, 554, 562, 662, 669
 Herter speech (*June 23, 1959*), 952, 960
 quadripartite discussions, 872-873, 994-995
 tripartite discussion, 551
 U.S. delegation meetings, 702, 721-722, 737, 746, 764, 800-801, 815, 1003, 1041
 quadripartite communiqué, 671-672
 recess proposals, 868-872, 876-877, 898-900, 925-926
 British position, 862, 892, 927
 second part:
 British-Soviet discussions, 1108
 plenary sessions, 982-983, 988-989, 996-998, 1017-1019, 1028-1029, 1041-1043
 private sessions, 1005-1006, 1015-1016, 1024-1025, 1049-1051, 1071-1073, 1080-1081, 1094-1095, 1102-1103, 1110-1113
 Soviet draft proposals, 1080-1081, 1083-1085, 1093-1094
 U.S. delegation meetings, 991-992, 1002-1003, 1039-1041
 U.S.-French discussions, 1020-1021
 U.S.-Soviet discussions, 1014-1015, 1086-1088, 1105-1107
 Western draft proposals, 996-997, 1004, 1037, 1080-1083, 1085-1086
 Western tactics:
 Brandt position, 974-975
 quadripartite discussions, 978-981, 985-986, 993-996, 1004, 1012-1013, 1047-1048, 1085-1086, 1089, 1096-1097
 tripartite discussions, 1078-1080
 U.S.-British discussions, 963-965, 1069-1071
 U.S.-FRG discussions, 1006-1007, 1100-1101
- Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting—continued
 second part—continued
 Western tactics—continued
 U.S. position, 962, 971-973, 998-999, 1007-1009, 1019-1020, 1022-1023
 Soviet draft proposals, 808, 810-812, 823-826, 872-874, 922-924, 927-928
 Soviet notes, 540-541, 550
 Soviet position, 684-686, 698, 925-926, 1057-1058, 1067
 Soviet representation, 378
 Soviet separate treaty and, 871
 Soviet tactics, 360-362, 595-599, 615-618, 675
 Spaak participation, 659
 summit meeting and, 339-340, 353, 355, 698
 British position, 519, 562, 642
 U.S. position, 467-468, 485, 518-519, 653, 675, 708, 718-719, 735, 757-760, 859-861, 868
 U.S.-British discussions, 713, 947-950
 U.S.-British-Soviet discussions, 702-703, 722-723
 U.S.-FRG discussions, 888-890
 Western draft proposals, 826-829, 840, 847-848, 857-858, 863, 872, 896, 904, 918, 924-925, 959, 974
 Western peace plan, 689-690, 734, 745, 791, 956-957
 British position, 711-712
 GDR position, 716-717
 Soviet position, 706-707, 711, 714-715, 717-718
- Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting proposals (*see also* Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting; Summit meeting; Western Four-Power working group):
 Ad Hoc working group position, 162
 agenda, 267, 362-363, 378-379, 468-469
 French position, 326-327, 331-332, 651
 FRG position, 309-310, 318-319, 340, 470
 British position, 226, 317, 321, 338, 349, 481

- Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting proposals—continued
 Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting proposal, 350-351
 free city proposal and, 175
 French position, 312, 465-466
 Geneva Conference proposals (1955) and, 318, 327-328, 332, 338, 340, 368-371, 651
 GDR access control and, 503
 FRG position, 287, 342, 355, 481
 NATO Ambassadors meeting discussion, 368
 Soviet note (*March 1959*), 408
 Soviet position, 235, 246, 390-391
 Soviet proposal (*January 10, 1959*), 246-248
 tripartite agreement, 357
 U.S. memorandum, 382
 U.S. position, 89-90, 116, 176, 185, 195, 226, 256-257, 298-299, 302, 304-306, 332, 349-350, 366, 514
 U.S.-Soviet discussion, 272
 Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*) communiqués and, 185, 195
- Four-Power Working Group. *See* Western Four-Power working group.
- France (*see also* Contingency planning; France, French, tripartite, quadripartite and Four-Power headings under other subjects), 635, 660-661, 680-681
- Frederika (Queen of Greece), 176-177
- Free city proposal (*see also* U.N. guarantee/observer proposals):
 access and, 150-152
 British position, 134-135, 159-160
 Defense Department position, 985
 East Berlin inclusion, 154-155, 249, 788
 French position, 138, 141-142, 174, 208
 FRG position, 174, 203, 209
 GDR position, 717
 German unification and, 208
- Free city proposal—continued
 Khrushchev-Humphrey talk, 149-150, 158-159, 162-163
 permanent commission, 237, 271, 810-811, 824
 Soviet draft protocol, 808, 810-812, 823-826, 882
 Soviet note (*November 27, 1958*) (*see also* Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*)), 133, 138, 141-142, 159-160, 174-175, 210-212
 NATO discussion, 186-188, 198
 U.S. response, 142-143, 145-147, 174, 176
 Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting and, 135-138, 146, 156, 172-173, 175
 Soviet position, 154-155, 275, 788-790, 881-882, 951, 960-961, 1060-1061
 U.S. position, 134, 166, 184, 424, 525, 859
- Freers, Edward L., 57*n*, 233*n*, 270*n*, 274*n*, 467*n*, 737, 897*n*, 921*n*, 927*n*
- Fulbright, J. William, 438, 637
- Gaitskell, Hugh, 436
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 308
- Geneva Summit Conference (1955), 16, 135, 257, 318, 327-328, 486-487, 519, 664
- German Democratic Republic (GDR) (*see also* German Democratic Republic access control; GDR headings under other subjects; Inter-German relations):
 East Berlin propaganda (*see also* Western propaganda under Berlin), 803-804, 812, 815-816, 822, 828-829, 846
 economic situation, 36-37, 139, 234, 273-274, 379
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 669-670, 688-689, 704, 716-717, 741
 international recognition, 420-421
 non-aggression pact proposals, 851, 905-906

- German Democratic Republic—continued
 political situation, 16-17, 58, 153, 234, 281, 360, 620
 rearmament, 762, 765
 recognition (*see also* GDR recognition under GDR access control), 14, 48-50, 57, 112-113, 163, 178, 245, 248, 509
 British position, 194, 331
 French position, 312, 466, 575, 613
 FRG position, 245, 308, 518, 524, 769
 Soviet position, 234, 459, 464, 595, 710
 Soviet Union, relations with, 389, 764
 Steinstuecken incident, 33-34, 39-40
 U.S. propaganda, 48*n*
- German Democratic Republic access control (*see also* Contingency planning):
 agency principle, 457-458, 586-587, 759
 British position, 82, 202, 206-207, 321, 518, 523-524
 French position, 326
 FRG position, 56, 70, 78, 105, 128, 137-139, 147, 206, 264
 U.S. position, 1-2, 11-14, 66, 71-72, 78, 93, 118-123, 140-141, 172, 175-178, 264, 326, 535
 air traffic controls, 1
 BASC personnel, 11-12, 76-77
 British memorandum, 82-83, 86-90, 97, 112, 114, 134
 FRG position, 96, 104
 British position, 82, 412, 674
 document stamping (*see also* agency principle *above*):
 British position, 202, 400, 422, 424, 442, 477
 French position, 329-330
 FRG position, 174, 422, 477, 498
 U.S. position, 50-51, 89, 172, 300-301, 303, 305-306, 338, 356, 400, 441-442, 472, 474, 493, 498, 501, 528, 969
 Dulles press conference, 122-129, 138-141
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting and, 503, 759
 free city proposal and, 133, 145
- German Democratic Republic access control—continued
 French position, 67-68, 83*n*, 106*n*, 141-142, 334
 GDR air corridor use, 148*n*
 GDR recognition and, 14, 48-50, 57, 77, 123-124
 British position, 82-83, 86-89, 104, 112
 French position, 87, 131
 FRG position, 78, 87-88, 104, 107, 178
 U.S. position, 88-90, 112-113, 118, 173, 292-293, 424, 442, 473-474
- FRG diplomatic relations breakoff, 96, 105
 FRG position, 55, 70-71, 76-77, 99, 103-104, 106-107, 353-354
 GDR visas, 50-51
 Khrushchev speech (*November 10, 1958*), 46-63, 68-69
 FRG position, 47-48, 52-56, 61, 76
 NATO position, 53-54, 67-68, 79-81, 84-85
 procedures, 82, 201, 586-587, 674
 Soviet occupation statute abolition proposal and, 95, 111
 Soviet separate treaty and, 421
 Summit meeting and, 503
 technical contact, 91, 106-107
 tripartite response, 61-65, 79, 89, 115-116, 161, 179, 185, 201-202, 377, 585-586, 640
 British position, 61, 63-64, 77
 French position, 64, 67-68, 77, 131-132
 FRG position, 53-56, 61, 104-105
 U.N. appeal and, 474, 503
 use of force and, 169, 223, 510-511
 U.S. assurances and, 50, 54, 61
 U.S. memorandum, 368, 383-384
 U.S. planning group discussions, 441-442, 474, 476-477
 U.S. position, 112, 275, 312-313, 320, 325-326, 337, 587
 U.S. response, 299-300
 Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*) discussions, 206-207
- German peace treaty (*see also* German unification; Summit meeting):
 British position, 560-561, 724-725

- German peace treaty—continued
 Dulles press conference, 124-125
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting discussion, 560-561, 572,
 598, 641, 666-667
 FRG position, 470, 560-561, 576, 727
 U.S. position, 468, 559-560, 637, 727
 French position, 560, 762
 FRG position, 246, 256-257, 277,
 307-309, 342, 666-667, 724, 820
 German unification and, 235, 277-278,
 380-381, 560
 Khrushchev speech (*November 10,*
1958) and, 89
 NATO discussions, 650
 Poland-Czechoslovakia frontier and,
 235
 Soviet position, 150, 235-236, 272, 277,
 598, 709-710, 715, 725, 732-733,
 1065
 Soviet proposal (*January 10, 1959*),
 246-248, 256-257, 267, 272,
 307-309, 371-372
 Soviet separate treaty, 248, 378, 382,
 391, 421, 542, 569, 675, 759,
 867-867, 871
 Soviet position, 776, 959
 U.S. position, 421, 493, 511, 959-960
 U.S. position, 535, 570
- German unification (*see also* Four-Power
 Foreign Ministers Meeting; German
 peace treaty):
 ABC weapons prohibition, 663-665
 access and, 102
 All-German Committee proposals (*see*
also Four-Power Commission
 proposals *below*), 170, 662, 1012,
 1042
 FRG position, 555-556, 559, 564,
 967, 1006-1007
 GDR position, 875, 1018
 Soviet position, 833, 866-867, 874,
 905, 936, 956, 988, 995,
 1005-1006, 1015, 1022
 All-German election proposals (*see*
plebiscite proposals below)
 Berlin and, 17
 British position, 170, 215-216, 319,
 321, 494, 513-514, 525, 672, 706,
 1042
 Canadian position, 213
- German unification—continued
 Central Europe forces limitation, 535,
 650, 758
 British position, 635, 646, 770
 French position, 557-558, 615
 confederation, 20, 268, 374-375, 511,
 524
 FRG position, 308, 494, 555-556,
 614, 679, 740
 GDR position, 716
 Soviet position, 235, 597, 710
 disarmament and:
 French position, 565, 572
 FRG position, 309-310, 583
 East-West study group, 524
 Eastern border, 125, 278-279, 654, 663,
 672, 679, 762
 election proposals (*see* plebiscite
 proposals *below*)
 European integration and, 308, 339
 Fechter-Meissner plan, 483
 force, use of, 118
 Four-Power Commission proposals
 (*see also* All-German Committee
 proposals *above*), 946, 999
 FRG position, 948, 967-968, 1004
 French position, 208, 332-333, 418,
 466, 590-591, 594, 614, 651-652,
 654, 665, 762
 FRG political situation and, 494
 FRG position, 17, 209, 245-246, 267,
 272-273, 318, 332, 513-514, 538,
 580-583, 614, 646, 663-664,
 1103-1104
 GDR recognition and, 89, 112-113,
 245, 466
 German peace treaty and, 235,
 277-278
 Grewe plan, 538, 556-557
 FRG position, 524, 556-557, 559
 Khrushchev speech (*November 10,*
1958) and, 57
 laender competency, 556, 559, 564
 mixed commission, 706
 FRG position, 563-564, 614, 728
 NATO participation, 213, 418, 594,
 951
 neutralization proposals, 89, 380, 543
 British position, 319, 460, 575
 French position, 592, 613, 654

- German unification—continued
 neutralization proposals—continued
 FRG position, 17-18, 577
 Soviet position, 17
 new capital proposals, 19-20
 phased plan, 378-379, 535, 538, 579,
 640, 662-663, 666-668, 951
 FRG position, 557, 559, 660
 plebiscite proposals:
 French position, 612-613
 FRG position, 257-258, 267-268, 421,
 564, 635, 679
 GDR position, 716
 phased plan and, 579
 Soviet position, 279, 833, 951, 1059
 U.S. position, 20, 166, 170, 175,
 257-258, 271, 280-281, 373-375,
 538, 707, 742-743, 957,
 1064-1065
 public opinion, 364, 373-374
 self-determination, 667
 Soviet position, 149-152, 272, 364-366,
 379, 391, 403-404, 410-411, 563,
 690, 706-707, 966, 1058-1059, 1066
 SPD plan, 581, 597, 657, 761, 1104
 transitional period, 379-380
 U.S.-FRG discussions, 15-17
 U.S. position, 165, 192, 328, 343,
 402-407, 489-490, 581-582, 1109
 Western European organizations and,
 17-18
 Western Quadripartite Foreign
 Ministers Meeting (*December*
 1958) communiqués, 185
- Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG)
(see also Berlin, U.S. assurances;
FRG headings under other subjects;
Inter-German relations; Four-Power
headings under other subjects)
 Berlin, relations with, 23, 39, 107-108
 Czechoslovakia, relations with,
 234-235, 278-279, 339, 1025-1026
 European integration participation,
 308, 380, 657-658
 NATO participation, 151, 234,
 308-309, 380, 404, 656-657, 663
 French position, 418, 613
 FRG position, 663
 Soviet position, 459
 Oder-Neisse line, 339, 654, 676
- Germany, Federal Republic of
 (FRG)—continued
 Poland, relations with, 234-235,
 278-279, 339, 1025-1026
 political situation, 38-39, 167, 169,
 494, 582, 933
 Adenauer presidency, 606-611,
 618-620, 644, 848-849, 853-854,
 877
 elections location, 744, 750-751, 852,
 854, 877-878, 889-891, 953, 982
 rearmament, 48, 57, 82, 94, 341, 531,
 744, 762
 GDR position, 765-766
 Soviet position, 153, 234, 279, 341,
 365, 748
 SPD visit to the Soviet Union, 852-853
 underdeveloped countries, aid to, 279
 United States, relations with, 15-23,
 394-395, 401-402
 West Berlin incorporation, 163,
 165-167, 189
 Western forces in (*see also Central*
Europe forces limitation), 57, 80,
 380, 517, 607, 613, 748
- Gerstenmaier, Eugene, 105, 195, 610,
 877, 889-890
- Gibson, William M., 684
- Gleason, S. Everett, 358-359, 624-634,
 738-739
- Globke, Hans, 608
- Gomulka, Wladislav, 57
- Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J.,
 498-499, 635-638, 766*n*, 971-973,
 976-977, 1030*n*, 1076*n*
- Gray, Gordon, 358, 421, 441*n*, 498*n*,
 983-984, 983-985
 contingency planning, 176, 304, 443,
 472, 601-606, 624-631
 National Security Council Special
 Meetings, 504-506, 624-628
- Greece, 176-177, 186, 214-215, 579
- Greene, Joseph N., Jr., 233*n*, 305*n*, 311*n*,
 337*n*, 348*n*, 354*n*, 354, 356*n*, 401*n*,
 411-412, 427, 486*n*, 512*n*
- Grewe, Wilhelm C. (*see also German*
unification, Grewe plan), 44-45, 76,
 80, 108, 189-190
 contingency planning, 77, 79-80, 109,
 369-370

- Grewe, Wilhelm C.—continued
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 257, 705, 724, 740-741,
 750, 813, 820, 851, 871, 887
 second part, 982, 994, 997, 1004,
 1006-1007, 1018, 1043, 1048
 GDR access control, 52-54, 61, 76-80,
 106-107
 GDR recognition, 76, 78, 107, 245
 German unification, 245-246, 257-258,
 267-268, 524, 584, 740, 994
 Western Quadripartite Foreign
 Ministers Meeting (*December*
 1958), 106, 188-189, 196, 199
- Gromyko, Andrei Andreivich, 16, 480,
 763
 disarmament, 690-691, 713, 722-723
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting:
 British-Soviet discussions, 714-715
 first part:
 plenary sessions, 692-694,
 696-698, 709-711, 717-718,
 725, 732-734, 754, 761-763,
 789-790, 821, 850-851,
 873-875, 886-887
 private sessions, 706-708,
 742-743, 771-776, 778-783,
 785-788, 793-797, 804-809,
 824-825, 827-833, 838-844,
 855-857, 863-867, 901,
 911-912, 921-926
 format, 684-686
 opening statement, 697-698
 other countries participation,
 691-694, 696-697, 703, 742
 second part:
 British-Soviet discussions, 1108
 plenary sessions, 982-983, 988,
 997-998, 1018, 1028,
 1042-1043
 private sessions, 1005-1006, 1016,
 1024-1025, 1049-1051,
 1071-1073, 1094-1095,
 1102-1103, 1110-1113
 U.S.-Soviet discussions, 689-691,
 879-884, 905-906, 929-930,
 1014-1015, 1086-1088,
 1105-1107
 free city proposal, 133, 154-155,
 787-790
 German peace treaty, 246, 709-710
- Gromyko, Andrei
 Andreivich—continued
 German unification, 17, 690, 706-707,
 714, 988, 1005-1006
 summit meeting, 408, 770
 Grotewohl, Otto, 55, 57, 63, 68, 308
 Grubyakov, A.M., 995
 Gufler, Bernard, 32-33, 138-140, 220-222,
 444-445, 599-600, 814, 851-854,
 1036-1039, 1054-1056
- Hagerty, James C., 354-355
 Halleck, Charles, 429, 433, 435, 438
 Hallstein, Walter, 253
 Hamlett, Maj. Gen. Barksdale, 70, 92-93,
 223, 813-814, 856, 953-954,
 1054-1056
 access, 24, 30, 32-33, 69*n*, 73-74
 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 388-390, 541, 544,
 569, 636, 752-753
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 541, 659, 683, 764
 Hancock, Patrick F., 483, 529, 994-996
 Harriman, W. Averell, 746-747, 941-943,
 948, 953, 977
 Haskell, John, 127-128
 Hassel, von, 849
 Henderson, Loy, 876-878
 Herter, Christian A., 7-10, 401-402,
 553*n*, 656, 763, 767-768, 817-818,
 978, 1025-1026
 Berlin visit, 1003, 1014, 1053
 Central Europe forces limitation, 558,
 727-728, 770
 Congressional consultations, 429-430,
 437-438
 contingency planning, 476-477,
 499-502, 510, 541, 548-550
 force, use of, 179-180, 420, 424, 427,
 472, 498, 620, 626
 military planning, 545-547,
 626-629, 631-633
 high altitude flights, 475, 533-534,
 551-552, 622-623, 934
 International Court of Justice
 appeal, 474, 525, 765
 pacific counter-blockade, 413-417,
 476, 542
 preparedness measures, 443,
 472-473, 764, 969
 U.N. appeal, 420, 440, 446-448,
 472-473, 493, 542

Herter, Christian A.—continued
 contingency planning—continued
 U.S. draft message, 172, 177-180
 U.S. memorandum, 381-384,
 398-400
 U.S. planning group, 442-443,
 471-478
 contractual agreement proposals, 535,
 543, 567
 disarmament, 666, 713, 722-723
 Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting
 proposals, 972-973, 976-977
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 358-359, 637-638, 676
 adjournment proposals, 860-862,
 864-865, 870, 1023, 1026,
 1056-1057
 communiqué, 1010-1011, 1108
 first part:
 plenary sessions, 688, 691-694,
 696-700, 704-705, 708-712,
 716-718, 724-725, 731-734,
 739-741, 753-754, 761-763,
 765-766, 789-791, 819-821,
 850-851, 873-875, 884-888
 private sessions, 707, 742-743,
 745-746, 754-755, 771-773,
 777-784, 786-788, 793-797,
 803-805, 807, 809, 824-825,
 827-833, 838-841, 843-844,
 854-858, 863-864, 863-867,
 901, 911-912, 924-926
 U.S. delegation meetings,
 683-684, 700-702, 720-722,
 736-737, 743-747, 763-765,
 798-801, 813-816, 845-847,
 869-871
 U.S.-Soviet discussions, 689-691,
 694-696, 722-723, 879-884,
 892-893, 905-906, 929-930,
 955-961
 Western tactics, 574-580, 768-769,
 847-848, 858-861
 quadrupartite discussions, 648,
 661-673, 682-683, 685-686,
 714-715, 748-751, 791-792,
 872-873, 897-900, 918,
 927-929
 tripartite discussions, 861-865,
 872, 904
 U.S.-British discussions,
 892-893, 930-932

Herter, Christian A.—continued
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting—continued
 first part—continued
 Western tactics—continued
 U.S.-French discussions,
 658-661, 895-896
 U.S.-FRG discussions, 655-658,
 678-681, 917
 format, 669, 685-686, 688
 GDR participation, 688-689
 other countries participation, 519,
 550-551, 691-694
 Paris trip, 648, 652-655
 publicity, 554, 563, 636, 800-801,
 818-819
 second part:
 plenary sessions, 982-983,
 988-989, 996-998, 1017-1019,
 1028-1029, 1041-1043
 private sessions, 1005-1006,
 1015-1016, 1024-1025,
 1049-1051, 1071-1073,
 1080-1081, 1094-1095,
 1102-1103, 1112
 Soviet draft proposals,
 1083-1085, 1092-1093
 U.S.-British discussions, 947-950,
 963-965
 U.S. delegation meetings,
 1002-1003, 1039-1041
 U.S.-French discussions,
 1020-1021
 U.S.-Soviet discussions,
 1014-1015, 1086-1088,
 1105-1107
 Western draft proposals,
 1080-1083
 Western tactics:
 quadrupartite discussions,
 978-981, 985-986, 1004,
 1012-1013, 1085-1086,
 1089, 1096-1097
 tripartite discussions,
 1078-1080
 U.S.-British discussions,
 1069-1071
 U.S.-FRG discussions,
 1100-1101

- Herter, Christian A.—continued
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting—continued
 second part—continued
 Western tactics—continued
 U.S. position, 962, 971-973, 998-999, 1007-1008
 summit meeting and, 467-468
 free city proposal, 174-175
 FRG elections location, 751, 891
 GDR access control, 52, 57-62, 112-113, 473-474, 969
 GDR recognition, 112-113, 473-474, 769
 German peace treaty, 421, 493, 559-560, 569, 637, 959-960
 German unification, 113, 494, 535, 558, 580-583, 663, 770, 1109
 Grewe plan, 538, 557
 plebiscite proposals, 635, 707, 742-743
 Kozlov visit, 955-961, 963
 Macmillan visit to the U.S., 408-409, 438-439, 492-495
 moratorium proposals, 487, 935, 943-944
 Soviet occupation statute abolition proposal, 113-114
 speech (*June 23, 1959*), 952, 960
 summit meeting, 442, 521, 636, 770, 816, 898, 972-973, 987, 1044-1045
 British position, 1051-1053, 1069-1071
 date, 484, 769
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting and, 467-468, 653, 708, 860-861
 location, 725-726, 767
 Western note, 484-486, 519
 U.N. guarantee/observer proposals, 569, 636, 847
 Western forces in Berlin, 817, 827, 856, 1054-1056, 1096-1097
 Western Four-Power working group, 421-422, 534
 Western propaganda, 736, 803-804, 812, 815-816, 822
 Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*), 175, 184-185
 Western summit meeting proposals, 1020-1021
- Heuss, Theodor, 287-288, 852
- Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 138-140
- Hillenbrand, Martin J., 44n, 52n, 53n, 57n, 65n, 76n, 82n, 112n, 154n, 193n, 208n, 225n, 245n, 266n, 282n, 295n, 296n, 315n, 316n, 356n, 381n, 398n, 576n, 580n, 655n, 736, 747n, 801n, 947n, 963n, 993n, 1047n, 1109n
 access, 3-6, 27-30, 102-103
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 257, 815, 888-890
 Western Four-Power working group, 529, 613-614
 Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*), 224, 870-871
- Hitler, Adolf, 212, 344, 364
- Hodes, Gen. Henry I., 24-30, 42n, 43, 69n, 73n, 100, 221-222, 263, 384-385
- Hood, Viscount Samuel, 225-229, 231-232, 240-244, 242
- Hoover, J. Edgar, 768
- Houghton, Amory, 131-132, 141-142, 190-191, 286, 482-484, 651-652
- Hoyer Millar. *See* Miller, Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer.
- Humphrey, Hubert H., 139-140, 148-153, 158-159, 162-163
- Hungary, 16, 640
- Inter-German relations:
 economic relations (*see also* economic countermeasures *under* Contingency planning), 77, 99, 109, 123-124, 139
 French position, 333, 466
 FRG position, 17, 76, 107, 340-341, 582
 non-aggression pact proposals, 851, 905-906
 recognition, 518, 524
 Soviet position, 36-37
 U.S. position, 166, 339, 488-489
- International Court of Justice (ICJ), 185, 190, 462, 472, 474, 525, 765
- Iraq, 654
- Irwin, John N., II, 21n, 474, 476, 845
 contingency planning, 100-102, 229-232, 241-244, 242-244, 443, 477-478, 527-528, 552, 601-605
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 845, 870, 1003, 1040

- Italy, 130, 186, 209, 538, 647, 650, 712
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 550-551, 573, 577, 618, 661, 670, 979
- Jackling, R.W., 225, 227-228, 283-286
- James, Alan G., 683*n*, 700*n*, 720*n*, 736*n*, 798*n*
- Jandrey, Frederick W., 8*n*, 10*n*, 44*n*, 245*n*
- Jansen, 425-427
- Javits, Jacob K., 434
- Jebb, Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn, 319
- Johnson, Maj. Gen. Douglas V., 229-232, 243
- Johnson, Lyndon B., 140, 432, 434-436, 438, 453
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS):
 contingency planning, 40-42, 101*n*, 116-117, 454-459
 airlift, 100, 175, 423
 force, use of, 84-85, 119, 174-175, 269-270, 301-303, 454-455, 458-459, 476
 land demonstration, 99-101, 116-117, 259-265
 military planning, 601-602, 604-605, 625
 high altitude flights, 836-837
 preparedness measures, 244*n*, 301, 384, 423, 442, 454-455, 458, 473, 476, 499
 corridor proposal, 1035-1036
 GDR access control, 115-116
 Western forces in Berlin, 970-971
- Joxe, Louis, 615-618, 660
- Jurgensen, Jean, 67, 418
- Kennan, George, 146, 340
- Kharlamov, M.A., 1003-1004
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. (*see also* Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting proposals), 16, 166, 210, 645, 752-753, 852-853, 941-942, 1001
 Budapest statement, 859, 862, 868
 East Berlin visit, 220-221
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 950-953
 free city proposal, 134-135, 149-150, 1060-1061
 FRG rearmament, 82
 German unification, 1058-1059
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.—continued
 Harriman visit, 941-943
 Humphrey talk, 148-153, 158-159, 162-163
 Macmillan visit, 385-387, 396-398, 459
 Nixon visit, 1057-1069
 speech (*November 10, 1958*), 46-63, 248
 speech (*February 24, 1959*), 387*n*, 390-391, 393-394
 summit meeting, 387*n*, 390-391, 464, 480, 868, 901, 913-917
 Western forces in Berlin, 153, 763-764, 952
- Klein, David, 337*n*, 348*n*
- Klein, Guenther, 144, 845, 889, 1037
- Knight, Robert H., 1008*n*
- Kohler, Foy D., 65*n*, 68*n*, 82*n*, 112*n*, 154*n*, 177*n*, 225*n*, 240*n*, 249*n*, 282*n*, 295*n*, 356*n*, 381*n*, 467*n*, 484*n*, 673*n*, 877*n*, 1008*n*, 1019*n*, 1057*n*
 contingency planning, 101*n*, 226-227, 229-232, 241, 243-244, 284, 969
 corridor proposal, 1035-1036
 GDR access control, 264, 969
 Harriman visit to the Soviet Union, 948
 Mikoyan visit to the U.S., 285-286
- Koht, Paul, 369-370
- Kosygin, Alexei, 391
- Kotsiuba, Col., 3-6
- Kozlov, Frol R., 955-961, 963, 965-967
- Krag, Jens Otto, 213, 578
- Krebs, Max V., 962*n*
- Kretzmann, Edwin M.J., 57*n*
- Kroeger, Herbert, 23
- Kroll, Hans, 47-48, 62, 155*n*
- Krone, Heinrich, 608
- Kuznetsov, V.V., 986
- Laloy, Jean, 67, 418, 529, 995
- Lampson, Edward T., 106*n*, 108, 283*n*, 553*n*, 1035*n*
- Lange, Halvard, 216, 578-579
- LeMay, Gen. Curtis, 101
- Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 21-22, 101-102
- Lewis, Geoffrey W., 838*n*, 850*n*, 982*n*
- Lipschitz, Joachim, 600, 846
- Lisle, Raymond E., 7*n*, 8*n*, 10*n*, 18*n*, 21*n*, 22*n*

- Lloyd, Selwyn, 459-460, 525, 527,
567-568, 817-818
contingency planning, 87, 319, 496,
525, 528, 548-550, 932
force, use of, 201, 292*n*, 293, 320,
545-548
high altitude flights, 551-553,
622-624
disarmament, 565-566, 713, 722-723
Dulles trip to Europe, 314, 317-320
Four-Power Foreign Ministers
Meeting:
first part:
plenary sessions, 688, 693,
698-699, 704, 711-712,
724-725, 732, 740, 754, 762,
790, 821, 850, 874-875, 885,
887-888
private sessions, 706-708, 771,
777-780, 783, 785-786, 788,
795-797, 807-809, 823-824,
829-832, 841-844, 867
Western tactics, 572, 661-670,
672, 682-683, 714-715,
748-749, 861-863, 865, 873,
892-893, 897-899, 918,
927-928, 930-932
format, 685
NATO report, 574-575
opening statement, 698-699
other countries participation,
550-551, 670, 693, 707-708, 742
publicity, 551, 554, 563, 669
recess proposals, 925
second part:
British-Soviet discussions, 1108
plenary sessions, 989, 997,
1017-1018, 1029, 1042-1043
private sessions, 1015-1016,
1072-1073, 1110, 1113
Western tactics, 979-980, 1004,
1012-1013, 1069-1071
free city proposal, 823-824
GDR access control, 86-88, 202,
206-207, 969
German peace treaty, 560-561
German unification, 215-216, 318, 460,
672, 706
resignation rumors, 812, 816, 822, 835
speech (*July 20, 1959*), 1049-1050
- Lloyd, Selwyn—continued
summit meeting, 816, 898, 1051-1052,
1069-1071, 1079
U.N. guarantee/observer proposals,
319, 569
Western forces in Berlin, 817, 1096
Western Quadripartite Foreign
Ministers Meeting (*December
1958*), 202, 204-207, 215-216
Western summit meeting proposals,
931
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 393-394, 734
U.N. appeal, 376-377, 388-390, 406*n*,
420, 440, 462-465, 490-491,
502-503
Loram, Matthew J., 311*n*, 367*n*
Lucet, Charles, 697, 1048
Luns, Joseph M.A.H., 215, 579
Lyon, Cecil B., 67-68, 417-419, 425-427
- Macmillan, Harold, 114, 612, 645, 1075
Central Europe forces limitation,
321-322, 324, 526-527
contingency planning, 102, 264, 321,
424, 460-461, 516, 521, 528-529,
641-643
Dulles trip to Europe, 314, 321-324
Four-Power Foreign Ministers
Meeting, 338, 349, 519, 526, 642,
892, 912-913, 935-938
France, visit to, 459-461, 516
GDR access control, 134, 321, 518,
523-524, 528
Germany, Federal Republic of, visit
to, 478-482, 484, 516-517, 530-531
moratorium proposals, 936-940,
1073-1074
Soviet Union, visit to, 292*n*, 314, 322,
324, 326, 340, 385-387, 390,
392-393, 410
communiqué, 411-412, 724
FRG position, 336, 478-482, 606
NATO discussion, 396-398
summit meeting, 460, 480, 494,
519-521, 642, 761, 1051-1052,
1069-1070, 1074-1075
Eisenhower correspondence,
906-910, 1032, 1034-1035,
1073-1075, 1090-1092,
1098-1100

- Macmillan, Harold—continued
 U.S. visit, 408-409, 421, 424, 438-439,
 476, 492-495, 504, 507-509,
 512-529
- Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich, 729-731,
 736, 794, 995-996
- Mansfield, Mike, 369, 390
- Markushin, Lt. Col. M.F., 27-30, 31*n*,
 311
- McBride, Robert H., 218*n*, 540*n*
- McCloy, John J., 164-168, 990, 1002
- McCone, John A., 538, 972
- McCormack, John W., 537
- McElroy, Neil, 80-81, 423, 432, 434-435,
 779-780, 970, 1009
 contingency planning, 304, 442-444,
 475, 500-502, 934
 force, use of, 81, 85, 102, 195,
 269-270, 434, 478, 498-499,
 602-603, 628, 630
 preparedness measures, 301, 443,
 473, 499, 764
- Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 638, 721, 744, 779-780,
 798
 GDR access control, 303, 441-442, 474
- McFarland, James H., 65*n*, 177*n*, 282*n*,
 546*n*, 570*n*
- McKiernan, Thomas D., 7*n*, 22*n*, 57*n*,
 82*n*, 229*n*, 240*n*, 249*n*, 295*n*, 356*n*,
 381*n*, 398*n*, 673*n*
- McSweeney, John M., 467*n*
- Menshikov, Mikhail A., 1027
- Merchant, Livingston T., 164, 177*n*,
 266*n*, 295*n*, 296*n*, 322, 345*n*, 356*n*,
 373, 401*n*, 402*n*, 408*n*, 446*n*, 467*n*,
 488*n*, 516*n*, 518*n*, 520*n*, 522*n*, 526*n*,
 527*n*, 537, 543, 574*n*, 685*n*, 689*n*,
 714*n*, 718*n*, 801*n*, 802, 803*n*, 839*n*,
 856*n*, 879*n*, 905*n*, 917*n*, 918*n*, 978*n*,
 980*n*, 1021, 1044*n*, 1047*n*
 access, 108, 536
 contingency planning, 107-109, 194,
 442-443, 475, 746
 force, use of, 174, 225-228, 226, 546,
 604-605
 Dulles trip to Europe, 314, 336,
 358-359
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 256-257, 637-638,
 694-696, 729-731, 758-760, 844,
 870, 1081
- Merchant, Livingston T.—continued
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting—continued
 proposals, 176, 226, 350, 368-371
 second part, 991-994, 1002,
 1006-1007, 1040
 U.S. delegation meetings, 684, 720,
 736, 763, 799-800, 813, 845-847,
 870-871, 991-992, 1002, 1040
 Western tactics, 928, 993-994,
 1006-1007
 GDR access control, 106-107, 128, 175,
 474, 477
 German unification, 257-258, 494
 Kozlov visit, 965-967
 NATO Ambassadors meeting,
 367-371
 summit meeting, 495, 523, 759-760
 U.N. guarantee/observer proposals,
 189-190
 Western Quadripartite Foreign
 Ministers Meeting (*December*
1958), 106, 188-189, 197-200, 202
- Mikoyan, Anastas I., 154-155, 235-236,
 363-364, 379, 391, 752, 1066
 U.S., visit to, 221, 233-239, 254-256,
 266, 268-281, 285-286, 296-297
- Moch, Jules, 592
- Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, 17,
 210-211, 318
- Mountbatten, Adm. Louis, 262
- Moratorium proposals:
 British position, 487, 530-531, 937-940,
 948, 1073-1074
 FRG position, 480, 482
 Soviet position, 936-937
 U.S. position, 517, 720*n*, 759-760,
 943-945, 948-949, 964, 984-985,
 1009
- Morgan, George A., 158-159, 413*n*,
 414-417
- Morris, Brewster H., 819*n*
- Murphy, Robert D., 7*n*, 10*n*, 99, 102,
 177*n*, 282*n*, 296*n*, 356*n*, 381*n*, 398*n*,
 446*n*, 524, 543, 673*n*, 835*n*, 848,
 1008*n*, 1019*n*, 1035*n*
 Central Europe forces limitation,
 542-543
 contingency planning, 103, 443, 475,
 478, 542, 548
 airlift, 128, 244-245, 251-252, 261,
 284, 304, 399, 442

- Murphy, Robert D.—continued
 contingency planning—continued
 force, use of, 99-101, 240-244,
 250-251, 259-265, 262, 399, 477,
 545, 601-605, 630
 Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting
 proposals, 1030-1033
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 551, 615-618
 GDR access control, 99, 400, 442, 474,
 477, 493, 528
 summit meeting, 894-895
- National Security Council (NSC):
 Actions:
 2048, 359
 contingency planning, 1000-1001
 Documents:
 NSC 5604, 41
 NSC 5803, 36-40, 81
 Dulles trip to Europe, 358-359
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 676, 738-739
 Meetings:
 396th (February 12, 1959), 358-359
 407th (May 21, 1959), 738-739
 413th (July 16, 1959) 1000-1001
 Special Meetings, 419-425, 441,
 504-506, 624-634
- Netherlands, 81, 215, 551, 579, 650, 661
 Neumann, Franz, 38-39
 New York agreement (1949), 11
 Nixon, Richard M., 129n, 175, 239n, 422,
 424, 519, 633
 Congressional consultations, 422-423,
 431, 434-436
 Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting
 proposals, 1030, 1068-1069
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 175, 638, 739
 Soviet Union visit, 965, 1023,
 1029-1030, 1040, 1057-1069
- Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., 574n
 Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 115-116, 195,
 316-317, 845, 856
 contingency planning, 84-85, 100,
 116-117, 230, 243, 263, 315-316,
 423, 495-497, 499
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 (NATO), 164, 166, 347-348, 350,
 367-371, 517, 550
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 (NATO)—continued
 communiqué (1957), 197-200
 communiqué (1958), 187, 216-217,
 222, 265
 contingency planning, 64, 66, 79-80,
 102, 129-131, 229, 231, 242, 567
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 547, 549-551, 572-584
 French role in, 593-594
 FRG participation, 151, 234, 308-309,
 380, 613, 663
 GDR access control, 53-54, 67-68,
 79-81, 84-85
 guarantees, 203, 567
 Ministerial meeting (April 2-4, 1959),
 540-546
 unified Germany participation, 213,
 418, 594, 951
 Western Quadripartite Foreign
 Ministers Meeting (December
 1958) and, 186-188, 208-217
 Norway, 130, 216, 490, 578-579, 649
 Nunley, William T., 446n
- Ollenhauer, Erich, 169, 852-853
 Operations Coordinating Board (OCB),
 36-40
 Organization for European Economic
 Cooperation (OEEC), 308
 Ormsby Gore, William David, 323
- Paris agreement (1949), 11, 37, 195, 211,
 263, 353, 536, 842
 Pauls, Rolf, 52n
 Pearkes, George R., 577-578
 Pella, Giuseppe, 577, 712, 979
 Persons, Maj. Gen. Wilton B., 421
 Pervukhin, Mikhail Georgievich, 55, 105
 Poland, 16, 82, 125
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting participation, 469, 519,
 538, 550-551, 563, 661, 669-670,
 691-696, 701, 707-708
 Germany, Federal Republic of,
 relations with, 234-235, 278-279,
 654, 1025-1026
- Potsdam Agreement, 46, 54, 59, 76, 125,
 149

- Quarles, Donald, 176, 177*n*, 527-528, 536-537, 721
 contingency planning, 40, 161-162, 302, 443, 473, 475, 478, 534
 force, use of, 472, 476, 603, 606, 632-633
 GDR access control, 300, 442, 474, 477
- Raab, Julius, 151
- Rapacki Plan. *See under* Central Europe forces limitation.
- Rayburn, Sam, 430-431, 434-436, 438
- Reilly, Sir Patrick, 986, 995
- Reinhardt, George F., 208*n*, 263, 476, 524*n*, 527*n*, 700, 718*n*, 737, 801, 816, 980*n*, 993*n*, 1044*n*
- Reinstein, Jacques J., 7*n*, 10*n*
- Roberts, Sir Frank, 496
- Rogers, William P., 628
- Rumania, 550, 661
- Rumbold, Sir Anthony, 523, 528, 720
- Safronov, Col., 5
- Sandys, Duncan, 816
- Schuyler, Gen. Cortlandt Van Rennselaer, 223
- Scranton, W.W., 1110*n*
- Segni, Antonio, 647, 712
- Senate, U.S., 265, 373
- Seydoux, François, 156-157
- Shirlov, Maj. A.S., 74-75
- Sisco, Joseph J., 446*n*
- Smirnov, Andrei Andreevich, 93-94, 99, 103, 104*n*, 110, 129-130
- Smith, Sidney E., 213
- Smith, Gerard C., 158, 441*n*, 446*n*, 498*n*, 510-512, 718*n*, 744, 847
 contingency planning, 195, 478, 510-511, 764
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 800, 813-814, 847, 870, 1040
- Sobolev, Arkady A., 393-394
- Soldatov, Aleksandr Andreevich, 694-696, 730-731, 755-757, 1080-1081
- Soviet Union (*see also* Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting proposals; *Soviet and Soviet Union headings under other subjects; specific topics*):
 economic situation, 151, 168
 German Democratic Republic, relations with, 389
 political situation, 16
- Soviet Union—continued
- United Kingdom, relations with, 645-647
 Macmillan visit, 292*n*, 314, 322, 324, 326, 340, 385-387, 390, 392-393, 396-398, 410
 communiqué, 411-412, 724
 FRG position, 336, 478-482, 606
 United States, relations with (*see also* Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting proposals):
 Harriman visit, 941-943, 948
 Kozlov visit, 955-961, 963, 965-967
 Mikoyan visit to the U.S., 221, 233-239, 270-281, 285-286, 296-297
 FRG position, 254-256, 266, 268-269
 Nixon visit, 965, 1023, 1029-1030, 1040, 1057-1069
 student exchange, 767-768
 trade relations, 167-168
 U.S. bilateral talk proposals, 406, 411, 620
- Spaak, Paul-Henri, 45, 129-131, 186-188, 193, 396-398, 397-398, 463
 Dulles trip to Europe, 314, 335, 337
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting, 579-580, 649-650, 659
 Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*), 197-199, 202, 216
- Stassen, Harold, 239*n*, 342
- Steel, Christopher, 135, 156-157, 202, 336, 482, 530, 674
- Stikker, Dirk U., 81
- Stilson, Marian S., 437*n*
- Stimpson, Harry F., Jr., 1020*n*
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 224, 1020*n*
- Strauss, Franz Josef, 254, 278-279, 364, 619-620
- Sullivan, Charles A., 764
- Summit meeting (*see also* Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting proposals; Four-power Foreign Minister conference proposals):
 agenda, 760
 British position, 117*n*, 460, 480, 494, 519-521, 575, 816, 862, 892-893, 898-899, 906-908, 1051-1053, 1069-1071, 1074-1075, 1097-1098


- Summit meeting—continued
 conditions for, 1044-1047
 contingency planning and, 984, 1001
 date, 484, 513-514, 517, 769-770
 British position, 461, 480, 516-517, 973
 French position, 461
 FRG position, 470, 516-517
 Dulles illness and, 480
 Dulles press conference, 124-125
 Eisenhower—de Gaulle meeting and, 973
 Eisenhower—Khrushchev
 correspondence, 901-903, 905, 913-917, 919-921
 Eisenhower—Khrushchev meeting
 proposals and, 1076-1078, 1090-1092
 Eisenhower—Macmillan
 correspondence, 906-910, 1032, 1034-1035, 1073-1075, 1090-1092, 1098-1100
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting and, 339-340, 353, 355
 British position, 519, 562, 642, 949, 1057
 Soviet position, 698
 U.S. position, 467-468, 485, 518-519, 653, 675, 708, 718-719, 735, 987-988
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting discussion, 757-760, 860-861, 868, 882, 886, 893
 French position, 137, 461, 480, 542, 590, 725-726, 896
 GDR access control and, 87, 97, 503
 FRG participation, 494-495
 FRG position, 287, 480-482, 530-531, 644, 990
 Hammarskjöld position, 752
 informal conversations proposal, 892-895, 909
 Khrushchev speech (*November 1958*), 47, 57
 Khrushchev speech (*February 1959*), 387*n*, 390-391
 Khrushchev visit to the U.S. and, 973
 length, 544
 location, 405-406, 481-482, 519, 638, 725-726, 767-768
 Macmillan—Eisenhower discussions, 507-508, 513
- Summit meeting—continued
 moratorium proposals and, 480, 482, 517, 720*n*, 759-760
 British position, 487, 530-531
 nuclear testing negotiations and, 758
 other countries participation, 770
 Soviet note (*March 1959*), 408
 Soviet position, 464, 480, 620, 761, 868, 881, 886
 stages proposal, 480, 493, 530-531, 761
 British position, 410, 761
 U.N. role in, 440, 442, 447, 636
 U.S. position, 98, 143, 405-406, 410-411, 486-488, 507, 757-758, 835-836, 876, 882, 898-899, 908-910, 972, 1076-1079
 Western note (*see also* Western Four-Power working group), 483-486, 518-523, 522-523, 529, 532-533
 British position, 522-523
 French position, 485
 FRG position, 470
 Sutulov, 221-222
- Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 21-22, 174-176, 175, 177*n*, 262-264, 449-453
 Thayer, Charles, 941*n*
 Thompson, Llewellyn E., 14, 16, 96, 276*n*, 380, 745, 763, 792*n*, 823*n*, 838*n*
 contingency planning, 97-98, 163
 Four-Power Foreign Ministers
 Meeting, 378-381, 390-391, 595-599, 638, 675, 718-719, 736, 755-757, 928, 950-953
 U.S. delegation meetings, 799, 813-814, 870
 free city proposal, 154-155
 GDR access control, 47-48, 62-63, 96-97
 German peace treaty, 378, 380-381, 928
 German unification, 379-381
 Harriman visit to the Soviet Union, 941-943
 Khrushchev—Humphrey talk, 149-153, 162-163
 Nixon visit to the Soviet Union, 1062-1065
 summit meeting, 97-98, 390-391, 410-411, 675
 Thurston, Raymond L., 164, 316

- Timmons, Benson E.L., III, 57n, 574n
 Toon, Malcolm, 1110n
 Topping, 220-222
 Trimble, William C., 63-65, 75, 83n, 93-96
 Truman-Stalin letters, 11
 Tsarapkin, Semyon K., 745
 Turkey, 216, 579
 Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 115
 contingency planning, 40-42, 100, 103, 424, 475, 498, 533-534
 force, use of, 99, 101, 195, 265, 302, 423, 454-455, 477
 general war, 303, 455, 476
 land demonstration, 260, 262-265, 301
 military planning, 601-604, 625, 627, 629-630
 preparedness measures, 301, 423, 442, 454-455, 473, 477-478, 495, 499
 Tyler, William R., 197n, 621n, 726n, 731n
- Ulbricht, Walter, 16, 139, 308-309, 360, 620, 737, 820, 851, 958
- U.N. guarantee/observer proposals (*see also* Contingency planning, U.N. appeal; Free city proposal), 388, 463, 564, 631, 640, 847
 British position, 319, 463, 518, 524, 568-569, 612, 991
 contractual agreement proposals and, 518, 524, 580
 French position, 612, 614
 FRG position, 189-190, 646
 propaganda, 964, 998-999
 Soviet position, 149-150, 775, 784
 summit meeting, 440, 442, 447, 636
 U.S. position, 646, 985
- Underdeveloped countries, aid to, 279, 652-653, 760
- United Kingdom (*see also* British, U.S.-British, tripartite and quadripartite and four-power headings under other subjects; Contingency planning; Macmillan, Harold), 438, 487, 645-647
- United Nations (*see also* U.N. guarantee/observer proposals), 901
 Berlin headquarters proposal, 419, 463
 Urguplu, Ali S.H., 369
- U.S. change of administration, 271
 U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 626
 U.S.-Soviet bilateral talk proposals (*see also* Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting proposals), 406, 411, 620
- van Scherpenberg, Albert H., 144, 198, 317, 319-320, 394-395
- Vigderman, Alfred G., 108, 112n, 188n, 255n, 257n, 467n, 561n, 619n, 673n, 877n, 1035n
- Wellington, Rebecca, 128, 223
- West Berlin. *See* Berlin; *specific topics*.
- Western Four-Power working group (*see also* Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting; Summit meeting), 371-372, 482-484, 506, 529, 613-614, 638-639
 British position, 257, 267, 317, 321, 470-471, 482-483
 efficacy of, 534, 536-539
 French position, 257, 267, 333, 483
 FRG position, 256, 267, 348-349, 470-471, 644-645
 Minute, 571-572
 NATO discussions, 350, 368-369
 report, 639-641
 U.S. position, 257, 298-299, 327, 339, 350, 421-422
- Western Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting (*December 1958*), 135-138, 143, 200-207, 220
 agenda, 146, 172-173
 Brandt participation, 145, 157
 British position, 156-157, 187
 communiqués, 186-188, 202-203, 218-219, 224
 British position, 194, 202, 204-207
 French position, 186-187, 190-191, 204-206, 208-209
 FRG position, 180-183, 186, 192-193, 196, 202, 205, 209
 meetings, 196, 204-210, 213-216
 Soviet position, 236-237
 U.S. position, 175-176, 184-185, 192-196, 204-206
 French position, 137
 FRG position, 104, 106, 136-137, 156, 180-183, 188-189
 location, 135, 138, 173
 NATO discussion, 208-217


- Western summit meeting proposals,
910-911, 931
British position, 931, 1075, 1099
French position, 1020-1021
White, Gen. Thomas D., 260-261
White, Lincoln, 46, 65*n*
Whitman, Ann C., 822
Whitney, John Hay, 49, 86-88, 134-135,
159-160, 459-461, 613-614, 1097-1098
contingency planning, 87, 146*n*,
622-624, 641-643
Four-Power Foreign Ministers
Meeting, 612-613, 642, 912-913
Wigny, Pierre, 214, 578
Wilcox, Francis O., 474-475, 706*n*, 721,
734-735, 764, 847, 871
Wilkinson, P.A., 35
Winzer, Otto, 248
Wollweber, 16-17
Working Group. *See* Western
Four-Power working group.
Yugoslavia, 661
Zakharov, Maj. Gen. Nikolai F., 24-30,
32-33, 73*n*, 221
Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich, 17,
912, 1112
Zorlu, Fatin Rustu, 216, 579












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